The Melakhah of *Hotza’ah*, Shabbat, and Our Function in the World (Column 345)

This year we are studying the first chapter of Tractate Shabbat. Naturally, our opening focus was on the melakhah of *hotza’ah* (carrying/transporting between domains), which the Rishonim famously define as a “lesser melakhah” (*melakhah geru’ah*). I have always wondered what this melakhah is really about and why it occupies a disproportionately large space compared with the other melakhot. This year, out of this inquiry, a clearer understanding crystallized for me regarding the essence of the forbidden labors on Shabbat, one that has broader philosophical ramifications, and I’d like to present it here.

Avot and Toldot on Shabbat

On Shabbat there are thirty-nine primary categories of labor (*avot melakhah*) listed in the Mishnah (Shabbat ch. 7). Each of these *avot* has *toldot*—labors that resemble the *av*. Almost no melakhah is stated explicitly in the Torah; they are all derived from it indirectly. The exceptions are kindling (“You shall not kindle fire in any of your dwellings on the Sabbath day”) and *hotza’ah* (there are several verses related to it, and opinions differ about the precise source). As for plowing and reaping, which are also mentioned in connection with Shabbat, Hazal at the beginning of Mo’ed Katan divert the verse to plowing and reaping in the sabbatical year. Regarding kindling, the Tannaim debate why the Torah singled it out (whether “to make it a mere prohibition” or “to divide” the labors). As for *hotza’ah*, there is no such discussion in the Talmud itself, but the Rishonim explain that it is mentioned because it is a “lesser melakhah” (see below).

According to most opinions, the list of *avot* is learned from the Mishkan, arranged by importance (Bava Kamma 2a). The labors performed in the Mishkan are described in the Torah as “skilled work” (*melechet machshevet*), and their juxtaposition to the prohibition of labor on Shabbat teaches that what is prohibited on Shabbat is likewise *melechet machshevet*. Thus, for example, it is clear that we would not prohibit walking or sitting, even though those also took place in the Mishkan. The list includes the meaningful labors that were in the Mishkan. Below I will touch on other laws learned from the definition of *melechet machshevet*. I note that there are views that the list is learned from the number of times the term “melakhah” and its cognates appear in the Torah (Shabbat 49b).

Naturally one asks: how do we classify labors into *avot* and their *toldot*? The Gemara in Bava Kamma 2a discusses the relationship between *av* and *toldah* with respect to Shabbat, tum’ah, and damages. Regarding Shabbat it says:

“And what practical difference is there between an *av* and a *toldah*? The difference is that if one performed two *avot* together, or two *toldot* together, one is liable for each and every one; but if one performed an *av* and its *toldah*, one is liable for only one. And according to Rabbi Eliezer, who deems one liable for a *toldah* in place of an *av*, why call this one an *av* and that one a *toldah*?—That which occurred in the Mishkan is considered important and is called an *av*; that which did not occur in the Mishkan is called a *toldah*.”

As noted, the definition of *av* and *toldah* is set by importance and by presence in the Mishkan. Commentators debate the relationship between these two parameters (occurrence in the Mishkan and importance),[1] and I will return to this below. But there are almost no halakhic ramifications. The Gemara here notes, according to the first Tanna, a halakhic consequence if one performs an *av* and its *toldah* in a single lapse of awareness—he is obligated only one sin-offering (just as if he performed the same *av* twice in one lapse). This would seem to mean that the *av* and its *toldah* are considered one prohibition, which could affect warning (*hatra’ah*) for a *toldah*.[2] But from here it follows that different *avot* are certainly different prohibitions. On the other hand, none of the enumerators of the commandments treats the Shabbat labors as thirty-nine separate prohibitions; all count them as a single commandment.

Warning for a Subcategory of Labor on Shabbat

Under halakhah one cannot punish an offender unless there was prior warning by witnesses, who inform the offender that his act constitutes a transgression and that its penalty is such-and-such. In addition, the offender must accept the warning—“Yes, and on that condition I act” (which, of course, then renders punishment impossible due to obvious insanity). The Rishonim disagree about what the warning must include—how one informs him of the relevant prohibition. In Minhat Hinukh commandment 32, three positions are cited: from Rambam (Sanhedrin ch. 12) it appears one need not warn with the specific name of the prohibition; it is enough to tell him he is violating a halakhic prohibition with penalty such-and-such. Tosafot (Mo’ed Katan 2b) write that one must warn him with the name of the prohibition (you are violating Shabbat labor, eating forbidden fat, etc.). And Rashi (Shevuot 20b) writes that the warning must also include the verse that prohibits the act.

Now, regarding the labors of Shabbat—*av* or *toldah*—it would seem that the warning must specify the particular melakhah (and that it is not enough to mention “Shabbat labor” generally or the verse “You shall not do any work”). Regarding a *toldah* it is accepted that one must warn “because of the *av*.” The principal source is Shabbat 138 (re *shomer*), which debates whether he is warned because of *borer* (selecting) or because of *meraked* (sifting). The Minhat Hinukh there challenges all three views above: why must one mention the *av*? The name of the prohibition is Shabbat desecration, and the prohibiting verse is “Keep the Sabbath day.” And according to Rambam one doesn’t even need the name of the prohibition. Why, then, must one warn a *toldah* on account of its *av*?

