חדש באתר: עוזר בינה מלאכותית המבוסס על כתביו ושיעוריו של הרב מיכאל אברהם

Yoma, Chapter 8, Lesson 6

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This is an English translation (via GPT-5.4). Read the original Hebrew version.

This transcript was produced automatically using artificial intelligence. There may be inaccuracies in the transcribed content and in speaker identification.

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Table of Contents

  • Transition from labor to affliction and the place of the laws of resting on the tenth
  • The six afflictions in the Mishnah and their reduction in the Talmud
  • “Forbidden” versus “liable,” and the difficulty from the punishment of karet
  • Maimonides in the fourteenth principle and the counting of punishments versus karet
  • The half-measure answer and the dispute between Rabbi Yoḥanan and Reish Lakish
  • The difficulty from the baraita, “Even though they said it is forbidden in all of them,” and its resolutions
  • Deriving “shabbaton, shevut” for the other afflictions and what that means for karet
  • Rashi’s interpretation: asmachta and shabbaton as parallel to Sabbath shevut
  • The verses in Daniel as clarification: washing and anointing are called affliction
  • The source of “affliction that involves loss of life” and the exclusion of karet from the other afflictions
  • Three systematic frameworks among the medieval authorities (Rishonim) and the dispute among halakhic decisors
  • The She’iltot and Maimonides: Torah-level status for additional afflictions and the structure of the positive commandment versus the prohibition

Summary

General Overview

The text concludes the framework of the commandments of Yom Kippur and shifts the focus of study from the laws of labor, which are similar to the Sabbath and Jewish holidays and whose details Maimonides does not duplicate, to the laws of affliction, which are the core of the “laws of Yom Kippur.” The Mishnah lists six afflictions, and the Talmud narrows and analyzes their status: what is Torah-level and what is rabbinic, what is learned from “and you shall afflict yourselves” and what is learned from “shabbaton,” and to what karet applies. In the course of the discussion, the meaning of the language “forbidden” versus “liable” becomes clarified and its connection to punishment, especially regarding karet and half-measures, and a broad dispute among the medieval authorities (Rishonim) is developed over whether the other afflictions are merely asmachta and rabbinic, or Torah-level only as a positive commandment, or Torah-level even as a prohibition but without karet by force of a limiting derivation.

Transition from labor to affliction and the place of the laws of resting on the tenth

The framework of Yom Kippur includes a positive commandment and a prohibition regarding labor and cessation, and a positive commandment and a prohibition regarding affliction, but the central topic going forward is affliction. Maimonides, in the laws of resting on the tenth, includes both cessation from labor and cessation from enjoyment, but he does not detail the labor prohibitions because they are like the Sabbath and the details are found in the laws of the Sabbath. The text emphasizes that this is the essential place of the labor laws of Yom Kippur even though there is no full repetition of the details of the Sabbath.

The six afflictions in the Mishnah and their reduction in the Talmud

The Mishnah opens by saying that Yom Kippur is forbidden with respect to eating, drinking, washing, anointing, wearing sandals, and marital relations. The Talmud presents drinking as included within eating, so there are not six but five, and later it also emerges that anointing is included within drinking, so there may be a further reduction. The question remains how the count of five is nevertheless maintained, and this is postponed to the conclusion after clarifying all the afflictions.

“Forbidden” versus “liable,” and the difficulty from the punishment of karet

The Talmud challenges the Mishnah’s wording “forbidden,” because eating on Yom Kippur is punishable by karet, and one would expect the wording “liable” when there is punishment. The text explains that “forbidden” means a prohibition without punishment, and that can fit a rabbinic prohibition, a positive commandment, or a prohibition without punishment, so “forbidden” does not necessarily exclude Torah law but rather excludes penal liability. The text also raises that even regarding karet, although it is a punishment from Heaven, the Talmud assumes that linguistically it is proper to say “liable to karet” and not “forbidden,” and connects this to the broader question whether “liable” depends specifically on something imposed by a religious court or also includes punishments from Heaven.

Maimonides in the fourteenth principle and the counting of punishments versus karet

The text cites Maimonides in the fourteenth principle, where he mocks the Behag for counting punishments of karet as commandments, because karet is not imposed by a religious court but by the Holy One, blessed be He. Maimonides is prepared to understand counting punishments as a commandment when it concerns the religious court, like lashes, but karet and death at the hands of Heaven are not commandments imposed on a person or a religious court. A possible answer on behalf of the Behag is brought from the law that those liable to karet who received lashes are exempted from their karet, along with the historical connection to the ordination controversy in Safed in the sixteenth century, which aimed to make lashes possible in order to exempt forced converts from karet; and it is discussed whether the lashes here are an ordinary punishment or an alternative track meant to replace karet.

The half-measure answer and the dispute between Rabbi Yoḥanan and Reish Lakish

The Talmud answers that the Mishnah uses the word “forbidden” because it is dealing with a half-measure, in which there is no punishment of karet. The dispute is cited between Rabbi Yoḥanan, who holds that a half-measure is forbidden by Torah law, and Reish Lakish, who holds that a half-measure is permitted by Torah law, and the Talmud determines that even Reish Lakish agrees that it is rabbinically forbidden. The text emphasizes that this proves that the wording “forbidden” can also fit a Torah prohibition when there is no penal liability, and therefore “forbidden” is not evidence that the prohibition is rabbinic. The scope of half-measures in actions as opposed to eating prohibitions is discussed through the Sefat Emet at the beginning of tractate Shabbat and Rabbi Shimon Shkop’s explanation of ḥazi le-itztarufe as a quantitative deficiency as opposed to a qualitative deficiency in labor.

The difficulty from the baraita, “Even though they said it is forbidden in all of them,” and its resolutions

A baraita is brought that says, “Even though they said it is forbidden in all of them, they only said one is punished with karet for eating, drinking, and doing labor alone,” from which it emerges that “forbidden” is used even in a context where some of the items do involve karet. The text explains that the Talmud resolves this with “this is what it means,” namely that the word “forbidden” refers to a half-measure, while in a full measure one is punished with karet only for eating, drinking, and labor. Another answer is brought, “teach ‘forbidden’ with respect to the others,” according to which “forbidden” was chosen as an umbrella term because of the other afflictions that do not involve karet, and so a minimal common denominator was used even though the information regarding eating and drinking is not complete.

Deriving “shabbaton, shevut” for the other afflictions and what that means for karet

The Talmud brings a midrash from “the other books of the school of Rav” from which the prohibition of washing, anointing, wearing sandals, and marital relations is learned from “shabbaton, shevut.” The text raises a difficulty: if all the afflictions are an extension of cessation, then why would deriving them from “shabbaton” reduce karet, and it suggests that this reflects a distinction between affliction for which karet was stated and additional cessation for which there is no karet. The text suggests that “shabbaton” expands the positive-commandment side rather than the prohibition side, and therefore there is no karet, and integrates this with the earlier discussion of the source of the prohibition in affliction.

Rashi’s interpretation: asmachta and shabbaton as parallel to Sabbath shevut

Rashi explains that “shabbaton” regarding affliction comes to add to the affliction of eating and drinking, and just as on the Sabbath “shabbaton” serves as support for the rabbis to require abstention from labors that are not “full-fledged labor,” so too here. The text notes that from Rashi there emerges the possibility that this is asmachta, in which case there is no need to build a new Torah-level model in order to explain the absence of karet, but there remains uncertainty whether “the rabbis attached it” means mere asmachta or an expansion of Torah law that is not included in the punishments of labor.

The verses in Daniel as clarification: washing and anointing are called affliction

On page 76b the question is asked: “From where do we know that washing and anointing are called affliction?” and verses are brought from the book of Daniel, “Pleasant bread I did not eat… and I did not anoint myself with oil,” and “to afflict yourself before your God,” in order to show that washing and anointing are called affliction. The text explains that words of the Prophets and Writings can serve as gilluy milta, clarification of a term in the Torah, similar to examples in Kiddushin regarding the interpretation of “taking,” and therefore seemingly there would be room to include this within Torah affliction. The text raises the difficulty of why “shabbaton, shevut” is then needed, and explains that the solution depends on the different approaches: if everything is only asmachta there is no contradiction, and if this is a Torah-level clarification, then the question of karet regarding the other afflictions becomes sharper.

The source of “affliction that involves loss of life” and the exclusion of karet from the other afflictions

On page 74b a derivation is brought from “you shall afflict yourselves” clarifying that affliction is “passive omission,” and the conclusion is brought that it means “affliction that is loss of life; and what is that? Eating and drinking.” The text presents the possibility among the medieval authorities (Rishonim) that this is the source that excludes karet from the other afflictions even if they are Torah-level, because karet is linked specifically to affliction involving loss of life. From here a third option is built, in which there is a Torah prohibition regarding additional afflictions, but karet is explicitly excluded.

Three systematic frameworks among the medieval authorities (Rishonim) and the dispute among halakhic decisors

The text organizes three possibilities: the other afflictions are rabbinic and the verses are merely asmachta; the other afflictions are Torah-level but only as a positive commandment and therefore there is no karet; the other afflictions are Torah-level also as a prohibition but there is no karet due to the limiting phrase “loss of life.” The text notes that most of the medieval authorities (Rishonim) and most halakhic decisors tend toward the rabbinic view, and cites Tosafot in Avodah Zarah: “And Rabbeinu Tam explained that all the afflictions of Yom Kippur are only rabbinic, and the verses are merely asmachta,” along with parallels in Tosafot in Nedarim and Niddah. The text also cites the old Tosafot, who raise the possibility that “even though all of them are from the Torah,” with a limitation of karet, but conclude that they incline toward rabbinic status on the basis of the permissions for a king, a bride, and those with sores, and present opposite this an explanation of being inherently permitted in the body of the law, namely that the prohibition is specifically “washing for pleasure.”

The She’iltot and Maimonides: Torah-level status for additional afflictions and the structure of the positive commandment versus the prohibition

In She’iltot 167 it says “He warned us,” and it includes eating, drinking, wearing sandals, washing, anointing, and marital relations as “Torah-level,” and divides the phrase “and you shall afflict yourselves” five times corresponding to the five afflictions. In She’iltot 168 a question is brought about shoes for someone whose feet hurt, and it is discussed whether the prohibition depends on pleasure, and the text notes that this fits better as an essential permission and not as a deferred permission. In Maimonides, positive commandment 164, it says that “you shall afflict yourselves” is affliction involving “loss of life,” namely eating and drinking, and “so too the tradition has come that washing, anointing, wearing sandals, and marital relations are forbidden,” and he connects this to “it shall be for you a Sabbath of complete rest, and you shall afflict yourselves.” The text emphasizes that in Maimonides it appears that the inclusion of the additional afflictions is on the side of the positive commandment of cessation and affliction, whereas in prohibition 196 he deals with eating and drinking, and so a structure is created in which the other afflictions are not a source for karet.

Full Transcript

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay, so in the previous lectures we saw the fundamental commandments, and with that I more or less finished the framework of Yom Kippur. The positive commandment and prohibition regarding labor, regarding cessation, and the positive commandment and prohibition regarding affliction. What I want to get into now is more the topic of affliction. Naturally, we’ll need the question of labor less, because that’s like an ordinary Sabbath and Jewish holiday. What is usually called the laws of Yom Kippur is of course the laws of affliction. Also in Maimonides, in the laws of resting on the tenth, as I said, those laws do indeed detail the cessation from labor as well, not only the cessation from affliction, from enjoyment, sorry. But when you look from the standpoint of the laws, of course there’s almost nothing there about the labor prohibitions, because basically he says it’s like the Sabbath, and you should look in the laws of the Sabbath for the rest. That doesn’t mean this is not the place for the laws of labor; it is the place for the laws of labor. He just didn’t duplicate everything. Otherwise, if it were structured like Passover or Sukkot, then he wouldn’t mention the obligation to cease from labor at all; that would remain under the laws of resting on a Jewish holiday. So it’s clear that he just doesn’t repeat it because there’s no need to duplicate things, but essentially their proper place is here. Okay, that’s just to close the framework. Now, in the Mishnah at the beginning of the chapter on page 73, chapter eight, 73. From the whole matter I can infer that you didn’t run through the chapter. I said it’s worthwhile to run through the chapter while learning, because then I think the picture you get is more complete. I’m not going by the order of the pages; I’m going by a kind of thematic order.

