Yoma, Chapter 8, Lesson 7

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[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If he doesn’t hear, he doesn’t hear; you can’t do anything. But on the principled level, as much as you can, you have to keep going—certainly as long as he isn’t obligated yet. And if during that period he still isn’t obligated in the commandment, then he is still considered a minor for this purpose. I think there is also a law of education even regarding an adult, but—

[Speaker C] That is, at twenty he’s already obligated, everything is fine and good.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right, and still, if he isn’t doing it, there is an obligation on his father to make sure he does it—as much as he can. If he can’t, then he’s under duress, fine. I don’t think there’s a difference here between a minor and an adult on this issue. By the way, Rabbi Ben Zion Abba Shaul writes this later—I saw it regarding the counting of the Omer. I’ll maybe bring another example, since you asked about the Sabbath. Where did this come up for me in the context of the Sabbath? There is the Rosh—ah yes, here, Moed Katan. Moving on. Now after this you’ll be amazed by me. You see what a wonder this is? A cheap wonder. This is a Talmudic text without the Rosh. Wonders have been abolished, wonders are gone. The Rosh writes—he discusses there the question of what happens if a minor heard that one of his parents died, say after two days. Okay? A minor, what? A minor. No, sorry, he didn’t hear—sorry. A minor’s parents died, and then he became an adult in the middle of the mourning period. Okay? The question is whether he has to continue—for example, the seven days—so the question is whether he has to continue mourning for the remaining days or not. The Rosh ties it to the question of whether there is deferral in commandments or not. Not the Rosh—the Mordechai. He ties it to the question of whether there is deferral in commandments or no deferral in— the Maharam of Rothenburg, not the Mordechai; that was the Rosh’s teacher, yes. Whether there is deferral in commandments or no deferral in commandments. The Maharam of Rothenburg claims that it depends on that question. If there is deferral in commandments, then the minor was deferred at the moment he heard about the parent’s death, and since that’s so, he was pushed out of this obligation and no longer has to fulfill it. If there is no deferral in commandments, then as long as he is a minor, he is a minor, and from the moment he is an adult, then he has to fast—by the way, yes, that’s another discussion. Now the Rosh asks, after he brings the Maharam of Rothenburg, he says to him—not only that, the Maharam of Rothenburg brings a proof. What is the proof? There is a Talmudic text in Yevamot 33. The Gemara there discusses the principle that one prohibition does not take effect on top of another prohibition. And you know that if it is inclusive, or adds something, or comes simultaneously, then the second prohibition does take effect on the first. Now what happens if a minor grows two pubic hairs on the Sabbath? So the Gemara says that the prohibition is that he entered the Temple in impurity while still a minor, and then he grew two hairs. Okay? So he also desecrated the Sabbath there—it doesn’t matter, there are all kinds of stories there, the minor pulled off a very interesting combination, he managed to rack up several prohibitions at once. So the Gemara says that since he grew two hairs on the Sabbath, he essentially became obligated in both things at once, and therefore he transgressed both. Let’s say if he offered a sacrifice or something like that and he was a non-priest, or impure, or something like that, then he is liable for everything, because it came all at once, not one after the other. And the Maharam of Rothenburg brings a proof from there to here. We see that the minor is in fact obligated to keep the rest of the Sabbath if he grew two hairs in the middle. So we see that there is no deferral in commandments. And therefore, in mourning too, there is no deferral in commandments, and he has to continue mourning. That’s what the Maharam of Rothenburg says. The Rosh asks him: what does the Sabbatical year have to do with an omelet? What does this have to do with Yevamot at all? In the Gemara about the Sabbath, it’s an obligation to keep the Sabbath.

[Speaker C] The obligation to keep the Sabbath is—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Every moment that you are in the Sabbath, you have to refrain from labor. Right? Now what? So between twilight—or from twilight until the time you grew two hairs—you were a minor, you weren’t commanded, so you didn’t keep it. From the moment you grew two hairs, you are obligated. What does this have to do with deferral in commandments? What deferral in commandments? When is deferral in commandments relevant? When the obligating principle for the whole commandment occurred when you were not obligated—for example, in mourning. In mourning, if you were a minor when you heard that the parent died, that event is what obligates you for all seven days of mourning, and if you were deferred at that moment, then you were deferred altogether. That’s the claim. Or else there is no deferral in commandments. That’s the debate, whether there is or isn’t deferral in commandments. But all that is in mourning. Why? Because all seven days of mourning are obligatory because of the moment of death. Because of the death I am obligated to mourn for seven days, so the question is what my status was at the moment of death, and whether that determines my ongoing obligation. On the Sabbath, what is the status of my obligation at twilight? Does someone who was a minor at that moment not need to keep that Sabbath? What does that have to do with anything? On the Sabbath there is no particular moment that is the foundation of the obligation, from which you have to keep the Sabbath. Every moment you are in the Sabbath, keep it. If you grew two hairs in the middle of the Sabbath, then from the moment you grew two hairs, keep whatever remains. Very similar to a minor with the counting of the Omer, and everything I said before, and on Yom Kippur, and everything I said before. So that’s how the Rosh asks, and therefore he rejects his teacher’s words. He says: no. One does not answer the lion after his death—but still, this doesn’t make sense, it doesn’t make sense. So what does the Maharam of Rothenburg mean after all? What the Maharam of Rothenburg claims—this was just in parentheses, because it’s less important for our issue—but the Maharam of Rothenburg apparently claims that even on the Sabbath, the obligating moment is twilight. When the Sabbath enters, the acceptance of the Sabbath—it’s not just simply because now it entered, but I accepted the Sabbath, and that is what obligates me for all twenty-four hours. If at that moment when the Sabbath was accepted, when the Sabbath entered, I was a minor, then, says the Maharam of Rothenburg, this falls under the question of whether there is deferral in commandments or not. Like with muktzeh. What? Exactly—with muktzeh there is the principle that since it was set aside during twilight, it is set aside for the whole day. Usually Baal HaMaor and Ritva and almost all the later authorities that I know understand this principle not as some mystical principle, that the status of the object during twilight determines its status for the whole day. Rather what? Twilight is simply the beginning of the Sabbath. If something was not prepared by the time the Sabbath entered, then it was not prepared. You can’t prepare it on the Sabbath itself. So if something was muktzeh during twilight, that only means it wasn’t prepared until now; automatically it will be muktzeh for the whole Sabbath. It’s not that there is something special about twilight that radiates over the whole Sabbath; it is simply the first moment at which one encounters the Sabbath, that’s all. But in the responsa Eretz Tzvi, he claims not so. I think it’s a dispute among the medieval authorities (Rishonim). He says not so; he says it’s some kind of mystical principle, that the status at twilight—the object’s status at twilight—if it was muktzeh then that is its status for the whole Sabbath. Not because of the law of preparation. One ramification, for example, is ‘since it was set aside because of the previous day.’ All this is in parentheses, but ‘since it was set aside because of the previous day’—what does that mean?

