Messianism, Lecture 2

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] There was messianism. You said there’s some kind of connection between the things — I don’t know. But last time we spoke a bit about authority with respect to facts and with respect to principles of faith. And that was the context in which the discussion of messianism appears, because belief in the coming of the Messiah, like other beliefs — these are beliefs, like all of Maimonides’ principles — they are beliefs whose subject matter is facts. Meaning, as distinct from halakhic norms, here we’re dealing with facts. Now, these facts are not always facts that can be observed with the eyes; usually they’re not. Whether the Holy One, blessed be He, exercises providence, whether the Messiah will come, whether the Torah was given at Sinai or things were added to it later — all these are factual questions. Either the Holy One, blessed be He, exercises providence or He doesn’t, either the Messiah will come or he won’t come, or the supervisor will come or the supervisor won’t come, right? So fine. All these are factual questions even if we can’t observe them empirically, and therefore the question arises to what extent authority is relevant in this kind of matter — meaning with respect to facts. Okay, that’s basically what we talked about last time. And I started to deal a little with this issue of messianism and false messianism because, in a certain sense, the discussion really is a factual one. When you talk about whether someone is or is not the Messiah, that’s a factual question — either he is the Messiah or he isn’t. Maybe you don’t always have clear indications in order to decide yes or no, but at the end of the day it’s a factual question. And therefore the question of identifying a true Messiah or a false Messiah is basically a question of identifying reality. And I already mentioned that there is a tendency to think that the identification is basically done from here onward, retroactively. Meaning, the identification is made in light of the results. In other words, if that Messiah really built the Temple, gathered Israel, brought Israel back to its land, and brought about everything the Messiah is supposed to do, then it becomes clear retroactively that he was the Messiah. But if there is a messiah who in the end didn’t do that, then it becomes clear retroactively that he wasn’t the Messiah. And I said that I don’t think that’s correct.

[Speaker B] Doesn’t Maimonides write that?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Wait, I’ll get to Maimonides in a moment. First I’m just giving the conceptual analysis. I don’t think it’s correct for at least two reasons. One reason is like they say — the Chabad people also say this — that in fact the Rebbe is the Messiah; we just didn’t merit it.

[Speaker C] That’s maybe what the most extreme group in Chabad says.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, in my opinion they all say it, as far as I know.

[Speaker C] Whoever says he’s still alive says he’s still the Messiah.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Ah, fine — so in the meantime we didn’t merit it; we will merit it, okay, fine. But basically they all claim that so far, at least, we didn’t merit it, and therefore he in fact was not — but he is the Messiah. So that basically empties the claim of empirical content. Meaning, you can’t now really check in light of the results whether this is truly the Messiah or not, because even if it didn’t materialize, it could be that we simply didn’t merit it. Now this is already in the words of the sages — again, that’s the conception. Hezekiah, for example, who was supposed to be the Messiah, and in the end we didn’t merit it and therefore it didn’t happen; or Bar Koziva, yes, Bar Kokhba. There are such statements already, ancient statements; this didn’t start now. That a person who really is meant to be the Messiah — and that is definitely possible, I don’t think one can rule such a thing out — a person may indeed be a true Messiah, not a false Messiah. The fact that it didn’t succeed — our sins caused it, or we didn’t merit it, or something like that. So in effect it turns out that you can’t judge it based on the results. So based on what, then? I mean, at the end of the day the claim is that you are supposed to act differently depending on whether it’s a true Messiah or a false Messiah. False messianism is a problematic phenomenon. So how do you identify this thing? Apparently it has to be identifiable through other indications — not through the indications of future realization, but through what is happening at the time. And the second claim, which is really just a continuation of the first, is that obviously it can’t be based on the future, because then what do you want from the person in the present? A person joins the messianic movement of Shabbetai Tzvi. Now he doesn’t know that afterward Shabbetai Tzvi will convert to Islam and the whole thing will collapse. So what do you want from him? What complaint can you have against him for being messianic — messianic in quotation marks, false messianism? Because today there’s a tendency to think that anyone who acts to bring the Messiah or believes in the coming of the Messiah is a messianist. I’m talking about a messianist in quotation marks. So the claim basically is that if you come with complaints against people and demand that they not join a false messiah and yes join a true messiah, that means there are supposed to be some indications available to them. Now the question is: what are those indications? Indications. Now if — yes — as Maimonides says, a king will arise who gathers Israel and all kinds of things like that, okay, that’s after he succeeds, all well and good. But I’m asking now whether to join. After all, my joining causes his success. So how am I supposed to know whether to support him or not?

