Talmud, Yoma Chapter 8 – Lesson 11

Table of Contents

• The two topics in chapter 2 and chapter 5, and the starting point
• The practical difference regarding a Noahide and the rule in Sanhedrin 59
• Ashkenaz versus Sepharad regarding contradictions between Talmudic passages
• Two directions for reconciling chapter 5 with chapter 2 and their implications
• A third possibility: a basic conceptual doubt and the connection to Sanhedrin
• Didactic versus chronological priority
• Maimonides: a Noahide is not commanded regarding sanctification of God’s name
• The basis for murder and forbidden sexual relations: reasoning or analogy, and the plain meaning of the verse
• The passage in Sanhedrin 74: “A Noahide is commanded regarding sanctification of God’s name”
• Tosafot’s reading: first a doubt, then a textual version that decides it
• Nachmanides: an obligation of sanctification of God’s name for a Noahide in public
• What is the law for a Noahide in cases of murder and forbidden sexual relations according to the later authorities (Acharonim)
• Kessef Mishneh and Maimonides in Terumot: handing over one person to save many
• Desecration of God’s name versus preservation of life, and the application to Siamese twins

Summary

General overview

The text presents a tension between two Talmudic passages regarding saving life. One passage requires sources in order to obligate martyrdom for the three most severe transgressions, while another requires sources in order to permit refraining from martyrdom for the other transgressions. From that, the question arises: what is the conceptual starting point, and what are its implications for the law of a Noahide, for whom the verses of permission do not apply? The text then presents two ways of reconciling the passages in the style of Ashkenazi sages, as opposed to the possibility of a dispute between passages in the style of Sephardi sages, and also offers a third possibility of a basic unresolved doubt with no “default setting.” It then examines the ruling through the Noahide passage in Sanhedrin and its interpretation by Rashi, Tosafot, Nachmanides, and Maimonides, including discussion of the Talmudic wording, the status of “sanctification of God’s name,” and whether murder and forbidden sexual relations depend on the reasoning of mai hazit or on the law of sanctification of God’s name. Finally, it discusses Kessef Mishneh, Maharash Yafeh, and Parashat Derakhim on bloodshed for a Noahide, and develops a fundamental dispute as to whether the prohibition against handing over one person to save many derives from “be killed rather than transgress” in the case of murder, or from the laws of desecration of God’s name, with an application to the question of separating Siamese twins.

The two topics in chapter 2 and chapter 5, and the starting point

The text states that on page 82 sources are brought showing that one must give up one’s life for the three most severe transgressions, and from this the starting point appears to be that there is no general obligation of martyrdom, and only in those three severe cases is there a source obligating it. The text states that on page 85 sources are brought showing that one need not give up one’s life for the other transgressions, and from this the starting point appears to be the reverse: without those sources one might have thought martyrdom would be required for everything. The text suggests that if one does not connect the two passages, one could say they disagree. In the case of Jews, the practical law is agreed upon, but the order of analysis and the conceptual justification have implications for a Noahide.

The practical difference regarding a Noahide and the rule in Sanhedrin 59

The text proposes that the practical difference between the two starting points concerns the law of a Noahide, because the innovative verses were said to Jews and are not relevant to a gentile. The text presents that if the starting point is that one gives up one’s life only for the three severe transgressions because of verses, then a Noahide would not give up his life even for those severe cases, because the sources do not speak about him. But if the starting point is that one must give up one’s life for everything, and only verses permit Jews to transgress through “and live by them,” then a Noahide would be required to give up his life for all his commandments, and his status would be stricter than that of a Jew. The text cites Sanhedrin 59 regarding the rule that there is nothing prohibited to a Noahide and permitted to a Jew, and explains that although this may seem like a contradiction, it is not a decisive difficulty, because this concerns circumstances rather than a new prohibition. Exceptions and examples are brought, such as a limb from a living animal, “the thigh of the grandmother of the bed,” and mixtures, and the later authorities (Acharonim) already discuss exceptions to this rule.

Ashkenaz versus Sepharad regarding contradictions between Talmudic passages

The text attributes to Maharshal a distinction that Ashkenazi sages and the Tosafists tend to harmonize and assume coherence within the Talmud, and admit that passages disagree only when they cannot reconcile them. The text states that Sephardi sages, led by the Rif, are more willing to say that the passages disagree, מתוך a conception that the editing of the Talmud did not necessarily aim at producing a coherent text, but rather at collecting traditions. The text presents that if one follows the Sephardi direction, one can say there is a dispute over whether a Noahide must give up his life; and if one follows the Ashkenazi direction, one seeks a reconciliation between the two passages.

Two directions for reconciling chapter 5 with chapter 2 and their implications

The text presents a first reconciliation in which the passage in chapter 5 is the fundamental one, and the starting point is that one must give up one’s life for any transgression, and only the Torah permits transgression through “and live by them,” “desecrate one Sabbath so that he may keep many Sabbaths,” and additional forms of reasoning. The text states that after chapter 5, the passage in chapter 2/74 excludes the three severe transgressions from that permission, so in those cases the original reasoning for obligation remains in place. From this it follows that a Noahide would be obligated to give up his life for everything. The text adds that such a structure may imply that the sources regarding the three severe transgressions are not the primary reason, but only markers of exclusion from “and live by them.” It raises the possibility that the conclusion of “be killed rather than transgress” in murder would apply even where the reasoning of “who says your blood is redder?” does not apply, with mention of Kessef Mishneh, to be discussed later. The text presents a second reconciliation in which the starting point is that one never gives up one’s life for anything, the passage in chapter 2 obligates it for the three severe transgressions, and the passage in chapter 5 comes to reject a hava amina that one might build a general rule from the severe cases to the rest of the transgressions. The text says this move is difficult because of the possibility of refuting the comparison on grounds of severity, and because of the rule of “two verses that come as one,” and although it is true that there are not three full verses here, there is still reason not to derive from them.

A third possibility: a basic conceptual doubt and the connection to Sanhedrin

The text suggests a third possibility in which both the obligation to give up one’s life and the permission not to give up one’s life are innovations, and without verses there would have been a dilemma that could not be resolved, because there is a “small piece of reasoning” in both directions. The text connects this to the passage in Sanhedrin that explicitly discusses sanctification of God’s name for a Noahide, where according to the plain sense of the passage and most medieval authorities (Rishonim), the matter remains unresolved, in teiku and doubt. It explains that this fits the idea that in the case of a Noahide we see the starting point “without verses,” and so we are left in doubt.

Didactic versus chronological priority

The text clarifies that the claim about a “fundamental passage” is logical-didactic, not historical-chronological, and that the passage that comes first didactically may have been edited later. The text suggests the possibility that the passage in chapter 2 is aware of “and live by them” but focuses on excluding the three severe transgressions, while the passage in chapter 5 records an earlier logical stage about the general permission, without determining a historical dating.

Maimonides: a Noahide is not commanded regarding sanctification of God’s name

The text brings the wording of Maimonides that a Noahide who is coerced into violating one of his commandments is permitted to transgress: “Even if he is coerced to worship idolatry, he may worship, because they are not commanded regarding sanctification of God’s name.” It adds a note that the exemption of a minor, deaf-mute, and mentally incompetent person is also said regarding a gentile, and that for a gentile the age of obligation is the age of understanding, not bar mitzvah age, citing the Hatam Sofer in the name of the Rosh, that adulthood for Jews is determined by fixed legal measures from a law given to Moses at Sinai. The text concludes that according to Maimonides, the starting point is that there is no martyrdom based purely on reasoning, and only among Jews was the law of sanctification of God’s name newly introduced, obligating martyrdom. The text notes that this is strange, because in the passage about the three severe transgressions the sources are not explicitly tied to sanctification of God’s name, and it suggests that medieval authorities (Rishonim) understand “And you shall love the Lord your God” as the boundary of sanctification of God’s name in idolatry, not as the commandment of loving God in its own right.

The basis for murder and forbidden sexual relations: reasoning or analogy, and the plain meaning of the verse

The text attributes murder to the conceptual source of “who says your blood is redder?” which is not connected to sanctification of God’s name, but rather to considerations of overriding and severity, and to preferring passive omission over active commission. The text discusses forbidden sexual relations through the case of the betrothed young woman and “for as when a man rises against his fellow and murders him, so is this matter,” and raises a dispute in understanding whether this is a technical analogy or whether the meaning of the verse is that the intensity of harm in forbidden sexual relations is similar to murder. The text presents an internal discussion as to whether the plain meaning is evidentiary—“she could not cry out”—or a substantive comparison of the severity of the harm, and describes the possibility that the verse teaches that because of the resemblance to murder, the law of the pursuer and “be killed rather than transgress” applies. The text raises possibilities for explaining why Parashat Derakhim tends to obligate a Noahide only in murder and not in forbidden sexual relations: either because forbidden sexual relations are learned from sanctification of God’s name rather than pure reasoning, or because the comparison of harm to murder was said for Jews and not for Noahides.

The passage in Sanhedrin 74: “A Noahide is commanded regarding sanctification of God’s name”

The text brings the question raised in Sanhedrin 74 whether a Noahide is commanded regarding sanctification of God’s name, the attempted proof from “the Noahides were commanded in seven commandments,” and Rava’s rejection: “they and all their accessories.” The text concludes from this that the Talmud sees sanctification of God’s name as something that can be considered a detail within other commandments, and notes that this differs from Maimonides’ expansion of sanctification of God’s name to include the behavior of a Torah scholar as well. The text continues with the proof from the story of Naaman and Elisha—“For this matter may the Lord forgive your servant… and he said to him, go in peace”—and the rejection, “in private versus in public,” and brings Rashi’s interpretation that public means in the presence of ten Jews. The text presents that Tosafot raise the difficulty that “and live by them” is written regarding Jews, and therefore without a verse even Jews would have been obligated to give up their lives even in private. Tosafot answer that “and live by them” is needed so that we do not learn the other commandments from the murderer and the betrothed young woman, and it becomes clear that Tosafot use “perhaps” in order to leave open the possibility of the second picture.

