On Voting: Lesser-Evil Considerations (Column 189)

Contents of the Article

With God’s help

On Voting: Considerations of the Lesser Evil

We have just finished the local elections, and the sounds of a general election are already in the air. I do not think I am indulging in excessive speculation if I suggest that before long our cousins in journalism and politics will begin telling us, and preaching to us, about fulfilling our civic duty: go vote! This is a good opportunity to examine several relevant considerations regarding voting, or in other words, to offer the public an inoculation against the aforesaid sermons: go get vaccinated!

The Very Duty to Vote: The Categorical Imperative

In Column 13 (see further discussion in Column 122), I addressed the claim that there is no point in voting in an election, because your chance of making any difference is negligible. The only situation in which your vote has any effect at all on the election result is when the party you favor receives, including your vote, a number of votes divisible exactly by the number of votes required for one full seat (in the last election, this was more than 30,000 votes). In such a case, had you not gone to vote, the party’s number of seats would have dropped by one. The probability that such a situation will occur is, of course, entirely negligible.^[1] It is not worth even one second of your time.

The obvious counter-argument is: what happens if everyone makes this calculation? Would that not create anarchy, for “were it not for fear of the government, each person would swallow his fellow alive” (Avot 3:2)? But even assuming that mass abstention from voting is indeed a bad state of affairs that I would not want (see below), I explained there that this is irrelevant to the discussion. Each person makes his own calculation, and it does not depend on what I myself do, especially if I do it secretly (so as not to influence others).

I explained there that the only argument that can answer this contention is the categorical imperative, that is, the duty to do what you would want to become a universal law. The judgment of a given act, that is, the determination whether it is moral or not, is made by examining a hypothetical state in which everyone does it. I explained there that this is a hypothetical state (that is, it does not depend on whether everyone is actually likely to do it), and therefore it is certainly not identical to the consequentialist consideration above (“What if everyone did as you do?!”).

Another Argument Against Voting

There is another argument against going to vote, namely that there is no candidate or party that seems worthy to me. As is well known, in elections in our parts a person does not vote for someone he supports, but against someone he opposes. In other words, he chooses whoever seems least bad in his eyes. The meaning of this is that in truth most of us do not really think any candidate is a worthy candidate. That too is a good reason not to go vote.

Does such an argument withstand the claim based on the categorical imperative? In my opinion, absolutely yes. If there is no one who seems worthy to you, do not vote. I would certainly want a universal law under which anyone who sees no worthy candidate would not go vote. This is not like the previous consideration, because here I am not abstaining from voting out of laziness or because it is pointless. Here, that itself is my vote. I am voting for the vacuum, because in my opinion it is the best candidate. And from another angle, even if I wanted to go vote in such a situation by force of the categorical imperative, long may it live, what ballot am I supposed to put in the box? The universal law I would want is that the holy vacuum be prime minister. That is the best option before us.

There are stricter souls who will certainly say that in such a case one should go and cast a blank ballot. Personally, I do not see much point in such a superfluous ritual (I will qualify this below). Better to say a few chapters of Psalms during that time. I assume that even such a step may influence events and help more.

The Lesser Evil

We have now reached our desired destination: the obvious solution to such a situation is our friend, “the lesser evil.” Surely it is clear that the best state I would want is one in which the less bad candidate receives the mandate. That is preferable to anarchy (when there is no ruler at all). Therefore, the universal law I would want is that everyone vote for the candidate who is, in my opinion (or perhaps in theirs?), the lesser evil. If so, ostensibly the categorical imperative instructs us to vote for the lesser evil even when no candidate seems worthy in our eyes.

Underlying these remarks is the assumption that I really would want the candidate who is the lesser evil. I now want to deny that assumption, and to argue that sometimes it is nevertheless better not to vote.