[Speaker B] 73a? No, 73b. 74. What are you looking at?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] He’s in the opposition too, he’s in the opposition too, no talking here. I know. In a minute my fear will fall on all the peoples, in a minute. It reminds me of the lectures with Rabbi Lichtenstein. I was there only for one or two lectures, but there was real fear there. If he asked you something, or you said something, and he saw you hadn’t prepared the lecture, he didn’t have to do much—you just buried yourself underground from the sheer realization that he had caught you. Right, okay, so, you know, I’m not worthy, fine, so I use his name. Okay, in the Mishnah at the beginning of the chapter it says: Yom Kippur is forbidden with respect to eating and drinking, and washing, and anointing, and wearing sandals, and marital relations. So there are basically six afflictions here: eating, drinking, washing, anointing, wearing sandals, and marital relations. In the Talmud it is explained that it’s not six, it’s five, because drinking is included in eating. We’ll later see that anointing is also included in drinking, and then it could even go down to four. The question is how we nevertheless remain with five, but we’ll leave that for the conclusion after we see all the afflictions. Where do these afflictions come from? What is their status? Torah-level, rabbinic, is there a prohibition on them, is there a positive commandment on them, karet, no karet? On that there are disagreements among the medieval authorities (Rishonim), and the seeds of that already start to appear in the Talmudic passages themselves. In the Talmud, right at the beginning of the chapter, it says as follows: “Forbidden? It is punishable by karet!” What do you mean “forbidden”? It carries the punishment of karet. What is the contradiction between the term “forbidden” and the fact that there is a punishment of karet?

[Speaker C] “Forbidden” is a prohibition, “forbidden” is an prohibition.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Usually, when there is a punishment, you say “liable,” not “forbidden.” Right, “liable.” Now “liable,” of course, if it was unintentional, then say liable to a sin-offering, or if intentional then liable to whatever one is liable for intentionally, but usually “forbidden” means a lighter prohibition. Which prohibition? Not entirely clear. In many places it seems that when it says “forbidden,” the meaning is rabbinic. But actually that doesn’t have to be so, because “forbidden” can also mean forbidden by Torah law. And that’s why I emphasized that “forbidden” means in contrast to “liable,” not in contrast to “forbidden by Torah law.” “Liable” means liable to punishment. Now, if there is a Torah prohibition that carries no punishment, it may also be possible to call that “forbidden.” For example, if there is a positive commandment. There is no punishment for neglecting a positive commandment, but it is certainly relevant to say that it is forbidden to do that, because one is neglecting a positive commandment. Okay? You say “forbidden” and not “liable,” because for neglect of a positive commandment there is no liability, you’re not liable to anything. What? Circumcision has karet.

[Speaker B] Right, so there are positive commandments that also have punishment.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Where there is punishment, then indeed, simply speaking, it should not say “forbidden”; it should say “liable.” Now regarding positive commandments, yes.

[Speaker D] Here—where does it use “forbidden” in place of… this—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The Talmud later on, we’ll see in a moment. I’m still at the stage of the question. At the beginning the Talmud immediately asks: Wait, “forbidden”? There’s karet! Why is that a contradiction? It’s forbidden, and it carries karet. When you say “forbidden” as opposed to “liable,” the meaning is that it’s a prohibition without punishment. A prohibition without punishment could be a positive-commandment prohibition, it could be rabbinic, it could maybe even be a prohibition that carries no punishment, like a prohibition linked to a positive commandment or a prohibition without an action, or various things of that sort. So it isn’t entirely one-dimensional. I’ll say more than that: there’s a very interesting Maimonides in the fourteenth principle. The discussions here always take us to foundational and principled questions, in the counting of the commandments and in general. Maimonides counts there the—he explains there how punishments should be counted. The punishment of lashes, death, burning, stoning, execution, and likewise fines, karet, and all sorts of things like that. And Maimonides argues there that punishments, it seems to me, as far as I remember, punishments should not be counted separately. Okay? Now, he brings there the Behag, where the Behag not only counted punishments, but also counted punishments of karet. And there Maimonides mocks him. He says: Fine, counting punishments—because if you tell me to count the punishment of lashes, why? Because there is a commandment upon the religious court to administer lashes. So I understand why you would count that as a commandment. Say eating pork—one is lashed for that, so there is a prohibition against eating pork. But to lash for eating pork, you can relate to that as a commandment, because that is a commandment on the religious court. The religious court has to lash the pork-eater. The pork-eater is under a prohibition; it is forbidden to eat pork. The obligation to administer lashes is also a commandment. So you can say it is one detail in the prohibition of eating pork, whose punishment is lashes, and you can say it is a separate commandment on the religious court. That he may perhaps accept. But karet—what sense does it make to count karet? What, is it a commandment on the Holy One, blessed be He? The one who imposes karet is not the religious court; the one who imposes karet is the Holy One, blessed be He. So how can you relate to karet as an independent commandment?

[Speaker C] But the Talmud already says that for an unintentional violation one has to bring a sin-offering, so therefore it should be counted.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Then count the sin-offering—why are you counting karet? The sin-offering is brought for a prohibition, so I’m saying: you can count liabilities to sin-offerings, that’s a different discussion. But what sense does it make to count liability to karet? Even if you view punishments as a commandment on the religious court, that itself is a big question—how to view punishments, whether it’s a commandment on the religious court or not—but even so—

[Speaker E] Liability to death at the hands of Heaven is the same thing.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right, right. Therefore death at the hands of Heaven or karet—this is something for which Maimonides mocks the Behag: what sense is there in counting it? Even according to your own view, that punishments can be counted because they are a commandment on the religious court, but these things we don’t count as commandments imposed on the Holy One, blessed be He.

[Speaker B] Doesn’t the knowledge itself have value?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The knowledge is nice, but what does that have to do with counting? It’s not a commandment.

[Speaker B] So he won’t say, “I didn’t know.” What? If we don’t count it, won’t we know it?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Why? There are many things we don’t count and yet we know. A half-measure, which we’ll see in a moment, isn’t counted anywhere, and yet we know that a half-measure is forbidden by Torah law according to Rabbi Yoḥanan. So that is what Maimonides says. Now actually there are some answers, because it says that those liable to karet who were lashed were exempted from their karet—the Talmud says that. So it could be that karet is counted to tell you that here there is a matter of administering lashes in order to exempt the person from karet. You know that in the sixteenth century in Safed, when the ordination controversy arose, right, the students of Maharai Beirav in Safed wanted to renew ordination and ordain him, and Maharalbach and the sages of Jerusalem objected. Their fundamental purpose in renewing ordination was to enable the religious court to administer lashes, because only an ordained religious court can administer lashes. Why was it important to administer lashes? In order to exempt people from karet. All the forced converts and the problems there after the expulsion from Spain at the end of the fifteenth century, or in the several expulsions that took place during the fifteenth century, there were people who apparently had become liable to karet, and if there is no ordained religious court, then you can’t lash them and you won’t succeed in exempting them from karet. So for our purposes, there are those who want to argue—I don’t remember who exactly—but there are those who want to argue that the Behag counts the karet penalties because that’s basically why there is a commandment on the religious court to administer lashes. Fine. So now the question is whether this is the ordinary law of lashes, or lashes that come to exempt from karet. If it’s the ordinary law of lashes, then it is included in the commandment of administering lashes for transgressions. Why is there any need for this extra point that this commandment carries karet? Fine, that’s a discussion in its own right—how to relate to those lashes that exempt from karet: do you administer lashes for the transgression, and that automatically exempts from karet, or are the lashes a separate obligation whose purpose is to serve as a substitute for karet, independent of the obligation of lashes from “then the judge shall cause him to be beaten” for every prohibition. But that’s a different discussion. For our purposes here, if we return to this topic, then even in this case there is a punishment, but the punishment is karet. So why does the Talmud see a contradiction between the word “forbidden” and the words “liable to karet”? Fine, if there is liability to death or lashes, then you tell me it should have said “liable” and not “forbidden.” But if the punishment is karet—karet is not something we impose; it’s just what comes out. So there definitely seems to be room there to use the language of “forbidden.” Forbidden, and of course the result is that whoever violates it will receive karet. So we see that even in the concept of “liable”—and this is what emerges from the Talmud here—the concept of “liable” is not necessarily only what the religious court imposes on you. Even with regard to karet, the correct formulation, at least as the Talmud assumes here, is to say “liable.” Liable to karet. That doesn’t mean it should be counted as a commandment. Liable to karet—the Holy One, blessed be He, will cut him off, not the religious court. But still, in the terminology we are supposed to use, it is terminology of “liable,” the kind used for punishments, and not terminology of “forbidden.”

[Speaker F] Okay, so can’t one say that this is for someone who has prohibitions and is liable to karet? Each and every one, if unintentional—its intentional form is karet and its unintentional form is a sin-offering.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And can’t one say that the assumption—

[Speaker F] is that a person doesn’t deliberately violate a prohibition, only unintentionally, and therefore you say—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] that it should have said “liable” here not because of karet, because karet indeed could fit the language of “forbidden,” but because if it’s unintentional it’s a sin-offering, and regarding that one says no—even if so, there is still the possibility that he doesn’t transgress intentionally; there’s no need to assume that’s specifically the typical case, it doesn’t matter. It could be, it could be. The implication may be what someone here noted earlier regarding positive commandments. Say Passover and circumcision, where there is karet for a positive commandment. There there really are no lashes. The question is whether there too they would say “liable.” Someone who did not circumcise is liable? Someone who did not circumcise violated something—the question is how one should say it there. I don’t know, maybe you’re right. In any case, that is what the Talmud says: how can the term “forbidden” be used here when in fact there is a punishment of karet? And actually, even from the language of the Talmud it doesn’t sound like what you say, because it should have said “punishable by a sin-offering,” not “punishable by karet.” If it says “punishable by karet,” it sounds like the problem with “forbidden” is the karet itself, not the fact that the unintentional case brings a sin-offering. Otherwise bring that. And anyway, the Mishnah generally wants to state what is permitted and what is forbidden, so therefore it writes—no, no problem, write “liable,” then write what the liability is, but write “liable,” not “forbidden.” Why—where do you see a Mishnah—where do you see Mishnayot like that? No, but where—what do you mean, you say that generally this is the Mishnah’s style? Where is that generally the Mishnah’s style?

[Speaker C] What’s the difference between a person who is liable for something—when you say, of course so.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What do you mean? Once you tell him he is liable, he understands that it is also forbidden. In many places. “Whoever ate an olive-sized amount is liable.” No one says “it is forbidden to eat an olive-sized amount.” Whoever ate—obviously, if he is liable, then he transgressed. It’s a bit reminiscent of the Talmud at the beginning of Berakhot, you know: “Where is the tanna standing that he teaches, from when does one recite Shema in the evening?” The Talmud asks: where is the tanna standing—how do you know that one must recite Shema at all, before you tell me from when? So the Talmud says: the tanna is standing on the verse—it’s written in the Torah that one must recite Shema, and the Mishnah tells you from when to recite Shema. We come to the Talmud with background; we don’t come as a blank slate. We understand that there is a prohibition—what? When “liable” is written, yes, but maybe it’s from the Torah; that doesn’t have to appear in the Mishnah. The Mishnah can go straight to “liable,” because we know it’s forbidden—

[Speaker C] From the Torah we don’t know the quantity, so here the Mishnah—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] says—the Mishnah says—

[Speaker C] this and this and this are like a dried fig.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, the Mishnah should have—that’s what the Talmud assumes—the Mishnah should have said “liable,” and you would have understood automatically that this is included in “you shall afflict yourselves,” which is what is forbidden there.

[Speaker C] The Mishnah will write “liable” or “exempt”—the dispute of Rabbi Eliezer—but—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The Talmud asks why not at the outset. And the question is why the Talmud asks this, because the Talmud expected that if there were a punishment here, if we are dealing with something for which there is punishment, then from the beginning it should say “liable” and not “forbidden.” Why? Because for the Talmud it is obvious that if you say “liable,” we also understand the prohibition; just use the precise language. If you write “forbidden,” it implies there is no punishment—you’re confusing us. And plain eating—

[Speaker C] is usually an olive-sized amount, right?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And here it says the size of a large date. Therefore why doesn’t it just say “liable” even for an olive-sized amount?

[Speaker C] Why? And here if it says “forbidden,” don’t you understand that eating is forbidden?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I don’t know. And how much is forbidden? So now if it says “liable,” I know he’s liable. Now how much makes him liable? Same thing. What’s the difference? What is forbidden? It’s the same thing. Whether it says “forbidden” or “liable,” it’s the same. In both cases, if you say either “forbidden” or “liable,” you can always ask: and in what quantity is he liable? And if it’s explained later, then it will also be explained later for “liable” in what quantity. What’s the problem? What do you gain by saying “forbidden” instead of “liable”?

[Speaker G] If they had said “liable,” it would have made the wording of the Mishnah very cumbersome. The eater, the drinker, the washer, the anointer, the one who wears sandals, the one who has marital relations—liable on the day…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] There are plenty of formulations like that in the Talmud. What’s the problem? It’s a little awkward. Fine. In any case, apparently that’s what the Talmud expected. Rabbi Ila said—

[Speaker H] What? “Liable to karet”?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What? In the Mishnah? Yes.

