The Western Wall Compromise and the Conversion Law: Another Look at Normative Duality (Column 80)
With God's help
In recent days the government has made two decisions that have aroused great anger in Israel and around the world: it canceled the Western Wall compromise (whose purpose was to allow reasonable prayer arrangements for people who want non-Orthodox standards, such as those who do not want separation between women and men, or women who want to don tefillin or wrap themselves in a prayer shawl), which it itself had adopted, and the conversion law, which gives the Chief Rabbinate a monopoly in this area.
These decisions have aroused great anger in Israel and around the world. Jewish organizations around the world turned to the prime minister and even canceled meetings with him. Some donors withdrew their contributions to Israel, and the subtler effects (the alienation of Jews and communities around the world from Israel and from Judaism) are, naturally, not really known to us. Many argue that this is a foolish, immoral decision, and strategically irrational as well. These are groups to whom we turn for political help (in influencing the American administration) and economic help (donations), and now we ourselves are kicking them in the face. At present, at least the conversion law is frozen (it was sent to committee) because of the criticism. We have now been informed that the Western Wall compromise too is already beginning to show signs of folding. Standing up to pressure was never Netanyahu's strong suit.
There is quite a bit to discuss regarding these two laws and the storms they have provoked (most of which, as usual in our neck of the woods, did not reflect discourse of a very high level), but here I want chiefly to focus on one central point that arose in the debate and has much broader principled implications.
A Jewish State
Almost all the critics raised the claim that the State of Israel has here handed the Jewish people a bill of divorce, and in effect undermined the idea that Israel is the state of the Jewish people. Their claim is that, as the state of the Jewish people, it should have taken into account all the religious streams in Judaism, especially important streams with many adherents, such as Reform and Conservative Judaism. Those defending the government's decisions counter that anyone who is not an Israeli citizen has no right to intervene in the state's internal affairs and influence its decisions. Let Reform Jews respect that and immigrate to Israel, and when there is a sufficient number of them here they will be able to demand and influence matters like any other citizen.
It is worth noting that the new conversion law mainly (and perhaps only) disqualifies Orthodox conversions (those performed by private rabbinical courts), since other conversions were not recognized in any case. The claim is that in reality this law does not materially change the openly discriminatory situation that preceded it, and therefore it does not concern the state's attitude toward other Jewish streams but at most further sharpens the existing situation. In contrast, the cancellation of the Western Wall compromise does indeed harm Reform Jews and other groups. True, here too the claim is raised that they already have the option of praying in a plaza allocated for that purpose (those in the know say it is generally empty today), but the critics argue that this plaza is not really convenient or accessible, especially since it is under the control of the rabbi of the Western Wall, who restricts them. Be that as it may, this decision is indeed relevant to the plane of relations between Israel and world Jewry.
Whether the State of Israel wants to be the state of the Jewish people is the affair of the state and its citizens, and theirs alone. On this the defenders are right. The state has every right to decide that it does not want to be the state of the Jewish people, and of course the other groups may make their decisions accordingly. One can debate the wisdom of such a policy, as well as the conception it reflects or its fidelity to the Zionist legacy, but there does not seem to be a moral issue here.[1] This is a tactical and Jewish-national issue. But there is another argument, one with clear moral significance, and for some reason it does not arise in the discussion at all, and I do not understand why.
Freedom of Religion
The State of Israel, as a democratic state, is committed to freedom of religion. Within that framework, we are required—and require of ourselves—to allow freedom of worship to Muslims and Christians in places sacred to them and in their houses of worship that are under our control, and also to care for and maintain those places. A democratic state is obligated to care for places under its responsibility that are assets of universal value or assets dear to other publics around the world, and to allow reasonable use of them to all who wish. It is no accident that the world is outraged when historical and religious sites of significance are harmed, and does not see this as a state's prerogative over its property and its territory.
As an aside, it hardly needs saying that with us there are exceptions to this rule, and they are, of course, the Jews. This is the only public whose freedom of worship is systematically violated by the authorities in our state. They are not given the freedom to pray on the Temple Mount, and no one safeguards their interests there. The Temple Mount was handed over to the full control of the Waqf, which does there as it pleases, destroys and builds, runs riot, and takes over with almost no interference. Jews are forbidden to pray on the Temple Mount; at most they may trudge silently and humiliated in an embarrassing procession through a very narrowly defined area of the mount, without moving their lips, heaven forbid—otherwise the Waqf and the police intervene immediately.
Back to the Western Wall Compromise
My claim is that the demand to allow Reform Jews and others to pray at the Wall according to their own understanding and faith should not be presented under the heading of the state's Jewishness, but under the heading of its democratic character and its commitment to freedom of worship. If we care for Muslims at the Cave of the Patriarchs and on the Temple Mount, or for Christians in their holy places, why is there no similar obligation upon us to protect the rights of Reform Jews at the Wall? Are they not entitled to freedom of worship? Do they not have religious rights in a place that is sacred to them?
This is a completely different argument from the one about the state being the nation-state of the Jewish people. Even if the state had not declared itself the state of the Jewish people but had become Christian or Buddhist, or simply estranged itself from Judaism, it would still have had to allow Jews freedom of worship in the holy places under its responsibility because of its commitment to freedom of religion and worship, and this of course includes the Western Wall. Like it or not, unfortunately, it is under our sovereignty (we have still not managed to get rid of it despite our efforts), and it is regarded as a precious and sacred asset by other communities as well, who want to pray there. The responsibility to care for it therefore falls on us.
Surrender to Fundamentalism
So what is really the problem? The state systematically prefers surrender to fundamentalism on all fronts. On the Temple Mount, Jews are not given freedom of worship because Muslim fundamentalism threatens riots (and carries them out as well). A few stones and knives, and threats of jihad over harm to al-Aqsa and Muhammad's steed, do the trick. At the Wall, non-Orthodox Jews are not given reasonable prayer arrangements because Jewish fundamentalism threatens riots (and carries them out as well).
It is worth remembering that the fact that Jews cannot ascend the Temple Mount is the result of a Jewish rabbinic interest, and not only of Muslim fundamentalism. After all, it all began after the conquest of eastern Jerusalem in the Six-Day War. At that time there was full rabbinic consensus that ascending the mount was forbidden, and therefore the religious leadership was happy for the mount to be given to the Muslims. That spared it nagging and headaches in fighting halakhic lawbreaking (such as Jews ascending the mount without immersion) and in contending with the rules of democracy and freedom of worship. It was convenient for them that the government surrender to the Muslims and do their dirty work for them, or pull the chestnuts out of the fire on their behalf. To this day, that is still the position of most of the rabbinic leadership that opposes ascending the mount. To the best of my understanding, this is part of the reason the issue does not provoke great uproar and there is no strong political pressure on the government to change this scandalous state of affairs (which today is already much harder to change). Even when there is pressure, it usually comes from public figures (mostly nationalist secularists), and much less from rabbis. Just as on the Temple Mount they fear riots by Muslims, so at the Wall they fear riots by Jews. The government and the police want quiet, and so fundamentalism always wins.
The conclusion is that in the state of the Jews, thugs and fundamentalists generally win, and Reform Jews would do well to understand the message. If they begin rioting, pulling donations, and boycotting the State of Israel, they will win. If they continue to come in the name of justice, morality, Judaism, and democracy, they have no chance. Nobody here cares about that. A few stabbings with kitchen knives, some stone-throwing, threats of riots and attacks on Orthodox Jews around the world and at the Wall, and everything would work out for them.