Tosafot’s reading: first a doubt, then a textual version that decides it

The text presents that in Tosafot there is a first reading according to which the passage remains in doubt as to whether a Noahide is commanded regarding sanctification of God’s name, and the discussion of private/public is simply an answer rejecting a proof. The text brings that Tosafot note that the phrase “what was concluded about it?” implies there is a conclusion, and therefore Tosafot suggest an alternative textual version that deletes “not” and reads: “And if that were so, let him say to him: this is in private, that is in public,” in a way that proves that Elisha did not distinguish, and therefore a Noahide is not commanded regarding sanctification of God’s name. The text concludes that in this way one can also understand Maimonides, who rules that a Noahide is exempt from sanctification of God’s name.

Nachmanides: an obligation of sanctification of God’s name for a Noahide in public

The text brings Nachmanides in Milhamot, who explains that the case of Naaman involved personal benefit, and that had he been Jewish, the law would have been “be killed rather than transgress.” But a resident alien in private may transgress and not be killed, “even in idolatry and forbidden sexual relations,” because they have no verse on this matter; whereas “sanctification of God’s name in public… they were commanded in it.” The text notes carefully that Nachmanides mentions idolatry and forbidden sexual relations but not bloodshed, and conjectures that in bloodshed there may be an obligation of self-sacrifice based on reasoning that does not depend on sanctification of God’s name. The text states that Nachmanides understands the conclusion of the passage as obligating sanctification of God’s name for a Noahide in public, and not merely presenting one side of an unresolved doubt.

What is the law for a Noahide in cases of murder and forbidden sexual relations according to the later authorities (Acharonim)

The text brings Mishneh LaMelekh, who notes that Parashat Derakhim innovated that in bloodshed a Noahide is commanded to accept death rather than transgress, because this derives from the reasoning of mai hazit, which applies equally to Jew and gentile. The text suggests that Maimonides mentioned “even idolatry” because there the main discussion is sanctification of God’s name, while in murder and forbidden sexual relations the law may rest on reasoning and therefore also apply to a Noahide. The text brings the view of Maharash Yafeh, according to which Noahides were not commanded to surrender themselves even in cases of bloodshed, and presents this as a position difficult to reconcile with the reasoning of mai hazit, while suggesting that it rests on a reading that the obligation in murder is not really based on reasoning, but on the law of sanctification of God’s name.

Kessef Mishneh and Maimonides in Terumot: handing over one person to save many

The text brings Maimonides in the laws of the Foundations of the Torah regarding a besieged city that is required to hand over one person to be killed or else all will be killed, and regarding women who are required to hand over one woman for defilement, and states that “let them all be killed, rather than hand over to them one Jewish soul,” unless they specified a particular person who is liable to death, like Sheva ben Bikhri. The text presents the question of the Ramakh: why not hand over one person, when in any case all will be killed and the reasoning of “who says?” does not apply? The text describes that Kessef Mishneh suggests that “who says?” is not the true reason but only a revealing indicator, and the text rejects this and argues that the basis in murder is the reasoning of mai hazit.

Desecration of God’s name versus preservation of life, and the application to Siamese twins

The text presents an alternative claim in the name of Professor Enker that Maimonides in Terumot is not speaking from the laws of “be killed rather than transgress” in murder, but rather from the laws of desecration of God’s name and surrendering to terror, and therefore it is forbidden to hand over a Jew to gentiles even if everyone will die. The text uses this to argue that in medical decision cases such as Siamese twins, where one will die in any event, the reasoning of mai hazit does not prevent acting to save the other, and the prohibition in Maimonides is not relevant because he is dealing with a threat imposed by people who demand surrender, not a situation of “Heaven is pursuing him.” The text relates that halakhic decisors instructed a Haredi couple not to perform separation surgery and both twins died, and the author protests and argues that there is an obligation to perform surgery in order to save one of them, comparing it to someone standing on a burning roof who jumps because otherwise he will die anyway.

