Halakha and Ethics, Lesson 6

This is an English translation (via GPT-5.4). Read the original Hebrew version.

This transcript was produced automatically using artificial intelligence. There may be inaccuracies in the transcribed content and in speaker identification.

🔗 Link to the original lecture

🔗 Link to the transcript on Sofer.AI

[0:00] The process of the Binding and the identity between Jewish law and morality
[1:32] Trust in intuitions and passing through the Binding
[4:15] The halakhic command and the conflict with morality
[15:43] The example of conversion and the halakhic challenge
[24:46] Postmodernism and the conflict between morality and Jewish law
[25:53] Reducing conflict – a criterion for truth
[28:23] The father’s right and the moral implication
[30:07] Torah sources for moral expectations – “and you shall do what is right and good”
[39:44] Morality as an inner process and not a technocratic one
[42:54] The value of education – a human value and not a moral one
[50:19] Morality and sibling relations – homosexuality
[51:40] Education budget versus hospitals – moral values
[53:51] Emotion versus reason: the central questions
[56:49] Conscience as a tool for moral navigation
[59:38] Sefer HaYashar – why it is called that
[1:02:55] Abraham our forefather and conscience without the verse

Full Transcript

[Speaker A] We brought up matters of Torah and morality. Last time and the time before that we dealt with the Chazon Ish and Rabbi Kook, who at first glance seem to hold, or represent, opposite conceptions regarding Torah and morality. But on second glance it’s actually much closer, because in the end I concluded by saying that there is some kind of process — you could call it educational — like the process that the Holy One, blessed be He, put Abraham our forefather through around the Binding. You begin with one conception, which is not the correct one, but you have to pass through it in order to arrive in the end at the correct conception, and not slide past it, yes, and not miss it, because the correct conception is dangerous or problematic. The correct conception, which Rabbi Kook argues for, says that there is supposed to be some kind of identity between Jewish law and morality, or that according to his view there cannot be a contradiction between Jewish law and morality. But such a conception can lead to religious shallowness, let’s call it that, or a lack of depth in the worship of God, because basically it means that a person will do whatever he wants and will always justify it by saying: after all, what I want is probably what the Holy One, blessed be He, said, because there can’t be any contradiction. So this conception is really courting disaster. And in order to allow a person to hold such a conception, or to trust his basic intuitions, first of all you have to make sure that that trust is really being given to the basic intuitions and not to impulses or external things. And in order to clarify that, a person is supposed to go through a process of Binding, what Abraham our forefather went through according to Rabbi Kook’s interpretation, which means—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If you’re truly prepared to bind your moral, rational, and all your other conceptions before the command of the Holy One, blessed be He, then after you pass through that refining furnace, you can really do what you think. But first they want to see that you are truly willing to bind everything before the command, and that you’re not really preferring yourself over the Holy One, blessed be He. Once that is known, then go after what you think, because what you think really shouldn’t stand in contradiction to the will of the Holy One, blessed be He. That is more or less the move. We saw it both in the Chazon Ish and in Rabbi Kook. Now here I need to make one more comment that touches on the previous part of our discussion, because basically then we reach the conclusion that there should not be a contradiction between the halakhic command and the moral norm or our natural feelings. Where does this fit among the three basic conceptions I sketched about Torah and morality? Apparently not in the complex direction. In other words, this is really a conception of identity. It’s a conception that says that moral intuitions are supposed to fit Jewish law — only, once again, this needs to be refined a bit — we’re talking about the correct intuitions. Not everything I think morality says is in fact what morality says. That needs some clarification. That’s what the process of the Binding is for. But after we’ve gone through that clarification, in the end these human feelings are supposed to fit the command of the Holy One, blessed be He. So here I’m coming back and once again I want to qualify this, although again with Rabbi Kook he probably doesn’t qualify it. But I still want to qualify it, because according to my own view at least this is not a conception of identity but a conception of some kind of duality. But to qualify it also means to qualify the notion of duality, to try to bring them a little closer to one another. I still think that the halakhic command does not necessarily come to achieve a moral goal, and not only that — sometimes it will also contradict what morality would tell us to do. We talked about religious values and moral values that can sometimes be in conflict, and therefore it is not true that the Torah can never expect me to do something that my natural feeling says is forbidden.

[Speaker C] That’s the meaning of the Binding.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, but according to Rabbi Kook the Binding is only a stage on the way. There isn’t really a true Binding. After all, after you go through this educational process, suddenly: “Do not stretch out your hand against the lad.” In other words, a new light is revealed on the matter, and that is exactly what Rabbi Kook argues — that the Binding is only an educational, methodological stage, but there is no real Binding. You don’t actually need to slaughter anything. So in the end he argues that there is supposed to be full compatibility between our natural feelings — moral, rational, and the like — and the divine command or Jewish law. And here I really disagree with him. I think that takes it too far. Yes, there are commands that no matter how much we work on ourselves, are supposed to be hard for us on the moral level, and I think that’s a good thing. In other words, it’s good that they are hard. “We shoot and weep” — we already talked about the “shoot and weep” of Siach Lochamim.

[Speaker C] What bothers me is that this isn’t universal at all, right? It’s sort of moralistic. It’s like when someone goes to the spiritual supervisor and says, “I’m not managing with the learning,” and he says, “Try harder.” What does that even mean? What is this process?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] He says that if you work hard on your intuitions, refine them properly, in the end you’ll discover that they tell you what Jewish law says. And if you’re not there yet, it means you haven’t worked enough. Fine. I’ll say again: that’s what Rabbi Kook says. Personally I’m not inclined to agree with it. I think it’s too idealized. Again, maybe if I were Rabbi Kook I would see this perfect match, and it’s just because I’m not on that level that I don’t know.

[Speaker D] Maybe — or the opposite — just as you refine yourself in the commandments, so too, just as in the end the Holy One, blessed be He, commanded not to bind, the commandment itself was changed in the end. In other words, like commandments becoming nullified in the future to come — even the non-moral commandments will gradually move in the direction of… well, it will fit.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay, that connects a little to the qualification I’m about to mention. I’ll get there in a moment.

[Speaker D] In the sense that in the end there is complete overlap, but…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, but on the other hand, you know, in our halakhic world it doesn’t look like there is such an option. There a heavenly voice or an angel comes from heaven and tells him it’s canceled. No — for us, “it is not in heaven,” even if a heavenly voice comes out.

[Speaker D] Rabbi Kook says we’re still in the process. Reality, including halakhic reality.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, on the principled level, “it is not in heaven” means that in principle such a process cannot happen. What? That Torah won’t… This Torah will not be replaced, meaning it cannot undergo change. It undergoes change from below. I’ll talk about that in a moment.

[Speaker D] It can’t undergo change from above?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no. From above — that’s “it is not in heaven,” that doesn’t exist.

[Speaker D] Well, even with “it is not in heaven” there’s probably some qualification. The Holy One, blessed be He, could come now and decide to give us a new Torah; this one is over. In principle, no.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] In principle, no.

[Speaker D] In principle, if I think that’s what God wants, that’s what I’ll do.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Why? Because that’s what He wants. Of course. In the Oven of Akhnai, the Holy One, blessed be He, said what He wanted and the sages didn’t agree.

[Speaker D] Because apparently He wanted them not to agree with Him. And if He doesn’t want to say something? Fine. I’ll receive prophecy saying that this is what God wants.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] You can’t know. You won’t know that until you’re there. On the theoretical level I’m saying… maybe, maybe if we get there in some different state unfamiliar to us, the whole thing will change. I’m saying that in the Torah, at least as we currently conceive it, that’s hypothetical. It’s not something that is supposed to happen.