Just to prevent misunderstandings, I will add here that the picture of self-interested conduct is entirely symmetrical. Those who rejoiced over the rejection of the Western Wall compromise because it preserves their religious-halakhic interest should not come whining about surrender to Muslims on the Temple Mount. It is the very same phenomenon. And of course I have not seen the Reform Jews forcefully protesting the refusal to permit Jews to ascend the Temple Mount either. They protest only over the Western Wall compromise and the injury to the state's Jewish character and the like. The reason is that democracy and rights—and Judaism too—do not interest anyone here. Each of the actors on the ground works to advance its own agenda, and the slogans about democracy and a Jewish state are nothing but a fig leaf covering action on behalf of self-interested goals and the advancement of a political agenda. Nothing more.
A consistent democratic approach, rather than a tendentious one, should say that Jews who wish to do so should be allowed to ascend the mount and pray there, and likewise Jews who want to pray at the Wall in different ways should be allowed to do so. The state is not supposed to serve as an instrument in the hands of religious or other forces in order to impose their views on others. Its role is to make sure that no such use is made of it, and to provide freedom of worship for all. It must not yield to any religious demands, because such surrender contradicts the values of democracy. Beyond that, surrender to fundamentalist forcefulness invites more and more use of violence to achieve various ends. Everyone understands that only violence works here, and therefore draws the necessary conclusions. As in many cases, the attempt to prevent violence by yielding to it and obtaining short-term quiet is itself what repeatedly brings violence down upon us. The consistent and obvious approach for anyone who supports democracy and a commitment to freedom of worship for all members of all religions should be to ensure such freedom for everyone.
The Difficulty from a Halakhic Perspective
At first glance, I, as a Jew committed to Jewish law (though a heretic, as is well known), ought to be happy with the situation. The government is doing the work for me and enforcing Orthodox standards in the holy places (Sunni orthodoxy on the Temple Mount and Jewish orthodoxy on both the Temple Mount and the Wall). After all, I myself am supposed to be happy that there will be no mixed prayer and that those defiled by contact with the dead will not ascend the mount, so why should I care that the government has stuck it to the wicked Reform Jews and done the work for me? And anyway, the Reform Jews do not really come, and apparently will not come, to pray at the Wall (which interests most of them about as much as last year's snow), so why is this decision so infuriating?! Is their protest not merely a tendentious provocation?
What is really so bad about that? As an Orthodox Jew, I want our public domain at the Wall to look like this, do I not? Why should I concern myself with securing rights for Reform Jews that they themselves do not really need, and in opposition to Jewish law? Moreover, Jewish law contains a doctrine of coercing commandment observance, so what is wrong with using governmental power to coerce Jews into observing commandments? In what way is that worse than using my own personal power, as Jewish law requires of me?
The Status of Democratic Values
I will tell you why: because I believe in democratic values. As a citizen of the state, it matters to me very much that it preserve its democratic values, and when it departs from them I protest and oppose it. Therefore it matters to me that Jews of every kind be allowed to pray at the Wall, just as on the Temple Mount. It matters to me that there be no surrender to fundamentalism, not only because I disagree with it but because I oppose surrender to bullying pressure in general, including when it comes from my own side. It matters to me that the state preserve its democratic character, even where that entails harm to religious values.
By the same token, I support separating religion from the state, that is, ending the use of the state's power to impose religious values on those who do not believe in them. So too with regard to the Sabbath, the Chief Rabbinate (kosher certification and marriage), and more. In all these areas I favor opening all the options and granting freedom of worship to all. This may lead to breaches of halakhic boundaries, since people will marry those whom they are forbidden to marry, eat non-kosher food, violate the Sabbath, and so on. True, in my assessment, in many cases the situation may actually improve if the intensity of coercion declines, but let us assume for the sake of argument that it will not. Let us assume that the results will indeed be worse from the halakhic perspective, and therefore contrary to my values. Even if that is the case, as someone who advocates democratic values I strongly oppose any infringement of freedom of religion and freedom from religion, and of course of freedom of worship as well (see also columns 12, 16, 18).
I also think that the claims that Reform Jews are not really interested in prayer at the Wall are irrelevant. Anyone can claim that something is not important to someone else. We have only what they themselves say, and if they demand it, they should be allowed it. Exactly like the Women of the Wall who want to don tefillin—even if this is an act of defiance and not genuine religious motivation (I assume there are some of both kinds)—it does not really matter. A state is not supposed to delve into the innermost soul of each individual. If he wants something and there is no obstacle to allowing it, it should be allowed. When I come to pray in the synagogue, no one checks whether my intentions are serious (and that is a good thing), or whether I am not praying for some ulterior reason. I come to pray, and things kept in the heart are not considered things (unspoken intentions have no legal standing).
A Note on Normative Duality[2]
Can halakhic commitment tolerate such a democratic conception? At first glance, there is here a commitment to foreign (external) values at the expense of distinctly halakhic and religious values. Does such an option exist for a Jew who is committed to Jewish law and to the Torah? Is this not a surrender to the surrounding culture that really expresses a lack of Torah commitment? Let me sharpen the difficulty even further. I mentioned above that Jewish law requires coercing transgressors by force in order to prevent their sins, and according to certain opinions they are coerced until their soul departs (see, for example, Ketzot HaChoshen, Netivot HaMishpat and Meshovev Netivot Hoshen Mishpat sec. 3, and many others). So when the government is willing to do this for us, how can one oppose it? On the contrary, I ought to act to make the government do so (and many indeed do). Even beyond the question of coercion, if I am committed to Jewish law and to the view that Jews are not supposed to deviate from it, then at first glance this does not sit well with a commitment to the democratic values of freedom of worship and freedom from religion. Am I obligated to allow Jews to be transgressors, and even to fight for that?
Fighting Against Halakhic Values
I will bring here an example from this week's Torah portion that shows the other side. The Talmud in Sanhedrin 82a says that if Zimri had killed Pinchas, he would have been exempt, since Pinchas had the status of a "a pursuer" (an aggressor who may be stopped). In the book Kli Chemda at the end of Parashat Balak, he asks why Zimri was permitted to kill Pinchas (or at least why he would have been exempt from punishment), since he could have stopped sinning, in which case Pinchas would of course not have killed him. According to Jewish law, there is no permission to kill an aggressor if the victim can be saved without killing the aggressor ("to save him by injuring one of his limbs"—saving him by injuring one of his limbs). He explains there that the fact that Zimri sinned was Zimri's own business, not Pinchas's. The question whether to sin or not is entrusted to the individual himself before God, and it is nobody else's concern. Pinchas cannot demand that Zimri stop sinning, and if he threatens to kill Zimri, Zimri may kill him under the law of an aggressor. In effect, he does so in order to stand up for his 'right to sin'.[3] By the same token, I will fight for the right of others to sin, and for the government not to interfere with them in this.
