Yoma, Chapter 8, Lesson 5

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[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Mishnah on 81a. Okay? So in order to incur separate sin-offerings, you need either two prohibitions or two separate lapses of awareness. So if he ate and drank in one lapse of awareness, then this is one lapse of awareness and also one prohibition—eating and drinking are under the same prohibition—so therefore it's only one sin-offering. But if he ate and did forbidden labor, even if it was in one lapse of awareness, he needs two sin-offerings. Because those are two prohibitions, okay? Two different categories. But foods that are not, etc.—fine, that's something else. Talmudic text. Reish Lakish said: Why was no warning stated regarding affliction? In Yoma 81a. Why was no warning stated regarding affliction? Yes, regarding affliction on Yom Kippur we don't find a warning, exactly what we saw in the Sifrei—in the Sifra, I always… we didn't find a warning. So Reish Lakish says as follows: because it's impossible. You can't say it; we have no way to formulate it. This is a very interesting Talmudic passage. How should it be written? Reish Lakish says: there's no way to write it, let me show you. Should the Merciful One write, "He shall not eat" or "Do not eat"? Eating is in an olive-bulk. We would then learn from here that eating is in an olive-bulk and not in a date-bulk. Already here I'll pause for a moment. So what if it's in an olive-bulk? What's the problem? Why shouldn't it be in an olive-bulk?

[Speaker C] But there is a positive commandment: "you shall afflict yourselves."

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Fine, that's a positive commandment.

[Speaker C] And affliction is measured by a date-bulk. So in the positive commandment it would be one measure, and in the prohibition it would be a second measure?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, yes. Someone who ate an olive-bulk violated only the prohibition and did not violate the positive commandment—what's the problem? Again, the assumption here is that the positive commandment and the prohibition are both talking about affliction. It's not that the prohibition is an eating prohibition and the positive commandment is an obligation to fast. The prohibition is against someone who does not afflict himself, not against someone who eats. We talked about this in previous times as well. Now you'll see it in a more explicit way. So that can't work, right? You can't write "do not eat" or "he shall not eat." Should the Merciful One write, "Do not be afflicted"?

[Speaker C] Yes, exactly the opposite. Why? What does "do not be afflicted" mean? "Do not be afflicted" would mean not to fast,

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] meaning yes, to eat—that obviously doesn't fit, right? So in short, there's no way to write a prohibition on affliction. How do you write a prohibition on affliction? In short, there's a bug in the language. The language in which Scripture is written is not a complete language. Meaning, even if the Holy One, blessed be He, wanted to write for us a prohibition regarding affliction, He is limited—He created a language that isn't good enough, not complete. There are contents that cannot be expressed in this language. A prohibition on affliction cannot be expressed. That's a very far-reaching statement, this statement of Reish Lakish. Right? So there's no way to formulate it. Before I continue—fine, so there's no way to formulate it. And therefore what? Is there a prohibition or isn't there?

[Speaker B] There isn't a prohibition.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] There isn't a prohibition. The Talmud implies that there is.

[Speaker C] It could be that there is a prohibition.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] How does the Talmud know that there is a prohibition? From the question: "Why was no warning stated regarding affliction?" We just read it. Right. What does that mean? That there is also a prohibition regarding affliction. So the Talmud knows that there is a prohibition regarding affliction. And Reish Lakish also argues within that assumption. Reish Lakish is not coming to claim that there is no prohibition. Reish Lakish claims there is a prohibition, but it isn't written because there's no way to write it. But that takes us backward—takes us back, with an s—so how did the Tannaim know that there is a prohibition? Fine, in the Mishnah we saw that there is a prohibition. How did the Tannaim know? After all, it's not written in the Torah.

[Speaker C] It can't be,

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So they say no, no—there is a prohibition, it just couldn't be written. Fine, who told you that? Maybe, maybe there is a prohibition only because it's impossible to write, but maybe there also isn't a prohibition.

[Speaker C] There are two possibilities—how do you know? We said earlier that there can't be a punishment without a prohibition.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And where do you know that there is a punishment?

[Speaker C] Because "for any soul that does not afflict itself"—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] kareit, right? Kareit, excision. The punishment of excision, okay, so therefore what?

[Speaker C] So if there is—we said that a punishment without a prohibition is impossible, and that's the stipulation, right?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If I—no, you can't say that's the stipulation, but you do need a warning. And Reish Lakish wants to argue that there is no warning. So I'm asking: then what do you do with the verse of punishment when there is no warning? Reish Lakish strongly claims there is no warning, right? That's what we said. Understand: beyond his explanations, what's the bottom line of what he says? That as written, you will not find a warning. Later in the Talmud we will find there are other sources—other Amoraim do bring a source. But Reish Lakish does not bring a source. Reish Lakish claims that here we have a prohibition without a warning. Here, we've found a counterexample to the Chinukh. We have a commandment where there is a punishment—kareit—for the prohibition of affliction, but there is no warning. And not only that—Reish Lakish says not that there is a warning and we didn't find it; there is no warning, none, because it's impossible to write it.

[Speaker B] And he suggests—wait—how would she write it? She can't write "do not eat."

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] He explains: it's impossible.

[Speaker B] That's what he says—it can't be written.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] He has no additional recommendations. He has no recommendations; he rejects all these recommendations. He shows you that there’s no way to write this. You could say that he means, for example, that same choice that’s required from somewhere else. We’ll soon see. On the face of it, according to Reish Lakish, what’s written is that there isn’t one; it can’t be written, and therefore there isn’t one. Right now I’m presenting this as a question. In a moment we’ll see later on why it wasn’t somehow possible to derive it. Make an analogy, a verbal analogy, I don’t know, some sort of derivation. We’ll see later in the Talmud that they actually do this. It could be that Reish Lakish does not accept Maimonides’ principle that one can formulate a prohibition from a derivation even where the punishment is written explicitly. Maimonides innovates that if the punishment is written, then the prohibition can be derived. Reish Lakish and the medieval authorities disagree with him; they argue that you can derive a prohibition even when the punishment is not written, because a derivation is fully Torah-level. In Maimonides’ view, a derivation is not Torah-level. But if the punishment is written, then one can derive the prohibition from a derivation. It could be that Reish Lakish is a more extreme approach. Reish Lakish says: a prohibition derived by interpretation is illegitimate. A prohibition has to be written. This is a source for Maimonides, but a source that goes even further than Maimonides. Okay? Even when there’s an explicit verse of punishment here, you still can’t derive the prohibition interpretively. Possibly. And therefore Reish Lakish does not take into account the possibility of deriving a prohibition and writes explicitly: it can’t be done. Since it can’t be done, therefore we have here a prohibition without an explicit warning verse.