In the previous class we began discussing saving a life in relation to the three severe transgressions and the other transgressions. We saw that there are two passages, on pages 82 and 85. On page 82 the discussion is about the three severe transgressions, about the obligation to give up one’s life for the three severe transgressions; and on page 85 the discussion is about the source for the fact that one need not give up one’s life, and perhaps is even forbidden to, as Maimonides and Tosafot hold, for the other transgressions, not the three severe ones. Now, I said that at first glance it seems that the conclusion—yes, I asked what we would do without sources, without verses—what is the starting point on top of which the verses are built? So seemingly the starting point looks opposite in the two passages. In the passage on page 82, sources are brought for the fact that one must give up one’s life for the three severe transgressions, which implies that the starting point is that there is no general obligation to give up one’s life, except for the three severe transgressions for which there is a specific source telling you that you do have to. So the starting point is that by reasoning alone you do not have to give up your life. In the passage on page 85 it looks the other way around: there sources are brought for the fact that one need not give up one’s life for other transgressions, not for the three severe ones, which implies that without the sources—we needed sources—that is, without the sources simple reasoning would obligate giving up one’s life. So at first glance these two passages seem to lead to opposite conclusions in terms of reasoning, or to start from opposite assumptions in terms of reasoning. If we want to connect the two passages—well, one option is to say they disagree, that there is a dispute between the passages. And we spoke about the possibility—we mentioned this earlier—that the practical implication of this could be the law regarding a gentile, because all the verses and novelties said regarding a Jew are not relevant to a gentile. A gentile has his seven commandments, and the rest of the Torah does not address him. Therefore, at first glance, according to our passage the starting point is that one does not give up one’s life except for the three severe transgressions, regarding which there are sources saying yes. So for a Noahide he would not give up his life, including for the severe transgressions, because the sources that deal with the severe transgressions do not speak about him but only about us, so he should not have to give up his life. According to the passage on page 85 it comes out the opposite, because there a source is needed to permit me not to give up my life, which implies that without the source simple reasoning would indeed obligate it. Regarding the gentile, who has no such sources because the sources brought there are not relevant to him, it would seem that he would indeed have to give up his life, and for all of his transgressions, not only the three severe ones. In other words, his situation would be worse than a Jew’s. There is a bit of room to discuss what the Talmud says in Sanhedrin, page 59 I think. The Talmud there says: there is nothing forbidden to a Noahide that is permitted to a Jew. Right? The assumption is that there is nothing for which it would be forbidden to a gentile and permitted to a Jew. Whatever is forbidden to a gentile is certainly also forbidden to a Jew. There are things forbidden to a Jew and permitted to a gentile, but there cannot be something forbidden to a gentile and permitted to a Jew—in other words, that the gentile is treated more strictly than the Jew. Here we seem to see otherwise, for example—or at least according to one of the passages, yes—if it turns out that a gentile must give up his life, meaning he may not violate any prohibition, even one that is not among the three severe ones, and must give up his life, whereas Jews may violate and not give up their lives, and perhaps even must, then it follows that here there is something forbidden to a gentile and permitted to a Jew. Ever min ha-chai is also a place where it applies to a gentile and not to a Jew, that also appears in the Guide, right? There is Har Kesef, there are examples of this, also with forbidden mixtures; never mind, there are examples of these things, and the later authorities already discuss that this rule has various exceptions. Indeed, this is not a very strong objection, because it is not some prohibition stated regarding a gentile and not regarding a Jew. These are circumstances in which the same prohibition applies to a gentile and not to a Jew, but there is no prohibition newly created for a gentile that does not exist for a Jew. At first glance, then, there would be room to say that the two passages disagree, and the practical implication would be what the law is for a gentile. The passages deal with a Jew, but the practical implication between them—after all, for a Jew, bottom line, the law is clear: regarding the three severe transgressions one must give oneself up, and regarding the other transgressions one need not. But the different way the two passages are structured can affect what the law is for a gentile. According to our passage, a gentile does not have to give up his life for anything. According to the passage on page 85, a gentile must give up himself for everything, for all transgressions. That is if we see the passages as disagreeing passages. But I think the Maharshal writes—and scholars have pointed this out a lot, but already the Maharshal, I think, points it out—that there is a difference between the sages of Spain and the sages of Ashkenaz in relation to contradictions between passages. The Ashkenazic sages—the Tosafists and the early Ashkenazic authorities—tend to harmonize. That is, they try to reconcile the passages and assume that there are no contradictions between passages, no disputes between passages, except in very remote cases where Tosafot cannot find a reconciliation, and then it says there is a dispute between the passages. But the starting point is that there ought to be a reconciliation, that the Talmud is coherent. They make the Talmud into a wheel, as I think the Maharshal writes. By contrast, the sages of Spain—the Rif and all those who basically follow him—are more readily willing—again, this does not mean that the Spanish sages did not raise contradictions between passages and reconcile them, but they have less of a problem saying that the passages disagree. There is no need to search for reconciliations, certainly not to build towers too high. If the straightforward reading is that the passages disagree, then the passages disagree. They assume that the editing of the Talmud did not necessarily strive to produce a coherent text, a coherent organism; they wanted to collect all the traditions, and it is not supposed to be something coherent. This has implications for the question of what the Talmud is for, and that distinction is interesting; there is much to discuss about it. But for our purposes, if one goes in the principled direction of the Spanish sages, then one can say: okay, the passages disagree, and there is indeed a dispute whether a gentile must give up his life or not—that is the practical implication. According to the more Ashkenazic approach, there we need to look for a reconciliation between the two passages. And there are two ways to reconcile the two passages. The first way assumes that the passage on page 85 is the fundamental one. That means the starting point is that one must give up one’s life for every transgression. To violate a transgression you need permission. The mouth that forbade is the mouth that permitted. If the Torah prohibited it, then it prohibited it, full stop. There is no way to violate that prohibition unless the Torah itself permits it. By reasoning alone, if there is no source, one violates nothing. And therefore verses are needed; on page 85 verses are brought—"and live by them," illness, "live by one Sabbath so as to keep many Sabbaths," reasonings, and so on—from which it emerges that one need not give up one’s life, because by reasoning, in principle, one would indeed have had to give up one’s life for everything. That is the passage on page 85. After the passage on page 85 proved that one need not give up one’s life for transgressions, our passage on page 82 comes and says: yes, but for the three severe ones one does have to, and it excludes the three severe ones from the novelty of the passage on page 85. So that you should not think this applies throughout Jewish law—it applies throughout Jewish law except for the three severe ones. And then the structure is basically that we begin with the passage on page 85, whose starting point is that one must give up one’s life for everything; practical implication for a gentile: a gentile would have to give up his life for everything. Regarding a Jew, the passage on page 85 brings sources saying that a Jew’s life need not be given up for transgressions; we would have thought that means all transgressions. Then our passage on page 82 comes and says: no, not all of them. For the three severe ones one does have to give up one’s life; the original reasoning remains in force. Okay? Regarding these, the permission of "and live by them" was not said. That is essentially the claim. By the way, from here an interesting conclusion can emerge when we look at the sources for why one must give up one’s life for the three severe transgressions. Those sources have implications—for example, "Who says your blood is redder?" That is a reasoning for which there may be situations in which that reasoning does not exist. We will see that a bit later. So those sources have implications. If those sources come only to exclude the law of "and live by them," then it actually comes out that the reason I must give up my life for murder, forbidden sexual relations, and idolatry is not because of the sources that appear in our passage on page 82, but because of the initial reasoning that says that for everything one must give up one’s life; only the three severe ones are not included in the permission of "and live by them," which took us out of that reasoning. They remain under the original reasoning, and then it could be, for example, that "be killed rather than transgress" for murder would exist even where the reasoning of "Who says?" does not really apply. There is such a Kesef Mishneh; we will see it later. So that is just an aside. That is one direction, and this direction basically sees the passage on page 85 as the fundamental passage, and our passage comes to exclude cases from the conclusions of the passage on page 85. There is of course the opposite possibility. The starting point is that one never gives up one’s life for anything. Then our passage comes and says: no, for the three severe ones one does have to give up one’s life, and sources are brought for the three severe ones. Now the question is whether from these three severe ones we might make a paradigm for all other transgressions, and say: okay, apparently these transgressions teach us that for all transgressions one must give up one’s life. Then the passage on page 85 comes and says: no, for transgressions other than the three severe ones one does not give up one’s life. It comes to exclude from the rule of our passage. That is a possible move in principle, but it is a bit difficult. It is difficult because why make a paradigm from the three severe transgressions to these other transgressions? There is a refutation. For severe ones you must give up your life—why on earth learn from that by paradigm that for lighter ones you also give up your life? There is a refutation: what about them, that they are not light? In general one could also have said that three verses that come as one do not teach. According to all views they do not teach, because these are three transgressions. True, we really only have two verses and not three, because murder is a reasoning and forbidden sexual relations are linked to murder, and idolatry is a verse. But there are still at least two texts here. So that is another reason why it is not right to learn from there. But we will see later that there are early and later commentators who do indeed go in that direction. Most of them go in that direction. I think there is a third possibility—I do not know whether people mention it or not. Rabbi is assuming that one of the sides has to be the simple reasoning, it must be either this or that. But there is a possibility that both sides are a novelty. Both that one must give up one’s life and that one must not. What would we have done without a verse? I do not know—there would have been a hard dilemma. But now this connects to what we discussed for half a class: whether something that has a source is necessarily devoid of reasoning. You say no, there may be a minor reasoning, but a minor reasoning in both directions, such that one could not have decided without the verses. Exactly. And it is not that there is some default state. That is how I understand the passages simply; it really seems they do not disagree or anything. What you are suggesting is interesting—I had not thought of it. But we will see—the Talmud in Sanhedrin, the passage I sent you to. The Talmud in Sanhedrin explicitly deals with the law of sanctifying the Name in the case of a gentile. And in the simple reading of the passage, and this is how most of the early authorities learned it, it remains unresolved, in doubt. And that fits very well with what you are saying. Because the law for a gentile reflects the starting point. So if it remains doubtful, that basically says that for a gentile we are indeed in the state before the verses—not clear, doubtful. Fine, interesting, I had not thought of that, but maybe that is indeed an option too. Between the two options the Rabbi suggested, then we have to say that one passage is prior to the other, right? One of the passages is chronologically earlier? Not necessarily chronologically earlier; it could be didactically prior, not chronologically. That is how the Rabbi described it, no? No—didactically prior, not chronologically. It could be that the earlier passage was written later; I do not care. But from a didactic standpoint, from the logic of the