[Speaker I] A Jewish holiday before the Sabbath?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Say a Jewish holiday before the Sabbath. So basically the etrog, for example, at the end of the seventh day of Sukkot, okay? So that was on Friday, and then the Sabbath entered. The question is whether the etrog is muktzeh on the Sabbath. So during twilight it was set aside for its commandment-use. Right? If it was set aside for its commandment-use, the question is whether it is also set aside for the rest of the day. So there is a dispute between Tosafot and Ritva whether one really says such a thing, ‘since it was set aside because of the previous day.’ Why? It seems to me that the dispute is on exactly this question. If you understand ‘since it was set aside’ to mean that the object was not prepared until the entrance of the Sabbath, then that is true here too. The object was not prepared at any point until the Sabbath entered, because it was set aside for its commandment-use until the Sabbath entered—it was Sukkot. Okay? Since that’s so, then it is muktzeh. Or Shemini Atzeret—not important. So it was set aside; actually you don’t need the Sabbath here. So it was set aside. But if you understand that the object has to be muktzeh at one moment within the Sabbath, because only then does that spread over the whole Sabbath, because the Sabbath is one unit, then you do not say ‘since it was set aside because of the previous day.’ Because all the time it was set aside was only in moments belonging to the previous day. True, you don’t know exactly when one passes from the previous day to the next day, but in principle all the time it was set aside was only because of moments belonging to the previous day. There was no moment belonging to the next day in which the etrog was muktzeh, so it does not spread over the whole day and give it the status of muktzeh for the entire day. Okay? So if that is how one understands the meaning of the Sabbath, then ‘since it was set aside’ also takes on a different meaning, and then indeed one definitely does not say ‘since it was set aside because of the previous day.’ Or that is the dispute between Tosafot and Ritva.

[Speaker E] So too regarding the commandment of kiddush, “remember it and keep it holy”—that’s a commandment at the beginning—

[Speaker H] —and at the end; it’s not a commandment at every moment. So what? At every time? No, then according to this, okay, but it’s not—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It’s a commandment applying to the whole Sabbath, but they’re two specific commandments; it doesn’t get us where we need to go.

[Speaker H] No, the question is whether a minor would have to recite kiddush or not. If you say that from that moment the Sabbath begins for him, then you—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] You mean a minor who became an adult in the middle of the Sabbath—would he have to recite kiddush?

[Speaker H] Exactly. If you say that the Sabbath begins only at twilight—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Then not only does he not—

[Speaker H] —have that concept of—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Of course, but then you don’t even get to kiddush; he doesn’t need to keep that Sabbath at all. Yes, so of course he wouldn’t need to recite kiddush. The question is: if he does have to keep the Sabbath, does the obligation of kiddush come back to him at the moment this Sabbath entered? Maybe yes, I don’t know. Good question.

[Speaker E] But maybe not because of “remember” and “keep,” and all that, because the Sabbath is different from a Jewish holiday. Meaning, “remember” and “keep” were said in one utterance. So then what?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What does that have to do with it? You mean kiddush and havdalah, not “remember” and “keep.”

[Speaker E] Why? I’m saying that keeping the Sabbath was linked to remembering the Sabbath, and then the commandment of kiddush can only be at the entrance and not in the middle.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Ah, you understand from that a source for saying there is an obligating point at twilight in keeping the Sabbath. Fine, maybe, I don’t know.

[Speaker G] The difference between muktzeh and the child who became an adult isn’t so clear to me. This is an object-status and that is a person-status. The object has its status by virtue of the decree of the Sabbath—it becomes permitted or forbidden.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But why? Why does its twilight status determine its status for the whole day?

[Speaker G] Whereas the child, obviously—here—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Full transcription of the segment: No, of the object. Why? The status, the status of—because there is a relation here to the Sabbath as one unit of time, at twilight.

[Speaker G] Why? What? Why? Because maybe it is prepared on Sabbath eve, maybe not.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] You’re going with Ritva and Baal HaMaor. I’m speaking according to Tosafot. Exactly—that’s the question. If you don’t take the preparation approach, then what is sanctified about twilight? Maharam of Rothenburg and Tosafot said, yes, that all of them went in that direction. What is holy about twilight that it determines the object’s status for the whole day? Why shouldn’t Sabbath morning determine it for the whole day? What is there about twilight more than any other time? The claim is that what happens at the first moment spreads over the whole time, not because of preparation issues. And if that’s so, then regarding the person’s keeping of the Sabbath it’s the same thing: if the Sabbath is one unit, then it is one unit. In any event, for our purposes, what I just want to say is that you see that even regarding the Sabbath there may be medieval authorities (Rishonim) who understand it as one unit of time, like Yom Kippur, because you asked earlier why this applies only to Yom Kippur. And this brings us back to the question whether what I said here is a definition of the concept of fasting, or whether it can also be a definition of the concept of refraining from labor. I said that with refraining from labor there is room to hesitate. Is the concept of refraining from labor also not defined moment by moment, but rather one has to refrain for some span of time—as distinct from merely not doing labor—like fasting as against merely not eating? Or not—maybe refraining from labor is different. With refraining from labor, maybe you can refrain for one moment, and then refrain for another moment, and another moment, all day. So regarding the prohibition of eating, it’s clear that it applies at every single moment. Regarding fasting, it’s clear that it applies to the whole day. Regarding refraining from labor, there is room to hesitate here, okay? And it could be that this itself is the dispute among the medieval authorities (Rishonim) regarding the Sabbath. Because if the concept of refraining from labor is also defined over a span of time, that is exactly the source for Tosafot and Maharam of Rothenburg, who say: fine, then the obligation of refraining from labor on the Sabbath is over a twenty-four-hour unit of time, exactly as we said about fasting, because they understand it that way even with refraining from labor. Then it would seem obvious to say this, of course, also about Yom Kippur, whether it is defined as a fast or as refraining from labor. Now look at one ramification, for example: would we say the same thing regarding labor-prohibitions on Yom Kippur, not only fasting? Someone who did labor on Yom Kippur—does he have to continue keeping Yom Kippur with respect to labor, not with respect to fasting, or has he lost it? Can we ask the same question there too? It’s not entirely simple. If I rely on defining that day as a fast, then because it is a fast, it applies only to the affliction, not to the labor. Then with labor, indeed, the obligation is at every moment. But if, according to Maharam of Rothenburg and Tosafot, even on Sabbaths where there is no affliction at all—there are only labor-prohibitions—and for them the duty of refraining from labor is also defined as covering a full period of time, then clearly on Yom Kippur it would also be so. And then this question could be asked regarding labor-prohibitions as well, not only regarding affliction-prohibitions. Meaning, these things ultimately bring us back to all the discussions we had about affliction versus refraining from labor. That is really the expression of this issue. Why view Yom Kippur as different from all eating prohibitions, in that it’s not moment by moment? Because here it really is one unit of refraining from labor or one unit of affliction, and therefore the definition is indeed the definition of one unit.

[Speaker G] So then he isn’t really obligated on the Sabbath, after he grows the hairs, to continue keeping the Sabbath?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] In the Gemara it says he is obligated; the question is why. Isn’t he obligated rabbinically? In the Gemara it says he is obligated; in the Gemara in Yevamot it says he is obligated—Yevamot 33. The question is whether that is connected to deferral in commandments or not; that is the dispute. The dispute is not about the law itself; certainly the minor must continue keeping the Sabbath. The question is whether it is connected to deferral in commandments. According to Maharam of Rothenburg it is connected to deferral in commandments; it is because there is no deferral in commandments. But according to the one who says there is deferral in commandments, then indeed he would not be obligated to keep it, and the whole Gemara speaks only according to the one who says there is no deferral in commandments, and therefore he proves that this is the law. The Rosh argues that this has nothing to do with the question of deferral in commandments, because there is nothing here to be deferred—there is no obligating moment.

[Speaker K] Okay. When you do labor on the Sabbath, you do the labor—you did half a labor, a quarter of a labor—according to the nature of what you did. But a fast—you can’t call something a fast if you only fasted for an hour. That isn’t a fast. The Torah said from evening to evening—that is a fast. Once you haven’t done that whole unit, it doesn’t count.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, even on the Sabbath, if you say that the prohibition on the Sabbath is refraining from labor over the whole unit of time, and let’s say you sorted at eight in the morning, then when you sorted at eight in the morning you violated that prohibition, because ultimately that is what broke your day-long refraining from labor.

[Speaker K] That’s connected to the labor you did.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Fine, but practically speaking it also broke the entire unit.

