On Unconscious Worldviews and Counting Someone for a Minyan (Column 191)
With God’s help
Yesterday I found myself discussing with someone the views common among researchers in the neurosciences. As is well known, many of them hold a materialist-determinist view, and it seems that anyone who works in this field can hardly avoid such conceptions. There it is taken as self-evident. Following that conversation, I began thinking about the significance of people’s unconscious views, and here I wanted to touch a bit on this interesting question.
The Failed Interface Between Science and Philosophy
In my book, The Sciences of Freedom, I explained that in my opinion the philosophical discussions in the area of free will and the neurosciences suffer from a built-in flaw, since they combine scientific discussion from various and diverse disciplines in the natural sciences (physics, chemistry, biology, mathematics and computer science, biomedicine, medical and imaging instrumentation, psychiatry, and more) with aspects from the humanities, such as psychology, philosophy, and law. In such a combination, an almost structural failure is created, since natural scientists are generally not skilled in philosophical thinking, while philosophers lack knowledge and skill in the natural sciences. Naturally, engagement with the philosophical significance of the neurosciences is conducted mainly by researchers from the various scientific fields, since the scientific material is less accessible to philosophers, and so we get statements that reflect a lack of understanding—sometimes a glaring one—of philosophical concepts and principles.
Materialism and Atheism as Methodological Assumptions
One of the prominent aspects of this phenomenon is the confusion between methodological assumptions and a conception of reality. Something very similar happens here to what happens around vitalism in biology. Vitalism is a view that assumes that living creatures contain an additional component beyond inanimate matter (a vital component). In biology over the past generation, vitalism has become a dirty word, since in the view of almost all researchers the phenomena of life can be explained even without recourse to that assumption. In fact, that assumption is even harmful to scientific research, since we have no scientific tools for investigating souls and spirits. Our science deals with the behavior of matter (from physics and chemistry to biology), so the assumption that there is something more here brings scientific progress to a halt. In effect, we are being told not to continue investigating certain phenomena because something else is responsible for them—something not exposed to our instruments or our scientific way of thinking. It is the progress of biology that led to the rejection of vitalism (because we managed without it), but that progress also feeds on this very rejection (had we held a vitalist view, scientific progress would probably have been far more limited).
This is essentially what happens in the neurosciences as well. There too, the assumption that there is a soul within us and that we are not merely a state machine (a mechanical calculating machine) is destructive to scientific research, because it tells us not to investigate certain phenomena since a priori it is clear that we will not find for them a scientific explanation within the existing disciplines. By contrast, research advances and finds explanations for more and more phenomena, and it is precisely the assumption that there is nothing in us beyond matter that underlies this progress, while the progress in turn repeatedly confirms it.
One can speak in a similar context about belief in God. Just as with the question of the soul within the individual person, so too the question arises of the existence of an additional spiritual entity in our material universe. Is the universe only the matter and creatures that we see and know within it, or is another spiritual component involved in it—God? And here too, the assumption that there is a God is not helpful, and perhaps even harmful, to scientific progress. Evolutionary research assumes that God is not involved and that everything can be explained in terms of the laws of nature. Belief can bring this research to a halt, because if we encounter a gap in the evolutionary process, we have no problem: here God intervened and caused a leap (god of the gaps). By contrast, the materialist researcher will not assume this, and will therefore look for a scientific explanation. The same is true of religious belief with respect to Zionism and social initiatives generally. The assumption that God moves the world and takes care of us may paralyze us and sap our motivation to act. It may lead to fatalism. In fact, things began to move forward only once secularization emerged, and not by accident.
Between Methodological Assumptions and Truth
So in all these areas there is a reductive assumption that yields the maximum methodological benefit: materialism in biology and the neurosciences, and atheism in social initiative. Scientific methodology and social effectiveness require taking the spiritual out of the picture. The question is whether the fact that this is an effective and methodologically sound assumption also means that it is true. In my opinion, it does not. The fact that biology advances more successfully under a materialist assumption follows from the nature of biology. We simply have no scientific way to investigate souls and spirits, while we do have very good ways of investigating biological and physico-chemical mechanisms. Therefore, if we assume that the reality with which we are dealing is only physico-chemical (and biological), it is obvious that this will help and will motivate us to advance the research and not abandon any unexplored corner. But that is a result of the fact that these are the research tools we have (and perhaps there are no others at all. It is not clear whether this is accidental or whether it reflects the nature of material science as against the way spiritual spheres operate). But this in no way means that we have no soul. It means only that we have no effective tools for investigating the soul, and therefore there is no point in dealing with it, or even assuming its existence, within the framework of our scientific work. But that certainly does not mean that in actual reality we truly have no soul.
Here it is important to add a clarification. One might understand me to mean that when I say I believe in vitalism, I am speaking of a parallel plane. That is, my claim would be that biology can be complete even without the vitalist assumption, and vitalism is merely a declaration that something beyond matter exists, but it does not affect our biology (this is the view called epiphenomenalism). If that were so, there really would be no point in talking about vitalism, because it would not be relevant to our lives. If the soul does not affect the body, then at least de facto it makes no difference whether it exists or not. The essential vitalist claim says that this soul definitely affects what happens, and yet the assumption of its nonexistence is highly useful methodologically. Science will not be wholly complete without the vitalist assumption, because there are parts inaccessible to science, but since science is the only tool we currently have, it is better to focus on it and achieve through it all that can be achieved.
The same is true in the neurosciences. There too one can speak of our soul or spirit as an epiphenomenon, that is, as a phenomenon appended or attached to the biological brain. The brain affects it, and it does not affect the brain. But then the essence of the dualist view (the one that advocates the existence of spirit alongside body) is emptied out. That spirit does not affect what happens, and the scientific explanation will give us a complete picture.
When I speak about vitalism or interactionist dualism, I mean to say that the spiritual dimensions also affect physical reality. And nevertheless, I argue that it is not constructive to assume their existence on the scientific plane. I explained that in the biological context this is not constructive because we have no way to deal scientifically with that dimension. But there is another important point here. So long as there is no full and explicit reduction of the laws of biology to the laws of physics and chemistry, the materialist claim stands on very shaky ground. The fact that all the phenomena of life can be explained through the laws of biology (even when that becomes possible, if it ever does; of course that is still not the case today) does not mean that we have no soul. The vitalist claim is that the soul is what causes the body to conduct itself according to the laws of biology. In effect, the claim is that the soul and its effects on the body are precisely the reason that biology cannot be fully reduced to physics and chemistry. In other words, the reason we do not currently have a complete reductionist picture of biology is the soul. The soul is not required in order to understand the conduct of the living creature, since that is explained according to the laws of biology. But vitalism holds that the soul is the reason there are laws of biology beyond physics and chemistry.