The Struggle in Yeruham

The coin finally dropped for me while I was in Yeruham, and so I will allow myself to dwell on the matter a bit. When we arrived there, the head of the local council was Moti Avitzrur. A pleasant and upright man (as far as I know), who also advanced the town in several respects. Because of several serious failures in his policy that outraged me, I called on people not to vote for him, and indeed the Lord heard the cry of His faithful ones, and he lost the election to another candidate, named Baruch Elmakayes. This new fellow proceeded systematically to abuse his employees, the town, and its residents alike; to act corruptly and arbitrarily; and even violently. Faint protest voices began to be heard, but they appeared on the internet anonymously (people were afraid) and weakly, and they were ineffective. I decided to take up the gauntlet and publish a notice in the newspaper in order to gather information and launch a public struggle against him.

We opened a bitter and lengthy struggle that lasted more than a year. This Elmakayes enjoyed steady and surprising backing from the leaders of the Labor Party at the time (Ofir Pines—who was then Minister of the Interior,^[2] Dalia Itzik, Shimon Peres, and others). It was impossible to remove him, although we used connections, crisscrossed the country, and approached every media outlet. Moreover, we had unequivocal evidence of corruption on the criminal plane as well, and certainly on the administrative plane, but we did not manage even to get the police to begin investigating. This was despite the fact that we had already done a good part of the preliminary work for them (we built orderly case files with various kinds of evidence). Nor did we have much success in the media sphere. Although at first I assumed that within a few weeks the fellow would be thrown bleeding onto the ropes, to my surprise and frustration we did not succeed in moving anything at all.

A Note on the Previous Column

In those days I thought to myself what residents of other peripheral towns, who have no connections with politicians and media people such as some of us had, are supposed to do in such a situation. What chance do they have of changing anything? A perfectly round zero. On the other hand, I have no doubt that had a similar situation arisen in Tel Aviv or Jerusalem, the world would have turned upside down and the fellow would have been removed at once (the Minister of the Interior has the authority to do this even without criminal proceedings). But Yeruham interests no one—not in politics, not in the media, and therefore not in the police either.

This reminds me of Tzachi Hanegbi’s remarks to the effect that the Gaza-border communities interest no one (if rockets were falling on Tel Aviv or Jerusalem, the world would tremble, but rockets on the border communities are merely a “measured response”). It is interesting that the press used his remarks to bash the government, while it itself, of course, suffers from precisely the same thing. The border communities do not interest it either, nor does Yeruham—only Tel Aviv and Jerusalem.

Incidentally, in light of what I wrote in the previous column, the accusations against the police and the government are grave and relevant, but with respect to the press there is a kind of partial justification. As I explained there, the press operates on ratings considerations, and therefore the main blame lies with the public, which is not interested in Yeruham but only in Tel Aviv. Even so, I should remind you that I explained there that in principle an important matter ought to be publicized and reported even if it is not interesting, and therefore the press too is not blameless on this issue.

The Meaning of Voting for the Lesser Evil

I described for you in detail the struggle in Yeruham so that you would understand how much we wanted Elmakayes removed. We were already completely exhausted, and every day we considered ceasing this futile struggle. And then, in the midst of this exhausting struggle (which drained from me the last remnants of whatever inclination I had never really had to engage in politics), my friends asked me for whom I would vote if the election were held today. They expected me to say Moti Avitzrur, the lesser evil. But to their surprise I answered that I would abstain. They asked me: But then there is a chance that Baruch Elmakayes would win again. I told them: Even so, I would abstain. The question of the lesser evil came up there, and then I understood why I oppose the policy of the lesser evil, and why it is destructive. That was when the coin dropped for me.

The policy of the lesser evil leads candidates and parties not to improve their ways, because they know that those who believe in the policy they represent (but usually do not actually carry out) will vote for them in any case. Why? Out of fear that the other candidate or party might be elected. Thus no party or person has any real interest in improving his ways. We have all become accustomed to the fact that corruption, bad conduct, inconsistency, failure to keep promises and policies, or even the absence of any policy at all, do not harm any party. Polls show that no candidate loses strength because of events that should have destroyed him. What matters is the declarations that are provided and the atmosphere that is created. The policy of the lesser evil is almost solely responsible for the perpetuation of corruption and governmental mediocrity. We will never see a change in the character of government if we continue to vote on lesser-evil considerations.

