Causality: D. Prayer for a Miracle (Column 463)
In the previous three columns I argued that causal relations have three components: the temporal, the logical, and the physical. I then noted the difficulty of treating the physical component formally (symbolically). In the last column I concluded that the logical component of the cause defines the cause as a sufficient (and not necessary) condition for the effect. One implication of this conclusion concerned God’s involvement in the world. I argued that if the laws of nature are a sufficient condition, then there is no divine involvement within nature. In principle, divine involvement in the world could still occur (though in my personal view it likely does not), but it would always be as a departure from nature.
This, of course, raises the question of prayer and its effectiveness. If we conclude that God is not involved in the world, then there is no point in asking Him for anything. That is the question of effectiveness, an empirical question, but I have discussed it more than once in the past, and therefore I will not enter into it here. In this column I wish to discuss a halakhic question: even if we assume that He is involved in the world, since we have seen that such involvement entails departing from nature, is it prohibited to ask for such involvement? At first glance this halakhic question seems very surprising and quite implausible. The Talmud and the halakhic authorities are full of permission and even obligation to ask God for our needs, in prayer and otherwise. How can one say that this is prohibited? This question has already been mentioned here several times (see, for example, here, here, here and here), but as far as I recall it has yet to receive its own dedicated place. Along the way I will occasionally remark on the factual plane, insofar as it arises.
The sugya of praying about the past
The Mishnah in Berakhot 9:3 (Berakhot 54a) states:
And one who cries out about the past—this is a vain prayer. If his wife was pregnant and he says, “May it be His will that my wife bear a male,” this is a vain prayer. If he was on the road and heard a scream in the city and says, “May it be His will that this not be from my house,” this is a vain prayer.
A person who prays that the fetus in his wife’s womb be male—this is a vain prayer. And likewise one who prays about an event that has already happened. The conclusion is that a prayer about an event that has already happened (a prayer about the past) is a vain prayer. From the language of the Mishnah one might understand that there is no prohibition, only that it is pointless and ineffective (that is the meaning of “vain”). If this is the Mishnah’s meaning, then the Mishnah is essentially saying that God does not depart from nature (we shall see below that a prayer about the past is nothing but a prayer for a miracle), i.e., He is not involved in the world (for, as we have seen, any involvement of His is a departure from nature), and therefore such requests are in vain. It is no wonder, then, that the halakhic authorities commonly explain that the Mishnah intends to say that there is a prohibition (see, for example, at the end of the thread here)[1]. The reason for the prohibition is unclear. Some wished to say that it diminishes our merits in the World to Come, or that this is an improper use of God—that is, attempting to cause Him to act against His policy. Perhaps the prohibition stems from a concern about a negative impact on believers if the prayer is not answered (for God does not obligate Himself to perform miracles and depart from nature). For our purposes here it suffices that there is a prohibition.
And behold, the Gemara there (60a) explains:
If his wife was pregnant and he said, “May it be His will that she bear…,” this is a vain prayer and mercy will not avail.
The Gemara explains that since the woman is already pregnant, the prayer is in vain, and even adds that it does not help (“it is ineffective”). Here we already have a factual assertion that what has already occurred cannot be changed, beyond the halakhic prohibition. Perhaps these two statements depend on each other: such a request does not help, and therefore it is also prohibited to make it.
Now the Gemara raises a difficulty from precedents where people did pray about the past:
Rav Yosef challenged: “And afterwards she bore a daughter, and she called her name Dinah.” What is “and afterwards”? Rav said: After Leah judged (danah) herself and said: “Twelve tribes are destined to come forth from Jacob; six have come from me and four from the maidservants—behold ten. If this one is a male, my sister Rachel will not be like one of the maidservants.” Immediately it was turned into a female, as it is said: “And she called her name Dinah.”
It appears that prayer can indeed change reality.
The Gemara there gives two answers. The first:
We do not cite miraculous occurrences.
There it was a miracle, and we are dealing with the normal course of nature. The commentators explain that our sugya is not dealing with prayer for a miracle. From this answer it follows that a miracle can occur; it is merely prohibited to pray for it. Moreover, from the wording of this answer it is quite clear that there is a prohibition on such prayer (and not merely that it is ineffective, since in practice it can be effective)[2]. Indeed, in the Jerusalem Talmud (Ta’anit 3) and in the halakhic authorities it is stated that it is prohibited to pray for a miracle, and such a prayer is like a vain prayer.