[Speaker C] But you need to distinguish between the cosmic level, the end of days, yes, and the everyday level.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right, that’s why I’m talking about the everyday. The end of days, I don’t know. I don’t know what will happen there. I’m talking about now; I’m talking about the historical process, not just right now.

[Speaker C] The nullification of commandments — are we there today?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s why I’m saying I don’t want to talk about that. It’s all speculation. I’m talking about what is demanded of us, what concerns us. Not in the future to come — all sorts of things may happen there.

[Speaker C] Our existentialism.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes. No, I don’t like the label “existentialism,” but yes, in that sense I want to deal with what concerns us.

[Speaker E] Our reality today is “it is not in heaven.”

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Ah, yes, exactly. So now — on the one hand I think Rabbi Kook takes it too far, or makes it too idealized. On the other hand, I very much identify with what he says about the Binding. There’s something here, because many times we have some tendency — maybe I already mentioned this — to think that if Jewish law wants something, then it must be irrational, or unpleasant, or immoral, or not fit ordinary human intuitions. I once brought that Maimonides in Guide for the Perplexed, part 3, where he says those fools who think it is bad to give reasons for the commandments, because then they make the Holy One, blessed be He, human, since then He wants from us things that make sense, things any person could know on his own. He says they make the Holy One, blessed be He, worse than His creatures, because creatures do only things that are rational and have a reason, and the Holy One, blessed be He, just does things with no logic. That’s not reasonable. So in this sense there is a tendency among us to think that not only is there no identity, but there is even supposed to be some built-in opposition. In other words, religion always has to be a bit irrational, a bit immoral, a bit — I don’t know — not in line with our ordinary human intuitions, because otherwise what have we done? Every gentile, every secular person, every atheist also behaves according to his intuitions. So in what sense are we religious? What is the meaning of the religious or halakhic command? Here I think that’s wrong. I definitely say that in this sense, after going through this Binding process — which is healthy as part of religious education, to create that commitment — afterwards you can discover that at least significant parts, and here I’m qualifying Rabbi Kook a bit, significant parts of Jewish law can indeed fit our intuitions. And this can happen in both directions, and here I connect to what you said. It can happen by refining our intuitions, as Rabbi Kook says. Not always what seems right to us at first glance is really the right thing. And I think we saw several examples of that even in the discussions in the last few lectures: claims that converts are asked for standards that ordinary Jews are not asked for. An ordinary Jew who observes commandments — but the convert isn’t accepted unless he is committed to all the commandments. He may sin, but he has to be committed to all the commandments. That sounds like an injustice — why in the world? And it isn’t true. On second thought it simply isn’t true. It’s obvious that someone who wants to be accepted into a family needs to meet certain standards, whereas someone who is already a family member — even if he doesn’t meet them — we don’t throw him out. Every reasonable country in the world, if someone steals there or is a criminal there, doesn’t revoke his citizenship or his civil rights. Nobody throws him out of the country. He goes to prison, he is punished, but he doesn’t lose his belonging. But if someone now wants to enter the country and he’s an arch-criminal with receipts to prove it, who would accept him? No country would accept him, if they knew it. So this is true everywhere, and it’s very logical. Many times we have some initial tendency to think there is a contradiction, that the religious command is somehow immoral. And if we’re willing to bend a bit, or think twice, and not go with our first intuition, then we may discover that it doesn’t have to be that way. Not always. Sometimes second thought tells us that the morality we were using wasn’t the right morality. On second thought we may discover that morality says something else. But there is also the other side of the coin. That same second thought, which also arises from Rabbi Kook’s approach, can sometimes refine Jewish law, not morality. And that’s the change in Jewish law that you spoke about — but not from above, from below, because “it is not in heaven.” When I understand very clearly that something is impossible logically, morally, and so on, then I will — and I think there should indeed be as much compatibility as possible, except in places where I can’t — but if I can interpret the halakhic system, or choose a view, or interpret, or conduct some interpretive process or another that brings Jewish law closer to my intuitions, then I will do that. And then Jewish law may undergo changes — and in fact it does undergo changes. It undergoes changes, and it is definitely shaped differently in different environments; you can’t deny that. So the place where a person stands, or the society in which a person stands, or the rabbi or halakhic decisor or interpreter stands, projects onto the Jewish law that emerges there. Jewish law is not… Rabbi Kook describes a picture that is a bit simplistic. I don’t think he meant it that way, but in his description of the Binding he presents a somewhat simplistic picture. He says: Jewish law is a given, and now you, with your morality, have to refine yourself through bindings until you discover that morality fits that fixed, unambiguous, clear Jewish law which you thought was in contradiction to it. But Jewish law too is not fixed and unambiguous and clear. It too can be interpreted in many ways according to circumstances, according to people, according to moral intuitions, according to many things. And therefore many times it is Jewish law that will undergo change in order to create identity between reason or morality and Jewish law. Here again I say: one must be careful not to return — in my humble opinion — one must be careful not to make a mistake and arrive once again at the identity approach. I qualify it; I stop in the middle. There is a certain limit. There are things that are simply not possible interpretations of Jewish law. It won’t help. In such a place, then no — it doesn’t fit. Apparently there is some religious value here, some other value, that I cannot integrate with my reason or with my morality. And if so, then here one really has to perform a Binding also on the conclusion, not only as an educational process. Therefore I think absolute identity is exaggerated; it’s not correct. But the basic approach — that I first want to try and look for identity, that I don’t reconcile so quickly with the idea that here are two systems that don’t talk to each other and are in contradiction — I think that’s a very healthy approach. Because many times, if you look, you discover either that Jewish law is not what you thought, or that morality is not what you thought. Or that morality is not what you thought, and then suddenly you discover that things are closer than they seemed at first glance — at least in some cases, even in many cases perhaps, maybe not in all of them. I don’t think in all of them you can do this.

[Speaker C] Halitzah nowadays?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Halitzah nowadays—

[Speaker C] It’s a horrifying ceremony.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] A horrifying ceremony, right, right.

[Speaker F] Halitzah — levirate marriage is worse.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Levirate marriage isn’t worse, unless you have some sort of aversion, an aversion to halitzah.

[Speaker F] Come on — it’s spitting, a shoe, what are you talking about, it’s nothing.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Never mind. In my opinion those aren’t the hard problems. That can be managed; I don’t think that’s it. Once there was a rabbis’ conference I took part in, and someone there raised the issue that in the conversion process women are required to immerse in front of the judges. And how can that be? And she proposed solutions, and even wrote an article about it that somehow allows bypassing the matter in one way or another, and there are halakhic approaches that allow it. Then I asked her — the one who was speaking — what is different from a doctor? Exactly. I asked, what is different from a doctor? When a woman goes to a doctor — and there are gynecologists, let’s say if things aren’t okay and she needs treatment, but there are also female gynecologists — and yet many women choose to go to male doctors, and they don’t feel any problem with that at all, because he’s a professional, and it’s clear that he looks at it professionally, and usually there isn’t… Now something was just published at Shaare Zedek, I don’t know, some story I heard this morning, but never mind — usually there isn’t a problem. I don’t know, a doctor who is exposed there to things during childbirth with a woman.

[Speaker G] If a photographer takes pictures there at the Dead Sea of naked people in the name of art, nobody makes a big deal of it. You don’t have to go.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right, here—

[Speaker G] You don’t have to.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] In conversion you have no option. For someone whom it bothers, okay, go to a female doctor, but in conversion there is no option. There are no female rabbinical judges. Yes, she has no option without it. That’s true. But I’m saying still, the difficulty — the intensity of the difficulty that she expressed there — and she, as a woman, said: listen, you as men don’t understand, it’s very, very, very disturbing. I told her: look, true, maybe I don’t understand because I’m a man, but I don’t understand, so explain it to me. How is it that with doctors many women manage? I don’t know if all of them do.

