Talmud, Yoma Chapter 8 – Lesson 12

Table of Contents

• The contradiction between the passages on pages 82 and 85 and ways to resolve it
• The practical difference for a Noahide and the dispute among the possible approaches
• The Re’em in Parashat Derakhim, Tosafot, and “and live by them”
• The doubt in Sanhedrin: sanctification of God’s name versus self-sacrifice
• The Arukh LaNer, Yad Ramah, and the scope of the doubt regarding a Noahide
• Passive omission in the three cardinal sins and the connection to deriving sexual prohibitions from murder
• Tosafot on Esther, passive involvement, and two ways of understanding the analogy
• Rabbi Chaim on Maimonides: sexual prohibitions in every form, and clarifying Tosafot’s example in murder
• Two understandings of mai yimar, Rashi in Pesachim, and the proof from “that your brother may live with you”
• Conclusion of the lecture

Summary

General overview

It was said that there is an apparent contradiction between the passages on pages 82 and 85 regarding the basic starting point of self-sacrifice, and three ways are constructed to resolve it without positing a dispute: either page 82 is fundamental and “and live by them” on page 85 limits the initial thought to expand self-sacrifice, or page 85 is fundamental and “and live by them” grants an exemption, with only the three cardinal sins excluded, or in both directions there is no rational determination on its own and verses are needed for both sides. The main practical implication is for the law of a Noahide, upon whom the Torah’s special innovations do not apply, and therefore the starting point before the verses may determine his law. It is said that among the medieval authorities (Rishonim) there are three possibilities: he is obligated to give up his life, he is exempt, or the matter remains doubtful. Later the positions of the Re’em, Tosafot, and Parashat Derakhim are brought regarding the connection between “and live by them,” sanctification of God’s name, and the Talmudic doubt in Sanhedrin concerning a Noahide, and then the discussion moves to passive omission in the three cardinal sins and the disputes among the medieval authorities (Rishonim) regarding Esther as passive involvement. Finally, Rabbi Chaim is cited as explaining Maimonides as disagreeing with Tosafot, and an understanding is proposed in Rashi and in Rabbi Chaim according to which even in murder there is no need to distinguish between positive action and passive omission, using “that your brother may live with you” in Bava Metzia.

The contradiction between the passages on pages 82 and 85 and ways to resolve it

It is said that on page 82 the starting point is that one need not give up one’s life, and a special innovation is needed to teach that for the three cardinal sins one must. It is said that on page 85 the starting point is that one must give up one’s life, and “and live by them” is needed to teach that for the rest of the commandments, aside from those three, one need not. Two possibilities are suggested that reverse which passage is fundamental: either page 82 is fundamental and page 85 comes so that one should not derive the other prohibitions from the three cardinal sins, or page 85 is fundamental and “and live by them” grants a general exemption, while the passage on page 82 excludes the three. Binyamin adds a third possibility, according to which there is no decisive logic in either direction without verses, and therefore verses are needed both for the obligation of self-sacrifice and for exemption.

The practical difference for a Noahide and the dispute among the possible approaches

It is said that the practical implication concerns whether a gentile is obligated to give himself up, because in the case of a gentile all the Torah’s special innovations do not apply, and therefore the starting point that exists before the verses is the law that will remain for a gentile. It is said that for a gentile there are three possibilities reflecting the three conceptions: one possibility is that the gentile must give himself up, one possibility is that the gentile need not give himself up, and one possibility is that the matter is in doubt. It is said, for example, that Nachmanides falls into the possibility that the gentile need not give himself up.

The Re’em in Parashat Derakhim, Tosafot, and “and live by them”

In Parashat Derakhim the view of the Re’em is brought on the Talmudic statement, “Should I circumcise and go out? It is a danger to the infant,” and the Re’em asks how it was permitted to violate the positive commandment of circumcision because of danger to the infant before the giving of the Torah, when “and live by them” had not yet been said. The Re’em maintains that “and live by them” is an innovation that the Torah introduced only for Israel, whereas among Noahides one does not say “and live by them” but rather “let him die and not transgress” with regard to the seven Noahide commandments. It is said that this is similar to the direction of Tosafot’s question, but Tosafot backed away from the initial picture because of the question from the Talmud’s doubt whether a Noahide is commanded in sanctification of God’s name. Parashat Derakhim accepts Tosafot’s conclusion that “and live by them” is needed so that one should not derive the other commandments from a murderer and a betrothed maiden, where even in private one must be killed rather than transgress. And therefore, regarding a Noahide, where in those very cases we hold “transgress and do not be killed,” it follows that he has no permission in a situation of danger to fulfill any commandment, and he violates “But your blood of your lives I will demand,” and that is why Moses postponed circumcision because of the danger to the infant.

The doubt in Sanhedrin: sanctification of God’s name versus self-sacrifice

It is said that the question against the Re’em is formulated around the issue of why there is doubt in the Talmud whether a gentile is commanded in sanctification of God’s name if “and live by them” was not said about him, and a simple answer is suggested: the Talmud is not asking directly about self-sacrifice but about the commandment of sanctifying God’s name. It is said that if the obligation to give up one’s life stems from sanctification of God’s name, then a Noahide, who is not commanded in sanctification of God’s name, is not obligated to give up his life even without “and live by them.” If so, the Talmud’s doubt is whether a Noahide is like Israel with respect to the obligation of sanctifying God’s name. It is said that the very fact that the obligation is made dependent on sanctification of God’s name shows that by logic alone there is no obligation to give up one’s life, and the verse “and live by them” comes to exclude the obligation of sanctification of God’s name for the other commandments apart from the three cardinal sins. It is said that in the Talmud itself the obligation of sanctifying God’s name is interpreted as an obligation of self-sacrifice for commandments, and it is said that in Maimonides it appears that sanctification of God’s name is a broader obligation and not only self-sacrifice.

The Arukh LaNer, Yad Ramah, and the scope of the doubt regarding a Noahide

It is said that the later authorities (Acharonim) discuss what exactly the Talmud’s doubt in Sanhedrin was when it asked whether a gentile is commanded in sanctification of God’s name. It is said that the Arukh LaNer explains, following Rashi, that the inquiry was only about idolatry, and then the matter is tied to “And you shall love the Lord your God,” whether that too is said regarding a gentile. It is said that in Yad Ramah it is written that the doubt concerns all seven Noahide commandments, and then the possibility returns that the plain logic is that one must give up one’s life, or that sanctification of God’s name applies to all the commandments. It is said that there is room to hesitate over whether self-sacrifice because of sanctification of God’s name applies only to idolatry or to all the commandments, and what the relation is between that and “and live by them” for Israel.

Passive omission in the three cardinal sins and the connection to deriving sexual prohibitions from murder

It is said that the discussion of passive omission arises only in the three cardinal sins, because in the other commandments one does not give up one’s life even in the case of positive action. In bloodshed it is said that the foundation is the logic of mai yimar, and that passive omission is preferable when there is no basis to decide between two lives. Tosafot brings the case of someone falling from a roof who may kill an infant, and suggests that he is not obligated to turn himself in order to die. It is said that there are those who disagree with Tosafot, such as the Baal HaMaor and Nachmanides, and they hold that even in passive omission one must be killed rather than transgress in murder. Regarding idolatry, it is said that because of the severity of the prohibition there is no logical basis to distinguish between positive action and passive omission if one can describe a case of transgression through passive omission. Regarding sexual prohibitions, it is said that the matter depends on how one derives a betrothed maiden from murder: if the derivation transfers the logic of mai yimar, then there is room to distinguish as in murder and exempt in passive omission; but if it is only a clarification that the severity of sexual prohibitions obligates one just like idolatry, then there is no room to distinguish.

Tosafot on Esther, passive involvement, and two ways of understanding the analogy

In Tosafot on page 82 it is brought in the name of Rashi that “do not read ‘let her be killed,’” because she was merely passive ground, and it is said that this resolves why the questioner in the chapter Ben Sorer asks only, “But Esther was in public,” and does not ask from the standpoint of sexual prohibition in private. Tosafot brings proof from a murderer, where the matter is founded on mai yimar, that the rule of being killed rather than transgress does not apply where there is no action, such as “they want to throw him onto an infant,” and from there compares to a betrothed maiden, that if she did not perform an action she need not be killed. Tosafot adds “and furthermore” and explains that the analogy from the verse “as when a man rises against his fellow and murders him” deals with a murderer acting directly with his hands, and therefore even aside from the logic of mai yimar, the analogy is aimed at murder through positive action. Tosafot brings “and some explain” that Esther is resolved by saying that “she did not derive benefit from the transgression, for he merely injected impurity into her,” and it is said that from here it follows that according to this view, had she derived benefit, there would have been room to obligate her even in passive omission.

Rabbi Chaim on Maimonides: sexual prohibitions in every form, and clarifying Tosafot’s example in murder

Rabbi Chaim cites the wording of Maimonides in the Laws of the Foundations of the Torah, chapter 5, that “with regard to these three transgressions… one must be killed rather than transgress,” and infers that Maimonides does not mention passive involvement at all, which implies that he holds that in sexual prohibitions, in every form, one must be killed. It is said that Rabbi Chaim notes that this is a dispute among the medieval authorities (Rishonim), and it is brought that the Baal HaMaor and Milchamot suggest that Esther was not a case of sexual prohibition according to the passage, for example because she was unmarried, or because “intercourse with a gentile is not considered included among the sexual prohibitions,” following Rabbeinu Tam, or because “she did not derive pleasure.” Rabbi Chaim asks from Tosafot, who proved from murder that in passive omission one is not obligated to give himself up, and he answers that the distinction in murder is not because of the severity of direct physical action but because of the balancing of equivalent lives in passive omission, and in that respect one should not compare sexual prohibitions to life-saving as though they were equal. Rabbi Chaim adds an internal difficulty regarding Tosafot’s example of someone thrown onto an infant, and argues that there “he is not considered a murderer at all,” but rather “like a stone or a piece of wood in the murderer’s hand,” and explains that Tosafot were speaking hypothetically, if there were such a case of passive omission that still carried the law of murder.