But that’s very difficult. Very difficult, because if so, then it should come out that there really would be no prohibition and really no sin-offering. Karet maybe would be on a positive commandment. I don’t know. Especially since there is a positive commandment here—we know there is a positive commandment of affliction. And there is already karet for failure to perform a positive commandment in circumcision and Passover. So what’s the problem? Why not say that on Yom Kippur too the karet is for the positive commandment? There’s no negative commandment because there isn’t one. You understand, this is the absurdity. If the Torah had no word for demons, would I say: ah, surely there are demons, it’s just that the Torah didn’t write about demons because it has no word for them? I need some indication. Why am I saying there are demons? If I had some source telling me: look, there are demons—and you asked me why the Torah doesn’t write it—then the answer could be: because it has no way to say it. Fine. But you have no source other than the Torah from which to derive prohibitions. So how can you tell me that since the Torah can’t write it, therefore there is a prohibition here even though it isn’t written? If you had an indication that there’s a prohibition here, and your problem was why the Torah doesn’t write it, then the answer is because it can’t write it. But where do you know the basic fact from, that there is a prohibition here at all?

So of course one could say: it’s a tradition, I don’t know, a law given to Moses at Sinai, whatever. Reish Lakish had a tradition that there is a prohibition here, and obviously he doesn’t disagree about that. Again, I remind you, the Mishnah says that there is a prohibition. It’s not reasonable to say that Reish Lakish held that in fact there is no prohibition here. Okay? So perhaps it really is tradition, and this goes back to what I said earlier—that all these derivations are really supportive derivations. We already know everything. We’re just playing here; we’re trying to anchor the tradition that came down to us in derivations or verses or something like that. And on that Reish Lakish says: look, here it came by tradition; we have no way to anchor it textually, and that’s okay. In a place where we have no way to anchor it, that’s also fine, because we have tradition.

So according to this, it comes out that we don’t have to say that the punishment here is a conditional punishment—even according to Sefer HaChinukh. No, no. It’s a punishment for a prohibition. It’s a sanction for wrongdoing. There is a prohibition here, only there’s no way to write it, so it wasn’t written. That’s the plain meaning of the Talmud. Rashi says that in this verse the warning is not written, but there is a prohibition. There is a prohibition, but no warning. No warning, but there is a prohibition. How? That’s what Reish Lakish asks. How can that be? Reish Lakish answers: in a place where the prohibition cannot be written, there can be a prohibition even without an explicit warning.

Now pay attention for one more second: there are several possible understandings of Reish Lakish. Theoretically you could say that he really thinks there is no prohibition—but we said the Mishnah states that there is. There is a sin-offering, so that’s not reasonable. There is a prohibition; tradition tells us there is a prohibition. Right, there is a prohibition, and it cannot be written, and he does not accept a prohibition derived by interpretation, even in a place where there is a verse of punishment. So he says: fine, the tradition remains valid. A third possibility is that he adopts Maimonides’ view, but once again goes one step too far. After all, there is a verse of punishment. Tradition only says that this punishment is not for neglecting a positive commandment but for violating a prohibition. Right? Because only in circumcision and Passover is there karet for neglecting a positive commandment. So now Reish Lakish says: this is punishment for a prohibition. Then I ask myself: but where is the prohibition? The karet is for a prohibition, and we don’t have a verse. And derivations are being ignored for the sake of the discussion right now. Okay, so what does Reish Lakish say? Fine, the Torah has no way to write it. But when the Torah has no way to write it, who told you that there is a prohibition? Maybe it didn’t write it because there isn’t one, not because it has no way to write it. No—there is a punishment verse. And there is no punishment verse without a prior warning. That alone is why Reish Lakish says there is a prohibition.

Think about it. Let’s say there were no karet for fasting on Passover—sorry, on Yom Kippur. No karet. Fine? Would Reish Lakish say that since there is no way to prohibit affliction, therefore there is a prohibition even though we found no warning? What, you invent a prohibition just because there is no way to write it? Then every matter that has no way to be written would be true according to this principle—since there’s no way to write it, that’s why it wasn’t written. That’s absurd. You first have to assume that it’s true and then answer the difficulty of why it wasn’t written: because there’s no way to write it. You cannot conclude from the fact that there’s no way to write it. It could be that he concluded it because there is a verse that gives punishment. Exactly the same logic of punishment that we said about this… No, on that there was a tradition that karet for a positive commandment exists only in circumcision and Passover. So if there is karet here—and apparently there is clearly such a tradition, that it applies only to those two—and there is a reason, by the way; those two really do share something in common. I once spoke about this in the study hall. But once I reach the conclusion that this karet is punishment for a prohibition, then there really is a difficulty: we didn’t find a prohibition. To that Reish Lakish answers: because there is no way to write it. But there is a prohibition here, and the karet is for that prohibition. Okay?

Therefore you cannot infer from Reish Lakish that anywhere I have reason to think there is a prohibition, then if there is no way to write it, it will count as a full prohibition and one would even receive lashes for it. That’s not enough. You need some indication from the text. Only here there is such an indication—the punishment verse is the indication. True, ordinarily punishment is not enough; you also need a verse that warns. But in a place where there is no way to write a warning verse, fine, the punishment verse tells me that this already exists as well.

And this is another implication of what we saw in Sefer HaChinukh—that the Chinukh assumes not only that if there were a punishment verse without a warning, we would interpret it as a condition. No. There is no such thing as a verse of punishment without a warning. There is no category of “conditional punishment.” And you have to say this if you want to say it here in Reish Lakish, because otherwise Reish Lakish should have said: this is a conditional punishment, so there is no prohibition. That’s all—it’s conditional punishment. Reish Lakish does not say that. Reish Lakish says: this punishment is an actual punishment, not a condition. So why isn’t it written? Because it can’t be written. Okay? This reinforces several things we saw in the previous stages.

