Dogmatics – Lecture 18
This transcript was produced automatically using artificial intelligence. There may be inaccuracies in the transcribed content and in speaker identification.
🔗 Link to the original lecture
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Table of Contents
- Providence and divine involvement versus the laws of nature
- Indications of providence and the position that the world runs according to its ordinary course
- The problem of evil, human evil, and natural evil
- Free choice as an explanation for human evil and its educational implications
- The value of decision, theodicy, and the debate over the “price” of free choice
- Elijah at Mount Carmel as an example of criticism of lack of decision
- Natural evil, laws of nature, and the burden of proof regarding a “better world”
- A historiographic note on pessimism and “old” versus “new” history
- Reward and punishment, the messianic era, and resurrection of the dead as a unit of “recompense” and as a possible “plan”
- Theodicy as a result and not as a justification, and suspicion toward motives that are “too reasonable”
- Beliefs as facts, the impossibility of commanding belief, and the claim of dubious sources
- Appearance in the Talmud, “Rabbi Hillel,” and the question of a tradition from Sinai
- Dynamics of customs and theses entering tradition and becoming sacred
- Maimonides, philosophy as “Torah,” and the tension between rational truth and tradition
- Serving out of love and reward, the Eglei Tal and the Book of Jonah
- Passivity, Zionism, and distinguishing between scales of belief
- The question of late appearance in the Hebrew Bible (Tanakh) and in the words of the Sages, and the end of the lecture
Summary
General Overview
The speaker completes the discussion of the tenth principle, providence, and argues that divine involvement “within nature” is an oxymoron, because any divine involvement means a deviation from the laws of nature. He presents a personal position according to which the world runs in its ordinary course and there is no indication of ongoing involvement “from above,” and connects this to the problem of evil, distinguishing between human evil and natural evil. He explains human evil through the value of free choice and its educational implications, and offers a direction for dealing with natural evil through the claim that there is no necessity that some alternative system of natural laws exists that would preserve a law-governed world while preventing suffering. Later he opens a unit on the last three principles—reward and punishment, the messianic era, resurrection of the dead—and argues that at least Messiah and resurrection of the dead may be part of the “plan” and not necessarily “recompense.” He also expresses suspicion that some of these beliefs were historically shaped out of considerations of theodicy and were accepted as binding dogmas despite dubious biblical grounding and the difficulty of attributing to them a tradition from Sinai.
Providence and divine involvement versus the laws of nature
The speaker states that there cannot be divine involvement within the framework of the laws of nature, and any divine involvement is a deviation from the laws of nature. He explains that he lingers on this because many people—thinkers, rabbis, and others—believe that divine involvement can indeed coexist with the laws of nature. He compares this to what Maimonides writes in his roots about things that seem obvious but on which some people err, and presents the claim that “divine involvement within the framework of nature is an oxymoron.”
Indications of providence and the position that the world runs according to its ordinary course
The speaker says that his personal opinion tends toward the view that natural processes are what govern the world, and he cannot categorically rule out occasional divine interventions at specific times or places. He argues that statements of the type “nothing that happens here is natural; it all comes from above” are, in his view, simply not correct, but the sweeping opposite claim—that absolutely nothing comes from above—is also something he cannot know. He states that there is no indication of involvement from above, and refers to claims of “look, the hand of God” as attempts to bring proofs that usually do not convince him.
The problem of evil, human evil, and natural evil
The speaker presents the problem of evil as closely related to the question of divine involvement, because the expectation of intervention stems from the assumption that the Holy One, blessed be He, is good. He says that on the factual level there is evil in the world, and distinguishes between human evil and natural evil: human evil is “what can really be called evil,” whereas in natural evil we are dealing with suffering without a conscious agent that can be judged. He argues that a priori claims such as “He cannot fail to intervene, otherwise there would be evil in the world” cannot contradict the fact that there is evil in the world, and compares this to theoretical claims that cannot override an existing factual condition.
Free choice as an explanation for human evil and its educational implications
The speaker explains that human evil stems from the fact that the Holy One, blessed be He, wants to give human beings free choice, and that if every time a person was about to do evil the Holy One, blessed be He, stopped him, then in practice there would be no choice. He argues that the Holy One, blessed be He, wants the right things to be done through human decision and not only as an outcome, and gives the example of a proposal to “hypnotize” a person to perform only commandments in order to show that this would turn a person into “a sheep.” He presents an educational lesson according to which one should aspire not only for children and students to do the right thing, but to do it through decision. He argues that a decision that is “not right in his eyes” is not a total failure, because the very act of deciding is itself a success, whereas walking in the “right” path merely because it is one’s comfort zone, without any decision, is a problematic state from the standpoint of the value of autonomy.
The value of decision, theodicy, and the debate over the “price” of free choice
The speaker distinguishes between the factual question of whether free choice exists and the question of what it means that free choice was given, and declares, “I’m a libertarian,” not a determinist. He argues that the importance of decision is a value that does not require any further justification, because “you don’t ask why about values,” and that a person who acts through decision is more worthy of appreciation than one who performs the same acts without decision. In response to the claim that the historical price has been heavy, he says that free choice is a value, and therefore there are prices the Holy One, blessed be He, is “willing to pay” in order to allow human decision, and he emphasizes that theodicy is a result of the conclusion about the importance of choice, not the reason for which he invents free choice.
Elijah at Mount Carmel as an example of criticism of lack of decision
The speaker interprets Elijah’s words, “If the Lord is God, follow Him; and if Baal, follow him,” in their plain sense, and argues that the criticism is not of an “incorrect” choice but of the absence of choice and of being dragged along. He describes the people as “limping between two opinions” and as “nonentities” who serve neither Baal nor the Lord out of decision, but simply “go with the crowd.” From this he concludes that the divine demand is not only to do the right thing, but to be a person who decides rather than one who is dragged along by the environment.
Natural evil, laws of nature, and the burden of proof regarding a “better world”
The speaker says that natural evil is a harder question, because he relates to it as “the handiwork of the Holy One, blessed be He,” and he rejects the assumption that in natural disasters those who suffer were “selected with tweezers.” He presents two theoretical possibilities for a world without natural suffering: a world without laws, in which the Holy One, blessed be He, manages every detail, or a world with different natural laws that prevent the points at which suffering arises. He argues that the facts show that the world is governed by laws and that apparently the Holy One, blessed be He, wanted a law-governed world, and adds that a world without laws would make basic human functioning difficult. He argues that anyone who comes with complaints about natural evil must show that there exists an alternative, rigid system of laws that governs a similar world but removes only the points of “unjustified suffering,” and suggests that perhaps, mathematically speaking, no such system exists and that this may be the possibility of “the optimal system,” so that the burden of proof shifts to whoever argues otherwise.
A historiographic note on pessimism and “old” versus “new” history
The speaker notes that the statement that history is the story of disasters fits an older historiography that focuses on kings, wars, and large-scale processes. He says that newer history examines the lives of “ordinary people” and finds also “a lot of good things,” and therefore the picture of reality on smaller scales seems less pessimistic to him.
Reward and punishment, the messianic era, and resurrection of the dead as a unit of “recompense” and as a possible “plan”
The speaker presents the next three principles: the eleventh principle of reward and punishment, the twelfth principle of the messianic era, and the thirteenth principle of resurrection of the dead. He argues that all three are usually linked to the topic of recompense, but suggests that it is not certain that the messianic era and resurrection of the dead belong to recompense; rather, they may be the realization of “the divine plan” to bring the world to a perfected state. He uses the saying “If they merit it, I will hasten it; if they do not merit it, it will come in its time” to argue that Messiah can come even if “we don’t deserve it,” because the realization is not only reward but an overall purpose. He suggests that resurrection of the dead, too, may be a return to a utopian plan in which life is not transient, a return from the condition of death decreed after Adam’s sin.
Theodicy as a result and not as a justification, and suspicion toward motives that are “too reasonable”
The speaker says that many people adopt beliefs about the World to Come, Messiah, and resurrection of the dead out of considerations relating to the goodness and perfection of the Holy One, blessed be He, in order to “settle the account” for suffering in the world. He argues that one can see them as solutions to theodicy, but from his perspective it is more correct to see theodicy as a result of what is factually true or as part of a plan, not as the reason for adopting the belief. He says that he is suspicious of beliefs that seem too reasonable, because reason itself can serve as motivation for historical invention, and he adds that ideas like reincarnations strike him as a similar intellectual move meant to balance the account.
Beliefs as facts, the impossibility of commanding belief, and the claim of dubious sources
The speaker emphasizes that questions about Messiah, resurrection of the dead, and the World to Come are factual questions about the future, and therefore a “command to think differently” is conceptually irrelevant; one can only persuade. He argues that biblical sources in this context are dubious, and that prophecies such as the vision of the dry bones can be interpreted in many ways, and returns to his claim that it is hard to draw unequivocal conclusions from the Hebrew Bible (Tanakh). He brings midrashic examples such as “From where is resurrection of the dead derived from the Torah?” and presents them as forcing verses, and argues that if there had been a tradition from Sinai there would have been no need for such interpretations.
Appearance in the Talmud, “Rabbi Hillel,” and the question of a tradition from Sinai
The speaker is asked how these beliefs entered the Talmud and what the sanctions against “the denier” mean, and he suggests the possibility of a social dynamic in which widespread beliefs become part of religious obligation. He quotes the statement of “Rabbi Hillel: Israel has no Messiah, for they already enjoyed him in the days of Hezekiah” as an indication that this is not a binding tradition from Sinai, because otherwise it would not depend on interpretation. He explains that perhaps Rabbi Hillel understood Messiah as part of the doctrine of recompense alone and not as part of a plan that is fulfilled “in any case,” thereby undermining the claim that the tradition requires one single interpretation.