[Speaker D] Isn’t that the same problem with a prophet? What’s the difference? What do you mean with a prophet? How do you make…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Wait, I’ll make the comparison to a prophet. I’ll make the comparison to a prophet. So there really is here a diagnostic question: how do you diagnose such a thing? Now I already said that there’s a certain problem here, because unlike a prophet — and here I think I mentioned this last time — in the case of a prophet, being a false prophet is a prohibition. Being a false messiah is not a prohibition. I don’t know of any prohibition against being a false messiah.

[Speaker E] Being a false messiah isn’t prohibited?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No. Lying is — I said, yes, lying is prohibited — but being a false messiah is not prohibited. If he believes he really is the Messiah, then he’s not even lying; he’s just a sick person. He thinks he’s Napoleon. And because this is also not a halakhic discussion, there also aren’t really halakhic criteria. Because once you don’t define a false messiah as a prohibition, then by definition there are no halakhic definitions of when one transgresses and when one doesn’t. So that only reinforces the question. With regard to a prophet, we’re told there is a prophet whom you can test. If his prophecies come true or something like that, there is a presumption that he is a true prophet, and Maimonides talks about how one tests a prophet and knows whether he is a true prophet or not. But with regard to the Messiah, you have no way to test it, and it’s also not a prohibition to be a false messiah. This whole issue is basically not really a halakhic issue. It’s not a halakhic issue, false messianism or true messianism. It’s a sociological issue. What is the problem with a messiah? From a halakhic perspective there is no problem. Everybody understands that there is a problem here, but it’s not a halakhic problem. Not a problem in the sense of violating a prohibition. You can’t point to any prohibition we violated if we joined a false messiah movement, or even the false messiah himself, except for the prohibition of lying of course, which is another matter.

[Speaker D] What does it mean that he’s a false messiah? He says, “I am the Messiah, people, come with me, I will redeem you.” So he’s delusional.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And I say that I’m Napoleon. So what if he says it?

[Speaker D] No, but the masses… you’re saying really that he… no, but I’m Napoleon.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, I’m not Napoleon. No, I know, but I’m confessing now: I’m not Napoleon.

[Speaker D] But there people don’t know. Rabbi Akiva himself thought he was the Messiah.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] First of all, so maybe they are coerced, but that still doesn’t mean there is a prohibition.

[Speaker D] What transgression did they technically commit?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] There is no transgression in false messianism, irrespective of coercion, irrespective of coercion — there is no such transgression.

[Speaker D] Because it has no practical implications.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What do you mean, it has practical implications? Don’t follow him.

[Speaker D] What do you mean, don’t follow him?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] You follow him, you obey him, whatever he says. What does he say? I don’t know — go to the Land of Israel, sell your property, do… what’s the problem? Like an idolatrous cult. In an idolatrous cult what do you do? You throw a stone at Mercury. So what happened? Because Mercury told you to throw a stone.

[Speaker D] Is that where I transgress a prohibition? There the Torah says, “Do not do.” That’s it. What does the Torah say here?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The Torah doesn’t say — that’s exactly what I said — and therefore there is no halakhic prohibition here, because the Torah doesn’t say so. And it could have said it here too, but it doesn’t. Don’t follow him, don’t obey him. With a prophet too, you obey him. What is there in the case of a prophet? He tells you, and you obey him. That’s the prohibition involved in following a false prophet.

[Speaker D] Does the Torah talk much there about the Messiah?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Maimonides brings that in the section of Balaam it appears, and in “You are standing today” there is some hint to the Messiah, but the Torah doesn’t speak explicitly about the Messiah, and therefore there also is no prohibition. There is no halakhic prohibition, there are no halakhic criteria, and therefore this is a question that is basically very vague. It’s very hard to discuss, certainly in real time, but also, as I said before, even retrospectively. Even after I know the results, even then I really have no indications.