In the context of the neurosciences this distinction appears in a somewhat different form. There too my claim is that the spirit affects the brain (and is not merely an epiphenomenon). Yet it is still not constructive to assume its existence on the scientific plane, because we do not have good scientific tools for dealing with it. But there my claim is that at least the dimension of free will, unlike all the other mental phenomena, is a direct influence of the mental dimension (the vital, spiritual one) on the body/brain, and that we will not be able to explain with scientific tools. As I showed in my book, a libertarian view of free will necessarily assumes either that there is an electron that moves without the influence of a physical force, or that a physical force is created from nonphysical sources (from the will). From that point onward, events proceed according to natural physical causality.
Therefore, in the context of the neurosciences, the assumption that we have a spirit and free will is not constructive for a somewhat different reason than in the context of vitalism in biology. Here the spirit is involved in the events themselves and is not needed merely to complete the reduction, as it is there. But the action of the spirit is still not amenable to scientific explanation. If we were to assume, regarding every unexplained phenomenon, that it is the result of the spirit’s influence, we would see no need to investigate it. The assumption that there is no spirit spurs research to try to explain every phenomenon, and therefore it is methodologically the more correct assumption. The question is whether this assumption will indeed explain all the events that occur in the brain. My claim is that it will not. If we happen to encounter that electron that begins to move under the influence of the will, we will have no physical explanation for that phenomenon. But the chance that we will encounter such an electron is negligible, and therefore methodologically it is not worthwhile to assume that such a thing exists at all. Better to assume that it does not, and to seek an explanation for every movement of every electron, thereby extracting everything possible from the scientific tools. But my claim is that in the end there really is no such explanation for the rare cases of electrons that move under the influence of the will. According to dualism, we will not arrive at a complete picture by scientific tools alone. By contrast, biology can arrive at a complete understanding using scientific tools. What will be missing (because of the soul) is the reduction to chemistry and physics.
Why Assume Vitalism Anyway?
So the fact that the materialist-determinist assumption is efficient and useful for advancing scientific research is, in my view, indeed correct. At the same time, I argue that it is wrong to infer from this that it is also the full picture of reality itself. It is no accident that brain researchers tend to adopt a materialist-determinist picture. Given their methodological assumptions, this is understandable and reasonable. My claim, however, is that they should not confuse their methodological assumptions with a conception of actual reality.
One may of course ask: if these assumptions are methodologically more effective and useful, why assume that there is anything more at all? True, it does not follow necessarily that there is no soul or spirit, but Ockham’s razor still tells us to choose the simplest picture, and if there is no reason to assume the existence of a spirit or a soul, why do so? Notice that this is already a consideration that justifies the jump from methodology to a conception of reality. Seemingly, this is not merely a confusion but a logical conclusion (even if of course not a necessary one).
In the above-mentioned book I explained that there are good reasons to hold a dualist-libertarian view—admittedly not scientific reasons, but philosophical and ethical ones. Here I will only say that our intuition points that way, and that too carries weight. There is no reason to abandon a healthy intuition if there is no need to do so. And if the conclusion about reality is not a necessary result of the methodological picture, then it is wrong to leap from methodology to reality (that is, to metaphysics) and give up our intuitions. I will not elaborate further, because that is not my topic here.
From Influencing Circumstances to Determining Circumstances
Another reason people abandon the libertarian intuition and see it as an illusion is the fact that it has often been shown that changing physical circumstances affects behavior and even character traits. Thus, for example, it is well known that damage to the brain changes character traits and even beliefs. From this many infer that there is nothing in us beyond the brain, and that even our mental dimension is merely a byproduct of the brain (it emerges from the neuronal whole. That is why this approach is called emergentism).
And again I argue that although this is a healthy and useful methodological assumption, there is still a gap between it and materialist determinism as a claim about reality itself, and the leap over that gap is unjustified. As I explained in my book, there is a difference between the claim that physical-neuronal circumstances influence behavior and the claim that they determine it. A clear-eyed libertarian will not deny that circumstances influence us and our behavior, and even our character and inclinations. But he will claim that these are only partial influences, and in the end the decision is ours (as we take those influences into account). I explained this through the parable of the topographical contour map (see for example my article here).
Real and Apparent Materialist Determinists
Many materialist determinists do not think about this gap, and therefore pass unwittingly from claims about influence to claims about absolute determination. In this, of course, they are mistaken. The same is true of vitalism: here too there are those who leap from methodology to reality, and in my opinion they are mistaken in this as well. Let me now move one step further and ask whether, for that reason, they can be seen as covert libertarians despite their materialist-determinist declarations. After all, if they were aware of this gap, it is entirely possible that they would admit that they themselves are not determinists at all; they merely thought they were because they failed to notice the gap (they are mistaken in diagnosing their own views). Seemingly, a person who declares himself a materialist determinist, if he reached his conclusions on the basis of an error, can be seen as a covert dualist (who does not diagnose himself correctly). His intuitions are dualist, and his abandonment of them is based on a mistaken consideration.
So I am not speaking here about genuine determinists. My claim is that there are probably quite a few people who have a libertarian intuition, and yet force themselves to abandon it. I presented here two reasons for this (there are others): failure to notice the gap between methodological assumptions and factual determinations, and failure to distinguish between the claim that circumstances influence our behavior and the claim that they determine it. I am speaking of people who, after hearing these arguments, would admit that there is no reason to abandon their intuitive view, which is dualist-libertarian. My concern here is the question of how I should relate to such people. Are they determinists, as they present themselves, or, since they abandon their true view (which exists within them) for mistaken reasons, are they not really such? Before touching on that discussion, I will preface something about its implications.