[Speaker H] It says “liable to karet”? That’s the question. Because on the Sabbath it’s clear to us that we have “liable” and not “forbidden,” because there it’s a matter of—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, but everywhere it says “liable to karet” it also brings a sin-offering, like he noted earlier. So I don’t know whether that would be an indication. One would need to look in tractate Keritot, where all those liable to karet are listed. I think the language there is “liable.” I don’t remember the exact wording of the Mishnayot there right now, but… Rabbi Ila said, and some say Rabbi Yirmiyah, it was only necessary for a half-measure. What is written here as “forbidden” is apparently about something that really is forbidden and does not carry the punishment of karet. What is that? What could it be? A half-measure. This works well according to the one who says that a half-measure is forbidden by Torah law, and that is Rabbi Yoḥanan, who appears later in the Talmud. But according to the one who says that a half-measure is permitted by Torah law, and that is Reish Lakish, what can be said? For it was stated: with regard to a half-measure, Rabbi Yoḥanan said it is forbidden by Torah law; Reish Lakish said it is permitted by Torah law. This works well according to Rabbi Yoḥanan, but according to Reish Lakish what can be said? According to Reish Lakish it’s permitted? The Talmud says: Reish Lakish agrees that it is rabbinically forbidden. So even Reish Lakish says that a half-measure is not forbidden by Torah law, but obviously it is rabbinically forbidden. Rabbi Yoḥanan argues that a half-measure is forbidden by Torah law. So what are the measures said for? Only with respect to punishment. Right? So it comes out that someone who eats less than an olive-sized amount, or on Yom Kippur less than the size of a large date, whatever, has violated a Torah prohibition, but does not receive the punishment. About such a case it is proper to write “forbidden” and not “liable,” because he truly is not liable; it is only forbidden. What?

[Speaker C] What half-measure is there in washing?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Who said there is for washing?

[Speaker C] It’s eating and drinking, where it says “forbidden.” No, so that’s—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That already gets complicated. In a moment we’ll see further on as well. It gets complicated because we say, okay, we use one formulation for all these things together. We’re not going to write “forbidden” for this and “liable” for that. We don’t expect too much complexity in the wording; they only had the word “forbidden,” just replace it with the word “liable”—that’s what the Talmud says, yes. No, it’s on the measures. No, but the main cases are eating and drinking, and with them it really is only “forbidden.” So that’s what they want to tell you. By the way, even with washing it’s not so simple that there is no half-measure in washing. Someone who washes half his body—who says that isn’t a half-measure? There is a Sefat Emet at the beginning of tractate Shabbat. The Sefat Emet discusses there what the Rosh basically—he talks about the case of the poor person putting his hand in and placing something with the homeowner, carrying out and carrying in, at the beginning of tractate Shabbat, the first Mishnah there. So the Sefat Emet asks: why for carrying in without carrying out, or uprooting without depositing, sorry, for uprooting without depositing—why is one not liable by the law of half-measures? There is a very well-known principle there, also in the father of the Ya’avetz, the Ḥakham Tzvi, who says that half-measures exist only in eating prohibitions. And the Sefat Emet argues that in prohibitions of action there is no half-measure. It’s not the same thing. There are prohibitions that are not eating, but maybe they’re also not action.

[Speaker H] What? There it’s like it could be fit to combine. The same thing—here too it is fit to combine in a half-measure. And still, even though it is fit to combine… here you can say that it’s not—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Say he eats half an olive-sized amount in the morning and half an olive-sized amount in the evening—that’s fit to combine. There, in that same action he can also—

[Speaker H] No, but if he—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If he had eaten another half-olive in the morning, that would have been fit to combine. You don’t need the second half. Even if I never did a second half at all, you’re telling me that if you did this half again, you’d be liable. I don’t care that in practice he did another half in the evening. What’s the difference? On the contrary, specifically the reasoning of “fit to combine”—there are two sources in the Talmud later on, either “any fat, any blood,” or the reasoning of “fit to combine.” So Rabbi Shimon Shkop explains what this reasoning of “fit to combine” means. The claim is that all that is missing here is only a quantitative issue, but in the end you performed the quality of the act, the quality of the thing; you’re only lacking quantity. Now, in actions it’s not like that, because in actions if you uprooted and did not deposit, then you’re missing half the quality of the action, not the quantity. That is one of the explanations precisely in the Sefat Emet, and precisely for that reason there is no half-measure in actions. One of the implications, for example, could be someone who throws two cubits in the public domain. I’m just saying, this is only a side point—we’ll still talk about half-measures. There it really is only a quantitative lack, because you performed the action only across two cubits and not across four cubits. Then there could be a practical difference if there would be a law of half-measures even according to the view that there are no half-measures in actions. If the explanation is like Rabbi Shimon Shkop, then there it does not apply. Yes. There are those who want to say that two cubits is not throwing at all, not that it is a small throw. It’s like with money—there is a Rashi and a Maggid Mishneh in Sanhedrin there—what happens with less than a perutah, where there is no theft prohibition? There they discuss why there isn’t a prohibition of half-measure there. There are those who say that there is no law of half-measure because a person waives it, and therefore there is no issue for a Jew, for Israel. And others say—the Leḥem Mishneh, Maggid Mishneh, I don’t remember anymore—that half a perutah is not money at all, not some amount of money; it simply isn’t money, it’s worth nothing. Meaning, there are things where less than the measure means… what’s lacking is the very thing itself; it’s not only a quantitative lack. What?

[Speaker D] You’re discussing half a measure, half a blessing. Half a measure, half a blessing—it’s not the same story. Half a measure I understand, but half a labor—you’re not at all—

[Speaker G] liable for it.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s what the rabbi—

[Speaker D] said. For half a measure I’m not liable for it.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But a half-measure is forbidden by Torah law.

[Speaker D] No, forbidden by Torah law, not liable by Torah law.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay, forbidden by Torah law.

[Speaker D] But in half a labor you’re not liable for anything at all.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Also with a half-measure you’re not liable for anything at all. No, you are liable—

[Speaker D] Forbidden, I’m not liable.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So with half a labor too it could be that it’s forbidden, but I’m not liable. What’s the difference? No, you’re asking from liability onto prohibition, but—

[Speaker D] exactly—you didn’t do anything at all.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Who says I didn’t do anything? I’m not liable. So it may be that just like a half-measure, where there too I’m not liable. The Sefat Emet wants to claim that in half a labor, it’s really not only that you aren’t liable, but that you didn’t do anything. Right. That’s not an objection; it’s an answer. You present it as an objection, as if one couldn’t say otherwise. Why can’t one say otherwise? Exactly like a half-measure. There is a measure, and someone who did less than that did nothing. But no, where you did something and only the quantitative measure is lacking, then at least you did something—only the punishment is absent. With half a labor, that indeed is the claim of the Sefat Emet. Fine. But it is not something self-evident such that one can challenge from one area to another. Why is one liable in religious court for a half-measure? For a half-measure one is not liable in religious court. Liable toward Heaven. What do you mean, with a small measure you can’t get there? Fine, then you have another answer, but the Talmud doesn’t answer that way. It could be, but the Talmud doesn’t answer that way. And we’ll still see later on—it could be that this depends on things we’ll see later.

[Speaker C] That’s exactly what should come out here—that you should say Yom Kippur is liable with respect to eating and drinking, and forbidden with respect to washing.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, that’s what they said here earlier, but then the formulation really is a bit more complicated, because then you have to say both “liable” and “forbidden,” and with complicated formulations, very often the Talmud doesn’t mind abbreviating. We’ll also see later, especially if we say that there is no half-measure in washing, for example, then in any case they still didn’t split the wording here, even according to the answer. They should have split it anyway: forbidden by Torah law in eating and drinking as a half-measure, and in washing it is rabbinically forbidden. In any case, apparently they just don’t make such distinctions in wording. So they say it this way.

[Speaker C] According to Reish Lakish, all of it is rabbinic.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What? According to Reish Lakish, all of it is rabbinic, yes, indeed. But according to Rabbi Yoḥanan—and the Talmud says it works well according to Rabbi Yoḥanan. It asks specifically on Reish Lakish. Another point: in the end the Talmud resolves it both according to Rabbi Yoḥanan and according to Reish Lakish. By the way, the law is ruled like Rabbi Yoḥanan. Now, the Talmud resolves it both according to Rabbi Yoḥanan and according to Reish Lakish. According to Rabbi Yoḥanan, a half-measure is a Torah prohibition. And from the Talmud’s point of view it is still fine that it says “forbidden.” Not only according to Reish Lakish—on the contrary, on Reish Lakish it was difficult, and they answer that there is a rabbinic prohibition. But according to Rabbi Yoḥanan, it works well. What works well? According to Rabbi Yoḥanan this is a Torah prohibition. So we see that “forbidden” fits with a Torah prohibition. “Forbidden” does not necessarily mean rabbinic. “Forbidden” means when there is no punishment. That’s what I said at the beginning. I’m just showing it here from the Talmud, because very often in many places where it says “forbidden,” the medieval authorities (Rishonim) understand from that that it is rabbinic. Here, in this case, it does not have to be so. In this case, for example, the Talmud explicitly says that according to Rabbi Yoḥanan, the wording “forbidden” works well. Why does it work well? But this is a Torah prohibition. Because there is no liability. Okay? That is enough for it to be called “forbidden.” There are places where the medieval authorities (Rishonim) apparently assume that if it says “forbidden” and not “liable,” there is no such category as a Torah-level liability without punishment; if it were a Torah-level liability, then why aren’t we giving lashes or imposing the punishment? If there is no liability, then apparently there is no Torah prohibition here. Okay? And therefore they assume that when it says “forbidden,” it means rabbinically forbidden. But the term “forbidden” itself can certainly fit a Torah prohibition as long as there is no punishment here. As I said at the beginning, it’s not excluding Torah law; “forbidden” excludes liability.

[Speaker C] But what is the meaning of a measure?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] A punishment for a half-measure? Not in religious court. Punishment in religious court. The Holy One, blessed be He, does what He thinks fit—but what is the meaning of a measure?

[Speaker C] Things from Heaven? What do you mean, from Heaven? Is this a prohibition?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] You’re asking whether this is a prohibition?

[Speaker C] Yes. A prohibition for a half-measure?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Not a formal prohibition—there’s no warning verse for it. There’s no warning verse for it. That’s a dispute. We’ll still talk more about half-measures, but these are the well-known conceptual analyses: is a half-measure a detail within the commandment, or is it a commandment in itself without an explicit warning verse, and that’s why one is not lashed. Okay, so it could be that the novelty is—there are those who understand the novelty the other way around. The novelty in measures is that from the full measure onward one gets lashes. The prohibition was said about everything. It’s just that there is an exclusion of a half-measure from lashes. Not that the measure creates the liability to lashes, but rather the measure excludes a half-measure from lashes. That is the novelty. Okay? Then the prohibition is an ordinary prohibition. Is a half-measure Torah-level or—

[Speaker C] or not Torah-level?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, not necessarily. What is a measure? According to the law. There is less than the measure.

[Speaker C] You’re saying that a remainder of a millimeter—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What? In the public domain can one do it by a millimeter? Because it’s—no, there is no half-measure there. There is no law of half-measure there. I said that it’s probably a half-measure in an action; I said that according to that explanation in the Sefat Emet, then it really could be problematic if I—fine, but the assumption is that behold—

[Speaker C] half really means half—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Like half-claims of defense, or half-opposition and defenses. Not half a measure. In the case of a half-measure, it isn’t literally half. A half-measure means any amount whatsoever. So everywhere they say “half,” the intention is less than the full measure. “Half-measure” is not specifically half. Not less than the measure in general, but specifically half a measure. There’s some commentary of Rabbi Meir HaLevi, I think, somewhere, that says something similar, and then he explains it—doesn’t matter, there are all kinds of explanations there. In the straightforward sense, without all these dialectical refinements, “half-measure” means any amount of forbidden fat, even the tiniest amount. “Any amount” means any amount at all, not specifically half. Some explain that “half-measure” is because it is fit to combine. What does “fit to combine” mean? If you eat half, then if you take another half it reaches a full measure. If you eat a third, then it’s not fit to combine. Take another third, it still doesn’t reach a full measure. Fine. And if you take another two-thirds? Then yes. Fine. I once saw in an article by Rabbi Zilberstein—Rabbi Zilberstein once tried to anchor this in the sources: whether it means any amount of forbidden fat, or the logic of “fit to combine.” I don’t know if that’s right. Fine. So now the Talmud raises an objection from a baraita in Nedarim. “And wherever it teaches ‘liable to karet,’ does it not teach ‘forbidden’? But wasn’t it taught…” Right, you want to tell me that in a case of karet it doesn’t make sense to say “forbidden”? Then it brings proof that it does make sense. What’s the subtext? What’s under discussion here? Why should karet be an exception? To the Talmud it’s obvious that regarding lashes or liability to death, certainly you don’t say “forbidden”; you need to say “liable.” Why is karet different? Exactly. Everything we talked about before. Right? Meaning, it’s all already here in the Talmud. What the Talmud is discussing here is—not that it has a proof—but what stands behind the proof. Why specifically with karet is it like this, and not with the other punishments? The Talmud doesn’t ask this about lashes, only about karet. Why? Because karet is a punishment from Heaven. So with karet it could be that the whole question doesn’t apply from the outset. They said “forbidden” because this isn’t a punishment of a religious court, it’s a punishment from Heaven. Heavenly punishments also exist for neglecting a positive commandment. So what if it isn’t defined specifically as karet? We didn’t specify for the Holy One, blessed be He, exactly which punishment He will give—He’ll give some other punishment, what difference does it make? Neglecting a positive commandment also has a punishment. The point is: if it isn’t a court-imposed punishment, then you can say “forbidden.” Well then, karet is like that too. And the proof the Talmud brings is from Nedarim. “For it was taught: Even though they said ‘forbidden’ regarding all of them, they said ‘liable to karet’ only regarding one who eats and drinks and performs labor.” Right, so what do we see? That in any case, although they said “forbidden” regarding all of them—right? Forbidden with respect to all the afflictions—the punishment of karet is only for eating, drinking, and labor. For the other afflictions there is no punishment of karet. So what? What’s the claim? From where do we learn that only in these cases there is karet?