[Speaker F] Let’s try a little — I think in a case like Shabbetai Tzvi, where the messiah is ultimately revealed not just as having failed — if, say, they had killed him, you could have said we didn’t merit it. He converts to Islam. He converts to Islam, and that shows with high probability at least that from the outset he was spiritually corrupt.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I agree, but that’s true. I’ll still get to these criteria, I will get to criteria in the end, but I’m saying there’s a problem in defining the criteria. And second, those who joined him at the beginning didn’t know he would convert to Islam. Now the question is what is expected of a person at the initial stage. Are there any indications in the mode of conduct that give you a hint or indication whether this is yes or no? In the end, if you couldn’t know, then maybe you were coerced, maybe it’s fine. But the phenomenon is a dangerous phenomenon that people warn against. The question is how to judge it, how to diagnose it. And as I said, ultimately I want to get to a more charged question that touches us, in our own lives: is Religious Zionism false messianism, or “messianism” in quotation marks, as I said before? So as I already said, that’s not just a provocative question. In my view there are elements that are, yes. And we need to discuss what is and what isn’t, and to what degree. It’s not one-dimensional, but there are certain elements that are. Fine. So let’s start for a moment from the beginning. Maimonides, in the introduction to the chapter Helek, brings the thirteen principles, in his commentary to the chapter Helek.

[Speaker E] Just a small question for the sake of definition and analysis: when people ask about false messianism, is it a person or a movement that claims it was chosen by God to be the Messiah and that’s not true?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Well, that’s exactly the question.

[Speaker E] No, is that the definition of a false messiah?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, not the criteria — the definition? Yes. But I think it goes beyond that. It’s not just a mistake. There is a dimension of problematicness here. A mistake — people can make mistakes, everyone can make mistakes. So there is a problematic dimension here even though it’s not a prohibition. It kind of sits in the middle: it’s a mistake, but not an innocent mistake. Meaning, it’s a mistake that people fight against, a problematic mistake. On the other hand, there is no formal transgression here. So this issue of false messianism falls between the cracks, and that really is why there is hardly any discussion of it — it’s difficult in the sources. I told you this is based on some work my daughter did; I accompanied her a little in that work. And the hardest question in that work was the methodological question. How do you even work on it? What do you rely on? Suppose you’re trying to look for criteria — just because someone wrote something, does that make it a criterion? He has no basis for it — no verse, no homiletic teaching, no… so he wrote it; so what if he wrote it? Then I’ll write the opposite and the opposite will be written. What, historical judgment? Great rabbis of Israel? A consensus that emerged? How do you decide at all? How do you look for the criteria — not what the criteria are, but how to look for them. What tools can I use to identify these criteria? It’s a very difficult question, and I don’t have a completely clear-cut answer. I say historically: I take the phenomena that were judged as phenomena of false messianism and try to distill criteria from them. Of course someone can always come and say: the fact that you judged these phenomena as false messianism — who says that judgment was correct? Maybe it actually wasn’t, no, I don’t agree, that wasn’t false messianism. By the way, concerning some of the false messiahs in the past there are disputes. Regarding Molkho, for example, there are very ambivalent references among later authorities (Acharonim). There are later authorities who see him as a false messiah and later authorities who see him as sanctifying God’s name. In the end he died for the sanctification of God’s name. So it’s really not simple at all. Not to mention Shabbetai Tzvi himself, where quite a few of the great rabbis of Israel fell into his net. Okay? In the end a full consensus emerged, and you know — even generations later they suspected Rabbi Yonatan Eybeschutz; Rabbi Yaakov Emden suspected Rabbi Yonatan Eybeschutz of being a Sabbatean. I don’t know if that’s true because I’m not sufficiently familiar with the kabbalistic subtleties over which they were arguing there, but the very fact that one could even talk about it means that this point is not unequivocal. And by the way, if Rabbi Yonatan Eybeschutz really did interpret Sabbateanism that way and agreed with it, who says that’s invalid? He didn’t claim that Shabbetai Tzvi — that’s clear, I don’t think the claim was that he thought Shabbetai Tzvi was the Messiah and that one had to follow him and do who-knows-what. Rather, his kabbalistic doctrine was influenced by the Kabbalah of Shabbetai Tzvi. Shabbetai Tzvi had certain innovations in the field of Kabbalah, and Rabbi Yonatan Eybeschutz — Rabbi Yaakov Emden found Sabbatean influences in his Kabbalah. So what happened? Who says that isn’t correct?