The Implications of the Dispute: Morality and Jewish Law
As I explain in the above-mentioned book, contrary to the common view there are almost no implications to the dispute between determinism and libertarianism (and there are even fewer implications to the dispute between materialism and dualism). A materialist determinist and a dualist libertarian will usually behave similarly in all situations. In both pictures of the world one can judge people and condemn them, make decisions, exercise judgment, and choose values, and so forth. The difference is that in the materialist-determinist picture this is a facade of judgment, decision-making, and evaluation. In their view, these are deterministic processes that we merely call judgment and decision, but whose real meaning is entirely different. All these concepts do indeed appear in the materialist picture as well, but their meaning changes.
Above all, it is clear that the picture of the human being as a distinct and special creature is fatally damaged in the materialist-determinist picture. There is no room to view a human being as a special creature with rights, who bears responsibility for his actions, if he is a calculating machine, however complex it may be. We will judge him in exactly the same way as in the other picture, but the motivations and the meaning will be entirely different (we will judge him in order to influence his future decisions, and not as “punishment,” that is, as a sanction for evil and wickedness). Of course, one can still say that we “judge” him and relate to him uniquely in a merely technical sense, without the theory of rights and uniqueness that accompanies this, but that is again the same facade. We do not really deliberate or judge, and a human being has no more rights than a grasshopper; killing him is not essentially different from crushing a grasshopper, aside from arbitrary conditionings ingrained in us.
All this is on the philosophical and everyday plane. But in the religious context there are further implications. For example, in my opinion one should not count toward a minyan (prayer quorum) a Jew who holds a materialist-determinist worldview. Such a person starts from the premise that whatever is not captured by our scientific measuring instruments does not exist. If so, he cannot believe in God either (for God is a nonmaterial being, and there is no reason to posit His existence. This is exactly like positing the existence of a soul). He can of course declare belief and behave like a believer, and again this will be a facade of faith and religious commitment. I know religious people who hold a materialist-determinist worldview, but because this is a facade, in my opinion they cannot be counted for a minyan. Essentially they are atheists. This is at least one practical and evaluative implication of this dispute, from my perspective.
From Ontology to Psychology[1]
Let us ask ourselves why such people come to pray at all. Many of them will tell you that they believe just as much as you and I do. How one can believe in God if one is a determinist—I do not know. Others will tell you that they are committed to the commandments and to Jewish law for various reasons (the facade strikes again). Some identify with the Jewish people’s acceptance of Jewish law, or with its historical and national heritage (similar to the view of Ahad Ha’am). Others will tell you that God is, in any case, a being we invented, so those who declare a dualist worldview and belief in the ordinary sense are living in a fantasy. They invent for themselves an imaginary friend because that is how they feel. So I too, the materialist, am built like my dualist brothers who believe, and I too, like them, feel comfortable with that assumption, and therefore I too observe this ritual. No further reasons are needed. Alternatively, I feel a psychological need to observe commandments, and that suffices for me. I have no need for theological justifications, especially since those who offer them are living in an illusion as well.
Incidentally, you will get similar answers regarding commitment to morality.[2] In a materialist world the explanations are usually that I act morally, am committed to morality, and judge people on the moral plane simply because that is how I am built. I am used to it, because within me too there is the “voice of conscience” (a psychological fiction), just as in every other person (and from my perspective as a materialist, in his case too it is a fiction), and that is enough for me. As stated, none of these excuses persuades me on the merits (see further below), but in any event my claim is that one cannot view someone who holds them either as a moral person or as a believer. This is a facade of morality and faith, but in truth it is a complete atheist who has religious feelings and experiences within him, and a person who behaves morally in practice but is not essentially committed to morality.
Therefore, as I wrote, I would not count such a person for a minyan—not because I am angry at him or because he deserves punishment (a sanction for his wickedness), but simply because he is not praying. Prayer is standing before God, and therefore it requires belief that there is someone before whom one stands. A person who prays to a psychological fiction within himself is not really praying.[3] Just as I would not count for a minyan an atheist who took hallucinogenic pills and begins to have religious experiences. That does not testify to faith or standing before God, but to psychic events that arise within him for one side reason or another.
Double Consciousness
But the situation is not so simple. Now the question I want to address here arises. In my estimation, in most of the cases I described, those people are not really atheists. The religious feeling within them stems from a genuine belief in God that dwells within them. But when they try to examine it by the tools of reason and science, they conclude that it is an illusion, because they have no rational explanation for why they feel this way, and no indication that God really exists (they have no “proofs”). Alternatively, those researchers I described above, who confuse the methodological plane with the ontic plane—that is, who assume that what is methodologically useful is also what is true in reality itself—in many cases do not themselves notice that this is a confusion. They make this jump as something self-evident and do not notice at all that it is a logical leap. Therefore, in my opinion, such people are covert vitalists even though they oppose and reject vitalism. The vitalist intuition, which in my estimation exists in almost every such person, is silenced because in his view (mistakenly, as I understand it) it has no place and is an illusion. Again, I am not speaking here about people who are aware of this gap and nevertheless made a decision and reached a materialist conclusion. Those are certainly full-fledged materialists. I am speaking about those whose unconscious view differs from their declared one.
What Is the Status of Unconscious Worldviews?
Here we have arrived at the question that is the subject of this column: can such people be considered believers, and can they be counted for a minyan? They actually believe in God, but are not aware of it. The rationalization they perform causes them to reject the faith that dwells within them and to view it as an illusion, even though they are mistaken in doing so. These arguments are not really supposed to lead them to abandon their intuition. It is not an illusion but genuine faith, but they do not understand that (in my opinion). Such a person, in his conscious mind, is a materialist atheist (his belief is merely psychological), but in the subconscious, as I understand him, he is a believer. He is a conscious atheist and a covert believer (in the subconscious). Can such an unconscious believer, who comes to the synagogue to pray, join a minyan, since inwardly he does believe? In the conventional discourse (which annoys me greatly)[4] one could say that the “Jewish point” or the “divine point” exists within him as well.