[Speaker K] Yes, it’s labor, not time. A fast is time. Whether you completed it.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But the question is when not to do the labor. Is the prohibition to do labor, or is the obligation to refrain? That’s the question—the same question I ask about fasting and not eating. With the prohibition of eating, it could be that the problem is that you are not refraining—that’s the problem.

[Speaker J] No, the question is something else: if you sorted at eight o’clock and sorted again at twelve o’clock, would that count as—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Ah, that’s the same question. Someone who desecrated the Sabbath—does it still make sense for him to continue keeping the Sabbath or not? Seemingly, one could have asked that same question there too, because it is one unit. By the way, there it is clear that as a matter of law this is not correct. On Yom Kippur one can discuss it. Wait, wait, wait. Obviously—we are talking about multiple sin-offerings on the Sabbath, or multiple punishments on the Sabbath; how can you say that after the first time you’re done with the Sabbath? Therefore it’s clear that there it really doesn’t make sense to say this. The question is whether it belongs to deferral in commandments or not.

[Speaker E] But isn’t it obvious that with refraining from labor it applies at every moment?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Meaning, if I refrain for one hour, I refrained during that hour, didn’t I? Even if I fasted during that hour, I fasted during that hour. But the Torah requires a day. I didn’t feel affliction? Why didn’t I feel affliction? I like to eat every half hour; I felt affliction. The Torah defines it as twenty-four hours; that doesn’t arise from the concept of fasting itself. The concept of fasting only says it is not moment by moment. It applies over some period of time—I don’t know, however much. The Torah tells you what span of time: twenty-four hours. Okay? So with labor too you could say the same thing. I’m saying again: since in practice, as a matter of law, on the Sabbath there really is no side to say that if you did labor once you may continue doing it afterward, I cannot imagine that these later authorities who discuss this question on Yom Kippur would discuss it also with respect to labor. They discuss it only regarding affliction, not regarding labor.

[Speaker D] Because labor is a prohibition.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What? Exactly, because labor is “do not do any labor,” and “you shall rest” is perhaps a positive commandment, but the prohibition is not defined as a prohibition on violating rest; the prohibition is on doing labor. Meaning, if there were a prohibition on Yom Kippur against eating, then it would be completely parallel. But on Yom Kippur there really is no prohibition against eating; there is a positive commandment of affliction. And if there is a prohibition derived there, it is a prohibition against violating affliction; it is not a prohibition against eating. Therefore, regarding affliction on Yom Kippur one can ask this question. Regarding the Sabbath, on the theoretical level maybe one could ask it—or regarding refraining from labor on Yom Kippur, refraining from labor on Yom Kippur. Practically, it is hard for me to believe that anyone would really raise such a possibility on Yom Kippur regarding labor. But regarding affliction, it does come up. Why does it come up? Because of the concept of fasting. Okay? On the contrary, the very fact that, as a matter of law, refraining from labor is indeed defined moment by moment probably means that the concept of refraining from labor is not necessarily a concept defined over a span of time, as distinct from the concept of fasting. Okay? And then indeed, even according to Maimonides, for whom Yom Kippur is one broad act of resting, still the component of that resting that speaks about—

[Speaker J] Labor, pleasures—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, pleasures—is defined as fasting, and therefore that part does need to cover a full span of time. Even if the concept of resting does not conceptually dictate that it must be a full twenty-four-hour period, the fasting component in it probably can at least only be over a full twenty-four-hour period, because fasting is over a full span of time. So that is one ramification of this issue. Now I want to continue to the other aspects I mentioned.

[Speaker I] Day and night now?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Day and night, for example, yes—let’s start with day and night. Regarding day and night, we encountered the Gemara on page 81. The Gemara says there, Ravina said—they’re searching for the prohibition regarding labor, the prohibition regarding affliction, sorry, the warning regarding affliction. Yoma 81a. Ravina said below: this tanna derived “selfsame” from “selfsame.” It is free. For if it were not free, one could refute it as we refuted before. Okay? Meaning, they learn by verbal analogy—“selfsame,” “selfsame”—the warning regarding affliction from the warning regarding labor: “on this very day,” “on this very day” is written about labor and written about affliction, so we make a verbal analogy from it. And one of them is free. Since it is free, one can make a verbal analogy. Which one is free? That is, from which of them does the freeing arise here?

[Speaker C] What is the meaning of the word “which one”? I don’t know the literal explanation—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But I’ve run into it many times.

[Speaker C] How does the freeing happen here?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Five verses are written regarding labor. Five verses means that five times it says “on this very day,” all in the context of labor. Four of them speak about, let’s say, punishment and warning—about punishment and warning—and the fifth is free. Okay? So five verses are written regarding labor: one for the warning of daytime, one for the warning of nighttime, one for the punishment of daytime, one for the punishment of nighttime, and one to free up. There are five occurrences of “on this very day.” In fact there are four texts about warning, and one text about the punishment of karet: “Any person who does any labor on this very day… that soul shall be cut off.” Okay, so there are four that are warnings regarding labor and one that is punishment. That’s what it says. What do we do with it? Why do we need four warnings about labor? So the Gemara says: one is a warning about labor by day, one is a warning about labor by night. One is a warning for punishment by day, one is a warning for punishment by night, and one is extra. Okay. Now what does “extra” mean? Free. I have nothing to learn from it. And therefore they learn from it, by verbal analogy, the warning regarding affliction. So Rashi writes, “and one for punishment of night”—Rashi says: if it is not needed for the warning, apply it to punishment. Because in fact what happens is that the punishment for labor is also learned from one of them. The punishment in labor too is learned from one of them. Okay? Because one of them is extra, so I learn from it the punishment for the night. There is punishment for the day—punishment is written explicitly. Punishment for the night is basically learned from a warning about labor that is extra. And besides that extra one, there is another extra “on this very day,” from which nothing is learned. Then the question is what to do with it, and so it is free for making a verbal analogy.

[Speaker I] And this separation between day and night is strange.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes. Now, that’s what I already noted when we read the Gemara. What is the initial assumption for distinguishing between day and night on Yom Kippur? A second thing I ask you: with respect to what is this initial assumption? Labor or affliction? The initial assumption is ultimately rejected—there is a warning both for day and for night—but to what does this initial assumption apply?

[Speaker I] That with affliction too there are four warnings, basically. To derive affliction from labor.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That there is a warning regarding affliction—both by day and by night.

[Speaker I] Meaning that with affliction too there is such an initial assumption: to derive affliction from labor both by day and by night.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Meaning both by day and by night—obviously, because just as with labor it is by day and by night, with affliction too it is by day and by night. Who said so? You are looking for a warning regarding affliction in general, not by day and by night. You have one extra verse that teaches you affliction, a warning regarding affliction. They tell you—just parenthetically they add—of course, both by day and by night, as with labor. In fact, from the Gemara here it seems that this initial assumption arises specifically regarding labor and not regarding affliction. Right? Affliction has one extra verse, and of course if it is already said, it is said about everything. Look for a moment at Maimonides—I’ll read you Maimonides, I didn’t photocopy it. Resting on the Tenth, chapter 1, law 6: “Just as one rests from labor on it both by day and by night, so too one rests for affliction both by day and by night. And one must add from the profane to the holy at its entrance and at its exit,” and so on. And that’s it. What—how do you understand that sentence? “Just as one rests from labor on it both by day and by night, so too one rests for affliction both by day and by night.” The subject of that law is affliction. Until now he spoke about labor, and now he says: know that with affliction too.