Two understandings of mai yimar, Rashi in Pesachim, and the proof from “that your brother may live with you”

It is said that there are two ways to explain the logic of mai yimar: either the equivalence of the two lives creates a default of passive omission, and therefore in positive action one must be killed, but in passive omission one need not; or the equivalence of the two lives means that the prohibition of murder is not set aside for life-saving at all, and therefore even in passive omission one must be killed if the law of murder applies there. Rashi in Pesachim is brought, explaining that the Torah permitted setting aside commandments only because of the preciousness of a Jewish life, but here “there is loss of life in any case,” and therefore “who says your life is more precious… than this one’s,” so it turns out that “a transgression is committed and a life is lost.” Rabbi Chaim brings a proof from Bava Metzia 62, in the case of two people traveling on the road with one flask of water, that a verse is needed—“that your brother may live with you; your life takes precedence”—to permit refraining from rescue, and from there he concludes that where there is no verse saying your life takes precedence, there is no rule of setting aside a prohibition even in passive omission. Therefore, in murder, and even in sexual prohibitions derived from it, there is room to say, “in every case one must be killed rather than transgress.”

Conclusion of the lecture

It is said that the lecture concludes the month of Elul, and the blessing “May you be sealed for a good final judgment” is given, and they part in advance of the retreat and the break in learning after the holidays.

Okay, let’s begin. We saw that there are two passages that seem, at least on the face of it, to start from contradictory assumptions. In the passage on page 82, it seems that the starting point is that one does not need to give up one’s life, and you need a special novelty to teach that for the three severe transgressions one does have to. On page 85, the starting point is that one does have to give up one’s life, and we need “and live by them” to teach that for the other commandments, aside from those three, one does not have to. So at first glance there seems to be a contradiction between the passages. In principle you can reconcile them in two ways. Binyamin added a third direction for reconciling them, so that there would be no disagreement between the passages. One possibility is that the fundamental passage is the one on page 82. Meaning, the starting point is that a person does not have to give up his life. But after it was newly taught that for the three severe transgressions one does have to give up one’s life, there was then a preliminary assumption that maybe for the other prohibitions too one would have to give up one’s life, and that is why we need the passage on page 85 that says “and live by them,” therefore one does not have to. A second possibility is the reverse. The fundamental passage is the one on page 85. That means that basically a person does have to give up his life, and “and live by them” says that a person does not have to, and the three severe transgressions in our passage come to exclude those and say that for those three, yes, one does. Binyamin added that it may be that the two passages stand on equal footing, and basically we have a not-very-strong argument in both directions. There is nothing decisive here without the verses, and therefore you need verses for both sides: both for the side that says you have to give yourself up, and for the side that says you do not have to give yourself up. We saw that the practical implication of this is regarding the obligation of a gentile to give himself up, because with regard to a gentile there are none of all those novelties written in the Torah, and therefore that same starting point that existed before all the verses came is basically the law that would remain in practice for a gentile. And in fact with regard to a gentile we saw all three possibilities. One possibility is that the gentile must give himself up; a second possibility is that the gentile, Nachmanides for example, a second possibility is that the gentile does not have to give himself up; and a third possibility is that there is doubt. That probably reflects these three conceptions.

Now there’s just one more completion I want to make here before I continue. In Parashat Derakhim, whom we also saw last time, there is another passage where he brings the view of the Ra’em. He says as follows: “And I saw in the Ra’em” — yes, that is Rabbi Eliyahu Mizrachi, one of Rashi’s commentators — “and I saw in the Ra’em in the portion of Shemot, on that which we say that ‘let me circumcise and go out’ is dangerous for the infant, and he wrote: but it is difficult — how was it permitted to transgress the positive commandment of circumcision because of danger to the infant, seeing that the Torah had not yet been given with the verse ‘and live by them’? And I already brought his words above in the first discourse and resolved them there. But his words, in my opinion, are astonishing, for it seems that he holds that this which the Merciful One wrote, ‘and live by them’ and not that he should die by them, is a novelty that the Torah introduced for Israel. But for the descendants of Noah we do not say ‘and live by them’; rather, let him die and not transgress any commandment of the seven commandments with which they were commanded.”

So the Ra’em basically says what Tosafot said as an objection: that the whole novelty of “and live by them,” namely that you may refrain from giving up your life, was said only regarding Israel. That implies that the simple reasoning, and the law regarding a gentile to whom the novelty of “and live by them” was not said, should be that yes, one gives up one’s life for all transgressions, not only for the three severe ones. And indeed that is the view of the Ra’em. The difference between him and Tosafot is that Tosafot raised an objection to this, and because he raised an objection to it he in fact backed away from it and adopted the second conception, the second picture we described, instead of the first picture. The second picture is that for a gentile — or according to the plain reasoning — and the law for a gentile is that he does not have to give himself up unless there is a verse that says he does. And therefore Parashat Derakhim indeed asks: “And if the verse ‘and live by them’ did not come as a novelty for Israel,” against what the Ra’em says, “but rather as Tosafot wrote in chapter Ben Sorer on page 74, that ‘and live by them’ was needed so that we would not derive the other commandments from murder and the betrothed young woman, that even in private one should be killed rather than transgress.”

Meaning, he takes Tosafot’s conclusion: Tosafot says that “and live by them” did not come to introduce the novelty that an Israelite need not give up his life. That too we know from logic — that he need not give up his life. “And live by them” comes to say that after it was newly taught that for the three severe transgressions one does have to give up his life, you should not learn from that to the other prohibitions. But without any verse and without any source at all, the simple conception is that one need not give up one’s life. The practical implication is with regard to a gentile. We already saw that in Tosafot itself. But he brings it against the Ra’em. So he says — he has to say this, for if you do not say so, then this question in the West would be difficult: Is a descendant of Noah commanded regarding sanctification of the Name or not? But “and live by them” is written regarding Israel, as Tosafot themselves asked there. Rather, it is certain that “and live by them” was needed so that we would not derive the other commandments from murder and the betrothed young woman. And if so, regarding a descendant of Noah, for even regarding those — “those” meaning murder and the betrothed young woman — we hold that he should transgress rather than be killed, it is obvious that he was not permitted in a place of danger to fulfill any commandment, and if he does so he transgresses because of “but your blood of your souls I will demand.” And therefore Moses our teacher acted correctly in postponing the circumcision because of danger to the infant.

What he wants to claim here is that Tosafot did not back away from his initial conception for nothing. He had an objection. Tosafot’s initial conception was, apparently, what emerges from the Gemara: if the Gemara brings “and live by them” in order to teach that one need not give up one’s life, that implies that without the verse the plain reasoning says that one should give up one’s life. And therefore we need the “and live by them,” and then it should come out that for a gentile he really does have to give up his life. So that is the plain reasoning, and that is indeed how the Ra’em learns. But Tosafot, although he too began with that reasoning, rejects it. Why? Because he asks: according to this, why is there any doubt in the Gemara whether a gentile is commanded in sanctification of the Name or not? Surely this source, “and live by them,” was not said regarding a gentile. So if it was not said regarding a gentile, then clearly the gentile too is obligated in self-sacrifice, in sanctification of the Name. Therefore, from the very fact that the Gemara has a doubt — right? — whether a gentile is commanded in sanctification of the Name or not, it is clear that “and live by them” is not introducing the fact that we are not required to give up our lives, because otherwise there would be no room for doubt regarding a gentile. So the very same objection Tosafot asked against his own first conception, and therefore retracted from it, is difficult for the Ra’em, because the Ra’em keeps it even in the conclusion. The Ra’em keeps, as the conclusion, that “and live by them” really is the source that teaches this. Basically, the Ra’em holds the conception — I don’t remember whether I called it the first or the second — he holds the conception that there is an obligation to give up one’s life were it not for the verses, and he keeps that even in the conclusion. Not like Tosafot, where it was only an initial assumption. So the question against him is: what then is the Gemara’s doubt about whether a gentile is obligated in sanctification of the Name or not? It is obvious that if a dispensation is needed in order to teach “and live by them,” that means that without “and live by them” there is an obligation to give up one’s life. So if “and live by them” was not said regarding a gentile, then the gentile must give up his life. So what will the Ra’em answer to that?

And actually — now I’m really thinking of another thing, I hadn’t thought of it before — but it seems to me there is the simplest direction possible. What do you say? Is the question difficult for him at all? What do you say? What is difficult for the… how would the Ra’em answer it? What is the Gemara’s doubt whether a gentile is commanded in sanctification of the Name, if it is obvious that without the verse “and live by them” a person has to give up his life? Then obviously he is commanded, because “and live by them” was not said about him. If “and live by them” was not said about him, then plainly he is obligated. What? What would he answer? This is just… now I do not understand at all why I was looking for other answers. This is just mixing things up. The Gemara is not asking whether a gentile has to give up his life. The Gemara is asking whether a gentile is commanded in sanctification of the Name. What does that mean? That the obligation to give up one’s life, the basic obligation without “and live by them,” comes from sanctification of the Name. Now, if a gentile is not obligated in sanctification of the Name, then he is not obligated to give up his life even without “and live by them.” But an Israelite certainly is obligated in sanctification of the Name, so with regard to an Israelite we need the verse “and live by them” to teach that he need not give up his life, even though he is obligated in sanctification of the Name. But if a gentile is not obligated at all in sanctification of the Name, then even without the verse “and live by them” being said about him, he would not need to give up his life. The only reason you need the verse is only for Israel, because with regard to Israel it is obvious that there is a commandment of sanctification of the Name. And what the Gemara is in doubt about is whether a gentile, like an Israelite, is also obligated in sanctification of the Name, and then, since the verse “and live by them” was not said about him, he will have to give up his life; or whether a gentile is not obligated in sanctification of the Name, and then although the verse “and live by them” was not said about him, he still does not need to give up his life, because he is not obligated in sanctification of the Name in the first place.