However, several commentators have noted that it follows from here that perfectly righteous individuals like Leah may also request a miracle (see, for example, Gevurat Ari to Ta’anit 19). But it is worth noting that such a leniency is not brought by the halakhic authorities (Rambam and the Shulchan Aruch and their commentaries). Therefore, even if in your view there are among us righteous people like our mother Leah, the authorities hold that there are not, and thus, in their opinion, this leniency, even if it exists, is irrelevant in practice. Accordingly, from here on I will ignore the question of the righteous, while asking forgiveness from all dear readers who belong to that group.
The second answer in the Gemara there:
And if you wish, say: Leah’s case was within forty days, as it was taught: During the first three days a person should pray that it not putrefy; from three to forty [days] he should pray that it be male; from forty days to three months he should pray that it not be a sandal; from three months to six he should pray that it not be a miscarriage; from six to nine he should pray that it come out in peace.
Here it seems the Gemara already assumes that even the righteous cannot request a change to an existing reality, but that up to forty days the sex of the embryo has not yet been determined. Moreover, the Gemara says that at every stage of pregnancy one can pray for what has not yet been determined.
This answer is the one brought by the halakhic authorities, which strengthens my conclusion above that the leniency for the righteous is irrelevant in practice. Perhaps this means that God does not perform such miracles even for the righteous, since His policy is not to intervene. This is not a question of the person’s level of merit (whether I “deserve” such intervention), in which case there would be room to distinguish between the righteous and ordinary people, but rather a divine policy (He wishes to run His world by way of nature). But as noted, here our concern is the halakhic question (whether such prayer is permitted), so I will not enter the factual question (whether God is involved in the world).
The Gemara there continues, clarifying how a situation can exist in which the matter has not yet been determined at that stage of pregnancy:
And will prayer help? But did not Rav Yitzḥak son of Rav Ami say: If the man emits seed first, she bears a female; if the woman emits seed first, she bears a male, as it is said: “A woman who conceives and bears a male.” With what are we dealing here? With a case where both emitted simultaneously.
Apparently, the sex of the newborn is determined already at conception and not at forty days. The Gemara answers that the case is where both partners emitted seed at the same time, and in such a case the sex is not determined at conception but at forty days. True, we do not know who emitted first, and thus we have no way to know in a specific case whether the sex of the fetus is still open. But it suffices that such a possibility exists to reject the claim that it is a vain prayer. In a case of doubt one may pray, and even that only up to forty days, for after that the sex is already fixed.
The halakhic authorities conclude that one should not pray for something miraculous, such as changing a female to a male or vice versa. A prayer to change reality is a vain prayer. Thus rules the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim §230:1):
One who prays about what has already occurred—for example, he entered a city and heard a scream in the city and said: “May it be [His] will that this scream not be from my house”; or his wife was pregnant more than forty days and he said: “May it be [His] will that my wife bear a male”—this is a vain prayer. Rather, a person should pray about what is yet to come and give thanks for what has passed…
For the past one may give thanks but not pray. Prayer is only for the future, i.e., for what has not yet occurred. One must not pray for a departure from nature.[3] As noted, he brings as normative law only the Gemara’s second answer, as above.
Perhaps you wonder why I shifted here from prayer about the past to prayer to change reality, and essentially to prayer for a miracle. These are not identical expressions, but substantively there is no difference between them. I already noted that the halakhic authorities (following the Yerushalmi in Ta’anit) state that one must not pray for a miracle, and not only about the past. I will sharpen this by removing from the table two distinctions likely to be raised here: the distinction between an overt miracle and a hidden miracle, and the distinction between past and future.
Is there a distinction between praying for an overt miracle and praying for a hidden miracle?
There is a tendency to think that the prohibition applies only to praying for an overt miracle, but not for a hidden miracle. What is the difference? Perhaps because we do not want people to be disappointed and lose their faith if, in the end, a miracle does not occur. With a hidden miracle no one knows whether a miracle occurred or not. Of course, there is the other side of the coin: if in the end a hidden miracle does occur, then there is no risk that people will deny it and attribute it to nature, for the same reason—one cannot know whether it occurred. Believers will remain believers and deniers will remain deniers. In short, according to this thesis, divine involvement or an answer to prayer is a thesis not subject to refutation or confirmation. The moment it is subject to refutation or confirmation, it is prohibited to deploy it. Convenient enough, no?