[Speaker F] The addition is also important.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] We’ll see the addition in a moment, but for now—

[Speaker F] Because it could be that after an hour in which you ate, then as it were—even if you ate an hour after the fast began—you still didn’t damage the affliction. And therefore maybe you need the addition.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Wait, wait—the addition, I said, we’ll get to that. But first of all, in the Gemara itself it seems that the distinction between day and night comes up as an initial assumption with respect to labor. But on that, Tosafot Yeshanim there asks—you can see it. Tosafot Yeshanim in front of you says—“your souls,” wait—“and one for punishment of daytime and one for punishment of nighttime,” you see, the last Tosafot on the page: I do not know whether everywhere we require punishment for daytime and nighttime in labor, such as Sabbaths and Jewish holidays and the intermediate days of a festival. And regarding the intermediate days of a festival he apparently understands that it is Torah-level, even there on the intermediate days of a festival. A dispute.

[Speaker H] But by definition the day begins from the night.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Doesn’t matter. But the very split—I don’t care at the moment whether it’s the night after the day or the night before the day. Decide however you decide. But why split between them? Okay? The problem is the split, not which night you take. So Tosafot Yeshanim understands that the division here was about labor and not about affliction. And therefore he says: then why on Sabbaths and holidays do we not also find a separate warning for the day and a separate warning for the night? What we say later, that for affliction too it is both by day and by night, is simply incidental. Once you said there is a warning regarding affliction, then don’t think that there it is something else. Obviously there too it is both by day and by night. But the initial assumption really arises in the context of labor. That is how it apparently seems, right? Now I’ll read you Maimonides again. “Just as one rests from labor on it both by day and by night, so too one rests for affliction both by day and by night.” This matter, that one rests from labor both by day and by night, is not mentioned anywhere else in Maimonides. Obviously it is by day too, but he didn’t see fit to emphasize this except in the law dealing with affliction. And in the law dealing with affliction he only says: after all, with labor it is both by day and by night; affliction is linked to labor by the verbal analogy of “selfsame,” “selfsame,” so with affliction too it is apparently both by day and by night. In Maimonides it seems a bit—or more than a bit—that this initial assumption is only about affliction. Only about affliction.

[Speaker D] But it’s a verbal analogy; he learns—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] From the verbal analogy, affliction gets the same thing. Correct. He says like this—look. In principle, if there had been four and not five occurrences of “on this very day,” then I would not say “both by day and by night” about labor. So the warning and punishment regarding labor, both by day and by night—then indeed it would be free and I would have to think what to do with it. But once there are five, and I say to myself that the fifth clearly speaks about affliction, then what are the first four? The first four come to tell me that labor applies both by day and by night. Why? Because they want to teach me by means of that verbal analogy that affliction too applies both by day and by night. Meaning, in fact all this learning about labor comes to answer the initial assumption that arose regarding affliction. About labor itself no one would ever imagine—unlike Tosafot Yeshanim—no one would imagine distinguishing between day and night. Where, with the Sabbath and a holiday, did we ever search for separate warnings for day and night? We never found such a thing anywhere. On Yom Kippur, says Maimonides apparently—that’s how I understand him—an initial assumption arises to distinguish in affliction between day and night. How do I know we don’t distinguish? So let’s do the accounting. Regarding where do we learn the warning for affliction from? From the warning for labor. And in the warning for labor there are four things written. Why? On a holiday and on the Sabbath we don’t have four things written, after all. Ah—apparently that is to teach me that with affliction we do not distinguish between day and night. Therefore only on Yom Kippur do they make this distinction of four times, for day and for night. True, they do it in the framework of labor—and that raises the question why the Torah chose to say it through labor with respect to affliction. But that question exists anyway; it isn’t specifically connected to what I’m saying. It’s that way in any case. Why do this by means of a kind of free text from which you make a verbal analogy? Just state a warning regarding affliction—what’s the problem?

[Speaker E] But also for labor itself—what? That on Yom Kippur itself there is some significance even in labor itself to distinguish between day and night.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So I’m saying: in Maimonides one could have understood that way, but in Maimonides it implies otherwise. Because Maimonides, when he speaks about the labor prohibition, does not say that the labor prohibition applies both by day and by night. That’s obvious—you must refrain on the tenth. When he moves to affliction, then he says: just as labor is both by day and by night, so too affliction. It implies that the derivation in labor—that it is both by day and by night—has one whole purpose only: to resolve for me an initial assumption, or remove an initial assumption, that arises with affliction. They taught me that labor is also by day and also by night simply so that I can learn that affliction too is also by day and by night. Because only with affliction is there an initial assumption to distinguish between day and night. And why really? So here one can go in various directions. If Maimonides, especially Maimonides who speaks in terms of resting—then, unlike Tosafot Yeshanim, for Maimonides it is obvious that on Sabbaths and holidays no initial assumption arises to distinguish between day and night. Tosafot Yeshanim remains with it unresolved; he says: from the Gemara here it looks like there should be warnings, but I didn’t find them. According to Tosafot Yeshanim, it really is difficult. So then how do we know that on the Sabbath and a holiday too it is both by day and by night?

[Speaker G] The verbal analogy gives us exactly the comparison between these two things: this is day and night and that is day and night.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right. Who said otherwise?

[Speaker G] That mechanism already exists. Why do you need, why do you need—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It exists—I didn’t understand the question. I’m saying that too. So what is the question? I’m only claiming that what needed to teach me about day and night on Yom Kippur is because on Yom Kippur there is also affliction. So what? Therefore, the derivation that labor too is by day and by night is not because I had an initial assumption to distinguish between day and night in labor—because in fact on Sabbaths and holidays no such initial assumption arises. Rather, it comes to resolve for me an initial assumption that arises with respect to affliction. Maybe the affliction was only at night or only by day. The Gemara comes and says no—the warning is both by day and by night. How does it tell me that? Through labor, from which we make a verbal analogy to affliction. But in the end the purpose is to remove an initial assumption that arises in affliction, not in labor. And again, why is that? Because affliction is a fast. And the concept of a fast can tolerate many interpretations. Our fasts—admittedly rabbinic, but our regular fasts—we do only during the day. The concept of a fast, in its conceptual definition, as I defined it before, is over a span of time—not necessarily twenty-four hours. A span of time. There was room to say maybe it is only day, maybe only night; maybe all day we will refrain from labor as on other Sabbaths and holidays, but the fasting we will do only for part of it. Okay? That too is a fast—a one-day fast, or a one-night fast. Not necessarily a full twenty-four hours. Right. So on that the Gemara says: here an initial assumption arose that with fasting we might distinguish between day and night, and therefore that assumption does not arise on Sabbaths and holidays, contrary to what Tosafot Yeshanim says. So why was it taught here after all? To teach me that with affliction there is no difference between day and night. Since affliction is learned through labor, so too the comparison—“to derive affliction from labor, both by day and by night.” It’s not incidental, as I answered earlier to the one who asked. That is the whole purpose of the matter. The entire reason they made this set of four sources is so that in the end, when I get to affliction, I will learn it as both by day and by night. Not just to teach me a warning regarding affliction and, in parentheses, I merely say that it is both by day and by night. No. The whole move is precisely to tell me that they are teaching me that affliction is both by day and by night, and not as you might have thought that it is perhaps only by day or only by night. Okay? The language of the Gemara is also very precise according to Maimonides. Meaning, there are really two ways to read the Gemara here. One could read the Gemara as raising a real possibility of distinguishing between day and night—whether in affliction or in labor, maybe only in labor, I don’t know. That is how Tosafot Yeshanim read it. Then he asks: so why on Sabbaths and holidays do we not need a separate source for day and night? And he leaves it unresolved. It really is a question—if that’s really the case, it isn’t clear. More than that, later on: “to derive from it a warning regarding affliction, both by day and by night”—for him this is only parenthetical: to derive from it a warning regarding affliction, and in parentheses of course it is also by day and by night as with labor. According to Maimonides, everything is settled, even though it seems at first glance as though it goes against the plain meaning of the Gemara—it is the plain meaning of the Gemara. The Gemara never entertains the idea of distinguishing between day and night on Sabbaths and holidays because the concept of resting is not a concept that speaks about an arbitrary span of time; what the Torah defines, it defines. But with the concept of fasting, we learn its parameters from the concept of fasting, from the definition, what I said earlier; and that can tolerate day by itself or night by itself. So here there is an initial assumption—maybe it’s only day, maybe it’s only night. Therefore an initial assumption arises to distinguish. What does the Torah do, on the interpretive level, I mean? It creates sources for labor, both by day and by night, in order to teach me by verbal analogy—even though one doesn’t really need it. Everything now I’m saying is ‘if it is not needed for its own matter.’ They are all free. Not only the last two are free—all of them are free. Why? Because in fact regarding labor one doesn’t need to teach me that it is both by day and by night. Everything they taught me separately about labor by day and night was in order that by verbal analogy to affliction I should make no distinction at all between day and night. Therefore, when one reads the Gemara at the end—‘to derive affliction from labor, both by day and by night’—the emphasis is on ‘both by day and by night.’ It is not parenthetical, as Tosafot Yeshanim says. Rather, the whole purpose of this convoluted move is so that in the end, regarding affliction, I won’t distinguish between day and night. Not merely a warning regarding affliction and that’s it, but so that I won’t distinguish. Maybe, by the way, that’s one of the reasons why they also learn the punishment in labor from a freed-up text, as Rashi writes here. Because in fact what is written is a warning, and from the warning they derive punishment. Punishment by day is learned from the punishment explicitly written: “Any person who does labor on this very day… shall be cut off”—so that is for the day, right? How do we know that there is also karet at night? Punishment for labor at night. So Rashi says: it is free. They learn it from the warning, from the negative commandment—they learn the punishment because the prohibition is extra; I already have three. So the prohibition is extra, and from that they learn that it’s not a prohibition—it’s punishment; it’s ‘if it is not needed for its own matter.’