Dynamics of customs and theses entering tradition and becoming sacred
The speaker recounts a conversation with a Druze inspector who argued that blood vengeance is not original to Islam but rather a tribal custom that entered religious consciousness, and he generalizes this as a dynamic in traditional societies in which cultural customs are absorbed, become fixed, and acquire sanctity. He gives a Jewish example of the custom that “a menstruating woman should not touch a Torah scroll,” which appears in the Rema as a custom of Krakow, and an example of communal enactments and “the seven good men of the city” entering the Shulchan Arukh even though, in his view, they are not “Jewish law” in the sense of a command from Sinai. He argues that in the same way ideas can become binding principles, and illustrates this with beliefs he sees as widespread but baseless, such as “whoever dies for Judaism is holy,” “Turn it over and turn it over, for everything is in it,” and mystical notions of “the special quality of Israel,” including an attribution to the Hatam Sofer that the Jewish body has a different physical structure.
Maimonides, philosophy as “Torah,” and the tension between rational truth and tradition
The speaker argues that Maimonides inserted into the Mishneh Torah contents that, in his view, are Aristotelian philosophy, especially “the first four chapters” of the Laws of the Foundations of the Torah, because in Maimonides’ view whatever is rationally true is binding truth and therefore also becomes “Torah.” He says that he himself does not accept this, and distinguishes between what is correct by human reasoning and “Torah” in the sense of instruction, as a command given at Sinai. He describes Maimonides’ view as one in which someone who does not arrive at the truth is not merely coerced by circumstance but is a wrongdoer, and argues that the obligation would be sharper if these things were a tradition from Sinai and not a product of reason.
Serving out of love and reward, the Eglei Tal and the Book of Jonah
The speaker is asked how one can serve out of love when there is reward, and replies through “the introduction of the Eglei Tal,” which teaches that there is pleasure in Torah study but that study should not be done for the sake of the pleasure. He argues that one can act for its own sake even when there are “bonuses,” and distinguishes between the existence of an interest and acting for the sake of that interest. He cites the a fortiori argument at the end of the Book of Jonah and proposes an interpretation against the “criminal eye,” according to which if Jonah needs the gourd, then he only pities himself; he argues that perhaps Jonah also had compassion for the gourd itself even though it served him. He explains that the test is a situation in which there is no immediate pleasure or reward, and if the person still acts, then it becomes clear that even when there is reward he is not acting only for the sake of the reward. He cites Maimonides in the tenth chapter of the Laws of Repentance regarding an educational progression that begins with bonuses and advances toward acting “because that is how one ought to behave.”
Passivity, Zionism, and distinguishing between scales of belief
The speaker rejects the claim that belief in future recompense necessarily produces passivity, and argues that a person wants neither the damage nor the compensation. He explains that the passivity he identifies in the religious world stems from the conception that “everything is in the hands of the Holy One, blessed be He” in the context of the question of human effort and trust, presented under the tenth principle, and not from the long-term conception of the purpose of history. He notes that the rebellion of secular Zionism is perceived as a response to religious passivity based on the World to Come, but he attributes the problem to other conceptions and not to what he is presenting here.
The question of late appearance in the Hebrew Bible (Tanakh) and in the words of the Sages, and the end of the lecture
The speaker agrees that the absence of explicit discourse in the Hebrew Bible (Tanakh) about the World to Come and resurrection of the dead, as opposed to the centrality of that discourse in the Talmud and in the later religious world, is an anomaly, and sees this as reinforcing the suspicion that this is a late development and not an ancient binding tradition. He is asked about a historical appearance in the Jerusalem Talmud and in the Mishnah and says that he does not remember, but argues that he does not think it is in the Mishnah and that it definitely appears in the Babylonian Talmud, “something like from the third or fourth century.” He concludes by saying that this is the discussion accompanying the study of the principles, and that regarding the last three the suspicion grows stronger because of the rational motivation to generate these beliefs and the dubious sources, and then wishes everyone, “Shabbat shalom.”
Full Transcript
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Last time we dealt with the tenth principle, which is providence. We talked about active providence, passive providence. At the end I also noted—I already don’t remember exactly what I managed to say—so I just want to add something, because it also connects to what’s coming now. I talked about the question of the Holy One, blessed be He, being involved, and I said that one thing is clear to me at least: there cannot be involvement within the framework of nature. Meaning, any divine involvement entails a deviation from the laws of nature. On the face of it this is so simple that every now and then I catch myself wondering why it even needs to be said or mentioned, but since there are people—and actually not a few, I think most of them—thinkers, rabbis, people who think these two things can go together, that divine involvement can also exist within the laws of nature, so it seems to me it’s still worth dwelling on. Yes, Maimonides writes in his roots, I think it’s in the first root, when he says that one does not count rabbinic commandments, and he says that I wouldn’t even have lingered over this because of how obvious it is, except that I saw people make mistakes about it. Meaning, from his words it sounds as though those roots come to say one of two things: either this is an important principle, or it’s a principle under dispute. Meaning, there are people who don’t think that way, and therefore it has to be put on the table. So here too, in the context of the principles—not the roots—maybe it also has to be treated that way, and we have to say that divine involvement inside the framework of nature is an oxymoron. Such a thing does not exist. Now beyond that we can discuss: okay, maybe He’s involved not within nature—that’s a different discussion. But first of all, conceptually, involvement within the framework of nature seems to me to be impossible. The question whether in principle He is involved—that’s where I said my personal opinion is that I tend to think the world runs according to its ordinary course, and natural process is what really governs the world. I can’t categorically rule out divine interventions at certain points, at certain times or places, so I can’t categorically determine that there is no involvement. But ordinarily, yes, when people say that nothing that happens here is just natural, that it all comes from above—that, in my view, is really not correct. Is there nothing at all that comes from above? That’s already too sweeping a statement. I don’t know; I can’t know. What I can know is that there is no indication that there is involvement from above. That, in my opinion, is true. But such an indication does not exist. Someone might tell me, okay, there’s no indication, but I know from the Torah that it does happen. Fine. I have nothing to argue with someone like that. But as for indications, I think there aren’t any. And very often people say, look, the hand of God, and they bring proof that this couldn’t have happened if there hadn’t been divine involvement here—but these usually seem unconvincing to me. I also touched, I think, at the end of the lesson—if I remember correctly—on the problem of evil. Because this raises the problem of evil. In the end, we expect divine involvement because the Holy One, blessed be He, is good. And if He is good, then He should be making sure that bad things don’t happen in the world. And therefore the problem of evil intersects with the question of divine involvement. To a large extent, people who insist on divine involvement insist on it because otherwise there would be evil here, and the Holy One, blessed be He, is good, He doesn’t want bad things here, so He has to intervene to deal with this issue. Now as a motivation, I understand that. But the question is what this means on the factual level. On the factual level, there is evil in the world. That’s a fact. By evil I mean on two planes—I don’t remember whether I spoke about this and made these distinctions—human evil and natural evil.
[Speaker B] Right, so—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I think I spoke about it, I just don’t remember anymore.
[Speaker C] Yes, yes, you did speak about it.
[Speaker B] Okay,
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So I’ll just summarize and move on. Human evil is basically—this is really what can be called evil. Natural evil means there is human suffering, but evil—it’s hard to speak here about evil, because there’s no agent here that I can judge. It’s nature. It’s not a conscious being that can make decisions and be judged. In a certain sense, if there’s anyone you can judge over natural evil, it would be the Holy One, blessed be He. Meaning, He is really the one we could judge. And so beyond the motivation—I said that if He is good then obviously He ought to intervene to prevent evil, which is often an argument against what I’m saying, that He is not involved: how can that be? He is good. He must be involved. But that argument always seems detached to me, because what do you mean He must be involved? Factually, look—there is evil. So what do I care about all these a priori theses saying it cannot be that He does not intervene, because otherwise there would be evil in the world. What do you mean there would be evil? There is evil. Factually, it exists. What, can you ignore that? There are people who somehow, hypothetically—it reminds me of the claims, I have this claim that you can’t learn anything from the Hebrew Bible (Tanakh). People don’t learn anything from the Hebrew Bible (Tanakh). “That can’t be—so why was the Hebrew Bible (Tanakh) written?” Great question. I have no answer. But I’m making a factual claim. Show me that you, or anyone else, no matter who, actually manages to learn something from the Hebrew Bible (Tanakh). The examples people brought me—I didn’t find them convincing; I haven’t seen convincing examples on this matter. So the theoretical, a priori arguments—surely it can’t be because of such and such—they may be good arguments, but they can’t contradict facts. Factually, the facts stand where they stand. So okay, the arguments remain under consideration. Same thing regarding the problem of evil. People say it can’t be that He’s not involved, because otherwise there would be evil in the world. I don’t know where they live. What does otherwise there would be evil in the world mean? There is evil in the world. So now the question is, okay, how does this fit with the goodness of the Holy One, blessed be He? So here—if I said this already, I’ll do it telegraphically—human evil is a result of the fact that the Holy One, blessed be He, wants to give us choice. Once the Holy One, blessed be He, gives us choice, that means we also have the option of doing bad things. Because if every time we did bad things the Holy One, blessed be He, stopped us, then that means de facto we really have no choice. We are compelled to do the good things. And what that means behind this whole picture—and there’s an educational lesson here, I don’t remember if I noted this either—is that when the Holy One, blessed be He, commands us or expects us to do various things—morality, Jewish law, all the goals He set before us—we could have understood this to mean that the Holy One, blessed be He, simply wants those things to happen. But if so, I would have expected Him to create us without choice, to program us to do the right things, and then that would ensure in the best possible way that what He wants to happen would indeed happen. Why did He give us choice and allow us not to do the right things? So the claim is that He wants the right things to be done through our own decision. Meaning, His interest is not only in the bottom line of what happens, but also in how it happens. The right things are indeed supposed to happen, but they are supposed to happen through decision. Therefore if someone were to offer me—I don’t know what—to hypnotize me so that I would do only commandments and avoid all transgressions and not do immoral things and so on, just put it into my head, hypnotize me—in principle I think I wouldn’t accept such an offer. Why not? Because the goal is not only to do the right things, but to do them through decision. If someone hypnotizes me, he has turned me into a sheep—someone who does the good things because that’s his nature. The Holy One, blessed be He, gave us choice not so that we would cancel our own choice in order to make sure we do good things. That He also could have done for us. We are supposed to arrive at doing the good things through decision. I think I mentioned that there are educational implications here, implications for how we look at our conduct in the world, with children, with students, what exactly we expect. Usually in the religious world the expectation is that we should educate children to do the right thing. Which is perfectly fine; I think that’s correct. But that’s not the whole right thing. We should aspire for children to do the right thing—students, children, everyone—to do the right thing through decision. And that’s a big difference. Because for example, if someone reaches a decision to do what I think is not the right thing—say not to be committed to Torah and commandments, or for some other reason, or to choose moral choices that don’t look right to me, or things of that sort—then in my eyes that’s not a total failure. Because the very fact that he makes decisions and acts according to his own decisions is itself a success. Now true, the best thing would be if he decided and also decided on the right thing. So he didn’t decide on what seems right to me—fine, then he didn’t decide on what seems right to me. So in my opinion there’s something lacking here. But on the other hand, the very fact that he decides—that is a success. And in that sense this is a more complex outlook than the prevailing one, in both directions. First, how I look at people who decided otherwise—where usually this is seen as an educational failure. And second, how I look at people who didn’t decide at all but are walking on the right path. They’re on the right path because that’s their comfort zone, right? That’s how they were raised, that’s their social group, so they stay on the path they were placed on—not because they decided, but because they stay there. It’s comfortable for them, it suits them. Yes.