Yes. According to Reish Lakish, in other words, this is something general: the punishment comes to serve this prohibition, and normally there is no punishment for failure to fulfill a positive commandment, except for Passover and circumcision. So that means the warning is there to serve the punishment of the prohibition. Why are they looking for a warning for the positive commandment? That’s what I’m saying. What warning for the positive commandment? The whole Mishnah and all that—how can you… No, it’s a prohibition, not a positive commandment. It’s a prohibition, the prohibition of affliction. The question is: where is its warning? And this… There is a positive commandment: “and you shall afflict yourselves.” “The soul that is not afflicted shall be cut off”—that karet is for a prohibition. There is a prohibition not to refrain from afflicting oneself—meaning, whoever does not fast has violated a prohibition. And Reish Lakish asks: where is the warning for that prohibition? If the karet were for the positive commandment, we wouldn’t be looking for anything; it would be karet for a positive commandment like Passover and circumcision, and we wouldn’t need anything. On the contrary—the assumption here is that it’s not for the positive commandment, so there must be some prohibition here, and to that Reish Lakish says: correct, but there is no way to write it.

A final possibility is that Reish Lakish really does not disagree with all those who come after him—we’ll see this in a moment—all the derivations that come afterward from various interpretations. He doesn’t disagree, doesn’t disagree. Reish Lakish just says: it could not have been written explicitly, because there is no way to write it. So how do we know it? From all the derivations that will be brought later. He’s only asking why it isn’t written. It isn’t written because there’s no way to write it. And one can strengthen the question further: in other places it is written. For Sabbath, for festivals, everywhere it’s written—the prohibition is written. What’s the problem? Like with labor, on Yom Kippur too it’s written. So why here is it left to derivations? Why isn’t it written explicitly here? To that Reish Lakish says: because there’s no way to write it explicitly, therefore it was left to derivations. What are those derivations? We’ll see in a moment. The Talmud later brings a collection of possibilities. Then Reish Lakish is really just an opening to the topic, not one opinion followed by more opinions, but an opening.

Are there not enough words in our language? Yes, yes. It’s very interesting. The Holy One created this language—what’s the problem with creating a language in which this too could be written? Fine. Let me perhaps give you another example regarding the sciatic nerve. The prohibition of the sciatic nerve—where is the prohibition? “Therefore the children of Israel do not eat…” That is not exactly a prohibition. It’s not a prohibition at all. “Therefore the children of Israel do not eat the sciatic nerve”—that’s a description, a biblical description. It’s not a command. It tells us why the Israelites had the practice of not eating the sciatic nerve, as a memorial to the struggle with the angel and all that. Fine? Okay, nice—a nice custom. What does that have to do with me? Where is the command? So Rashba asks this in his aggadic novellae on Berakhot, and Rashba says that here we probably have to say that there was some tradition saying that this is indeed also a prohibition, even though there is no warning. This is another example of a prohibition that has no warning. But here too there is some hint in the text that this is the proper practice. True, it is not fully a warning command. In such a place we can sometimes play a little. “That they do not eat”—he holds that if they did not eat, then they should not eat. Meaning, there is something there. “Therefore the children of Israel do not eat the sciatic nerve.” Yes. A description. It tells you what the Israelites did. So what? It says, “Jacob dwelled in the land of his father’s sojournings, in the land of Canaan”—so therefore we all need to dwell in the land of our fathers’ sojournings? What does that have to do with anything? Scripture describes various stories. This one did so, that one acts thus, and that one does not. For there to be a command, there has to be a command—a commanding verse, not a descriptive verse. This verse is descriptive.

Maimonides does count it. Count what? Negative commandment 158. Of course—everyone counts it. Right? Everyone counts it. That’s exactly what Rashba is asking. Even though it’s a prohibition, obviously it’s a prohibition. Here there isn’t even a positive commandment—there is only a prohibition regarding the sciatic nerve. It is certain that there is a prohibition, because otherwise what is the prohibition at all? What? I think there is punishment for the sciatic nerve too, no? Why not? It says somewhere that one who eats the sciatic nerve receives lashes, no? But where is the source for that? I don’t know. You don’t need a source for that. I spoke last time about lashes; lashes do not require a separate source. Ah, so there can be a warning without an explicit punishment. Yes, of course. It is only punishments other than lashes that need an explicit source. Right. This also collides with the point that the warning has to be from Sinai—say, like all those things in the dispute of the Tannaim in the chapter on the sciatic nerve, Rabbi Yehuda and the Sages there, whether it applies to impure animals or only pure ones, and what was said at Sinai was said only from Sinai, in accordance with Maimonides’ famous words in his commentary to the Mishnah there.

In any case, this is just an example that sometimes, when I have some other indication that there is a prohibition, then either tradition can come and tell me, or a verse that is not formulated exactly as a command can tell me, that there is in fact still a prohibition here.

Rav Beivai bar Abaye raised an objection: let the Merciful One write, “Guard the commandment of affliction.” He has a suggestion—yes, it can be put into the wording of Scripture. To that he answers: if so, “guarding” attached to a prohibition is a prohibition, but “guarding” attached to a positive commandment is a positive commandment. No—“guard the commandment of affliction” would have been a positive commandment, not a prohibition. Even though “guard,” “lest,” and “do not” are rabbinic expressions for a prohibition, nevertheless if “guard” is attached to a positive commandment, then it has the status of a positive commandment. It’s like a prohibition inferred from a positive commandment, and according to the Talmudic rule, “a prohibition inferred from a positive commandment is a positive commandment.” Okay?

Rav Ashi raised an objection: let it write, “Do not depart from the affliction.” Why are you speaking ill of the Holy One’s language? This language can contain, or express, a prohibition regarding affliction too. “Difficult,” says the Talmud. Now, this is a known rule—you surely know it—and there is a difference between “difficult” and “refutation,” right? When we say “difficult,” that does not mean the view is rejected; it means there may be some answer, and for some reason the Talmud does not bring it. There are places—and even quite a few places—where Maimonides rules in accordance with a view that remains “difficult.” Okay? Meaning, “difficult” and “refutation” are not the same thing. “Refutation” means the opinion is rejected; “difficult” does not. Why am I saying this? Because once Rav Ashi says this, Reish Lakish’s view would seemingly be rejected. Then in a moment we’ll see the following opinions, which are the source for the prohibition of affliction. But as we said, since this remains only “difficult,” Reish Lakish may still have some room to preserve his view.