Why? On the contrary, if the obligation — after all, what comes out from here is that the Gemara understands that the verse “and live by them” did not come to override plain logic, but rather to override the obligation of sanctification of the Name. It comes to say that the obligation of sanctification of the Name does not apply to the other commandments, only to the three severe ones. The three severe ones are a separate issue in themselves, never mind that right now, but with regard to the other commandments it is not there. It comes to override the obligation of sanctification of the Name, not plain logic. Now regarding a gentile, we have a doubt whether that obligation exists. On the contrary, from here it seems that plain logic says not to give up one’s life. The whole reason that for an Israelite one needs to give up one’s life is because of sanctification of the Name, and regarding that the verse “and live by them” comes and says that one does not have to for the other transgressions, aside from the three severe ones. So it comes out that in fact the logic is that one need not give up one’s life, so what happens with a gentile? But that is also because of the reasoning of “who says” — one has to give up one’s life. No, not in murder right now. Murder is reasoning. I’m speaking right now about idolatry. Idolatry. Fine. Murder is the reasoning of “who says”; we’ll still discuss that. But right now I’m talking about the reasoning for the obligation to give up one’s life for idolatry. From the fact that they make it depend on sanctification of the Name, it follows from that itself that by simple logic there is no obligation to give up one’s life. Only because of the commandment of sanctification of the Name does one have to. So in Israel, where there is a commandment of sanctification of the Name, we need the verse “and live by them” to say that he is not obligated to give up his life for the other transgressions. And what the Gemara is in doubt about in Sanhedrin is with regard to a gentile: is a gentile like Israel and obligated in sanctification of the Name, only that for him there is no “and live by them,” and therefore he will have to give up his life for all his transgressions? Or is a gentile not obligated in sanctification of the Name, and then although “and live by them” was not said about him, he does not need to give up his life because he simply has no sanctification of the Name — not because of “and live by them.”

The Gemara makes it depend on sanctification of the Name — which means that that is the reason for the obligation to give up one’s life. That is what it seems like. The Gemara does not speak at all about the obligation to give up one’s life; it speaks only about sanctification of the Name. The medieval authorities (Rishonim) explain that the practical implication is self-sacrifice. So it seems strange — why should it depend on the commandment of sanctification of the Name? Why should it depend on that? Seemingly the question is an independent question whether one is obligated to give up one’s life or not. It seems to understand that it is a desecration of the Name if a person does not give up his life. I noted that when I read the Gemara. When I read the Gemara, you can see there — or at least according to the explanations of the medieval authorities (Rishonim), and from the proof from Naaman it may even be a proof from the Gemara itself — but you see from the Gemara itself that the obligation of sanctification of the Name is nothing other than the obligation to give up one’s life for commandments. That is the meaning of sanctification of the Name. And I noted that in Maimonides it seems that the obligation is broader than that, and not only the obligation to give up one’s life for commandments. Then the question really arises in the Gemara: so why not count sanctification of the Name as an independent commandment, even if it is only an accessory to the other prohibitions? Because there is, in the commandment of sanctification of the Name, something beyond the obligation to give up one’s life for the other prohibitions — to conduct oneself the way a Jew ought to conduct himself. And that certainly ought to be counted separately.

More than that: I do not understand what desecration of the Name there is if a person does not sacrifice his life. But fine — why is that more of a desecration of the Name than an ordinary transgression? It is less of a desecration of the Name than an ordinary transgression. No, the very fact that a person commits a transgression is itself a desecration of the Name, and therefore he has to die. Every transgression you commit is a desecration of the Name. I understand, okay, and therefore one has to die. “And live by them” introduces the novelty that for the other transgressions, apart from the three severe ones, one does not have to. And that in itself is a problem, because a transgression that adds nothing to the transgressions — what does it mean, that anyone who commits a transgression has yet another transgression? Therefore the Gemara says that it is accessory to the others and need not be counted separately, but it does add one more thing: it adds the obligation to die. For ordinary transgressions, were it not a desecration of the Name, there would be no obligation to die over them. It is as though there is a positive commandment to die. By pure logic it is the same question as sanctification of the Name — why is desecration of the Name a more severe transgression such that you understand on your own that one must die for it? It seems to me from the Gemara that if it is a desecration of the Name, then one has to die over it. It cannot be that this is what it meant — fine, if that goes against the medieval authorities (Rishonim) there, then there is no point. I think the Gemara can also be explained differently. How? No, it may be that the issue of desecration of the Name is not the reason; the reason is always in order not to commit the transgression, only from the Gemara’s perspective — I do not remember the give-and-take right now — but desecration of the Name is not the reason, maybe it is only a sign that it is forbidden. No, it works the other way around. The Gemara does not speak at all about self-sacrifice for transgressions, not at all. It asks whether a gentile has sanctification of the Name or not, that’s all. The medieval authorities (Rishonim) explain that the implication is regarding self-sacrifice. Fine, then with the Gemara itself you do not need to force anything. I said, but because there is the proof from Naaman and what the medieval authorities (Rishonim) say, so they… So only the medieval authorities (Rishonim) understood that the practical implication is self-sacrifice. Correct. That is one of the possibilities I wanted to suggest here to defend the Ra’em: that the Ra’em says that the Gemara’s question is whether a gentile has to give up his life, whether a gentile is obligated in sanctification of the Name or not, independently of self-sacrifice for commandments. Self-sacrifice for commandments he is obligated in. The Gemara is not asking about that; it is asking whether sanctification of the Name exists for a gentile or not. That’s all. I said, but in Naaman it looks a little like that’s not so. So therefore I think there is a basis for what the medieval authorities (Rishonim) say there in the Gemara.

And in any case, now I’m saying, you don’t need all these answers. Because on the contrary, now I do not understand what Tosafot’s objection was. Tosafot assumed the first picture, that the reasoning is that one should give up one’s life, and “and live by them” introduces the novelty that one should not. And Tosafot says that cannot be, because then why is the Gemara in doubt whether there is sanctification of the Name for a gentile or not? Surely with regard to a gentile “and live by them” was certainly not said. So if “and live by them” was not said, then he certainly has to give up his life. So what is there to doubt about sanctification of the Name? What do you mean? If there is no sanctification of the Name in him, then he also would not have to give up his life even without “and live by them.” That itself is the doubt. What is the question? But now that I think about it — all this I had not thought of — I’m saying, maybe now I think that Tosafot really wants to say this: according to Tosafot’s initial conception, it comes out that by pure logic a person has to give up his life, and we need the verse “and live by them” to exempt him from that. Okay? At this stage, not because of sanctification of the Name. That’s it. But now what? Suppose you do not give up your life — what have you transgressed? Have you transgressed the prohibition itself, or have you transgressed sanctification of the Name? That is the question. It may be that the Gemara understands that after there is already an obligation to give up one’s life and you did not, now there is a new idea that this contains desecration of the Name. Not that because of desecration of the Name you have to give up your life. You have to give up your life because of the prohibition. Now true, but since we see that this is such an acute matter that you are obligated to the point of giving up your life, then if a person did not do so, he did something very severe, and that is called desecration of the Name. Then the Gemara asks what happens regarding a gentile. Now Tosafot says there is nothing to wonder about regarding a gentile, because if a gentile has to give up his life, seeing as “and live by them” was not said about him and by pure logic he has to give up his life, then clearly for him too this is sanctification of the Name. Otherwise, what is the severity of the transgression that requires him to give up his life? So it is an indication, not the cause. Then Tosafot asks: so what is the Gemara’s doubt whether he has sanctification of the Name or not? If there were no sanctification of the Name, then why would he have to give up his life without “and live by them”? But of course this is no longer an objection — I understand Tosafot’s objection, but of course it is no longer an objection against the Ra’em. The Ra’em would not learn that way. The Ra’em would learn the way most of the medieval authorities (Rishonim) learn: that the obligation to give up one’s life is because of sanctification of the Name. And the Gemara’s doubt is whether that reason exists for a gentile or not. If that reason is not there, then you do not need the verse “and live by them” to exempt him. If he does have sanctification of the Name, then you would need the verse, but the verse was not said about a gentile, so he has to give up his life. That’s all. It is not difficult.

Rabbi, isn’t there a problem in that with the seven Noahide commandments a descendant of Noah is liable to death for every one of them? Therefore the question… What? I didn’t understand. I didn’t understand. For the seven Noahide commandments the gentile is liable to death for each one, right? Yes, death. So then really, why does the Gemara connect this to sanctification of the Name? The gentile is liable to death… Fine, but what does that have to do with sanctification of the Name? The gentile is liable to death because he is not doing his job. So why the… what is the difference between the obligation to give up one’s life and the death penalty? Apparently the obligation to give up one’s life means that there is something here that is very acute. The obligation — the fact that you are liable to the death penalty, even though de facto it is the same thing — the fact that you are liable to the death penalty simply means that if the gentile is not doing his job, there is no reason for him to live. Why is that not the same thing? It is not the same thing. For desecrating the Sabbath one is liable to death, but one does not have to give up one’s life for it. So they are not two sides of the same coin. Correct. And the Gemara connects the two things. And on the contrary, a gentile is liable to death for all his transgressions. So that does not mean he has to give up his life. Why? Just as I am liable to death for desecrating the Sabbath, but I am not obligated to give up my life for it, so too with a gentile. What do you mean — you’re basically just returning to what I said. Meaning, the fact that there is a death penalty for it does not necessarily mean that there is some sanctification of the Name that requires you to hand yourself over to death in order not to transgress. The death penalty is the death penalty. Yes. Or the Sabbath is indeed a good proof of that. The Sabbath for a Jew, yes. The death penalty is with respect to the court, and sanctification of the Name is in one’s own power to hand oneself over. Exactly, right — that is exactly the difference I’m talking about.