[Speaker G] The claim was only that there were influences, nothing beyond that? Meaning maybe the assumption wasn’t that he believed that he — maybe not that one had to go and convert to Islam, but that he really was the Messiah and who knows what would happen if you followed him?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I don’t think so, because there were no indications of that. Maybe he had such claims, but they weren’t based on anything. What can you know? You can know only from his writings. He simply checked his amulets and all kinds of things Rabbi Yonatan Eybeschutz did, and he says you can see there kabbalistic ideas of Shabbetai Tzvi. Now maybe from that he inferred that you also sympathize with Shabbetai Tzvi — maybe yes, maybe no — but if he inferred that, it’s baseless. Meaning, all you saw was the mode of thought. That’s what you have; the conclusions are your responsibility. Fine. So Maimonides: the twelfth principle, the days of the Messiah, and it is to believe and affirm that he will come. And one should not say that he is delayed; though he tarry, wait for him. And one must not set a time for him, nor interpret the verses so as to derive from them the time of his coming. Right from the beginning — notice this. Together with establishing the principle of belief in the coming of the Messiah, right there on the spot he starts with all kinds of warnings. A bit of denunciation of those who calculate the end, yes, and all those things, some of which come from the sages. And it is to believe — one must not interpret the verses so as to derive from them the time of his coming. And you know that quite a few medieval authorities (Rishonim) did do that.

[Speaker B] Maimonides too. And Maimonides himself too, right.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And Maimonides himself too. In the Letter to Yemen there he does, right. And also Maimonides regarding returning to Egypt — the Radbaz already comments on him. About the prohibition of returning to Egypt, and he himself lived in Egypt.

[Speaker D] Right, but in that letter, Rabbi, I think it’s not that the purpose…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] In any case, the sages said: “May the spirit of those who calculate the end expire,” and one must believe in him out of greatness and love, and pray for his coming in accordance with what was said about him by every prophet, from Moses to Malachi. And one who doubts him or belittles the matter denies the Torah, which promised him explicitly in the section of Balaam and in “You are standing today.” And included in this principle is that Israel has no king except from David and specifically from the seed of Solomon. This is part of the belief in the coming of the Messiah, that a king can only be from the seed of David and the seed of Solomon. He takes that as part of the matter because “the scepter shall not depart from Judah” — that’s where they derive that the king must be from the House of David. “The scepter shall not depart from Judah,” in its plain sense, refers to King Messiah. So Maimonides probably understands that this is the same principle — that ultimately our leadership has to come from the House of David, and this culminates in the fact that the future Messiah will also be the end of that chain. Fine, not important.

[Speaker D] Bibi isn’t from the House of David.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Bibi probably isn’t from the House of David, I don’t know. I am, by the way. In our family there’s a tradition, so I could already be a false messiah. In our family there’s a tradition: David, Solomon, David, Solomon, generation after generation. So we’re from King David — it started already there — and with us we’re just the latest David-Solomons. Yes, if you want, my donkey is saddled outside.

[Speaker E] So you’re saying every king has the potential to be the Messiah? Is that why Maimonides says it? Maybe. Maybe this messianism will in the end be embodied in the Messiah.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Maybe, I don’t know. “Anyone who disputes concerning this family thereby denies God and the words of His prophets.” That’s a very interesting point. “Anyone who disputes concerning this family” — what does he mean?