This brings us back, of course, to whether each *av* is a separate prohibition. The natural answer is that the various Shabbat labors are different prohibitions, as though each were written in a different verse (even though, as we saw, in practice none is explicitly written—and need not be). Indeed, the Tosafist Rid (on Shabbat 138, in the discussion about warning a *shomer*) writes:

“Because of what do we warn him?—Since kindling was singled out ‘to divide,’ it is as though a separate prohibition were written for each and every melakhah. It is like the prohibitions of forbidden fat and blood, which are distinct from each other; one must warn for fat because of fat and for blood because of blood, and so too for each and every melakhah.”

He holds that each *av melakhah* is an independent prohibition (this is learned from the Torah’s writing of kindling—“to divide,” i.e., to teach that each *av melakhah* is a separate prohibition), like fat and blood; therefore one warns separately for each *av*. As noted, for a *toldah* one presumably warns on account of its *av*; it is not a separate prohibition.[3]

However, in several places Rashi implies that the Shabbat labors are all one prohibition. For example, on Shabbat 72b s.v. “chelev v’dam,” he writes that fat and blood are like reaping and grinding, which are “like distinct bodies.” This suggests he views them like distinctions of objects (i.e., performing the same prohibition multiple times on different objects).[4] So too on Shabbat 68a and Keritot 17.[5]

Still, even according to Rashi we must answer the Minhat Hinukh’s question (why warn for an *av* or warn a *toldah* on account of its *av* rather than with the general name/verse). It seems that, on his view, the Gemara’s intent is that one may (!) warn on account of the *av*—that is, to innovate that this too counts as warning with the name of the prohibition—not that one must (!) warn on account of the *av*. Indeed, in his code Rambam brings a practical difference between *av* and *toldah* only regarding the sin-offering, not regarding warning (so the Minhat Hinukh also infers there).

Explaining the Dispute: The Basis of the Shabbat Melakhot

It seems that the core dispute between the Tosafist Rid and Rashi is whether the critical parameter for defining a melakhah as an *av* is the importance of the melakhah or its occurrence in the Mishkan. If importance is the determinant, one needs a criterion to rank importance—apparently the degree of creativity (*yetzirah*) in the melakhah. In that case, all the labors are manifestations of one prohibition of creativity. That is the view that these are different expressions of one prohibition. But according to the Rid, for whom each *av* is a separate prohibition, there need not be some shared substantive element; consequently, each *av* is its own prohibition.

I’ll add another note that I discussed in my article on conceptual construction (see ch. 3 there). In Bava Kamma 6a–b the Gemara teaches that some subcategories of damages are learned via the common-denominator (*tzad hashaveh*) of two *avot* (i.e., they cannot be derived from a single *av*). But in Shabbat we never find a *toldah* learned via *tzad hashaveh* from two *avot*. As far as I checked, it’s not in either Talmud, nor in the Rishonim or Aharonim.[6] This phenomenon seems to support the Rid’s view that the *avot melakhah* on Shabbat do not share a common denominator.[7] So too emerges from the plain reading of the Gemara on 72b, which compares two *avot* to fat and blood (contrary to Rashi there). But according to Rashi, who writes that these are distinct “bodies” (*gufin*), it seems all the labors have a shared core (*tzad hashaveh*): creativity. God created the world in six days and rested on the seventh; that’s what is demanded of us as well.[8] If so, on his view it remains unclear why we don’t find derivations via *tzad hashaveh*. Perhaps it’s due to resolution: Shabbat has very many *avot* (damages has only four), so they cover the *toldot* more densely, leaving no *toldah* that can’t be placed under some *av*.

In any case, according to Rashi, it seems that what is prohibited on Shabbat is creativity, and the various labors are merely different modes of creativity. But according to the Rid, there are thirty-nine different prohibitions, and there need not be any intrinsic element of creativity. Consequently—at least on Rashi’s view—the *toldot* are labors in which the creativity is diminished, hence less important and less distinctive; whereas for the Rid they may simply be less distinctive (since creativity is not the relevant parameter). Now we can consider the implications for *hotza’ah*.

*Hotza’ah* as a “Lesser Melakhah”

I noted above that *hotza’ah* is explicitly mentioned in the Torah, and the Rishonim write that this is because it’s a “lesser melakhah.” The source for *hotza’ah* appears in Shabbat 96b, which derives it from the verse “And Moses commanded and they caused it to pass throughout the camp”:

“Since throwing is a subcategory of *hotza’ah*, where is *hotza’ah* itself written?—R. Yohanan said: as it is written (Ex. 36), ‘And Moses commanded and they caused it to pass throughout the camp.’ Where did Moses sit?—In the camp of the Levites; and the camp of the Levites was a public domain. He said to Israel: Do not take out and bring in from your private domain to the public domain. And how do we know this was on Shabbat? Perhaps it was on a weekday, simply because the work was completed, as it is written (Ex. 36), ‘And the work was sufficient,’ etc.?—We derive ‘causing to pass’ from ‘causing to pass’ with Yom Kippur: here it says ‘they caused it to pass throughout the camp,’ and there it says (Lev. 25) ‘You shall cause the shofar to pass’; just as there it is a prohibited day, so too here it is a prohibited day.”