[Speaker B] We’ll see in a moment.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But that’s what the baraita says. There are some sources. We’ll see it later.

[Speaker B] “By tradition.”

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] “By tradition” means a derivation. There’s some source. Not “rumors,” like Major Rumor. Isn’t that in the Talmud? It is in the Talmud. He says “by tradition” means in the Talmud. Yes. It’s in the Talmud, not in the Torah. It isn’t written in the Torah, but the tradition came down to us through the Talmud. Tradition has a basis. So what is the difficulty from Nedarim? What do we see there? First of all, in the first question—why does it say “forbidden”? “Liable to karet.” The baraita addresses the Talmud’s first difficulty, namely what?

[Speaker B] Why are you asking from any place where it says “forbidden”?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What’s the problem? It says here: “Even though they said ‘forbidden’ regarding all of them, they said ‘liable to karet’ only regarding one who eats and drinks and performs labor.” So what’s the problem? They said “forbidden” about all of them because they wanted to teach you the half-measure. And afterward they say an additional law: the punishment that was given, karet, is only for eating, drinking, and performing labor. So what do you learn from here? What’s difficult? On the contrary. From the fact that after saying “forbidden” they went to the trouble of detailing where there is punishment and where there isn’t, you learn that the word “forbidden” really does not teach about the punishment; rather it deals with something that isn’t about punishment. So what’s the problem? That’s exactly what the Talmud assumed above. What’s difficult? I think the plain sense of the difficulty here is apparently that this is not talking about a half-measure. Because if it were talking about a half-measure, then the wording is incorrect. “Even though they said ‘forbidden’ regarding all of them…” About what did they say “forbidden” regarding all of them? We just learned: about a half-measure, right? “They said ‘liable to karet’ only regarding one who eats and drinks.” But with a half-measure, even for eating and drinking there is no punishment of karet. After all, if the word “forbidden” is speaking about a half-measure, then how do you continue in the same context: although they said “forbidden” regarding all of them, the punishment of karet is not for all of them but only for some of them. It’s not for some of them at all—the whole “forbidden” stated at the beginning refers only to a half-measure. And with a half-measure there is no karet even for eating and drinking. So the Talmud says that apparently what is written here as “forbidden” also applies to things that carry karet. And that qualifies it: that it’s only eating and drinking, and not the other afflictions—and not like what you said above, that the word “forbidden” here refers only to a half-measure. This is not a direct linguistic proof that the word “forbidden” refers to a case punishable by karet. Rather, it is a proof against the way you are proposing to read the Mishnah. You want to read the Mishnah as dealing only with a half-measure, so why does the baraita explain that it applies only to eating and drinking and not to the rest? It’s talking neither about this nor about that—it’s a half-measure, and a half-measure applies to everything.

[Speaker G] That formulates the question differently; it doesn’t match the wording, “wherever it teaches liability to karet, does it not teach ‘forbidden’?”

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Why not? As a consequence. You’re telling me that for anything that has karet, it makes no sense to say “forbidden”; here, I’ll prove to you that it does. After all, how did the baraita read the Mishnah? That what is written there as “forbidden” is not a half-measure, because if it were a half-measure, what relevance would punishment have? So it’s a full measure, and about that it says “forbidden.” So we see that the word “forbidden” can also be said about things punished by karet. You’re right that it isn’t direct; it’s a consequence. But that is the consequence, because otherwise it’s hard to understand the Talmud’s objection. Okay, but I’m just saying—and after you finish the calculation I’ll strengthen it even more. Since there are all kinds of calculations here, it’s clear from the outset that the Talmud is really asking: the subtext of the Talmud is, why do you treat the punishment of karet like the other punishments? It isn’t lashes, it isn’t death, it isn’t a punishment imposed by people. With a punishment of karet, it does make sense to say “forbidden”—that’s the reasoning in the background here. The Talmud only brings you a proof for that reasoning, but behind the discussion sits the reasoning itself, the reasoning that says “forbidden” can be said about anything that isn’t a punishment of a religious court, not about anything that has no punishment. Because neglecting a positive commandment also has a punishment, and a rabbinic prohibition also has a punishment, a heavenly punishment. Okay, so what’s the problem? Then on everything you could say “liable.” Rather, what? For heavenly punishments we don’t say “liable.” Well then, with karet too you shouldn’t have to say “liable,” but rather “forbidden,” so what’s the problem? And here I go back to what I said in the gloss against Maimonides: it could be that karet really does speak to the religious court, because the court has to administer lashes in order to exempt the person from karet. And therefore to say that a person is liable to karet is a statement directed to the court. And that’s why the Talmud says it makes sense to say “liable.” But against that the Talmud asks that in the baraita in Nedarim we see otherwise, because we see that the baraita read the Mishnah as saying that the prohibition refers to a full measure, not a half-measure—otherwise it would make no sense to say that one is liable to karet for eating and drinking, because for a half-measure one is not liable to karet. So if it is talking about a full measure, where one is liable to karet, and nevertheless it says “forbidden,” then we see not like the Talmud’s assumption here: that “forbidden” can also be said in a place where there is liability to karet.

[Speaker D] Is there an obligation—and every time there is karet, is there lashes?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I don’t know if it’s an obligation, but a recommendation: if you lash him, he’ll be exempted from karet; if you don’t want to exempt him from karet, don’t lash him.

[Speaker D] According to your explanation, that’s part of the issue—meaning, you need that…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I’m saying: he is liable to a punishment. If the religious court won’t lash him, then he’ll take karet. If the religious court lashes him, he’ll be exempt. Whether the religious court is obligated to move him from the karet track to the lashes track—that’s something to discuss. I don’t know. What?

[Speaker C] There were witnesses for the lashes, a religious court…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Can administer lashes. I didn’t understand. To lash someone you need witnesses. There are witnesses—why wouldn’t there be witnesses? They didn’t warn him regarding lashes; they warned him regarding karet. Says who? They warned him regarding karet, they didn’t warn him regarding lashes.

[Speaker D] Why? Who told you that?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Someone who eats on Yom Kippur…

[Speaker D] Is liable to karet.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Who told you they won’t lash him with lashes? He sinned in practice. First, who told you they didn’t warn him regarding lashes? And second, even if they warned him regarding karet, those liable to karet who were lashed are exempted from their karet. After all, the famous renewal of ordination in Safed was talking about people who had not been warned either about karet or about lashes. It was talking about people for whom there was no religious court at all at the time they transgressed, and they wanted to lash them in order to exempt them from karet. That implies that not only do you not need warning for lashes, you don’t even need warning for karet for this purpose. And that strengthens even more what I noted earlier in parentheses: that it could be that these lashes that exempt from karet are not the regular lashes of court-imposed punishments, where indeed you need warning for lashes. Rather, he is liable to karet according to the criteria of how one incurs karet, and the religious court has the option to lash him and exempt him. He himself wants them to lash him so that he can be exempted from karet, and then you don’t need all the… But then it’s really not clear that the religious court is obligated to do this, because it is not a punishment the court is required to impose; rather, it is an option. If the court lashes him, then he will be exempted from karet.

[Speaker B] Where is it written that if they lash him he is exempt from karet?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] In several places; also in Keritot, I think—those liable to karet who were lashed are exempted from their karet. What? I don’t remember anymore; in several places. Another explanation—why?

[Speaker B] Because everyone, also…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Rabbi Yohanan is speaking about a half…

[Speaker B] Measure, but half-measure—everyone, Rabbi Yohanan too, is speaking about a half-measure. In Nedarim, where it says, “An oath that I will not eat”…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But Rabbi Yohanan too is speaking about a half-measure. Yes, but there it’s Torah-level. So what?

[Speaker B] And here this Mishnah does not distinguish between a full measure and a half-measure. It says, “An oath that I will not eat,” and he ate carcasses and torn animals. Where are you? We’re not there. You jumped ahead.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] You jumped ahead; we’re not talking about that. Why? We’re talking about the objection from Nedarim. Yes. “Even though they said ‘forbidden’ regarding all of them, they said ‘liable to karet’ only regarding one who eats and drinks and performs labor.” I asked: what is the difficulty?

[Speaker G] Page 4a.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] You’re talking about the continuation; I’m talking about the beginning.

[Speaker G] He’s talking about earlier and we jumped ahead—right, sorry.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay? Yes, I don’t want to get into the issue of an oath there, because whether an oath takes effect on a half-measure is its own topic. I don’t know if we’ll manage to get into it when we talk about half-measures, so I’ll speak more about that later.

[Speaker H] Maybe the baraita here is basically saying that you can use the word “forbidden,” even though in one case it is karet and in another case it isn’t.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s how the Talmud speaks in the objection. In the objection, the Talmud says: why are you telling me that you can’t say “forbidden” regarding something punishable by karet? You can say it. In principle, regarding a karet prohibition. Now it’s true that for a half-measure you say “forbidden”; you don’t speak about a punishment of karet. If it won’t be a half-measure, it will be karet. That’s the intention, isn’t it?

[Speaker H] But…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] At first, when the Talmud answered, that’s…

[Speaker H] What it said. And in the objection it says, no—that’s not correct. Even regarding actual liability to karet, it makes sense to say “forbidden,” as we see in the baraita.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It depends on which stage of the Talmud you’re in. All right? So the Talmud says: this is what it means—when they said “forbidden,” they said it only regarding a half-measure; but for a full measure one is liable to karet. And even though there is liability to karet, liability to karet applies only to one who eats and drinks and performs labor. Meaning, they insert a kind of “there is an omission and this is how it should read,” right? Again, into the baraita, not the Mishnah. The Mishnah speaks about a half-measure. But the baraita adds that everything written in the Mishnah is about a half-measure, but for a full measure there is liability to karet. When? For one who eats and drinks and performs labor. This is not an interpretation of the Mishnah; it is an addition to the Mishnah. In the objection we understood that the baraita came to explain the Mishnah. The answer is that the baraita did not come to explain the Mishnah but to add to it. The Mishnah deals with a half-measure, and the baraita speaks about a full measure, about the punishment of karet. And if you want, say instead: “It teaches ‘forbidden’ regarding the others,” as Rabba and Rav Yosef taught in the other books of the school of Rav. What are “the other books of the school of Rav”? Rashi here has an interesting comment: it means Sifrei on Numbers and Deuteronomy. Sifra is Leviticus, and “the other books of the school of Rav” are Numbers and Deuteronomy. “From where do we know that on Yom Kippur it is forbidden to wash, to anoint, to wear sandals, and to engage in marital relations? Scripture says: ‘a Sabbath-rest’—resting.” Fine? So from here we learn that the prohibition written here is about the others. What does that mean—about the others?

[Speaker G] Washing, anointing, wearing sandals, and marital relations.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And then what—what changed? What is this answer trying to do? Is this another answer for how to read the baraita?

[Speaker G] No, no, it’s an answer to the Talmud’s first question.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Correct. It’s another answer to the Talmud’s first difficulty—how to read the Mishnah. Does the “forbidden” of the Mishnah refer to a half-measure or not? The “forbidden” refers to everything. It’s just that one part—the other afflictions—has no karet, while the first part does have karet. Why did they say “forbidden”? Because you can’t say “liable” about everything. Because only for eating and drinking is one liable. So they wanted to use one simple expression for all the matters, and therefore they said “forbidden.” Even though in principle, regarding liability to karet, you can’t use the term “forbidden.” Okay? That’s the point. And since there are things for which there is no karet, you can’t say “liable”—that would be incorrect. Saying “forbidden” is correct, just not complete. If I were to say “liable” about everything, that would be wrong, because there isn’t liability. All right? So clearly, if I already want to use one simple formulation, meaning one word relevant to everything, then I use the minimal formulation: “forbidden.” What?

[Speaker C] A limitation of language?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, not a limitation of language; they just don’t want to complicate matters. They could have said “liable” for these and “forbidden” for those—no big deal. But if they want a simple formulation and say one thing about everything, they use the minimal formulation.

[Speaker H] What? Why not say that “forbidden” applies only to the other prohibitions besides eating and drinking—that for eating and drinking you really don’t say “forbidden”?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But the Mishnah doesn’t say that. The Mishnah says: Yom Kippur is forbidden with respect to eating, drinking, washing, anointing, wearing sandals, and marital relations. And that’s why it says “regarding the others.”