matter, it belongs to an earlier layer. I am not making a historical claim here; that is for Talmud scholars. I am not dealing with that. Maybe yes, maybe no—there are various indicators for dating passages. I did not go into it, and I do not understand that field very much. But what I want to argue is the logical-didactic claim, not the chronological one. Could it be didactically earlier even though it is not chronologically earlier? Can such a thing happen? Of course, what do you mean? These passages did not invent the material they discuss. The question is which discussion in the study hall was recorded in the Talmud. Now if, say, the passage on page 85 is the fundamental one—let us go in that direction—then the passage on page 82 may nevertheless be earlier chronologically. I want to claim that this is possible. How would that work? The passage on page 82 already knows there is a source of "and live by them"; it just is not discussing it. And now it discusses what happens with the three severe ones, and says that the three severe ones are excluded from it. It did not discuss "and live by them" even though it knew it. Now who were the sages who discussed "and live by them"? That is the passage on page 85, and there it is a different passage. But it records a stage that is logically and didactically earlier; it was merely edited later historically, in a later redaction or whatever. In principle that could be. I did not check and I do not know. But I am making the claim on the substantive plane, not the chronological one, okay? So these are basically the two pictures. Now, to check which of the two pictures is correct—if either, or maybe there are different approaches—but to check this, the easiest thing is to go to the law of a gentile. That is the practical implication, right? Let us see what happens with a gentile. So I will begin with Maimonides, and afterwards we will return to the passage. Let me share Maimonides for a moment. A Noahide who is coerced to violate one of his commandments is permitted to violate it. Which commandments? Even if he is coerced to worship idolatry, he may worship, because they were not commanded concerning sanctification of the Name. And one is never punished for them—not a minor, nor a deaf-mute, nor an imbecile—because they are not subject to commandments. And this exemption for a minor, a deaf-mute, and an imbecile is also stated regarding a gentile—that is just a remark in parentheses. Of course, the exemption of a minor regarding a gentile is not the age of bar mitzvah. The Hatam Sofer brings in the name of the Rosh that in a Jew, minority and majority and fixed measurements are a law given to Moses at Sinai, so that was certainly said about Jews and not gentiles. For a gentile the determining age is the age of understanding. From the time he understands, he is obligated; there is no formal age established by a law given to Moses at Sinai. Okay, but that is just an aside. The main point for us is the beginning of Maimonides’ words, where we see that a gentile need not give up his life, including for the three severe ones—even idolatry. What do we see here? It seems he holds like the second possibility I mentioned, right? A gentile is not commanded regarding giving up his life—sorry, regarding martyrdom—which means that for him the starting point, the reasoning before all the sources, is that one need not give up one’s life. Therefore our passage, the one on page 82, is the fundamental one, because it comes to say that for the three severe ones one does have to. So why do we need the passage on page 85 saying that for the others one does not? Because after I learned that for the three severe ones one does, I would have thought that perhaps this is true for all prohibitions. Then the passage on page 85 comes and says no—it is only the three severe ones; for the others one need not give up one’s life. That is what emerges from Maimonides’ wording. Notice, however, that Maimonides’ reasoning—I will stop the screen share from time to time because I also want to see you—the reasoning of Maimonides is that the gentile is not commanded concerning sanctification of the Name. In a Jew, the obligation to give up one’s life is because we are commanded concerning sanctification of the Name. In other words, he is emphasizing that in terms of reasoning, both for gentile and Jew, there was no need to give up one’s life; rather, in a Jew a law of sanctification of the Name was introduced that obligates them to give up their lives, whereas in a gentile this was not introduced, and they remain with the initial reasoning. Okay, that is basically what is written there. Now at first glance this is a bit strange, because the obligation to give up one’s life in our passage—the passage on page 82—is not made dependent on sanctification of the Name. Where does sanctification of the Name appear there? It says "And you shall love the Lord your God"—that is the source for idolatry. The source for bloodshed is "Who says your blood is redder?" That is the reasoning; it has nothing to do with sanctification of the Name. And forbidden sexual relations comes from the betrothed maiden, which is compared to a murderer, where there is "be killed rather than transgress." It seems to me that if sanctification of the Name is relevant here at all, it is maybe only for idolatry. Because for idolatry we learn it from "And you shall love the Lord your God with all your heart, with all your soul, and with all your might"—even if He takes your soul, one whose money is dearer to him than his body and vice versa, and so on. Even there it is not stated that this is connected to sanctification of the Name. Seemingly this is the commandment of love of God, not sanctification of the Name. But that is strange, because the commandment to love God is one of the other 613 commandments, and for it one is not commanded to give up one’s life, only for the three severe transgressions. So it does not seem that "And you shall love the Lord your God" serves as a source for giving up one’s life because of the commandment to love God, which is itself one of the severe transgressions. So what is written here? So the early authorities apparently understand that what is written here is basically: how far does sanctification of the Name go? It is not the commandment of love of God. "And you shall love the Lord your God with all your heart, with all your soul, and with all your might"—where is that love expressed? That you give up your soul for sanctification of the Name in the case of idol worship. Idol worship, idolatry. Okay? And that is how they understand it. Even though the Talmud does not state it, that is how they understand it: the foundation that obligates us to give up our lives is sanctification of the Name. But that is only in idol worship. In the other two severe transgressions, although one must also give up one’s life there, it is not because of sanctification of the Name. So why then? It is ordinary laws of override and severity and regular halakhic considerations. I am simply—how do we decide a dilemma? We do what I said in the introduction: we construct a scale of values, right? We want to determine which side of the dilemma is more severe, and accordingly we decide. Those are essentially the considerations we are discussing in the context of murder and forbidden sexual relations. Therefore it has nothing to do with sanctification of the Name at all. It is a question of whether it is preferable that they kill me or preferable that they kill him. The Talmud says passive non-action is preferable. Why should your blood be redder than his blood? Therefore do not do it. What does that have to do with sanctification of the Name? It is just the principle that passive non-action is preferable. And forbidden sexual relations are compared to murder, because "for as when a man rises against his neighbor and murders him, so is this matter." So it seems that forbidden sexual relations, too, emerge from that same reasoning of murder. They tell me that forbidden sexual relations are like murder. You have to pay close attention here. It is not really a formal comparison. I think it is not really a formal comparison; it is learned from the meaning. Although the early authorities engage in much fine analysis here on the issue of how you turn the derivation there from murderer to betrothed maiden and from betrothed maiden back to murderer. But on the face of it, the simple explanation is that it is not some inversion of a derivation. It is simply the meaning of the verse. What does the verse say? It says that harming a betrothed maiden—basically forbidden sexual relations—is the same thing as killing someone. And therefore they are essentially saying to me: Who says your blood is redder than the blood of the maiden who is about to be raped? In other words, the rape is considered like murder, and from here on it is the regular reasoning of "Who says?" What you need the verse for is only to teach me that forbidden sexual relations are like murder, or that harming a betrothed maiden is like the murderous harming of a person. It is the same level of harm, the same level of severity or something like that. But that is not the simple meaning of the verse. The simple meaning of the verse is about the matter of evidence—that she could not cry out. That is what the verse means to say. But then why "for as when a man rises against his neighbor and murders him, so is this matter"? No, then you cannot come with claims against her for why she did not resist, because just as—that is a different reasoning—because she cried out in the field. But what does the resemblance to murder have to do with it? No, because just as you do not accuse the murdered person of not crying out, because what could he have done? He could have cried out until tomorrow and they would have killed him, so too you cannot accuse her. That is his claim. What do I accuse the murdered man of, for not crying out? What transgression did the murdered person commit? What am I accusing him of? No, you do not impose responsibility on him—heaven forbid—for the fact that he was murdered. Right. For what? You do not impose it. Right, I agree. It cannot be—that is not the plain meaning of the verse. Well, that is how I understood it all these years. I do not think so. The Talmud certainly does not say that; you are only claiming that this is not the plain meaning but a homiletic reading. I do not think so; I think it is the plain meaning. That is what is written. The meaning is: "for as when a man rises against his neighbor and murders him, so is this matter"—this is such a severe harm, even though she is not killed, she remains alive. This harm is so severe that it is like murdering a person. Therefore there is a law of pursuer to prevent it, and therefore there is also "be killed rather than transgress" for the same reason. But what is different here—who is the murdered person? It is not so trivial that it is specifically her. It could also be him. Why? Because the act of rape itself is not the severe thing here, because if she were unmarried that would not be the transgression. The transgression—both of them commit the transgression, both he and she. Yes, but he commits it himself and you are causing her to commit the transgression. Right, so that depends somewhat on the question of passive non-action and "the ground itself," which I hope we will get to next class. But at first glance it seems from the plain meaning of the verse that this is the intention. That really is a big question. If I were reading the verse—here I agree that this is not the plain meaning of the verse. If I were reading the verse simply, I would understand it as referring to the harm to the maiden and not the transgression. No, but from the section on rape you see it is the harm to the victim. And then maybe it is not even necessarily connected specifically to a betrothed maiden; maybe even the rape of an unmarried woman, though in the norms of those days there was apparently also a difference in the level of human harm. Today we do not understand it that way, but it seems to me that in the norms of those days it is quite clear that also on the level of human harm, raping a betrothed maiden is different from raping an unmarried woman. The harm is mainly in that someone betrothed her. If anything, then he is the murdered one here in the whole story, the husband, not her. Okay, right. That is in the Sages’ conception. Fine, but still the harmed party is not me, the harmed party is him. It is a third party, either the maiden or her fiancé. Yes, but it seems strange that this is compared to murder. Why? Why? By reasoning, rape I would understand as some kind of serious harm, but here—well, okay. On the level of the transgression, what you are causing this woman is that she has undergone the transgression of forbidden sexual relations. I also committed it, okay, fine. Or the harm to the husband, who indeed says, what do you mean, I wanted a virgin wife and you are giving me damaged goods. Yes, these readings sound very hard to our ears today, but still not to the point of comparing it to murder. It seems more reasonable to me to interpret the verse as something very local regarding—The Torah says it is equal, and we learn that it is equal at least regarding these consequences. I am not sure the total comparison means that it is really entirely equal; rather, the claim is that such an intensity of harm is enough to count as like the intensity of murder, even if murder is more severe. For the purpose of "be killed rather than transgress" and for the purpose of the law of pursuer, this is considered a sufficient level of harm like murder. That is enough for me to derive these laws from the verse. But the verse helps Binyamin, because that comparison is said—"and to the maiden do nothing, for as when…"—specifically in the context of "to the maiden do nothing." Fine, but I do not see the connection. No, because there was room to come and accuse her, exactly—that is why I always understood it this way. There was room to come with claims against her: what is this, why did you cooperate? No, she is like one being murdered; she is not guilty. That is the point. It is true that with a murder victim there is no reason to accuse. Right, exactly, and that is why they brought