Note that the Gemara takes pains to prove the incident occurred on Shabbat (“And how do we know this was on Shabbat?”). This is puzzling, since even if it were on a weekday, it would be enough to show that it was done in the Mishkan context to prove it is prohibited on Shabbat. Evidently, even if we knew the act took place in the Mishkan, we would not necessarily prohibit it, because we might regard it as a banal activity (as I already noted, in the Mishkan they also sat and walked, and no one imagines prohibiting sitting or walking on Shabbat). Thus the Gemara needed an explicit source that it is forbidden on Shabbat. This is a hint from the Gemara itself that *hotza’ah* is a “lesser melakhah,” something banal like walking or sitting. (Though the Yerushalmi and R. Hananel appear to disagree.)[9]

Indeed, Ran’s novellae here note that with respect to *hotza’ah*, Hazal didn’t even entertain the question of why this melakhah was written explicitly (as they did for kindling). He explains that it was obvious to them: it was written explicitly because it is a lesser melakhah. So write other Rishonim as well. One can still ask about the status of *hotza’ah* once we have a verse prohibiting it: perhaps a verse was required because *hotza’ah* is a lesser melakhah, and the verse comes to teach that it is not lesser. Or perhaps the verse teaches that even though it is lesser, it is nevertheless forbidden (and even after the conclusion it remains a “lesser” melakhah).

In fact, according to Riva in Tosafot s.v. “Yetsiot,” 2a, it seems he does not hold *hotza’ah* to be a lesser melakhah (compare to the end of Tosafot there), and so explains the Hatam Sofer ad loc. So too implies Riva in Tosafot s.v. “mi lo askinan,” 2b (compare to Rabbenu Tam in Shevuot 5b s.v. “mi lo askinan” and in Tosafot “Yetsiot” cited). However, Riva says *hotza’ah* is not a lesser melakhah only to resolve the phrasing of the opening mishnah in Shabbat—i.e., he speaks after the presence of an explicit verse. It is reasonable that he agrees that logically, *hotza’ah* is a lesser melakhah.

On 96b, two reasons are given why bringing in (*hachnasah*) is prohibited: by logic (“what difference between taking out and bringing in?”) or because it too occurred in the Mishkan. The Gemara also says it is a *toldah* of *hotza’ah* (the *av*). There are two explanations: (A) whatever occurred in the Mishkan is an *av*; (B) whatever is written in the Torah is an *av*. Tosafot s.v. “i nami” write that only for *hotza’ah* do we require that its *toldot* be written in the Torah—because *hotza’ah* is a lesser melakhah. Two conclusions follow: (1) the *av* must be explicitly written in the Torah; (2) the *toldah* of a lesser melakhah must have occurred in the Mishkan to be prohibited—unlike ordinary *toldot* (so write other Rishonim).

For our purposes there appear to be three views: (1) R. Hananel and the Yerushalmi: *hotza’ah* is not a lesser melakhah; (2) Riva: *hotza’ah* is a lesser melakhah, but the verse teaches that it is not; (3) Rabbenu Tam: *hotza’ah* remains a lesser melakhah even after the verse. Several other Rishonim side with him in explaining the opening mishnah in Shabbat.

Why Is *Hotza’ah* a “Lesser Melakhah”?

The Rishonim offer several explanations for why *hotza’ah* is a lesser melakhah, which fall into two main directions:[10]

• The Or Zaru’a (Shabbat §82) writes: “What labor has he done? … At first there was an object and now there is an object.” Similarly the Sefer Mitzvot Gadol (negative command 65) writes “for it does not appear as a melakhah.” So too implied by Hagahot Mordekhai §455. Likewise in R. Moshe Kazis’s novellae at the beginning of Shabbat, s.v. “u’bedavar ha’hotza’ah,” who writes: “All the melakhot leave an imprint on the object upon which the melakhah is done, and it is changed from what it was beforehand.”
• Several Rishonim hold *hotza’ah* to be a lesser melakhah because its parameters are illogical or inconsistent (see Ramban beginning of Shabbat and beginning of Shevuot; Rashba; Tosafot ha-Rosh; the work attributed to Ran at the beginning of Shabbat; and others). There are several formulations in this group: how can it be that a light load is prohibited (from private to public domain) while a heavy load is permitted (within one domain)? Some tie this to distinctions between domains—what difference does it make if one carries to the public domain, the private domain, or within the same domain? Some note that, unlike other melakhot, place has no effect on the prohibition.

For the Rishonim in group A it is clear that the criterion of importance is creativity. Therefore a melakhah like *hotza’ah*, which produces nothing in the object (does not change it), is a lesser melakhah.[11] By contrast, for the Rishonim in group B, it is not troubling that *hotza’ah* produces nothing, and that no change ensues in the object. In this they align with the view that *hotza’ah* is not a lesser melakhah. Not coincidentally, some in this camp invoke the weight of the load—something generally irrelevant to Shabbat prohibitions (for we commonly think the prohibition is to create, not to labor strenuously).[12] Thus, this dispute perhaps reflects, once again, the Rashi vs. Rid debate above: whether Shabbat’s melakhot are all expressions of creativity, or creativity is not the primary parameter here.

Framing the Dispute: Is the Shabbat Prohibition a Matter of Object (*hefza*) or Person (*gavra*)?