There is room to discuss the relation between this picture and the halakhic obligation to coerce a person not to sin. If Jewish law requires me to prevent transgression even by coercion, then using governmental force would seem to be the obvious form of coercion. It nevertheless seems to me that this is not the same. First, a democratic and secular state is not supposed to coerce religious values. When there is a state governed by Jewish law, whose citizens have agreed to regard the halakhic framework as binding, we can deliberate about the matter. Second, one must add here my view that a commandment performed under coercion, or the prevention of transgression by coercion, is usually devoid of value with respect to people who do not believe in the Torah and in halakhic commitment.[4] And third, there is here a conflict between the religious value of coercing commandment observance and the moral-democratic value that a state should not intervene in such matters. The Sages lived in a different culture and environment, and therefore for them there was no moral problem here. They decided in favor of coercion because they were not in any conflict at all. But we today live in a democratic environment and culture, and our values are different. We are in a conflict that the Sages were not in (this is of course not detached from the arguments on the first and second planes—that is, from the fact that most of the people around us are not committed to Jewish law and do not think there is any such commitment at all. In the time of the Sages, the situation was different).
Example: The Relation Between Jewish Law and Morality
A similar question can be asked regarding commitment to moral values, at least where they contradict Jewish law. Should a Jew committed to Jewish law hesitate over the question of saving a non-Jew on the Sabbath? At first glance, Jewish law instructs him not to save him, and that is the true morality. In column 15 I explained that the halakhic directive comes to achieve religious goals and not necessarily moral values, and therefore even a Jew committed to Jewish law can find himself in a conflict between a religious value and a moral value. Moreover, I argue that the decision in such a conflict need not necessarily favor the religious-halakhic value. There are cases in which it is right to prefer the moral value. My assumption is that moral obligation too is grounded in God's will (and you shall do what is right and good, 'and you shall do what is right and good,' which is not included in the count of the commandments and is not part of Jewish law in the plain sense, except perhaps as a kind of going beyond the letter of the law). And when there is a conflict between two values that reflect God's will, it is not clear which of them should decide the matter. This is an intra-Torah conflict even if it is not an intra-halakhic one.
Within morality itself, too, conflicts can arise between two moral values, and likewise within Jewish law. Saving life and the Sabbath are both halakhic values, but they can conflict with one another. In such a case the question of how to decide is not simple, and the Sages discuss it in a rather intricate halakhic debate. Moral values, too, can conflict with one another. For example, the case described by Sartre, of a student of his in occupied Paris during the Second World War who came to him torn between leaving Paris and joining the Free French army to fight the Nazis, or staying to assist his elderly mother in Paris. This is an intramoral dilemma, and it is not clear what the correct decision is. In such conflicts, there is commitment to both values on both sides, and a decision in one direction does not mean that there is no commitment to the opposing value as well. There is simply no avoiding the fact that in the end one must decide in one direction. By the same token, there can be conflicts between a religious value and a moral value, and here too there is commitment to both sides, but one must decide. On the contrary, it is precisely the commitment to both sides that creates the conflict.
If I see the values of democracy as binding moral values, then from my perspective, even if there is a conflict between them and 'pure' halakhic and religious values, that does not testify to a defect in commitment to either side. I am committed to Jewish law and to morality, and that itself is what brings me into conflict. In the end, I must decide, but that does not mean that I am not committed to one of them. If I were to say that Reform Jews should be allowed to pray as they wish because I do not care what they do, that would indeed reflect a lack of commitment. But if I argue that in this case the democratic-moral value overrides the religious value, that precisely reflects commitment to both these systems of values (normative duality).
Is External Influence Legitimate?
Now someone may say that these values (democracy) are drawn from outside and not from the Torah. Therefore the very commitment to them is not legitimate for a believing Jew. I do not deny the claim that in a certain sense (which will immediately be clarified) there is indeed external influence here, but the same is true of moral values in general. Moral values are usually drawn from conscience and from our environment, not from an objective interpretation of the Torah. It is conscience that guides us in how to read the Torah and what to learn from it. When the Torah commands and you shall do what is right and good, it does not spell out and explain to us what that right and good is. It seems to assume that this is obvious to all of us, that is, embedded in the imperative of conscience. My conscience is the result of my own insights, but also of various environmental and cultural influences. This is not a defect, but a fact. A person is always influenced by the society in which he lives, and together with his own personal insights, that is the whole person. In my understanding, when the Sages shaped their moral values, this too was based on both their conscience and the best they drew from the environment in which they lived (they learn modesty from a cat and honoring parents from Dama ben Netina), and not only on objective study of the Torah. There is a commandment that tells us to cleave to God's attributes, and yet no one imagines that there is an obligation to be jealous and vengeful (jealous and vengeful). compassionate and gracious, slow to anger, and abundant in kindness (merciful and gracious, slow to anger, abundant in kindness) — yes. jealous and vengeful — no. Why? Are not both of these among God's attributes? Because it is obvious to us that, at least for human beings, these are not desirable traits. In other words, we learn values from the Torah through our own insights and intuitions. Presumably this is what we are supposed to do in every context and place.[5]
Similarly, for example, I reject attempts to look in the Torah and in Jewish law for a conceptual framework for socioeconomic questions (socialism or capitalism). The Torah expects us to behave in a way that is right and good, and each person must decide whether what is right and good, in his opinion, is socialism or capitalism. The attempts to find such directives in the Torah are not at all convincing. Socialists always find socialism in the Torah, and capitalists, amazingly enough, find capitalism in it (and they are right too, of course J). Our values take part in the interpretation we give the Torah, and therefore it is naïve to think that one can extract from the Torah, objectively and independently, a given set of values and set it up as a pure set of Torah values over against external influences. Not only is this impossible, in my opinion there is no reason to assume it is desirable.
The conclusion is that even if it is hard to detach the values of democracy from external influences (for it is clear that I believe in them and am committed to them also—and perhaps mainly—because of the environment and culture in which I live), still, at present, this is who I am. A person draws the best from the environment in which he lives and internalizes it into his box of values, and he does well to do so. That is how human beings have always been, including all our greatest sages. A person is shaped by his environment and culture no less than by his inner insights, and yet, after he has internalized the values that seem to him correct, the person is the aggregate of all this. That aggregate is the person who is committed and who is going to conduct himself according to his values, by virtue of the Torah's directive (which is not a halakhic commandment) of and you shall do what is right and good.
The meaning of this is that the influence on me and on my values may indeed come from outside, but once I have internalized these values and believe in them, the source of authority that binds me to them is God Himself. Therefore there is no subordination here to an external system of values in the essential sense (that is, to a source of authority other than God). I do not do this because that is what people or one group or another expect of me, but because, to the best of my understanding, it is the imperative of morality—that is, God's expectation of me.
The meaning of all this is that the conflict between the values of democracy and Jewish law is an intra-Torah conflict (within God's will), even if not an intra-halakhic one. From this two conclusions follow: A. Commitment to both systems of values (normative duality) is legitimate and proper. This is God's will for us. B. When they clash, it is not true that Jewish law must necessarily prevail. So how does one decide such conflicts? That is a whole and very complex discipline (and very far from being algorithmic), but this is not unique specifically to conflicts between Jewish law and morality or to external values, but to every value conflict (even if it is intramoral or intrahalakhic). Therefore the dual commitment I have described here—that is, commitment to the values of democracy and also to Jewish law—is legitimate. And even if at times it seems right to me to prefer the values of democracy over Jewish law, this does not necessarily mean that I am not committed to Jewish law. I am in conflict precisely because I am committed to both sides of the equation. For our purposes, my judgment says that it is far better to allow Reform Jews and anyone else who wants to pray according to his own understanding and his own wishes at the Wall and on the Temple Mount, even if that runs counter to my halakhic values. One should remember that the other side of the coin is that if I use the state's power to impose my views and way of life on others, then when I myself am harmed in the name of the values of another group (as on the Temple Mount), I will have no basis for complaint against it. It becomes a bullying power struggle in which the violent prevails, and it seems to me that it is neither right nor wise for us to endorse such a culture and way of life.