One might attempt to infer this from the very sugya in Berakhot. The Gemara there speaks of one who was on the road and prays about a disaster that has already occurred, asking that it not be from his household. One may wonder why it speaks of someone on the road, rather than of one who already saw that his family members died and asks that they come back to life. Seemingly, this is a difference between a hidden and an overt miracle. The novelty is that even if he is on the road, since the matter is public and others have already seen what happened, this would be an overt miracle, and one may not pray for it. This could also explain the difference between the righteous and ordinary people: the righteous are worthy of a miracle and will not be disappointed if it does not occur. But as noted, this distinction is not ruled as law.
Moreover, a closer look at the sugya itself shows that this distinction is incorrect. The second example in the Mishnah is praying about a fetus in the mother’s womb. When I ask to change the sex of the fetus after one hundred days (by then it is certainly a vain prayer), even if God were to perform a miracle and change the fetus’s sex from female to male, it would be a hidden miracle, for all this occurs in the womb. As is known, in that era there was no ultrasound (and at fifty days, to my knowledge, even ultrasound does not yet reveal the sex). So why is the prayer deemed a vain prayer? From here we have evidence that the prohibition also applies to praying for a hidden miracle. So long as it entails a departure from nature, one may not request it.
Note that, in principle, a surgeon can (or will be able to in the future) perform in-utero surgery to change the sex of the fetus, and in that case it would be a change within the framework of nature and science. I assume that most halakhic authorities would not say that such an operation is prohibited because it interferes with nature. It is no greater an interference than curing cancer or any other disease (as is known, the physician has been given permission to heal).[4] And is it conceivable that one may not ask God to do something that a human surgeon can do? The answer is yes: divine involvement, unlike an operation performed by a human being, is a departure from nature. One must not ask God to interfere with nature, even in something a human being can do.
Is there a distinction between praying about the past and praying about the future?
I have heard some argue that one may request miracles, but not miracles that change the past. But this too does not withstand the facts. I request that God change the sex of the fetus from now on (not retroactively and not retroactive-from-now-on). This is not a request to change the past. For all I care, let the fetus have been formed as female, and now God will change its sex to male. As was said: “The past is gone, the future not yet, and the present is as the blink of an eye—whence worry?!” So why is this prohibited? The conclusion is that even if I request a change to the present or the future, so long as the future depends on the past and has already been set by it, this is a vain prayer.
Conclusion of the sugya
The conclusion that emerges from our discussion thus far: any request of God to change reality—whether in the past or in the future (in a case where the future has already been determined by the past)—is a vain prayer. We have also seen that there is no difference between an overt change of reality and a hidden change. Any request for divine involvement that departs from nature is a vain prayer.
When is the sex of the fetus determined?
I hold the heretical and progressive view (this old communist expression has enjoyed a revival and become a pejorative of late) that we now possess scientific knowledge that the Sages did not have. For example, with respect to the sex of the newborn, science today knows that it is determined at the moment the sperm meets the egg. Here is a passage from the infomed site:
The sex of the newborn is determined the moment the sperm meets the egg. If the sperm carries a Y chromosome, a boy will be born; if it carries an X chromosome, a girl will be born…
The natures of the sperm and egg determine the sex that will result from their meeting.[5] If so, the Gemara’s assumption that the sex of the newborn remains an open question until forty days after conception is false. The sex is fixed from the beginning of the pregnancy.
Halakhic ramifications
Does this change the law? Very likely yes. Once this is the knowledge we possess, the prohibition to pray about the sex of the fetus applies from the moment the sperm meets the egg. It seems that today such a prayer would be permitted only before intercourse.
But if we continue in that line of thought, we will find that, in fact, even before intercourse it is a vain prayer. In truth, the entire natural causal chain is deterministic, and each stage is determined by the preceding stages. Even the meeting of sperm and egg is a natural event and is governed by the laws of nature and circumstances. What determines which sperm and which egg meet is a very complex process that cannot be predicted, but it is still a deterministic process. Even the decision about the time of intercourse between father and mother, or even the choice of spouse—which are, of course, the primary influences on the identity of the sperm and egg that will participate in fertilization—are determined by a combination of the laws of nature and human choices.
Note that this description is a corollary of the picture presented in the previous column, according to which circumstances and the laws of nature (and now I will add: human choices) are a sufficient condition for everything that happens in the world. According to the conclusion of the sugya in Berakhot, in effect one cannot pray for anything that happens in the world. There is nothing that is not fixed by the laws of nature, and any divine involvement that does not depart from nature does not exist. If there is a prohibition to pray for a departure from nature, then there remains no place for prayer at all.