Some Aharonim (see, e.g., Mi-Tal on *hotza’ah*) propose tying this debate to whether Shabbat prohibitions are in the *hefza* or the *gavra*. The Aharonim dispute the basis of the prohibition of instructing a non-Jew (*amira le-nokhri*, a rabbinic prohibition): is it because of agency or not? Shulhan Arukh ha-Rav (O.C. 243:1; 253:29) writes that instructing a non-Jew is prohibited because the non-Jew acts as one’s agent (and a non-Jew can be an agent for stringency, as Tosafot say in *Eizehu Neshekh*). This is rooted in Rashi at the start of *Mi she-hekhshikh*. Conversely, the Hatam Sofer (O.C. responsum 84; C.M. responsum 185) and the Beit Meir (E.H. §5) challenge Rashi and write that agency does not apply to Shabbat because they are prohibitions “on one’s person” (*issurim she-begufo*—the person must rest on Shabbat),[13] and for such things there is no agency.

If Shabbat’s prohibition of melakhah targets the *hefza*—i.e., forbids changing reality (or altering objects)—then it is clear why *hotza’ah* is a lesser melakhah: there is no change in the object. But if the prohibition targets the *gavra*, then *hotza’ah* is a melakhah like any other; and even if one wishes to call it “lesser,” that would be only because of internal inconsistencies in its parameters, not because of a lack of creativity. Indeed, Shulhan Arukh ha-Rav (O.C. 301:1) explains “lesser melakhah” as do the Or Zaru’a and SeMaG, not like Ramban and his camp.

Yet this linkage seems weak, for it is clear that the melakhot (all of them, not only *hotza’ah*) are about creativity, not toil. The *gavra/*hefza* question can be asked regardless: is the duty that the person (the Jew) not create, or that no creation emerge from him? But by all accounts the prohibition concerns change to the *hefza*. Moreover, it is obvious that the outcome, as such, is not prohibited; otherwise we would expect that a non-Jew too may not perform melakhah on Shabbat, or at least that instructing a non-Jew would be biblically prohibited. Clearly, what is at issue is a Jew who effects a change in the world.

It is more reasonable, therefore, to link the debate to Rashi vs. the Rid as above: if there is a single foundation to the melakhot, it is creativity. On that view, *hotza’ah* is clearly a lesser melakhah. But if each melakhah is a separate prohibition and the Mishkan is the basis for prohibition (as per R. Hananel above), then creativity is not the determinant; *hotza’ah* is a lesser melakhah only because of the ambiguity and inconsistency of its parameters (and for R. Hananel himself it may not be lesser at all, as noted).

Is *Hotza’ah* Really Essentially Different from the Other Melakhot?

Even if *hotza’ah* is a lesser melakhah, we still must understand why the Torah forbids it nonetheless. I have explained more than once (see, e.g., here) that even a scriptural decree (*gezerat hakatuv*) should have an explanation and rationale. Some have seen *hotza’ah* as an attempt to keep a person in his place (“Let no man go out from his place on the seventh day”). But then why should *hachnasah* (bringing in) be prohibited (if anything, we should require everyone to perform *hachnasah* on Shabbat)? And why does logic say there is no distinction between bringing in and taking out? Beyond that, we should be keeping the person in his place, not forbidding the removal of objects (that would be the province of the prohibition of *techumin*). Yet, upon further reflection, one can reopen the assumption that *hotza’ah* is different from the other melakhot (whether or not it is “lesser” because of this).

There is a fundamental asymmetry between God’s creation and human creation. He creates things ex nihilo; we always act *ex materia*—something from something. A human being cannot create, only form. Now note that our *yesh mi-yesh* activity is always merely moving things from place to place. Even changes we produce in the world or in an object (as in most melakhot) are nothing but moving things from place to place, after which the laws of nature produce the substantive change in the object. A carpenter moves parts of the wood aside, then places nails to join them. A builder gathers components to form a structure. Even cloning or IVF—regarded as the pinnacle of human intervention in God’s work—amounts to placing things in their proper place and enabling nature to act. We place the seed where it can be fruitful and multiply, and the result happens on its own. If we pay attention, we will see that all our actions in the world are nothing but moving and placing things “in the right place.” Our creativity lies in thinking where and when to put things, and which things—but our role ends there, and nature does the rest.

It follows that this is the situation with the Shabbat melakhot as well. Consider *me’amer* (gathering), mentioned above: collecting scattered produce into a basket. What we do here is merely moving and repositioning, from which a cluster or collection arises that is ready for use. Here there is not even a real change in the object; the change of place is itself the result. But so it is with the other melakhot. This is most evident in sowing and cooking. In cooking we place the pot on the fire, and then the dish cooks. In sowing, the person places the seed in the ground and brings it water, and then it grows.[14] In these two we merely place something somewhere; the same is true of writing (placing ink on paper) or erasing (removing it)—or bringing an eraser that removes it. Slaughtering is passing a knife over an animal’s neck; tanning is bringing substances that act upon the hide, and so on. I doubt there is any action in the world—or melakhah on Shabbat—that, from our side, is anything more than relocation and placement.

From this vantage point, all our melakhot are “lesser.” Our doing in the world is always moving what already exists. When is it not lesser? When, after the move, we have placed things where nature performs a non-trivial action upon them. When there is no such result, the act is lesser. Thus, the difference between a lesser and a non-lesser melakhah is simply where we placed the object and, consequently, what nature did to it.