[Speaker H] What does “regarding the others” mean? No—don’t relate to the word “forbidden.”

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What do you mean, “forbidden”? Then read me the Mishnah. What is it?

[Speaker H] Read me the Mishnah now: Yom Kippur is forbidden with respect to eating and drinking.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So you need to read it…

[Speaker H] As though: Yom Kippur is forbidden with respect to washing, anointing… Well then, from eating and drinking you can’t learn anything from this. So erase eating and drinking. So why are they written here? I’m asking why eating and drinking are written here. That was exactly the answer.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The answer is explaining to you that the formulation…

[Speaker H] Is not like…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It’s like when they say, for example, “there is an omission.” You can’t say, “So why did the Mishnah write it?”

[Speaker H] Of course I can say that, absolutely I can.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It’s not the same. There too I say it, and here too I say it. Why did the Mishnah write eating and drinking? Are you emending the text of the Mishnah? What they want to say is not that the word “forbidden” does not refer to eating and drinking. No. What they want to say is that the word “forbidden”—if it had said only eating and drinking, they would not have used the word “forbidden,” because the word “forbidden” cannot refer to karet. But since there is a list here, and with the latter part of the list you cannot say “liable” but only “forbidden,” they already said “forbidden” regarding the whole list.

[Speaker H] Even though we’re not talking about a half-measure, and it doesn’t refer to eating and drinking?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, it does refer to eating and drinking. Eating and drinking are also forbidden. And with eating and drinking, when is it forbidden? Only for a half-measure? No, no—it is forbidden also for a full measure. It’s just that for a full measure the word “forbidden” is not the full information, because besides being forbidden there is also punishment.

[Speaker H] Right. For eating and drinking you didn’t give all the information. That’s the first situation where you can use the word “forbidden” also for something that is less than that. What does “less than that” mean? No, again, no, no—and that’s exactly the point. I’m putting a foot in the door.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, you can’t use the word “forbidden” for something that carries karet. Why? Not because it is incorrect, but because it doesn’t give the full information. And if you say “forbidden,” I would understand that there is no karet. Here you don’t have that problem. Why? Because I understand why they used the word “forbidden.” They used the word “forbidden” because for the other afflictions there is only a prohibition and no karet. So I won’t mistakenly say that for eating and drinking there is no karet, because I understand that they used the word “forbidden” not in order to say there is no karet, but because for the other things there is no karet, so they couldn’t say “liable” about everything; therefore they said “forbidden” about everything, including eating and drinking. It’s just obvious that regarding eating and drinking this is only partial information: besides the prohibition there is also punishment. But in the end, they are reading the Mishnah. The Mishnah says eating and drinking. You can’t—understand—even with all the “there is an omission” and all that, in the end you still have to read the Mishnah. The Mishnah was written in a certain way, unless you tell me there is a corruption in the textual version of the Mishnah. There are some who want to claim that “there is an omission” simply means there is a textual error; you have to read the Mishnah differently. But here it’s clear in the Talmud that they don’t mean to say “there is an omission,” but only that it applies to this and not to the earlier cases—they are not saying “there is an omission.” Why? Nobody intends to erase eating and drinking. And why? Because the word “forbidden” is not incorrect for eating and drinking; it really is forbidden. It’s just that in a place where there is also punishment, you don’t usually use the word “forbidden,” not because it doesn’t fit, but because it isn’t complete—you might make a mistake and think there is only a prohibition and no punishment. But here I won’t make that mistake, because I understand that it’s only because of the other matters. Okay? Yes, exactly: they take the lowest common denominator; it’s true for everyone. Therefore they also didn’t say—why didn’t they say “liable” about everything, and I’d understand that it applies only to eating and drinking? What’s the problem? Why isn’t it symmetrical? Because saying “liable” about the other afflictions would be false. The Talmud doesn’t write something false, something untrue—the Mishnah doesn’t. It may write something that is partial information or somewhat misleading information. Fine? It cannot write something false. So you can’t say “liable” about everything. But you can say “forbidden” about everything.

[Speaker D] And regarding karet you don’t say “liable”? What? And regarding karet you don’t say “liable”?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, I do say “liable.” Regarding karet? Certainly—that’s what the Talmud says here.

[Speaker D] Oh, karet is the concept that they need to lash him?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no, because the word “forbidden” is relevant also in a place where there is liability to karet; it just doesn’t state the liability to karet, only the prohibition. Perfectly fine. So that’s incomplete information, but not incorrect information. Therefore when it says here “forbidden,” it speaks also about eating and drinking. It’s just that if there were only eating and drinking, I would not have written the word “forbidden”—not because it would be incorrect, but because it would be incomplete; I would have written “liable.” Since the list continues with things for which it does not make sense to say “liable,” they said “forbidden” regarding everything, including eating and drinking. And the “forbidden” really does refer to everything. All right?

[Speaker B] Does “Sabbath-rest” come to add to eating and drinking?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Wait, we’ll get to “Sabbath-rest” in a second. We’ll see. What is he liable for regarding the other things?

[Speaker B] What is he liable for regarding the other things?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] We’ll see in a moment, we’ll see in a moment. “As Rabba and Rav Yosef taught in the other books of the school of Rav: From where do we know that on Yom Kippur it is forbidden to wash, to anoint, to wear sandals, and to engage in marital relations? Scripture says: ‘Sabbath-rest’—resting,” or “rest.” One time someone claimed you should read it as “rest,” not “Sabbath-rest.” No—the vocalization doesn’t prove anything; vocalization is interpretation.

[Speaker H] Like a manuscript of “most holy.”

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Ah, when were the vowels added? Yes. Okay. In any event, the claim is that we learn this from “Sabbath-rest”—resting, or rest. I don’t know; I’m used to saying “resting.” What?

[Speaker G] No, because “resting” sounds minor; “rest” would mean that it’s…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Rabbinic.

[Speaker G] Does “resting” mean it’s rabbinic? What?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The term “resting” is usually used that way. There’s the famous Nachmanides—that this is Torah-level; I’ll bring it up in a moment.

[Speaker G] Right, here it’s not…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] We’ll see in a moment. I’m not sure—not sure at all. It’s a dispute among the medieval authorities. We’ll see soon.

[Speaker B] In the Talmud in Niddah, “its usual manner does not come.”

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Again? In the Talmud in Niddah, “its usual manner does not come.”

[Speaker B] So what does that mean? Not “usual manner”—it means spacing, room.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Ah, you mean a mistake in… a mistake in…

[Speaker B] There are lots of mistakes in things like that, yes. Okay, one time…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I know—they always read “qavei,” not “qovai.”

[Speaker B] In the yeshivot…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] They say “qavei”; I don’t know, with vocalization they say “qovai,” I don’t know. “Qavei” and “qovai.” Yes, yes. I don’t know. But I don’t know who is right or what he is basing himself on.

[Speaker B] Doesn’t matter, yes—what practical difference does it make?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Fine, let it be.

[Speaker B] No…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Shakespeare—it was his cousin who also wasn’t called Shakespeare. Do you know who wrote Macbeth? It wasn’t Shakespeare, it was his cousin, who also wasn’t called Shakespeare. Fine, in any event, the claim is that the afflictions are learned from “Sabbath-rest”—resting. What does that mean? What is it trying to say? It is coming to say… to say that there is no punishment of karet for these. Why? Why, if we learn it from “Sabbath-rest”—resting, is there no punishment of karet? Because it says, “For every person who shall not afflict himself shall be cut off.” Whatever is included in affliction—if you violate it, that is karet. And we discussed that, straightforwardly, this applies to the prohibition and not to the positive commandment. We’ll still talk about that today. But the afflictions—this is what they’re called, “the afflictions”—aren’t they afflictions? Isn’t that part of affliction? Rather what? It’s a failure to rest. Washing, anointing, wearing sandals, marital relations—isn’t that part of affliction? No, that’s what the Talmud says here. Because it says, “For every person who shall not afflict himself shall be cut off.” Why, regarding the other afflictions—they’re called afflictions, I call them that because that’s what people are used to calling them—why is there no karet for the other afflictions? So the Talmud says: what is the reason there is no karet? Because we learn it from “Sabbath-rest”—resting, not from “you shall afflict yourselves.” It isn’t part of affliction. This is another discussion. It is rest. And regarding rest we did not find karet. “The person who shall not rest shall be cut off”—that is not written. What is written is, “the person who shall not afflict himself.” Now this is very interesting in light of what we discussed in the introductory lessons, where we saw that at least according to Maimonides, and also in the plain meaning of the Torah, all the afflictions of Yom Kippur are an expansion of the obligation of rest. On Yom Kippur there is a broader obligation of rest. Here you see that this issue keeps accompanying us all the time—the question of how to understand the relationship between the afflictions and labor. If that were really the case, then this Talmud is unclear. Because basically, the fact that the afflictions are learned from “Sabbath-rest”—resting, what does that mean? It only means that the rest of Yom Kippur includes the afflictions as well. Excellent. And whoever does not rest is cut off—so why does learning it from “Sabbath-rest”—resting mean there is no karet for it? It seems from here that all of a sudden there are two laws on Yom Kippur: there is affliction on Yom Kippur, and there is rest on Yom Kippur. And karet was said regarding affliction, not regarding rest. And something learned from rest is not liable to karet. But even that is difficult. Because according to that, what about resting from labor? One who performs labor on Yom Kippur—does he incur karet? Yes, for labor there is karet. Labor is not part of affliction? Labor is certainly part of rest.

[Speaker G] It went out from the category of rest, from all the…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It’s an exception. From the whole category of rest, labor went out in order to tell you that its punishment is karet.

[Speaker G] From the whole rest—what other rest is there? Washing, anointing, and so on.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, those are not rest. Eating and drinking are the affliction, right? And labor—sorry, no—eating and drinking are the affliction. And for that there is karet. And for rest there is no karet, right?

[Speaker G] Washing, anointing, etc. are…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Part of rest; not the affliction.

[Speaker G] And labor is an exception within rest—only about it was karet said.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Where did they tell you that it’s an exception?

[Speaker G] Because the fact is it says “shall not afflict himself,” only about afflictions.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Why shouldn’t you say…

[Speaker G] That “shall not afflict himself” means everything?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Say instead that there is karet also for the afflictions by virtue of the rest contained in them, not by virtue of the affliction contained in them.

[Speaker G] Let’s…

[Speaker B] Let’s see what Rashi answers to all these questions. What does he say? We learn it from “Sabbath-rest”—resting. The intention is the “Sabbath-rest” said regarding the Sabbath, not only the “Sabbath-rest” said regarding Yom Kippur. It compares it to “Sabbath-rest” written concerning the Sabbath. And there you have the thirty-nine primary labors at the Torah level, and you add to them other things that are rabbinic. And here we’re talking about afflictions.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So just as there the additional labors beyond the thirty-nine…

[Speaker B] Labors are not subject to the original punishment, so too here.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Why indeed is there no liability there? Because outside the thirty-nine labors, this is not the original law. And that is rest—part of the rest of the Sabbath. What is in the Tabernacle is included; what…

[Speaker B] Is not in the Tabernacle is not.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, that’s not why. Why not? Because it is a positive commandment. After all, the karet on Yom Kippur is for a prohibition. We discussed that there is karet for neglecting positive commandments only for circumcision and Passover. The karet—true, on Yom Kippur there is a positive commandment and there is karet—but the karet is not for the positive commandment; it is for the prohibition. At least according to the accepted approaches. I’ll still comment on this issue. If so, what the Talmud is saying is not because “Sabbath-rest”—resting is rest and not affliction. That is not the point. Rather, regarding these afflictions there is only the positive commandment and not the prohibition. And therefore there is no karet for them. Regarding these afflictions there is only the positive commandment, and not the prohibition. How do I know that? From where do we learn the prohibition?

[Speaker G] From “you shall afflict”—the prohibition of affliction, we learned from “you shall afflict.”