Note: I have not addressed here at all my view that nowadays God is not involved in the world. That is a different claim (on the factual plane), and my words here stand independently of it. Even if He is involved in every step we take, still, from our sugya it emerges that there is a halakhic prohibition to request it. Of course, if you assume that the sugya also states as a fact that He does not depart from nature (not that He cannot, but that this is His policy) and therefore there is no point in requesting it, and not merely that it prohibits praying for it, then the conclusion remains the same: both prohibited and pointless to pray for anything. But such an interpretation (which is stated almost explicitly in the sugya: “it does not avail”) turns the Sages into heretics like me, so for the sake of our discussion here I will not assume it. Even if we assume that God is involved, there is still a prohibition to ask Him for it.
Two kinds of randomness
To understand this better, I must sharpen a point that many tend to ignore (it was laid out well in column 326). We habitually treat various events in the world as if they were random: tossing a coin or a die, a chance meeting on the street, and the like. But these have nothing to do with randomness in the essential sense. A coin toss is a completely deterministic mechanical process, and if I knew the initial conditions (the circumstances)—namely, air density, the die’s exact shape, the initial velocity (magnitude and direction)—I could tell you how it will land. This is a calculation using the laws of Newtonian mechanics, elementary physics. Our inability to do so stems from the practical complexity of the calculation and the strong sensitivity of the outcome to initial conditions. But that is only a technical difficulty. In principle, in all such cases the circumstances and the laws of nature uniquely determine the outcome.
All the cases you normally regard as random (perhaps excepting quantum theory, which is irrelevant at these scales) are of this kind. They are all deterministic, and we use probabilistic tools only due to a technical difficulty. So it is with all events in the world known to us, and therefore all are subject to deterministic causality. This means that in our world everything that happens is the product of prior circumstances and the laws of nature. A chance encounter between a lion and a monkey, a particular weather pattern prevailing in a given region, the mood of human beings, and more—all these are products of the laws of nature and the circumstances that constitute a sufficient condition for them. Therefore, any divine involvement that would produce a different result (different weather, a different mood, a different encounter, and so on) is a departure from the laws of nature. Hence, a request that God intervene in something in the world is a departure from the laws of nature. The expression “a request for divine involvement without departing from nature” is an empty oxymoron. This holds for determining the sex of the newborn, a house fire, a dog’s attack on a baby, a pandemic, a tsunami, cancer or its cure, and any other event you can think of. There may be complexity, but the processes are deterministic, and involvement in them is a departure from the laws of nature. So what, in fact, is there to pray for? It seems: nothing.
And what about human choice?
I noted above that beyond the laws of nature and natural circumstances there is another factor influencing events in the world: human choice. Could divine involvement not enter via influencing human choice? Our decision whether, when, and with whom to have intercourse is the result of our free will, and therefore perhaps one could pray that God direct it so that the sperm and egg that meet will produce a male or female, as we desire.
To this I say two things: First, even if that is correct, prayer about the sex of the newborn would retreat much further back—before we even decided when to have intercourse. Certainly not after forty days from conception. Beyond this, as I will now explain, in my understanding even such involvement is, in a sense, a departure from nature.
The Sages say: “Everything is in the hands of Heaven except the fear of Heaven,” meaning that everything is done by God except for our deeds. If so, precisely in human actions He is not expected to intervene. In my view this is probably not the meaning of that dictum, since natural processes are “in the hands of Heaven” only in the sense that they are not in our hands but in the hands of the laws of nature (which themselves, of course, were created by God). What is in our hands are decisions pertaining to fear of Heaven—that is, decisions with moral significance. These are entrusted to us and our free choice. In any case, our actions certainly are not in Heaven’s hands, nor in the hands of the laws of nature. That dictum indeed rejects the deterministic claim that the laws of nature determine our choices and decisions.
Therefore, as I have been asked more than once (mainly by Oren, the site’s editor—see, for example, here and also here), one may wonder whether God might be involved in the world by influencing our choices, human beings. If these are not deterministic processes, then, ostensibly, divine involvement that does not depart from the laws of nature could occur there. According to this proposal, our prayer about the sex of the fetus, or about anything else, could be answered by divine intervention in the decisions of the human beings involved in the events—for example, decisions about whom to marry, when to have intercourse, and so on. This would be involvement that does not depart from nature (more precisely: the events themselves are not part of nature, and therefore my arguments here do not preclude divine involvement in them).