Midrash Tanhuma (Tazria) expresses precisely this principle:

“Turnus Rufus the wicked asked R. Akiva: Whose deeds are more beautiful—those of the Holy One, blessed be He, or those of flesh and blood? He said to him: Those of flesh and blood are more beautiful. He said: Behold the heavens and the earth—can you make the like of them? He said: Do not answer me regarding what is above creatures and beyond their control; speak of things found among humans. He said to him: Why do you circumcise? He said: I knew you would say this, therefore I said to you in advance that the deeds of flesh and blood are more beautiful than those of the Holy One, blessed be He. Bring me ears of grain and cakes. [He said: These are the deeds of the Holy One, blessed be He, and these are the deeds of flesh and blood; are not these more beautiful? Bring me] flax stalks and garments from Beit She’an. He said: These are the deeds of the Holy One, blessed be He, and these are the deeds of flesh and blood; are not these more beautiful? He said to him: If God desires circumcision, why does a child not emerge circumcised from the womb? He said: And why does he emerge with a navel-cord—let his mother not cut his cord! Why does he not emerge circumcised? Because the Holy One, blessed be He, gave Israel the commandments only in order to refine them; as David said (Ps. 18:31), ‘The word of the Lord is refined,’ etc.”

Indeed, our handiwork is “more beautiful,” yet note that we are only “moving the cheese.” The laws of nature are the acts of the Holy One, blessed be He, and without them even our deeds would be meaningless.

A similar idea appears on the verse “Who has preceded Me that I should pay?” (Vayikra Rabbah, Emor 27):

“‘Who has preceded Me that I should pay?’ (Job 41:3). R. Tanhuma interpreted the verse regarding an unmarried man who lives in a town and pays the wages of scribes and teachers. The Holy One, blessed be He, says: It is upon Me to pay his reward and give him a son, as it says, ‘and He will pay him his recompense’ (Prov. 19:17). R. Yirmiyah b. Elazar said: In the future a heavenly voice will thunder from the mountaintops and say, ‘Who has acted with God? Whoever has acted with God, let him come and take his reward,’ as it says, ‘At this time it shall be said to Jacob and to Israel what God has wrought’ (Num. 23:23)—now let him come and take his reward. And the Holy Spirit says, ‘Who has preceded Me that I should pay?’ Who praised Me before I gave him a soul? Who circumcised for My name before I gave him a son? Who made Me a parapet before I gave him a roof? Who made Me a mezuzah before I gave him a house? Who made Me a sukkah before I gave him a place? Who took a lulav before I gave him money? Who made Me tzitzit before I gave him a garment? Who set aside pe’ah before I gave him a field? Who set aside terumah and ma’aser before I gave him a threshing floor? Who separated challah before I gave him dough? Who brought before Me a sacrifice before I gave him an animal—an ox, or a sheep, or a goat?’”

God’s acts always precede human acts. A person can only operate what God has already made—that is, move things to a chosen place deliberately, and then let nature act and change something in the thing itself.

*Melechet Machshevet*: The Duty of Resting on Shabbat

This is what Hazal call *melechet machshevet*—the definition they give the Shabbat prohibition. I noted that the expression appears with respect to the Mishkan’s work. *Melechet machshevet* is labor grounded in prior planning, whereby a person brings his plan (his “thought”) to fruition. Therefore unplanned acts (like unintended outcomes,[15] or labor not needed for its primary purpose), destructive acts, etc., one is exempt. This is a leniency, but there are also stringencies. For example, if one acts by indirect causation (*grama*), throughout the Torah one is exempt, but on Shabbat one is liable, because after all there was a plan that was executed through the person’s act—even if it was done indirectly and not literally by his hands (see Rashi, Bava Kamma 60a).[16] For our purposes, *melechet machshevet* is implementing a person’s plan, even if indirectly (with the help of wind, etc.).

In light of what I described, we can now understand that every one of our actions is, at most, *melechet machshevet* in this sense. Some actions generate their outcomes via *grama*, like cooking, where we cause the cooking; or sowing, where we cause the growth; and so on. Sometimes the outcome is immediate (as in writing or erasing), yet even then the results are produced by our actions. Our action is always relocation; afterwards nature (or the wind) creates the change in the object itself.

Resting on Shabbat commemorates Creation. God rested from the creation that occurred over the six days, but a human cannot create—only form (*yesh mi-yesh*)—and that is what we do over six days. Therefore, even on Shabbat we are not meant to rest from creation, but from formation. In our terms: we are to refrain from significant relocations of things. For human beings, *melechet machshevet* is deliberate relocation—yet still relocation. A “lesser melakhah” is a relocation that yields no further consequences in the object beyond a change of location.

Back to *Hotza’ah*

Given all this, it is fitting to explain that *hotza’ah* comes to remind us that what we actually do is merely move things from place to place. Even when we fashion our most wondrous “creations,” the creation is in the *gavra* (the idea, the thought), but in the *hefza* we only move. Therefore, *hotza’ah* too is defined as a melakhah—to remind us that even during the six weekdays we do not create like God; we only move. If in all the melakhot we may feel we resemble the Creator and effect grand changes in the world as He did, *hotza’ah* comes to say that in truth we are only moving.

In *hotza’ah* there is a relocation that has no effect in the object, and in that sense perhaps it is a lesser melakhah as to result. But in the essential sense—in terms of the character of human action—*hotza’ah* is the most typical melakhah, for it reflects the added value we contribute in all melakhot and all our worldly actions. Here *gavra* and *hefza* converge. If all melakhot are about the *hefza* (change in the world or in the object), *hotza’ah* reflects to us that in the other melakhot as well, our contribution (*gavra*) is only relocation. The other melakhot are prohibited even within a private domain, because there the novelty is in the object itself—relocation along a non-geographical axis. Pure relocation is prohibited only on Shabbat.