[Speaker C] With doctors it’s part of the training. With rabbis it’s not part of the training?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Absolutely not part of the training. I don’t think — do you really think the rabbis there are standing there because as part of Jewish law they need to see it?

[Speaker C] Doctors learn to detach.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And rabbis also learn to detach, and that’s what they deal with, and they detach as professionals, like any professional. I don’t see any problem with it at all. By the way, the judges are there in a group, whereas with a doctor you go in alone. There are even things here — but I’m saying beyond that, never mind at the moment, maybe someone will find a distinction — but suddenly my wife and I thought together; we were together at that session, and both of us, without speaking, asked the same question. And the feeling was that many of the participants there strongly, strongly identified with what she was saying, and didn’t think twice whether maybe it’s not quite as terrible as it seems. We go much too quickly with our initial moral intuition, and sometimes on second thought we’ll discover that the dissonance isn’t as bad as it seems. Never mind this case specifically — you can argue about it — but I’m saying on the principled level, I’m bringing examples here of situations in which — and the point here, I think, part of it is the Binding. If you really are very committed, and it’s very clear to you that this is the word of God, then this is the word of God, period. Then you will think ten times whether this thing really ought to bother you on the human, moral level and so on, or maybe not. You will also think whether there is a halakhic solution — fine, no problem, I said we should sometimes refine both sides — but both sides. Many times there is a feeling that you always need to refine only one side. And in that sense I think Rabbi Kook really presents here a process that is partial. It is partial both in the sense that he says there must be full identity, and I don’t really believe that is true, and also in the sense that the picture that emerges from him is always that the refining is supposed to be refinement of morality and not refinement of Jewish law. Jewish law is treated as something given, and now you have to cope with that given thing. But Jewish law too is shaped by us. Jewish law too is something that, if it really bothers someone, then he will look for a solution, and it may be that he will find a solution.

[Speaker E] Or that both are given. In thought more connected to halakhic matters, he goes very much in that direction.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s why I said I don’t think this is Rabbi Kook’s position. I’m saying that the reading — his interpretation of the Binding, through the lenses with which I read it — presents a partial picture. Rabbi Kook is definitely not suspect of that. I think he was very concerned with the other side too. Very. We even saw such things when we studied his book To the Perplexed of the Generation.

[Speaker D] But still, in Rabbi Kook it seems that both things are given — both morality and Jewish law. It’s not that you… you don’t refine either one of them, you just need to look better.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, okay, no—

[Speaker D] Jewish law too is a given. We also agree that this may be God’s will in the Torah…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I don’t mind. I’m willing to accept that formulation regarding Jewish law too. But in the end, what I perceive as Jewish law is something that can change. It may be that I move closer to or farther from that Jewish law that is there. Right. Morality too. Fine, I agree; on both sides I’m willing to accept that interpretation of the notion of refinement as well. The question is whether there is something true and I merely move closer to it or farther from it, or whether the thing is what I create — that itself is the thing.

[Speaker D] So really the question that keeps coming back is: how can I find what is right in both of them? How do I discover it? What is my tool for discovering it?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Simply think halakhically. Just think, the way you do any halakhic thinking, any halakhic interpretation — here too. And when you think halakhically…

[Speaker D] Maybe there’s some difference that in the end boils down to this: in morality I somehow have to see it.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, and here, for example, I think in these two examples that I gave here — again, even if some of you don’t agree with them — you can still see that one can undergo change in our moral perception. In other words, not everything that seems immoral at first glance is also immoral at second glance. Fine? Like the example I gave with Meiri, for instance, about the attitude toward gentiles. Maimonides writes things there as though gentiles are like animals and all sorts of things like that, and everyone today is appalled by it. Fine. But really, on second thought, since I’m unwilling to accept such an attitude of Jewish law toward gentiles, I thought about it again and then suddenly I say: wait, maybe in fact the gentiles back then were not what we today know as gentiles? Then the sages are okay; they related to what they saw. You’re being anachronistic when you judge them by the picture you know today. So that too is a kind of interpretation that comes only out of commitment, because those who are not committed immediately condemn it. They immediately say it’s just immoral nonsense. And I’m saying — now even if one doesn’t accept this, at least it can give examples of what may happen. You can argue whether I’m right or wrong, but second thought in the sense that if I’m committed to both sides and conflicts arise, then I will have some aspiration to reduce the conflict. And that reduction can be done on both sides. And in that sense I do think Rabbi Kook describes a very important process, even if partial.

[Speaker H] There’s no real indication here; in the end it’s just what you want. Because you’ll refine it… I agree, I accept the approach, I just have the feeling that if I keep refining it however I want, in the end…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If you mean that it’s dangerous because that can happen, I agree. If you suspect that that is always what happens because there is nothing else, that I do not agree with. Right, it’s dangerous, it’s dangerous — what can you do? Life is not a bubble.

[Speaker H] Even within Jewish law itself, from one stringency to another stringency, every time I find myself convincing myself that it’s fine, it’s not terrible.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Then check yourself again. But what can you do? You have nothing beyond what you…

[Speaker H] Where is the problem? It’s always going back and repenting…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] You have no criterion outside yourself. None. It won’t help. You have to make the decisions. The Torah was not given to ministering angels. You do the maximum you can to try to cleanse yourself, to look at it as balanced as possible. That’s it. Of course there can always be some suspicion that you’re not balanced. By the way, the conservative can be just as unbalanced, and indeed that often happens. Many times it’s convenient to be conservative: don’t change anything, don’t touch anything, and he’s sure that this is what came down to Moses at Sinai, and it’s very convenient for him, because it lets you be committed without all the pangs of conscience of the one who knows that the connection between our Torah today and what Moses our teacher knew is pretty tenuous. You understand? Then you have to deal with the problem of how to remain committed to such a thing, whereas he, in that sense, chooses an easy life. He says: what are you talking about? What arrived… Moses our teacher studied Mishnah Berurah in chavruta with the Holy One, blessed be He — obviously, everyone knows that. Right? So as not to put yourself into… In other words, it’s not only liberals who follow the inclination of their hearts; being conservative is often convenient too. Therefore there is no escape. And I say, this is true for both sides. It is dangerous, but there is a difference between being aware of the danger and trying to minimize it as much as possible, and being a despairing postmodernist and saying: look, this isn’t a danger — this is just how it is. In other words, every refinement of yours is by definition you inserting yourself into the matter. There is nothing to discover here; you don’t discover anything, you create. That is the postmodern despair that I do not accept. You understand? Pointing out the danger is correct; one needs to do this carefully.

[Speaker I] I didn’t understand. What does the postmodernist say?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] He says that in any case, everything you do is only you. You can’t really discover the true intention of the text. Exactly — you’re inserting what you want into it. So it’s not a suspicion that maybe you’re inserting yourself. You said maybe you’re inserting yourself — that’s a question mark, fair enough. But the postmodernist turns it into an exclamation point. He says: you are inserting yourself, period. And it’s only you there; there is nothing else besides that. That, I think, is a step I don’t agree with, one step too far. So that’s my qualification somewhat regarding Rabbi Kook’s words. I think that in the end, the picture that at least I believe in is the complex picture: there are religious values and there are moral values, and there are things that cannot be reconciled. On the other hand, this approach that says that by definition they are not reconcilable and always have to oppose one another — I think that is really not correct. Very many things can in fact be reconciled, and if possible, it is preferable to do so. An interpretation in which the conflict is smaller is preferable to an interpretation in which the conflict is greater, even though in principle I do not deny the existence of conflict. And then one might say: so what? Then it’s just what you want; that isn’t really a true criterion.