As a rule, I tend not to recognize, or at least not to attach importance to, unconscious views. I have already written here in the past that in my view the pioneers who drained swamps did not fulfill the commandment of settling the Land of Israel, because most of them were unbelievers, and commandments require belief (even according to the view that commandments do not require intention).[5] There is, of course, the common speculation (see the “Jewish/divine point”) that deep down, in their subconscious, there was faith that motivated them to do this. I absolutely do not accept this. In my opinion, they did what they did like any gentile who acts and sacrifices himself for his people, as part of the phenomenon of the Springtime of Nations and the awakening of nationalism from the nineteenth century onward. But even if I did accept this speculation, in my view it has no value whatsoever. What such a person does cannot be regarded as a commandment if in his consciousness he is not a believer. Even if deep down he believes in some sense, what determines his views, in terms of my judgment of him, is solely what he decides consciously. What is deep within him is not the result of a decision but of innate or acquired formation (or unconscious recognition of the truth), and therefore it cannot be considered his position. A person’s position is the position he arrived at through his mind, awareness, and reason. Seemingly there is no room for the hesitation I presented here. The covert believer I have described should be treated as an atheist.
But with regard to prayer, it seems to me that there is nonetheless room for discussion. Here the question is not whether he fulfills the commandment of prayer but whether he is praying. Is he in fact standing before God? Consciously, he may think that he is standing before a psychological phenomenon, but the truth is that he is standing before God, and he feels it that way too. Therefore there is room for the argument that such a person can be counted for a minyan despite his declared beliefs. This is true at least if one assumes that counting for a minyan requires that the person be praying, and not necessarily that he be fulfilling the commandment of prayer. He certainly does not fulfill the commandment of prayer, because as I explained he is not a believer in the essential sense (that is, in terms of his decision), and commandments require belief. But if I ask whether, as a matter of fact, he is standing before God and praying, the answer can be yes even if he himself is not aware of it.
The Laws of Doubt and Presumptions
This is of course not true of every nonbeliever, but only of covert believers. Therefore the question still remains how I should relate to a person who openly declares that he does not believe and comes to the synagogue to pray. Should I subject him to a comprehensive interrogation in order to clarify his unconscious position? That seems unlikely. Is there some presumption regarding such a person’s state that I can assume even without investigating him? I do not know. My feeling is that regarding most people who come to the synagogue (though not most people in general), there is a presumption that if he comes and prays, then even if he declares that he does not believe in the ontic sense (but only in the psychological sense), he is probably an unconscious ontic believer. Therefore there is no need to question him, and one may count him for a minyan.
Does such prayer have value for him? I think not, because such value exists only when one fulfills the commandment of prayer. Therefore, in my opinion, there is likewise no value in putting tefillin on an atheist in the street (as distinct from putting tefillin on a traditional Jew or a believer who has not yet put on tefillin today), even if I assume that he may believe in his subconscious. Here the question is whether he fulfilled the commandment of tefillin, and my answer is no. For that purpose, what determines the matter is conscious beliefs. But with regard to counting for a minyan, as I explained, it may perhaps depend only on the factual question whether he is praying and not on the normative question whether he is fulfilling the commandment of prayer.
[1] In this context it is worth looking at Column 7, and to some extent also Column 168.
[2] See on this topic Column 86.
[3] See on this Column 97 on “secular prayers.”
[4] It annoys me because, from my perspective, the claim that there is unconscious faith within him is the result of a logical and philosophical analysis such as the one I have offered here, and not a metaphysical assumption about the Jew’s unique character as against the gentile. Therefore I assume this regarding every person (or at least many human beings), from all religions and cultures, and not only regarding Jews. It is not the result of something God implanted in us by virtue of our being His chosen people, but a philosophical-cognitive intuition that exists within many people, Jews and non-Jews alike.
[5] For details, see my article on causing secular Jews to sin.
Discussion
R. Michael, regarding the question of human excess or surplus, what is your opinion of Raymond Tallis’s 2011 book, Aping Mankind (as Erik Glasner translated it in his article on Tallis in the collection The Post-Human Age), and of the maladies of "Darwinitis" and "neuromania" that Tallis diagnoses in modern scientific discourse?
The claim is as follows: inanimate matter behaves according to the laws of physics and chemistry. Living matter behaves according to different laws—those of biology. Now there are two possibilities: 1. The laws of biology can be grounded in (reduced to) physics and chemistry. In that case, of course, there is no need to posit anything additional. This is the anti-vitalist view. 2. The laws of biology cannot be grounded in physics and chemistry. In that case, it is reasonable to assume that living matter contains something beyond inanimate matter, and that is what causes it to behave according to different laws (and prevents the reduction).
I’m not familiar with the book. If there is a specific argument, I’d be happy for you to raise it and we can discuss it.
A. You’re giving yourself a bit of a break when you say that, methodologically, it is preferable to assume materialism. After all, even if the non-material part of the brain were just a single electron, we would expect it to play a very central role in the brain, so its absence really does call for explanation.
B. According to your Platonic view, that there are strong intuitions in all of us such that if only we listen to them properly we will arrive at the truth, what is the difference between a hidden believer and a heretic?
The honorable rabbi writes—
"One can speak in a similar context about belief in God as well. Just as with the question of the soul within the individual person, there also arises the question of the existence of another spiritual object in our material universe. Is the universe only the matter and creatures that we see and know within it, or is another spiritual component involved in it—God?"
And the honored Rambam writes—
Guide of the Perplexed, Part I, Chapter 58
Negative attributes are indeed those that ought to be employed, in order to direct the mind to what one ought to believe concerning Him, may He be exalted; for on their account no multiplicity arises in any way, and they direct the mind to the utmost extent of what man can apprehend of Him, may He be exalted. The illustration of this is that it has been demonstrated to us by proof that there exists some one being other than these substances apprehended by the senses and whose knowledge the intellect comprehends in general—and we say of this that it exists, meaning that its non-existence is false. Then we apprehend that this existent is not like the existence of the elements, for example, which are inanimate bodies—and we say that it is living, meaning that He, may He be exalted, is not dead. Then we apprehend that this existent is also not like the existence of the heavens, which are a living body—and we say that He is not a body. Then we apprehend that this existent is not like the existence of the intellect, which is not a body and is not dead, but is caused—and we say that He, may He be exalted, is eternal, meaning that He has no cause that brought Him into existence. Then we apprehend that this existent does not merely have an existence sufficient for itself alone, but that many existents overflow from Him—and this is not like the overflow of heat from fire, nor like the necessary emanation of light from the sun, but rather an overflow that continually provides them with permanence, existence, and orderly governance, as we shall explain—and on account of these notions we say of Him that He is powerful, wise, and willing; and the intent of these attributes is that He is not weak, nor ignorant, nor hasty or neglectful. The meaning of our saying "not weak" is that His existence suffices to bring other things into existence besides Himself; the meaning of our saying "not ignorant" is that He apprehends—namely, that He lives, for everything that apprehends is living; and the meaning of our saying "not hasty or neglectful" is that all these existents proceed according to order and governance, and are not abandoned and brought forth by chance, but rather as everything governed by one who wills—with intention and will. Then we apprehend that this existent has no other like it—and we say that "He is one," meaning the negation of multiplicity.