him. With the murdered person you understand that he is completely passive, he lost his life—there is no crime here. I think that is a very strange comparison, but okay, fine. In any event, plain meaning or homiletic meaning, that is what the Talmud learns from this verse. In any case, for our purposes, what is written in Maimonides—that what requires giving up one’s life is only because of sanctification of the Name—seemingly applies only to idolatry. Forbidden sexual relations and bloodshed are a matter of overriding prohibitions or conflict between values; it has nothing to do with sanctification of the Name. Rather the question is whether life is worth more than forbidden sexual relations or worth less than forbidden sexual relations, worth more than someone else’s life or worth less than someone else’s life. That is the picture, apparently. We will see later—I am getting ahead of myself a little—that there are indeed some who want to claim this, but they say it only about murder and not about forbidden sexual relations. In Parashat Derakhim we will see. It seems he understands that forbidden sexual relations is compared to murder, but not as I said earlier, that the reasoning is the same reasoning because harming a maiden by rape is like murdering someone, and from there on it is "Who says your blood is redder?" Because otherwise this is reasoning, just as that is reasoning this is reasoning. Since Parashat Derakhim really wants to say that according to this, in murder for example, even today for a gentile too there is "be killed rather than transgress" regarding murder. Because true, he is not commanded concerning sanctification of the Name, but the reasoning of "Who says your blood is redder?" is reasoning; that is equally true for a gentile. What difference is there? Therefore he says that about murder. Now what about forbidden sexual relations? I would say that according to this view, for forbidden sexual relations too the gentile should be killed rather than transgress, because "for as when a man rises against his neighbor, so is this matter." But he says it only about murder and not about forbidden sexual relations. This can be understood in two ways. One way is that he really understands that it is only revealing—but in the end, the fact that you must be killed for forbidden sexual relations is because of sanctification of the Name, like idolatry. The revelation that one must be killed is because of murder, but not because it is really the same reason. Then it is quite clear that it is not like I read the verse earlier, that the intention is really the reasoning of "Who says?" in both. Okay? A second possibility is to say that perhaps for a gentile "for as when a man rises against his neighbor, so is this matter" does not apply. The reasoning of "Who says?" does apply to a gentile, but the fact that harming a betrothed maiden, having relations with a betrothed maiden, is harm on the level of murder—that was said about a Jew. With gentiles, who in any case are sexually lax, or whatever, for various reasons, there the harm is not so devastating, and therefore one cannot derive from here the law of "be killed rather than transgress" in forbidden sexual relations. Then one can remain with my reading of the verse as I read it earlier, that the comparison of forbidden sexual relations to murder is indeed the reasoning of "Who says?"—it is just that this comparison exists only among Jews. Among gentiles it is not similar, and then forbidden sexual relations become like the other transgressions, not like murder, and for the other transgressions it is only because of sanctification of the Name, and sanctification of the Name was not stated regarding a gentile. So those are two possibilities. Again, we will see this later. Why did the halakhic decisors not rule that in murder a gentile too must be killed rather than transgress, since it is not simple? Well, Maimonides says no—that for all three transgressions. No. What? He says even idolatry; he does not mention forbidden sexual relations and does not mention bloodshed. "Even" there means that this is included in… "Even" means all the regular transgressions and even idolatry. It is not entirely clear what happens with forbidden sexual relations and bloodshed; we will see in a moment, they point this out. One can say that "even" means absolutely everything, but then his choice is strange. His choice is that when you want to say "even"—say you want to choose only one and not all three—that is not the one I would have chosen. More than that: regarding idolatry there is even a tannaitic dispute. According to Rabbi Ishmael there is no "be killed rather than transgress" for idolatry, only for forbidden sexual relations and bloodshed. It turns out that in idolatry the source is the weakest for "be killed rather than transgress." So to say "even," and specifically to bring idolatry, I would have said "even in murder" or "even in forbidden sexual relations." I think murder would have been the best thing to say here. To me, the straightforward plain meaning in Maimonides is—even though there are later authorities who somehow write the opposite—that in my opinion that is not right. The straightforward plain meaning in Maimonides, "even idolatry," means all transgressions for which there is no specific reasoning, all transgressions where the issue is an issue of sanctification of the Name. So he says: there is no issue of sanctification of the Name for a gentile, and therefore even idolatry. Cases where the obligation to be killed rather than transgress is not connected to sanctification of the Name—about those he did not speak. True, Maimonides does not bring—he should have brought: okay, and what about forbidden sexual relations and bloodshed? He should have said that for a gentile there is "be killed rather than transgress" on those. But the rule in Maimonides is that Maimonides does not bring laws that do not explicitly appear in the Talmud. It does not explicitly appear in the Talmud what the law is for a gentile in those situations. So it could be that Maimonides omitted it because he brought the laws that are written in the Talmud. Understand the logic: if the reason is "Who says?"—a reasoning—then clearly that reasoning applies to a gentile as well. It need not be written. Fine, I do not know. In short, I tend to think that in Maimonides this refers only to idolatry. We will see later. The source for Maimonides’ words is the passage in Sanhedrin 74. Let us look at it for a moment. They asked Rabbi Ami: is a Noahide commanded regarding sanctification of the Name or not? The early authorities explain what the intention is: does he have to die rather than violate his commandments? A question on which transgressions—the most severe ones or all seven? The Yad Ramah says all seven. Most of the early authorities seem to mean only the severe ones. Abaye said: come and hear, the Noahides were commanded seven commandments. And if so, there would be eight. Right? A baraita says that the Noahides were commanded seven commandments. By the way, the seven for Noahides is of course equivalent to our many dozens. It is just that under one heading of a commandment for them are included commandments that for us are broken down into many commandments. So it is not exactly seven out of 613. It is not that 606 commandments are irrelevant to Noahides; there are fewer. But never mind. So it says here seven commandments, and if so there would have to be eight. Then one should also have counted sanctification of the Name. If sanctification of the Name applies to a gentile, one should have counted sanctification of the Name as an eighth. Rava said to him: those and all their accessories. Meaning, the seven commandments and all the details that accompany them. And here the conception is that sanctification of the Name is not a separate commandment. Sanctification of the Name is a detail within the other commandments. Remember, we spoke about half-measures—why do we not count half-measures? I said that according to the conception that a half-measure is not a special prohibition but a detail within the other prohibitions, then it is clear why we do not count it. Because it is simply a detail within the prohibition of pork, the prohibition of forbidden fat, the prohibition of leaven, every other prohibition. So it need not be counted as a separate commandment. That is essentially what the Talmud is saying here about sanctification of the Name. By the way, from here it really also follows that the commandment of sanctification of the Name includes nothing beyond the obligation to give up one’s life for transgressions. When Maimonides speaks about sanctification of the Name, he expands it much more. Sanctification of the Name in permitted things, that a Torah scholar should not do things that cause suspicion, that there is a difference between the conduct of a Torah scholar and the conduct of an ordinary person. Sanctification of the Name is something broader than the obligation to die in situations where one must die for the three severe ones—or perhaps in public for everything, or during a time of persecution, never mind all the definitions of sanctification of the Name. But in the Talmud here it does not seem so. Because if there were such a broader commandment of sanctification of the Name, it would not be a detail in the other commandments. The obligation to die for the other prohibitions is a detail within those prohibitions. But if there is a broader commandment of sanctification of the Name, beyond the obligation to die for these commandments, then why is it not counted? One could perhaps say that this applies only to Jews and not to gentiles. Regarding a gentile there is only the obligation to die, and that is already included as a detail in his commandments. Fine, that is forced. In any event, that is what the Talmud says. The Talmud asks: what came of it? Right? So we have a doubt; they tried to resolve it from the baraita and rejected it. Keep in mind: it is only rejected. Okay? So they rejected it. Now the Talmud asks: fine, now we are left in doubt—what came of it? What is the conclusion? Rav Adda bar Ahava said in the study hall: it is written, "May the Lord forgive your servant in this matter: when my master enters the house of Rimmon to bow there, and he leans on my hand, and I bow myself," and it is written, "And he said to him: Go in peace." And if so, let him say to him… and if so, let him say to him—in private, in public? There are variant readings here. The Talmud says that when Naaman parted from Elisha, he repented, he abandoned his idolatry, but he says: when I return to the house of Rimmon, I will have to bow there to the idol. So may the Lord forgive me for that, in this matter, that I will have to bow—even though I have repented, I no longer believe, I will still have to bow there. Then Elisha says to him, "Go in peace." Meaning Elisha accepts it. Now, if so, let him say to him—yes, then he should not say to him "Go in peace." After all, if a Noahide is commanded regarding sanctification of the Name—sorry, if so, let him say to him—then he should not tell him, "Go in peace." You are commanded regarding sanctification of the Name; I do not accept that you are going to bow there. You are commanded regarding sanctification of the Name; you should die. Rather we see from here that a Noahide is not commanded regarding sanctification of the Name. Right? We see from here that he is not commanded regarding sanctification of the Name, because Elisha did not protest; he accepts the fact that Naaman says he is going to bow. It is not terrible. Why is it not terrible? Because he has no choice, he is coerced, he does not really believe, but he will be coerced—the king there will coerce him—so he will have to bow. Fine, not terrible, because you are not commanded concerning sanctification of the Name; you are a gentile. Yes, that is what the Talmud says: if so, let him say to him—so why does he say to him, "Go in peace"? He should not say that. The Talmud rejects: in private, in public. No, he knew that there it was in private. Rashi writes that "private" means there were not ten Jews there. Even if there are ten gentiles, that is not called public. Public means only ten Jews. That itself is also a novelty not all the early authorities accept. And that is how Rashi explains it. In any event, there it was in private, and therefore Elisha did not protest. But if it had indeed been in public, then Elisha would not have accepted what Naaman told him. Then what emerges according to this from the conclusion of the Talmud? Is a Noahide commanded concerning sanctification of the Name or not? He is commanded in public. Does everyone agree? No, there is no proof. There is no proof in this direction and no proof in that direction now. Exactly. Right. Seemingly it remains open. They tried to bring a proof from Elisha, they rejected the proof, maybe there it was in private, so do not bring me evidence from there. So what then is the law? I do not know. Either he is commanded or he is not commanded. It remains in doubt. Indeed, from Rashi and Tosafot there it seems that the Talmud remains in doubt. That is what I mentioned earlier, what Binyamin pointed out. But before I get to the conclusions of the Talmud, look at the difficulty Tosafot raises there. Is a Noahide commanded concerning sanctification of the Name? And if you say: but "and live by them" is written regarding a Jew. Even a Jew would have been obligated to give himself up even in private, were it not for the verse "and live by them." What is the difficulty? What is the basis to say that a Noahide is commanded regarding sanctification of the Name? After all, the whole obligation of a Jew to give himself up is only because of "and live by them," right? We see that in the passage on page 85. Without "and live by them," a Jew would have had to give up his life even in private, not only in public. Only because of "and live by them" is he exempt from giving himself up, right? So the straightforward law is that a Jew would have to give himself up without "and live by them." So what? A gentile does not have "and live by them." A gentile does not have "and live by them," so what follows? Therefore he would have to give up even in private. Right, and therefore he should in