[Speaker H] Maybe that really is an indication? What? That the more you succeed in reducing the gap, the smaller the dispute, then apparently that is the truer thing.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Or not. Or maybe I’ve succeeded in inserting myself enough here and there so that they both become me, and then of course they’ll be close, because I turned Jewish law into me and I turned morality into me, and then of course they’re close by definition.

[Speaker D] Precisely because it’s more convenient for you that everything works out.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, yes, because it’s more convenient. Sure. Therefore there are no — I don’t know the criteria for when you are clean and when you’re not. But on the other hand, this feeling that those who make changes are always the people who insert themselves into Jewish law, whereas those who preserve it in its plain, literal form are not inserting themselves — I don’t think that’s true. Here too and there too, you can certainly find yourself taking a position not because that is the truth, but because that is what you want the truth to be.

[Speaker D] Rabbi, there’s another layer here. What the rabbi mentioned about returning a lost object — that it’s not changing Jewish law or trying to understand it, but rather this is Jewish law, this is what the Torah says, yet Jewish law now establishes moral criteria, basically.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right. In other words, there is definitely room to say that Jewish law is one layer—

[Speaker D] And on—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] and on top of Jewish law there is another layer, which is a moral layer. Inside Jewish law? Sometimes it will enter into Jewish law and sometimes not. Fine. But still, even if something is due to me according to… “A father may marry off his daughter to a man afflicted with boils,” it says in the Talmud. That is the father’s right. So what does that mean — that now it is proper to do so? Halakhically he can. Is it proper? Certainly not. Certainly it’s an injustice beyond compare.

[Speaker D] So basically the ability itself is the injustice, seemingly.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Fine. The ability I don’t know how to erase; he has that ability. But on the other hand it is clear that on the moral level I can demand that he not make use of that ability, even though the ability is halakhic. And in that sense I’m talking about returning a lost object. There are situations in which this conflict exists on the theoretical level, but practically I can erase it because I will act — I will simply be stricter in the moral direction in a way that doesn’t contradict Jewish law; it just goes beyond my halakhic rights.

[Speaker D] Even though you erased something from Jewish law?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I didn’t erase it. I waived a right I have. There’s no problem with that. You don’t have to marry off your daughter—

[Speaker D] to a man afflicted with boils. There is such a right. If now the sages determine, okay, but now nobody by halakhic definition can…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, again, I didn’t say it always works. I said there are situations where, when I look at it in the two-story model, I haven’t solved the conflict, but on the practical level I’m not obligated to behave immorally. I can waive rights I have, and there’s no problem with that. It is permitted to waive rights. There is no obligation to marry off one’s daughter to a man afflicted with boils; there is a right to do so. That right itself is a moral problem. But on the other hand one can certainly choose not to use it. And in that sense this too is a kind of solution — a practical solution, not an interpretive, essential one. Okay. So basically, if I really remain with such a complex picture, that means I still cannot give up this duality that I spoke about a few lectures ago, between religious values and moral values. There are still two kinds of values, and therefore not every conflict can be resolved. But I said that I think that from a halakhic or Torah perspective — I don’t know what to call it — an accepted one, I think it is more reasonable to see these two systems as systems whose source is the will of God. In other words, morality is not an atheistic category, as Leibowitz says, while Jewish law is the will of God and I am both a gentile and a Jew, fine; rather, no, I am a Jew, and as a Jew the Holy One, blessed be He, demands two kinds… kinds of demands from me. There are religious demands — that is Jewish law — and there are moral demands. And both demands are demands of the Holy One, blessed be He. Now this has two fairly explicit sources. One of them is “and you shall do what is right and good,” or to cleave to the attributes of the Holy One, blessed be He, and so on. Here there are verses from which the sages derive that the Holy One, blessed be He, has moral expectations of us. In other words, not to leave morality outside the system. Maybe outside Jewish law, but not outside Torah. Fine? And in that sense, maybe we once spoke about the paradox of the scoundrel in Nachmanides on “You shall be holy.” The Torah says, “You shall be holy.” Nachmanides says: do not be a scoundrel with the permission of the Torah. Right? And I already noted there that Nachmanides does not place “You shall be holy” into the system of commandments. If you look at his additions to Maimonides’ Book of Commandments, you won’t find there the commandment “You shall be holy.” I don’t know anyone who counts that commandment. Each for his own reasons. Not everyone interprets it like Nachmanides. Maimonides, for example, says “You shall be holy” means: fulfill the commandments. So he doesn’t count it because it is a general commandment, which is his fourth root. But Nachmanides argues that it means to act beyond the letter of the law. So why doesn’t he count it? Because if he counted it, then it would be the letter of the law. Right? In other words, that’s built in — it can’t be otherwise. That is the paradox of the scoundrel. “The scoundrel says in his heart, there is no God.” So the scoundrel is the one who acts beyond the letter of the law — that’s what Nachmanides says there. So if there is a commandment of “You shall be holy,” meaning to act beyond the letter of the law, then the meaning of acting beyond the letter of the law becomes the letter of the law, because there is such a commandment. You have to do it. So in what sense is it beyond the letter of the law? In other words, to insert it into the system of commandments is actually to saw off the branch on which this — I won’t call it a commandment, but rather this Torah expectation — sits. It is not a commandment. This expectation. Because if it becomes a commandment, then it becomes something that is the letter of the law, whereas the Torah specifically expects us to do it in a way that is beyond the letter of the law. Why is that important? Because here we really see one of the indications that the Torah itself is the source not only of Jewish law but also of the extra-halakhic moral expectations. In other words, both come from the Torah. True, it is extra-halakhic, and true that sometimes it will contradict Jewish law, but it is not extra-Torah. Because if it were extra-Torah, or not God’s will at all, then as I said, it somehow borders in a certain sense on dualism, on belief in two authorities. Therefore, it seems to me that here one must see both of these as stemming from the will of God. And the same with “and you shall do what is right and good.” Again, at least I don’t remember anyone counting that in the enumeration of the commandments. “And you shall do what is right and good” — to act beyond the letter of the law — and again for the same reason. The Torah expects us to behave like human beings. But you cannot insert that into Jewish law, because if it were inserted into Jewish law, then you would not be behaving like a human being; you would be behaving as Jewish law commands. But the Torah specifically wants to leave this outside the halakhic framework, because it tells us: yes, the conclusion of the Binding according to Rabbi Kook — you are supposed to do what morality says, and I expect you to do it even though I am not telling you what it is. Right? We should ask ourselves: the Torah says, “and you shall do what is right and good.” So I ask myself, what is right and good? Where is it written?

[Speaker C] There’s a problem here. No, basically every person can imagine whatever he wants that God wants.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Fine, okay. I’ll get to relativism in a moment. But I’m saying: so what is right and good? The Torah doesn’t define it. That creates problems too, but beyond that — even beyond that, let’s say we all think the same thing about what is right and good. But the Torah doesn’t bother to define what is right and good. So what is it expecting us to do? It expects us to do what we think is right and good. In other words, our personal compass receives authorization here from the Torah, because it does not define what is right and good. So yes, that means there really is trust — the Torah has trust in what we perceive as right and good. What Rabbi Kook says is the conclusion of the Binding. Right? Because otherwise the Torah would have had to define it. I also once talked about cleaving to the attributes of the Holy One, blessed be He: “The Lord, the Lord, compassionate and gracious, slow to anger…” So we have to cleave to His attributes. But for some reason, “a jealous God” is not something we are supposed to cleave to. That too is one of His attributes. What, we aren’t supposed to cleave to it?