So that is with regard to the Ra’em. The truth is that when I was wondering how to reconcile the Ra’em, I thought of something else too. We saw that the simple conception is that “and live by them” is a positive commandment. But we saw that they do not count it among the commandments; those who enumerate the commandments do not count it. It does not seem that they relate to it as some sort of positive commandment. So why is it that by force of “and live by them” I do not have to give up my life? What exactly is the point? So I said that “and live by them” is not some positive commandment that overrides my obligation to give up my life, but rather a meta-halakhic principle that reveals to me that the obligations to fulfill commandments or not transgress prohibitions do not apply to me in a place where the price is my life. It is a meta-halakhic principle, not a positive commandment. If that is so, then it is certainly possible that this principle was also said regarding a gentile. The fact that a gentile is obligated only in seven commandments and no more is true, but “and live by them” is not a commandment. “And live by them” is a principle. And it could be that the Gemara is in doubt about this very thing. Meaning: was the principle of “and live by them” also said regarding a gentile, or not? Since if the principle is that the Holy One, blessed be He, created me, then He wants me alive, not dead, and therefore He did not impose on me commandments that would require me to give up my life, perhaps that reasoning is also true for a gentile. If it were a commandment, then you would say: there are seven commandments for a gentile, there are no more commandments, so “and live by them” was not said regarding a gentile. But if it is not a commandment but rather a principle that teaches the value of human life, why not say it regarding a gentile as well? Maybe it was said regarding a gentile too. Then the Gemara’s doubt is exactly about that. Again, the wording is unfortunate — is a gentile obligated in sanctification of the Name? The wording is not: does “and live by them” apply to a gentile? I am only saying, for those medieval authorities (Rishonim) who wonder and connect these two statements with each other — whether there is “and live by them” and whether there is a commandment of sanctification of the Name — I am saying there is no need to connect them. But if you do see them as synonymous, that there is “and live by them” and there is the commandment of sanctification of the Name, then I say that one can explain that with regard to a gentile too there is a side in the Gemara that “and live by them” was said regarding him as well, or not. But as I said before, in my opinion there is no need to get into all of that. There is a much simpler explanation — I just had not thought of it before. A much simpler explanation. It is clear that there is a doubt regarding a gentile whether he is obligated in sanctification of the Name. If he is obligated in sanctification of the Name, and the verse “and live by them” does not apply to him, then he really will have to give up his life. If he is not obligated in sanctification of the Name, then although the verse “and live by them” was not said regarding him, he will not have to give up his life because from the outset one need not give up one’s life. That is the Gemara’s doubt: whether sanctification of the Name applies to a gentile or not. And then of course according to this, what comes out? That the reasoning says not to give up one’s life. No, no. Right? The reasoning says not to give up one’s life according to this. No. Okay, which is exactly Maimonides. The reasoning says not to give up one’s life, and therefore a gentile does not have to give up his life. Maimonides says that a gentile has no sanctification of the Name, Maimonides says. What? I can’t hear. Maimonides says that a gentile has no sanctification of the Name. Yes, so what? But from the standpoint of the reasoning, that he should have to give up his life? No, the reasoning does not obligate him. If sanctification of the Name applied to him, then by the law of sanctification of the Name he would have to give up his life. Since sanctification of the Name does not apply to him, he does not have to. What do we see from that? That by simple reasoning, without verses and commandments, one does not have to give up one’s life. Correct. Correct.

Indeed, the later authorities (Acharonim) here on the Gemara — the medieval authorities (Rishonim), the later authorities (Acharonim) — discuss the question of what exactly the Gemara’s doubt was there in Sanhedrin, whether a gentile is commanded in sanctification of the Name. The Arukh LaNer explains, according to Rashi, that the question concerned only idolatry. In Rashi there there is room to hesitate; it is not clear at all. But that is how the Arukh LaNer learned. Then it seems that indeed the whole doubt was only about the severe transgressions. Then it has nothing at all to do with “and live by them”; it is only the question of “and you shall love the Lord your God.” Was “and you shall love the Lord your God” also said regarding a gentile, or not? So it was not said regarding a gentile, therefore he is not obligated. And now we can go back over the whole discussion we had before. So that was said only regarding idolatry. But in the Yad Ramah it says there that the doubt concerns all seven of his commandments. Then indeed this returns us to what I said before, that the simple reasoning is that one does have to give up one’s life. Okay. And according to the Arukh LaNer too, even on the side that says a gentile must give up his life, it is not because of the plain reasoning, because in fact this exists only with idolatry and not with his other commandments. Rather, apparently the source that obligates him to give up his life for idolatry applies to a gentile too because of sanctification of the Name. But with the other commandments there is no self-sacrifice for sanctification of the Name. Therefore there the gentile would not be obligated. So it comes out that from the standpoint of the pure reasoning itself, one is not obligated. So it may be that this disagreement — Yad Ramah and the Arukh LaNer in Rashi — also sheds light on what we discussed before. Because the side in the Gemara that says the gentile would be obligated to give up his life for all seven commandments means basically either that sanctification of the Name applies to all commandments, or that he is obligated by pure reasoning to give up his life for all commandments. It is interesting: when people speak of self-sacrifice because of sanctification of the Name, is that only for idolatry or is it for all commandments? Because in Israel it is only for idolatry and the three commandments, but not for the others. And for the others it is “and live by them” — not because there is no sanctification of the Name there, but because of “and live by them.” So there is room here to hesitate. Okay.

Now I want to move on to the next point. I now want to talk about a transgression by passive omission. That is really the long Tosafot in our passage on page 82, and there are two parallel Tosafot, also in Sanhedrin 74 and in Pesachim 25. The question there is what happens with passive omission. It seems that this too may perhaps connect to our discussions. What happens in a transgression committed passively? Does one have to give up one’s life or not? Here I want to go separately through the three severe transgressions. For non-severe transgressions, even in active commission one does not give up one’s life, so the question does not arise. I am speaking about the severe transgressions. For the severe transgressions one has to give up one’s life. Is that only when I commit them actively, or also when I commit them passively? Here we need to distinguish. Let us begin with bloodshed. In bloodshed, the reason why I do not… why I do give up my life, the Gemara explains, is because of the reasoning of “who says.” Who says your blood is redder than his? Right? What happens in passive omission? For example, the case Tosafot itself brings: what if someone falls from the top of a roof, and below there is a baby? Now if he continues to fall he will kill the baby, but the baby will cushion his blow and he will survive. Is he obligated to tilt himself aside and smash onto the pavement in order not to kill the baby? Because regarding murder it is “be killed rather than transgress.” Tosafot says: no. In all three of those places — there is another place in Yevamot and elsewhere too — Tosafot says: no, he is not obligated. Why? Because the baby’s blood is no redder than the blood of the one falling. It is not that the other person’s blood is always redder than mine; there is no logic in that. The point is that you cannot decide — no one’s blood is redder than anyone else’s. Therefore what? Passive omission is preferable. So if someone threatens me… Why would that not also be true in active commission? I don’t understand. Why would it not also be true in active commission? It is true in active commission too. Let’s now explain, look. Someone threatens me with a gun and says: kill so-and-so, and if not I will kill you. Now I have either so-and-so’s life or my own life; neither one is redder than the other. What do we do in such a case? Passive omission is preferable. I have no justification to kill him, because his blood is no less red, so I do nothing. Whatever happens will happen, and of course as a result I will die. But not because I chose to die; rather because I simply did nothing. The solution is passive omission is preferable — not that the other person’s life takes precedence over mine, but that no one’s life takes precedence over anyone else’s. Therefore, once there is… you know, for example when a positive commandment overrides a prohibition, that means the positive commandment prevails over the prohibition. What happens when there is a positive commandment against a positive commandment? A prohibition against a prohibition? Passive omission is preferable. What does that mean? That active commission of a positive commandment is more severe than passive omission of a positive commandment? No — they are equal. What do you do when they are equal? Since I have no reason to act, I do not act. It is not preferring one side; it is to refrain, to do nothing, and to leave oneself in the hands of fate, the surroundings, whatever happens will happen. Because I have no justification to do anything. It is a decision not to decide, right? It is to do nothing. That is in simple terms the conception of “who says.”

If that is the conception of “who says,” then in the case of someone who is falling from the roof and is about to fall onto the baby, there is no reason in the world for him to tilt himself aside and smash onto the pavement. Passive omission is preferable. He also does not need to tilt himself aside. He should do nothing, and whatever happens will happen; in this case the circumstances dictate that the baby dies and I survive. Fine — no one’s life is redder than anyone else’s. Therefore I am not supposed to do anything, and whatever happens will happen. I have a problem: I do not understand why this is called murdering by passive omission. Why is this an act of murder at all? Correct, very correct. And it is not an act at all. I fell. What difference does it make if a stone had fallen on him rather than me? Then you understand on your own that I would not have had to… I’ll get to that; I’m getting to that later. That is a distinction Rabbi Chaim makes, and it is clear, it is simple. We’ll see in a moment. Let us say even that I jumped from the roof. On my own, not that I fell. But I did not see that there was a baby below. Suddenly I see that there is a baby below. Here there is already room to hesitate. Is it called active commission because of my original act? Or is it still my act now — I did not just fall — but at this stage it is passive omission? So here perhaps there is more room to hesitate, but let us leave that — in a moment, in a moment, we’ll return to it.