Therefore, one should not say of the Holy One, blessed be He, that He is "spiritual," heaven forbid, just as He is not "corporeal" and is not even "existent" in any straightforward sense.
It seems to me that if we are not going to count someone for a minyan because of a flawed conception of God, then even someone who follows the Rambam would not count the honorable rabbi for a minyan…. With all due respect. There is no end to such a thing.
(And by the way, the Rambam emphasizes even in the Mishneh Torah that the Holy One, blessed be He, is not a "force in a body," even though force is "spiritual.")
Regarding the gap between methodological assumptions and truth
It seems to me that it is worth noting that according to the pragmatic theory of truth, every useful and fruitful methodological assumption is also a true assumption. So there is also a philosophical justification for the "leap" made by those engaged in neuroscience and biology.
Would you include Prof. Yeshayahu Leibowitz in a minyan?
A. I don’t know on what basis you determine that this is so significant. In how many events in which the brain is examined by instruments am I engaged in making a choice? And even in such an event, we are talking about the movement of individual electrons that begin the chain of action, so it is not likely that we would see them and notice that no force is acting on them. In my estimation there is no chance of encountering such an electron in an experiment.
B. I didn’t say that all of us have the right intuitions. I assume there are quite a few heretics who have no such intuitions within them. I mentioned this in the post here as well. Though a commitment to morality too is, in my view, a hidden faith, and that really does include quite a few people.
Where did I write that one should not count for a minyan people who are mistaken in their conception of God? Perhaps in dramatic errors that is true. And besides, if the Rambam would not count me for a minyan, then so be it. Why is that a difficulty?
The fact that something is defined as a method or as a doctrine does not mean there is anything to it. In my view this is nonsense.
Why not?
Hello and blessings (Blessed is He who revives the dead),
Regarding the discussion itself,
A person who made a mistake in reasoning, and if only we were to point out his error he would immediately accept it and correct his mistake—
can one say that even though at the moment he has not realized his mistake, the very fact that he would certainly correct it if he became aware of it means that already now he has a true conception subconsciously, and therefore he is considered a believer?
Any heretic or idolater or apikores, if only he were made aware of the truth, would repent (unless he is wicked and believes what he wants to believe).
Is your discussion a general discussion about all forms of heresy that stem from error, or only about heresy that stems from this particular error?
On the margins of the discussion:
You accept the assumption that methodologically there is no ability to make progress in neuroscience or biology without a materialist assumption, because there are no scientific tools with which to investigate the spiritual component.
That is certainly a correct assumption insofar as there are no tools to investigate spirit.
Obviously, with research tools from the realm of physics and matter there is no chance of reaching anything in the realm of spirit. The disaster of the "humanities" ("bogus sciences," in your terminology), such as psychology, is the desire to use the wrong tools for the subject matter under discussion.
Is this situation—that there are no scientific tools and no research methodologies in spiritual realms—certainly not going to change?
Is there no possibility that a breakthrough will be found in that realm as well?
Here I was not speaking about someone who would be exposed to correct arguments, but about someone who has a correct intuition and abandons it because of mistaken arguments. That is not the same thing. You are speaking about people who have no intuitive starting point at all and form their view on the basis of arguments. Such people, who formed a position on the basis of mistaken arguments and arrived at atheism, are atheists (otherwise there would be no atheists in the world). I was speaking about someone who has faith in his heart, but because of mistaken arguments finds himself compelled to abandon it.
It is possible that a way will be found to investigate spirit scientifically. At present there is no such way. Specifically regarding the will, I suspect there will be no such way in the future either, because its freedom (I am a libertarian) means that causal explanations for it cannot be found.
As far as I’m concerned, I would include in a minyan the one who has a logical problem with God’s existence together with the one who declares that as far as he is concerned "prayer doesn’t really help in most cases and doesn’t really have a significant impact on our lives." And it is true that most of us do not really feel God’s presence before us—go out and see how we behave—but at least we recognize the truth and aspire to reach it. But those two fellows, when they stand to pray, are in fact not standing before God.
Two comments:
A. It seems the same applies to "faith and trust." Methodologically, it is appropriate to be of little faith and not think that the Holy One, blessed be He, works for you. (Build a parapet for your roof, guard your health, acquire a profession and work for your livelihood, etc.) But beware lest you think, "My power and the might of my hand have gotten me this wealth."
B. Regarding the discussion about "hidden believers," it reminds me a bit of the dispute between the Rambam and the Raavad about one who corporealizes the Creator because he erred in interpreting the verses and aggadot (Laws of Repentance 3:7 and the Raavad’s gloss there, and see the Rambam’s reply to this gloss in the Guide of the Perplexed; I have forgotten the exact reference). Perhaps the matter is also related to the Rambam’s famous words in Laws of Divorce (2:20) regarding a coerced bill of divorce.
A. Indeed correct. I just do not accept the warning at the end. I interpret it in line with the well-known homilies of Rabbenu Nissim and with the plain meaning of the verses: "My power and the might of my hand" really do get me this wealth. But that is thanks to the Holy One, blessed be He, who gave me the power to gain wealth. If you accept the common interpretation that the Holy One, blessed be He, does everything, then human effort becomes something bizarre, a purposeless scriptural decree.
B. See my reply above about the difference between someone who has a correct intuition and denies it because of mistaken arguments, and someone who forms a worldview on the basis of mistaken arguments. The discussion regarding corporealization deals with the question of blameworthiness (whether these mistaken people are culpable), but there is no claim there that they really believe in the correct thing because deep down they have the correct faith.
Hi
I’m asking not in order to provoke or argue (in any case, neither you nor I has changed our mind on the matter).
Don’t you think that a central component in the witness argument (which gives it its force) is that the Torah is one whole? As I understand it, if we reject the principle of the whole, the very plausibility of the Sinai revelation is weakened. In other words: is your statement above (that the question of what exactly is included in the Torah is marginal) not in practice a rejection of the witness argument?