[Speaker I] Again—the prohibition is extra?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I have three times where a prohibition appears and one time where a punishment appears. There is one more time of a prohibition—that’s for affliction. But three times a prohibition appears and one time a punishment appears. Yet we need two prohibitions and two punishments, right? Punishment by day and by night, and prohibition by day and by night. So Rashi says that the punishment for the night is: if it is not needed for its warning, apply it to punishment. Meaning one of the verses that speak about warning is actually, by ‘if it is not needed for its own matter,’ teaching about punishment—punishment for labor, okay? Within the first four, not the fifth; within the first four. Why is that? Maybe that too gives you some indication—maybe it was also arranged intentionally to teach you that this whole move is really for the ‘if it is not needed’ regarding affliction. The whole story about labor really doesn’t come to deal with labor; it comes to deal with affliction.

[Speaker H] So then why do I need “you shall rest” from the verse? With that from which they learn the addition—that one must add from the profane to the holy at its entrance and its exit, from “from evening to evening you shall afflict yourselves”—why not say that if you need to add to the affliction, that already includes the night-affliction?

[Speaker I] It is explicitly stated that “from evening to evening you shall observe your Sabbath” explicitly means that it begins from the evening and not from the day. So you don’t need all four, four places.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Positive commandment. We are talking about the prohibition. The whole discussion here is about the prohibition. Isn’t the positive commandment also about the prohibition?

[Speaker I] A warning is to teach the prohibition.

[Speaker H] A positive commandment at night, without a prohibition?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Why not? What’s the problem?

[Speaker I] A positive commandment at night.

[Speaker H] By the way, regarding the addition—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] There are those who say that’s also the law, yes.

[Speaker H] I thought maybe he wants to say that specifically “you shall afflict yourselves” he learns only regarding labor and not regarding affliction. “You shall afflict yourselves” regarding labor? When he writes, “and one must add from the profane to the holy at its entrance and its exit,” does that refer to affliction or to labor?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] We’ll discuss that when we discuss the addition. In any event, what I’m saying is that according to Maimonides the whole initial assumption that arises here—to distinguish between day and night—is really about affliction. And this whole game with labor is just the basis for making the verbal analogy about affliction and negating the initial assumption to distinguish between day and night. Just one more second: why really—if regarding labor no such initial assumption arises, and on Sabbaths and holidays certainly not, though maybe on Yom Kippur not either, because it’s like them—then why regarding affliction does it arise?

[Speaker C] Because it’s a novelty; you don’t have other examples.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] As I said earlier, because within the concept of affliction, the term “fast” can also tolerate twelve hours; it doesn’t have to be twenty-four hours. The whole idea is that the concept of fasting is what dictates the definition. As we saw earlier, the concept of fasting can also bear the meaning of twelve hours. So it could be that the twenty-four hours was said regarding labor, but the fasting maybe is only twelve hours, like the rabbinic fasts we know—Tenth of Tevet, Seventeenth of Tammuz, and all those. So maybe here too it’s like that? Then the Torah comes and rules that out. It says: no, the fasting is like the labor. According to Maimonides this is even stronger, because after the Torah says that the fasting is like the labor, what is it saying by that? What it’s saying is exactly Maimonides’ general idea, that the fasting here is not an eating prohibition; it is part of the obligation of cessation. Just as there is cessation from labor, there is also cessation in the form of fasting. The cessation on Yom Kippur is a broader cessation, both from pleasures and from labors, but that is of course after the conclusion. The initial assumption was that no, there is an obligation to fast and there is an obligation of cessation. The obligation of cessation is like on Sabbaths and holidays, both at night and by day; the obligation to fast is open—maybe day, maybe night, maybe both, I don’t know. In order to teach that it is both, we need the verbal analogy and the free term and all those things. After we learned that it is both, now Maimonides says: what did we learn? We learned this itself—that the fasting is not something separate; it is simply part of the obligation of cessation. The cessation is not only from labor but also from pleasures. That is exactly why it applies both by day and by night, like the labor prohibitions. And now there really is no room to distinguish. Did you want to comment here?

[Speaker E] Yes. Why is it agreed that on Yom Kippur there would even be any point in distinguishing in labor between day and night? No. Not at all? No. So why did the Torah write this as an “if it is not needed” transfer from labor?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So I said, only in order to teach about the affliction.

[Speaker E] Let it just write it directly about the affliction.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] You asked that before and I answered before. The warning regarding affliction also could have been written directly; why do it through an “if it is not needed” transfer from labor? I don’t know, but the Torah did an “if it is not needed” here in any case.

[Speaker E] If the Torah wrote it this way, it’s obvious there’s a reason the Torah wrote it this way.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So now I ask you, according to your view, what is the reason that the Torah wrote the warning about affliction in the form of a labor prohibition? Why? What is the reason the Torah wrote the punishment in the form of a labor prohibition? It’s a punishment, not a warning. One has to think—I agree, thinking is good. But after you think, when you discover why the Torah wrote that, then maybe you’ll also discover why the Torah wrote this.

[Speaker E] But until one finds—if there is a reason that the Torah—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] —wrote it, I’m saying: maybe, I assume there is a reason why the Torah wrote it, but that’s a different question that has nothing to do with what I’m saying. Since in any case it comes up here. I agree, I have no answer. One has to think. But it’s not connected to what I’m saying here; in any case there is some “if it is not needed” here. I’m claiming that the whole idea is “if it is not needed”; the entire discussion done regarding labor is really meant to teach about the affliction. Yes.

[Speaker E] I saw in the Talmud in Shevuot 13 that it says: “Our Rabbis taught: ‘You shall afflict yourselves’—might one think this means with cold and heat?” And then they compare labor to affliction, and they say, “Just as regarding labor you did not distinguish, so too regarding affliction you should not distinguish.” That says the same thing, let’s say, regarding day and night—that just as regarding labor you did not distinguish between day and night, so too regarding affliction—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] —you don’t distinguish between day and night. But where does that comparison between labor and affliction come from?