[Speaker I] Someone who says the Messiah won’t be from the seed of David.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right — is it someone who denies the coming of the Messiah, or someone who takes kingship away from the House of David? Like the Hasmoneans, which we talked about in the previous topic. So no, because he says it only after he says that included in this thing is that kingship must not depart from the House of David, and then he says that anyone who denies this thereby denies God — “concerning this family thereby denies God and the words of His prophets.” I don’t know whether he means denial of the coming of the Messiah or the removal of kingship from the House of David. Maybe both. Against this background there is the famous statement, which I think I also mentioned. Rabbi Hillel says in the Talmud in Sanhedrin: Rabbi Hillel says, “Israel has no Messiah, for they already consumed him in the days of Hezekiah.” Meaning Rabbi Hillel, one of the Amoraim, said that there is no Messiah; they already consumed him in the days of Hezekiah. By the way, that’s the same argument as with the Chabad people, right? Basically, we didn’t merit it. Meaning, Hezekiah was supposed to be the Messiah, we didn’t merit it, “we consumed him,” he says. That’s it, there won’t be another one. Meaning, it’s just a continuation of that same line of thought. Rav Yosef said, “May the Master forgive Rabbi Hillel.” May the Holy One, blessed be He, forgive Rabbi Hillel — how can one say such a thing? It’s denial of a principle. When was Hezekiah? In the First Temple period. Hezekiah was in the First Temple period. Yet Zechariah prophesied in the Second Temple period, and Zechariah prophesied about the coming of the Messiah already in the Second Temple period, after Hezekiah had even existed. How can one say there is no Messiah? “Rejoice greatly, daughter of Zion; shout, daughter of Jerusalem: behold, your king shall come to you, righteous and victorious is he, humble and riding on a donkey, on a colt, the foal of a she-ass.” Fine. So there are in fact prophecies about the coming of the Messiah that appear after Hezekiah altogether. So in fact Rabbi Hillel was mistaken. But that itself already says something interesting, because the question — and this is a question with regard to all the principles — is: what exactly is belief in this principle based on? Is belief in this principle based on a tradition from Sinai? Or is belief in this principle based on prophecies, or maybe even verses, yes, as Maimonides brings from Balaam and the section of “You are standing today”? Because if it’s a tradition from Sinai, then a received tradition is a received tradition. It’s a tradition from Sinai. If it’s interpretation of verses, verses can be argued over. Meaning, I assume Rabbi Hillel interpreted this verse differently. They just thought he was wrong in his interpretation of this verse, and “may the Master forgive Rabbi Hillel.” I assume he knew this verse too. Fine? Which means he interpreted it differently. We also say that “an eye for an eye” means monetary compensation. So “behold, your king shall come to you,” yes, what is written here in the verse, “Rejoice, daughter of Zion… behold, your king shall come to you, righteous and victorious is he, humble and riding on a donkey, on a colt, the foal of a she-ass” — who says this speaks about the Messiah? Maybe it speaks, I don’t know, about some other phenomenon, or maybe the king is a metaphor — some Torah scholar will come and lead you. I don’t know exactly. I can offer a million interpretations. To the same extent that we remove verses from their plain meaning, these too can be removed from their plain meaning. Meaning, if the point comes out of the verses, in my eyes that is weaker than if it comes from a tradition from Sinai. And in the reasoning here, it seems that the criticism of him comes not from tradition but from a verse. Meaning, if it were a tradition from Sinai, then you would say, “May the Master forgive Rabbi Hillel — after all there is a law given to Moses at Sinai, or a tradition from Sinai, that we have received that there is a Messiah.” But they don’t say that. Rather, they bring a verse. They bring proof from a verse. Fine. So that is already an interesting observation on this issue.

[Speaker H] Leibowitz mentions Tosafot who say that a prophet prophesies only about what ought to be. Right.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What does “ought” mean? That this is what should be, but it’s not certain that it will actually happen. So then it’s not prediction of the future — we talked about this once, I think — when I brought that Rashi on “he turned this way and that way and saw that there was no man.” So Rashi says that he saw that no convert would emerge from him in the future. Which of course he was mistaken about, because someone did emerge from him who converted. That Shelomit bat Divri there, right? She was descended from the…

[Speaker E] No, and another person. No, and the idea is that killing him wouldn’t damage future offspring that had not yet been born.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Meaning, why wasn’t Moses mistaken? Because obviously, he killed him, so obviously no one would emerge from him afterward. Someone emerged from him beforehand — that was seed that already existed. The question is what would happen with future offspring. But then, if that’s really the case, then in practice this isn’t prophecy at all. Because after all, descendants he already had did convert. So what are you saying? Only future descendants that he would have had would not convert? Obviously — because you’re killing him.

[Speaker B] No, the idea is that if he hadn’t killed him…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Meaning, in effect you’re not talking about prediction of the future but about an assessment. What would happen if I left him alive? That’s an assessment of the present. It’s not looking at the future. You’re really looking at him in the present and saying, from someone like this nothing good will come. That’s what you’re basically saying. That’s not prophecy. Prophecy means seeing something that will happen in the future — already today seeing it before it happens. And here, you’re not seeing something that in fact happened in the future independently, and you’re already seeing it from here. It happened in the future because you created it with your own hands.