And a Tanna derives it from here—I’m continuing to read in the Talmud: “And you shall afflict yourselves, and you shall do no labor.” Could one think that one is liable to punishment for the additional time of labor? This refers to the extension of Yom Kippur, meaning adding onto Yom Kippur from beforehand, which is Torah-level. There are views that this is the only addition that is Torah-level. There are debates about that. So the extension of Yom Kippur is Torah-level. The question is: what are the laws during that added time? Is it exactly like the core of the day itself, where labor and affliction are prohibited and there is even karet?

The affliction here is the extension parallel to labor. No, no. The extension of Yom Kippur means the period before Yom Kippur begins. The question is whether in that added period there is a prohibition of labor and a prohibition of affliction. What does Jewish law tell us to do in that added period? Does it say that both regarding labor and affliction there is even karet and full prohibition? Or only prohibition without karet? Or perhaps there isn’t even a prohibition in the form of a negative commandment, but only perhaps a positive commandment of adding from the weekday onto the holy? These are all possible options. So the Talmud is discussing that here, and in a moment we’ll see how it connects to our issue.

And what about the extension? I don’t remember. It may be from this very phrase. “On this very day” implies that outside this very day there is also something, only the karet applies specifically to this very day. But it implies that beyond this very day, in the extension too there is a prohibition without karet. I don’t remember right now where they derive it from.

And a Tanna derives it from here: “And you shall afflict yourselves, and you shall do no labor.” Could one think one is punished—what does “punished” mean? Karet, yes—for added labor? Scripture says: “And every soul that does any labor on this very day shall be cut off.” On the very essence of the day one is liable to karet, but one is not liable to karet for added labor. Could one then say that one is not liable to karet for added labor, but is liable to karet for added affliction? Until now we discussed added labor. Is there karet for added affliction? Scripture says: “For every soul that is not afflicted on this very day shall be cut off.” On the essence of the day one is liable to karet, but not for added affliction. Same thing—it applies to the very essence of the day.

Could one say that there is no punishment at all, but there is a warning regarding added labor? What does that mean? No karet, perhaps—but maybe a prohibition exists? A prohibition regarding labor. Regarding labor we have a verse, right? Scripture says: “And you shall do no labor on this very day.” The warning “you shall do no labor” also applies only to this very day. On the essence of the day he is warned, and he is not warned concerning added labor. Could one say that he is not warned concerning added labor, but he is warned concerning added affliction? What is that? How can that be? We still haven’t learned a warning for affliction itself, so why are they suddenly discussing a warning in the added time? The Talmud assumes that obviously there is a warning regarding affliction on the very day itself. Right? “Warning” means a prohibition, because the positive commandment is certainly written. But there is a prohibition regarding the essence of the day, and therefore it now starts discussing whether there is also a prohibition in the added time. And it doesn’t say where that comes from. Fine? But in a moment.

A warning—you don’t even know it for the essence of the day itself. Exactly. You don’t even know the warning for the day itself, so why bring this? That’s what I said. “And by logic! Just as labor, which applies on Sabbaths and festivals, one is not warned concerning it in the added time, then affliction, which does not apply on Sabbaths and festivals, all the more so one should not be warned concerning it.” This is speaking about the extension now, right? Yes. No, no—the extension. It’s all about the extension. This is really the a fortiori argument of the Sifra that we saw, right? Right? Earlier we learned the stringency side for Sabbaths, and now we’re learning the leniency side for Yom Kippur. But these are two sides of the same coin. It’s strict and lenient and all that, but the same side of the coin.

Now the Talmud says: but we have not learned the warning for affliction on the day itself. You’re talking to me about the extension? What about the day itself? “A warning for affliction—from where?” “The punishment for labor need not be stated, for it could be learned from affliction. And just as affliction, which does not apply on Sabbaths and festivals, incurs karet, labor, which does apply on Sabbaths and festivals, all the more so.” Why then was it stated? To free it up for comparison and for a verbal analogy. A punishment is stated regarding affliction, and a punishment is stated regarding labor. Just as labor is punished only if there was a warning, so too affliction is punished only if there was a warning.

Okay? In contrast to the Sifra, there are many interesting points here. What do you mean, “just as labor is punished only if there was a warning, so too affliction is punished only if there was a warning”? That labor is punished only if there was a warning—that is true everywhere. What does that have to do particularly with labor? It’s a general rule in the Talmud: there is no punishment unless there was prior warning. You don’t need to learn separately in each case that there is no punishment without warning. The rule is always that there is no punishment without warning. What you want to learn is the very existence of the warning, not that punishment is conditioned on warning. So just say: just as there there is a warning, here too there is a warning.

It seems from here that there is indeed some initial thought that Sefer HaChinukh rejected—to have punishment without warning. If there is punishment here, and this is Reish Lakish—I remind you that we came from Reish Lakish, right? What did Reish Lakish tell us? Reish Lakish told us that the warning is not written, right? Because it cannot be written, but the punishment is written. According to the Chinukh, what do we do in such a case? I said that seemingly I would have said: here we punish without warning—a conditional punishment, not a sanction for criminal wrongdoing. A conditional punishment. Fine? Because the punishment is written. Reish Lakish cannot say that we do not punish: “Every soul that is not afflicted shall be cut off.” That is written; you can’t deny it. But we didn’t find a warning. Reish Lakish says: you won’t find one either, because there is no way to write it. So there is no warning. What do we do in such a case? Punish without warning. And then this derivation comes and says: no, Reish Lakish. Here is an alternative to Reish Lakish. After we rejected Reish Lakish, now they bring an alternative and say: precisely because of that, the wording here too is “it is punished only if there was a warning.” Because no one says there would be no punishment here. Obviously there will be punishment—the verse says so. Rather, Reish Lakish wants to argue that here there is punishment without warning. There is no such thing. Here too there is punishment only if there was warning. Okay? How do we know this? From labor. Okay, so this is responding to Reish Lakish. It hints that what the Talmud is doing here is not bringing an independent source, but explaining why Reish Lakish is not right. Here too punishment exists only because of warning, not as Reish Lakish wants to say—that here there is punishment without warning. This addresses Reish Lakish; it is not an independent source.

But regarding the substance: unlike the Sifra, here it is a verbal analogy, and in the Sifra no verbal analogy was mentioned. In a moment we’ll see, in a moment we’ll see. Here—ah, I’m missing a page. They printed me the second page. Fine—does anyone have it? Is it something I sent by email? No, no, I sent it to the secretary to print because I didn’t have a printer. Ah, it’s on the other side. Fine, we have it, that’s it. Okay.