[Speaker D] This huge question of the justification of God, of theodicy, which is the problem of evil—all of it so heavy and difficult—we’ve found a simple solution to answer it. We say free choice, we found some slogan like “bread of shame” from the Zohar, and with that we come out clean. Why is this really so important? Why is choice really so important? For example, let’s take Mozart. He wrote works. His free choice whether to write them or not doesn’t really interest us. He produced enormous works. Einstein discovered relativity. His free choice whether to do it or not doesn’t interest us all that much. He created something very great. So we invent some fiction of free choice, build the whole huge question of divine justification on it, and go home happy.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] First of all, I’m not building my whole theodicy on it. We’ll still get to natural evil; there you don’t have theodicy of this kind. Second, you need to distinguish here between two questions. The first question is factual: do we have free choice? And the second question is: what does it mean that free choice was given to us? So I’m saying, even before theodicy, I ask first of all on the factual level. I think we have free choice. I’m a libertarian, okay? I’m not a determinist. You can argue about that, but that’s my position. Now I ask: if that’s so, then apparently the Holy One, blessed be He, saw to it that I would have free choice. I ask myself why. I answer: apparently it was important to Him that what I do be done through decision, and not only the bare fact of what I do. And also, as I said earlier, if only the bare fact of what I do mattered to Him, it would have been much more efficient and correct to create me without choice. Meaning, to program me to do what I’m supposed to do. So it seems to me that first of all the world itself says this; it’s not theodicy. It’s not in order to arrive at the conclusion that the Holy One, blessed be He, is good. In the end it also serves theodicy, but the reason I reach this reasoning is simply the facts. The facts are that I have choice and that He gave me choice. So from that this result follows, regardless of any need to justify the goodness of the Holy One, blessed be He.
[Speaker D] Yes, I didn’t say the Rabbi invented it. The disagreement between me and the Rabbi about free choice isn’t really connected to that. But I’m saying people cling to this consciousness and then already solve with it a question that in fact was never answered. To say “bread of shame” doesn’t answer it.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] “Bread of shame” you didn’t hear from me. “Bread of shame” you didn’t hear from me,
[Speaker D] I—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I’m not solving anything with that; in my view it’s just an invention.
[Speaker D] So why is decision really important? What difference would it make if we were born righteous?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Why is it important to be moral? Because it’s important to be moral. You don’t ask why about values. Values are the answer to other why-questions. When you ask why a certain value is correct, that’s an oxymoron. If it’s a value, you can’t ask why about it.
[Speaker D] But why is it moral only if you had the possibility of being Hitler and chose to be Abraham our forefather?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And that gives us—
[Speaker D] You’re just repeating—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] the same question in different words. You’re asking why part of morality is the ability to decide. And the answer is: that’s just how it is. What do you mean why? Like every value in the world—I don’t know how to explain why it’s a value—the value of being a chooser, the value of autonomy, I also can’t explain. To me it’s self-evident, but if I needed an explanation, I don’t have one. I think most human beings understand that a person who makes a decision is a person more worthy of appreciation than someone who does the exact same things but not through decision. I think all of us, almost all of us, relate to human beings that way. So I don’t see a need to justify such a thing. It’s self-evident to everyone. Meaning, to justify something that is self-evident—on the basis of what exactly should I justify it? On the basis of some principle that itself would also need justification? In the end, if there is something self-evident, then for me it is correct.
[Speaker D] I agree, Rabbi, but the prices are so heavy. Human history—Edward, I don’t remember exactly, Gibbon—who said human history is the story of disasters, madness, and wickedness that humanity has gone through. And all this for the sake of that choice, so that you can pat yourself on the back and say we’re good?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, you belittle it at the end when you say so that you can pat yourself on the back. No. Yes, it’s all because of choice—up to there I’m with you. But so that you can pat yourself on the back, and all those belittlings—I’m not with you. Meaning, yes, choice is a value. Correct. For that we pay prices here in the world. Yes. The Holy One, blessed be He, created it this way. Meaning, He is willing that prices be paid here—moral prices, halakhic prices, in every sense, things that go against His own will—just in order to allow human beings to make their decisions through decision, yes? Apparently that is very important to Him. Now I’m saying, you ask me—even in my own intuition it seems very important, and it seems to me that for most people it seems very important, so I’m less troubled by the question of what the justification for it is, because for things that are self-evident I don’t look for a justification. But factually, first of all, that’s how it is. You see that the Holy One, blessed be He, created the world this way. So I’m saying: theodicy, for me, is not the reason I reach this conclusion; theodicy is a result. After I reached the conclusion that it is important that there be free choice here, with that I can also explain why evil was created in the world. I didn’t produce the concept of free choice for the sake of evil in the world. I came to the conclusion that there is free choice and that the Holy One, blessed be He, gave us free choice, and therefore He probably had a reason. All of that is forward-moving argument. Afterward I go backward and say: ah, if so, then this can also help me settle the problem of theodicy—how can it be that the Holy One, blessed be He, is good and yet there is so much evil in the world? But that is not the reason why I formulate this position that there is free choice and that it is important. Okay, so that’s regarding human evil, yes? And then I say, also in terms of how we view students or children, success or failure—very often people basically look at the bottom line: if he’s going on the path I wanted, that’s success; and if he’s not going on the path I wanted, that’s failure. And I claim that the picture is more complex. I don’t accept the completely opposite thesis that says if he chose, that’s success, and if he didn’t choose, that’s failure, period, no matter what he chose. Rather, I say it matters what he chose, but it has to come through choice. The full structure should have two levels: one level is that you choose, and the second level is that you also choose correctly, and both are important. But each one by itself also has value. An example of this is Elijah at Mount Carmel, when he says to the people: “How long will you go limping between two opinions? If the Lord is God, follow Him; and if Baal, follow him.” Now usually when people read these verses, they think there’s some rhetorical trick here. He’s really trying to push them into a corner, saying: listen, you’re nobodies, you don’t make decisions, you sit on the fence, because he assumes it’s obvious to them that the Holy One, blessed be He, is God, and he’s telling them: friends, then follow what is obvious to you, don’t let the evil inclination mislead you. I read the verses in their plain sense. Elijah is really telling them: if Baal is God, follow him. That’s right. That’s what you should do. You believe that? That’s what you think? Then go with it. But you’re deciding neither for Baal nor for the Holy One, blessed be He. You’re just nobodies. Meaning, his criticism of them is not criticism that they are doing the wrong thing, but criticism that they’re doing nothing, they’re not deciding, they’re simply being dragged along. And the criticism is about the first level and not the second level. That’s really the point. Yes, like in that old Israeli comedy sketch, with the helicopter there and all the suffering, where they ask him, wait, did you go with your father or with your mother? And he says, I went with the guys. Meaning, neither with father nor with mother—I go with the guys. What does with the guys mean? It means whatever wind happens to blow through here, I go with it. Okay? No—choose. Either you go with father or you go with mother. Go after what you chose, not after what the crowd dictates to you. Meaning, I think Elijah’s criticism of the people was on that plane, not on the plane that they were serving idols, but that they were nonentities; even their idolatry they didn’t do properly. They didn’t choose idolatry; they went with the crowd. The crowd serves idols, so they serve idols too. If you were ideological idol worshipers, I’d have no claim against you. If that’s what you think—fine, so that’s what you think, then do it. Don’t serve the Lord if you really believe idolatry is right—go with idolatry. But you don’t; one day here, one day there, you’re not really making a decision, you’re not really autonomous people who do what they themselves decide or determine. And that is the demand. And I think that demand truly expresses the point I made before: that the Holy One, blessed be He, expects from us not only to do the right thing, but to do it through decision. And decision is no less important than what I decide—the very fact that I’m a deciding person and not a dragged-along person, not someone who does what his environment leads him to do. So that’s regarding human evil. Regarding natural evil—I don’t remember whether I spoke about this—did I speak about the impossibility of creating a perfect system of laws with natural evil, yes,