[Speaker E] No, the point is that he saw there was no spark of holiness in him that could come back into the people of Israel.

[Speaker B] Fine,

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So that’s an assessment of the present. Not of… that doesn’t speak about the future at all.

[Speaker E] It’s not because he killed him that no one converted. He saw that, as you said, there was no chance that anyone would convert.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So I’m saying: the factual future was created because he killed him. Therefore no one came from him who converted. Moses’ assessment — the assessment of Moses our teacher — was not about the factual future, but was in fact an assessment of the present. From such a present state, nothing beneficial is supposed to emerge. So that’s not prophecy. It’s a good or deep diagnosis of the present. Prophecy is seeing what will happen in the future. What will actually happen, yes — what will actually happen, right. That is basically prophecy. So in the case of Moses our teacher, it was a diagnosis of the present, where the future is only some kind of indication. I’m saying the present… I’m describing his present condition in such a way that you should know that even if this continues, nothing good will come out of it. But that is a statement about the present; it is not a statement about the future.

[Speaker E] Are you describing it as something whose potential does not exist now?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What? No, I’m saying this: the accepted conception of prophecy is simply seeing something that will happen in the future. It’s not connected to the present at all. We ordinary human beings simply can’t see something that hasn’t happened yet. A prophet can see what will happen in 10 years or what will happen in 100 years or something like that. That’s usually how the concept of prophecy is understood. Now here, with Moses our teacher, we see that at least there is a kind of prophecy that isn’t looking at the future at all; it’s looking at the present. It’s just that from this present, if you are, say, an excellent psychologist — superb, perfect — then you can know what in fact ought to emerge. And on that, the Shelah says that all prophecies are like that. All prophecies are basically looking at the present, at what ought to be. That is exactly that Tosafot in Yevamot: that prophecies are about what ought to be. And the implication of that is that prophecies can indeed fail, because human beings have choice. And if a person chooses good even though the prophet thought that nothing good would come out of him, the gates of choice are not locked. If he had repented, then he would have repented.

[Speaker E] But what about a favorable prophecy?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] A favorable prophecy — that’s an interesting question on the view of the Shelah. What… I mean, the Shelah who comes to explain prophecy this way — why doesn’t a favorable prophecy get revoked? And even there one may need to distinguish between types of prophecies. There are certain prophecies where the Holy One, blessed be He, dictates the future — not foresees the future, but simply takes the reins into His hand and says: I will create this. No problem. In such a situation you can see the future. But as long as something depends on human choices — this is the question of knowledge and choice — then you really can’t see what will happen. You can assess, based on the present, what is expected to happen. But since human beings have choice, it could be that your prediction will be wrong. And even the Holy One, blessed be He — after all, it says in chapter 6 of Genesis, “for I regret that I have made them.” The Holy One, blessed be He, Himself did not foresee in advance what would happen with human beings. The Holy One, blessed be He, is not a prophet. He did not foresee. “I regret that I have made them.” Now there the Or HaChaim discusses this, and everyone discusses it, as though it were a problematic verse. It’s not a problematic verse at all. That is exactly what it says there: that the Holy One, blessed be He, did not foresee what would happen, because He gave us free choice. And once we have free choice, you can’t know in advance what will happen. He gave us the choice. Of course He could have taken away our choice and dictated to us what would happen. He can do anything. But once He decided to give us choice, He left both options open to us. How can He know what we will do? What we decide — that is what we will do. This is exactly a continuation of that same conception of the Shelah. It’s not a deficiency in omnipotence; it’s that the Holy One, blessed be He, is not a prophet — He cannot know what will happen if it is the result of choice. As for actions that are rooted in the present, then He can know what will happen. He is a perfect psychologist, a perfect physicist; He will run the calculation to the end and know what will happen. But something that is not determined by the present at all — no one can know that, including the Holy One, blessed be He Himself. And that is what is written: “for I regret that I made them.”

[Speaker D] So then how does a false prophet come into being? What? Suppose that’s the calculation, but then you changed reality, so it happened that way.