[Speaker E] Maimonides at the beginning says jealous—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And avenging — no, we aren’t supposed to cleave to that. “Just as He is compassionate, so you be compassionate; just as He is gracious, so you be gracious,” and it more or less stops there.

[Speaker E] What about Maimonides who counts some attribute here, where he writes that from here a ruler should learn his traits, and among other things he should also learn to punish, from what is learned from the ruler?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] has control, so it could be something else. But an ordinary individual isn’t supposed to learn those attributes of the Holy One, blessed be He. Okay, a ruler has to act that way. Which means that even when the Torah lists the attributes of the Holy One, blessed be He, and tells us to cleave to them, we still decide by our own reasoning which of them do apply to us and which do not. “And you shall do what is right and good” — the Torah doesn’t even say what that is; it relies on what is in our hearts. But even where it does say, if our heart says, or our conscience says, “not this,” then no. Meaning, I think there are a few indications here that the ordinary human moral system — what Rabbi Kook says — the Torah expects that from us as well. There’s no indication here that it’s identical with what Jewish law says; on the contrary. In both of these places the commentators say this is called going beyond the letter of the law. Both “and you shall do what is right and good” and “you shall be holy” — not that this is the strict law. And according to Rabbi Kook, really it should have been the law; law and morality should have coincided. No — it’s beyond the letter of the law, but the Torah still expects that from us too.

[Speaker J] But it does say it — it brings it into the Torah?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Into the Torah, not into Jewish law. It doesn’t enter the count of the commandments. It can’t be a command, because if it were a command, it wouldn’t be beyond the letter of the law. But yes, certainly it is the will of God. The Holy One, blessed be He, expresses His will in the Torah; we have no other connection to Him. Of course we have another connection to Him — we think morally that this is what He wants, even without the Torah. Who told you that that’s what your morality thinks?

[Speaker D] No, okay. No, but here I’m saying — you said we have no other connection with what His will is?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Here I’m saying: someone will tell you, where’s the real legitimacy for your thinking that this is what the Holy One, blessed be He, wants? From “and you shall do what is right and good.” No, from “and you shall do what is right and good.” That verse tells you that what you think is what the Holy One, blessed be He, wants. Do you need a verse at all?

[Speaker D] Even without that you’d do it.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Maybe yes and maybe no.

[Speaker D] This mechanism — really the question is why we need these two mechanisms. Meaning, the Holy One, blessed be He, commands us in the Torah, and that ought to be enough as to what we need to do.

[Speaker K] Morality changes from place to place, from period to period.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Not when it changes. I think there’s some point in its not being under command.

[Speaker D] Right, so the question is why, basically?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Because there is something—

[Speaker D] Why have two mechanisms that are doing the same job, basically?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] They’re not doing the same job.

[Speaker D] They’re not, because the Holy One, blessed be He, built them in such a way that morality points to certain things, and sometimes they’ll even conflict and you’ll have to decide.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If it were all Jewish law, that still wouldn’t solve the conflicts.

[Speaker D] No, but it would make the—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It would make it one system, it would leave—

[Speaker D] it in a formal framework.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, but it’s not one system, because in the end they have different goals, different methodology; these are different systems.

[Speaker D] Fine, let it be different, but still let it be counted as a command. Meaning, let the Torah count it as a command; you’d be obligated to it in that way. I brought this once, I think — Rabbi Chaim Vital and Rabbi Kook — Rabbi Chaim Vital’s question, where he—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] asks why the Torah did not command us to improve our character traits. And then Rabbi Kook says about this in his letters that if the Torah had commanded the improvement of character traits, then basically you would do character improvement as one who is commanded and acts. And in improving character traits, it is preferable to be one who is not commanded and acts. He says: usually the Sages tell us that one who is commanded and acts is preferable, but intuition says that one who is not commanded and acts is preferable. So what does he say? Regarding commandments in which one who is commanded and acts really is preferable, the Torah commanded them. But there are things in which the simple intuition remains that one who is not commanded and acts is preferable, and there the Torah did not want to ruin it. It wanted to leave me as someone who does these things as one who is not commanded and acts, because otherwise it would destroy it. The example I always bring in this context is the guy in the marriage-matchmaking scene who met all the girls and none of them seemed right to him, so the spiritual supervisor says to him: work on your character traits for a year — you’re terribly arrogant. What, no one is good enough for you? Who do you think you are? Work on your character traits, and in a year come back. He worked for a year enthusiastically, studied ethics with enthusiasm, and after a year he starts meeting girls again, and again he rejects all of them. The supervisor says to him: what did you do? So he says: look, a year ago I was proud and no one suited me; now that I’m humble too, all the more so no one suits me — it’s even less clear. Now, that kind of person is exactly someone who works on his traits because there’s a clause saying you have to work on your traits. And that’s what someone looks like who behaves morally because there’s a clause in the Shulchan Arukh saying you have to be moral. That’s what it looks like.

[Speaker D] Meaning, he just didn’t manage to act according to the clause? He just didn’t manage to act according to the clause.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Why? He’s right. What’s the problem?

[Speaker D] No, he only thinks he worked on the trait; he didn’t really work on it.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Why not? He did work on it — he recognizes his own value. He worked on the trait of humility completely. So I’m saying there’s something about morality that cannot be technocratic.

[Speaker D] Which is a practical problem.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It’s a practical problem, yes — practical, but essential practicality. Meaning, there is something about morality such that if it is done in a technocratic way, the way Jewish law is carried out, then you do not become a moral person. To become a moral person it has to come from here; it can’t come from command. It has to come from your inner feeling, because then you become a better human being. Commands do not make you a better person; commands make you a person who behaves correctly, if you respond to the command. But when you want to transform the personality, then it has to come from you, from below. And therefore the Torah intentionally leaves some domain that is expectations, not commandments, not commands. And this — afterward — this isn’t some simple innovation.

[Speaker C] I once heard — I don’t know if it’s true — that the one who brought ethics back into Judaism was Rabbi Samson Raphael Hirsch, right? That for many generations people managed without it: keep the Torah and that’s it. And he came with some external thing from the Gentiles, right? No, I don’t think so.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It seems to me that’s too extreme. I agree that he emphasizes the point, yes — it is very emphasized by him — but that’s extreme. It’s extreme, but it says something. It’s more a question of what consciousness you live in. In that sense I think there was a change with Rabbi Samson Raphael Hirsch.

[Speaker C] There are many observant people whom today I—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] who live in that kind of consciousness—

[Speaker C] in which it’s enough just to fulfill the Shulchan Arukh.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right, although you know, many of those people do in the end behave in a—

[Speaker C] moral way.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, and when they give themselves an account of why they do it, they’ll always find a clause in the Shulchan Arukh, because they can’t live with the fact that they are doing something not out of a halakhic clause.

[Speaker J] But—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] many times it’s simply to get the theology in order. Meaning, they can’t make theological sense of it, so these are a kind of excuses. But not all of them are really there. It’s a question of what your religious consciousness is. Is your religious consciousness that everything has to be in the Shulchan Arukh — we are Jews of the Shulchan Arukh — even though the truth is that you really are not; many of them at least don’t actually act that way. Many of them do things because they are good people and they want to behave properly, and they do it for the same reasons any Gentile does it, except that they cannot tolerate that on the theological level, so they explain to themselves: no, no, it’s all some little clause in the Mishnah Berurah, this one or that one. But that’s not always morality — “and you shall do what is right and good.”

[Speaker D] What? “And you shall do what is right and good.”

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, “and you shall do what is right and good” — that really is not a commandment.

[Speaker C] But—

[Speaker D] It’s written in the Torah.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Correct.