principle have to give up his life even in private. No, but that is arguing from the stricter to the lighter where there is no straightforward a fortiori argument, because the fact that a Jew is commanded in private does not mean a gentile would be commanded in private, and only a verse exempts him. Why? We already discussed this: "and live by them" comes to remove one from the initial reasoning. The initial reasoning without "and live by them" says that one must give up one’s life for everything, including the other transgressions, not only the three severe ones. Then "and live by them" comes and says no, one need not give up one’s life. Then our passage comes and says that for the three severe ones one is not exempt. Right? So what is Tosafot really saying, in other words? Tosafot says: I learn the Talmud the way—the first or second way I described earlier, I no longer remember which—basically in the first way. Right? Namely, that the passage on page 85 is the original one. Therefore, fundamentally, there is an obligation to give up one’s life for everything. Then "and live by them" exempts me with respect to most commandments, and then our passage comes and says that for the three severe ones I am not exempt. What happens to a gentile according to that picture? He must give himself up for everything! And that is what Tosafot understood. In other words, Tosafot read this according to the first picture. Right? I said there were two ways of reconciling our two passages, page 82 and page 85. In his question Tosafot assumes the first way. And the practical implication is that a gentile must give up his life, because without the verses one must give up one’s life. But of course Tosafot answers: one can say—and here it is—that perhaps "and live by them" was only needed so that we should not derive the other commandments from murder and the betrothed maiden, that even in private one should be killed rather than transgress according to everyone. What is he saying here? Seemingly this is like the second explanation, but he uses the word "perhaps," which is interesting. In other words, it is enough that maybe it is like the second explanation and that… You are repeating what you said before. But that is what is written here. No—"perhaps" means yes, it means you can say also… he is not committing to the second side; not related to what I said before. It may be there are only two possibilities. He simply is not committing to one of them; he is saying it is enough that the second picture is possible. That is what I… In short, I am saying it is not a doubt; rather, he is trying to keep the Talmud’s doubt alive. What the conclusion will be we will see later. But he is trying to keep the Talmud’s doubt alive, therefore he says "perhaps." By the way, he also mentions here—Parashat Derakhim points this out, I think—he mentions only murder and the betrothed maiden. Why not… the opposite, I would have expected him to mention only idolatry. Murder and the betrothed maiden are specific reasonings—why should one derive from them to the entire Torah? From idolatry you can say that it is the prohibition itself that causes this, that it is forbidden to violate it and I must give up my life. From there one could perhaps derive to the rest of the Torah. Even there I said perhaps there is a refutation because it is severe, but let us say there is not, okay? But he brings specifically the betrothed maiden and murder. That is strange—why derive from them? It is just obvious reasoning. Actually notice here at the end of Tosafot it says, according to everyone. What does "according to everyone" mean? Remember I mentioned earlier that according to Rabbi Ishmael there is no "be killed rather than transgress" for idolatry. He essentially means to say from the three transgressions. Right? We would derive the rest of the Torah from the three transgressions, for which one must give up one’s life. He just says, in order to gain according to everyone without getting into Rabbi Ishmael, yes, so let us talk about the betrothed maiden and murder. But it still comes out strange. Because if indeed it is only from the betrothed maiden and murder, take Rabbi Ishmael: according to Rabbi Ishmael you can derive this only from the betrothed maiden and murder, right? For in idolatry this law does not exist. But from the betrothed maiden and murder one cannot derive it, because there it is the reasoning of "Who says?" That reasoning does not apply to a prohibition. What is there to derive from there? It seems Tosafot understood what I said before, and everyone in their holy intuition sees what I said already at the beginning of the class: that the reasoning of "Who says?" was said regarding murder. The verse tells me, "for as when a man rises against his neighbor, so is this matter"—also regarding forbidden sexual relations. The question is whether the verse says that the reasoning of "Who says?" also applies to forbidden sexual relations, as I wanted to read in the verse, or whether the verse merely reveals that regarding forbidden sexual relations too there is "be killed rather than transgress," like in murder. Why? No—it is a formal comparison. It is a formal comparison. I wanted to say earlier that it is not a formal comparison but a matter of meaning. The verse says this is like that, it is very severe, and therefore the reasoning of "Who says?" applies. Tosafot understood it as a formal comparison, and then we derive the obligation to give up one’s life in forbidden sexual relations from the obligation to give up one’s life for murder. That only says that one must give up one’s life also in forbidden sexual relations; it does not say that the reasoning of "Who says?" applies in forbidden sexual relations. Rather, one must give up one’s life. Why? Like idolatry, apart from Rabbi Ishmael, because of sanctification of the Name. Then one can understand why there was an initial thought to derive from here to the rest of the Torah’s prohibitions, that sanctification of the Name requires giving up one’s life for prohibitions. Then the passage on page 85 comes and says no, only for the three severe ones; for the rest of the prohibitions there is no such obligation. In any event, Tosafot’s conclusion is like Maimonides. Right? Tosafot’s conclusion is that the fundamental passage is our passage on page 82: there is no obligation by reasoning to give up one’s life. Only in the three severe transgressions is there an obligation, and there was an initial thought to derive from them to the rest of the Torah. The passage on page 85 comes to say: do not derive from them. Right? So basically it comes out like Maimonides. This is the second picture I described. And the practical implication is that a Noahide need not give up his life. Right? That a Noahide need not give up his life as Maimonides says. But that is not necessary, because Tosafot is discussing—notice the opening phrase of Tosafot: is a Noahide commanded regarding sanctification of the Name? He is discussing the beginning of the passage. And at the beginning of the passage there is doubt. In the doubt there is certainly one side that a Noahide must give himself up and one side that he need not; both sides are there. Tosafot comes to explain why there are two sides here. He comes only to explain the doubt in the Talmud. The big question for practical law is what remains in the conclusion of the Talmud. Therefore from this Tosafot one still cannot infer what he says as practical law. All he explains here are the two sides of the doubt in the Talmud. There is a doubtful side that a Noahide would not need to give up his life despite "and live by them." Why? Because of the second picture, like Maimonides. Maimonides also leaves this as the practical law, while in Tosafot it is written only as an explanation of the Talmud’s doubt. In conclusion, it could be that the conclusion is that a Noahide must give up his life for sanctification of the Name. We need to see what the conclusion of the passage is. Let us stop here for a moment. A few minutes’ break, and we will come back. All this Maimonides wrote. But Nachmanides disagrees with him and holds that the World to Come mentioned everywhere is the world of resurrection. After the resurrection of the dead, the souls will return to the bodies and will live eternal life in body and soul. But the body will be refined and more spiritual, and will be able to exist without eating and drinking; rather, it will be nourished by the radiance of the Divine Presence. And why is it so important to know what the World to Come is? Because faith in the World to Come is one of the principles of faith of the Jewish people. As we opened with the words of the Mishnah: all Israel have a share in the World to Come. The knowledge that there is a world of reward, a world of eternity, gives a person strength to withstand the trials of this world. It gives meaning to every single commandment, to every hour of Torah study. And as the Sages said in tractate Avot: this world is like a corridor before the World to Come; prepare yourself in the corridor so that you may enter the banquet hall. May it be God’s will that we all merit to prepare ourselves properly in this world, in order to merit that eternal delight in the World to Come. What did we buy? Noam, what did we buy? What are we going to talk about now? They will not fix it for you at all. What are we going to talk about? With another store. They will not fix it? No. Why? I went to a better store. Okay, let us begin. Good, we are now at the conclusion of the passage in Sanhedrin. As I said earlier, according to Rashi and apparently according to Tosafot as well, it seems that the conclusion is that for a Noahide it is doubtful whether he is commanded regarding sanctification of the Name or not. And it is not clear what that means concerning—meaning, whether there is a difference between private and public. Because if, let us put it this way, on the side that he is not obligated to give up his life in public, then it is quite clear that in private he also would not have to give up his life, because in private you have the substantive dimension, and in public you have both the substantive dimension and sanctification of the Name. And if the two together do not obligate him to give up his life, then in private he certainly need not give up his life. If, on the other hand, on the side that he does have to give up his life, it may be that this is only in public and not in private, because of sanctification of the Name, while intrinsically not. And so indeed it seems according to Rashi and Tosafot, because what remains in the conclusion of the Talmud? That you have proof that at least in private the gentile need not give up his life, right? Because if there were a law of sanctification of the Name regarding a gentile, then the Talmud says Elisha should have told him to do it in private but not in public. This implies that in private, even on the side that there is an obligation of sanctification of the Name, with a gentile there would not be. So according to Rashi, the straightforward reading of the Talmud’s conclusion is that there is doubt whether a gentile must give up his life, whether sanctification of the Name applies to a gentile. The practical implication is only for public, because in private even on the side that he has an obligation of sanctification of the Name he need not give up his life; but in public we remain in doubt. That seems to be the Talmud’s conclusion according to Rashi. Nachmanides, in the Milhamot there, writes differently. He wants to say—let us share for a moment from the end of the chapter there—"Likewise the case of Naaman was for his own benefit, as it is written, 'and he leaned on his hand.' Had he been a Jew, his law would be that he should be killed rather than transgress. But a resident alien, all in private—even in idolatry and forbidden sexual relations—should transgress rather than be killed. For the Torah was not stricter with them in idolatry and forbidden sexual relations than in their other commandments, since they have no verse in the Torah on this, and it is not written in the verses. But sanctification of the Name in public, which is something that applies in all commandments, they were commanded. And that is what we say: it is not difficult, this is in private and that is in public." In Nachmanides one might have said he is like Rashi, but it seems more that he says this as the conclusion, not merely on the side that there is sanctification of the Name. He understands that the conclusion of the passage—one of you also said this, I asked what you thought the passage’s conclusion was—the conclusion is that a gentile is obligated in sanctification of the Name. Therefore in public he must give himself up; in private he need not. Jews must also give themselves up in private for the three severe transgressions. Then it follows that in private, the fact that a Jew must give himself up for the three severe transgressions is apparently not because of sanctification of the Name, because if it were, then a gentile too would be obligated. So why is it? Regarding idolatry and forbidden sexual relations—in forbidden sexual relations and murder we know it is reasoning. But regarding idolatry it is really not entirely clear why one must give up one’s life in private, because the whole obligation to give up one’s life there is only for sanctification of the Name, so maybe even for a Jew in idolatry in private one need not, and only in public one must. It is still not entirely clear what comes out here. In any case, in Nachmanides it appears that he is not explaining only one side of the doubt, but rather that this is how he reads the conclusion of the Talmud. The conclusion is: a gentile is obligated in sanctification of the Name. Practical implication: in public he must give up his life. In private he need not. With Rashi too he accepts that there is a difference between private and public; he just claims that this is only on the side that the gentile is obligated. But according to the Talmud’s conclusion there is doubt whether the gentile is obligated or not. So for Nachmanides this is one side of Rashi’s doubt. By the way, notice that Nachmanides says: even idolatry and forbidden sexual relations, he should transgress rather than be killed. What about