[Speaker B] where there are hurricanes and storms and earthquakes.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, say a tsunami, or epidemics, or things of that sort—then that’s a harder question. In the last column, or the one before that, I don’t remember anymore, I brought there someone, some clown, one of the things that bothered him—and that’s why he came up with some weird thesis there, doesn’t matter, that there’s consciousness in the universe, or consciousness, therefore panpsychism and all kinds of things like that. What bothered him? What bothered him was that belief in God doesn’t work out. Why doesn’t it work out? Because God is supposed to be good, and there is evil in the world. So I explained human evil before. What about natural evil? Natural evil really is supposed to be in the hands of the Holy One, blessed be He, and I brought the Talmudic text in Makkot, right, that an unintentional killer is basically something manipulated by the Holy One, blessed be He, because an unintentional killer is not someone who decided to murder, who chose to murder, but he simply killed. And once he did it by mistake, not by choice, then it is basically the handiwork of the Holy One, blessed be He. So that doesn’t contradict “some perish without justice,” and the claim that apparently in the Sages, or at least in some places in the Sages, it seems that nature really is in the hands of the Holy One, blessed be He, unlike human actions. And therefore even if we accepted the solution to human evil, because you have to give a person free choice, the solution to natural evil is a much harder question. Because natural evil really is the handiwork of the Holy One, blessed be He, so why should such great suffering be caused to so many people? And I said it’s not reasonable that in a tsunami they picked with tweezers exactly every person who suffered as someone who deserved to suffer, and somehow all those millions gathered precisely in that area there with the tsunami. That sounds unreasonable to me. So basically it comes out that there is natural evil, that there are those who perish without justice also in the natural sense, not only in the sense of human choice. And the claim about that was that whoever makes such a claim against the Holy One, blessed be He, is basically assuming that there is another possibility: to create a more perfect world in which there would be no natural evil. To run a more perfect world in which there would be no natural evil. Now this could be done in one of two ways: either to create different laws of nature in which natural evil would not appear, or not to operate by laws at all, but rather the Holy One, blessed be He, would constantly run things and make sure that nothing happens that causes pointless, unjustified suffering—meaning, He would manage everything directly, not through laws. Those are the two possibilities. Now I claim, first of all, we see that the Holy One, blessed be He, wants laws of nature—and again, I’m not saying this for the sake of theodicy; the theodicy is a result. I look at the world. In the world, what I see is that the world is governed by laws. Like I said before, I see that we have free choice. I start from the facts, not from my theological goals. So here too I start from the facts: in the world there are laws; the world is governed by laws. That means from here I understand that the Holy One, blessed be He, apparently wanted a world that is governed by fixed laws. Not something that’s this kind of chaos where every time the Holy One, blessed be He, decides what happens, but something governed by fixed laws. I can even guess why that is, or offer a suggestion why that is: because in a world without laws it would be very hard for us to function. Meaning, we don’t understand what we’re supposed to do if there are no laws. Something is falling on you and you want to stop it—what are you supposed to do? Are you supposed to move toward it or run away from it? Who knows? The laws of nature change every time; you don’t know how to function. So therefore, even just so that we can function, I think you need a world here with fixed laws of nature. So if the Holy One, blessed be He, wants a world that operates according to fixed laws of nature, then the first option for making a better world is out. A world without laws, where the Holy One, blessed be He, manages everything and makes sure that everything runs properly—that option is gone. What option remains? Another option: that there be a world with laws, but different laws. Laws that don’t bring about the bad results, the unjustified suffering. I’m talking now about natural suffering, unjustified suffering. Make other laws of nature in which that doesn’t appear. Here I claim that whoever makes such a claim against the Holy One, blessed be He, the burden of proof is on him that such a system of laws even exists. Meaning, who says there is such a rigid system of laws that, first, would function like our world, because after all that’s apparently what the Holy One, blessed be He, wants to happen. It’s not for nothing that He established the laws to be specifically these laws and not others, because these laws apparently govern things in the way He wants. So you want laws that would govern the world similarly to our laws, except at those points where there is a tsunami or an epidemic or some unjustified suffering to people who don’t deserve to suffer. The question is whether there is such a system of laws. Who says there is such a system of laws that behaves exactly like our world except for those points where some unjustified suffering occurs? And therefore, now I want to suggest something—maybe it’s true, maybe it’s not.
[Speaker D] But why not add a few natural miracles, hidden miracles, just increase the rate of hidden miracles a bit so that in a disaster you wouldn’t feel that…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] First of all, hidden miracles may indeed exist—I can’t rule out their existence. But the world is still run in a natural way, and that dictates that at least some suffering apparently does have to appear here. It’s impossible to completely prevent suffering—I won’t call it evil, because I don’t like the concept of evil. But suffering or unjustified distress, apparently some part of that probably has to happen; it’s part of the result of the laws of nature. And therefore the claim is that whoever makes this claim against the Holy One, blessed be He, basically has to show that there is a rigid system of laws that manages to do the job. If there were such a system, then you really could ask: so why didn’t the Holy One, blessed be He, make it? After all, He is good, so why wouldn’t He make it? But if there is no such system, then you can’t claim anything against the Holy One, blessed be He. I think I also said that I tend to think, just on a mathematical level even before the theodicy, that there really won’t be such a system. There won’t be such a system of laws. I don’t think you can somehow remove certain points and leave the system as it is, but make these little changes that remove only the points where some unjustified suffering appears. Because we’ll pay for that from another direction. Meaning, we’ll pay for that in other places where it won’t function the way the Holy One, blessed be He, wants, or it will cause suffering or something like that. And therefore my claim is that at least there is a possibility that this is the optimal system. And once there is such a possibility, whoever wants to come with claims against the Holy One, blessed be He, the burden of proof is on him. Meaning, I don’t want to claim that there is no such possibility; rather, I’m saying that since it may be that there is no such possibility, then the question no longer really stands. Meaning, in order to ask this question, the burden of proof is on you. You need to show that there is another, better possibility. So that is the solution regarding natural evil. It reminds me—you mentioned the historian Gibbon, I think, the historian who said that the world, history, is a description of all the suffering and wars and so on. That’s a statement from old history, by the way. Old history—just a side remark, I suddenly remembered that I wanted to comment to you about this—old history, old historians described history through what kings did, wars, the big processes. New history, as part of the shift to an individual perspective, actually looks at what the little person did in all those periods. Meaning, experiences of a small person in order to see what the world looked like on the small scales and not on the large scales of nations and wars and great governmental things and all kinds of things of that sort. And therefore when you look at the small scale, there are also things—there is suffering, there are also bad things, but there are also lots of good things. Meaning, I don’t think the picture is all that bad. I think that on the larger scales it is easier to arrive at the pessimistic picture that you presented earlier. I think on the smaller scales the picture comes out not so pessimistic. So that’s just a remark about historiography. In any event, so that is about that, just the completion I wanted to make regarding the root, regarding the tenth principle. The principle? What?