Anyone can see this in the reality in which we have been living for years. It seems to me obvious to any sensible person that in the coming years we are condemned to an eternal pendulum of Likud–Labor–some centrist party, replacing one another and never changing. Incidentally, even the figures who populate them do not really change, but at most switch platforms back and forth. On rare occasions a new figure arrives (it is good that nature does its work; people age) and within a short time joins this game of musical chairs. “A generation goes and a generation comes, but the earth stands forever” (Eccl. 1:4). This is a direct result of voting for the lesser evil. I vote Labor, regardless of its deeds and performance, otherwise Likud will rise, and vice versa. The existing situation is stuck and perpetuated without any chance of substantive change, precisely because all of us vote for the lesser evil. We aspire to the least bad, and perhaps get it—but forever. We will never progress from it to something a bit better. There is no chance of that.

In Favor of Anarchism^[3]

At this point, of course, the question arises: what is the alternative? How can this vicious circle be broken? Are we not condemned to spin forever in this game of musical chairs? Each time we will vote for the lesser evil and at least prevent deterioration into a worse state. Many have defined my view as childish. A mature person compromises with reality and chooses the lesser evil.

But people fail to notice that this is actually a state of local equilibrium, because we are in a situation in which any movement will worsen our condition, and because of that fear we freeze in place and vote for the lesser evil. In precisely this way we perpetuate the situation and prevent it from changing. My claim is that if we have diagnosed things correctly, then there is a way out of this paralysis: not to vote. In the short term this will admittedly worsen the situation, because the government that is elected will enjoy little legitimacy and little power, and it will face threats from forces that may come from outside and dispossess it (other parties or candidates). Moreover, perhaps someone will be elected who is not the lesser evil but something worse.

But I still favor the approach of not voting. The more citizens do not vote, the more a political vacuum will be created. Suppose indeed that non-voting became a universal law, and a situation arose in which only 20% of the citizens voted. In such a state there would be a strong pull for new forces to enter the political field and offer better alternatives (today the motivation is close to zero, because the share of votes they can hope to win is rather small). More generally, the more turnover there is and the less secure a candidate feels in his office and his seat, the better off we will be (see Bibi, who today looks as though he has registered title to the chair in his own name, so that there is no way to influence him). True, there is no guarantee that the new forces will be better, but at worst we will replace them as well. In the end, the evolutionary process is likely to bring us to a situation in which the elected will behave in a more proper and decent fashion, because otherwise they will be replaced. From the standpoint of game theory and economic considerations (considerations of utility and evolutionary survival), this is almost a mathematical consequence of a voting policy not conducted on lesser-evil considerations. Exactly to the same degree that the current stagnation is an almost mathematical consequence of a voting policy conducted on lesser-evil considerations, as is customary around here.

My claim is that in the long run, non-voting is nevertheless the correct and most beneficial policy, even from the standpoint of the categorical imperative. Even if this were the universal law, it would still be preferable, because there would be anarchy in the short term but improvement in the long term. I claim that there is good reason to prefer the long term over lesser-evil considerations, which see only the short term before their eyes.

One can think of the situation I have described here as a small ball standing at the top of the local maximum in the diagram below. Indeed, any movement in either direction will produce a worse result in the short run (a descent to a lower place), but once we leave this local maximum and descend to a worse state, the path opens before us to reach a higher point (the global maximum on the left side of the diagram). Our present fear of the local descent prevents us from moving and thus from reaching a better point.