Look for a moment at the next line in the Talmud: “One could challenge this: what about affliction, which has no general permission exception; will you say the same about labor, which does have a general permission exception?” “General permission exception” here means Temple service. Temple service is permitted—meaning labor has a permitted context under certain circumstances; affliction has no such permitted context. That is, no one is exempt from fasting on Yom Kippur. The designated man, by the way, apparently is exempt. But fine, that’s a side remark. In principle, though, affliction has not been generally permitted, and therefore there is a possible challenge.

On the face of it, this refutes the a fortiori argument of the Sifra, right? The Sifra’s argument says labor is more severe than affliction. So if there is punishment for affliction, then certainly there is punishment for labor, right? That’s also what the Talmud says here. And there is a challenge to that. Notice that there is a difference between the Talmud here and the Sifra. Do you see the difference? The Sifra ended with “if it is not needed for this matter,” right? The Babylonian Talmud does not end with “if it is not needed.” The Babylonian Talmud ends with comparison and verbal analogy, something not found in the Sifra. In the end it’s not “if it is not needed,” it’s a verbal analogy. After all, how does it conclude here? It says: it is free for comparison and for deriving a verbal analogy. A punishment is stated regarding affliction and regarding labor. Just as labor is punished only if there was warning… So why do you need all the introduction? There is a verbal analogy. A punishment is written here and a punishment is written there. Just as there the punishment requires prior warning, so too here. Finished. Why do you need all this introduction, all this a fortiori setup? It’s a totally different derivation from the Sifra. In the Sifra there is no comparison and no verbal analogy. The Sifra says that the punishment for labor is superfluous. Why was it written? If it is not needed for that, apply it to the prohibition of affliction. Right? No verbal analogy or anything. Simply: something is superfluous, so we apply it elsewhere through “if it is not needed.” Here they make a verbal analogy.

So why do we need the entire preface from the Sifra? Just make a verbal analogy: a punishment is said here and a punishment is said there. Just as there, not punished unless warned, so too here. What’s the problem? Karet, karet—from the word karet. He may be trying to use what the Sifra said, the a fortiori argument the Sifra tried to use. So what is the role of that? It seems like a completely different derivation, so why do you need the Sifra? More than that: the Sifra’s derivation is rejected because of the challenge. Can one challenge a verbal analogy? Never. If it is free on one side—or on both sides—you do not challenge it. If it is not free, then in the simple sense you do not derive from it at all. A verbal analogy does not get challenged. I think you won’t find anywhere a challenge to a verbal analogy. There are challenges to an a fortiori argument and to an inductive prototype, not to text-based hermeneutics like general-and-particular, and not to verbal analogy. But here the Talmud challenges the a fortiori argument.

One second—the challenge attacks the logic. It says: it’s not more severe than that, because here there is a leniency. The verbal analogy is not based on which is more severe. Here there is this word and there there is this word, therefore we compare. What is there to challenge? It has nothing to do with which is stricter and which is more lenient. So it turns out that the challenge is to the a fortiori argument, not to the verbal analogy. But then why did I introduce this? Because that means the a fortiori argument is indeed part of the derivation; it is not just a random preface to a verbal analogy. The preface of the a fortiori argument is needed in order to make the verbal analogy. The question is why. And the answer is that the preface of the a fortiori argument comes to prove that the punishment for labor is textually free. Without being free, we do not make a verbal analogy. Therefore without the a fortiori argument there is no verbal analogy here. The a fortiori argument of the Sifra does not stand on its own in the Babylonian Talmud; in the Sifra it does. But in the Babylonian Talmud the a fortiori argument is not the source; it is only the infrastructure. It proves that the punishment for labor is free. Once it is free, we make the verbal analogy. Then if I challenge the a fortiori argument, I am left with a verbal analogy that is not free. And a verbal analogy that is not free cannot be made.

Can’t be made at all? Can’t be made at all. That is the challenge the Talmud is making. So the challenge here is not attacking the verbal analogy; it attacks the a fortiori argument. First, it knocks down the Sifra’s a fortiori argument, and in the Babylonian Talmud, which does not derive from the a fortiori argument directly, you still need the a fortiori argument to show that the term is free. Once there is a challenge, then you see it is not free. And if it is not free, you cannot make the verbal analogy. The a fortiori argument justified the verbal analogy, justified the freedom of the term in the verbal analogy. Because you cannot make a verbal analogy unless you have proved that it is free, at least on one side. Okay?

But now—one second—it may be that there is no difference between the Sifra and the Babylonian Talmud. The Sifra may simply be abbreviated, and maybe it is not “if it is not needed” in the Sifra. Maybe the Sifra just doesn’t mention verbal analogy. It doesn’t mention it, but maybe it abbreviates. It says: there is an a fortiori argument, and therefore this is superfluous, and from there we learn here. How do we learn from there to here? I understood that as “if it is not needed,” because nothing else is mentioned. But maybe not. Maybe “from there to here” means by verbal analogy.

By the way, it says “for comparison and for deriving a verbal analogy.” You know that comparison and verbal analogy are not the same thing. What is comparison? Because it is logical? Adjacent verses. Comparison means adjacent verses, right? And in truth, there is comparison here too: “you shall do no labor” and “you shall afflict yourselves.” Or “you shall afflict yourselves and whoever does labor shall be cut off.” There is a comparison between affliction and labor. So why not make that comparison directly? Simply because affliction here is in the form of a positive commandment, while labor is in the form of a prohibition. You can’t compare the positive commandment to the prohibition when what we’re looking for is the prohibition, right? But the karet—the karet in both places is said about the prohibition. Okay? Therefore they use the verbal analogy and not the comparison. What it says here, “for comparison and for deriving a verbal analogy,” because the term “comparison” in rabbinic language is often used in the context of verbal analogy, not in the technical sense of juxtaposition. It’s a borrowed usage; it appears in place of verbal analogy.

What? Verbal analogy and comparison are two opposite terms. Therefore I do not make a comparison; rather I make a verbal analogy. And in the verbal analogy you have karet and karet. So if that karet has a warning attached to it, then this karet too has a warning attached to it. Then why not say that for all cases of karet in the world one doesn’t need warnings at all? Everywhere karet is written, let us derive from here that karet always comes with warning. No. Only where the term is superfluous, only where there is freedom, do we make a verbal analogy. Therefore in every place where there is karet we will still need a warning. Only here, because it is superfluous, it substitutes for the warning. Okay? That is the freedom.