So for now, regarding bloodshed, this is a well-known discussion among the medieval authorities (Rishonim). Is there “be killed rather than transgress” for murder in passive omission? Incidentally, the Ba’al HaMaor and Nachmanides disagree with Tosafot about this. They claim that even in passive omission there is “be killed rather than transgress.” We’ll see that later. So that is with regard to bloodshed. What about forbidden sexual relations? Or before forbidden sexual relations, what about idolatry? Suppose I worship idolatry passively. Let us think of how there is such a case, but let us suppose there is such a case. Fine? Suppose I worship idolatry by passive omission. All the idol worshippers are supposed to stand still, and whoever does not worship idolatry walks, runs, I don’t know, goes. So I stand still, and thus I worship idolatry by passive omission. Okay? Do I have to give up my life in such a situation? They threaten me with a gun and say: stand still, don’t move, because Peor is here, and when Peor is around everyone has to stand still. Fine? The question is whether I may stand still, or whether I have to walk and give up my life. So here this is a transgression by passive omission. Yes, right. But on the other hand, why should a transgression by passive omission not be overridden? If I commit the prohibition of idolatry, then the severity of the prohibition of idolatry obligates me to give up my life. What difference does it make whether it is passive omission or active commission? The whole difference between passive omission and active commission is only in murder, because in murder the point is not the severity of the prohibition. The point is that the two options are equal, and then they tell me the solution is passive omission. So I always sit and do nothing. Sometimes that means he dies, sometimes it means I die. But with idolatry the decision is not a decision of passive omission. In idolatry, the decision is that because of the severity of the transgression I really have to give up my life — it is more severe than the value of life. So what difference does it make whether it is passive omission or active commission? As long as I transgressed idolatry, even if passively, apparently I should still have to give up my life for passive omission as well. So the reasoning I gave before with murder does not seem relevant to idolatry.

What is interesting is forbidden sexual relations. And again, here we return once more to the discussion I had with Binyamin, and I showed this also in the medieval authorities (Rishonim): Maimonides versus Tosafot and Nachmanides and Parashat Derakhim and others. How do we learn forbidden sexual relations from murder? If, as I suggested and as I understand Maimonides to have learned — for Maimonides mentions only idolatry. Regarding a gentile who need not give up his life for sanctification of the Name, he mentions only idolatry, even idolatry. He does not mention forbidden sexual relations or bloodshed. So I said: since in both forbidden sexual relations and bloodshed, the gentile does have to give up his life. Why? In bloodshed it is clear, because it is pure reasoning — the reasoning of “who says” — and that applies to a gentile too. And I argued that in forbidden sexual relations too there is “who says.” What we learn from murder to forbidden sexual relations is that the reasoning of “who says” that exists in murder also exists in forbidden sexual relations. Why do we need a verse? Because the betrothed young woman is only violated; she remains alive. We need a verse to say that such a violation is like the injury of murder. Once the verse revealed that, the reasoning of “who says” returns. So if they threaten me to violate a betrothed young woman, who says that her blood is less red than mine? Ah, her blood is not spilled? Violating her is like spilling her blood. Fine? If I read the verse that way, then apparently first of all with a gentile too he would be obligated also regarding forbidden sexual relations, as we saw in Maimonides, from the inference I made in Maimonides. And second, in passive omission what would the law be? “He was forced into intercourse with his sister-in-law,” right? They throw me so that I am thrust into a betrothed young woman. Do I have to give up my life, or since this is passive omission, is it okay because passive omission is preferable? If the reasoning of “who says” is the basis in forbidden sexual relations too, not only in murder, then what I said in murder I will say also in forbidden sexual relations. The second? I do not have to do an act; I have to do nothing. If it turns out that I violate her, that is what happens; if it turns out that I die, that is what happens. I am not supposed to do anything. Then here too there would be a difference between passive omission and active commission; it would be like murder and not like idolatry.

But if, as Binyamin suggested — and as we saw that most of the medieval authorities (Rishonim) learn — the derivation of forbidden sexual relations from murder is only an analogy, a revealing indication, that just as for murder it is “be killed rather than transgress,” so too for forbidden sexual relations it is “be killed rather than transgress,” but for forbidden sexual relations this is not because of “who says.” Rather, for forbidden sexual relations it is because of the severity of the transgression, like idolatry. If that is so, then it should be like idolatry: it makes no difference whether it is passive omission or active commission. As long as the transgression is severe, you have to give up your life in order not to commit it. What difference does it make whether you committed it passively or actively? It is not a principle of default. They do not tell you to give up your life because passive omission is preferable. No, you have to actively give up your life. You have to avoid this severe transgression even at the price of life. So it does not matter whether you committed it by passive omission or active commission. Here then is an additional practical difference: besides what the law is for a gentile in forbidden sexual relations, there is another practical difference — what happens with forbidden sexual relations by passive omission. “Passive ground,” as they always discuss with Esther and others — passive ground. Did Esther have to give up her life or not? It is a disagreement among medieval authorities (Rishonim), incidentally. And to a certain extent that disagreement is this very disagreement. Tosafot there claims that with the male violator there is no “passive ground”; the reasoning of passive ground never applies. With the violator? Yes. But with the violated woman there is. Yes, with the violated woman yes. No, but before you spoke about being thrust into intercourse with his sister-in-law. No, fine. One can discuss when exactly this is called passive omission. But assuming, given that there is some scenario of passive omission, the question is whether in forbidden sexual relations there is “be killed rather than transgress” or not. What? No, I’m saying, fine, we just have to notice that not every transgression can have such a scenario. With idolatry there certainly can be. Obviously not. Rav Shmuel also deals with this in Pesachim — Rav Shmuel, whom I mentioned and sent you — and he, for example, keeps speaking hypothetically: suppose there were a case of passive omission in murder. He does not bring any such case. Because the case Tosafot brings, of someone falling, he really explains as you said before and as Rabbi Chaim says, that this is not an act of murder at all — it is not murder by passive omission. So he basically keeps saying hypothetically: if there were murder by passive omission, what would the law be? But he does not bring any such case. Because it is a hypothetical discussion; apparently he has no such case. I’m only speaking at the conceptual level.

What? Someone who chokes another person? What? Someone who chokes another person? No, that is like constricting him, like pushing him into the sea, into the water. No, a person who literally chokes another with his hands, not constricting him indirectly. That is with his hands! No, then when he began the act he did so with no intention to murder. He was just giving medical treatment. Now if he does not remove his hands, if he does not remove his hands, he is murdering. Not so simple. Not really. I think that once you are pressing with your hands, that is called an act at every moment, like with kilayim, right? That is Tosafot’s reasoning that something sustained by action is considered an act — somewhat similar. Yes, yes. Here the reasoning is pretty simple. If you are pressing the whole time, even if it is static, you are applying force in order to maintain the pressure. That is called active commission, even if the fingers are not moving. That is how it seems to me; it seems logical to me. Anyway, not important. I am talking hypothetically, if there were passive omission, right? Then it seems that the disagreement of the medieval authorities (Rishonim) regarding passive ground in forbidden sexual relations is really rooted in this point: do we learn forbidden sexual relations from murder such that in forbidden sexual relations too the reasoning is “who says,” or not? We learn from murder that there is “be killed rather than transgress,” but the reasoning is sanctification of the Name, as with idolatry. The additional practical difference would be regarding a gentile. Would a gentile be obligated in this or not? In murder, apparently a gentile is obligated, because this reasoning applies to him too. But in forbidden sexual relations it will depend on whether forbidden sexual relations is based on “who says” or not. Passive omission is one practical difference, and a gentile is a second practical difference. And as I said before, that is apparently the disagreement of the medieval authorities (Rishonim) regarding Esther as passive ground — whether she was obligated to give up her life or not, even though she was passive ground — and that is the same disagreement among medieval authorities (Rishonim) that we saw in previous classes on the question whether forbidden sexual relations is learned from murder also with respect to the reasoning of “who says,” or whether it is merely a revealing indication. In Maimonides, I said, it is learned also with respect to “who says,” and in other medieval authorities (Rishonim) we see that it is only a revealing indication. So all these disagreements really show themselves in the question of what happens with passive omission in forbidden sexual relations.

And indeed Tosafot in our passage… “Just as a murderer must be killed rather than transgress, so too in the case of a betrothed young woman one must be killed rather than transgress.” Rashi explained that the text does not read “she must be killed,” because if so she would not be obligated to give up her life, since she is passive ground. So “just as a betrothed young woman one must be killed rather than transgress” apparently means the violator, not “she must be killed rather than transgress.” So Rashi says we do not read “she must be killed.” Why? “For she is not obligated to give up her life, because she is passive ground.” And with this it works well that at the end of chapter Ben Sorer it asks: “But Esther was in public!” — on that same page of the passage we saw. And why does it not ask: but it was forbidden sexual relations, and “be killed rather than transgress” applies even in private? According to the one who does not read “she must be killed,” this is fine, because regarding forbidden sexual relations the questioner knew very well that passive ground helps, but regarding publicity, whose reason is desecration of the Name, he did not think that passive ground would help. Therefore he asks: but Esther was in public! And it answers: with respect to publicity too, she was passive ground. Meaning, passive ground is effective also regarding desecration of the Name, not only regarding forbidden sexual relations. “And it is effective; and know this, for if she did no act, she need not be killed.” How do we know this? “And know this” — yes, how do we know it? “For we learn it from murder, and murder itself, that one must be killed, is because of ‘what did you see, that your blood is redder?’ And this applies only where one performs an act, but if one does not perform an act, such as if they want to throw him onto a baby in order to kill it, and if he resists them they will kill him, in any such case he need not be killed, for on the contrary one can say: what did you see that my blood is redder? Perhaps my blood is redder.” That is exactly what we said before, right? Tosafot says: after all we learn forbidden sexual relations from murder, and in murder the whole idea is “who says,” and in forbidden sexual relations too it is “who says.” That means that here we explicitly see what I said about Maimonides against Tosafot in Sanhedrin. What I said about Maimonides — that forbidden sexual relations is learned essentially from murder, not merely a revealing indication. “For just as when a man rises against his fellow,” there is “who says” here too: why is the blood of the young woman redder — less red — than yours? Therefore Tosafot says: just as in murder, so too here.