A witty literary expression of this process is found in Douglas Adams:^[4]

A spaceship lands on Earth, a robot comes down from the spaceship, and then raises one hand: “I come in peace,” it says, and after a long moment of further creaking adds, “Take me to your Head Lizard” […]

“It comes from a very ancient democracy, you see…” “You mean it comes from a world of lizards?” “No,” said Ford, who by that time was already a little more rational and sober than he had been before, after finally being forced to drink the coffee. “It isn’t as simple as that. It doesn’t come close to anything that comprehensible. On its world, the people are people. The leaders are lizards. The people hate the lizards, and the lizards rule the people.”

“Strange,” said Arthur, “I thought you said it was a democracy.” “I did,” said Ford. “It is a democracy.” “So,” said Arthur, hoping he did not sound absurdly obtuse, “why don’t the people get rid of the lizards?” “The truth is that it simply never occurs to them,” said Ford. “Everyone has the right to vote, and everyone more or less assumes that the government they chose is more or less the government they want.”

“You mean they themselves choose the lizards?” “Certainly,” said Ford with a shrug, “of course.” “But,” said Arthur, once again raising the great question, “why?” “Because if they did not vote for a lizard,” said Ford, “the wrong lizard might seize power.”.

Voting with a Blank Ballot

Incidentally, this is the place to return to the matter of voting with a blank ballot. We can now say that blank ballots are preferable to passive non-voting. In that way it becomes clearer to everyone that there is a substantial segment of citizens who are unwilling to vote because they are seeking improvement and change, and that itself calls on new forces to try to win this electorate, helps thaw the freeze, and lets in some light. If we simply do not go vote, people may think that people lack the energy to invest in voting and that this is mere indifference. In that case new candidates will not come, because they will assume that the eternal incumbents will continue forever to receive most of the votes. Therefore this is a situation that is less inviting to new forces to enter the arena. A blank ballot emphasizes that non-voting stems from the absence of a worthy candidate, and thus new candidates are summoned into the arena to try to win the available electorate. For a vivid expression of such an approach (if you will) by Meir Ariel, see here.

Caveat: Apocalypse Now

Many people have heard this thesis from me and reacted out of an apocalyptic instinct. If you vote Meretz, Labor, or Likud, the world will collapse. With your childish approach, none of us will still be here when the improvement you are hoping for arrives.

Well then. If, in someone’s assessment, the truly expected immediate result is collapse and destruction, that is indeed a valid reason to adopt the lesser evil and ignore the long term (for otherwise we simply will not be here when it arrives). My claim is that this is not always the case. Moreover, I claim that specifically at the present time, although everyone (a consensus composed of a combination of interested parties and fools) is trying to convince us of the necessity of the “right” vote (for the lesser evil), this is simply not the case.

It is important to understand that this challenge to my proposal is based on the result that is expected actually to occur, and not on Kant’s hypothetical consideration (only an actual possibility of annihilation is a reason not to abstain from voting). But even if I personally do not vote, that would in any event change nothing in practice (this is relevant only to the argument of the categorical imperative, which, as stated, is hypothetical in its essence). Therefore it seems to me that the thesis of not voting withstands this challenge as well.

More than that: as I explained, even if none of us voted, I still do not share these apocalyptic visions. If we have survived until now despite the wretched leadership we have been granted, there is no reason we should not continue to survive. To destroy a people or a state is no easy business, and it does not happen so quickly. I think there are boundaries that none of the parties I mentioned will cross, and overall, in my opinion, the state’s security and economic condition will not be very different whether it is led by Meretz, Likud, Jewish Home, Lapid, Kahlon, or Labor. Certainly not different to the point of destruction. At present the situation is such that circumstances dictate what the government does, and therefore it does not really matter who exactly sits there (“things look different from there…” ). Hence, at least in our current circumstances, there is no significant existential risk in a policy of non-voting. And even if we agreed on non-voting as a social agreement (a universal law; Kant’s hypothetical consideration), the distribution of votes would still be roughly what it is today. Voter turnout would fall in all parties, but there is no reason to assume that the governing outcome would be different.^[5] In short, do not frighten us with apocalypses. This is part of the chorus of the lesser evil that produces the present stagnation.