What is the Talmud saying here? Look at the baraita—the difference between a midrash and someone who just says it. “A Tanna derives it from here,” meaning this is a baraita. In any case, this is the alternative stage to Reish Lakish. So indeed, punishment comes by virtue of a warning, not as Reish Lakish says—that one punishes without warning. Right? When there is freedom, and that freedom creates the basis for a verbal analogy. But now we challenge it: “what about affliction, which has no general permission exception?” Fine. The freedom falls away, there is no basis for verbal analogy, and the story is over. We are left with nothing. The only source currently left is Reish Lakish, who remained “difficult,” but “difficult,” we said, is not so terrible, right?

This challenge is a strange challenge. “One could challenge.” Here we are digging a little into the Talmud’s derivations, because behind them sit many interesting substantive ideas. Why? “What about affliction, which has no general permission exception; will you say the same about labor, which does have a general permission exception?” What sort of challenge is that? Affliction has no general permission exception because it does not need one. Why was labor given a general permission exception? Where was labor permitted? In sacrifices, right? In order to offer the sacrifices, you have to permit labor. How else can I do slaughtering, taking life? I slaughter the sacrifice, the additional offerings. How can I permit this? How can I command additional offerings without permitting labor? You couldn’t slaughter. In the Temple—we’re talking about the Temple. Not rabbinic restrictions; we’re talking about Torah-level prohibitions. Torah-level prohibitions, not rabbinic restrictions. They permitted categories of labor, Torah labor prohibitions, not rabbinic restrictions.

So labor was permitted because otherwise you couldn’t bring the sacrifices. But affliction was not permitted because I can work while fasting—what’s the problem? Eating the sacrifice? I’ll eat it on Sunday, or not eat it at all. So what? Or at night, depending on what kind of sacrifice it is. Most sacrifices can be eaten at night too, by the way. In sacred matters, the night follows the day. But if you say that all sacrificial service overrides the prohibition of affliction because otherwise it can’t be done—how will you perform the sacrificial service during the day? At night it’s already after Yom Kippur. But sacrificial meat can often be eaten at night too. That’s the first Mishnah in Berakhot, right? The burning of fats and limbs is valid all night, and eating is until midnight. So you don’t need to permit affliction generally; labor, yes. So what kind of challenge is this? It’s not because labor is more lenient, but because labor has to be permitted.

Maybe there is some initial thought here to say that perhaps the Torah should not have obligated us to bring sacrifices because that would involve permitting labor prohibitions. But then that spills into the question of what Yom Kippur is all about. Is the core of Yom Kippur the Temple service? It would make no sense to say such a thing—without that, it wouldn’t be Yom Kippur. But if the essence of Yom Kippur could exist also without the service—a meeting with the Holy One including our fasting and, as we discussed, our cessation—then perhaps there is room for such an initial thought: if labor is as severe as affliction, perhaps it too should not be permitted, and one should not require sacrifices. To the point that the designated man can even eat? I said, that’s a side comment in any case in the Talmud; I don’t know what to answer to that.

So does that mean that the derivation is that wherever there is service, even affliction is permitted? For apparently if the designated man can eat, that means that if it is overridden, you can set it aside. The same question I would ask there. Obviously—then I would say cancel the designated man as well. And indeed the designated man, who carries all the sins of Israel into the wilderness… You wanted to learn labor from affliction, right? So which is more severe? Meaning, if affliction can be suspended in a situation where otherwise it’s impossible—and not like in the Temple where you thought that because… No, in affliction they don’t suspend it because you can manage without suspending it. In affliction too, you can also manage. That’s in the Temple. But from there you see that when it conflicts, you can set it aside. And indeed it is permitted. But then it becomes difficult whichever way you look at it. The Talmud itself challenges and says that affliction has not been generally permitted. On the contrary, the designated man is a challenge—there too it was permitted where necessary. It was not permitted because there was no need. The sacrifices you can offer even without suspending affliction; that only strengthens the question. As I noted earlier, I don’t have an answer to that. I don’t know. But let’s leave it for now.

So I think what lies behind this—perhaps the only way to understand it—is that in truth the essence of Yom Kippur is not the sacrifices. Because if it were the sacrifices, what kind of challenge would this be? There is an initial thought here saying: then don’t obligate bringing a sacrifice, so you won’t have to permit labor prohibitions generally. Rather, if you do obligate bringing a sacrifice, apparently labor prohibitions are not such a big deal in your eyes. Affliction is the main thing. And if you remember, when we began the opening lecture I spoke about the section of “After the Death,” where entry into the holy requires all the Yom Kippur Temple service, right? And then the question is what is really the main point: the Yom Kippur service, or the cessation and the fasting. And I said that the service is indeed entry into the holy—that is the essence of the service. But Yom Kippur’s encounter with the Holy One can take place even without the service, as happens today when we have no Temple. And that is probably the idea in the other sources, not from the section of “After the Death.” And maybe that is what lies behind this challenge: that the challenge is really saying, wait, Yom Kippur itself did not have to require service. And if we remember that the section of “After the Death” talks about entering the holy, not about Yom Kippur itself, then there is no problem at all. When you enter the holy on an ordinary weekday, do it with the service—no problem. But when on Yom Kippur you need to cease, then leave it; give up the service dimension. Just as today, when we have no Temple, we give up the service dimension and still the day atones. But it says in the end that this is on Yom Kippur. And to that they ask: why not give it up? Exactly—that’s what they ask. Fine, so again, that’s just a remark.

The Talmud now proposes another source. So we rejected that—“one could challenge,” right? By the way, “one could challenge” itself leaves some room for discussion. “One could challenge” means it would be possible to challenge. It doesn’t say: but after all, affliction has no general permission exception. It does not state the challenge flatly. “One could challenge” means there is some hesitation in the Talmud’s language. I think it is not entirely decisive here that this is really a knockdown challenge. At least that is how the music of the Talmud sounds to me.