I made a mistake and sent the question to the wrong post…
I have no problem at all with questions meant to provoke. It’s just that the questions should be good ones.
As for the matter itself, I really do not agree. As I explained at length in the fifth notebook, the witness argument is meant to substantiate the claim that there was a revelation and that something was conveyed in it. One cannot derive from it the reliability of every detail. Why should that depend on this?
Where is this intended for?
I saw that it belongs here:
https://mikyab.net/%D7%A9%D7%95%D7%AA/%D7%94%D7%A8%D7%90%D7%99%D7%94-%D7%9C%D7%A7%D7%99%D7%95%D7%9D-%D7%9E%D7%AA%D7%9F-%D7%AA%D7%95%D7%A8%D7%94/#comment-19292
If you want to continue, please do so there.
Okay, but if the reliability of the details is unimportant, and all that can be said is that there was a revelation on the mountain (and that “something” was conveyed there), then this does nothing to defend the exclusivity of Judaism. Other religions will gladly adopt (and in fact have adopted) this minimal requirement, but derive from it the conclusions convenient for them.
First of all, the honored Rambam forbids quoting the Guide of the Perplexed; if you look in the introduction, this is out of concern that you did not understand him correctly and will take things out of context.
But even without that, the definition of "spiritual" is "non-corporeal." I am not familiar with "spiritual" things in reality; I’d be glad if you would tell me about such things. I have heard this claim in the past and in my opinion it is incorrect. To say that someone who uses the term "spiritual" as a negation of corporeality is denying the existence of the Creator is excessive.
I asked that this be continued there.
The Rambam is perhaps the only halakhic decisor who rules in practice that prayer without intention is not prayer (even though commandments do not require intention, and many commentators discussed this and explained why prayer in particular is different).
Rambam, Laws of Prayer 4:1:
"Five things prevent prayer, even though its time has arrived: purity of the hands, covering nakedness, purity of the place of prayer, things that pressure him, and concentration of the heart."
"15
What is concentration of the heart? Any prayer that is not with concentration is not prayer; and if one prayed without concentration, he must pray again with concentration. If he finds his mind confused and his heart troubled, he is forbidden to pray until his mind settles. Therefore, one coming from a journey, being weary or distressed, is forbidden to pray until his mind settles. The Sages said: he should wait three days until he rests and his mind cools, and afterwards he should pray."
Although I have no problem accepting your point regarding commandments in general, specifically with prayer I find it difficult to accept this. From the concept of intention (which is unique here with regard to prayer), it seems that according to the Rambam even we ought not to pray today as a matter of strict law (in practice, we simply do not rule like him, as the Hagahot Maimoniyot and others write).
And if a person who knows who his Creator is, but lacks intention, cannot pray—how much more so a person who does not know at all who his Creator is [because he does not consciously believe].
I presented the position here on the basis of the Rambam only because he rules that intention in prayer is required in practice. Whereas the other Rishonim leave even the commandment of prayer like other commandments that do not require intention (and many have drawn distinctions between different concepts of "prayers")—but in any case, whichever way you look at it: either prayer is indeed more unique than other commandments with respect to intention and faith (and specifically there I would not accept one who does not consciously believe), or it is like the other commandments (and then the same implication would apply in every area, whether prayer or tefillin or waving the lulav…)
Therefore, specifically with prayer, it does not seem to me that one can say this..
As an aside, my impression is that most of the opposition among biologists to vitalism is directed toward various kinds of alternative "medicine" that use vitalism on the level of scientific theory, and the overwhelming majority of biologists do not engage at all with the related philosophical questions—neither positively nor negatively.
Perhaps among those engaged in brain research the situation is different..
Hello Rabbi,
I saw an interesting post by an educated person on matters of dualism and materialism, and I’d be glad to know what the rabbi thinks about it:
He presents why he is a materialist and why he is not skeptical about his other understandings, for example the existence of the external world.
"I take the existence of the world as a starting point because long before I learned that I have a soul and free choice, I learned that the world operates with internal laws that do not respond to any non-corporeal instrument. Therefore, together with the intuitive instinct deeply embedded in me since childhood (if not earlier) of Ockham’s razor, I do not believe in the existence of intelligent powers that transcend nature and govern it in a way that is not through its internal laws."
I would appreciate an answer,
Y
Could the presumption to include materialists on the basis of the assumption that they are pseudo-materialists, in the rabbi’s opinion, depend on location? For example, Hebron is not the same as Bar-Ilan University (at the university there are presumably more heretics who are genuine heretics—or perhaps the reverse?)
I don’t know. Each person according to who he is.
There is nothing that precedes the understanding that we have judgment and free decision. Without that, all our other insights have no meaning, since they are forced upon us.
Beyond that, he learned from nowhere that the material world does not respond to spiritual things, for he does not acknowledge the existence of such things at all.
As for Ockham’s razor, this principle serves us to choose among theories that explain all the facts reasonably. Among them, one chooses the simplest. But when there is a theory that does not offer a reasonable explanation, there is no point choosing it because of the razor principle. Newtonian mechanics is simpler than quantum theory and relativity, so should we choose it?
I expanded on this in my book The Science of Freedom, and also in an article here on the site:
https://mikyab.net/%D7%9B%D7%AA%D7%91%D7%99%D7%9D/%D7%9E%D7%90%D7%9E%D7%A8%D7%99%D7%9D/%D7%9E%D7%91%D7%98-%D7%A9%D7%99%D7%98%D7%AA%D7%99-%D7%A2%D7%9C-%D7%97%D7%95%D7%A4%D7%A9-%D7%94%D7%A8%D7%A6%D7%95%D7%9F/
My impression is completely different. Vitalism is not related to alternative medicine but to biological theory.
I am not speaking at all about intention but about faith. See about this distinction regarding commandments (which require faith even according to the view that they do not require intention) in an article here:
https://mikyab.net/%D7%9B%D7%AA%D7%91%D7%99%D7%9D/%D7%9E%D7%90%D7%9E%D7%A8%D7%99%D7%9D/%D7%91%D7%A2%D7%A0%D7%99%D7%99%D7%9F-%D7%94%D7%9B%D7%A9%D7%9C%D7%AA-%D7%97%D7%99%D7%9C%D7%95%D7%A0%D7%99-%D7%91%D7%A2%D7%91%D7%99%D7%A8%D7%94/
By the way, even regarding intention, without intending the meaning of the words you have done nothing. Lip movement is not speech. That is simple reasoning, regardless of the views of this or that halakhic authority.