That picture has obvious implications for the conversion law as well, but for now I will not go into them.
[1] Admittedly, one can raise the claim that the Jewish people helped and continues to help the state, and that cutting ties with it now involves a moral problem of ingratitude. They would not have helped us and worked on our behalf on that understanding. But that is a marginal point for my discussion here.
[2] See on this here and briefly here, and also in my book Enosh KeChatzir.
[3] Of course it is forbidden to sin, but the prohibition is between him and Heaven. Pinchas cannot demand it of him.
[4] I discussed this in my article here. This is a substantial topic, and this is not the place to go into it.
[5] Incidentally, my remarks here should not be understood as a relativistic conception of morality. On the contrary, I believe in objective morality, but the path to those values involves drawing from the environment. It teaches us what is right (not always, of course. But if one uses critical thinking, it certainly helps us discern correct values that would have been hard for us to discern without it).
Discussion
The problem is that they do not come as just one more religion among the many that exist, but as a legitimate stream within Judaism, and that is no longer the state's business.
I don't see any difference. The state should not intervene and determine which religion is legitimate and what Judaism is. If there is a significant number of people who want some kind of use of a place holy to them, it should allow it. On the question of who is a Jew for the purposes of the Law of Return and legal and civil implications, the state does need to decide. But that is a different discussion.
Hello Rabbi Michi,
Two points for now:
1. The matter of freedom of worship was resolved long ago by allocating the joint plaza. The claims raised regarding it are technical, and should be resolved through the usual technical means – renovation, administrative changes, etc. The discussion today (to the best of my understanding) is not about joint prayer but about joint management. That is an entirely different demand.
2. Even the argument from freedom of religion is not immune from examination as to its legitimacy. The requested form of worship really has to be part of the religion making the request, not in theory but in practice. As you wrote, things in the heart are not things – the test has to be objective, otherwise every claim of any religious group would automatically receive protection, at the expense of the public's rights and money. Therefore, the fact that the plaza is empty is very significant in my eyes.
Rabbi Michi,
One could actually think that our Jewish insistence on mass ascents to the Temple Mount in recent years is itself the fundamentalism and the shutting of our eyes. Just think for a moment: how many people were killed by terror in Judea and Samaria from the beginning of PM Bibi's term until the obsession with going up to the Temple Mount began, together with the public statements by Hotovely, Regev, and Ariel on this issue, starting in the winter of 5775? In Bibi's first six years there were only a few dozen Jewish fatalities from attacks in Judea and Samaria. Such a low number had not existed roughly since 1882.
Obviously every person is an entire world, but when you compare this to the eras of the 'victims of peace' (like the years 2002-3), or to what happened last year, it turns out that the 'lone-wolf intifada' really was not a lone-wolf intifada. Or at least not only that. It is very much connected to stupidity and stubbornness on our part, which are at the same time a denial of the importance and sanctity of every synagogue in which we pray (a topic you have written quite a bit about lately in another context).
You have to bury your head in the sand not to notice that every time the riots happen in October, which in Hebrew (or Babylonian) means Tishrei. From our purposeful Jewish mindset one might expect a bit less fundamentalism regarding behaviors that it is obvious to us that our neighbors (not-so-rational, what can you do) go crazy over. Again, this does not justify any Muslim violence, but one may also ask what happened to our common sense.
1. As I understand it, the request is for separate management, not joint management (that they should manage their own plaza).
2. As long as there is a large public requesting it, it cannot be ignored. It may be that the emptiness is because at present one cannot pray there in a reasonable way. If it turns out there is no demand, one can reconsider. By the way, there is no reason to allocate budgets for this. They can be allocated the area and allowed to finance it themselves. That too is legitimate (as long as it is clear that there is a difference in demand, and therefore there is justification for the state to fund the Orthodox).
Truth be told, going up to the Temple Mount is also a negligible minority of people. And if it becomes permitted and stops being an issue, it will stop interesting anyone apart from a handful of activists.
Hello Chaim.
This consideration is a basic mistake that for some reason keeps recurring. There is nothing fundamentalist about people wanting to go up to the Mount. The fact that human savages go wild and threaten to riot (and also do riot) does not make the matter fundamentalism. One simply has to deal with them with a heavy hand, and that's all. Is the Gay Pride parade also fundamentalism on the part of the LGBT community? After all, every time it brings riots and demonstrations. Is the Reform movement's demand for a prayer plaza also fundamentalism (after all, the Haredim will go berserk)? I saw an upside-down world, the upper ones below and the lower ones above. What you are proposing is an inversion and confusion of concepts, and in fact surrender to terror and encouragement of fundamentalism, and I oppose that.
Fanaticism is harming another because he behaves differently from you. Someone who goes up to the Mount is harming no one; he is merely unwilling to let others harm him.
In a regular synagogue, can just anyone come in and pray however he wants? Presumably a Reform cantor would not be allowed to lead services in our synagogue. It is our right as the owners of the place, or those who run it, to decide its character.
So the state decided (whether by direct decision or by aligning itself with the situation on the ground) that the area of the Western Wall plaza is like a synagogue. It further decided, in the same way, that it is run in a certain manner. Why should one fight for it to be run differently? Would you insist that Reform Jews be able to pray in every synagogue? What about at the Cave of the Patriarchs? What about at the Great Synagogue in Jerusalem? It seems to me that perhaps there is somewhat different treatment of the Wall because it is ostensibly an open public area that does not look like a classic synagogue. But once it was decided that the character of the place is such, one can conduct oneself there accordingly, and it is the state's right in a democratic fashion to decide that it is an Orthodox synagogue.
Every rule has its limit, and so does freedom of worship. No one is preventing Reform prayer at all, and for this matter it is indeed important to examine technically whether there is a Reform public in Israel and how many of them are interested in the Wall in order to decide how the synagogue there should be run. If there were a large public demanding worship in a place belonging to the state, it would be proper to examine and decide the issue democratically. But as long as the situation is otherwise, there is no reason to change the existing situation because of a noisy influential handful (just as I could not organize a small group and decide that Sacher Park should serve us as a place for a camping ritual).
1. נכון, אבל זו לא הרחבה שלהם. זו הרחבה של מדינת ישראל, שהיא מקצה לתפילה מעורבת (לא רק שלהם, אלא של כל מי שירצה) בגלל מחויבותה לחופש דת. לדרוש מימוש זכות זה דבר אחד, ולדרוש להיות חלק מהגוף שמנהל אותה זה דבר אחר. לטענה השניה אין לדעתי ביסוס במסגרת חופש הדת.
2. לגבי הר הבית זו באמת שאלה מעניינת. אני חושב להפך, שאם זה יהיה מותר המקום יהפוך למתויר מאוד ע"י ישראלים, אבל בהחלט ייתכן שאתה צודק.