[Speaker D] Can I ask one more small question about the previous principle? Yes. He said—I just wasn’t there, I only listened to the recording—he said that the Rabbi did not rule out the possibility that according to Maimonides there is also active providence, and he recognized this principle in Maimonides that I never understood: that supposedly a person should serve out of love, right? It’s also written in Avot, not to expect to receive reward, but there is reward. And the Rabbi said he could accept that. Now I never understood how that is possible. Meaning, suppose a person—suppose I give charity and I believe I’ll receive reward and I really do receive reward; every time I give one shekel I get an SMS from the bank: ten shekels have been deposited into your account. Okay. How can I now fulfill the commandment of charity when every time I know for certain that when I give charity I receive ten times the reward? Then there’s nothing here—it’s not giving, it’s an investment. So how can there be reward?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] You know, it’s like the—I think this is where I usually bring the introduction to the Eglei Tal. The introduction to Eglei Tal says that there are those who mistakenly think that you’re not allowed to enjoy Torah study. Because if you enjoy the study, then you are studying not for its own sake. And he says there is no greater mistake than this; of course there is specifically value in enjoying it, and the enjoyment also improves the study and strengthens the connection to the material and so on. But he goes on and says: but they are right in this, that the study is not supposed to be done for the sake of the enjoyment. Meaning, there is enjoyment, but I don’t do the studying for the sake of the enjoyment, because otherwise it really is study not for its own sake. What is he really saying? He is basically saying that even where there is a positive result from what I do, that does not automatically mean that my action is for the sake of that result. Those are two different things. I can act for its own sake even where I receive bonuses, reward, and so on. In this context there is the—
[Speaker D] The problem is that it’s not always like that.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Difficult—that’s one claim. Impossible—that’s a different claim. No, no, it’s possible. Maybe it’s difficult; by the way, I’m not sure it’s difficult. Maybe it’s difficult, but it’s not impossible, right? You can act for its own sake even where you know there is reward. And in this context I’m also reminded—I’ve spoken about this before as well—of the a fortiori argument at the end of the book of Jonah. Right? At the end Jonah sees the gourd, and he is in great distress. So the Holy One, blessed be He, says to him: “Are you so greatly grieved over the gourd?” He says: “Yes, I am greatly grieved, even unto death.” He says: “You had pity on the gourd, for which you did not labor and which you did not grow, and should I not have pity on Nineveh, the great city, in which there are many beasts and thousands of people,” and so on. Now on the face of it, that a fortiori argument is a ridiculous one. Why? Because Jonah did not pity the gourd; he pitied himself. He needed the gourd for shade. So why are you bringing him proofs that You pity Nineveh, all the more so from the fact that Jonah pitied the gourd? Jonah didn’t pity the gourd; he needed it, and now he was suffering from the sun. And I said that this can be answered in two ways. One way is to say: the Holy One, blessed be He, also does not pity Nineveh just in a purely altruistic sense. He needs them. Service for a higher need. He created them because He needs them. That’s one direction; I won’t get into it here, but it’s one direction. The second direction is the opposite one, which says: you look with this criminal eye at Jonah and you say: if Jonah used the gourd, then clearly he didn’t have compassion on it, he had compassion on himself. Not true. It could be that he needed the gourd and the gourd served him, but he still also genuinely had compassion for the gourd itself. And who says not? This is basically the cynical outlook of political commentators, which many times may be right, but you have to be careful not to adopt it as something self-evident. Political commentators—once they show that a politician has an interest in what he did, that automatically means that the action is not clean. Now that’s not true. Meaning, he may have an interest in it, but it still may genuinely be what he believes in, and that is why he does it. Meaning, it doesn’t have to be that if you have an interest, you are also acting for the sake of the interest. Those are two different things. Exactly like the Eglei Tal. Meaning, the fact that you enjoy the study does not mean that you study for the sake of the enjoyment. Where are you tested? You are tested, say, if one morning you wake up and right now you don’t feel like studying; you have no enjoyment from the study. Will you still sit down and study? If yes, then that means that even when you do enjoy it, you are not studying for the sake of the enjoyment, or not only for the sake of the enjoyment, but also for the intrinsic value of the study. Meaning, there can be a situation where you receive bonuses but you don’t do the act for the bonuses. You do it for the sake of Heaven. What Maimonides describes in the tenth chapter of the Laws of Repentance, he really says that there is a kind of educational ranking. He says: with children you begin with the bonuses until they mature, and gradually they understand—it helps instill in them that this is how one should behave, and when they are older they are expected to understand that this is how one should behave not for the bonuses but because this is how one should behave. Meaning, now not everyone reaches that, and you can say maybe it’s hard to reach that—I’m not sure it’s hard, but maybe—but it’s not impossible. Meaning yes, that is what is demanded of a person: that in the end he should reach that kind of service. So that is regarding the tenth principle. Now I want to move on to the next principles and first of all look for a moment at all the rest, because the rest here is some sort of unit that it’s worth seeing as one whole. In light of what I’ve said until now—and that’s why I repeated what I said until now, because that is the framework within which I want to look at the rest. So what remains for us in the continuation is basically three more foundations. The eleventh foundation: that He, exalted be He, grants good reward to whoever keeps the commandments of the Torah and punishes whoever violates its prohibitions. Fine, leave the continuation aside for a moment. Meaning reward, reward and punishment. That is the eleventh foundation. The twelfth foundation is the days of the Messiah. To believe that he will come and that he will not tarry, and so on. And the thirteenth foundation is the resurrection of the dead. Right? Meaning reward and punishment, the days of the Messiah, and the resurrection of the dead. And there he is brief, so he doesn’t elaborate, but it doesn’t matter—that is the thirteenth foundation. Now what exactly—these three foundations are connected for us, in one way or another, to the question of recompense. Because reward and punishment, of course, directly speaks about recompense. But the days of the Messiah also are usually perceived as some kind of recompense. Right? This is the reward: in the end the Messiah will come and we will all live in peace and tranquility and everything will be wonderful. Meaning, there is some kind of optimistic end here to this history of wars, distress, and human suffering. In the very end the Messiah will come and there will be light at the end of the tunnel. Meaning, there is also some scent here of recompense, right, there is recompense, there is reward for our labor—the Messiah. Not as recompense that is owed to us because of what we did, but rather that is probably a plan that in any case is ultimately supposed to be realized, whether we deserve it or not. And that is something I want to talk about in a moment. And the thirteenth foundation is the resurrection of the dead. And in the resurrection of the dead as well there is this tension, because on the face of it this too seems to be part of recompense. Meaning, whoever behaved properly and did what he should, in the end is destined to live. Right? He does not remain dead; he is destined to live, and that is basically some kind of recompense. Therefore the days of the Messiah and the resurrection of the dead and so on—a lot of thinkers also mix them together; each defines differently the difference between these two concepts. It is well known that there is Ramchal and Maimonides and all that—everyone who deals with these uninteresting topics deals with the disputes regarding what the order is and exactly what appears before what and what the meaning of Messiah is, what the meaning of resurrection of the dead is, whether it is even the same thing or not the same thing, and so on. And also recompense in the World to Come, also the eleventh foundation. All these things basically belong to the section of recompense, but here I want to make several comments. The first comment is that it is not really certain that at least the next two foundations—the days of the Messiah and the resurrection of the dead—it is not certain that they really belong to the section of recompense. Meaning, the eleventh foundation is reward and punishment; that is openly about recompense. But the days of the Messiah and the resurrection of the dead—it is quite possible that these things are supposed to happen because that is the plan. Meaning, in the end the goal of the Holy One, blessed be He, in creating the whole world is that in the end the world should function properly—not in order to give us reward for the good things we did, but because in the end the world was created in order to reach a corrected state. When we finish the process of correction, in the end it will be realized and we will reach the goal, and the goal is that there should be a corrected world. And therefore the corrected world is not necessarily something that is recompense to us for our good deeds, as we often tend to understand it. No. The corrected world is the purpose of the divine plan regardless of what we do, because that is where it has to get to. Regardless of our actions—it was not created in order to give us recompense. And therefore indeed, as the Sages say: “If they merit it, I will hasten it; if not, in its time.” And if we don’t deserve the Messiah? Then in the framework of recompense, the Messiah is not supposed to come. We don’t deserve it, so no—then he should not come. What does it mean that in any case he will come? It means that at some stage there will come a time when the Messiah will come in any case, even if we have not merited it. Why? Because Messiah is not only part of recompense; Messiah is also part of the divine plan, of what is ultimately meant to be done. And therefore in the end, as they constantly speak about in the Ari and in Kabbalah, the world of correction and after that the corrected world—the world of correction is the progress toward the corrected world. So this is basically a description of our mission. It is not actions and recompense for actions; rather our mission is to bring the world to a corrected state. If we do not succeed in that, the Holy One, blessed be He, will do it in any case, because in the end the world has to get there. He wants it to be done through our deeds—as I said before, our choice is also important, not only the result. But in the end He does it not in order to give us reward, but because that is where He wants the world to arrive. And the same thing with the resurrection of the dead. The resurrection of the dead is also not necessarily only reward for those who deserve it and therefore they get a prize that they will rise in the resurrection of the dead. Rather, the resurrection of the dead may be simply the plan in the end: that life will not be fleeting. That we will return from the sin of Adam the first, because of which death was decreed upon us, and return to the original plan in which we were supposed to live in Eden—that is the days of the Messiah—and not die—that is the resurrection of the dead. Some different kind of life that was actually the plan of the utopian world; that is what was supposed to be from the outset. Only it fell—again it fell; apparently there was also a plan that it should fall, but that doesn’t matter right now—but that is the corrected world, and in the end the goal is that we reach a corrected world. The corrected world is not a prize for us but the plan of the Holy One, blessed be He. Meaning, that is where things are supposed to arrive. So what this actually means is that the three remaining foundations are found in this sphere that speaks about recompense, but it is not completely certain, at least not regarding all of them, that they really belong only to the world of recompense. Why am I saying this? Because these foundations are often arrived at through considerations of the goodness of the Holy One, blessed be He, or the perfection of the Holy One, blessed be He. Meaning, it cannot be that human beings… either in the World to Come, right, for good or for bad, or in the days of the Messiah, or in the resurrection of the dead, right—resurrection of the dead and the days of the Messiah. Meaning, at some point the Holy One, blessed be He, will settle the account. Because otherwise, again we’re back to theodicy, because otherwise we are left with a situation that it is not reasonable that the Holy One, blessed be He, if He is truly good, would allow. It is not reasonable that a good person should suffer. Therefore there must be some sort of compensation in the World to Come or in the resurrection of the dead, right, in the future to come, where they will already pay me what I deserve. And if I accumulated more, if the Holy One, blessed be He, accumulated more debt toward me because I suffered unjustly, no problem—that will be offset later on, I will be compensated for it later on, in the World to Come, the resurrection of the dead, or all kinds of things of that sort. Therefore often this consideration of the goodness of the Holy One, blessed be He, is actually perceived as the reason these principles are true. And here again I say what—I didn’t happen to think that Shmuel would ask this earlier when I answered him—but this is exactly what I meant to say regarding these foundations. You can bring these foundations as an answer to the goodness of the Holy One, blessed be He: after all, we see that suffering occurs here, so that undermines—or yes, challenges—the conception that the Holy One, blessed be He, is good. No, no, He settles accounts with us in the World to Come and so on. You can say: no, no, this was not created for theodicy; it was not created in order to justify the fair or good relationship of the Holy One, blessed be He, to the world. Rather, this is simply His plan—this is where He wants the world to arrive—therefore it goes there. I did not invent it as a necessary answer to what appears to be the lack of goodness of the Holy One, blessed be He; rather, this is what happens. True, once I have already reached the conclusion that this is His plan, then it can also solve problems of theodicy for me. Right, it can also solve the problems where He appears evil. Then you say yes, in the future to come, in the World to Come, He will settle accounts with us and give us what we deserve for good or for bad, and in the end everything comes out whole and everything will be perfectly fine.