If prayer is only standing before God—what difference is there to me between intention and speech?
If prayer requires dialogue with God—then I must know (at least in a simple and "corporealizing" way) with whom I am speaking. (And according to the Rambam—I must also understand what I am saying—intention.)
The requirement of intention in prayer comes on top of the usual requirement in commandments. That is exactly why one cannot say this reasoning with regard to prayer.
Even in the conclusion of your article you said there that one who does not believe is not subject to transgression, and all the more so is not subject to commandment.
I am willing to accept this, but why should the commandment of prayer be easier on this point? We see that specifically in prayer they were even stricter about the meaning of the words, understanding before whom one stands and what one says. (At least according to those who require intention.)
Whichever way you look at it: if prayer does not require [conscious] faith, why would it require intention at all? Does a person who is conducting a dialogue with himself need to intend the meaning of his words? Of course not!
Prayer is standing before God in prayer (= speaking to Him). You can also stand and be silent, but that would be standing, not prayer.
Indeed, you need to know, and my claim is that perhaps he knows, but only implicitly. [Again, I raised this only as a possibility.]
The commandment of prayer would be easier because of what I explained: whether he is counted for a minyan depends on the fact that he is praying, not on the fulfillment of the commandment of prayer. I explicitly wrote that he does not fulfill the commandment of prayer, so I do not understand where you saw in my words that the commandment of prayer is easier. I am not speaking about the commandment of prayer but about his being counted for a minyan (the Divine Presence resting upon ten Israelites).
A child has no such views. The more significant views are the personal existence of the external environment around us.
All the other views—about independent choice and judgment—are views that came from the outside environment. This is cognitive contamination. Therefore, it is proper to begin knowing the world according to the very most basic views there are, namely only the non-materialistic existence of the world.
Ps
I am also familiar with both the article and the book.
Begging the question is the recommended way to reach the conclusion you marked in advance.
Why should anyone care what a child thinks? Why do you assume that this is pure, whereas what I inferred through mature reasoning is "cognitive contamination"? I am astonished!
If what emerges from your words is that a person who does not fulfill the commandment of prayer can still be part of a minyan because he performs the act of prayer (and he recognizes implicitly), then fine… but then I need to understand why a Jew who consciously denies completely (what you called a full-fledged materialist) cannot. After all, there is no connection between performing the act (because that materialist loves me and wants me to feel good..) and faith or intention..
The less a child has heard views external to his basic understandings, the more his basic understandings remain the most precise with respect to what he was born with. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that if truth exists—or at least if we are uncertain which axioms we should choose—then we should choose the child’s axioms, and those should be the axioms we work with. After all, they are the most natural for us.
And regarding the "cognitive contamination" of an adult: I think it is obvious that the more a person grows up and becomes aware of more and more philosophical views, the more his basic understandings are undermined. And as we see, because there are many different views that cannot all exist together (all be correct), it follows that as one grows older, one’s views become less and less correct relative to their original source.
Three questions
1) In one of the comments above you wrote:
"Here I was not speaking about someone who would be exposed to correct arguments, but about someone who has a correct intuition and abandons it because of mistaken arguments. That is not the same thing. You are speaking about people who have no intuitive starting point at all and form their view on the basis of arguments. Such people, who formed a position on the basis of mistaken arguments and arrived at atheism, are atheists (otherwise there would be no atheists in the world). I was speaking about someone who has faith in his heart, but because of mistaken arguments finds himself compelled to abandon it."
Could you elaborate?
Given your view of intuition, do you assume that there are people who simply have no intuition at all?
2) In light of what you say regarding the commandment of prayer, if your inclination is that the unconscious believer can be counted for a minyan,
does that not mean that the unconscious believer also fulfills the commandment of prayer itself?
How can one stand before God yet say that he does not intend to stand before God and therefore does not fulfill the norm?
3) Regarding the fourth comment about the "divine point."
First, I do not understand why you are angry that various people arrived intuitively at the same insight that you reached through rational philosophical analysis (even though the halakhic and normative conclusion regarding the meaning of that insight is different).
But more than that, why do you reject metaphysical assumptions regarding the statistics of the intensity of intuitive exposure to God?
Is that something that is even amenable to philosophical analysis or measurement?
If I define the assumption of the "divine point" as being that the distribution and intensity of intuitive exposure to God are exceptional among the chosen people, and therefore my attitude to unconscious faith in a Jew is essentially different from my attitude to unconscious faith among a gentile.
And I can even justify the claim intuitively…
Is there any way to refute it?
How does one even approach such a question through rational philosophical analysis?
1) I’ll elaborate in one of the coming posts. My claim is that if someone has intuitive faith and rejects it because of mistaken arguments (such that if he heard them he would retract), there is room to view him as a hidden believer. I was not speaking about someone who has no such intuition (not that his intuition lobe was cut out of his brain).
2) I explained this in my remarks. What is there to add here?!
3) I am not angry with anyone. I simply do not accept unreasoned mystical statements. Reaching a similar conclusion by faulty reasoning does not mean there is nothing to reject in what they say.
I did not understand the last sentences. I did not assume anything statistical. I am speaking about the considerations of an individual person.
??
!!
Thank you for the answer.
1) I did not understand how you distinguish between someone who would hypothetically retract and someone who has no intuition.
If you tried to persuade him and he did not retract, is that because you did not present him with the correct arguments, or because he has no intuition?
Is the only indicator of repressed intuition that the person admits that this is his feeling and that he is denying it?
2) Regarding the unconscious believer, you claimed that "even if inwardly he believes in some sense, what determines his views for purposes of my judging him is only what he decides consciously."
But on the other hand, regarding the minyan you said that "here the question is not whether he fulfills the commandment of prayer but whether he is praying. Is he in fact standing before the Holy One, blessed be He."
But if the person is in fact standing before the Holy One, blessed be He, by virtue of his decision to submit himself to that point which he sees as psychological and which you claim is unconscious faith, then that too is a decision.
If by the power of that decision he is indeed standing before the Holy One, blessed be He, and not merely playing with his own psychology, then why is that not a sufficient decision to say that he also fulfills the commandment?