Commenter Yuval Sh is completely right. In the same way, it is also not at all fundamentalist for a woman in a bikini to enter a synagogue in Mea Shearim, even though from the point of view of extreme individualistic liberalism one could justify that too. In the same way, the 'freedom of worship' argument regarding the Temple Mount is fundamentalism, and it costs us so many orphans and widows, and it is terrible. In halakhic language, burying one's head in the sand is called a 'psik reisha and it won't die,' and it is not clear why Rabbi Michi is pretending not to see this.
Regarding the matter of being zealous and taking vengeance: there actually is a positive side to zealotry, like the zeal of Elijah the prophet ('I have been very zealous for the Lord') and that of Phinehas. Vengeance too has a positive side ('A Torah scholar who does not take vengeance and bear a grudge like a serpent is not a Torah scholar'), and compassion too has a negative side ('Whoever is compassionate to the cruel will in the end be cruel to the compassionate'). That is, perhaps one must cleave to all the attributes of the Holy One, blessed be He, only that one must do so in the way our conscience instructs us.
There is a practical problem here. In the state there is the 'Law of Return,' which allows every 'Jew' (according to the state's definition) to receive immediate citizenship.
If the state does not intervene and recognizes every conversion whatsoever, Reform conversion will very quickly be exploited as an easy entry ticket into a developed country. Orthodox conversion (and especially that of the Chief Rabbinate, according to rumor) has a clear advantage in closing this loophole.
Hello,
First, on the democratic issue, you are absolutely right. Last week I heard a fascinating lecture by an expert on the subject (Dr. Shmuel Berkovits, who deals with the legal status of the holy places), and he (and others agreed) argued that the High Court simply makes a mockery of the issue, because in the ruling that dealt with entering the Temple Mount, the High Court actually argued that the petitioners had no standing and that the state decides this and no one else, whereas in the Women of the Wall case, in their previous petition (the second of three), the High Court really pushed them in a non-objective way to file a different petition and hinted that it would be accepted. So from a democratic point of view there cannot be any difference between the standing of Reform Jews in the plaza and standing on the Temple Mount.
Second, on the merits, the discussion is indeed not about intentions of the heart, nor about what the Reform Jews or the general public feel when Reform Jews pray near them. We may presume that whoever wants to pray there has good intentions. But the only democratic discussion should be in terms of majority versus minority and minority rights. First of all, if the women wanted to pray a hundred meters east of there, inside the al-Aqsa Mosque, you and I have no doubt what the High Court would rule regarding those rights. Second, even if a minority has a right, it is disproportionate when they are given permission to pray in the same plaza as an Orthodox public that is at least ten thousand times larger in terms of the scope of its synagogues. Even if Satmar came and wanted to make such-and-such a partition, and they are a tiny minority of a minority, in a democratic state (as distinct from a religious one) such an argument cannot be accepted. And the discussion should be conducted on the grounds that proportionally they have a suitable alternative – an outer plaza or Robinson's Arch. But they specifically want to pray in our rather small plaza, so if there were a quarter of a Reform public here, I would give it to them. But as long as that is not the case, let them kindly pray on the side.
Since there is an interest nowadays in shortening the prayer service (as explained in posts 77-78) – one may say that the very trouble of getting all the way to the Wall is unnecessary, and one can pray comfortably in the magnificent 'Temple' at Hebrew Union College, or in the plaza beside it. Why go to the wall of the old 'Temple' when we have a dignified and magnificent 'Temple' gleaming in its beauty?
The place is closer to the city center, right next to the King David Hotel, the YMCA, George Washington and Lincoln streets, and the U.S. Consulate. I see no point in praying in that outdated place, disputed internationally and religiously, and causing discomfort because of its proximity to the Haram al-Sharif and the al-Aqsa Mosque, which is sacred to our Muslim brothers.
With blessings of peace, equality, and interfaith brotherhood, Rabbi Samson Liberlinger, Cincinnati
Yuval, a synagogue anyone can build for himself. That is precisely the difference from a sacred site that is unique and has no substitute (somewhat like the reason there is no overreaching in real estate transactions. Every piece of land is something unique).
At the Cave of the Patriarchs it really is the same thing. Though there is a difference, because there there is already a building being run in a certain way, and allocating them another separate area at the Wall is not the same as letting them enter the existing plaza (which, admittedly, was made by the state, so it is not quite like the Cave of the Patriarchs).
But that is exactly it: a state cannot decide that a unique public area becomes an Orthodox synagogue. Absolutely not. Such an area is supposed to serve everyone. It is like deciding that the Gilabon nature reserve or the Kinneret or any other unique place becomes an Orthodox synagogue.
1. I disagree. Something allocated to them should be managed by them.
2. The issue is not whether it will become toured, but whether it will become prayed in.
Indeed, the similarity between the arguments is very impressive, and therefore just as he is not right, neither are you. A synagogue in Mea Shearim is private property, and the Wall and the Temple Mount are not. By the way, if you had brought a relevant example, like entering the Wall with a bikini, even into their plaza, I might perhaps agree (and there is still room for further discussion on this).
If you do not understand what I explained above (and even call it pretending), I do not know how to do it better. One can always continue burying one's head in the sand comfortably. Good luck. Our living in this country also cost many victims. Zionism is the greatest fundamentalism of all by your method. And so is driving a car.
Indeed. And still, we do not apply that literally, but rather make our own interpretation.
Of course. And therefore I was not talking about conversion. But the right thing would have been to forgo conversion and separate religion from state. To have a civic conversion as a condition for receiving citizenship (or to abolish the Law of Return).
As for the High Court, I am not familiar with the matter. It may be that the considerations are different (security considerations versus freedom-of-religion considerations, for example). And perhaps the High Court really does discriminate. It is not correct to speak of al-Aqsa Mosque, because that is a defined and private place. Speak about the Temple Mount in general, and there I will agree with you regarding the women.
As I understand it, they have no problem praying on the side. The problem is that even on the side the conditions are not reasonable in their eyes. Considerations of the rabbi's rights and the minority's rights are irrelevant, since the minority does not come at the expense of the majority. They do not want to pray as they wish in the regular plaza, but rather in a reasonable place on the side.
Without question the worst post of yours I have ever read. Your opinions, though – as usual – are formulated at exhausting length and decked out in pure logic, giving the reader the feeling of a lofty judge of justice sitting in some tribunal while petty arguments among the primitive masses are described before him. This time it made me nauseous. I could not hold out even to the middle.
I know this probably will not move you; you have gone through more in life than a disrespectful comment from an angry commenter, but perhaps some enlightened reader – one who has not hung his entire spiritual world on you (and therefore cannot saw off the branch he is sitting on) – perhaps he will finally understand that this is not the direction.
Someone who claims morning and evening that psychological practical ramifications and the like do not interest him, but only absolute intellectual ramifications – will never understand where his opinions lead the herd (and perhaps even himself), because the herd is not a dead philosopher but a living human being – such a person will always see the world through the tiny olive-sized straw of his brain.
P.S. – for anyone who did not notice – I raised only one argument in my comment, and it is in the last paragraph.
Yochai, you are simply amazing
I join in the curses
Michi, you are vile
How dare you express your opinions (and at length, no less)
You are crazy, stupid, disgusting.