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s why we’re building the topic stage by stage. From where do we know this? First of all, do you understand what I said here? If this were an expansion of the concept of rest—even affliction—then I don’t understand why “Sabbath-rest”—resting proves that there is no karet here. There is karet, like for any neglect of rest. There is no punishment derived by logic here. What does that mean, no punishment derived by logic? Some derivation was made here. Who said it’s a derivation? “A Sabbath of complete rest.” From “rest” we learn afflictions. No—it’s the concept of rest. To rest is broader than ordinary rest; it includes the afflictions. Understood. So as you yourself said, it is broader. Broader than the concept of rest, but it is written in the Torah that on Yom Kippur one rests in a broader sense. So I’m saying again: whichever way you take it. If the Talmud says that “a Sabbath of complete rest” is the reason they are exempt from karet, I ask why? After all, karet is incurred by whoever does not rest—whether from labor or from affliction. We saw there is karet for both this and that. So what will you tell me—no? Really, the conception we said at the beginning is wrong. Maybe what Maimonides wrote—or the plain sense of the Torah—that the afflictions are only an expansion of rest, is not correct. No. There are two sections on Yom Kippur: there is affliction, for which there is karet, and there is rest, for which there is no karet. And the five so-called afflictions other than eating and drinking are really an expansion of rest. But eating and drinking are affliction; that is not rest. And only about that was karet said, apparently. That’s one possible way to say it, and then it goes against the Maimonides we discussed. But it doesn’t work whichever way you look at it, even aside from contradicting Maimonides. Because after all, there is karet also for rest—resting from labor incurs karet. So even if affliction is an expansion of resting from labor in some strange way, still, why shouldn’t we say that the same karet that applies to labor also applies to affliction? We are forced to say otherwise. The problem with “Sabbath-rest”—resting is not rest as opposed to affliction. Not for nothing are they called the five afflictions; this too is affliction. Rather, the point is that here there is only the positive commandment and not the prohibition, and therefore there is no karet here. That’s what the Talmud is saying. And why? That brings us back to the question we dealt with in previous lessons: from where is the prohibition of affliction learned? If I learn the prohibition of affliction from the phrase “you shall afflict yourselves,” or from some verbal analogy of karet, or all those things, then here that does not apply to the other afflictions. The other afflictions are learned from “Sabbath-rest”—resting. And from “Sabbath-rest”—resting, I don’t know whether there is also a prohibition. Right, because with labor there is the positive commandment of rest, but concerning labor the prohibition is written explicitly. The prohibition is not learned the way the prohibition of affliction is learned. So if the other four afflictions—not eating and drinking—are learned from the word “rest,” then all the dialectics we went through about the warnings, the verbal analogy, the juxtaposition, everything we discussed in previous sessions—Resh Lakish saying you can’t write it, and all the things we discussed—that was not said regarding affliction. Consequently it is clear why the Talmud proves that for these afflictions there is no karet.

[Speaker G] But it says, “For every person who shall not afflict himself…” Okay, so there is karet.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That is not included in “the person who shall not afflict himself,” because otherwise there would be no need to learn it from “Sabbath-rest”—resting.

[Speaker G] A moment ago you said that all of them are called afflictions?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, again. Fine, let’s call them afflictions. But the prohibition of affliction applies only to eating and drinking. Otherwise there would be no need for this extension from “Sabbath-rest”—resting.

[Speaker G] Meaning that the word “affliction” in the Torah refers only to eating and drinking?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, exactly. And these are other afflictions that are really some sort of extension. But that extension expands only the positive commandment, not the prohibition, and therefore there is no karet for them. So that means that really it is not “rest” versus “affliction.” That’s not the point against Maimonides that we mentioned—that what is learned from “rest” comes to exclude what is learned from affliction. Affliction really is an extension of rest, as we have seen until now. What is written here is not coming to say “rest” as excluding affliction, but rather “rest” means the positive commandment to rest, as excluding the prohibition. Then indeed everything—if you… and this will depend on the question of how we learn the prohibition. All the methods we saw: if the prohibition is learned from something connected to karet, then indeed with these afflictions there is no karet and there will be no prohibition there either. If it is learned from a verbal analogy with affliction, then that verbal analogy with affliction likewise does not apply to these afflictions, because these afflictions are not learned from “the person who shall not afflict himself,” but from “Sabbath-rest”—resting. So the verbal analogy was not said about this. Thus the prohibition was not said here, and therefore neither was karet. Okay, so in short, this will depend on everything we have discussed until now. Another possibility: if despite everything this would still enter the category of affliction and there would also be a prohibition here, then we would expect there to be karet too. How then are we to read the Talmud here? For that, look at the Rashi someone mentioned earlier. Rashi says: “‘Rest’—it is written regarding affliction. And just as with ‘rest’ said concerning the Sabbath, the rabbis attached to it other labors that were not in the Tabernacle and are not full-fledged labor…” Incidentally, that differs somewhat from the famous Nachmanides in the portion of Emor, where Nachmanides says that what is called “resting” regarding Sabbath labors is a Torah prohibition, not a rabbinic prohibition. The Ritva in Rosh Hashanah 34—and in Maimonides there are some who learn this way too, that Maimonides understands “rest” as a Torah prohibition, only one is not liable for lashes or stoning for it. It is not the regular labor prohibition of “you shall not do any labor.” So in Rashi here it seems not like Nachmanides, who says it is the character of the Sabbath—opening stores on the Sabbath, that sort of thing; usually that’s what they mean by Nachmanides’s “resting.” Here Rashi understands that we are talking about an expansion of labors, for example the resting of one’s son and daughter, something like that—meaning a Torah prohibition, but one is not liable for lashes for it, perhaps things like letting one’s animal carry a load, things of that kind. “And here too, ‘rest,’ regarding affliction, as it is written, ‘It shall be a Sabbath-rest for you, and you shall afflict yourselves’—it comes to add to the affliction of eating and drinking.” “It shall be a Sabbath-rest for you, and you shall afflict yourselves.” This is not “rest” as excluding affliction; it is a kind of “rest” that expands affliction. That strengthens even more what I said before: there is no contradiction here to Maimonides’s conception that “rest” and the concept of affliction go together. No—“rest” is an expansion of affliction. Since I am expanding it only on the side of the positive commandment and not on the side of the prohibition, there is no karet here. Rashi says more than that: maybe even if this were an expansion to the prohibition, still it is only a rabbinic expansion—“the rabbis attached it,” and in the plain sense in Rashi this seems to be only a scriptural support. That’s it. And if so, the whole enterprise collapses. My whole discussion before was then wrong—or at least unnecessary, not wrong. Because then the reason there is no karet here is not because of different conceptual frameworks, but simply because this is only a mere scriptural support. If it were a genuine derivation, then even if it were from “rest,” and even if it were affliction, it wouldn’t matter—there would also be karet here. That’s why Rashi had to say it is only a scriptural support.

[Speaker H] So that’s it—we really see from this whether it’s a full derivation or not. What? How can you know whether it really…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Rashi says: from the fact that there is no karet here, Rashi understands that this is only a scriptural support. From the Talmud itself—how did the Talmud know? I don’t know. But Rashi understands from the Talmud here that the Talmud apparently understood this as a scriptural support. And why? Because if it were a full derivation, then there would also be karet here. Why should I care whether it’s “rest” or “affliction”? It’s the same thing. It is all rest on Yom Kippur. And if it is included in that, then there is karet. Okay? Rashi, precisely because of that, is forced to say that there is apparently only some sort of scriptural support here. If, hypothetically, there were really a different conception even at the Torah level, then in order to explain why there is no karet you would not need to arrive at the claim that this is only a scriptural support. Even if it were a full derivation, it could still be only the positive commandment and not the prohibition, or it could be rest and not affliction, and all the possibilities we discussed before. Then you would not need to say it is only a scriptural support.

[Speaker G] But Rashi says “other labors that were not in the Tabernacle,” meaning they are still labors, still Torah-level.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So that’s the question, because Rashi also uses here the phrase “the rabbis attached.” Right. Here there is room for some hesitation. And I hesitate about Rashi in Shabbat 114—a topic we didn’t have time to study; I sent you the summaries but we didn’t manage to see it inside. There it seems from Rashi that he learns like Maimonides, that “resting” on the Sabbath in tractate Shabbat 114 is a Torah prohibition, only one is not liable for stoning for it; it is not a rabbinic prohibition. And if so, it could be that “the rabbis attached” does not mean a mere scriptural support in the usual sense—that it is a scriptural support, but not merely that. It is not a mere scriptural support; rather, it means the sages attached it to the verse and expanded it. So it is a Torah prohibition that is not included under the warning for stoning on the Sabbath for labor prohibitions, but it is a Torah prohibition. So I don’t know. In Rashi there are those who learn this way and those who learn that way; here too it is not entirely clear. So one of two things must be true: either this thing is a mere scriptural support, in which case there is no need to enter all the conceptual discussions; or indeed it is a Torah prohibition, and the sages attached it to “resting” and not to affliction, and therefore there is no karet here. Why? But didn’t we say there is karet even for resting? We did—apparently because this is a positive commandment and not a prohibition. And that now opens up several options. When we expand the afflictions and learn them from “Sabbath-rest”—resting, what is being said here? Either this is a rabbinic prohibition regarding the afflictions, and therefore there is no karet for them. Second possibility: it is a Torah-level expansion, but only of the positive commandment and not of the prohibition, and therefore there is no karet. Third possibility: there is even a prohibition here, but no karet. And that needs explanation—why not?

[Speaker G] Again, the three possibilities.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] One possibility: a rabbinic prohibition. Tosafot in many places holds it is a rabbinic prohibition. By the way, that’s how most halakhic decisors rule: most halakhic decisors hold that the other afflictions on Yom Kippur are a rabbinic prohibition. Perhaps they are from the Prophets, but not Torah-level. There are opinions that say there is a positive commandment here. The Ran, for example, says there is a positive commandment here. And not a prohibition, and therefore… though even in the Ran it is not entirely clear, but it is Torah-level. So what does Torah-level mean? One possible understanding is that it is only the positive commandment, and therefore there is no karet, because karet for a positive commandment exists only for Passover and circumcision. Here the karet is for the prohibition, and this is not included in the prohibition. That is what I called in the Talmud here: “resting” means the positive commandment and not the prohibition. A third possibility is to say: no, there is also a prohibition here, but there is no karet. Why? If it is included in the prohibition, then this karet was said about that prohibition—“For every person who shall not afflict himself shall be cut off.” If it is included in “the person who shall not afflict himself,” why shouldn’t karet apply here? Then you have to say there is a special exclusion from karet for these afflictions.

[Speaker C] A special exclusion?

[Speaker H] Yes.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] How do I know that? It isn’t written here. How do I know that? We’ll see in the Talmudic passages later. In the later passages such derivations appear.

[Speaker H] It is reflected in the phrase “shall not afflict himself.” In verse 29 it says, “For every person who shall not afflict himself on that very day shall be cut off from his people.” Meaning the word “afflict himself” goes together with the words “shall be cut off.” Right. Afterward, in verse 32, it says, “It shall be a Sabbath of complete rest for you, and you shall afflict yourselves.” So they expand the phrase “you shall afflict yourselves” by means of “a Sabbath of complete rest.”

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right—that affliction is really a form of rest.

[Speaker H] But how do I know that the phrase “a Sabbath of complete rest” is connected to the word affliction? After all, if you look at verse 29…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, it’s not “a Sabbath of complete rest.” As it is written: “It is a sabbath-rest for you, and you shall afflict your souls.”

[Speaker H] Ah, but in verse 29 it says that karet only goes with the word “shall be afflicted.” So if you want to extend it… for karet, you also need the word “rest” to be close to the word karet.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Why? “Rest” and “affliction” are the same thing; they’re synonymous.

[Speaker H] Because “every soul that does not rest and is not afflicted…”

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, what do you mean, “does not rest and is not afflicted”? That’s just a doubled expression.

[Speaker H] No, “rest” and “be afflicted” are the same thing.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Like in the negative commandments, it’s not a doubled expression. No, it is a doubled expression; now we have to understand why it was doubled.

[Speaker H] No, “be afflicted” means eating and drinking. Right? “A Sabbath of complete rest” refers to the other afflictions, so if you want to extend that to karet—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, eating and drinking are also rest. That’s the halakhic point with all the measures at the beginning: eating and drinking are rest from eating and drinking. In the end it’s all rest.

[Speaker H] According to the exposition here, it isn’t. Why not? Because the phrase “a Sabbath of complete rest” refers only to the other afflictions.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] “Reston” refers only to the other afflictions; “Sabbath” does not.

[Speaker H] What it says here is: the Talmud says, “reston” means cessation. Right, so that’s verse 32.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And what about “Sabbath”? “Sabbath of complete rest” — what is “Sabbath”?

[Speaker H] “Sabbath”…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It means ceasing from everything, from labor and from affliction. That’s also what we said in Maimonides: there is another kind of cessation in it, namely cessation from affliction, from eating and drinking.

[Speaker H] Maimonides…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Calls it cessation.

[Speaker H] And with ordinary cessation we said that it carries karet.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So I’m saying that apparently here too there should have been karet, because all you’re doing is expanding and saying that this too is included in cessation, so why shouldn’t it also be included in karet?

[Speaker H] There’s a separate verse, no? Regarding labors there’s a separate verse that explicitly says karet.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Obviously. But after both verses are there, each one needed to be taught separately. But once they’ve taught that, I understand that what we have here is a broad concept of cessation.

[Speaker H] Right, but if you say that the word “reston” includes eating and drinking, then learn it from labors.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, it doesn’t include eating and drinking — “reston” does not—

[Speaker H] Include eating and drinking.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Again: there is a concept called cessation, and for that concept one is liable to karet. What’s included in it? For that you need derivations. There’s one cessation. One verse teaches that labor prohibitions are included in that cessation. Another verse teaches that eating and drinking are included in that cessation. A third verse teaches that the other afflictions are included in that cessation. Once I’ve learned that, now everything is cessation, and then karet applies to that as well.