Now look at the next sentence. “And furthermore, the analogy of the verse is written regarding a murderer who kills with his hands: ‘just as when a man rises against his fellow and murders him.’” What does this “and furthermore” mean? The analogy of the verse is killing with one’s hands. What? I can’t hear. “Just as when a man rises…” Fine, I understand what is written there, but how is that different from the first explanation? What is this “and furthermore”? How is it different from the previous explanation? That is what he said, that we learn it from murder, no? The difference is exactly what I said before. The “and furthermore” goes with Binyamin. What Tosafot said initially is that the reasoning of “who says” applies also to a betrothed young woman. We learn it from murder, and just as in murder with passive omission one need not give up his life, so too with a betrothed young woman in passive omission she need not give up her life. Therefore if she is passive ground she need not give up her life because of the reasoning of “who says.” The second answer says “and furthermore”: leave aside the reasoning of “who says”; perhaps it is only a revealing indication. We compare the betrothed young woman to murder, but with the betrothed young woman it is not because of “who says.” It is “be killed rather than transgress” for some other reason. Tosafot says: true, but still, from where does the analogy come? The analogy of the betrothed young woman comes from murder in active commission, not murder in passive omission. Therefore even if it is only an analogy that does not transfer the reasoning of “who says,” the reason why passive ground need not give up her life is not because of “who says” and the underlying logic, but because her source is murder, and there too it is only in active commission. The difference between these two explanations is exactly the two sides I mentioned before. If I learn the betrothed young woman from murder in the sense that there too it is “be killed rather than transgress” because of “who says,” then of course that is only in active commission and not in passive omission. But if I learn it from murder only as a revealing indication, it is an analogy, but now it stands on its own, then apparently there too in passive omission I would have to give up my life, like with idolatry. Tosafot says no — even according to that side, it is not like idolatry. Why? Because the analogy is to murder. And which murder? A murderer who “rises against his fellow” — active commission. So the form of the analogy shows that it is compared to murder in active commission, not to murder as such — not because there is here the reasoning of “who says.” Even without the reasoning of “who says,” still in the formalism of the analogy, the source is only active commission. Can’t hear. How do we learn that this is the formalism of the analogy — that it comes only from active commission and not from “who says”? “When a man rises against his fellow and murders him” — rises, active commission. Not because of the reasoning of “who says,” simply because it is speaking about murder in active commission. Okay?

“And there are those who explain that the reason it does not ask there regarding Esther ‘it was forbidden sexual relations’ is because she derived no pleasure from the transgression, for he merely cast filth into her.” Meaning, there are those who explain that she simply did not benefit, and therefore there is no “be killed rather than transgress.” What does that explanation hold? That if she had benefited, then even though it was passive omission, she would have had to give up her life. A third view. So first of all, that assumes a revealing indication. It assumes that the derivation of forbidden sexual relations from murder is only a revealing indication; it is not like I said, but like Binyamin said. Second, it does not accept this inference from the analogy, that it is compared specifically to murder in active commission — Tosafot’s second answer above. Therefore it says that in principle indeed there would be “be killed rather than transgress” here; it is only that she did not benefit because he was wicked. But if there had been a woman who did benefit, then even in passive omission she would have had to give up her life, exactly like with idolatry. It is interesting why this depends on pleasure; he understood that the transgression is the pleasure specifically? So here the transgression is because it is like “for he derived pleasure.” Right, there it only says that there is no such thing as unintentional, because the pleasure takes the place of intention. Not so simple, not so simple. Meaning, perhaps there too there are those who explain that “for he derived pleasure” is not merely compensating for the lack of intention — incidentally that is mistaken action, not unintentional action — but that the prohibition is the pleasure itself. That itself is the prohibition. Fine, it is strange that the prohibition is pleasure. Well. If a person… no, I can understand that sometimes if a person eats without deriving pleasure, I might say maybe don’t call that eating. But to say that the prohibition is only the pleasure and not… there are those who explain there that the prohibition is pleasure; that is what is written there. “But regarding forbidden sexual relations,” right? “But regarding forbidden sexual relations, the prohibition is the pleasure,” I think. I hear; I think especially with forbidden sexual relations, forbidden sexual relations. Kilayim and forbidden sexual relations — no, but one who acts mistakenly regarding kilayim and forbidden sexual relations is liable because he derived pleasure. In the whole Torah, this is said with respect to all prohibitions, but the example here… In any case, for our purposes, what you see here in Tosafot very sharply is the two sides I mentioned before. If one learns from the reasoning of “what did you see,” then certainly it comes out that in passive omission one need not give up one’s life even for forbidden sexual relations, and then indeed that means that the similarity between forbidden sexual relations and murder is essential. If one learns it as a revealing indication, but there is no “what did you see” in forbidden sexual relations, then it depends. If we go with the formalism of the analogy, then one can still say that for passive omission there is no “be killed rather than transgress,” because there is simply no source — the source is from murder, and murder speaks of active commission. Or else indeed there will be, except for cases where she derived no pleasure, but in principle there is “be killed rather than transgress” there. Okay, so let’s stop here for a moment, take a few minutes’ break, and continue. “As a deer longs for streams of water, so my soul longs for You, God. So my soul longs for You, God. As a deer longs for streams of water, so my soul longs for You, God, so my soul longs for You, God. As a deer.”

Okay, let’s continue. I’ll share here Rabbi Chaim on the laws of Foundations of the Torah, chapter 5. He says as follows: “When a gentile stands and coerces an Israelite to transgress one of all the commandments stated in the Torah, or else he will kill him, he should transgress rather than be killed. When is this said? Regarding the other commandments, aside from idolatry, forbidden sexual relations, and bloodshed. But these three transgressions — if he says to him to transgress one of them or you will be killed — he should be killed rather than transgress.” End quote. So I’m skipping a bit. “And Maimonides wrote this without qualification and did not mention at all this issue of passive ground, which implies that he disagrees with it and holds that in all cases one should be killed rather than transgress for forbidden sexual relations” — against the Tosafot we saw, like the second answer in Tosafot without the issue of pleasure, that she did not benefit. “And the medieval authorities (Rishonim) have already disputed this, as explained in Ba’al HaMaor and in the Milchamot there. See there, for he holds that Esther did not constitute forbidden sexual relations at all, because that passage holds that she was unmarried, or that intercourse with a gentile is not included among forbidden sexual relations, as Rabbenu Tam says in Tosafot, or as Tosafot here says, that she derived no pleasure.” Yes, all those directions basically go in the direction that passive ground, in principle, also requires self-sacrifice. “And therefore Maimonides wrote it simply, that with forbidden sexual relations in any case one should be killed rather than transgress.”

Before I continue — what about murder and idolatry? There too Maimonides does not distinguish between active commission and passive omission. In Rabbi Chaim I at least get the sense that he intends to say this only regarding forbidden sexual relations, because with forbidden sexual relations there is an explicit discussion in the Gemara about passive ground and not passive ground. So one would have expected Maimonides to mention it. And that is when she is not passive ground; but if she is passive ground there is no “be killed rather than transgress.” With the other things one can discuss whether there is a difference between active commission and passive omission, but that discussion does not arise in the Gemara. When it does not arise in the Gemara, then the fact that Maimonides does not bring it is not such a strong point. Maimonides brings the things that appear in the Gemara. So it seems to me that Rabbi Chaim makes this inference specifically about passive ground in forbidden sexual relations. Yes — he is basically saying that in forbidden sexual relations there is self-sacrifice even in passive omission. What am I asking? What about murder and idolatry? Passive omission? Maimonides does not distinguish there either. I would say that there too perhaps in passive omission one must give up one’s life. But when Rabbi Chaim infers this, he infers it only about forbidden sexual relations. We’ll return to that in a moment.

He then says: “However, this requires investigation, for Tosafot proved from murder that where it is by passive omission one is not obligated to hand himself over. So why did he rule that in all cases one should be killed rather than transgress?” What does he mean? Where is the proof from murder? Tosafot — it is like our Tosafot, it does not matter; it is all three Tosafots. In murder, even though it is not written explicitly, the basis is “who says.” And if the basis is “who says,” then clearly in passive omission one need not give up his life, because the other person’s blood is no redder than his own. That is clear, even though the Gemara does not say it, but it follows from the reasoning of “who says.” And if forbidden sexual relations is learned from murder, then in forbidden sexual relations too you should make this distinction, as Tosafot said — either because there is also “who says” in forbidden sexual relations, or because of the formalism of the analogy. The two possibilities we saw before. So that is what he says here. It is seemingly difficult for Maimonides, because Maimonides says that even in forbidden sexual relations one gives up one’s life for passive omission too. True, this of course joins the third view we saw in Tosafot, which indeed says that there is an obligation to give up one’s life even for passive omission in forbidden sexual relations. Ah, but the source is murder? So we said: the source is murder, but only as a revealing indication. Once we learn that in forbidden sexual relations there is “be killed rather than transgress,” it is “be killed rather than transgress” by the law of sanctification of the Name, not by the law of “who says,” and then what difference does it make whether it is passive omission or active commission? Right — that is how I explained the third view in Tosafot. The same thing can explain here too what he asks on Maimonides.