Go shower in Auschwitz
The diet ruined your figure
Your beard is scraggly
And your house is falling apart
P.S. I raised one argument
Whoever wants to find it should read what I wrote skipping the guttural letters, in Atbash, and your mnemonic is 'At bach al yahud'
I can understand that there are many people, secular traditionalists and even some who are not members of the covenant, who wish to approach the Wall, whether for prayer or for a visit, without the need for separation between men and women, a separation to which they are unaccustomed, and I understand that there is room for the government to respond to the needs of those people.
The questions are:
(a) By what right does the 'Reform movement' appoint itself to represent all those interested in a mixed plaza, most of whom have no connection at all to this movement? If the government is interested in a 'free plaza,' let it appoint a 'free' official to manage it, and not hand it over to a religious group that has no real stake in the place.
(b) After all, the place is sacred to the Jewish religion, and that religion has championed, for the last two thousand years, ever since the 'great enactment,' separation between men and women in prayer. Reform is not a 'stream' in historical Judaism but a completely different religion, whose difference from historical Judaism is far greater than the difference between Catholics and Protestants. Could one imagine a Protestant church demanding rights in the Vatican?
Regards, S.Z. Levinger
It is hard to imagine anything that would embarrass Rabbi Michi more than an admirer coming to his defense. There were enough of those yesterday for Britney. Let it go.
With a sour face, I find myself agreeing with most of it.
I disagree that the state should not enter into the inner depths of the soul of someone requesting some action from it in the name of protecting his liberties.
The reason is my aspiration as a citizen that the protection of liberties should not become a weapon.
Example – a court can refuse to hear a request because it is 'vexatious' (and there have been cases). Even if there is no dispute that a right of the citizen was infringed. Rather, the court identifies that the harm to the citizen is minor and does not really bother him, but that he is inflating it in order to achieve some other gain (in this example it is usually financial gain, though there are also motives of revenge and so on).
In the present case too, one has to discuss how much the Reform Jews are interested in praying next to the Wall (sanctity of place? among Reform Jews?) or whether they are interested in getting a foot in the religious door.
Even if there is a desire to get a foot in the door, that too is legitimate. That is not vexatiousness. After all, the Orthodox also want to get their foot in the door and preserve control. That is part of the desires of religious and ideological groups.
Beyond that, they did not ask the state for protection. They asked to approach the Wall as they understand it and for the state not to attack them.
I wrote this in my remarks, regarding Women of the Wall and the like, that motives are in no way relevant. This is what they want, and even if what they want is to express their outlook and receive legitimacy, that is an entirely legitimate desire. Just as one does not examine someone entering a synagogue to see whether he sincerely wants to pray or is merely doing it by rote.
Yochai, I do indeed agree that you raised only one argument and that it is in the last paragraph, that is, in your P.S. But that one argument too is mistaken. A mistaken argument is still an argument.
If someone comes to the synagogue and wants to start changing things, shortening parts of the prayer service…, the ark doesn't sit right with him, and why won't they let him come in with a cross, after all Jesus was a Jew.
I think that here it is important to examine the motives.
In the end the discussion is about the limit of legitimacy that can be given to change within Judaism.
After all, a group of Christians could decide to hold a mass at the Wall
on the claim that they are the true Jews, or recreate the Last Supper in the Dome of the Rock.
Jews could decide to establish a yeshiva at the tomb of Jesus.
At some point the state will have to enter into the niche that decides between religions
And between freedom of worship and harm to a holy site
And to the feelings of worshippers.
Your discussion with the Haredim is ultimately about where that line is drawn
and nothing more
I already explained that a synagogue is not a good example because it belongs to its community, and whoever wants something else should build himself another structure. The Wall is unique, and one cannot send someone to build himself another Wall.
If a significant group of Christians wanted to hold a mass at the Wall, that is similar to Jews wanting to pray on the Temple Mount (and not in the al-Aqsa Mosque). In principle a place should be allocated to them too.
Hello Rabbi Michi.
I cannot understand why you distinguish between private property and the Wall.
From my limited acquaintance (mainly from disputes over my father-in-law's synagogue), a synagogue too is public property.
Quite a few synagogues are in fact public land allocated for the purpose of establishing a synagogue managed by an association.
And there it does not seem that you have a problem.
(And from here to the obvious practical implication regarding the Temple Mount –
even if it is the state's right, it is my right as a citizen to disagree with it and work to change it. And my duty as a Jew…)
The state can and must set rules of conduct in the public sphere.
The obligation (ethical or practical) to allow freedom to the individual is not an obligation to allow it everywhere,
and precisely in unique places – there there will be a clash between the desires of individuals – the state as sovereign must regulate binding rules.
If you try, I am sure you will manage to understand. One cannot send groups to build themselves another Wall. But one can do that for another synagogue. What is so difficult to understand about that? The Wall is a unique area, and therefore one should allow its use to anyone who wishes, insofar as possible.
There is no clash between desires at all. There is an attempt by one group to impose its will on another. Therefore each group should be given its own area and each should do there as it sees fit ((within reasonable limits).
Is there a source that this is the reason there is no overreaching in real estate?
It is necessary to add a discussion about the monetary ownership of the Wall – whether it belongs to the public, or the state, or its users, or those who hold control over it (the rabbi of the Wall).
It is hard to find a difference between this and any synagogue most of which was built with state budgets (and the overwhelming majority are like that, allocations, etc.).
Likewise, one must discuss the right of users to prevent others from using it after they have already established possession by use, or even the type of use.
Likewise, a democratic conception is not a moral conception; it is at most a practice, aside from the fact that there really is no democracy in this sense anywhere that calls itself a democracy.
Likewise, by the same measure the state must allow a group of worshippers to hold prayer quorums in the Israel Museum in the name of freedom of art and freedom of religion and summer vacation.
In short, an article whose main point is missing from the book.
In short, you did not read what I wrote. Everything has already been answered.
In short
Rabbi Michi, the uniqueness of an area does not deprive the state of the ability to decide. If anything, the opposite.
If something is unique, then one cannot say that everyone should do whatever he wants – because there is not enough for everyone.
(And from synagogue quarrels that I know – sometimes it is more practical to send the Reform Jews to build themselves their own Wall than to cause people to give up a synagogue they think is theirs…)
The attempt to impose is mutual, because each side sees its own position as the 'normal' one and what the other side demands as coercion.
In fact, there is here an attempt to shape a norm of conduct in a public area, and there is much logic in creating such a procedure in an area that is unique.
But which procedure will be set? It seems to me to be within the state's authority to do so. And there is room to take an existing procedure into account.
And therefore even if practically one can give each side its own area, as an argument on the principled plane it is not successful –
because when we run into those same 'reasonable limits' then you will probably agree that it is within the state's authority to determine who will receive and who will not,
and therefore perhaps it is also within the state's (or the public's, whose representatives the legislators are) authority to determine what those limits are.
Eitan, if it were not possible to divide the area into different uses, there would be no need or point in the discussion. But there is no problem at all in designating different areas for different groups without them disturbing one another, and after all the plan that was approved (the one that was canceled) already did that. So what exactly are we talking about? It is worth coming down to earth.
My logic tells me that if a new religion arises, it cannot claim a right to pray at a place that was sacred to another religion even before the new religion was invented. It can establish temples for itself in all sorts of places that are not yet occupied.