[Speaker C] I’m asking a question here: on the principled level, do they claim that they only do the Shulchan Arukh?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Why — there are those who claim that, yes. There are.

[Speaker L] But you don’t have here a side that doesn’t observe the fifth part of the Shulchan Arukh among us. Maybe that’s also its binding force.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, as I said, this is much more a matter of consciousness than a matter of truth. A person will, all in all, often do things according to what seems to him right and decent to do. But his consciousness is that he is a man of the Shulchan Arukh, a Jew of the Shulchan Arukh. Meaning, if you ask him why he does it, he immediately gets tense and starts looking for some clause. Meaning, he won’t be willing to live with the fact that… because it’s terribly logical. Someone asked me some time ago whether there is a Torah value in general education. So I told him that in my opinion there certainly is, and I intentionally insist on not bringing him sources for it. I don’t bring him sources for it because if it’s a human value, then it’s also a Jewish value. Meaning, since on the human level it is clear to me that it is important, it enters for me into the same category as morality, or like— it’s not a moral value, education is not that, but it is a human value. And in that sense, yes, nothing human is foreign to me — as Cicero said. So if there is a value that is a human value, then as far as I’m concerned the Holy One, blessed be He, expects me to be a person of values. Therefore I insist on not bringing sources, even though maybe you can bring sources here and there — but then of course you ask where those sources got it from. What difference does it make? If I bring a book printed in Rashi script that says it, then it’s okay? Where did it get it from? From the same place I got it from. There’s a story they tell — not a joke, the Ketav Sofer, I think, writes this somewhere. The Magen Avraham writes somewhere about the order of precedence for Kaddishes. I don’t remember exactly what the question was. They came with a question to the Chatam Sofer, and he said: do whatever you want. What — about the order of precedence for Kaddishes? Who goes before whom? They said, but the Magen Avraham says this one has precedence. He said to them: and where did the Magen Avraham get that from? He did what he wanted, so you do what you want too. Meaning, there are things that are written in Rashi script in the halakhic decisors, wrapped in golden letters like a holy book, but they are taken from the same place every Gentile takes them from — plain common sense. So why do I need now to quote those sources? What does it add? Right now I know on my own that it’s true. Did the Chatam Sofer write it?

[Speaker D] Huh? Did the Chatam Sofer write it?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Someone once showed me that yes; I’m almost sure I even saw it written in the Chatam Sofer.

[Speaker D] Before “the new is forbidden by the Torah”?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Huh? Before “the new…” No — the Chatam Sofer, leave those myths aside that “the new is forbidden by the Torah”; the Chatam Sofer was a very interesting Jew. Much more complex than people present him as. Peace and blessings. I’m simply shocked by the responsum—

[Speaker C] that we learned with the Rabbi a few years ago about that child they wanted to bring into the hospital? To save him, but because of the— bringing him—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] into the hospital with the terminal illnesses. Okay. Good, so this is another note that touches on the boundary between religious values and moral values. How would we define moral values? What defines a value as moral as opposed to a religious value? Of course, first of all, if Jewish law commands it, then it’s a religious value. Meaning, there’s a kind of definition by source, where there is a halakhic source.

[Speaker D] And even when Jewish law commands it, it can still be both. What? Can’t it still be both?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It can be. It becomes a religious value because Jewish law commanded it; obviously it can also coincide with a moral value. Meaning, when the Torah forbids murder, that of course does not remove the moral content of the prohibition of murder, but it adds another religious layer to it. Okay? So there is also a moral value here, and together with that there is also a religious command. But I think that in the categorical definition, in how to relate to this, usually we are used to thinking that moral values are values between one person and another — repairing society and the like. It seems to me that it’s not entirely simple. It seems to me that once at a third Sabbath meal I spoke about this here. It’s not entirely simple. For example, “You shall not do as the practices of the land of Egypt,” all kinds of things that the Torah relates to as ugly acts, base in a human sense — these are acts that do not harm anyone. Take homosexuality, for example. Okay? So homosexuality — it’s clear that there are references in various sources, not that it has to be this way, but there are references in various sources to it as something disgraceful, morally disgraceful. Fine, but what’s the problem? Both sides agree, everything is fine, no one is harmed. I’m not talking about rape; I’m talking about consensual relations. So in consensual relations no one is harmed. What’s the problem? Or adultery, incest — let’s talk today: someone has sexual relations with his sister. Here even if you ask the greatest liberals, or at least a large portion of the greatest liberals, they still haven’t crossed that barrier. Meaning, this still strikes them as disgraceful. If you ask why, you won’t get an answer. There is no why. What’s the problem if both want it, both agree? Some time ago it was published in Germany, I think, that someone was actually living with his sister, even married her somewhere — I don’t know if formally, I don’t know exactly; there was some story like that. And everyone was horrified. What are you horrified about? What’s the problem? If they both agree, they’re adults — what’s the problem? What’s wrong with it? And yet there is some feeling among many people at least — it’s hard to explain — but many people feel that there is still something disgraceful here. Now, that disgraceful thing is not religiously disgraceful. I’m talking about people who relate to it on the moral level, not the religious one. So that means there may be values that we would call moral values, or human values, or I don’t know what you’d call them, that do not necessarily concern harming another person. Sometimes there is something that is low behavior in a human sense, inhuman behavior — I don’t know exactly what — and yet it is perceived as part of morality, or I don’t even know exactly. Morality is not the precise term here. So yes, if you’re very rationalistic you’ll say these are just conventions, there’s nothing to them. But the fact is that many people are willing — they see such a thing as…

[Speaker D] It’s evolutionary programming so there won’t be defects.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s not important. That can explain all morality. It can explain all morality; it won’t distinguish between this and morality. So if you go with that, you can erase all morality from the map. But—

[Speaker E] From the start it doesn’t sound to me like something moral; people recoil from it, but it’s not a moral value.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Or else give up the assumption that morality is always something that is supposed to harm or not harm another person — meaning, a prohibition on harming another person. Maybe morality has something—I don’t know exactly. Maybe “morality” isn’t such a successful term; maybe “human values” is better, not “moral values.” Meaning, some particular human level. Like what I spoke about earlier — education. Education is not a moral value. If you are uneducated, you are not less moral. You’re uneducated, you don’t feel like studying — what’s the problem? But many people see education as a value. So what is that? It’s not a religious value, but it’s also not a moral value. Meaning, there are human values that are not religious but also not moral — or not values of harming another person, however you want to call it. These are already just names; I don’t care what you call it, morality, human, whatever. But there are things here where the distinction between what is moral and what is not moral is not sharp. Meaning, it’s not— people usually think it’s simply harm to another person, but that’s not true. Many times, when I speak with people for example about all these arguments about homosexuality, I immediately ask them about their sister. Meaning, about living with your sister. What do you say about that? Meaning, I don’t know — I too, after all, live in our generation, and I too have gone through some process in relation to homosexuality, and today I too don’t tend to see it as a moral problem. It’s a prohibition. But just as an exercise, it’s an interesting exercise — when you ask a person that question, many times you are met with an open mouth. I’m telling you from experience. This has happened to me several times. What do you say about that? What’s the problem? Two adults. And then he starts inventing excuses — don’t ask what excuses I hear there. Excuses like: look, maybe she was his little sister, and then there’s a power imbalance because she can’t resist. Not a little girl — grown up, an adult woman, both on the same footing. An ordinary woman can also be young and you can also have a power imbalance with her, so maybe don’t marry an ordinary woman either. What kind of argument is that? But the very fact that people get to all kinds of funny arguments of that sort shows that they are looking for explanations in terms of harming another person, because they are unwilling to accept that there are values that are not moral values. And I think in that sense, at least, it has explanatory value — I mean intellectually, it’s interesting to notice this. But it also has explanatory value in showing a person: look, you too have values that are not moral values; they’re other kinds of values. And for example, if I now ask him — not a moral value—

[Speaker D] moral value; you just need to change your conception of morality.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Fine, words. Bottom line, it doesn’t harm anyone.