“Rather, the punishment regarding affliction need not be stated, for it could be learned from labor. Just as labor, which has a general permission exception, incurs karet, affliction, which has no general permission exception, all the more so. So why was it stated? To make it free.” In short, they reverse the whole thing. And of course they reject that too—this is a stacked game—because just as there is a leniency in labor, namely that it has a general permission exception, there is also a stringency in labor, namely that it applies on Sabbaths and festivals, whereas affliction does not. Right? So this is simply the reverse move from before. It’s didactic, but obviously it doesn’t work.

Ravina said: this Tanna derives “etzem, etzem”—“this very day,” “this very day.” It is free. Because if it were not free, one could challenge it as we challenged earlier. Meaning, there is a verbal analogy of “this very day” from labor to affliction. Fine? Now this is free. How do we know? The Talmud explains afterward, but it is free. Therefore one can make the verbal analogy. And here the Talmud continues: if it were not free, one could challenge it. Now that it is free, one cannot challenge it. Right? Therefore the freedom is needed.

So now we don’t need the a fortiori argument at all? The freedom here is apparently not based on the a fortiori argument. After all, we challenged the a fortiori argument. In a moment we’ll see where this freedom comes from. But here they say that a verbal analogy that is not free could be challenged. Earlier we said otherwise. Earlier we said that a verbal analogy that is not free cannot be made at all, not merely that one can challenge it. A verbal analogy that is free—challenging doesn’t help. But a verbal analogy that is not free, we simply do not make. What they did earlier was challenge the freedom, not the verbal analogy. The a fortiori argument created the freedom, and when they challenged the a fortiori argument, there was no freedom. But the assumption was that once there is a verbal analogy, there are no challenges to it. Challenges are not made against verbal analogies. From here it sounds otherwise. From here it sounds like this: a free verbal analogy cannot be challenged; a non-free verbal analogy can in principle be made, but if there is a challenge, then it can be challenged. Maybe “free” here means free on both sides, and “not free” means free only on one side? It’s not mentioned here. It sounds like freedom on one side—we’ll see in a moment.

The issue of the extension—the phrase “this very day” comes to exclude the extension. We said earlier that “on this very day” teaches that a person is not liable for the extension, if he failed to observe or did labor during the extension. So how can you say that it is free? Maybe he disagrees with what was said earlier. Good question. I really don’t know. One would have to look in the commentators around the Talmud; I didn’t look that much.

In any case, from here it seems somewhat unlike what we said earlier—that with a verbal analogy, if it is not free, one can challenge it, but as long as there is no challenge one can make it. “From where do we know that it is indeed free?” The Talmud says: five verses are written regarding labor. One for the daytime warning, one for the nighttime warning, one for the daytime punishment, one for the nighttime punishment, and one to free up. That one is superfluous, in order to derive from it regarding labor both by day and by night.

So the freedom here is not the same freedom we discussed before, because the freedom there would have made the fourth verse superfluous, not the fifth. Right? There is one for daytime warning, one for nighttime warning, right? One for daytime punishment, one for nighttime punishment. According to what we said before, the punishment itself is superfluous because it can be learned by an a fortiori argument. Right? Then not the fifth is superfluous; already the fourth—or the third and fourth—would be superfluous. So the freedom here is not freedom by force of that a fortiori argument; rather, there is simply something here that in fact teaches nothing because everything is already covered. That is what serves for the verbal analogy.

So the challenge stated above is, I think, the only place I know—again, I did not check this all the way through—the only place I know where a challenge is made to a verbal analogy. Again—what? Where is a challenge to a verbal analogy? Again, the Talmud says that if this were not free, then the challenge from above would knock down the verbal analogy. In the earlier section of the sugya, the challenge attacks the a fortiori argument and removes the freedom; that is fine, the challenge attacks an a fortiori argument, not a verbal analogy. But here the challenge attacks the verbal analogy itself—or would attack it were it not free. And since it is free, the challenge does not help. And from here it sounds unlike what we saw before. From here it sounds like a non-free verbal analogy can in principle be made, only that a challenge can knock it down. That is a major novelty; I don’t know another source for it. So that is what seems to emerge here from the Talmud. Again, I didn’t examine the surrounding literature very much; I’m just reading the plain sense of the Talmud right now.

One may need to look into the topic of freedom itself. No, the opposite. The Talmud says: since here it is free, we don’t need to search further. It says: since here it is free, therefore the challenge doesn’t knock down the verbal analogy. But that implies that in a place where there was a verbal analogy that was not free, in principle one could still make it—only if there were a challenge, then it would fall. And here, because it is free, even though there is a challenge, it does not fall. Okay?

This division between day and night is strange. Why on Sabbath don’t they ask where there is a prohibition of labor for the night and for the day? This division is very… Good question, although we do find it elsewhere. In Sukkot, for example, there is a distinction between day and night. And really not everywhere in the Torah does the night follow the day… Not everywhere in the Torah—only with sacred matters. Fine, in sacred matters. But regarding festival joy too there are separate sources for night as opposed to day. Some claim that at night there is no commandment of joy at all, only by day. There are distinctions. One really does need to understand why the Talmud here wants to distinguish between them. Maybe because there is some mixing here between sacred matters—that is, the Temple service—and labor and affliction, which are not sacred matters. So perhaps even the ordinary dimensions of Yom Kippur could have been learned from sacred matters, and there was room to distinguish between night and day. I don’t know.

In short, another source is then brought: Rabbi Yishmael taught: “Affliction” is stated here and “affliction” is stated elsewhere. Just as there there is no punishment unless there was warning, so too here there is no punishment unless there was warning. The affliction referred to there is the betrothed maiden; we won’t go into that here. But this is another derivation that there must be some warning. Another source: Acha bar Yaakov said that he derives “Sabbath of solemn rest” from the creation Sabbath. “Sabbath of solemn rest” is Yom Kippur. Just as there there is no punishment unless there was warning, so too here there is no punishment unless there was warning. All these sources, once again, go against Reish Lakish, because in all of them the wording is not that there is a warning, but that there is no punishment unless there was warning. Okay? They are not learning the existence of the warning itself; rather they reject the possibility of punishment without warning, as Reish Lakish wanted to say.

By the way, this makes it look a bit as though Reish Lakish really does disagree with all these sources, and is not merely an introduction as I suggested earlier, with these later sources complementing him. Rav Pappa said: it itself is called Sabbath, as it is written, “you shall observe your Sabbath.” Meaning, since it is called Sabbath, you say: it is Sabbath. Everything stated about Sabbath is stated here as well. This is a kind of, let’s call it, textual clarification. Not exactly a verbal analogy, but a clarification. It is called Sabbath. Not because here the word Sabbath appears and there the word Sabbath appears, and therefore all the laws from there apply here, but simply because the word Sabbath tells you that there is here a cessation like that of the regular Sabbath. Why not learn “Sabbath, Sabbath…”? Because this is even stronger—it is clarification.