The requirement that *hotza’ah* be specifically from private to public domain or vice versa serves to define a significant relocation (otherwise every movement on Shabbat would be forbidden). Therefore, we require moving from a place of one character to a place of a different character; and from “Let no man go out from his place” we learn that the two domains which are essentially different are the private and the public. (As Tosafot note, it is unclear why carrying from one private domain to another was not prohibited; apparently in that case the consequence of the person’s act—the change—is insufficiently significant.)

This may also be why Tractate Shabbat opens with *hotza’ah*. Some Aharonim cite the Maharal that the beginning of each tractate addresses the most typical law of that tractate. In light of our discussion it is clear why *hotza’ah* was chosen—especially given that it is a lesser melakhah—for it is the archetype of all Shabbat melakhot. Intriguingly, the very “lesser-ness” of *hotza’ah* (the absence of a change in the object, only its relocation) is what makes it the prototype of the melakhot. It reveals something easily missed about all our worldly activity and, by extension, about all the Shabbat melakhot. This may also explain why on Yom Tov—which does not commemorate Creation—*hotza’ah* was not prohibited.

Above we saw a three-way dispute among the Rishonim: whether *hotza’ah* is not a lesser melakhah at all; whether the verse prohibiting it on Shabbat innovates that it is not lesser; or whether the verse innovates that although it is lesser, it is still prohibited. We can now appreciate all three. From a philosophical vantage, *hotza’ah* is not lesser at all. In terms of the human act (*gavra*), there is no difference between it and other melakhot, for in all of them the person only moves things from place to place. It may be that this is precisely what the verse innovates—teaching us this very foundation (hence some Rishonim write that only after the verse is it not lesser). Yet in practice this relocation yields no effect in the world, so one could say that even after the verse it remains a lesser melakhah. The underlying question is whether we look at the outcome in the world or at the person’s contribution to that outcome.

Entropy

This description recalls the physical concept of entropy—a mathematical measure of a system’s order. *Hotza’ah* is a change that alters the world’s entropy—that is, it creates a new order in reality. To take an object from one place and put it in another is to change the world’s order. From this viewpoint, *hotza’ah* certainly effects a change in reality, but not in the object—rather, in the world. Looking at the world, it is different, even though no individual object has changed.[17]

For the mathematically inclined: we can define the world’s order via a state vector whose entries are locations in the world, and at each location there sits some object (or it is empty). Consider, for example, the vector (A, 0, B, C, 0, A), describing object A at position 1, position 2 empty, object B at position 3, and so on. Now move object A from position 6 to position 1. We obtain a new state vector: (2A, 0, B, C, 0, 0). The two states differ in entropy (order), and physicists can compute the entropy of each such state,[18] i.e., quantify the degree of order in each. Imagine moving object A from position 6 to position 5. In that case the entropy would not change, for we would have produced a very similar state vector (merely swapping the names/roles of positions 6 and 5). That is not a significant change. For this reason, *hotza’ah* qualifies as melakhah only when performed between domains that are dissimilar (private vs. public), like in the first example (from 6 to 1). Moving objects between similar domains is essentially what we did in the second example (from 6 to 5).

To sharpen this entropy framing: the second law of thermodynamics says you cannot increase order without a guiding hand. A random process does not increase order (it either preserves or reduces it). When a guiding hand—divine or human—is involved, order can increase; that is creation. In this language, creation is a decrease of entropy (imposing order). An object at position 6 that I place at a qualitatively different position, say 1, if this produces better order (more aligned with my plan—*melechet machshevet*)—that is melakhah. We imitate God’s six-day work, and on Shabbat we rest, like Him, from changing entropy. In this sense, *hotza’ah* is the prototype of creating order; therefore, despite being “lesser,” it is the most typical melakhah of Shabbat prohibitions. As we saw, every formation in an object is in truth merely a change of the locations of things—a change of entropy—and *hotza’ah* is simply the most distilled expression of that.

Conclusion

*Hotza’ah* teaches that our actions—which are mere relocations—derive their meaning only because God created nature in the six days of Creation. Nature, created by God, is what turns our relocations into changes in the world. God rested on the seventh day and saw that all He had made was very good. When we rest from *hotza’ah* and from melakhot generally, we suddenly grasp that all our actions have meaning (they are “very good”) only thanks to the six days of Creation. Without God’s acts (nature), our relocations would effect nothing. Without nature created in the six days, all our melakhot would be one big, empty *hotza’ah*—a “lesser melakhah.”

Therefore we must not be misled by R. Akiva’s retort to Turnus Rufus in the midrash cited above. Our deeds may be finer than God’s, but in the end they are only relocations. They have such beautiful results only because of God’s acts (the laws of nature) and thanks to them. Hence the second midrash I quoted: “Who has preceded Me that I should pay?!” Indeed, payment is due; our toil has reward—but only by virtue of Him. In this sense, resting from melakhah—and especially from *hotza’ah*—is the most prominent and definitive commemoration of Creation and of its meaning for us.