However, even regarding such human decisions there are only two possibilities: 1) They were made not out of moral considerations but simply because both partners felt like having intercourse on that day. In that case it is a natural event with natural causes. The human body is also part of the physical world. Divine involvement in such a process is certainly a departure from the laws of nature. 2) They were made out of moral considerations (choosing that particular spouse or that particular time for intercourse). But if so, then again it is unlikely that God would intervene, for such decisions are precisely entrusted to us and our free choice (“Everything is in the hands of Heaven except the fear of Heaven”). In other words, just as His policy is not to intervene in the workings of nature and its laws, so too He refrains from intervening in our free choices. Just as He refrains from an intervention that contradicts natural processes, He refrains from an intervention that contradicts free choice.[6] Put differently: it is implausible to interpret my prayer as asking God to take away my choice of when to have intercourse. And even if the intent is not that He take away my choice but that this act is not a choice, and I am asking that God direct it to the right moment—this too is involvement that departs from the laws of nature, for were it not for the involvement, a particular moment would have been chosen by virtue of the laws of nature (recall that the human being is part of nature).
So what did the Gemara have in mind?
The conclusion is that, according to the sugya in Berakhot, there is no permission to pray for anything. Every event that occurs here is either a natural event with sufficient natural causes or a voluntary event entrusted to human free choice (which is the sufficient condition for it). Now the question arises: if this is indeed the conclusion of the sugya, what did the Sages think? They surely spoke of permitted requests in prayer. If every involvement is a departure from nature, and asking for a departure from nature is prohibited, then in what cases may one request anything? What did the Sages themselves mean when they spoke of requests to God? For example, the sugya rules that a request to change the sex of the fetus before forty days from conception is certainly permitted halakhically.
My claim is that the Sages erred in understanding natural reality (they lacked scientific knowledge). They thought there are open questions in nature, i.e., situations where circumstances do not dictate the outcome. Such “margins” mean that, given circumstances X, at least two different outcomes—Y and Z—can develop. For example, under circumstances prevailing before forty days (X), the newborn’s sex can be male (Y) or female (Z). But it turns out they were mistaken about this. According to current scientific knowledge, there are no such open states; i.e., there are no margins in nature.
Halakhic analysis: practical conclusion
The assumption is that the Talmud has the authority to determine halakhah and we do not dispute it. What, then, should we learn from the sugya in Berakhot? As noted, there are two claims in it: 1) A factual-scientific claim: there are margins in nature. 2) A halakhic-normative claim: it is prohibited to pray for involvement that departs from nature (i.e., to ask to change the outcome where there are no margins). We have seen that the factual claim is false, but this is not a principled problem. The Sages were often wrong in factual-scientific determinations. They were human beings like you and me and were equipped with the scientific knowledge of their time; therefore, there is no obligation to adopt their factual determinations. The Talmud’s authority does not extend to factual claims. That authority means that their normative claims are binding halakhah—especially where they are not dependent on any factual assumption.
So if we adopt claim 2 (for it is normative and therefore binding) and replace claim 1 with the more up-to-date information (that there are no margins in nature), the logically necessary conclusion is that there is no situation in which divine involvement occurs within the framework of nature, and therefore there is no permission to pray for anything. Note well: prayers for the healing of a sick person or for rescue from trouble, like any other request, are all halakhically prohibited.
I emphasize again that this conclusion does not depend on my heretical view that nowadays there is likely no divine involvement in the world. Even if such involvement exists—and this is certainly what the Sages thought—still, as we have seen, there is a halakhic prohibition to request it. For the same reason, do not challenge me from sugyot that state one may pray for a sick person. That stems from the mistaken assumption that healing a disease is an open matter and thus divine involvement can occur there without departing from nature.
“He who goes to measure his threshing floor”
There is a parallel sugya that seems to contradict our conclusion (it was cited in the thread here). The Gemara in Bava Metzia 42a says:
And Rabbi Yitzḥak said: Blessing is found only in something hidden from the eye, as it is said, “The Lord will command the blessing with you in your storehouses (asamekha).” The school of Rabbi Yishmael taught: Blessing is found only in something over which the eye has no power, as it is said, “The Lord will command the blessing with you in your storehouses.”
The Gemara’s premise is that there is divine involvement in the world.