[Speaker H] Says who? Just because the word karet was once stated explicitly regarding labor, and once stated explicitly regarding eating and drinking — because I take “affliction” and expand it, suddenly I also want to add karet to it? Why should that be?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It’s the same prohibition — what’s the difference? You’re saying that these afflictions are included within that prohibition, so the karet that was stated there was stated about them too. What’s the difference?

[Speaker H] I also could have expanded it by means of the word for labor. If you don’t want to make it exceptional from the cessation of labor, then fine — with karet.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, labor and affliction are the same thing; both carry karet. The only question is about the other four afflictions, not about eating and drinking. The other four afflictions also join the package.

[Speaker H] For the other afflictions you needed a special expansion. Right — so it’s not enough that you made a special expansion, now you also want to add—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It’s not “not enough,” it’s the same thing. Once you expanded something, you expanded it as is — the prohibition and the karet. Why not?

[Speaker H] Why not? Because you expand it only to the prohibition, not to karet.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Why? Why? If you expand it, then whatever is in it is also in the other afflictions.

[Speaker H] Otherwise it would have said: “For every soul that does not rest and is not afflicted shall be cut off.”

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, it would be enough to say: “a soul that does not rest shall be cut off,” and then they reveal to you that “does not rest” also includes the afflictions. And now, anywhere there is cessation, insert the other afflictions too, not only eating and drinking.

[Speaker H] It seems to me that if you expand something, then it’s more natural, so to speak, to expand it minimally and not expand it further.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Then that’s not expanding it; that’s just creating another prohibition. No, you expanded that it too is forbidden. Again, you’re right if we’re talking about a separate prohibition, but if you say that this is only an expansion of the concept of cessation, then whatever was said about cessation was also said about this. Why not? That’s exactly the difference between expansion and adding another prohibition. But when I say that eating and drinking too — after all, eating and drinking and labors are stated in different places. How does Maimonides, and really also the Torah itself, view this? They make it one whole: everything is cessation on Yom Kippur. Again, the negative commandments are separate negative commandments, but in the end, even though it is counted as a separate prohibition, we view it as one package. So if that’s the case, there is some general package here, even though it is assembled from several distinct warnings. Then this warning too is only an expansion of the general package, and whatever is in the general package is here too. That’s how I would say it in the simple sense. Again, if the Torah had said no — then fine, you could say no. It doesn’t say no. It seems later on that it actually does say no. Again: whenever you add the prohibition, you also add the punishment. Who said not? That’s exactly what we discussed — I think it was with you after the previous class — about the beginning of the laws of marriage. Maimonides says there that acquisition by money is rabbinic, at the beginning of the laws of marriage. One law later he says that someone who has relations with that woman is liable to death, including the punishment. Why? Because where the expansion broadens a concept that already exists in the Torah, that is not deriving a punishment from a derivation. It is a revelation that the Torah’s concept — “when a man takes a woman” — includes taking by money as well. Now whatever is said about taking is also said about taking by money. “One does not derive a punishment from a derivation” applies when the exposition creates a new law. You see this in Maimonides in many places.

[Speaker G] Is there some teaching or exclusion that tells us that this is not karet? About the third possibility — that there is a negative commandment, but no karet. Where does the exclusion come from?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] We’ll see that later in the Talmud. I’m just laying out the three possibilities that arise here, and later in the Talmud I already… We really need to hurry because I see I’m not going to finish this. Later in the Talmud there are all kinds of strange sources, and it’s not entirely clear what the connection is between the passages. It’s scattered here until page 77 — also on 74, on 77a, 77b. In each of those places some discussion starts as though we had never learned the five afflictions at all, and each time they bring a source all over again, and it’s really not clear what the relationship is between all these sources. So briefly, let’s look at them quickly so we can at least finish and discuss the general issue. Maybe before we move on, look at 77a, Tosafot beginning with “as we learned.” Usually the pages I hand out don’t include what appears in the Talmud itself, okay? They only include sources outside the Talmud, so bring your Talmuds too. There in the middle of Tosafot it says: “And Rabbenu Tam explained.” Did you find it? “For all the afflictions of Yom Kippur are only rabbinic, and the verses are merely a scriptural support.” Just as some read in Rashi that the rabbis merely attached them to verses — the Rashi we read earlier. In Rabbenu Tam it is explicit. The same in Tosafot in Nedarim on that same passage on page 80, which is brought in our Talmud — where all the afflictions are discussed, the baraita brought there. There are other Tosafot too in Niddah, Tosafot in Niddah 32. The old Tosafot at the beginning of our chapter — if you look there, his conclusion too is that it is rabbinic, although he also raises the possibility that it is Torah-level. So this is the view of most of the medieval authorities and most of the halakhic decisors: that the remaining afflictions are rabbinic. Okay? And if we return to the Talmud passage we just read about “reston” meaning cessation, that really has to be read as merely a scriptural support. Maybe that’s what Rashi means, maybe not, but according to those medieval authorities it’s apparently just a scriptural support. Now look at the Talmud on 76b. It says: “From where do we know that washing and anointing are called affliction?” You see? 76b. “From where do we know that washing and anointing are called affliction?” Am I right, or is it 77a? 76b, near the bottom, around the lower third. Okay. “From where do we know that they are called affliction? As it is written: ‘I ate no pleasant bread, and neither meat nor wine entered my mouth, nor did I anoint myself at all.’ What does ‘I ate no pleasant bread’ mean? Rav Yehuda son of Rav Shmuel bar Sheilat said: he did not even eat bread of clean wheat. And from where do we know that this is considered affliction? As it is written: ‘And he said to me: Fear not, Daniel, for from the first day that you set your heart to understand and to afflict yourself before your God, your words were heard.’” Meaning, there is a verbal clarification from the book of Daniel that washing and anointing are called affliction. Then later as well: “If you wish, say: from where do we know that washing is called affliction?” — they continue there with washing too. In short, we have verbal clarifications for what is called affliction. By the way, all of this is from the Prophets and Writings. Do you know what “words of tradition” means? It means from the Hebrew Bible, not from the Torah. We have these verbal clarifications of what is called affliction. Why do we need that? On the face of it, it seems to be an alternative source for how we know that the other afflictions are forbidden. We have a clarification that they too are called affliction, and after all the Torah said that one must afflict oneself on Yom Kippur, and “every soul that is not afflicted shall be cut off.” We’re only asking ourselves: what does “to afflict oneself” mean? So from Daniel we learn that washing and anointing too are called affliction. Fine. Now that we’ve learned that, it is included in the Torah prohibition of washing and anointing. And then of course I would have expected — as much as I would naturally expect — that karet should apply here too, right? And if you ask: but this is from the Prophets and Writings? No — not as an independent source, but as a verbal clarification only. I already mentioned the Talmud in Kiddushin 2b, right? Where the Ritva brings there — maybe even 2a — that “taking” from the field of Ephron is a verbal clarification, not a gezerah shavah. A verbal clarification means — and I said this on 2b, and Zedekiah son of Chenaanah had iron horns, and you corrected me that it was 2b and not 3b. Bava Kamma? That’s Bava Kamma, right; in Kiddushin it’s page 2. There you see — that’s how medieval authorities explain it — that a verbal clarification is not a gezerah shavah. What does that mean? You do not make a gezerah shavah between a verse in the Hebrew Bible and a verse in the Torah. That would just be a scriptural support; it would be a prohibition from the Prophets and Writings. But a verbal clarification — yes. Why? Because a verbal clarification is just explaining the meaning of a word. If I ask myself: what does “taking” mean? What does “goring with horns” mean? Then I can learn from a verse in the Hebrew Bible what the word means. It’s not a source; it only reveals to me what the word means in the Torah. So why should I care that it comes from the Hebrew Bible? Once I’ve found that this is the meaning of the Torah’s word, I know what the Torah prohibited. Once I understand that this is a verbal clarification, it’s only a verbal clarification — a dictionary, basically — then it doesn’t matter where it comes from; it’s included in what the Torah said. But if all these are called affliction, then now I return to the Torah. If so, then all afflictions should have been included in the prohibition of affliction, including karet, the negative commandment, the positive commandment, and everything we said. There should be no difference between them and eating and drinking. The verbal clarification comes from the Prophets and Writings, but that’s only the dictionary. Once I’ve learned it, I know that this is what the Torah wrote. More than that: if that’s really so, then why does our Talmud derive it from “reston” meaning cessation? Learn it from “you shall afflict your souls,” since there is a verbal clarification that “you shall afflict your souls” also includes the four other afflictions. Why do we need a special inclusion from “reston” meaning cessation? The whole issue is very unclear. If we — this depends on the various views I mentioned earlier. If I understand that it’s merely a scriptural support, then there’s no problem; then this too is just a scriptural support. Okay, basically “affliction” is only eating and drinking. Washing and so on — the fact that they are called affliction is just a scriptural support, and “reston” meaning cessation is really…

[Speaker H] What? How do we know that affliction means specifically eating and drinking? After all, in the Torah it doesn’t say eating and drinking, it says affliction, right?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] “You shall afflict your souls.”

[Speaker H] No, “whoever eats on it” — it’s not written explicitly. It is written, it is written. Whoever eats on it gets karet, etc. I think it is. Because Maimonides, for example, says that the positive commandment on Yom Kippur is to cease from eating and drinking, and he doesn’t bring a verse; he says, “as it says, ‘you shall afflict your souls,’ and by oral tradition they learned that affliction of the soul is fasting.” Seemingly I would have expected a verse: “every…”

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] “Every soul that is not afflicted” — it doesn’t say eating, it doesn’t say eating—

[Speaker H] In the Torah. So I’m missing how to interpret the word affliction, the basic concept.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Correct. The Talmud understood in the simple sense that “you shall afflict your souls” — what is a fast? A fast is not eating and not drinking. Why?

[Speaker H] Let’s say every place in the Hebrew Bible where it appears in connection with affliction—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The Talmud says, the Talmud says, the Talmud—

[Speaker H] Lists all the verses there.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Then apparently the conception is — that’s one way to say it — and then everything would come out as having both a negative commandment and a positive commandment, according to the third conception I mentioned, and then even karet, so you would need a special source to separate them. Exactly. So that’s the third conception. The second conception, which says that it’s all just scriptural support — then this too is apparently just scriptural support. Fasting means eating and drinking, and these afflictions are only part of the scriptural support.

[Speaker H] What about tradition?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What do you mean, tradition? The meaning of the word is eating and drinking. “Fasting” means eating and drinking from the verse. What do you mean, tradition? All explanations of word meanings are tradition — that’s the well-known Kuzari. So too “the fruit of a beautiful tree”: the meaning of the words is etrog, not date palm and some kind of clay. Why? Because that’s how we understand it — that is the meaning of the Torah’s words “the fruit of a beautiful tree.” Okay? Now true, that doesn’t mean one can’t afflict oneself in other ways as well. But when the Torah forbids affliction, that’s what it means, and the rest is scriptural support, one kind of extension or another. That’s one possibility. A second possibility: what is the derivation from Daniel?

[Speaker D] Anointing and drinking? Scriptural support, scriptural support.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] All of it scriptural support. That’s what you have to say according to Rabbenu Tam in any case. All the medieval authorities who say that the four afflictions are only rabbinic — then this too is scriptural support, not only “reston” meaning cessation. Right?

[Speaker D] But eating and drinking—

[Speaker H] Are in the same category too.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, eating and drinking do not need scriptural support. Eating and drinking are the word itself in the Torah. To afflict oneself means not to eat and not to drink. That is what is called affliction.

[Speaker H] Then it should follow that there is no Talmud passage that asks where we know that eating and drinking count as affliction.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] There’s no need, because that’s the meaning of the word.

[Speaker H] Meaning there isn’t such a Talmud passage.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It’s the meaning of the word. Yes, that’s what I’m saying — it’s the meaning of the word. You don’t need this issue here. So you have to say it’s a scriptural support. Another possibility is to say that here it really is talking about affliction, while in our Talmud it’s talking about cessation, and then we really have to understand the relationship between them. Either I give up the basic model in which affliction is part of a larger cessation, or I go back to the question that this is the negative commandment and that is the positive commandment. Then I would say as follows: “reston” meaning cessation is an expansion of the positive commandment, and therefore there is no karet there. Not because it’s scriptural support, but because it is an expansion of the positive commandment. And here we are dealing with an expansion of the negative commandment.

[Speaker G] Fine, if it’s an expansion of the negative commandment, then why is there no karet?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] One second. Then it comes out that the four afflictions were included both for the negative commandment and for the positive commandment, and that is the third conception. Which of course raises the question: then why isn’t there karet for the four afflictions? So here we would have to bring a source that exempts the four afflictions from karet, an explicit source that exempts them. Okay? And in fact if you look, the Talmud on 74b also brings a discussion of the source for the afflictions. “The rabbis taught: ‘You shall afflict your souls’ — perhaps one might sit in the sun or in the cold in order to suffer? The verse says: ‘and you shall do no labor.’ Just as labor is a passive prohibition, so too affliction of the soul is by passive abstention.” And then: perhaps wherever there is… it doesn’t matter, they discuss all these things. But in the end, among the discussion, you see: “Just as labor is something for which one is liable elsewhere” — what does “liable” mean? Karet elsewhere — “so too affliction of the soul is something for which one is liable to karet elsewhere.” I’m adding the word karet; it isn’t written in the Torah. “And what is that? Piggul and notar.” So let it be piggul and notar, which carry karet, and not tevel, which does not carry karet. The verse therefore says: “you shall afflict” and “you afflicted your souls,” including more, and so on. They continue. “And if you wish, say: behold it says, ‘and I will destroy that soul.’” I’m not going into all the inclusions that they’re trying to force in there at the end. “And if you wish, say: behold it says, ‘and I will destroy that soul’ — an affliction that involves destruction of the soul. And what is that? Eating and drinking.” By the way, that is some sort of source for the fact that affliction here means eating and drinking.