On further thought, this seems the meaning of the verse “For it is He who gives you strength to achieve success,” as Derashot ha-Ran writes at the beginning of the tenth discourse:

“Above this it says (Deut. 8:12–18): ‘Lest you eat and be satisfied, and build good houses and live in them, and your cattle and sheep increase… and you say in your heart, “My strength and the might of my hand made me this wealth.”’ And [Scripture] says: ‘You shall remember the Lord your God, for it is He who gives you strength to make wealth.’ He means: It is true that individuals have particular dispositions toward certain things, as some are apt to receive wisdom and others are apt to set plans within themselves to amass and gather. In this sense it is true, to a degree, that a wealthy man might say, ‘My strength and the might of my hand made me this wealth.’ Nevertheless, though that power is indeed planted within you, remember from whom that power came and whence it arrived. That is [the meaning of] ‘You shall remember the Lord your God, for it is He who gives you strength to make wealth.’ He did not say, ‘Remember that the Lord your God gives you wealth,’ for then he would deny that the power planted in man is an intermediate cause in the acquisition of fortune; and that is not the case. Therefore it says that though your power makes this wealth, remember the One who gave you that power, blessed be He.”

The detached “mashgiah-style” slogans on which we were raised learn from this verse that we do nothing and everything comes from Heaven (cf. the supervisors’ rebukes about “my strength and the might of my hand”). But that is not the plain meaning. The verse says the opposite: we are the ones who make the wealth—only it is by virtue of the strength He gives us. From my discussion here a further reading of the Ran’s words emerges. God gives us the strength to achieve—not (only) in some mystical sense (that He animates each of us at every moment, another *vort* of the “mashgihim”)—but in that every action of ours gains meaning and bears fruit only by virtue of the laws of nature He created. Without those laws, all our actions would be random relocations from here to there and nothing more.

In my article on ontic gratitude as a basis for serving God, I argued that every creature has an (ontic, not necessarily moral) obligation to the One who created it. This is likely what the verse in Ha’azinu says: “Do you thus repay the Lord, O foolish and unwise people? Is He not your Father, your Maker, who made you and established you?” Our obligation to God is grounded both in His sustaining us and in His making us. There is moral gratitude (to one who has benefitted us) and ontic gratitude (to one who made us). In light of what I have said here, this gains added meaning: every act of ours gains significance by His power. Without Him, at best we could engage in empty relocations from place to place and nothing more. That is, it is not only that He made us and sustains us; every act of ours can have meaning only by virtue of Him. This surely constitutes a significant basis for our mandatory obligation toward Him.

This proposal sheds interesting light on *hotza’ah*, on the melakhot as a whole, and on our activity in the world generally—and no less on the relationship between our deeds, God, and nature, and on our obligation to Him. I hope and believe there is something here beyond mere homiletics (Heaven forfend).

[1] See Tosafot here, and Maharsha and Maharam there, as well as the introduction of the author of Tiferet Yisrael to the Mishnah, Tractate Shabbat, titled “Kalkalat Shabbat.” There he also discusses what “importance” means—uniqueness or significant creativity—and what determines the similarity between *av* and *toldah*—the purpose and end of the act or the form of its performance. I will note more on this below.

[2] Three further practical differences between *av* and *toldah* have been suggested:

• Combining measures (see Mahar”i Katz in Shitah Mekubetzet to Bava Kamma ad loc., s.v. “heishah Mahar”r Yechiel,” and the novellae of R. Shmuel there).
• An *av* has a *toldah*, while a *toldah* perhaps does not (at least per R. Hananel at the start of ch. 7, who writes there is no *toldah* of a *toldah*).
• Some write that for labor not needed for its primary purpose (*melakhah she-eina tzrikhah le-gufah*), in a *toldah* one is exempt even according to R. Yehudah.

[3] Some have sought to learn that *toldot* in general are an independent prohibition, since there is a separate source that teaches the *toldot* as a class (“*hineh me-henna*,” see Shabbat 70b and parallels). See also note 5 below.

[4] So some Aharonim understand him. One must still consider why fat and blood, too, would be so understood according to him, since there it is clear these are two distinct prohibitions.

[5] The work Tots’ot Chayim, §§5–6, ties the dispute between the Rid and Rashi to the source for distinguishing melakhot: if the source is “kindling was singled out to divide,” then each *av melakhah* is an independent prohibition like kindling; but if the source is “those who desecrate it shall surely die” (see Shabbat 70a)—which multiplies many deaths for one desecration—then all melakhot constitute one *av*, merely “distinct bodies.”

[6] See my article cited above for the exceptional case in the Yerushalmi per R. Menashe of Ilya regarding spitting in the public domain (and even that is not a *tzad hashaveh* derivation but what I called “conceptual construction”).

[7] This depends on how one understands the *tzad hashaveh* inference: is it truly a search for a shared common element of the two teachers, or is one teacher primary and the other merely removes refutations? (See the dispute between Rosh and “the Gedolim,” Bava Kamma 6a, and my article in Meisharim II.) I’ll address this in a forthcoming column.

[8] Indeed, Rashi at the start of Bava Kamma writes, in the view of the Sages, that when one is liable to only one sin-offering for an *av* and its *toldah*, that offering is for the *av*. So implies the reading in Shitah Mekubetzet on the Gemara: “For the *av* he is liable; for the *toldah* he is not.” And in Porat Yosef there he brings that according to Rashi, if he brought a sin-offering for the *toldah*, it is unconsecrated meat in the Temple courtyard; and Tiferet Shmuel writes a practical difference if he forgot to bring for the *av* and brought for the *toldah*, and later remembered—he must bring again for the *av*.