[Speaker E] They say here: “You shall afflict yourselves” and “you shall do no labor”; regarding labor, a cessation—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So that is the comparison. So I’m saying: these are the same two opinions we already saw in this context too. Do we learn that the linkage of Sabbath and affliction is learned from a comparison? Our tanna learns it from the verbal analogy of “that very” and “that very.” We spoke about the fact that there are disputes here. Now, the Talmud there does it through comparison; here they do it through a verbal analogy that requires a free term and this whole move, and that’s only according to that approach. So each thing in its own context. Okay, now that is regarding—maybe one more comment. Why, in the initial assumption, do we really distinguish between day and night? So I found a few references here. The old Tosafot basically leaves it as requiring further analysis. He understands that they distinguish it with respect to labor, and therefore he does not understand why on Sabbaths and holidays too we would not need two separate sources. In Tosafot HaRosh here it says: “One for the punishment of the daytime and one for the punishment of the nighttime, because here it is written, ‘on this very day,’ therefore a verse was needed for the punishment of the night more than on Sabbaths and holidays.” Because the words “on this very day” are written, there arose here an initial assumption to say that it is only by day and not at night. And therefore we need the teaching that there is also—

[Speaker G] —at night.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Because otherwise we would have thought not. In Gevurat Ari here too, on this Talmudic passage, he says: “I do not know whether in every place we require punishment for day and night, such as Sabbaths and holidays and the end of the Sabbatical year.” That is almost a quotation of the old Tosafot. At the end of the Sabbatical year there is some teaching about adding time. “And it seems to me that although on other holidays and Sabbaths one does not need a separate warning and punishment for the night, because the night too is included in the day, nevertheless because the Merciful One tied the affliction and labor prohibition of Yom Kippur to the atonement of the day, as it is written: ‘You shall afflict yourselves, and you shall do no labor, for on this day He will atone for you.’” And the initial assumption would be that since the night of Yom Kippur does not atone, only the day does, as is stated at the end of the first chapter of Shevuot—there there is a discussion of exactly when atonement happens on Yom Kippur, and in the end the conclusion is that the day atones and not the night, that the very essence of the day atones. So why do we fast at night? After you fast at night and by day, the day atones. The moment at which atonement happens is the day, but it comes after a fast that includes the night as well. Regarding the karet of Yom Kippur, why do I need what the Talmud says there? “That implies that you only find it if he did labor at night and died before the day of Yom Kippur came upon him.” If someone did labor on Yom Kippur at night and died, he did not reach the day, so the day did not atone for him. All right? So basically you see that the day is what atones. It follows that the night does not atone, only the essence of the day. And since that is so, the initial assumption was: since the night does not atone, only the day, the night is not included in affliction and labor prohibition. Therefore a verse was needed to include the night of Yom Kippur like its day for affliction and labor. Now here this is an interesting point. He is really just explaining Tosafot HaRosh; he is not arguing. Tosafot HaRosh says: it says “on this very day,” therefore we had an initial assumption that it would be only by day and not by night, and therefore we need separate sources for day and night. Why really? What stands behind this in terms of the rationale of the verse? So he says: because the atonement of Yom Kippur is only by day, and therefore there was an initial assumption that both the labor and the affliction would be only by day. Labor prohibitions and affliction prohibitions would be only by day. It comes to teach us that it is both by day and by night. So first of all, you see from here that he is apparently taking a third approach. Apparently a third. He holds that the initial assumption to distinguish between day and night applies both to affliction and to labor. In the old Tosafot it seems this is only regarding labor. Affliction perhaps comes out as a consequence, but the initial assumption is only regarding labor. In Maimonides it is only regarding affliction. The Gevurat Ari says it is both regarding affliction and regarding labor. Why really? I think the difference between this and Maimonides is a difference in the question of the initial assumption and the conclusion. The Gevurat Ari understands that already in the initial assumption we understood that the whole idea of Yom Kippur is cessation. So there is no basis to distinguish between cessation from labor and cessation in affliction. When do you have to cease? The cessation is the condition for atonement. What is the cessation? It includes cessation from labors and cessation from pleasures. Right? So if there is an initial assumption to tie everything to atonement, and the atonement is only by day, then both the labor and the pleasures are only by day. That is the initial assumption. There is no room to distinguish between labor and pleasures. Right? In Maimonides it is not like that. Maimonides says the initial assumption was only about affliction. Why? Because in the initial assumption they thought that only the affliction is the condition for atonement—or not necessarily, or only the affliction belongs only to the day. But in the conclusion we came back to what the Gevurat Ari understood. In the conclusion they told us: no, it is both by day and by night. Why? Because really there is no room to distinguish between labor and affliction. And why not? Because Maimonides’ approach is that all of this is one great cessation. The fast too is part of this picture of cessation. So in the end Maimonides also gets there; it’s just that the Gevurat Ari claimed that already in the initial assumption they knew this. Therefore he says the initial assumption concerned both day and night. In Maimonides the novelty is that there is no distinction between day and night. So in the initial assumption there was room to make the initial assumption only about affliction and not about labor. All right? Okay, so in the end where are we standing? We are currently in a situation where this picture of cessation and fasting ultimately projects onto the conception of time on Yom Kippur. In the first stage I spoke about the fact that this is one unit of time and not every moment standing on its own. In the second stage we asked: what is the length of that unit of time? Day and night. And simply speaking, probably this is one unit; I assume that is the straightforward understanding. After that there are two more—I said there are two more aspects. One aspect is the extension added to Yom Kippur, and the second aspect is eating on the ninth. Now I’ll do this briefly; maybe see more details in the summary, because I still want to finish this today. Tuesday is a day off. Are there no more elections at all on Tuesday? None? No. These are things that have no fixed measure: elections and first-fruits.

[Speaker D] And acts of blessing-kindness, say that too.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] In a few more months we’ll have more elections, and that’s fine.

[Speaker D] There’s some such day when they canceled learning.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] In the yeshivot they learn everywhere. Okay. In the yeshivot they are the ten idlers, so ordinary life is idleness, and therefore on a day of cessation they also cease. No—“idlers” in the language of the Talmud, not in the negative sense.

[Speaker I] What kind of ceasing? Everyone runs ten times to vote.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s sanctification of God’s name, it’s a passing commandment. Anyway, besides that, you can also send the dead; you don’t have to stop work for that, there are people who vote for them. In any case, to our subject: the next two chapters are the extension of Yom Kippur and eating on the ninth. Regarding the extension of Yom Kippur, there is some room here to hesitate in terms of the sources, and I’m not going to enter into all the chapters of this discussion, but what is the idea of the extension of Yom Kippur? So I already mentioned that at least according to Maimonides’ approach—after all, in our Talmudic passage it appears on 81b, in the continuation of the passage we saw—it appears as: “Rav Acha bar Yaakov said: He learns ‘a Sabbath of complete rest’ from the Sabbath of Creation. Just as there one does not punish unless one has warned, so too here one does not punish unless one has warned. Rav Pappa said: It itself is called Sabbath, as it is written, ‘you shall observe your Sabbath rest.’” And then it begins: why did Rav Pappa not say like Rav Acha, why did Rav Acha not say like Rav Pappa, and then the Talmud says: “As it was taught: Might one think from darkness? Scripture says: ‘on the ninth.’ How so? One begins and afflicts oneself while it is still day. From here we learn that one adds from the profane to the holy. And I have this only for its entrance; from where do I know it for its exit?” What is the difference between its entrance and its exit? Why should there be a difference?

[Speaker D] The atonement already took place on Yom Kippur. And at its end there was atonement. So then what?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Maybe at its end that is the end of the extension, I don’t know. So if I mentioned someone earlier—I don’t remember, it says somewhere for me who says this—it was in Rabbi Zevin, I don’t remember in whose name he brings it in Festivals in Halakhah. He writes there that there are some who want to claim—after all, we did not find a measure for the extension. How much does one need to add? He claims that the measure is digestion time.