[Speaker D] Doesn’t that make us passive? Because if in the end everything will really be solved, everything will work out, then I come to treat the suffering of a sick person and they tell him, listen, it’s not really so terrible that you’re in pain; in the World to Come you’ll get many times more.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, but the World to Come is all very nice—that’s compensation. You know, don’t cause damage and then compensation won’t be needed.
[Speaker D] No, but if one builds on this a faith, a consciousness that there isn’t really such a need to fight and be active in the world, to fight evil and suffering, because everything…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] You are taking it in the direction of short-range determinism. Meaning, what is supposed to happen to me now will happen anyway, whether through effort or trust—I’m not talking about that. This outcome may come after two thousand years also, but right now I don’t want to suffer, right now I don’t want to die.
[Speaker D] And after all, the whole rebellion of secular Zionism was that they felt that the religious type was very passive, because he was relying on—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The World to Come. He basically lives… And I claim that this passivity stems from the question of trust and effort, not from what I’m saying here. What I’m saying here speaks about the long term; it is not connected to the question of what I do now and how I conduct my life. Nobody is going to say, okay, I’ll enter suffering now because after all in the World to Come they’ll compensate me for it. I want neither the damage nor the compensation. Meaning, this won’t bring me to passivity. What brings me to be passive is that same conception I discussed in the tenth principle, which says that everything is in the hands of the Holy One, blessed be He, therefore what I do is just some sort of game of effort, but in the end it is all whatever the Holy One, blessed be He, decides. That really does bring passivity. But not the conception I’m talking about here. It’s too large a scale; that is not what will generate passivity in our conduct. So in the end the claim is that even if there is theodicy here, the reasons why I adopt—or why people adopt—these principles, these foundations, are not in order to make the Holy One, blessed be He, come out good, but because they are really true. Only after they are true can one also use them to explain why, despite the fact that He appears evil, it is not true that He is evil; it is actually possible that He is completely good. But here the theodicy is a result; it is not the argument. Now why is this important? First of all, just because it’s important. But beyond that, I am a bit suspicious of theodicy considerations, precisely for the same reasons that Shmuel mentioned earlier. Meaning, all these outcomes of the days of the Messiah and the resurrection of the dead and all kinds of things of that sort—or you know what, let’s even talk about reincarnations, this kabbalistic mystical idea of reincarnations—this too was born out of that. It basically says: look, since here I suffered, and not always do I deserve… deserve it, then I will return afterward and there will be compensation. Meaning, in the end it will work out; the account will balance in the end, for good or for bad. Basically this is a very similar thought process to the one I described earlier that gave rise to the belief in the World to Come and in the resurrection of the dead and so on. And I am somewhat suspicious of such beliefs, precisely because they are logical. Beliefs, precisely because they are logical, are very easy for us to adopt as true, because after all we have good arguments why they are true. But when I ask myself—and this is the question that accompanies us all along this study of the principles—I ask whether this principle is a binding principle or whether this principle is a correct principle. Because I talked about the fact that formal authority cannot apply to facts. Now, will the Messiah come or not come, will there be resurrection of the dead or not, World to Come or not World to Come—these are all factual questions. Either it will be or it won’t be. Again, facts that I do not know how to measure now with scientific tools or other tools, doesn’t matter—they are not measurable, but they are factual questions. Now once the question is a factual question, if I have a position about it, then a command to think otherwise is not relevant; conceptually it does not belong. You cannot command me to think otherwise. You can persuade me to think otherwise, but not command me. Right, I already elaborated on that at the beginning of the series. Now what happens here is that some of these foundations sound to me very dubious on their face. The sources are very dubious. Resurrection of the dead and the days of the Messiah and so on. Right? Ezekiel and the vision of the dry bones, such prophecies can be explained in a thousand ways, and we also do that in various sections of the Bible. Therefore to draw conclusions from the Hebrew Bible (Tanakh), as I mentioned earlier—I am very doubtful about our ability to draw conclusions from the Hebrew Bible (Tanakh). Now what does this actually mean? It basically means that perhaps, if this does not really come out of the Hebrew Bible (Tanakh), and if this is not a tradition from Sinai, because I do not see indications that we have a tradition from Sinai about these things, then perhaps they were simply invented over the generations. Now the fact that there are logical considerations leading to these beliefs, in that sense, is actually harmful. Because it strengthens even more the possibility that people really invented these principles because they sounded very logical to them. And after this became a kind of accepted set of principles, now they turn it into dogmas that one must believe in, and that this is certainly true and came down from Sinai and all kinds of things of that sort. Because that is the way religious faith works: after you arrive at certain conclusions, suddenly it becomes something sacred that one must not dispute. And therefore, precisely the logic that people find in these beliefs—and there is such logic, yes, indeed, the theodicy logic, our ability to justify the goodness of the Holy One, blessed be He—precisely that makes these beliefs suspect in my eyes as something people invented exactly in order to justify the goodness of the Holy One, blessed be He. They have a good motivation to do that. So there is a good motivation to do it, the source for it is very dubious, and that raises suspicion whether these things really arose over the course of history and did not in fact come through a tradition from Sinai. And therefore the big question is to what extent these principles really are principles to which I am obligated. I do think there is logic in them, the same logic I mentioned before of settling the account, but precisely because of that I am not at all sure that these things were given at Sinai, and in that sense, am I supposed to accept this because it is part of the faith? No. I may accept it because it is logical, but I will not accept it because it is part of the faith, because it can become part of the faith precisely because of the logic in it.
[Speaker E] But Rabbi, whenever it’s written in the Talmudic text, what does that mean? I didn’t understand. That in the Talmudic text they speak about the Messiah and…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, I’m talking about the Talmudic text—what do you mean?
[Speaker E] Well then what is it—at what stage did they invent it? Before the Talmudic text. And it’s not a tradition from Sinai?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The Rabbi thinks it’s not… I don’t see indications that it’s a tradition from Sinai. Look, Maimonides hangs it on verses; it’s not a tradition, rather he brings verses. And let’s say, with his verses we’ve already seen that one can also manage in other ways; it’s hard to draw unequivocal conclusions from verses. Right? “Until I come to my lord in Seir”—the Sages say: in the future to come he will come to my lord in Seir. If that’s what is written in the verse, then it seems to me I can derive anything from any verse. Or yes, “From where is resurrection of the dead derived from the Torah?” Right? “For I know that after my death this people will rise and go astray.” That’s what is written in the verses, right? So the Sages interpret it: “for I know that after your death this people will rise,” or something like that—I don’t remember the exact wording of the verse, right? “after your death.” And “your death” and “rise,” so there you have resurrection of the dead. Come on, really? Are you serious? Is that what the verses say? Now you can tell me this is a tradition from Sinai, so they forced the verses because they already knew it was true. Then say there is a law given to Moses at Sinai that there is resurrection of the dead—why do you need to force verses for that?
[Speaker E] Fine, again, but it’s not Jewish law.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Doesn’t matter—a tradition from Sinai.
[Speaker E] Yes, a tradition from Sinai.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] You could also say that it is Jewish law, because, you know, denying a principle also has a halakhic implication. We talked about that here in the first lessons. But, but fine—then say it’s a tradition from Sinai, so what? The verses don’t really do the job. Therefore my feeling is that there is definitely a chance that these things were invented over the generations. By the way, the fact that they were invented over the generations does not mean they are not true. On the contrary, I said there is a lot of logic in this, and I may also adopt it because of that same logic. And still, it is meaningful whether we arrive at these conclusions because that is what our logic tells us, or whether there is some tradition from Sinai, because then I am more at ease—because if the Holy One, blessed be He, said so, then it is probably true. My conclusions can be true; they can be untrue. My conclusions are my conclusions.
[Speaker E] But about what future fact can one even say with certainty that there is a tradition from Sinai?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I don’t know if there is one.
[Speaker E] There isn’t one—I mean, I can’t think of such a thing.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right, so what?