[Speaker D] Something that is not right, morally it is not right.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Fine, but it doesn’t harm anyone.

[Speaker D] It doesn’t harm, okay. So still, don’t remove it from morality. Don’t give it another category.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Call it morality too if you want. I said I can also call all religious values moral. What difference does it make? But it is still something different. If you are willing to accept the existence of such a thing, then you cannot dismiss out of hand the existence of other values that you don’t recognize, or don’t agree with. That’s legitimate, but you can’t say: what do you mean? This has nothing to do with morality, so what do you want? When you take budgets for higher education, it comes at the expense of hospitals. Hospitals have obvious moral value, right? How do you take things — I’m not talking about training doctors, okay? The kind of higher education that trains doctors is also needed for hospitals. But just plain higher education, say in who-knows-what, in the studies of medieval India in the 12th century. Why are you taking budgets, when there’s a shortage, people are in poverty, they have nothing to eat, hospitals, the health basket — my eyes could fill with tears if I started listing all the places where money is genuinely lacking. And we take money and give it to higher education, to culture, to sports, to all kinds of things like that. Why? Is higher education a moral value? No, it’s not a moral value. But it is a value — a human value, another value. I’m in favor of it; I’m only saying that it’s interesting to think about it through these lenses. Even people who are not halakhic or religious or anything like that — it’s worth drawing their attention sometimes, and maybe also our own attention, to the fact that in our world there are non-moral values, not only in the religious sphere.

[Speaker M] Like that story about the person who had one shekel, and with half he bought bread and with half a flower.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So that he would have something to live for, right? Yes — finding meaning in life is a kind of value, right? Even though no one is harmed if you don’t have meaning in life. Maybe you yourself are, but maybe not someone else. So therefore this boundary between moral values and non-moral values is blurry on the one hand, and on the other hand it seems to me that many people — I don’t know if everyone, but many — would agree that there are values in the world beyond morality. And in that sense I think it makes things easier even on the explanatory level. But I’m not talking only outwardly; I’m also talking inwardly. Because even religious people find it hard to accept this conception that I’m trying to defend here — of religious values and moral values. And therefore if there is a conflict, okay, there is a conflict. There are also conflicts between higher education and hospitals, and still people have to live with both sides. Therefore it doesn’t seem to me that there’s anything too novel or too far-reaching here. Okay, now one more point: the question of emotion and intellect. That of course is called for by all these discussions. I think we spoke about this at some point, right? Maybe at the beginning of the year, I think we touched on it a bit. Many times there is some connection made between morality and emotion. I brought then — I’m sure I brought the example, if not now then certainly in previous years — of a priest’s wife who was raped, and they were required to separate. And I heard more than once the claim: don’t those rabbis have a heart? Meaning, how can they issue such a ruling to that poor couple? And people’s feeling is that morality is basically an emotional matter. Meaning, morality is supposed to be somehow connected to feeling, or to the heart, in the usual metaphors. And part of what leads to this feeling is the fact that it’s genuinely hard to justify why a certain thing is moral or not moral, and that there are disagreements sometimes between people about what morality says, or what is more moral and what less moral, and things like that that are not sharp and not clearly agreed on and are not obvious; you can’t bring arguments for them. So there is a tendency among people to assign these things to emotion, or to something subjective. But in a certain sense that empties moral obligation of content, I think, because a moral emotion is a kind of fact. It certainly exists, but it is a fact. The fact that I have a moral feeling is certainly a fact. The question is: why should I behave according to that moral feeling? I also have a feeling that I want to speak gossip, so does that mean I should speak gossip? The mere existence of a feeling cannot in itself constitute a justification or basis for validity — for why I really ought to do it. And indeed, in connection with what we said earlier about “and you shall do what is right and good,” the verse tells us to do what is right and good but does not say what is right and good. So I said it is probably relying on our general conscientious sense, our inner sense of what is called right and good. But there is a very important point here, because what you asked earlier — if this really exists in our conscience, then we would do it even without the verse “and you shall do what is right and good,” so why do we need the verse? We need the verse because the fact that I have this in my conscience does not mean that this is what one should do. By the same token, I have an impulse to speak gossip, and I’m not supposed to speak gossip. But even if there were no prohibition — say, there is a prohibition on gossip — but why assume that I should? Maybe I shouldn’t, and maybe it’s not even forbidden; it’s just some feeling, so what? Everyone with his own feelings — what does that have to do with anything? Feeling cannot be the basis for anything. You can use conscience — one second — you can use conscience as a compass. In the sense that when the Torah already tells you that there is such a thing as right and good, and that you are expected to do what is right and good, and now you ask yourself, okay, what is right and good? You want to mark out, or know how to sort, to define what is right and good and what is not right and good — here you can use conscience. So conscience is not the basis for why you should do it. The basis for why you should do it is “and you shall do what is right and good.” Maybe. It could be not that, but it doesn’t matter — let’s say for the sake of discussion, “and you shall do what is right and good.” “And you shall do what is right and good” does not define what right and good are, and in order to understand what right and good are, look inward: conscience will give you a compass for where the right and good are and where they are not. But the fact that such a conscience exists is not enough to tell me that this is what should be done. For that you need a verse: “and you shall do what is right and good.” There is — and maybe this contradicts it, I’m not sure — Rashi’s first comment on the Torah. He asks there why the Torah began with Genesis and not with “This month shall be for you the first of the months.” There’s an interesting assumption there: that the Torah ought to contain only commandments, and anything that is not a commandment needs an explanation for why it is there — why the Torah writes it at all. That’s his assumption. And then he says: “He declared to His people the power of His works, to give them the inheritance of the nations,” that the Holy One, blessed be He, created the world and gave the land to whomsoever was upright in His eyes, something like that; there’s some statement there like that. And the question is, of course: okay, you explained the first two chapters of Genesis for me, but how do you get me all the way to the portion of Bo? “This month shall be for you the first of the months” is in Bo, in the book of Exodus. There’s another book and a bit missing. You explained why it was necessary to write that the Holy One, blessed be He, created the world — because then you know He can give the land to whomever He wants — but what about the rest of Genesis and the beginning of Exodus? The question was why they didn’t begin with “This month shall be for you the first of the months.”

[Speaker D] To show to whom He wanted to give it at all.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What do you mean?

[Speaker D] To show the patriarchs and that—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I think Rashi himself actually says this. Rashi himself writes that He created the land and gave it to whomever was upright in His eyes. And one has to define what “upright in His eyes” means, because the claim is that— usually people understand this, again, and it connects to our discussion here. How do they understand it? The Holy One, blessed be He, created the world, so He felt like giving it to the people of Israel; who can tell Him what to do? He’s the owner; He created the world, He gave it to whomever He felt like. That’s not what Rashi says. Rashi says that He gives it to whomever is upright in His eyes. “To whomever is upright in His eyes” does not mean whoever He feels like, but rather whoever it is truly right, in His view, to give it to — yes? To whoever is upright in His eyes. And in order to show why Israel is indeed the collective, or the people, to whom it is upright to give the land, or that it is the upright one, you needed the book of Genesis — which, by the way, is called the Book of the Upright. It is called the Book of the Upright because the patriarchs were upright, right? I don’t remember if it’s a midrash or commentators who say this — that the patriarchs were upright, and therefore it is called the book of the upright ones, the Book of the Upright. What?