[Speaker G] “And I will destroy that soul” — is that a verse said regarding Yom Kippur? What? “And I will destroy that soul” — is that a verse said regarding Yom Kippur?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no. But the point is that an affliction involving destruction of the soul — that is the affliction learned regarding Yom Kippur. “And if you wish, say” — and if you say it’s about forbidden sexual relations, behold it says “and I will destroy that soul” — an affliction that involves destruction of the soul. And what is that? Eating and drinking. Now here, in this context, some of the medieval authorities want to claim that only for an affliction involving destruction of the soul is one liable to karet, and that this comes to exclude all afflictions other than eating and drinking from karet. The negative commandment and the positive commandment still apply, but they are excluded from karet. This Talmud passage — depending on the textual version, depending on how you read it—

[Speaker C] Deals—

[Speaker D] With karet.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Exactly. This Talmud passage follows the view that there is both a negative commandment and a positive commandment regarding the afflictions, and you need a source that excludes them from karet.

[Speaker D] Specifically destruction of the soul.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right. Okay, so that could complete the third conception. In short, we have three possibilities. There’s also another Talmud passage I didn’t read, on 76a: “These five afflictions from whom do they correspond?” Rav Chisda says: they correspond to the five instances of affliction in the Torah — it says “you shall afflict your souls” five times. Another source for the five afflictions. In short, it is really not clear in the Talmud what the relationship is among all these sources. There are many possibilities: either they are all merely scriptural supports, or they are verbal clarifications, or one concerns the positive commandment and one concerns the negative commandment. You can try to stitch each of them together according to each view of the medieval authorities, but it doesn’t really matter; these are the possibilities, and everything else is just combinatorics. So in the end the claim is that there are three possibilities. First possibility: the view of Tosafot, that it’s all scriptural support. Second possibility: all of these are full-fledged derivations; one is an inclusion for the positive commandment and the other is an inclusion for the negative commandment, and then there are both a positive commandment and a negative commandment regarding the afflictions, and then of course you need an explicit source to exclude them from karet — that’s the source we saw on 74. Third possibility: all of these inclusions were said only regarding the positive commandment. Maybe if there is an inclusion for the negative commandment, that is scriptural support, but on the Torah level it is only the positive commandment, and therefore there is no karet. “Reston” meaning cessation comes to include the positive commandment, and therefore there is no karet here even though it is included on the Torah level. Where do you find such a view? In the old Tosafot at the beginning of the chapter.

[Speaker G] A view that it’s a positive commandment and not a negative commandment?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That there is something Torah-level here, it’s not merely a scriptural support, and yet there is no karet.

[Speaker H] Why, for example, did they bring piggul and not, say, someone who eats leaven on Passover? There it’s sort of a positive commandment.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Again: there the karet is on the positive commandment; we are looking for the negative commandment. If this comes to exclude karet from the negative commandment, then only something that has karet there would have karet here on the negative commandment. But something that doesn’t have karet there, then here on the negative commandment it won’t have karet either. It depends on the textual versions; there are different versions there about how to read it, what “and I will destroy” means, what it comes to exclude. In the old Tosafot at the beginning of the chapter it says that on Yom Kippur it is forbidden to eat and drink, to wash and anoint, and so on. Seemingly that implies that all these afflictions besides eating and drinking are rabbinic, since they do not involve karet. Of course he already assumes that they don’t involve karet anyway, so they must be rabbinic. Only eating and drinking, as we say in the Talmud. And also because we allow a king and a bride — after all, there are special permissions in the Mishnah itself for a king and a bride to wash, and if someone has sores on his head he may anoint as usual and need not worry, and someone whose hands are dirty with mud or excrement. All these permissions do not make sense if they are permitting a Torah prohibition. Therefore it says — and note the key sentence — “As for washing, however, all of these can be rejected, for karet applies only to eating and drinking, which involve loss of life, as we say in the Talmud, even though all of them are from the Torah.” So he takes the view that all of them are from the Torah, only there is no karet. Why? Because only with something involving destruction of the soul — what we saw in this Talmud passage — the old Tosafot suggests that “destruction of the soul” comes to exclude from karet, but there is still a Torah prohibition. Not only that — there is a Torah prohibition both for the positive commandment and the negative commandment. In principle there should also have been karet here, only because of “destruction of the soul” was karet excluded. The conclusion of the old Tosafot is not like that, okay? His conclusion is not like that. And why not? Because otherwise they would not have permitted it.

[Speaker H] So why not say that the permission itself is from the Torah?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What? They would not have permitted it for a king and a bride — no. That too would be from the Torah. So he says no. Like on Chol HaMoed, where the sages… So he says no. He claims that since there are permissions, that implies it’s rabbinic. He apparently understands these permissions — I’m skipping because I really can’t get into all the sources now — as a suspension. Because there is some need, the sages therefore permitted it here. The sages can permit something they themselves prohibited, but what the Torah prohibits is not permitted just because there is some need. What will those who say it is Torah-level say? A tentative assumption. Either the old Tosafot or the Ran — if you saw the Ran on the Rif, he says it is Torah-level — he will indeed say that these are essential permissions. Meaning, this kind of washing is simply not included in the prohibition at all; it is not a suspension but part of the definition. All that was prohibited is washing for pleasure. But washing for sores, for medicine, or other such things was never prohibited — at least not on the Torah level; maybe rabbinically yes — and then in a case of need there is room to be lenient.

[Speaker G] Who says there is also a negative commandment?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The Ran says it is Torah-level, but it’s not clear exactly what he means — whether it’s only a positive commandment, and therefore there is no karet, or whether it’s both a positive commandment and a negative commandment and nevertheless it was excluded from karet.

[Speaker G] Is there anything explicit that says it’s also a negative commandment?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Only this tentative assumption in the old Tosafot, that’s what—

[Speaker G] No, it’s a positive commandment.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] He says both a positive commandment and a negative commandment, because otherwise he wouldn’t need the exclusion from karet. If it were only the positive commandment, then you wouldn’t need the exclusion from karet. We just have to remember one more thing: there are medieval authorities — I already mentioned the Behag and Rav Saadia Gaon according to Rabbi Yerucham Perla — who claim that regarding affliction on Yom Kippur there really is no negative commandment, only a positive commandment. Really no negative commandment. Then a very great novelty follows: the karet stated regarding Yom Kippur would then be karet for violating a positive commandment. Then we would have a third example, besides circumcision and Passover, of karet on a positive commandment. Then it could be that even if these afflictions were included only under the positive commandment, the question would still remain why there should not be karet. So necessarily we need a special exclusion that excludes them from karet: “and you shall destroy the soul.” Yes, everything else is just combinatorics, but these are the principles for organizing the views. If I missed something here — yes, there are the She’iltot, look on your page. I’m skipping the Ran on the Rif; look in the Talmud. The Ran on the Rif — you’ll see that he holds it is Torah-level. He asks himself: then why did the sages permit it? But in the end he holds it is Torah-level. I said that most views say it is rabbinic; he claims that Maimonides too holds it is Torah-level. Maimonides says “by oral tradition,” and it’s not entirely clear what the status of that is. But in the She’iltot it says as follows — look at She’ilta 167. “A query: that the Holy One, blessed be He, warned Israel to observe affliction on the tenth of Tishrei.” “Warned us” means a negative commandment, right? “Even on the Sabbath, for even when Yom Kippur falls on the Sabbath. And it is forbidden in eating and drinking, wearing shoes, washing, anointing, and marital relations, from the Torah.” Everything is forbidden from the Torah, and he also does not distinguish — also the negative commandment, “warned us.” Right? So he says both a negative commandment and a positive commandment. From where? “Five afflictions are written.” “You shall afflict,” “you shall afflict,” one for eating and drinking, one for washing, one for anointing, one for wearing shoes, and one for marital relations. So he understands the inclusion of the five afflictions as an inclusion that all of them fall within the Torah-level negative commandment. Then we would really expect there to be karet — that there should be karet too, not only a negative commandment, right? Now look at She’ilta 168. “A query: that the house of Israel is obligated to observe affliction on Yom Kippur.” Here it doesn’t say “warned us” but “they are obligated.” What does “they are obligated” mean? Not entirely clear. Maybe he means the liability of karet, I don’t know. “And to afflict his soul, as it is written: ‘but on the tenth of this seventh month is the Day of Atonement.’ And it is forbidden in eating, drinking, washing, etc. Rav Chisda said: these five afflictions that were taught correspond to the five afflictions written in the Torah, and these are they: ‘but on the tenth of the month,’ ‘and in the month, the month,’ ‘Sabbath of complete rest,’ ‘Sabbath of complete rest,’ ‘and it shall be for you an eternal statute.’” In short, all these sources are all Torah-level. But then he says we need to ask: someone delicate, or someone whose feet hurt — is he permitted to go out wearing some kind of soft footwear? In short, all these permissions — exactly what the old Tosafot asked — if everything is Torah-level, then how can the sages permit it, and so on. He brings more permissions and then says: do we say that the reason for shoes is because of pleasure, and this person gets no pleasure? Or perhaps the Merciful One simply said “shoe” in an undifferentiated way, and any kind is forbidden? So what do we see? That he understands the permission not as a dispensation by suspension, but rather that it may be that only a shoe worn for pleasure was ever prohibited. Someone who is not doing it for pleasure was simply never included in the prohibition. That is his answer to the old Tosafot’s difficulty. Okay? Therefore, regarding someone delicate, he is permitted to go out in soft footwear, for Rav Yehuda went out in a kind of reed sandal, and so on. In short, these are all permissions built into the very body of the law. And why? Because according to his view everything is prohibited by Torah law. So indeed the difficulty arises: how did the sages permit it? The sages permitted it because the Torah handed it over to the sages to determine. By the way, that wording appears in the Ran: “Scripture handed it over to the sages,” right? It seems to me: “Scripture handed it over to the sages to determine what is permitted and what is forbidden.” But all of it is Torah-level.

[Speaker H] Look at it later, I already don’t remember, I can’t—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Find the wording right now, but it’s something like “Scripture handed it over to the sages.” Okay, so these are the sources that say it is Torah-level. Fine. In the Ran himself it’s not entirely clear whether that means only a positive commandment or also a negative commandment. I’ll say again: according to those who say there is only a positive commandment on Yom Kippur, then certainly this too is only a positive commandment and not a negative commandment, because it cannot be that the afflictions include something beyond eating and drinking, when even eating and drinking themselves are only a positive commandment. Okay, so that will depend on all the views we already saw. In Maimonides, just one final note, in Maimonides — look at your page at positive commandment 164. I already brought negative commandment 196 earlier, but in positive commandment 164 he writes as follows: “He commanded us to afflict ourselves on the tenth of Tishrei, and that is His statement, may He be exalted” — in Acharei Mot — “you shall afflict your souls.” And the explanation comes in the Sifra: “‘you shall afflict your souls’ — an affliction that involves loss of life; and what is that? Eating and drinking.” And the received tradition also teaches that washing, anointing, wearing shoes, and marital relations are forbidden. “And cessation is obligatory from all these acts, from His statement: ‘It is a Sabbath of complete rest for you, and you shall afflict your souls,’ as if it says that there is an obligation in it of the cessation specific to labors and actions, and the cessation specific to the nourishment and sustaining of the body.” Yes — both the prohibitions and the afflictions — and therefore it says “Sabbath of complete rest.” In Maimonides it sounds like this is a real inclusion, not merely a scriptural support — a real inclusion. But note that in the negative commandment it does not appear. We read negative commandment 196: “He warned us against eating on the fast of Yom Kippur.” There the inclusion of the afflictions is not mentioned. In Maimonides it sounds like he reads the two passages we saw this way: in our passage, where they included it from “reston,” they included the positive commandment — what I read at the beginning. And regarding the negative commandment of the negative commandments, there on the Torah level it is only eating and drinking and the afflictions — and therefore there is no karet. So what about all this idea that affliction in general includes them, which appears later in the Talmud? Maimonides will say — apparently — that that is some kind of scriptural support. After all, it all comes from the Prophets and Writings, right? We already saw that. So it doesn’t have to be scriptural support, but apparently that’s how Maimonides learned it. In Maimonides it seems to be only a positive commandment and not a negative commandment. Okay, good, thank you very much.

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Yoma, Chapter 8, Lesson 5

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