Okay: “And one may say that since in murder itself, the fact that passive omission is different from an act done with one’s hands is not because of the severity of an act done with one’s hands.” It is not because murder with one’s hands is more severe than murder by passive omission. “Rather, since the two lives are equal, necessarily it has to be passive omission, and its law is like two murders that do not override one another, whose rule is passive omission. Necessarily this does not apply to forbidden sexual relations, to say that danger to one’s own life is equal to forbidden sexual relations.” Yes, of course he is assuming against what I said, like Binyamin. I said before that on the contrary, that is what “for just as when a man rises against his fellow” means — there is “who says” in forbidden sexual relations too. He says: that cannot be. “Who says” is only when there is a life against a life, and then it is really equal. Forbidden sexual relations is not like a life; rather, it is a revealing indication. Basically he is saying it is a revealing indication. “Necessarily it has to be passive omission, and its law is like two murders that do not override one another, whose rule is passive omission. Necessarily this does not apply to forbidden sexual relations, to say that danger to one’s own life is equal to forbidden sexual relations. And since we learn from murder the main rule that it is not overridden by danger to life, then the law reverts and passive omission and an act done with one’s hands are equal, and in all cases one should be killed rather than transgress.” What is he really saying? It is all a revealing indication. All a revealing indication — exactly what I said before. Forbidden sexual relations is a revealing indication from murder, and therefore all I learn is that there is “be killed rather than transgress” for forbidden sexual relations. Does that apply in passive omission or active commission? It depends. If it is by the law of sanctification of the Name, as I understand in idolatry, then what difference does it make whether it is passive omission or active commission? Because of the severity of the prohibition you have to give up your life. And after all there is no difference in the severity of the prohibition between active commission and passive omission, as he said before. The distinction is not one of severity of the prohibition. For example, in cases of life versus life we distinguish between passive omission and active commission, and that is not because of severity of prohibition but because the solution is always passive omission. But where the issue is the severity of the prohibition, there should be no difference between passive omission and active commission.

Incidentally, for those who know, in the Kuntres Divrei Sofrim of Rabbi Elchanan, he speaks about human dignity. When he says that human dignity overrides a Torah prohibition, he discusses there whether human dignity overrides a prohibition because it is more severe than the prohibition, or because human dignity and the prohibition are equal and we say passive omission when there are two equal values. There is a Noda B'Yehuda there and a disagreement between the Rosh and Maimonides on this and more. But I want to claim more than this. I will go further. In Maimonides it is difficult to say such a thing. At least if I am right. Because what did I infer in Maimonides? I inferred in Maimonides, in chapter 10, law 2 of the laws of kings — what does he say there? He says there that a gentile does not give up his life even for idolatry. I asked: and what about forbidden sexual relations and bloodshed? Regarding bloodshed, since that is pure reasoning, then we say that for bloodshed he does give up his life. And what about forbidden sexual relations? I argued that Maimonides understands that forbidden sexual relations is also “who says,” like bloodshed. And therefore a gentile has to give up his life also for forbidden sexual relations, because that is not due to the severity of the transgression. Here it is because of the consideration of “who says.” And Maimonides learned like me and not like Binyamin. He learned that forbidden sexual relations is learned from murder in an essential way, that there is “who says” in forbidden sexual relations too. If that is so, then how can one say what Rabbi Chaim says here in Maimonides’ view? Rabbi Chaim says in Maimonides’ view that for forbidden sexual relations, passive omission is not preferable. It is only a revealing indication. But really in forbidden sexual relations it is the severity of the prohibition that dictates the matter. According to what I said before in Maimonides, that is not so. In forbidden sexual relations too, just as in murder, this is a principle of passive omission, so I would expect there to be a difference between passive ground and forbidden sexual relations in active commission.

What does he say here? Can you hear? What did you say? I didn’t hear. Okay. So I want to argue differently. I want to argue — and what I want to argue now is that perhaps even if I understand this as “who says” in the ordinary sense, still there would be no difference between passive omission and active commission, perhaps even in murder. We saw that the medieval authorities (Rishonim) disagree even in forbidden sexual relations and say that there is no difference between passive ground and not passive ground. I want to argue that in murder too there would be no difference, even though the reasoning is the reasoning of “who says.” What is the idea? I will bring you Rashi in Pesachim. Look at Rashi. “What did you see, that your blood is redder?” Rashi says as follows: “Meaning, did you come to ask about this? Why did you come to ask?” They came and threatened you that you should kill someone, and if not they will kill you. You come to ask. So the decisor says to you: what did you come to ask here about? “Only because you know that no commandment stands before danger to life” — for you know that all commandments are overridden by danger to life — “and you think that this too should be overridden because of the danger to your life? This is not similar to the other transgressions. Why? Because in any event there is destruction of life here. Whether he will be killed or you will be killed, one life will be lost here either way. And the Torah only permitted pushing aside the commandment because of the belovedness of the life of an Israelite. But here a transgression is committed and a life is lost. Who says that your life is dearer before the Omnipresent than that one’s? Perhaps his blood is dearer to Him. Then a transgression is committed and a life is lost.”

What Rashi is saying here is fascinating. He explains the whole principle of “who says” completely differently. How did we understand the principle of “who says”? There is the possibility that either he dies or I die. Since the two possibilities are equal, there is no way to decide, so passive omission is preferable. We do nothing. Right? That is how we generally understood it. Rashi says no, that is not how it works. Fine, the two lives are equal, but in addition there is a transgression here. If you murder him, then you have committed a transgression. If you do not murder him, then you have no transgression. You die, but you are under duress. But I’m under duress. Do you hear? Under duress? How is it a transgression if I am under duress? Why are you under duress? It is not at all clear that you are under duress. After all, what could be more coercive than a threat to one’s life? Obviously. Yes. After all, his life is no less valuable than yours, so in what sense are you under duress? They are threatening to kill you, fine — but why does he have to pay with his life? So regarding us it is as if he were physically coerced. But what do you mean — and he has to pay with his life? That consideration does not exist, and therefore we return to the point that you are not under duress. So what Rashi is saying here is this: you come and ask me, say you are the one asking me and I am the decisor. You come and ask because you know that all the commandments are overridden by danger to life, because a person’s life is dear to the Holy One, blessed be He. Fine — but here one life is going to be lost either way. A life is lost one way or another: if you kill him, then he dies; if you do not kill him, then you die. If one life is going to be lost in any case, then what is the justification for killing? If you are killing him in order to save lives, I understand, because the Holy One, blessed be He, cherishes the lives of Israel. Therefore He is willing for you to commit a prohibition in order to save a life. But here, transgressing the prohibition will not save a life, because either way a life will be lost. So there is no justification to transgress the prohibition. Notice what that means: if you kill him, then you are a murderer. It is not just that you did not maintain passive omission. In the usual interpretation, the principle is passive omission. The two options are equal. You are no more a criminal if you get up and kill him than if you sit and do not kill him. Since the two options are equal, they say to you: listen, there is no justification for getting up and killing him; you should remain still and die. But not that if you got up and killed him then you are a murderer. You are not a murderer; you just made the wrong calculation, because you preferred your own life to his life, and yours is not preferable. According to Rashi, you really are a murderer. It is a positive transgression. Since the only reason they permitted you to transgress was in order to save a life, in a place where one life will be lost either way they did not permit the prohibition, and the prohibition of murder remains in full force. So one could say that if I remain in passive omission, then I am actively committing suicide. Wait, I’ll get to passive omission in a moment; that is where I am heading. Incidentally, this Rashi is very similar to Rashi in Sanhedrin — I just remembered now — Rashi in Sanhedrin regarding the pursuer. Rashi explains there why we kill the pursuer in order to save the pursued. He says because the pursuer also has a transgression — he is going to kill the pursued — so by killing the pursuer you save the life of the pursued and you save the pursuer from a transgression. It seems that it is not just that the pursuer and the pursued are equal; rather, the pursuer is at a disadvantage because I save him from transgression too if I kill him. A bit similar to the consideration he uses here.

In any event, what you see here in Rashi — and from this Rashi I want to argue — is that even if the murder is by passive omission, I still need not murder and instead die. Why? Because if I count as a murderer by passive omission, then that is an act of murder. But you will tell me: fine, yet passive omission. What do you mean? The instruction is not passive omission. The instruction is that you have no permission to murder, since either way one life is going to be lost — either his life or your life. In such a situation they did not permit the prohibitions, including the prohibition of murder. So that means the prohibition of murder still applies to you. If the prohibition of murder still applies to you, what difference does it make whether it is passive omission or active commission? The prohibition of murder applies to you. And again, I am not entering right now into the question whether this is murder by passive omission or not murder at all. Let us suppose a situation where it would count as murder by passive omission. Do you understand what I’m saying? Me or not? Yes, right, yes. What I want to claim is that even in murder, not only in forbidden sexual relations — and in forbidden sexual relations this is a dispute among the medieval authorities (Rishonim), but in murder it is certainly “who says” — even where the consideration is certainly “who says,” there is no difference between passive omission and active commission. In both cases it is forbidden, because in the end you are performing an act of murder, and they did not permit that prohibition to you if you are not saving a life. The whole reason the Torah permitted transgressing prohibitions is in order to save a life for the Holy One, blessed be He — to save a life. But here, where one life is going to be lost anyway, they did not permit the prohibition. Consequently the prohibition remains in place; this is an ordinary prohibition of murder. And if you murder by passive omission, what justifies it? You cannot murder, even by passive omission, since you are transgressing the prohibition and there is no justification to transgress it.

According to the previous standard interpretation, the prohibition was not… It was not permitted here. I do not transgress “you shall not murder” if I got up and murdered him; there is just no justification for it, because blood is a matter of outcome. It is just not fair, so to speak, that you prefer your blood to his blood. He is not worth less than you. So they will come to you with the claim that this was unfair, and then you are a murderer. You did not reduce more lives in the world because of your act. A life was lost, it would have been lost this way and it would have been lost that way, you did not lower the total number of lives in the world. So they do not come to you with the claim that you are a murderer; they come to you with the claim that you are unfair. Why are you preferring your life to his? According to Rashi, no — they come to you with the claim that you are a murderer. Why? Because the prohibition itself is a prohibition of taking life. It is not an outcome-based prohibition that there are now fewer lives in the world. When you took a life, you performed an act of murder. Now it depends whether the Torah permitted you to do that. In a place where there is saving of human life, the Torah permits the prohibition, and then there is no prohibition. But in a place where “one life is lost in any event,” as Rashi writes, one life is going to be lost either way here, they did not permit the prohibition. It is a full-fledged prohibition of murder, and you may not transgress it. So what does it matter whether you transgress it by passive omission or active commission?