Or to phrase it differently: why, regarding that same act, do you decide to split the statement, and accept his decision half according to how he sees it and half according to how you see it?
3) Your statistical assumption was that unconscious faith "is not the result of something that the Holy One, blessed be He, implanted in us by virtue of our being His treasured people, but rather a philosophical-cognitive intuition that exists within many people, Jews and non-Jews alike."
I understood you to be assuming that there is no difference in the existence of unconscious faith between Jews and non-Jews.
By contrast, I see the talk about a "Jewish point" as a qualitative and/or quantitative statement about unconscious faith. Even without denying the possibility of unconscious faith among non-Jews, the talk about a "Jewish point" can include a softer view claiming that unconscious faith is stronger among Jews.
My question is: what is the source of this assumption, that it is an equal distribution across the whole population?
How does one even approach such a claim? If indeed talk about a "Jewish point" is an "unreasoned mystical statement," I wonder how one can approach such an assumption in a reasoned way and with what tools.
(Usually the phrase "it annoys me מאוד" stems from some degree of anger. My apologies to those who get annoyed without becoming angry.)
?? I didn’t understand. I wrote a lengthy reply; it seemed the rabbi didn’t notice.
1. Why do I need to distinguish? Am I under an obligation to diagnose? Each person knows where he stands. And if I need to know, I can ask or make some assumptions and presumptions. The discussion here is theoretical and not necessarily practical.
2. I didn’t understand the pilpul here. I explained the matter well. As far as I am concerned, fulfillment of commandments depends on the conscious decision, but the very fact of your being one who prays can perhaps be determined on the basis of the unconscious reality. These matters will be explained more in the next post.
3. There is nothing statistical here. I also did not assume an equal distribution across all populations, although that is indeed my assessment—simply because I have no indication otherwise.
What I did was approach the matter with non-mystical tools.
I saw it, and I have nothing to add. You assume that what we are born with is the most reasonable and reliable, and I really do not think so. In my view, the judgment and intuition of an adult are worth more than the opinion of a child. And the "contaminating" philosophical influences are actually welcome because they enrich his judgment.
Can the rabbi answer Yuval Cohen’s question: why does one atheist non-believer out of the ten prevent the Divine Presence from resting on all ten?
Hello!
I couldn’t understand why the rabbi thinks that "biology cannot be fully grounded in physics and chemistry. That is, the fact that we do not currently have a full reductionist picture of biology is because of the soul." In many cases it is certainly possible to explain the laws of biology on the basis of a chemical mechanism down to the level of the individual molecule, so it seems much more likely that the difficulty in doing so is not because of the soul but because biological research tools generally do not descend to such a low resolution.
I too believe that our world is not a closed deterministic system, but I do not think this can be based on the artificial separation that exists between biology and chemistry and physics, but rather more like the example you gave with respect to the brain—that there are indeed individual electrons that can move according to the will of the human soul.
Thank you!
I do not have a very firm position regarding vitalism. My intuition says that the biological cannot be grounded in the physical. But all this is unrelated to the question of determinism; it relates rather to the question of dualism. Even a non-reductive biology can be deterministic (as with animals). In Kabbalistic terminology, vital matter is nefesh; choice belongs to ruach or neshamah and above.
My claim was only that from the very fact that this is a useful methodological assumption it does not follow that this is indeed reality. The question whether this is reality or not is a different question.
With God’s help, 16 Tevet 5779
Regarding the claim that a materialist is necessarily an atheist—this is not necessary. A materialist discusses observable reality and assumes that in our world there is no spirit without matter. This does not mean that he denies the existence of the Creator of the world, who is not part of the world and is not subject to the regularities according to which the entities in the world behave.
Regarding the question of not counting for a minyan one who does not believe: the question is whether the non-inclusion is because of the gavra—that the person, heaven forbid, has gone outside the community of Israel due to his heresy. In that case one can say that a person who does not believe because he lives in a society where disbelief is presented as "pure scientific truth" is in the category of an unwitting sinner close to compulsion, and the Holy One, blessed be He, does not come harshly upon him for his error, and he too joins in bringing down the Divine Presence upon ten.
Or perhaps the problem of inclusion in a minyan is due to the cheftza of the prayer or Torah reading, which requires ten partners in the act. In that case there is room to say that one who does not believe in the matter of prayer or Torah cannot be a partner in the prayer or study. According to this, even an unwitting sinner close to compulsion cannot be part of the prayer or Torah study in which he does not actually believe.
In practice, it seems to me that the question is not so common, because most people have at least a "vague faith"; they do not deny with absolute certainty, but leave room for the possibility that the faith is true, except that they have various difficulties and doubts that trouble them.
. And sometimes precisely one who argues passionately against faith does so because he is troubled by the doubt that perhaps "there is something to it." And if such a person is willing to join a minyan, and all the more so if he prays regularly, there is reasonable basis to assume that he has at least a "vague faith," at least as a "maybe," and in such a situation there is apparently reason to think that his joining a minyan of people who pray or study will strengthen the sides of faith that already exist within him.
With blessings, S.Z. Levinger
Of course there is no necessity, but in practice that is usually the case. The materialist assumes that what he has not seen does not exist, and if so, the same applies to God.
There is also no necessity that a materialist be a determinist, but usually that is the case. He assumes that the world operates according to the laws of physics, and therefore he is a determinist.
The heretic is not excluded from the minyan as a sanction or punishment. Therefore, the fact that he is like a captured infant is not relevant. He is not included because, with respect to prayer, he is like a flowerpot.
An off-the-cuff thought regarding the electron:
One might perhaps suppose that the electron is at an unstable equilibrium point (for example, at the top of a hill), and free will causes it to move דווקא in a certain direction. The energy required for this is "as small as we like," and so in this way the effect of free will does not violate the conservation laws.
It violates the conservation laws too, and even more so Newton’s laws (there is no acceleration without a force).
You wrote regarding vitalism that "the soul is what causes the body to behave according to the laws of biology."
Does this sentence even mean anything? Does a law of nature need a "policeman" to enforce it? That is, things are what they are. For example, when an object falls to the ground, does it need some spiritual essence to make it behave according to the law of gravity? Or are you simply assuming from the outset that laws of nature are manifestations of "spirituality"? And how can the existence of spirituality be disproved, if at all?