bloodshed? Again he mentions only two, but this time the two are not excluding idolatry so that one could say, as with Tosafot, that this is to accommodate Rabbi Ishmael. Rather, the two are idolatry and forbidden sexual relations without bloodshed. Why? It seems Nachmanides means to say that regarding bloodshed, a gentile does indeed have to give himself up, independently of sanctification of the Name. Because of the reasoning of "Who says?" which applies to a gentile too. That was not under discussion at all. The whole discussion was only about idolatry and forbidden sexual relations; the issue of Naaman concerns idolatry. Now this too is a good question and an interesting point. Regarding idolatry I understand that it is because of sanctification of the Name, so that was exactly the question: does sanctification of the Name apply to a gentile or not, with the practical implication of giving up his life for idolatry. But what about forbidden sexual relations? After all, forbidden sexual relations are compared to murder; it is not because of sanctification of the Name. We see, as with Tosafot, that in Nachmanides too he understands the comparison of forbidden sexual relations to murder as a formal comparison. Not what I read earlier with the semantic meaning, but from the comparison we learn that in forbidden sexual relations too one must give up one’s life. Why? Because of sanctification of the Name, not because of the reasoning of "Who says?" As we saw in Tosafot. That is how it appears in Nachmanides. In any event, in Maimonides somehow it seems that everything belongs to sanctification of the Name. Because Maimonides says that a gentile does not need to give himself up because he is not commanded regarding sanctification of the Name. He is speaking about all his commandments. How does he read the Talmud? In the Talmud you can say like Rashi that it remains in doubt. You can say like Nachmanides that the conclusion is that a gentile is obligated in sanctification of the Name. But Maimonides has a third approach: that the conclusion is that a gentile is certainly exempt from sanctification of the Name. Nachmanides says certainly obligated, Rashi says doubtful, and Maimonides says certainly exempt. That is a different reading of the passage. How does one read it? I think Maimonides reads it the way Tosafot there reads it. I will share the Tosafot. "And if so, should he not have said to him…" that is, Elisha to Naaman. Tosafot says: he should not have approved of a forbidden matter, since he said to him, "Go in peace"; from this we infer that a Noahide is not commanded regarding sanctification of the Name. And it answers: this is in private, that is in public. Naaman was in private, because there were no Jews in the house of Rimmon, and regarding sanctification of the Name it is written, "in the midst of the children of Israel"—"and I shall be sanctified in the midst." In the midst of the children of Israel, meaning specifically ten Jews there. And even according to the one who says that even in private one should be killed rather than transgress, that is for Jews, but not for a gentile. And you can always say that a Noahide is commanded regarding sanctification of the Name, namely in public. That is the side that a Noahide is commanded. And in conclusion, this question was not resolved. All this is just an explanation on the side that a Noahide is commanded regarding sanctification of the Name. But that is only one side. According to the conclusion of the passage, we remain in doubt. So far Tosafot, and like Rashi. But Tosafot now continues: and the wording "what came of it" implies that the conclusion should be resolved. After all, when the Talmud says "what came of it," it usually means: okay, what is the practical conclusion? So Tosafot says: apparently here too it was resolved. They did not want to leave it in doubt. One second. Yes—so what is Tosafot saying? According to Rashi, they ask "what came of it" and in the end there is no answer to "what came of it," it remains in doubt. Therefore Tosafot says this is not likely. So how should one read it? He says: it seems better according to the versions that read, "and if so, let him say to him: this is in private, that is in public," and then the Talmud resolves that he is not commanded, from the fact that he simply said to him, "Go in peace." Let us return for a moment to the Talmud. Do you see this "not"? I told you there are textual questions here. In the final sentence of the Talmud: "And if so"—without the "not," erase the "not." And read the whole sentence as one sentence: "And if so, let him say to him: this is in private, that is in public." That is, he should not have simply said "Go in peace"; rather, he should have distinguished between private and public. What do we see from that? That there is no commandment of sanctification of the Name for a gentile. Because if there were, then at least in public he should not have agreed. Right? The question is not—as we previously read it—"And if so, he should not have said to him," and the Talmud answers, "this is in private, that is in public," and then the doubt remains. That is Rashi and Tosafot at the beginning of Tosafot. The second interpretation of Tosafot says no. Erase the word "not" and read this whole statement as one sentence: "And if so, let him say to him: this is in private, that is in public." Why does he say to him "Go in peace" and not distinguish between private and public? Necessarily there is no distinction. Why is there no distinction? Because a gentile is not commanded regarding sanctification of the Name. This is probably how Maimonides also read the Talmud. Therefore Maimonides says that according to the Talmud’s conclusion a gentile is not commanded regarding sanctification of the Name. A third approach. The first approach in Tosafot and Rashi is that in conclusion it remains doubtful. Nachmanides’ conclusion is that he is obligated regarding sanctification of the Name, only that this is only in public. Maimonides and the second approach in Tosafot hold that the conclusion is that a gentile is not obligated regarding sanctification of the Name. As I said earlier, the dispute is apparently exactly between the two pictures I described at the beginning of the class. If a gentile is not commanded regarding sanctification of the Name, that means the gentile need not give up his life. If he need not give up his life, that means our passage on page 82 is the fundamental one. The reasoning is that one need not give up one’s life. There are only scriptural novelties regarding Jews. That is Maimonides and the second approach in Tosafot. The first approach—Nachmanides’ approach—is that a gentile does have to give up his life. He apparently understood that the passage on page 85 is the main one. Okay? And our passage only comes to exclude—so that you should not say that "and live by them" was said even regarding the three severe ones. But all this is regarding Jews; it is irrelevant to a gentile. Okay? And Rashi and Tosafot say it is doubtful. That is the third approach—Rashi and the first approach in Tosafot. It is doubtful. That seems to be how Maimonides understood it. Just one remark. As I said earlier, according to Maimonides it seems that because a gentile is not commanded regarding sanctification of the Name, he need not give up his life. You could say: he need not give up his life in public. There is no distinction between public and private. Why? So seemingly this means that according to Maimonides, both private and public belong to sanctification of the Name, not only public. Because if that is so, it is not like Tosafot. Tosafot, when he reads the Talmud, says: if so, let him say to him, this is in private and that is in public. According to Maimonides that is not correct. If a gentile had been commanded regarding sanctification of the Name, then it would not be relevant to say either private or public; in both cases he would have been obligated. If so, Maimonides did not read the Talmud like Tosafot, and then the question returns: how did Maimonides read the Talmud? Because Tosafot remain with the idea that public is the obligation of sanctification of the Name and private is not sanctification. But according to Maimonides, if both are sanctification of the Name, then there is no way to read the Talmud. One could say that… I do not understand something. Yes. It is possible that Maimonides is not speaking about private at all. He is speaking only about public. In private, obviously a gentile does not have to give up his life. That is one simple possibility: to say that in private it is obviously irrelevant because there is no "and live by them," and a gentile is not obligated in this, and the whole issue never starts. We already saw that Maimonides belongs to the second picture. In the second picture, the reasoning is that a gentile need not give himself up. If he were obligated in sanctification of the Name, then yes. So he says he is not obligated to give himself up when in any case we are speaking only about public; he does not specify, but it is obvious, because he is not commanded regarding sanctification of the Name. In private it is not connected to sanctification of the Name. He is not generally commanded to give up his life, so that is not relevant. Maimonides does not distinguish anywhere between private and public, so that is a bit difficult. But it is possible. One can read Maimonides that way. It could be that Maimonides really understands that the distinction between private and public was said only regarding—just a second—that both private and public belong to sanctification of the Name for a Jew, but for a gentile, even if he had been obligated regarding sanctification of the Name, it would only have been in public and not in private. Therefore the Talmud says: if a gentile were obligated regarding sanctification of the Name, then Elisha should have told him this is private and that is public, because for a gentile that would indeed be a relevant distinction. The conclusion of the Talmud is that he is not obligated regarding sanctification of the Name, and therefore neither in public nor in private. But there is a distinction between private and public, as emerges from the Talmud. This changes nothing in practical law; it only helps me read the Talmud according to Maimonides, because then it comes out that there is a distinction between private and public in the laws of sanctification of the Name for a gentile. Not for a Jew—for a gentile, yes. Okay, so that is for now. I noted earlier regarding Maimonides that he mentions only idolatry, that a gentile need not give up his life for idolatry because he is not obligated regarding sanctification of the Name. What about forbidden sexual relations and bloodshed? So I would say that with forbidden sexual relations and bloodshed, this has nothing to do with the laws of sanctification of the Name; it is the reasoning of "Who says?" Therefore it applies to a gentile as well. For bloodshed it is definitely the reasoning of "Who says?" And for forbidden sexual relations, because it is learned from bloodshed. And I am claiming that this is not just a formal comparison as we saw Tosafot and Nachmanides understand. They understand like Binyamin, that basically it is only a formal comparison, and forbidden sexual relations is not because of the reasoning of "Who says?" Rather, forbidden sexual relations is because of sanctification of the Name, even though we learn from murder that forbidden sexual relations too has "be killed rather than transgress." Why? Not because of "Who says?" but because of sanctification of the Name. It is merely a revealing of the law; it is not really compared to murder. But it could be that Maimonides did not learn this way. Maimonides understands as I do, that this is really from the meaning; it is not a formal comparison. And they say that the reasoning of "Who says?" applies in forbidden sexual relations too, just as in bloodshed. In that case the whole discussion of sanctification of the Name regarding a gentile is relevant only to idolatry. In forbidden sexual relations and bloodshed, both are reasoning, and that reasoning applies to a gentile too. The Mishneh La-Melekh on this law in Maimonides notes: "This is well explained in the words of the author in his homilies"—yes, the editor of the Mishneh La-Melekh was not Rabbi Yehuda Rosanes himself. He brings from the words of Rabbi Yehuda Rosanes. Meaning: it is well explained in the words of the author in his homilies, Derekh Ha-Atarim, that is the second homily there; the author innovated in this law that regarding bloodshed a Noahide is commanded to be killed rather than transgress, since it comes from reasoning—"Who says?" and so on—there is no difference between Jew and gentile; see there at length. So he indeed learns as I said earlier, that regarding bloodshed, since the issue is reasoning and not sanctification of the Name, Maimonides did not write that a gentile is exempt from giving up his life, because regarding bloodshed he really must give up his life. Because the same reasoning that exists for a Jew exists also for a gentile. But he says nothing at all about forbidden sexual relations. Only about bloodshed. I think he assumes like Binyamin. He assumes that Maimonides too is like Tosafot and Nachmanides, who saw this as a formal comparison. But in fact what is written in Maimonides is only about idolatry. It says nothing about either forbidden sexual relations or bloodshed. Therefore in my opinion the plain meaning in Maimonides is not like that. The plain meaning in Maimonides is that he read as I do: that forbidden sexual relations and bloodshed are both the reasoning of "Who says?" After that he brings: "And in the Talmud, Sanhedrin, they said: is a Noahide commanded regarding sanctification of the Name…" sorry, "and he wrote in the Book of Commandments as follows, commandment nine, that He commanded us to sanctify His Name." And there Maimonides says this is a counted commandment, to sanctify the Name. "And in the Talmud, Sanhedrin, they said: is a Noahide commanded regarding sanctification of the Name or is he not commanded? Come and hear: the Noahides were commanded seven commandments, and if you say so there would be eight. Behold, it has been clarified for you that it is