[Speaker E] So there isn’t. No, the question is whether there was even such a thing at Sinai, whether there was even some kind of…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What, statements about the future? Maybe there weren’t any. Who says there were? The claim I’m making here could apply to all our statements about the future. I have no problem with that; it doesn’t scare me. I mean, many times things—you know, once some guy told me, I don’t remember whether he was Muslim or Druze, there was someone—we were vacationing at Kibbutz Dafna, I think it was, and next door there was a very nice man, an inspector in the Ministry of Education. Or—I think he was Druze. And he once explained to me this whole issue of blood redemption. Yes, revenge killing over family honor, blood revenge, all these desert concepts, this Arab desert culture. So he told me: there is no such thing in Islam. Right? People often say: this isn’t Islam—violence, terrorism, that’s not Islam. Muslim spokespeople say that a lot, which of course is very reminiscent of what people say among us as well—yes, yes, the behavior of those people, that’s not Judaism, it’s something else. And a lot of times it smells like apologetics. But here—so I spoke with him, I had the privilege of talking with him a bit and not just hearing the short slogan and that’s it—and he told me: listen, truly, this has no source. It has no source in the Muslim sources. Rather what is it? He told me: these are customs that basically developed among tribes in the Arabian deserts. Now, in a religious culture, social customs that are accepted in that environment often start to become fixed and get perceived as part of the religious system, because the system sanctifies whatever people have practiced. So this too was practiced. Now once it was practiced, it became part of the tradition, it went into the Shulchan Arukh. All kinds of customs of Krakow also got in—for example, that a menstruating woman should not touch a Torah scroll. Where did that strange invention come from? I don’t know. But the Rema writes it because that was the custom in Krakow. And to this day all kinds of people have decided that Krakow is here. Meaning, if that was the custom in Krakow, then that’s what has to be done. So there’s this kind of dynamic in traditional societies, in religious societies, where all sorts of social customs that got attached for all kinds of reasons and from completely external sources get absorbed into the religious tradition and become part of it and receive some kind of holiness. And now someone who’s really religious has to kill over family honor or blood revenge or I don’t know what, all sorts of things of that kind, because he’s seriously religious, he keeps everything our fathers and rabbis practiced. Okay? When in fact it has no source at all. It has no source. Again, these are customs that seem bad to us, so maybe the criticism sounds more understandable, but good customs can also be like that. That is, many very good customs can get in because they’re good. On the contrary, it’s even more likely they’ll get in if they’re good. And still, these are good customs whose source is cultural, social, one thing or another. That does not mean it’s a tradition from Sinai or a commandment of the Holy One, blessed be He, or that it’s part of Jewish law. Good things enter in this way too. For example among us—I’ve spoken more than once about communal ordinances, the status of the seven leading members of the town in the community, communal ordinances, like a municipality in our language today. Right? Where does their authority come from? So there are all kinds of inventions, this and that, which of course don’t hold water, saying that they have authority. Now in the end, after it was brought in—and this entered in the 11th or 12th century, I don’t know, something like that, in the form we know today—and it entered into the Shulchan Arukh, today it’s part of Jewish law. Now this is nonsense, it has no basis whatsoever, it is not part of Jewish law, and the Shulchan Arukh has nothing to say about it—calling it that is simply nonsense. Not that the customs are nonsense, but the claim that this is binding Jewish law is nonsense. But it entered the Shulchan Arukh, and in this case it’s also a positive thing. Since the authority of town leaders and of the municipality and proper administration and so on—these are positive things, not negative things. They entered because they are positive, but they entered because society understood that this is how one ought to act. Now does that make it a religious principle? Does someone who violates it now violate Jewish law because it’s written in the Shulchan Arukh? No, I don’t think so. This is a dynamic that takes things—sometimes bad, sometimes good—but things that entered through one kind of social dynamic or another, and turns them into part of the overall tradition of Jewish law; both in the Muslim context and in the Jewish context, part of the law, and now it receives holiness, now you have to do it, even if you disagree, even if it doesn’t seem right to you—yes, but you must, what can you do, that’s what Jewish law says. And if it has a real source, if it’s written in the Torah, fine—that’s what the Holy One, blessed be He, said, so okay, you’re right: even if I don’t identify with it, I’ll do it because that’s what’s written in the Torah, maybe. But if it’s not written in the Torah, then so what if you declared that this is Jewish law? Just because Maimonides suddenly decided that these are the Thirteen Principles that obligate all of us—so that obligates me because he decided? So what if he decided. I mean, if it were a tradition from Sinai I would accept it, but if this thing is really some invention that arose over the generations and Maimonides decided to include it as part of the binding Thirteen Principles, then with all due respect to Maimonides, why should I be obligated to accept it? And therefore I think this discussion—and it’s a discussion that accompanies us here all the time—is an important discussion, and it becomes much stronger precisely in those places where we have a natural tendency to think it’s true. There are rational considerations that lead us to these beliefs, like theodicy, and precisely because of that it arouses more suspicion that these are things that came in from elsewhere because they are rational. But now if someone comes and says: no, in my view this is not rational—resurrection of the dead, or I don’t know exactly what—fine, so if in his eyes it’s not rational, do we demand of him: yes, but you have to accept it, it’s one of the Thirteen Principles? No. The Thirteen Principles—the Thirteen Principles are like murder over family honor. Meaning, Maimonides brought it in because from his point of view whatever was ultimately accepted and whatever ultimately seemed rational, for him that was part of binding religious belief. But for Maimonides that is certainly the case. Maimonides often sees rational foundations as—there you have all the Laws of the Foundations of the Torah, the first four chapters, we talked about this—the first four chapters of the Laws of the Foundations of the Torah are all results of Aristotle’s philosophy, of one philosophical mode of thought or another, and that is part of the Mishneh Torah. And it entered Jewish law. Why? Because it is true. Now I think it isn’t true—so what? Now go tell the people in, I don’t know, Bnei Brak or Har Hamor that the Laws of the Foundations of the Torah are not Torah. It’s not Torah, it’s Aristotelian philosophy—not all of it, but those relevant chapters, the first four chapters, most of them—in the first four chapters, it’s a collection of things that in my opinion have no basis whatsoever. And this is part of the Mishneh Torah, part of the most basic book of Jewish law that we have. Fine—why? Because Maimonides decided to include these things because he thought they were true. Because from his point of view, if Aristotle said it, that’s a rational consideration, so it’s true. And if it’s true, then now it’s part of the Torah. For Maimonides, if it’s rational then it’s part of the Torah. And I think that’s wrong. Meaning, even if it’s rational I’ll accept it because it’s rational, but Torah for me is what the Holy One, blessed be He, instructs us to do. Torah in the sense of instruction, right? What He gave us at Sinai and was transmitted to us from there—that is called Torah. What goes beyond that may be true, but it is not necessarily Torah. And if someone thinks it’s not true, then of course the practical consequence is that he won’t accept it. So in that sense I think all these principles—if I see them as having arisen on the basis of theodicy—that very much arouses suspicion that these are in fact later inventions and not some authentic tradition. And again, the fact that they are later inventions does not mean they aren’t true. There are good reasons to accept them, but you still have to understand that this is an invention that arose from rational considerations, and not—if I’m right, I’m saying we need to understand this—it’s not that I have a conclusion here, I’m raising a suspicion here, not some command—or not command, but instruction or information, I don’t know what—that came to us from Mount Sinai, because then I would accept it. If the Holy One, blessed be He, said it, then I accept it regardless of whether I think it is rational or irrational.
[Speaker C] May I ask a question, Rabbi? Yes? Can I ask something? So I understood that the Rabbi didn’t draw a conclusion but is only raising a question, but still I want to take it one step further. So how did it nevertheless get into the Talmud that anyone who denies resurrection of the dead or the messiah has sanctions imposed against him?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The same way it got into Maimonides.
[Speaker C] Maybe—just maybe—it could be that in the past, someone who really denied these principles, maybe that also came together with some additional corruption?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Could be, could be, because once upon a time religiosity and morality really went together, and certainly, certainly this also threatens religiosity, not just morality, because if you don’t believe then your commitment to the halakhic framework also loosens. But—but it could also be a mechanism or social dynamic like the one I described earlier. These beliefs were simply widespread among the public, and in the ancient world they certainly were widespread. It could even be that they came from outside, but that doesn’t matter. There’s some kind of logic underlying these beliefs, and slowly, once everyone believes they’re true, it becomes some binding principle, part of the binding religious tradition. There is such a dynamic; we know it today. Do you know how many things are perceived by people today as obligatory beliefs, such that anyone who even questions them is denying the Torah—and how many such beliefs have no basis whatsoever? They have no foundation, no source, no logic, nothing. I discussed quite a list of these in the second book of the trilogy. Yes—this notion that anyone who died for his Judaism is holy, that kind of nonsense that everyone repeats as if, I don’t know what, it came down from Sinai. Even if it had come down from Sinai I wouldn’t accept it; it’s just complete nonsense. Or I don’t know, that “turn it over and turn it over, for everything is in it”—all kinds of claims like that, that everything is really found within the Torah. Or the “special quality of Israel”—that a Jew is constructed in some different way than any other human being, essentially, inherently—not that we have a different culture or different norms, that’s obvious, those are facts—but that there is something, like what the Kuzari brings, that there is inanimate, vegetative, animate, speaking, and Jew—or prophet, as he calls it. Meaning, another level in the hierarchy, yes, in the biological classification if you like, or in the classification of beings or entities in the world, in the taxonomy of the world. So this is some notion that many people today see as a principle of faith, that anyone who doesn’t accept the special quality of Israel or this mystical view that a Jew is some kind of different sort of person—to the point that the Hatam Sofer said that it’s even dangerous to be treated medically by someone who studied on the bodies of non-Jews, because a Jewish body is built a little differently. Some people see this as a principle of faith because the Kuzari said so, and in the yeshivot of the line that is certainly a principle of faith—but also outside them. And all these things have no basis whatsoever. They have no source, nothing. In my opinion even the logic behind them is wrong; the facts also contradict them. I don’t know—it’s just that the logic contradicts them so strongly, so strongly. And the religious dynamic shows you how these things come in and become binding principles that everyone says in some way as though they were self-evident. And suddenly you say to yourself: wait a second—so maybe those very things I was educated to see as self-evident, Maimonides’ principles of faith, maybe they too entered in this way? Sorry if I sound like some sort of heretic here who’s trying to undermine things, but that’s the truth. I really do suspect this dogmatism that Maimonides established here, because the sources he brings from the verses, as I’ve already said more than once, are far from convincing to me. Therefore—
[Speaker E] But Rabbi, in the end, how important is it really to believe these things at all?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Maimonides regarded them as foundations, as principles—that’s exactly the point.
[Speaker E] He apparently understands that this is the infrastructure of a believing Jew. So again we’re back to the same question: if I don’t believe this, is that a transgression according to Maimonides?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s the whole discussion we had in the first classes. Yes, according to Maimonides it seems that the answer is yes.
[Speaker E] But didn’t we conclude that you can’t prove it? We did, didn’t we, we did.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Maimonides apparently doesn’t agree with that conclusion.