Now a baraita is brought:
Our Rabbis taught: One who goes to measure his threshing floor says, “May it be Your will, Lord our God, that You send blessing in the work of our hands.” If he began measuring he says, “Blessed is He who sends blessing in this heap.” If he measured and only afterward prayed, this is a vain prayer, for blessing is not found in a weighed thing, nor in a measured thing, nor in a counted thing, but only in a thing hidden from the eye, as it is said, “The Lord will command the blessing with you in your storehouses.”
That is, if a person has not measured his grain, it is deemed hidden from the eye, and therefore blessing may rest upon it and it is fitting to request that. Once it has been measured, it is already revealed, and one should no longer pray over it. We see that the Gemara ties permission to request to whether the matter is revealed or hidden—i.e., whether it is a hidden or overt miracle. One requests a hidden miracle, not an overt one. But according to this sugya it seems that the very request to depart from nature is permitted. Rather, one may request only a hidden miracle, even if it entails a departure from nature and even if it concerns the past (for the grain is already in the threshing floor even if it has not yet been measured).
So rules the Rambam as well (Laws of Blessings 10:22):
One who goes to measure his threshing floor says, “May it be Your will, Lord my God, that You send blessing in the work of my hands.” If he began to measure he says, “Blessed is He who sends blessing in this heap.” If he measured and only then beseeched mercy, this is a vain prayer. And anyone who cries out about the past—this is a vain prayer.
He even links this to our sugya. And so it is in the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim §230:2).
The contradiction to the Berakhot sugya
However, the conclusion of this sugya not only contradicts my words above but also the sugya in Berakhot itself. There we saw that one must not request a change of the fetus’s sex, even though that would be a hidden miracle (no one knows its sex before birth). Therefore, in any case, do not blame me.
One might understand that there is a dispute between the sugyot (and indeed the Rambam omitted the Berakhot sugya from his code, though the Shulchan Aruch brings both). I once saw in the name of the Meiri that he wrote that the request here is that he succeed in commerce with this grain, and not about the quantity of grain—which would be a change of nature. That view leaves our earlier conclusion intact (though, as I explained above, even a request for success in commerce is a request to change nature. The Meiri apparently thought that here there is a margin). But that interpretation is difficult to square with the sugya itself, for that he could pray even after measuring. We have seen someone who wrote (see here) to distinguish between changing the laws of physics (permitted) and changing the laws of logic (prohibited). But as I responded there, this is a mistaken distinction, for even prayer to change the fetus’s sex is a change in the laws of physics, not of logic. We pray that God perform in-utero surgery to change the sex. There should be no difference between before forty days and after forty days.
What seems to me most plausible is that this is a special law regarding tithes specifically (see here), because there the Torah promises that the matter will bring us blessing (“And I will pour out for you a blessing”), and as is known, with tithes it is even permitted to “test” God. But regarding everything else one must not request a departure from nature. According to this, my words stand as is—except regarding tithes. It seems the Sages assumed that the amount of grain in the threshing floor is an open matter until it is measured (depending on its nature on account of God’s blessing), and thus subject to change.[7] In light of my words above, it is likely that even in this they were factually mistaken, but the normative principle (that one must not pray to change reality where there are no margins) remains in place.
Either way, at least from the Berakhot sugya it emerges that there is no possibility to ask God to intervene in the world. The Bava Metzia sugya perhaps disagrees, or perhaps exempts only the matter of tithes, or perhaps it too is mistaken. But it seems our conclusion stands.
[1] Perhaps like a vain oath (shevu’at shav), which is also prohibited. Just as there is a prohibition to bear the Name of God in vain, there may be a prohibition to address Him in vain.
[2] And perhaps for one who is not righteous it will not avail.
[3] See on this also the words of the Vilna Gaon (brought in Imrei No’am, Berakhot ad loc.) and the Bekhor Shor (Shabbat 21b; his words are cited in Sha’arei Teshuvah §187:2).
[4] One could debate whether such surgery constitutes healing, but that is not our topic here.
[5] See there how the mother’s condition (who has two X chromosomes) also influences the newborn’s sex.
[6] Involvement in our decisions that does not contradict free choice is impossible—exactly as I explained at the end of the previous column regarding involvement within nature.
[7] In Keli Ḥemdah, Exodus p. 157, col. 3, he proves from here that grain added by virtue of blessing is obligated in tithes, for otherwise they would not have permitted praying about it, lest one separate from exempt produce on obligated produce. This would seem to indicate that such additional “blessing” is deemed a natural matter.