[Speaker I] Digestion time.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Seventy-two minutes.

[Speaker I] Digestion of what? Of food.

[Speaker E] Every food has a different time.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Fine, okay, digestion time in Jewish law is seventy-two minutes. The walking time of four parasangs, or whatever. “One adds from the profane to the holy.” What is the meaning of this matter beyond the question whether that is the amount of time one needs to add? What is the meaning of this matter?

[Speaker C] So that he enters already afflicted.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Exactly. We said earlier that the commandment is not not to eat; the commandment is to fast. And I said that one of the implications of the commandment to fast is that this is one long unit of time and not not eating at each and every moment. But in the first moments of Yom Kippur I’m only not eating; I’m not fasting. Right? Just as between meals I’m not fasting. In order for me truly, from evening to evening, to observe my cessation, so that I fulfill the commandment of affliction for the entire twenty-four-hour period, I have to add time. But then it really comes out that the extension is not a continuation of the obligation of Yom Kippur; it is actually preparation for Yom Kippur. It’s not that the laws of Yom Kippur apply to the extension. There is no such commandment of extension at all, and nothing of the kind. All you need is simply to make sure that you will be in a state of fasting from the moment Yom Kippur begins. How do you do that? You add before Yom Kippur a period of time in which one does not eat. One implication, for example, is that on the extension the obligation would not be on cessation in general but only on eating. Right? In Maimonides, the Maggid Mishneh at least understands that the extension applies only to affliction. Look, for example, at Maimonides’ wording. Maimonides says—one second—Maimonides says, the Maimonides I read earlier. Yes, he says: “And one must add from the profane to the holy at its entrance and at its exit, as it is said, ‘And you shall afflict yourselves on the ninth day of the month in the evening,’ meaning: begin to fast and afflict oneself from the evening of the ninth, close to the tenth. And so too at the exit, one remains in one’s affliction a little into the night of the eleventh, close to the tenth, as it is said, ‘from evening to evening shall you observe your Sabbath rest.’” He speaks about affliction; he does not speak about cessation. Indeed the Maggid Mishneh there writes that Maimonides’ approach is only that the extension is only regarding affliction. “From our teacher’s words it appears that there is no Torah-level extension except in affliction, but not in doing labor, neither on Yom Kippur nor on Sabbaths.” And therefore Maimonides’ approach is indeed that the extension on Sabbaths is only rabbinic, since extension regarding labor, even on Yom Kippur, is only rabbinic. The Torah-level extension learned from Yom Kippur is only about affliction. Why? If we explain as I suggested earlier, then it is very clear why. So this continues the whole move I have made until now. Basically the obligation is to fast.

[Speaker D] And that’s all—to fast during the day.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The extension is not really an obligation; rather, it is because one has to make sure that the affliction begins from the first moment. And then it is also clear why the initial assumption was to make the extension only on the eve of Yom Kippur and not at its end. Because what is there to make an extension at its end? Eat after it ends, everything is fine; after all, there is no real obligation to add. But in the Talmud itself in the end they do say to add also at the end, also at the conclusion. The question is whether the adding at the end is an additional law, or whether it uproots the initial assumption and in truth the extension is an independent law, and it is not only so that you will be fasting from the moment the day starts, but really an independent law. I don’t know. There is room here to hesitate as to what exactly the conclusion is. That is the initial assumption, but what the conclusion is—that is a question one can hesitate about. What?

[Speaker H] He says that women who eat and drink until dark, and they don’t know that there is a commandment to add from the profane to the holy, he doesn’t mention this issue that they are also, as it were, doing labor until dark.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] In any such case, that joins up with the principle there of “better that they remain inadvertent rather than intentional.”

[Speaker C] The extension after a festival is rabbinic. What? Rabbinic, not Torah-level. Extension after a festival?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, so I’m saying no—when I speak about extension after a festival, I mean extension of affliction, not extension of labor. Extension of affliction after the festival. Rabbinic? Apparently that’s Torah-level, in the plain sense of the Talmud. Why? Why? So I explained. The question is what the conclusion is teaching. In the initial assumption they thought this was only on the eve of Yom Kippur, and that I understand. The conclusion teaches that it is also after Yom Kippur. Now the question is why. Is it after Yom Kippur because in truth they retreat from the initial assumption, and even on the eve of Yom Kippur it is not in order that you be fasting but rather there is a law of extension, to add more time—Torah-level, yes—and then at the end of the day too there is a law to add more time? Or not: maybe there is a difference between the extension at the beginning and the extension at the end. The extension at the beginning is digestion time. If it is digestion time, then obviously no one will say that the extension at the end of the day is digestion time—what initial assumption would there be to say that it is digestion time? And then it is clear that the conception really is that these are two different laws: the extension at the end and the extension at the beginning. All right? By the way, there is also some Magen Avraham—now I remember—there is some Magen Avraham regarding rabbinic restrictions at twilight. After all, there is Rabbi and the Rabbis, a dispute whether there are rabbinic restrictions at twilight or not; not only on Yom Kippur, on Sabbath too, same thing. So the Magen Avraham wants to claim that there is a difference between Friday evening and Saturday night—bringing in the day and taking out the day. Because when bringing in the day there is a presumption of weekday status, so if you are in doubt during twilight, you follow the presumption and it is weekday, so there is no rabbinic restriction. But if you are taking out the day, then the presumption is that it is holy day. So there too you see that there is some discussion about the beginning and the end, but really it could be that these are separate laws, or that the law does not apply when taking out the day at all but only when bringing it in. Okay? So here too there may be room to hesitate, although I say the plain sense of the Talmud is not like that. The plain sense of the Talmud is that there really is a law to add.

[Speaker C] What about labor? Labor at the end?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So in Maimonides it is written no, that is only rabbinic. Both of them, both beginning— In Maimonides nothing is written explicitly. The Maggid Mishneh learns that it is only rabbinic. And from here Maimonides’ position regarding Sabbaths and holidays is also clear, because there there is only labor, and the extension is only rabbinic. In the other medieval authorities (Rishonim) it is written that on Sabbaths and holidays there is also a Torah-level extension, and then it is quite clear that also on Yom Kippur it is Torah-level, the extension regarding labor, and that there is extension also regarding labor and not only affliction. But that is Maimonides’ position. I said that at least the initial assumption according to Maimonides’ position joins everything we have said up to now; the question of what emerges in the conclusion, what the Talmud’s final conclusion is, that is a different discussion. There are two more comments here about the extension. One comment is the question: if we already understand that it is not really digestion time, just making sure that you will be fasting, then it really is time that is added. Does it join this unit of the day? Does it also have the prohibition and the positive commandment, and it is simply Yom Kippur? Another Yom Kippur? Karet was excluded—that is explicit on 81a, we saw it. Right? Surely karet was excluded. But the question is whether the positive commandment and the prohibition remain. There are views that yes, there are views that it is only the positive commandment, and there are views that it is neither of them. Maybe a separate positive commandment? A positive commandment of extension; it is not the regular positive commandment of Yom Kippur simply expanding.