So if, say, you are falling from the roof onto a baby below, then you have to tilt yourself aside and smash onto the pavement in order to save the baby. Why? Because if you continue to fall below, then you have killed him — true, by passive omission — but you murdered him. And since one life is going to be lost either way, there is no justification to perform the act of murder. So you will tell me: but if I tilt myself toward the pavement, then the baby murdered me by passive omission? That is obviously not correct. The baby performed no act of murder here. Therefore there is an advantage to my tilting myself aside rather than falling onto the baby. Because if I tilt myself aside, nobody performed an act of murder, and if I continue falling onto the baby then I murdered him by passive omission. And since one life is going to be lost in any case, there is no permission to transgress the prohibition. And that is exactly the language of Rashi. If you tilt yourself, are you then committing an active transgression? No, because I am killing myself. Is killing yourself not a transgression? No, it is not a transgression — not the transgression of murder, let us put it that way; on the scale of murder prohibitions it is not there. You see, this is what he says: “And in any event there is destruction of life here, and the Torah only permitted setting aside the commandment because of the belovedness of the lives of Israel. But here a transgression is committed and a life is lost.” The transgression would be committed and still a life is lost, so what is the justification for committing the transgression? Either way a life is lost, so there is no justification at all for committing the transgression. I claim that according to this Rashi there will be “be killed rather than transgress” even for passive omission, against what Tosafot says there about someone falling from the roof. And consequently also in forbidden sexual relations this would be so. Then what Maimonides does not distinguish, and what Rabbi Chaim inferred regarding forbidden sexual relations, I infer regarding all three severe transgressions. Maimonides does not distinguish; he says that for the three severe transgressions one should be killed rather than transgress, and he does not distinguish between passive omission and active commission. And for all the transgressions, whether by passive omission or by active commission, you have to give up your life. I claim that Maimonides fits his own view very well. It can be said according to his view. Because now I am claiming this in the name of… Rabbi Chaim said it only regarding forbidden sexual relations, and I said that cannot be, because Maimonides does not distinguish between forbidden sexual relations and bloodshed; he understands the derivation such that in forbidden sexual relations too there is “who says.” And Rabbi Chaim understands that “who says” is a kind of “passive omission is preferable.” Well then, if in murder it is so, then in forbidden sexual relations it should also be so. I want to claim no. According to Maimonides, indeed in forbidden sexual relations too there is “who says” just as in murder. But also in murder, exactly as in forbidden sexual relations, this does not mean that passive omission is always preferable. No — once you are performing an act of murder, whether by passive omission or by active commission, you have to give yourself up and not kill. In all the severe transgressions. I claim that Maimonides disagrees with Tosafot on the distinction between passive ground and not passive ground, but I claim more than that: Maimonides also disagrees with Tosafot on this issue that if someone throws you from the roof, you do not have to tilt yourself aside. Maimonides would claim that you do have to tilt yourself aside. Then everything is resolved, and basically it comes out that we have three views regarding passive omission. One view says that there is a distinction between passive omission and active commission only in bloodshed, because they understand that forbidden sexual relations is only a revealing indication. There is a view that there is a distinction between passive omission and active commission also in forbidden sexual relations — those medieval authorities (Rishonim) who disagree with Tosafot. And there is a view that there is no distinction between passive omission and active commission in any of the transgressions. In idolatry clearly there is no distinction — at least I did not find anyone. I am claiming that according to Rashi and Maimonides, in both there is no distinction. According to Tosafot, with bloodshed it is certainly so, and according to some of Tosafot’s answers also in forbidden sexual relations it is so. Okay? Those are basically three views.

Maimonides was asked regarding the forced converts in Morocco, regarding those whom Islam was forced upon, and Maimonides says: mumble something. Can you hear? Maimonides was asked regarding the forced converts in Morocco, regarding those whom Islam was forced upon, and Maimonides says: mumble something like that. Yes, but everyone knows how seriously one can treat those letters he sent. That was said to comfort the people there who were in a difficult situation; I don’t know. There are all kinds of explanations for that.

Look, later on there in Rabbi Chaim there is a similar formulation. I do not know if he literally means what I said, but I think at least something like it. After he brings the previous explanation in Maimonides — I said, in Maimonides it cannot fit because the previous explanation distinguishes between forbidden sexual relations and bloodshed, and in Maimonides in my opinion it is the same law — so he says: “And one may say further: behold, the words of Tosafot require investigation. What connection is there between the betrothed young woman and one whom they throw onto a baby and it is crushed? For there he is no murderer at all and does not transgress bloodshed.” That is your point, Binyamin. “This is not murder by passive omission; it is not murder at all, for he is merely like a stone or a piece of wood in the hand of the murderer who throws him. The one who throws him is the murderer. So I am like a stone that the murderer throws; the murderer performed the act of murder. Therefore he is not obligated to hand himself over. But with the betrothed young woman, although she does no act, nevertheless she is transgressing forbidden sexual relations. Therefore it is indeed proper that she should be killed rather than transgress.” It seems that Tosafot means this: “Since murder is based on the reasoning of ‘what did you see, that your blood is redder,’ therefore even if we were to find a case that there is a law of murder here, only one would not be doing an act, even then he would not be obligated to hand himself over, for he could say, on the contrary: what did you see, that your fellow’s blood is redder? Perhaps my blood is redder, since he is not doing an act.” I now see that this is already Rabbi Chaim, not Rav Shmuel — not only Rav Shmuel.

You see here? Rabbi Chaim says that Tosafot does not mean to speak about someone they threw from the roof. That is not an act of murder at all. Tosafot says hypothetically: if there were a case of murder by passive omission, I do not know if there is such a case, but hypothetically, there there would not be “be killed rather than transgress,” and someone they throw from the roof may simply not be included because there is no act of murder at all. But hypothetically, if there were an act of murder by passive omission, there would not be “be killed rather than transgress,” because it is “who says.” Okay? “And if so,” he continues, “the same applies to the betrothed young woman, who is learned from murder: although she transgresses forbidden sexual relations, since she does no act there is no law that she should be killed rather than transgress.”

Now look. “However, with murder itself this requires investigation. For one can really explain what the Gemara says — this reasoning of ‘what did you see, that your blood is redder; perhaps your fellow’s blood is redder’ — in two ways.” The reasoning of “who says” can be explained in two ways. “Either we say that since the two are equal, therefore the rule is necessarily passive omission, and where one acts with his hands it is ‘be killed rather than transgress.’” That is the ordinary explanation, what I said before. Then indeed if I kill by passive omission I need not give up my life. “Or a second explanation: since they are equal, therefore it is not overridden by danger to life, and there is no distinction between passive omission and an act done with one’s hands; for in every case there is no rule of overriding, and therefore the rule is that in all cases one should be killed rather than transgress. And also in murder itself, if there were passive omission in a case where there is a law of murder” — unlike where they threw him from the roof — “there too we would say: since they are equal, and his fellow is not overridden before danger to his life, therefore one should be killed rather than transgress, since no rule of overriding takes effect in murder.” That is exactly what I said from Rashi. In Rashi it is explicitly written. And now look, he brings a proof to this. “And it seems that it is indeed like the second explanation we wrote, from that which is stated in Bava Metzia 62: two people were walking on the road and one of them had a flask of water, until Rabbi Akiva came and taught, ‘and your brother shall live with you’ — your life takes precedence over your fellow’s life.” There, even though if I do not give him the flask of water, I am killing him by passive omission. More than that — there there is no law of murder at all; it is only a law of rescue, not even murder at all. Yet we still need the verse “and your brother shall live with you” to teach that your life takes precedence. So why do we need the verse “and your brother shall live with you” at all to teach that your life takes precedence over your fellow’s? Even without the verse, after all all I am doing is by passive omission — I am simply not giving him the water. This is even a more extreme passive omission, a passive omission parallel to Tosafot’s case of someone throwing someone from the roof. It is not even an act of murder at all. And still a verse is brought here, by whose force alone I am permitted not to give the water to the other person. Why do we need a verse? So he says — but with murder, this is what he says — specifically in rescue, and the main verse “and your brother shall live with you,” teaching that your life takes precedence, that verse introducing that applies to rescue. But with murder, “be killed rather than transgress,” where there is no verse that your life takes precedence — that law was not said there — in every case one should be killed rather than transgress, even by passive omission and even if he did no act, if only there is a law of murder involved. Of course, once again, if someone throws him from the roof, perhaps there is no law of murder here at all. But if there is a law of murder, even if it is passive omission, you have to give up your life, because clearly here there is no verse of “and your brother shall live with you.” And even in a case of rescue a verse of “and your brother shall live with you” was needed to permit you not to give the water. That is proof for what he said above, that even in murder there is a prohibition — not merely passive omission but a real prohibition — just as I brought from Rashi.

“And according to this, Maimonides ruled correctly that in forbidden sexual relations one should be killed rather than transgress in every case, even in passive ground, since also in murder the law is so, that it is not overridden before danger to life in any case. And the same applies to forbidden sexual relations, which we learn from it: there is never any overriding in them at all. Therefore necessarily in every case one should be killed rather than transgress, even in passive ground and in passive omission, as I wrote.” Okay? So the conclusion here is basically that it may be that even in murder itself, and certainly in forbidden sexual relations, there is no difference between active commission and passive omission, and in both cases a person must give up his life.

Fine, the next section is already too long, so I won’t do it here. That’s it — we have basically finished Elul. If anyone wants either to ask something here or comment, whether a general comment or on the class or whatever you want, then gladly. Thank you very much, the classes were very, very interesting as usual. Good, thank you. More power to you. May you be sealed for a good year. May you too be sealed for a good year. I’m going on sabbatical, so during the year I won’t be teaching anymore after the holidays. So may you have a successful year and may you be sealed for a good year. May you be sealed for a good year. Goodbye.