[Speaker C] Ha’amek Davar in the introduction to the book—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, but the Netziv of Volozhin writes this; there are a number of commentators who write this. But I don’t know whether it has a source in a midrash of the Sages or not, I don’t remember.

[Speaker C] He says it’s called the Book of the Upright according to Jewish tradition.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, it’s well known that it’s called the Book of the Upright. The question is what the explanation is. So the claim that it is the book of the upright ones means, basically, just as regarding Abraham our father it is written that his two kidneys became like two rabbis for him — yes, that’s a midrash of the Sages — his two kidneys became like two rabbis, meaning that he followed his inner uprightness, which told him what was right to do and what was not right to do. Saadia Gaon argues that this uprightness — and this relates to us too — this uprightness can actually lead you to all 613 commandments. Saadia Gaon says that all 613 commandments reason can derive from reason. And this connects to what Rabbi Kook says, what I mentioned earlier: that really all the— huh? Saadia Gaon. Emunot Ve-Deot. I don’t remember exactly where; maybe already in the introduction he says it.

[Speaker F] Yes, yes. Emunot Ve-Deot. What? Even the red heifer? What?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, his claim is that everything can come from reason. For someone whose reason is upright, everything can be derived. And the patriarchs — what the Sages say, that the patriarchs kept the entire Torah, even the rabbinic ordinance of eruv tavshilin Abraham our father kept — the intention is that all the details can be derived; there are no details that have no rationale. All the details have rationale, and someone who has upright reason can derive everything. That is the claim. Fine, maybe.

[Speaker D] Then what does someone with upright reason mean? Someone whose reason says all the things the Torah says?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no, plain meaning. But still there is someone for whom it says that. It’s an interesting claim; it’s not so simple. In any event, the claim is that this is what is meant by the book of the upright ones. Meaning, someone whose conscience is straightened, meaning that he knows what is right — that is called upright, an upright person — and to such a person the Holy One, blessed be He, gave the land. Therefore Genesis is the book of the upright ones. Meaning, this inner uprightness, conscience, is what indicates to you what is upright and what is not upright. And one should note well that Abraham our father had no command. “And you shall do what is right and good” is written in the Torah. Abraham our father did not receive the Torah, and he acted according to his conscience without the verse “and you shall do what is right and good.” Therefore I said that this may actually contradict what I said.

[Speaker D] And that’s not only from the light of the Torah; it’s also according to the midrashim. What?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And in all the— no, that’s not true. There is no such thing. What did the Sages want to teach me in the midrashim?

[Speaker D] But Rashi says that Genesis itself is not all that full of the good deeds of the patriarchs; there are lots of midrashim.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That doesn’t matter to me. Right now I’m talking about what the Sages wanted to communicate to me in the midrashim. What difference does it make what really happened? That’s not important to me. Same with Rashi’s explanation.

[Speaker D] Also Rashi’s explanation — then don’t bring Genesis; there are no midrashim without the— what do you mean, Genesis?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] These are the midrashim on the book. The midrashim are on the book. It doesn’t matter exactly how this emerges from the book, but apparently it is somehow supposed to emerge from the book. Again, what is true in all of this is not important to me right now; this is the picture they want to convey to us, what the Sages want to convey to us. But here there really is a point that is even more far-reaching. Because here they are already telling us that Abraham our father also followed the command of his conscience. Not only is there a verse, “and you shall do what is right and good,” and conscience tells me what is right and good and what is not; in Abraham our father’s case there wasn’t even the verse. There was only conscience. And he followed it. That means that really, one does not truly need even the verse, because one can arrive at moral obligation also—

[Speaker E] without this interpretation of the verse. After all, we would not get there if we really went only by the verse. It’s not only from the verse that we understand the intent is upright human thought.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Why? “And you shall do what is right and good” seems a very reasonable interpretation of the verse. Why?

[Speaker E] A reasonable interpretation, but not a necessary one.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Fine, not necessary. There are many verses — I don’t know a single verse where the interpretation given is necessary. At best, interpretations are reasonable.

[Speaker E] “Do not murder” and “do not steal.” Huh? “Do not steal.” Ah. “Do not murder” and “do not steal.”

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I can invent interpretations for you there too. You can invent them, but there is a clear interpretation and there is a reasonable interpretation, and there are different levels of reasonableness. But this still seems to me completely within the reasonable range. When it says “and you shall do what is right and good,” understanding that one should do what is right and good — what is upright and what is good — is a plain reading. What is the— so here, with Abraham our father, you really see one step further: that in truth you don’t even need the verse; conscience already stands independently, not only as a guide to the command.

[Speaker D] It has to be that it’s not only emotion, because if it were only emotion, then you also wouldn’t act. There has to be choice within choice, something within these emotions, a decision — there has to be a decision.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Exactly. And therefore this is really the point I want to end with: returning to the point about emotion and intellect. This feeling that morality has to be connected with emotion, meaning that morality is an emotional matter — that’s a mistake. As I said earlier, emotion is just something that is there. It’s a fact. You are born with a certain emotional system. Sometimes I can shape my emotional system a little bit, but broadly speaking it is something very largely dictated by how I am built, by my character, by how I was born. And precisely because of that, it is rather lacking in significance, because I am born in all sorts of ways — so what? In the end, moral obligation cannot be based on certain facts, because that’s just how I am. So what if that’s how I am? I also want to speak gossip, as I said earlier. There has to be in this conscience something beyond emotions. Of course there are also emotions, clearly there are, but there is something beyond that. And that thing beyond that is probably that same moral perception that understands that emotions of this kind are not the same kind of emotions as the desire to speak gossip. Even though this too is an emotion that exists in me, and that too is an emotion that exists in me. But still I feel that this is a different category — I feel, or perceive, or decide, or I don’t know how to put it. Not “feel,” because then again it becomes fantasies. Rather, I understand that this is a different category. This is an emotion that indicates to me things that ought to be done, and that one is an emotion that simply exists there. There I have to decide whether to do it or not, but it simply exists there; that does not mean that that is what ought to be done. And in that sense, yes, there are emotions in the moral realm, but it is not only emotions. There is also this dimension that says that there are certain emotions here that point me toward the right thing, toward what is upright and good. And therefore Abraham our father did not even need the verse “and you shall do what is right and good” in order to follow what is right and good, his two kidneys — because inside the kidneys there are not only emotions, but also some normative dimension, a dimension of “this is what one ought to do,” some clear understanding that this is what one ought to do. There is some intellectual dimension here and not only an emotional one, and therefore Abraham our father can do this even without the verse. The verse says that apparently the Holy One, blessed be He, also expects me to do this, and in that sense it has religious value — though not the status of a command, but religious value. Whereas without the verse I might have said: okay, it matters to me to be this way; it’s a human value, but I don’t know whether it’s a Torah value or a religious value. And in that sense it seems to me that this is indeed an important point. If I really grasp morality as something that is binding in itself, that itself means it is not emotion. Notice: if it were a command, just to sharpen the point, then morality could be entirely emotion, nothing beyond that. Because morality would merely indicate: the command tells me, whatever this or that emotion tells you — do that. You have to do it because there is a command; it has nothing to do with what you feel. The feeling only indicates what the command is referring to. Okay? So there wouldn’t need to be anything there besides emotion. The moment I understand that “and you shall do what is right and good,” or even without “and you shall do what is right and good,” there is something here that is not a command — maybe an expectation, if anything, or in Abraham’s case not even that — then that means that in conscience itself there is already something beyond its emotional dimension. Meaning, it has to contain some statement that this is also what should be done, and not just a drive to do something or an inclination to do something, which is just a fact. Inclinations say nothing; inclinations can go in all kinds of directions.

Halakha and Ethics, Lesson 6

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