It’s like at the beginning of tractate Kiddushin, page 3, where “acquisition” is learned from Ephron’s field. What does “acquisition” from Ephron’s field mean? Ritva there, and Tosafot—especially Ritva—notes that “acquisition, acquisition” from Ephron’s field does not mean a verbal analogy. It is a clarification. It clarifies for me the concept of acquisition; it is a dictionary. It’s not that here it says acquisition and there it says acquisition, therefore all the laws here apply there. For example “to her, to her,” the verbal analogy between a slave and a woman—that is a verbal analogy. We are not learning the meaning of the word “to her”; rather, because the same word appears here and there, all the laws that apply there apply here. But here we are discussing what “solemn rest” means—it’s simply a dictionary entry. Such a dictionary can even be made from verses in the Prophets, not only in the Torah. That’s what the medieval authorities say. “Zedekiah son of Chenaanah made for himself iron horns”—there in Bava Kamma 3b—that is a verse from the Prophets. And everyone asks: how can you make a verbal analogy from the Prophets? They answer: clarification can be made even from the Prophets. Why? Because it just teaches you what the word means; it’s not a verbal analogy. Here too, “Sabbath of solemn rest” is not really a verbal analogy. It simply tells you: this is a Sabbath, plain and simple. What do you want? Whatever there is in Sabbath there is here too. This too is Sabbath. Fine?

So all these sources are basically alternative sources to Reish Lakish. Exactly.

Now one more remark, and I really have to finish. One more remark regarding the positive commandment connected with labor. Until now we discussed the prohibition of affliction—that’s what we’ve done so far. Regarding the positive commandment of labor, let’s go back for a moment to Maimonides. Maimonides says that anything learned by derivation is rabbinic. And you cannot formulate a warning from it; there is no punishment unless there was warning. Okay? If there is a punishment verse, that is something else. What happens regarding a positive commandment? If I have a positive commandment learned by derivation—not a warning, not a prohibition, but a positive commandment—here there is room to hesitate. If I were learning from the rule that one does not formulate warnings by logical derivation, then for a positive commandment it isn’t a warning; after all there is no punishment for it. So perhaps as to the prohibition itself one could derive it logically; it just couldn’t serve as a basis for punishment. There is no warning here. But we saw that in Maimonides he says more than that. In the second principle, Maimonides says that something learned by derivation is rabbinic. Not merely that one does not punish for it—it simply is not a Torah prohibition at all; it is rabbinic. If so, then obviously that also applies to a positive commandment. Therefore with a positive commandment too there is no option to learn it from derivation. So if a positive commandment regarding labor is not written for us, the question returns: what do we now do with the positive commandment regarding labor? Here we do not even have the fallback that we had for the prohibition, namely that since there is a punishment verse, if we find a derivation for the warning that is enough. Because for a positive commandment there is no punishment, and the karet here is not for the positive commandment. So where is there, how can there be, a source for a positive commandment regarding labor? Yet Maimonides writes that there is a positive commandment regarding labor. Okay? That is an even harder question than the prohibition of affliction. Because for the prohibition of affliction there is a punishment verse, and when there is a punishment verse, a derivation can suffice. But for the positive commandment—if all we had was the rule that one does not formulate warnings by logic, I would say fine, that concerns warnings, not positive commandments. But according to Maimonides, why can one not formulate warnings by logic? Because something learned by logic is rabbinic. It’s not just a special rule about negative-commandment warnings; it’s rabbinic in general—it’s not Torah-level. So you cannot make a positive commandment out of it either, not only a prohibition. And for a positive commandment I have no punishment written in the Torah. So if there is no punishment, how can there be a positive commandment? Yet Maimonides’ view is that there is a positive commandment, right? And where is it learned from? From “Sabbath, Sabbath,” right? In Maimonides it says from “solemn rest”—we read that Maimonides. I think that is the conclusion of the sugya here. The first “solemn rest,” no? “Solemn rest” for washing and anointing and all that, and the extension of Sabbath—you know the first “solemn rest” says, because Sabbath is the main thing there, that “solemn rest” adds to it. And that is why Maimonides says, since “Sabbath of solemn rest” is written several times, apparently one instance is for labor and one is for affliction. And that is the conclusion of the sugya in Yoma that we just read. At the end Rav Pappa says that it is called Sabbath. “It is called Sabbath” means a clarification, not a verbal analogy. Whatever there is on Sabbath there is also on Yom Kippur: a positive commandment regarding labor, a prohibition regarding labor, whatever you found on Sabbath. No need for anything else. Right? That is Maimonides.

But if you saw the Avnei Nezer—I referred you to it in the email. Whoever, by the way, did not email me doesn’t get the emails, so whoever didn’t should send one, because I didn’t add him to the mailing list. So the Avnei Nezer there learns from the Talmud in Shabbat 114 that at least according to Rashi there is no positive commandment regarding labor on Yom Kippur. In my opinion he is wrong even according to Rashi; certainly it is not required by Rashi, but that is his claim. And the basis is what we said today, because indeed there is no verse and a derivation can’t help; there is no source for a positive commandment on Yom Kippur. In the Talmud there one could debate whether it really says this or not in Shabbat 114, but that is the basis. The basis is simply that there is no warning. But Maimonides who says—Maimonides who says that there is a positive commandment, and Maimonides’ view is that even a derivation here would not help—that is very difficult. We have no choice but to say that this is the conclusion of the Talmud in Yoma 81. “Solemn rest” is written; “solemn rest”—whatever there is on Sabbath there is also on Yom Kippur, including a positive commandment, including a prohibition, including everything. Okay?

So I’m not going to return to the Talmud in Shabbat 114 because that would already be too much—I lingered here too long. I’ll leave you with some of my summaries and then maybe you’ll be able to look there. Summaries for tomorrow? What do you mean summaries for tomorrow? Not tomorrow—for the afternoon lecture on Sunday. What do you mean tomorrow? What tomorrow? There is nothing tomorrow. On Thursday the lecture is on Yoma. On Thursday, the continuation of the lecture on Yoma.