According to Rashi, the Gemara’s phrasing fits better, since it was seeking a practical difference between *av* and *toldah*; if we explain that the offering is brought for both, we still don’t know what the difference is between them (we would know only the difference of a *toldah* vis-à-vis its *av*, but not the difference between them). The Rid (cited in Shitah Mekubetzet at the beginning of Bava Kamma, s.v. “nafa mina d’i avid”) challenges the Gemara with this very question and writes that indeed there is no difference between *av* and *toldah* (there is another difference detailed later in the sugya; this is not the place). Thus, for the Rid the Mishkan determines who is *av* and who is *toldah* (as we saw above in his view); hence there is no difference between them. For Rashi, importance determines, hence there is a difference. Each follows his own approach.

[9] Note that R. Hananel (97a, printed at the start of *Perek ha-Zorek*) only proves that *hotza’ah* is a melakhah and that it occurred in the Mishkan. He interprets that it was on a weekday and does not include the passage in the Gemara that proves it was on Shabbat. Evidently he follows his approach that everything depends on the Mishkan (as a cause, not a sign), so it suffices to prove that *hotza’ah* took place in the Mishkan; its “importance” is irrelevant. So too in the Yerushalmi (cited by R. Hananel 3b): “Whence do we know that *hotza’ah* is called melakhah? For it is written, ‘And Moses commanded and they caused it to pass throughout the camp.’” That is, they seek only proof that it is called melakhah, not that it is forbidden (and the source is from what Moses then said to the people: ‘Let no man make any more melakhah’). See also Tosafot s.v. “u-mimai” (96b) for R. Hananel and the Yerushalmi.

Thus, according to R. Hananel, *hotza’ah* is not a lesser melakhah, for there is no such notion as “lesser”: the determinant of importance plays no role in the definition of melakhot per R. Hananel.

[10] Me’iri on Shabbat 2a cites both approaches; see there.

[11] One can debate other *avot* that do not produce something in the object, like *me’amer* (gathering fruit into one basket). Yet in *me’amer* there is a creative aspect: gathering produce in the field. Accumulating the yield into the basket turns it from plant or field growth into merchandise—i.e., a commodity ready for human use.

[12] The poskim cite several halakhic consequences of *hotza’ah* being a lesser melakhah. I will bring four:

• Hayyei Adam (Shabbat, general rule 9 §11) writes that the prohibition of benefiting from a melakhah done on Shabbat applies only where the object itself underwent change (as in cooking). Therefore, for *hotza’ah* there is no such prohibition; thus, if one carried on Shabbat inadvertently, it is permitted even to the carrier himself immediately (while for intentional violation it is forbidden until Saturday night). See his source in Nishmat Adam ad loc.
• In responsa Beit Yitzhak (O.C. §34) there is doubt about the status of destructive *hotza’ah*. He proves from Shabbat 91a (throwing an olive’s volume of terumah into a defiled house) that a “destructive” *hotza’ah* is liable, and explains that since in *hotza’ah* there is no repair to the object, the exemption of “destructive act” does not apply (for that exemption is grounded in the absence of repair in the object).
• Pri Megadim, introduction to Hilkhot Shabbat (cited in Afikei Yam II §4, end of branch 8), doubts whether the rule that, for partial measures, the first half must still exist in the world to obligate—applies only to *hotza’ah*, because it is a lesser melakhah. It seems one cannot say such things if the rationale for “lesser” is that there is no repair to the object, for that rationale would actually lead us to waive the requirement that the first half still exist. Thus, the Pri Megadim reflects a view that *hotza’ah* is lesser because its parameters are puzzling—hence it is harder to impose liability.
• Penei Yehoshua (Shabbat 51b) brings another (non-halakhic) consequence of *hotza’ah* being lesser: he writes that the Torah did not prohibit resting one’s animal from *hotza’ah*.

“For *hotza’ah* to the public domain, even for a person, is a lesser melakhah and would not be included in ‘You shall not do any work’ were it not derived independently… Therefore it seems this has no place regarding an animal from the Torah, only rabbinically.”

After it has been derived, though, it may well be considered a melakhah (and be prohibited on Yom Tov as well).

[13] Indeed, Beit Yosef cites SeMaG, who brings a Mekhilta that prohibits *amira le-nokhri* from the verse “No melakhah shall be done,” which implies that the prohibition is in the *hefza*—i.e., it is forbidden that the melakhah be done, not specifically that a Jew do it (of course, if so one must explain why a non-Jew has no Shabbat prohibition). But for nearly all authorities that Mekhilta is merely an *asmakhta*.

[14] Note that in these two melakhot a question arises about acts on Shabbat that complete only in the weekday that follows, or the reverse (since the person’s action has already ended). But in light of what I argue here, one could raise similar questions for all melakhot.

[15] While unintended outcomes are permitted throughout the Torah and not just in Shabbat, R. Hayyim of Brisk (on Rambam, Hilkhot Shabbat 10:17) already noted that on Shabbat there is a special law flowing from *melechet machshevet*.

[16] Many Aharonim already noted that Rosh there disagrees with Rashi; in his view, *grama* is exempt even on Shabbat, and there it is a special rule of *zoreh* (winnowing).

[17] In different terms, perhaps the prohibition is to alter the public domain (to subtract from or add to it), for only the public domain is a state of the world; private domains are states of particular people and are irrelevant here. This is a different focus for *hotza’ah*.

[18] One counts how many equivalent microstates correspond to each such macrostate. The more equivalent microstates, the lower the order. For example, in the case above, when object A moved from position 6 to 1, the entropy is higher (the order is lower).