There is something to that logic, but Reform and Conservative Judaism are not a new religion; they claim that they are the continuation of the religion of Moses. The fact that there are differences between then and now is also true of Orthodoxy (and perhaps no less than of the Conservatives). And more than that, the factor that can decide who is the legitimate continuation is not the state. If there is a sufficiently large group that claims to be the continuation, there is no one (from a democratic, not philosophical, point of view) who may judge it and decide whether it is right or not.
Islam too arose long after Judaism, and its claim to continuity is even more tenuous, yet I do not think that is a reason not to give them rights on the Temple Mount (and us as well, of course).
The same goes for Christianity, which claims that it is the continuation of the people of Israel. The same goes for all kinds of sects that see themselves as a continuation of the religion of Moses.
Reform is a foreign religion not because it has changes in it. There are changes in the Jewish religion too, as you rightly noted, but because it uprooted the foundation, which is fidelity to the Torah and the commandments and to the internal development of halakhah.
They may claim that they are the continuation, but that does not mean we have to accept every claim simply because we are democrats. And it does not mean we have no right within democracy to try to act according to our opinion and according to how we see the situation.
It is not clear to me why, in your view, this contradicts democracy.
It certainly does not contradict the principle of majority rule (the majority in the Knesset and the government has spoken).
It sounds as though you think it contradicts principles of individual rights, but it is not clear why. Can every new group come and decide that it wants to establish a temple in a place sacred to another religion, and the democratic state will be obliged to comply?
Regarding a clash between halakhah and morality: why not say that one must always follow halakhah, according to the rule you brought in one of your books, that a specific law (such as 'it is forbidden to treat a gentile on Shabbat') overrides a general law (such as 'one must save people' or 'one must be moral')? After all, there it was explained in detail that only in this way 'is it possible to uphold them both,' because the specific law does not entirely nullify the general one but only introduces a condition into it.
[By the way, personally I do not accept at all the distinction between 'moral values' and 'religious values.' In my opinion, if the Holy One, blessed be He, explicitly commanded us to do something, it is necessarily a moral act, even if this is hard to understand. One can bring many examples of actions that superficially seem immoral, but in a somewhat broader view turn out to be highly moral, and vice versa. It seems that our 'view' of the moral idea is somewhat blurred, and therefore there are disputes in matters of morality, and therefore we need the Torah to make us more precise].
I will not enter here again into the discussion of halakhah and morality.
As for clashes, indeed when there is a specific halakhic principle versus a general moral law, halakhah has the advantage. But by the same token, if there were a specific moral principle and a general halakhic one, morality would have the advantage. There is symmetry here. The more correct distinction is not on the plane of specific versus general but on the plane of essential versus incidental. For example, separating a woman who was raped from her priestly husband always involves a moral wrong, and therefore here it is reasonable to prefer halakhah. By contrast, in an incidental clash such as saving a gentile on Shabbat (because there is not always a clash between the two values. Sometimes the rescue does not require desecrating Shabbat, and sometimes observing Shabbat does not harm the value of life because there is no gentile in danger), there is room to prefer morality. These cases fall into a category similar to that of a transgression for its own sake.
In short – Saul asked well in the wadi
That is certainly possible, except that there he had Samuel to ask, and he did not do what Samuel instructed him.
What is there to ask if that is his moral decision?
If the Holy One, blessed be He, instructs him otherwise, he must act otherwise. Today we have no prophets for consultations. Beyond that, it is possible that his decision was mistaken, and therefore he was punished.
Is 'It is not in heaven' not about morality? That is, morality is not halakhah. For such an error – such a punishment?
There is a concept of a prophet's temporary ruling
and for that he was punished
'It is not in heaven' was said only regarding a ruling for generations
It has nothing to do with 'It is not in heaven.' There is a commandment in the Torah to kill Amalek, and that did not come from Samuel or from heaven. Moreover, every killing of a non-combatant Amalekite is a moral wrong, and if the Torah commands it then halakhah overrides morality (because here the clash is essential).
The question that could arise here is whether an interpretation is possible according to which Agag need not be killed, or whether this command is overridden by another moral principle. Samuel ruled that it was not. Saul erred here and for that he was punished.
If the honored rabbi were in Saul's place, would he kill an innocent Amalekite? Like ISIS?
If an Amalekite accepts the seven Noahide commandments, he is not an Amalekite, and then there is no commandment to kill him (one can debate whether he still bears the title Amalekite, but the category of Amalekite no longer applies to him).
The whole commandment applies only if the Amalekite does not accept the seven Noahide commandments, in which case according to the Torah he is not innocent.
I do not think one can answer the question of what you would do in so-and-so's place. We are speaking of a different person, and a different place, time, and circumstances.
See here on the dependence of halakhah on circumstances:
https://mikyab.net/%D7%9B%D7%AA%D7%91%D7%99%D7%9D/%D7%9E%D7%90%D7%9E%D7%A8%D7%99%D7%9D/%D7%A4%D7%A1%D7%99%D7%A7%D7%AA-%D7%94%D7%9C%D7%9B%D7%94-%D7%91%D7%A9%D7%95%D7%90%D7%94-%D7%95%D7%9E%D7%A9%D7%9E%D7%A2%D7%95%D7%AA%D7%94-%D7%9C%D7%93%D7%95%D7%A8%D7%95%D7%AA/
Good week.
You wrote that both morality and halakhah are the will of God, that there can be a contradiction between them, and that the decision is not always on one side. Sometimes halakhah, sometimes morality.
In your article you compared this to cases in which there is a contradiction between two moral values.
Let us consider a case in which there is a contradiction between two values in the Torah: for example, a positive commandment and a negative commandment. In such a case halakhah says that a positive commandment overrides a negative one, and therefore, for example, one should cut off a leprous patch in circumcision.
In such a case, is there a value contradiction between two 'wills of God'? I think not. That is, the contradiction and the dilemma exist only in the 'rules of halakhah,' that is, in knowing what God wants in a case where two commandments that He Himself commanded collide. For usually He wants us to circumcise. And usually He wants us not to cut off leprous patches. And what shall we do when there is a foreskin with a lesion on it – cut it or not? In such a case we learn (by analogy from the commandment of fringes to the commandment of shaatnez) that a positive commandment overrides a negative one, and if so we have learned that God's will is to cut off the lesion in circumcision. There are not here (after deriving this by exegesis) two conflicting wills between which one must decide, but one single will: to cut off the lesion.
And what would we say to someone who did the opposite, and did not circumcise because of the lesion, because God commanded not to cut off lesions? We would say to him that 'the mouth that forbade is the mouth that permitted,' meaning that the same One who commanded not to cut cut, said here to cut. Therefore, as long as your desire is to do His will and fulfill His commandment, there is no dilemma at all, because His will regarding what to do in such a case where the values He Himself commanded collide was explicitly stated by Him.
Also in the value clash that you described in the article, between commandments and morality, the analogy is in my opinion similar. The commandments are an explicit command as to how to behave in a specific case. That is, in my opinion, morality is the desirable act, and even the divine command, so long as there is no other explicit divine command to act against it. When the latter arrives, it certainly overrides the former, because the Commander Himself explicitly commanded me in this case to follow the explicit command and not morality.