[Speaker G] But the atonement was finished on Yom Kippur.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] For example, regarding Sabbath extension there is a discussion whether you are obligated or able to recite kiddush during the Sabbath extension. What does that depend on? If you understand that this is an addition to the day and the— But is it like early prayer? What? No. Early prayer is from plag hamincha; that is the dispute of Rabbi Yehuda and the Rabbis, that is something else. But if you understand that this is only an extension of prohibitions for some reason, then you cannot recite kiddush there, because it is not really Sabbath; they are only telling you to start being careful about labors a little before the day. So the question is whether they expand the day or only expand the laws of the day. Why? So there are those who want to say they expand the laws in order that you not miss at twilight, in a doubtful period, so start already beforehand in order to ensure that during the doubtful period you won’t fail, for example. Then of course this is a conception that is not an expansion of the day, but rather only a law intended to stress that you should not miss the actual day itself, so they tell you to place a little before and a little after some safety fence, something like that. An additional comment: since we did not find a time span required for the extension—how long does one need to add? So exactly—something. But now this enters the question—

[Speaker H] Maimonides writes only at the exit; at the entrance he doesn’t write.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Fine, he also doesn’t write what yes.

[Speaker H] He said something more—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I don’t know, what does “more” mean? Two epsilons. When epsilon is as small as you like, two epsilons and one epsilon are the same thing. So in the end, the Chelkat Yoav in Orach Chaim, section 30, brings and proves from Ritva that a person needs acceptance of the extension. He needs to accept the extension upon himself.

[Speaker I] That is probably a conception that says that it is—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] —a continuation of the day, and not merely an addition of labors or prohibitions. The day starts earlier. But there are medieval authorities (Rishonim), yes, there are—there are medieval authorities from whom it seems that you do not need acceptance; you just need to add. There is Or Zarua, I’m not going into it now, how this appears in the summary. If that is really so, and there is also no required time span, then it is not clear what practical difference this makes. I don’t need to accept it, right? And there is also no time span at all; it can be an epsilon as small as you like.

[Speaker I] What practical difference does it make whether it is part of Yom Kippur or not?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, there is no practical difference at all to the extension. Observe Yom Kippur and that’s it. Meaning, add one more epsilon at the beginning, okay, what does that mean? I added another millionth of a second before it started.

[Speaker G] What good is that?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It has no meaning at all. You don’t—you can’t do anything with it. If we really understand it this way, then apparently what is being said here is not really a law of extension, but simply to be careful not to enter the doubtful zone of twilight. Any time span you want, as small as you want, provided that you make sure not to enter the twilight period. There is no law of extension; there is only a law to be careful not to fail in a doubt.

[Speaker H] But you have an explicit exposition from a verse. If it is only a matter of caution—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] This is the matter of caution. This verse teaches only an obligation of caution.

[Speaker H] So apparently according to that, on Sabbath you can right at twilight really—what?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It depends whether on Sabbath there is a law of extension or not. If on Sabbath there is a verse—who said? There is a law of extension. The Talmud says it learns from here to Sabbath. Where is the verse of Yom Kippur? Here—the Talmud, read the Talmud.

[Speaker H] The Talmud says: from where do we know Sabbaths and holidays?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] From where do we know Sabbaths and holidays? For Maimonides that is a different story. The Talmud—Maimonides says that on Sabbaths there is no Torah-level extension; that is something else. “I have only Yom Kippur; from where do I know Sabbaths and holidays? From where do I know holidays? Scripture says: ‘you shall observe.’ I have only holidays; Sabbaths— From where do I know holidays? Scripture says: ‘your Sabbath rest.’” All right?

[Speaker H] Maybe that is only an exposition of the Rabbis.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] According to Maimonides it is probably an asmakhta. Either an asmakhta, or he follows a different tanna; here there is some calculation in the Talmud, but I didn’t go into it. But according to the other medieval authorities (Rishonim), who take it in its plain sense, then the extension exists there too and here too. Now I am speaking according to the other medieval authorities (Rishonim). According to the other medieval authorities (Rishonim) it is Torah-level. There is no required period of time, right? And you also don’t need to accept it verbally. If you did need to accept it verbally, then there would be some practical difference. You would need to accept it verbally a bit before Yom Kippur. Right, they don’t tell you how much, but you need first to accept it verbally. Right, that is the practical difference. If you do not need to accept it verbally and there is also no defined period of time that you need to add, then what practical difference is there? Every time you observe Yom Kippur, obviously you are not entering twilight; you stop a moment earlier. That moment earlier is the epsilon you added, and that’s it—there is no practical difference. Therefore, according to this conception, that you don’t need verbal acceptance and don’t need a minimum period of time, it is clear that the whole purpose of the extension is simply to ensure that you do not miss the prohibitions in the doubtful segment, at twilight. What does one do for that? Make sure not to enter twilight. How do you make sure of that? I leave that to you. If one second is enough for you and you are willing to take that risk, health to you. If you want to be sure, take a few minutes; it doesn’t matter to me, but that is your calculation. There is no halakhic definition telling you how much time to add. The halakhic definition is that you must make sure not to stumble in the doubt of twilight. That’s all. And if so, then once again we return to the fact that the extension is not an issue in itself, but its purpose is to ensure that you do what you need to do on that day.

[Speaker G] And which extension are you talking about—? Both at the end and at the beginning. If I’m talking about the end, that is totally unnecessary.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Why is it unnecessary?

[Speaker G] The day is over, the atonement is over, from evening to evening.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] How do we know that you won’t desecrate Yom Kippur at the end? What is this? How do we know that you won’t desecrate Yom Kippur at the end? From evening to evening. Desecrate at the end of Yom Kippur? The day is over. What do you mean it’s over? You don’t know it’s over! Twilight is doubtful. How do we make sure that you don’t fail there? Add! Be sure that it’s over. That is called adding. The extension means: be sure that it ended. What difference is there between the day and Yom Kippur? It’s the same thing.

[Speaker A] The practice today, the way we finish Yom Kippur nowadays—is that called extension? Is that already the extension written here? Yes.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But he sounds like we need verses.

[Speaker H] Any person—they’ll tell him in the manner of the Sages—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Here there is a Torah-level obligation to be careful, not just simple logic. One who is careful fulfills a positive commandment.

[Speaker H] Ah, so that’s it—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Meaning, according to Maimonides, on Sabbath—

[Speaker H] —you don’t have that positive commandment. Correct. Correct.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And according to other medieval authorities (Rishonim) you do. But the positive commandment is a positive commandment to be careful, not a positive commandment to add, but to be careful regarding the day itself.

[Speaker H] So for them there is no such verse and they needed to learn a different exposition from the Talmud?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, this is the verse. This verse, the Talmud here says so.

[Speaker H] No, but they said—they added, as it were, another derivation. They can’t use only this verse.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Who is “they”?

[Speaker H] The other medieval authorities (Rishonim). Why? There is a Talmud here. The Talmud brings a verse.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It wasn’t enough for them just—

[Speaker H] —“from evening to evening”; they need Sabbath differently—where is what they established? I didn’t understand. The Talmud says it includes from here both extension on a holiday and extension on Sabbath. But from the same verse, no?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] From the same verse itself, only there are extra words, so from here it includes both holiday and Sabbath. Yes. They do not learn from Yom Kippur to the other days. There is a derivation for holiday on its own and for Sabbath on its own. By the way, that is also a comment: why don’t we learn from Yom Kippur to the other days? Because Yom Kippur may be that its law of extension is different, and perhaps that itself is what leads Maimonides to say that on Yom Kippur there is a Torah-level extension, while on the other days this is an extension—a different law, an asmakhta, an exposition, or whatever it may be.

[Speaker H] So maybe one really can distinguish between these two, that on Yom Kippur where you have the derivation itself, there it really is extension in its own right.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] In all of them there is a derivation. In all of them there is a derivation. In all of them there is a derivation, but it is a different derivation, and the question is why an additional derivation is needed. In all of them there is a derivation. I’m saying: in the other matters it may be that this is only a warning, whereas on Yom Kippur it is something else. Or alternatively, it could be. Everything is open—I’m not—in the Talmud itself you can fit in everything. I’m only trying to show the different possibilities that arise in the medieval authorities (Rishonim), how they actually begin—they begin in the Talmud. Where are we? Fine, I’ll stop here. Now.