A Similar Consideration

I will add here another consideration. I have already written here in the past that on the political-security plane, about which everyone talks all the time, nothing real will happen regardless of who holds the reins of power. Circumstances dictate diplomatic paralysis and security stagnation, and there is no difference, in this respect, between Zehava Galon, Lapid, Bennett, or Bibi. All of them will do fairly similar things on the large scale. No one will bring peace, and all of them will give us little wars from time to time. “We shall forever live by the sword.” This is actually a reason not to give my vote to a party because of a security or diplomatic platform. What can be changed, and therefore what alone is worth focusing on, is דווקא economic policy and a social-cultural platform. But we always mortgage all of those for the sake of security apocalypses (if we vote according to integrity and socio-economic considerations, the state will collapse and there will be no one left to enjoy it). If we do not vote for anyone because no one inspires confidence in us and no one conducts himself decently, the fear is that the state will collapse in security terms. Thus with our own hands we bring about stagnation even in areas where change and improvement could have occurred.

In my view, there is nothing to prevent a person of the political right from voting for Meretz if he thinks they will lead better policy, by his lights, in the social and economic spheres, even if in his opinion their diplomatic-security platform is a disaster. In any case, it changes nothing. But morning and night our brains are washed with diplomatic and security apocalypses, and we are taken captive by them, thereby preventing improvement even in the areas where it could happen.

This consideration is not identical to the previous one, but logically it is very similar. Here the conclusion is indeed to vote (for someone other than the one toward whom we naturally tend) and not to abstain from voting, but the mechanism that prevents us from doing so seems very similar to the previous one. Here too this is a kind of lesser-evil consideration, that is, short term versus long term. Thus, for example, a man of the right says to himself: Bibi may not be honest, he may be threatened by various indictments in many different matters, he may conduct himself as though the state were registered in his name in the land registry, Sarah may chatter endlessly at the whole country and obstruct affairs of state, but still he is the only one who can take care of us in security terms (as our eyes plainly see from the marvelous “security” in which we live), and therefore it is important that all of us vote for him. Consequently, no problem discovered in Bibi’s conduct will move him from his place. That is the recipe for the stagnation in which we find ourselves. Does this remind you of the local maximum? Indeed it does. People do not understand that it is better not to vote for him, thereby taking upon ourselves a small security risk (in their view), in order to gain long-term benefit. In that way people will learn that if they are not honest, they will not be elected.

Caveat: The Lesser Evil or the Least Flawed Good

It is important to mention another reservation here. My consideration may seem somewhat utopian. Should we always refrain from voting for someone whenever he has some defect? Are we waiting until the perfect candidate comes along (more precisely: until the person elected behaves perfectly and again merits our vote), and only then go vote? That sounds purist and implausible. That really is childish. It is difficult to expect a perfect candidate, since we are all human beings, and therefore it is unreasonable to suspend our participation in political action until a perfect state of affairs comes into being.

Briefly, I would say that in my opinion we must distinguish here between considerations of the lesser evil and considerations of the least flawed good. The principle I am proposing is not to vote for evil, even if it is the lesser evil, until the good arrives. But if the good before us is not perfect, then there is room to choose it despite its imperfection (at least when there is nothing better). The principle is that one does not vote for someone bad, but one does vote for someone who is not perfect (not wholly good). This may be called choosing the least flawed good. In the language of game theory, one might perhaps say that we ought not to act on maximin considerations (the maximum among the minima—the lesser evil), but on minimax considerations (the accessible minimum among the possible maxima—the least flawed good). For a concise formulation of this principle, see Arel Segal (not the journalist) here.