[Speaker E] That you can’t command beliefs and facts, basically.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right—you can’t command, not prove.
[Speaker E] Yes, you can’t command.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes. No, that’s what I talked about in the first classes—I tried to twist things a bit, maybe, maybe it’s possible, maybe we can save Maimonides—but on the face of it, it seems that for Maimonides, what is rational is a basis that one can command people to accept. And if they don’t understand the logic, then let them accept it because I said so, because I’m wise and they’re foolish. Yes, that is Maimonides’ view. It appears very clearly from his words that from his perspective there is truth, and truth obligates, and someone who doesn’t reach it—he does not regard him as coerced, he regards him as a wrongdoer. Meaning, if he didn’t arrive at this truth, then let him accept it from me because I told him that this is the truth. No, but again—if you brought it in the name of the tradition, then I’d be willing to hear that claim. If it came down from Sinai. But if this is an invention such that because it seems true to you I’m supposed to accept it—why should I accept it? Fine, so yes, this somewhat undermines that whole way of looking at things. But the truth has to be said: I think there is a significant suspicion here that these things are really later developments. Their late appearance, their dubious hanging on scriptural verses, and even the very logic underlying them—all of these arouse this suspicion, that this is really something invented at a later stage.
[Speaker E] Rabbi, but isn’t there a difference between facts that happened in the past and future facts? Say, to believe that the Torah was given at Sinai—that’s something transmitted in tradition, something you can say passed from generation to generation. That’s probably a bit more important than a future fact, where you don’t even know whether it has any source at all.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, important or unimportant has nothing to do with past and future. A future thing can be important and a past thing can be unimportant.
[Speaker E] I don’t see why you justify past and future. No, I’m trying to explain why this is important or not important—why specifically when it’s in the past, as if when it’s in the past—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Say the Torah was given from Sinai—maybe that fact is more important. It’s important not because it happened in the past, but because it’s important. Don’t bring the past in here. It’s important because it’s truly the basis of everything, but not because it was in the past. The past isn’t the issue here.
[Speaker E] No, Uriel means stronger, Uriel, you mean that it’s stronger, talking about facts that happened—there’s more—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That I agree with.
[Speaker E] Right, Uriel? I think.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That I agree with, but that’s not a matter of importance, it’s a matter of strength. And again, if I were convinced that the Holy One, blessed be He, says that the messiah will come, then for me that would be very strong. The question is whether He really said it. Now there’s Hillel—Hillel in the Talmud—yes, Rabbi Hillel said: “Israel has no messiah, for they already consumed him in the days of Hezekiah.” I mentioned this Talmudic passage. So he did not accept the coming of the messiah, certainly not in the future. He says they already had him in the days of Hezekiah, that’s it, he’s not coming anymore. Now he also knew what’s written in the Torah, and he also received the traditions, and the Talmud still calls him Rabbi Hillel, right? That’s what Sefer Ha-Ikkarim talks about. Meaning, he did not accept this tradition, apparently because he thought it wasn’t true. So what, if it’s not true? Did it come from Sinai? No, it did not come from Sinai. People accept it because it is true, or because that’s how they interpret the verses, whatever. But he interpreted the verses differently and it didn’t seem true to him, so he didn’t accept it. Meaning, Rabbi Hillel’s statement is, for me, also an indication of the historical claim I’m making. I don’t think these things really came through a tradition from Sinai. Because if it were a tradition from Sinai, then it wouldn’t depend on Rabbi Hillel’s interpretation of this verse or that one. Where did Rabbi Hillel go wrong? There is a tradition—we received it from Sinai, that’s all. What is there to discuss?
[Speaker E] No, but a tradition from Sinai is not unequivocal. A tradition from Sinai generates disputes in every tradition.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay, so de facto in the end it really is not a tradition—not in the binding sense. Because evidently the tradition can also be interpreted in such a way that the messiah will no longer come, and that is still a possible interpretation of the tradition we received. So that means you can’t come and claim that the tradition says the messiah will come, and therefore it’s obviously true. I’m not even talking about formal authority—even on the level of substantive authority. To tell me it’s true because that’s what the tradition said, because that’s what the Holy One, blessed be He, said—no, He didn’t say that. He said something that perhaps some people interpreted this way, and others interpreted differently.
[Speaker E] So what is Rabbi Hillel actually saying? That it’s too late? That he should have come already, or what?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] He was supposed to come in the days of Hezekiah and we missed the opportunity—like the Chabad people say about their Rebbe. Yes, he was supposed to be the messiah, but we didn’t merit it. Only they think he’ll still come back to them, whereas Rabbi Hillel was apparently more clear-eyed and said no—we missed it.
[Speaker E] Meaning it’s not that he didn’t believe in the messiah; he believed in the messiah, he just says we missed the opportunity.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Christians also believe in the messiah.
[Speaker E] Meaning, it could be that he believed—not—but it could be that he believed in the fact that there is a messiah, we just missed it.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, because he believed in it—the messiah as an option, the messiah as something that could have been. But no—that’s exactly the difference from what I said earlier between “in its time” and “I will hasten it.” I said that if they merit it, “I will hasten it”; if they do not merit it, “in its time.” What does that mean? That basically the messiah is supposed to come not necessarily as a response or reward for our good deeds if we merit it, but because that is the plan. Now if that really is the plan, then it ought to be realized in any case. And Rabbi Hillel apparently did not accept that. Meaning, Rabbi Hillel may have viewed the messiah as something that is a response to our deeds, and since we did not merit it, then we blew it and he will not come. He did not accept the “if they do not merit it, then in its time”; for him it was only “if they merit it, I will hasten it,” only that exists. Meaning, for him the messiah is part of the doctrine of reward and punishment; it is not the divine plan according to which in the end things must get there regardless.
[Speaker E] I think the common view says that there really is a plan that in the end he will come, but with our good deeds we can bring the date closer.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, of course—that’s the accepted view, yes. So again, this whole perspective really puts the whole relation to principles in question. It accompanies us all the time, but I’m saying: with the last three it’s much stronger, because I can very well understand the motivation to create these beliefs, these principles. And that very much strengthens the suspicion that this was really formed over the course of history and was not transmitted to us by the Holy One, blessed be He, at Sinai.
[Speaker D] Rabbi, how does the Rabbi explain this anomaly? After all, Maimonides spoke about a person’s development: children, women, simpletons—you give them some prize or something, but when he grows up he’s supposed to do it for its own sake. When we look at the Hebrew Bible, there is no discourse at all there—not of the World to Come and not of resurrection of the dead. There just isn’t. In reality it’s not there; it doesn’t talk about it. And only when we get to the Talmud and to today’s religious world—and especially the Haredi world, but not only there—this becomes the central discourse, that people talk all the time about reward and the World to Come. How does the Rabbi explain that we actually declined instead of rising?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, I didn’t say we declined. Whether the messiah will come, whether there is a World to Come, whether there will be resurrection of the dead—that’s not a decline. If you serve God for the sake of that, that’s a decline.
[Speaker D] So how is it that in the Hebrew Bible they didn’t talk about it at all?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Even if—
[Speaker D] Even if it existed, if there is such a thing, they didn’t—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] You’re pushing on an open door here; that’s what everyone asks.
[Speaker D] It’s strange.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So I’m saying, that’s why I suspect these things are really beliefs that were created at a later stage and are not tradition.
[Speaker D] Rabbi, can we still judge Maimonides favorably here? Those first chapters in the Laws of the Foundations of the Torah really are strange. Is there reason to think Maimonides knew this was the science of his time, and it could be that in another two hundred years, a thousand years, eight hundred years, it would change? And he taught us that I can put this into the Laws of the Foundations of the Torah and it can still change—you have to keep thinking for yourselves. After all, you won’t accept Aristotelian science, and so too with the principles of that same matter. The fact is there aren’t many of the great sages of Israel who were said to disagree to the point of not accepting resurrection of the dead, as they said about Maimonides. And Maimonides emphasized that we know nothing about the World to Come. Precisely he, who inserted it into the principles—maybe he actually wanted to empty them of fixed content?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I don’t know if he wanted to empty them of content, but I am willing to accept this thesis that says those chapters in the Laws of the Foundations of the Torah are not unnecessary even though they are not correct. They are not unnecessary because they still teach us that we can learn things, that there is also Torah in the person and not only Torah in the object. For example, that we can learn things from other sources, from rational considerations, from science, from philosophy, from various fields, and not everything has to come out of the classical religious tradition, from the classical religious literature. In that sense, I think Maimonides’ chapters definitely do teach that. The question is whether Maimonides thought that, or whether that was his goal when he wrote those chapters—I very much doubt it. I tend to think he intended to teach the content itself, not to teach us that future science, even if it won’t be this science, should be treated the same way. He thought this was the truth.
[Speaker E] Rabbi, are the messiah and resurrection of the dead and all those things mentioned in the Jerusalem Talmud as well, or only in the Babylonian Talmud?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I don’t remember right now.
[Speaker E] And in the Mishnah? I’m trying to understand historically what happened there.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I don’t think it appears in the Mishnah.
[Speaker E] Meaning it appears for the first time in the Talmud—in the Babylonian Talmud for sure. From around the third or fourth century—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Something like that.
[Speaker E] Don’t remember—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Whether in the Jerusalem Talmud, but yes, in the Babylonian Talmud it appears.
[Speaker E] Which is around the third or fourth century, something like that. Okay.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Again, the question is whether this was a tradition that was only written down then, or whether it was actually created then. Or created two hundred years earlier and written down then. There are various possibilities here. Interesting. Okay. Well then, Sabbath peace.
[Speaker E] Sabbath peace. Thank you. Sabbath peace.