And even more than that, and this is the main point: by saying that there is a contradiction between God's wills, halakhah and morality, in case x, you are putting into the mouth of the Holy One contradictory statements about His will. He explicitly said to behave in case x in manner A, and you say, 'He also told me to listen to morality, and morality says B.' How can the explicit command for case x be displaced by the general duty of the command of morality?
That is, in such a case the divine command to listen to morality does not apply. There is no divine command in such a case to listen to morality. And even if morality protests, that is a contradiction between morality (without a divine command to listen to it) and the commandment, not between two divine commands. There is no 'conflict between two values that reflect the will of God.' The divine will is one, and against it rises the conscience, and between them is the contradiction, and between them the chooser will choose.
And here I will address your distinction in the comments to the article, between an essential command (as in a priest's wife who was raped) and an incidental command (saving a gentile while desecrating Shabbat).
However, these things are difficult in my eyes: if you think the halakhic command says that it is permitted to desecrate Shabbat to save a gentile's life [that is, that in halakhic analysis we discuss why according to halakhah the prohibition on saving a gentile on Shabbat no longer applies in our day], then there is no contradiction here between halakhah and morality. One only has to discuss halakhically whether the suspension of the prohibition is indeed correct halakhically.
Rather, surely we are discussing a case where according to halakhah A is forbidden, and morality says to do that same A. If so, why should I care whether this is an essential or incidental command?
Suppose, for example, that the case did not run counter to morality. Surely we would fulfill it, and even lose all our property over it, as halakhah commands. Why? Because an explicit command (!) applies to this case.
I claim that there is no such thing as an essential or incidental command, an implied or explicit command. If according to halakhah there is a command A for a certain case, whether explicit or learned by exegesis, whether a detailing of a general rule or a singular case – as long as there is a halakhic command about it, that is God's explicit will for this case, and it overrides the general command, the command of morality, which applies whenever there is no other explicit command.
1. I see no difference at all between an internal halakhic clash of values and a clash between morality and halakhah. When the Holy One expects me to help another person, He takes into account that sometimes this will clash with another value and be overridden by it, or override it. Exactly as in halakhah. For me, a moral imperative is like something stated explicitly by the Holy One. I see no difference.
2. I think you did not understand the distinction I made between an incidental clash and an essential one. An incidental clash means that fulfillment of value (or commandment) A does not necessarily clash with value B. Like saving life and Shabbat. Saving life does not generally require desecrating Shabbat, and vice versa. But sometimes there is an incidental clash. In such a situation there is no way to know what overrides what. In an essential clash, like for example killing Amalek, where every time one kills a young Amalekite one violates the halakhic and moral prohibition of murder, there it is reasonable to assume that when the halakhic command was given it took the moral prohibition into account, and therefore it overrides it.
3. Even when there is an explicit command, that does not mean it is mandatory. It only means there is such a value. But there is no necessity to say that it is always in force and never overridden. Like saying that chocolate is tasty and it is worth eating. That is true from the standpoint of taste, but it does not contradict the statement that it is fattening and from that standpoint not worth eating.
4. In addition, you do not distinguish between things written in the Torah and things that emerged from the interpretation or exegesis of the Sages. For me, the exegesis of the Sages is not like what is written in the Torah (and apparently Maimonides also sees them as different; see the second root). The Sages could err, and could establish things even though they have no general validity in every situation.
Thank you for the response.
Rabbi Michi, let me tell you something interesting.
I tried twice to write you a response and express in it my view of your own view, and each time after I finished, I read my response and tried, from your point of view, to see what you would answer and how you would respond. And each time I understood that I could not persuade, for the following interesting reason: any proof from halakhah will not work in this discussion of ours, because you think that not only halakhah is a source of God's will, but morality too.
Basically (if I may offer a philosophical interpretation of you 🙂 ), the act desired in God's eyes is known through two channels: morality and halakhah.
Any saying or proof from halakhah 'in favor of halakhah defeating morality' will prove nothing to you, because it expresses only one channel, the halakhic one, while morality may say the opposite.
Only when halakhah relates essentially to the contradiction with morality (as in a priest's wife who was raped), only then will you know faithfully(?) that God's will is that halakhah prevail over morality in that case.
In any other case (halakhah that incidentally clashes with morality), there is no proof of that.
I have been thinking a lot in this direction in recent days. There is no doubt that it is a special and interesting thought in my eyes.
I noticed something else too: in a number of halakhot, morality is integrated into halakhah and is found within it as an influencing factor, a shaping factor, as a 'halakhic factor.' That is, even in halakhah there is mixing with moral claims.
May I ask one more question:
Morality works in us (also) as an emotion, a conscience. We feel that it is right to do good, and we feel bad after insulting or stealing.
Without knowledge of God's existence (whether the question of God's existence remained an unresolved doubt, or whether there were 'knowledge that there is no God'): a. Would morality have validity? b. Would you act according to it in cases where morality causes financial loss / loss of time / ?
Thanks,
Hello Y'.
First, this is not an interpretation. It is what I say explicitly. See for example column 15.
In a place where there are several interpretive or decisional possibilities, there there is room to choose the one that better suits morality. Again, not because that is the more correct interpretation (because halakhah is indifferent to morality in my opinion), but because if all the paths are legitimate, then why not gain morality as well?
As for your last question, see on my site in the fourth notebook, part three. Without God there is no morality (there is only moral feeling). But that does not mean that in practice I would not behave that way. But even if I did behave that way – I would not be a moral person but a pleasant person (one of the wise of the nations, not one of their pious, in Maimonides' phrase at the end of chapter 8 of Kings).
Hello Rabbi,
In my opinion it is a mistake to place the Reform demand in the category of freedom of religion/worship, because their religion does not forbid praying with men and women separated; it simply seems more suitable and convenient to them to pray that way (and by the way, I agree with them on this). Freedom of religion means that every person has the right to realize his religion, not his convenience.
I disagree. True, it is not forbidden to them, but it is their religious preference (not merely convenience). They believe in equality. By your reasoning, there is also no obligation to allow the Orthodox to pray in a minyan, because that too is not a religious obligation but merely an added virtue?
Prayer in a minyan has clear sources in halakhah, even if it is not obligatory. Equality is not part of Judaism even according to the Reform; rather, they import it as a correction that ought to be made. By the way, it seems to me that you too agree that anything that is not a basic obligation does not enter the category of freedom of religion; for example, one does not have to provide mehadrin food. We do so today and that is nice, but it is not mandatory. And what about a demand by Yemenites for a plaza of their own? What about a demand for pure gold decorations for the Torah scrolls? The example you gave, minyan, is unfair because the masses perceive it as an obligation and not as an added virtue, proof of which is the number of fights between parents and sleepy teenagers during summer vacation. One more thing: in my opinion, even if no Jew were allowed to reach the Wall, there would be no violation of freedom of religion here because it is not a commandment. The reality on the Temple Mount is problematic because they do not allow prayer (if they did not allow entry at all, I would not see a problem with that, just as we accept that one cannot pray at Joseph's Tomb). I think the Reform Jews need to argue that since the state surrendered to the Haredim and created separation at the Wall, something that does not exist in ordinary public spaces, it should 'compensate' the normal people who were harmed by this.
Most Reform Jews see the Western Wall as occupied territory; in general they have no right to speak.