included in the count of the commandments." We need to understand this proof, since later in the Talmud this was rejected. Rava said: those and all their accessories. And that means that there is no reason to count sanctification of the Name as a separate commandment, as Rashi wrote there. But the Talmud there says the opposite, that the commandment of sanctification of the Name is not a separate commandment but a detail within the other prohibitions and commandments. But he answers, of course, with a simple reconciliation: according to Maimonides’ view, the question was resolved. We saw that according to Maimonides the passage is resolved: there is no obligation of sanctification of the Name for a Noahide. If so, then all of Rava’s rejection falls away. The Talmud said like this: let me prove to you that there is no commandment of sanctification of the Name for a gentile, because if there were, then the Noahide commandments would be eight and not seven. The Talmud answers: no, it is possible that a gentile does have a commandment of sanctification of the Name, and it is not counted because it is a detail within the commandments. That is what you have to say if you think that a gentile does have a commandment of sanctification of the Name. But Maimonides rules as practical law that the Talmud’s conclusion is that there is no sanctification of the Name for a gentile. If so, then the simple reasoning in the Talmud remains, that when it says seven Noahide commandments, there cannot be a commandment of sanctification of the Name, because otherwise there should have been eight. What do we see? That sanctification of the Name is indeed a commandment; it is not merely a detail within other commandments. And we rule that a gentile does not have the commandment of sanctification of the Name; therefore it really is a separate commandment, and Maimonides is right. Okay. After that he brings a second view: "It is true that Rabbi Shelomo Yaffe, of blessed memory"—he quotes him a lot there, apparently one of his teachers or something, I do not know exactly—fine, Lech Lecha, section 44, beginning with "that there was," wrote as follows: even though it emerges from reasoning—"Who says?"—since the Noahides were not commanded to give themselves up for idolatry and forbidden sexual relations, because for Jews this was newly taught from verses, then presumably regarding bloodshed too they were not commanded to give up their lives. End quote. First of all, you can see here one thing: forbidden sexual relations is attached to idolatry, not to murder. Do you see that? Notice: since Noahides were not commanded to give themselves up for idolatry and forbidden sexual relations, because that comes from verses and the verses were said only to Jews, bloodshed—which comes from reasoning—also applies to a gentile. I do not understand. But forbidden sexual relations is learned from bloodshed, so why does he attach forbidden sexual relations to idolatry? Because Rabbi Shelomo Yaffe too assumes, like Nachmanides and Tosafot and the Mishneh La-Melekh in Maimonides, that the derivation of forbidden sexual relations from murder is only a revealing of the law. It is not really that the reasoning of "Who says?" applies also in forbidden sexual relations. Again, I do not agree with that, but that is his claim. "In any case, the reasoning we wrote seems right to me, and all the more so since there are indications in the words of the Ramah as mentioned." The Mishneh La-Melekh concludes by disagreeing with Rabbi Shelomo Yaffe. There is a dispute between them over whether regarding bloodshed a gentile must give up his life or not. Rabbi Shelomo Yaffe says he does not have to, and the Mishneh La-Melekh says he does. What is the basis to say—we spoke regarding forbidden sexual relations, that perhaps forbidden sexual relations is only a revealing of the law, but not really that the reasoning of "Who says?" applies in forbidden sexual relations. But Rabbi Shelomo Yaffe wants to claim that even for bloodshed a gentile is not commanded. Now this is really astonishing. For bloodshed, "Who says?" is a reasoning; there it is explicit in the Talmud that this is the reasoning of "Who says?" Fine, that reasoning certainly applies to a gentile just as to a Jew. What difference is there? Regarding forbidden sexual relations you can say it is just a revealing of the law, but regarding bloodshed the Talmud explicitly says that this is the reasoning. And that reasoning certainly applies to a gentile. How can one say otherwise? Actually that is really very difficult. But perhaps he joins the famous Kesef Mishneh—Maimonides, Laws of the Foundations of the Torah, chapter 5, law 5. A very famous Maimonides, beginning from the Jerusalem Talmud Terumot, the Tosefta Terumot, the Jerusalem Talmud Terumot. Women to whom idolaters said: give us one of you and we will defile her, and if not we will defile all of you—all of them should be defiled rather than hand over one Jewish life. Likewise, if idolaters said to them: give us one of you and we will kill him, and if not we will kill all of you—they should all be killed rather than hand over one Jewish life. And if they singled him out and said: give us So-and-so or we will kill all of you—if he was liable to death, like Sheva ben Bichri, hand him over to them, though one should not instruct them to do so at the outset. And if he is not liable to death, then they should all be killed rather than hand over one Jewish life. So this is the Jerusalem Talmud in Terumot, as I said earlier, and it works like this: if gentiles come and besiege a city and say, give us one of you—we do not care who—it is forbidden to give one. What if they single someone out? If they single someone out, it is still forbidden to give him. If they single out someone specific—and about this there is a dispute between Rabbi Yohanan and Reish Lakish in the Jerusalem Talmud, and Maimonides rules like Reish Lakish—that too is forbidden. If they singled out someone, and that specific person is also liable to death, then one may give him over, but ideally it is still preferable not to give him over and to die as well. There is some measure of piety there not to hand him over, but by strict law one may. Elijah meets Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi there and tells him this matter. That is the Jerusalem Talmud. That is what Maimonides says. The Ramakh, quoted there in the Kesef Mishneh, asks—and I will say it from memory because we do not have much time. The Ramakh asks: this law is very strange. Why not hand over one person if they ask for one person and he is not liable to death? And even if they did not single him out, make a lottery or whatever, hand over one person. Why not? Because there is "be killed rather than transgress" with murder, right? Seemingly it is because this is one of the three severe transgressions. But here that does not apply. Because if they do not hand him over, then the gentiles will kill everyone, all the inhabitants of the city, including that one person whom we would have handed over. If we hand him over, then he dies, but in any case he would have died. At least we would survive. The reasoning of "Who says?" does not apply here. The reasoning of "Who says?" says: who says your blood is redder—your blood is not redder than his. But here, in any case, he is going to die. So why should we not hand him over and at least save ourselves? It is not his blood versus our blood; his blood is doomed anyway. So why should we not hand him over and at least save ourselves? The Kesef Mishneh says—this is a great novelty, and in my opinion it is incorrect; it cannot be right. The Kesef Mishneh says that the "Who says?" is only an outward reason, not the real reason. In other words, perhaps he means to say that even "Who says?" is only a revealing of the law. In essence this too is sanctification of the Name. Not to kill someone—to die rather than kill someone—is sanctification of the Name, like idolatry and forbidden sexual relations, and it is not really "Who says?" at all. If that is so, it fits with Rabbi Shelomo Yaffe. Rabbi Shelomo Yaffe says that a gentile, who is not commanded regarding sanctification of the Name, does not even have to give up his life in murder. And I asked: but there is the reasoning of "Who says?" and that certainly applies to a gentile. If this is really not based on the reasoning of "Who says?," then this too belongs to the category of sanctification of the Name, and perhaps a gentile is exempt from this as well. But as I said earlier, this is extremely forced in the Talmud. The Talmud says "Who says?"—that is the source. On the contrary, that is the source from which forbidden sexual relations is learned. Murder is certainly the basic source. I think this Maimonides—and many ask on this Maimonides, and various answers have been given, all of them forced. I once wrote an article about separating Siamese twins. There is a link in the summary I will upload to the site, so you can see it there. There I argue—it is not really my idea, Professor Anker already suggested this interpretation—that when Maimonides says not to hand anyone over, it is not because of the laws of preserving life, but because it is a desecration of the Name to hand him over. We are supposed—it is not because of "Who says your blood is redder," it is not from the laws of "be killed rather than transgress," but from the laws of capitulating to terror. If they force us to hand over a Jew or else they will kill everyone, we must all die rather than hand him over. Not because of the calculation of lives, because then it would be "Who says?," but because it is a desecration of the Name to hand over a Jew to gentiles to be killed so that we can survive. That is forbidden, and that is why everyone must be killed. But that is from the laws of desecration of the Name and not from the laws of "Who says?" If that is really so, where will the practical difference be? For example, in separating Siamese twins. There are twins—there was just such an operation in Beersheba, at Ben-Gurion, at Soroka—yes, surely you saw it on the news—apparently a very, very complicated surgery, the first in Israel. In any case, many years ago there was such a case that got me involved in the issue: two twins born joined together, and the doctors said they would both die within nine months. They shared a heart or a brain—each time it is something else—and both would die. Unless they did a separation surgery, gave the heart to one of them and left the other to die. All the halakhic decisors ruled—it was on the news, I heard it on the radio—that the couple, a Haredi couple, were forbidden to do the separation surgery. They did not do the surgery, and both twins died. And I really felt outraged over this issue, because it seemed obvious to me by reasoning that one could do the separation. So I wrote my article on Siamese twins against the view of all the decisors. I had major arguments with Mordechai Halperin on this issue, because he conducted a large survey among all the decisors, and his main difficulty against me was from this Maimonides. Because in this Maimonides you see—after all, what happens with Siamese twins? It is exactly like the case in this Maimonides. With Siamese twins, what was my claim? My claim against him was: this is not a case where "Who says?" applies. Not doing surgery in order not to kill someone leaves both of them to die. The one I am going to kill will die in any case. The only question is whether the second one will also die. So why not do separation surgery, and at least one will survive? After all, the other will die in any case. If I do not do separation surgery, both die. When you do the surgery, yes, you kill one of them, fine. Leave aside for a moment the distinction between passive non-action and active deed—that is another question—but I will leave it aside now because I do not have time; I just want to illustrate the point. So he answered me: his claim was that this is this Maimonides. We see in this Maimonides that even in such a situation we say "Who says?" Because you are handing him over to die and all of you survive, while the alternative is that all of you die including him, and nevertheless it is forbidden. Exactly like Siamese twins. And I said to him that in my opinion this is not correct, because Maimonides and the Jerusalem Talmud in Terumot are speaking about the laws of sanctification and desecration of the Name, not about the laws of preserving life. In terms of "Who says?," it is certainly permitted here, and therefore with Siamese twins there is a commandment and an obligation to do separation surgery. Because "Who says?" does not apply here. Why is it forbidden for me to kill him? Because my blood is not redder than his? He is going to die in any case; I am leaving him to die. Think of someone standing on a burning roof, a house on fire. Is he allowed to jump down? That is what I asked him. After all, he may die, fine—but if he stays above, he will certainly die. Let him jump down; at least he has a fifty percent chance to survive. Same here. If you do separation surgery, there is a fifty percent chance to survive; one of them will survive. If you do not, both die. There is simply no world in which such a thing should be forbidden. It is nonsense. This Maimonides is not relevant, because Maimonides speaks when someone is threatening me, not in a situation where I must choose between two alternatives under the laws of preserving life. If some terrorist threatens me, then because of sanctification of the Name I must not hand anyone over, even if we all die. But when someone is about to die because of natural causes or—in Siamese twins—because heaven is pursuing them, as the Talmud says, there one certainly should do separation surgery, make a lottery as to which one is left to die and save at least the other. So that is the practical difference. Therefore I think that with all due respect to Rabbi Shelomo Yaffe and the Kesef Mishneh, this is an extremely remote interpretation. It is obvious that the basis for "be killed rather than transgress" in murder is the reasoning of "Who says?" Okay, I will stop here. Is there any question or comment? Okay, so tomorrow we will meet for the last class, basically. Last class. Okay, goodbye. Goodbye, thank you very much.