The assumption underlying the matter is that good and evil are not two formulations of the same thing. It is not true that someone who is not perfect may be called a little bad or a little good. There is a difference between a little bad and a little good, and this is not merely a matter of looking at the half-full or half-empty side of the same glass. The important question is whether the present situation is regarded as imperfect good or as incomplete evil, and that is not the same thing. For a similar distinction, see our article on the second root (following Robert Nozick’s distinction between extortion and enticement. See my discussion of this in Column 8).

Example: Rabbi Ila’i’s Ruling

I will conclude with an example from Jewish law of this principle. In several places in the Talmud, a saying of Rabbi Ila’i is cited regarding someone who thinks that his inclination is overpowering him (Moed Katan 17a):

As it was taught: Rabbi Ila’i says, If a person sees that his inclination is overpowering him, let him go to a place where no one knows him, wear black, wrap himself in black, and do what his heart desires, but let him not profane the name of Heaven in public.

There are several interpretations of this saying, but according to the straightforward reading Rabbi Ila’i is trying to minimize damage. A person who sees that he cannot prevent the expected spiritual harm is supposed to minimize damage (let him commit the transgression, but at least without desecrating God’s name), that is, to choose the option of the lesser evil.

But even this was said only when it is clear that the evil will occur and the only question is how to minimize it. In our case I am proposing a path that in the long run will be good (or better). In such a situation it is certainly incorrect to apply Rabbi Ila’i’s policy. Moreover, even regarding the situation with which Rabbi Ila’i is concerned, the Rosh and the Rif write there:

Rabbi Ila’i’s ruling is not accepted. Rather, even though his inclination overpowers him, he must bring himself to his senses, for we hold that everything is in the hands of Heaven except the fear of Heaven (Berakhot 33b).

That is, they categorically reject the policy of the lesser evil when it is a matter of evil. There is room to choose the least flawed good, but not the lesser evil.^[6]

1.

Footnotes

1. Although in the last local elections there was a case of a tie in Tzafria between two candidates. But there we are speaking of about 250 voters, and even there the probability is very small. When we are dealing with the scale of a state, there is simply no chance of this. For discussion of this and of voting in general, see here.
2. This sorry creature, who in public is portrayed as “Mr. Clean,” served then as Minister of the Interior and gave Elmakayes active and consistent backing. He was unwilling to address our complaints, and did not even answer the letters we sent. In the end, after about a year and a half, we managed to persuade a reporter from News 1 in the South to prepare a report on the situation. We saw that the report was not being aired, and when we asked about it, the reporter himself told us that heavy political pressure was being exerted on the system not to broadcast the report. After a few days of hesitation, the system decided nevertheless to air the report on the news broadcast. We waited impatiently for the broadcast, and indeed at the beginning of the edition they announced that a report on Yeruham was forthcoming. When they came to the report itself, the presenter opened by saying, to our surprise, that a response had just arrived from the Minister of the Interior, our old friend Pines, saying that he was dismissing the head of the Yeruham local council, Baruch Elmakayes. So once again, of course, “Mr. Clean” demonstrated before everyone’s eyes the purity of his hands. It turns out that when he heard that the report on his failures was about to be aired, he hurried to dismiss him immediately through an announcement on television, explaining with excellent taste and judgment that he was unwilling to tolerate corruption. Very interesting: how his selective conscience awakens only when he hears that a television report is about to appear. In retrospect it became clear to us that Elmakayes learned of his dismissal through the television on that very news broadcast. Pines never had the slightest intention of dismissing him—except when he heard that the matter was about to be publicized. Thus far the commandment to speak ill of the wicked. Let the public know and understand.
3. For more detail on this, see my article in __Nekuda__, 5769, and see also in the responsum here.
4. So Long, and Thanks for All the Fish, chapter 36.
5. But the long-term effect, of course, does exist. After all, the electoral vacuum still calls on new forces to bring the voters back to the ballot box and to win their votes.
6. For a broader discussion of choosing the lesser evil in Jewish law and of Rabbi Ila’i’s ruling, see our article in __Midah Tovah 5767, parashat Chayei Sarah (also appears in our book, __To Do Your Commandments).