Messianism: Lesson 3
This transcript was produced automatically using artificial intelligence. There may be inaccuracies in the transcribed content and in speaker identification.
🔗 Link to the original lecture
🔗 Link to the transcript on Sofer.AI
Table of Contents
- Calculating the end-times in the Talmud in Sanhedrin
- The medieval authorities (Rishonim) and Maimonides in light of the warning against calculating the end
- The limits of knowledge about the signs and the authority of the verses
- Maimonides against engaging in aggadic literature and midrashim about the Messiah
- Realism, practical preparation, and the fear of disappointment
- The expectation of prophecy as a criterion for identifying the Messiah
- Actions to bring redemption and the building of the Temple
- Haredi Judaism versus Religious Zionism as a dispute over initiative versus waiting
- False messianism as a problem not framed as a formal halakhic prohibition
- Criteria for determination and the problem of “actual realization”
- Modern discomfort with messianism: Leibowitz and Ben-Gurion
- “It is Jewish law, but we do not instruct that way,” and the tension between publication and public guidance
- Secular messianism: communism, modernism, and postmodernism
- Religious messianism: problematic conduct and unrealistic steps
- Success after the fact versus decision-making in real time: Entebbe and Rabbi Shach
- Secular Zionism versus Religious Zionism: two different kinds of “messianism”
Summary
General Overview
The text sets out a conceptual framework for the question of the Messiah and messianism based on rabbinic sources and Maimonides, focusing mainly on the tension between belief in the coming of the Messiah and the danger of calculating the end-times and building messianic movements that may be disappointed and cause religious and social harm. It offers a complex reading of the expression “May the spirits of those who calculate the end-times expire,” examines Maimonides’ position against engaging in signs and midrashim concerning the end of days, and emphasizes that there is no orderly received tradition about the details of the signs, only conclusions drawn from verses that can be interpreted in different ways. It then connects the discussion to the dispute over proactive efforts to bring redemption, especially around building the Temple, and expands on “false messianism” as a problem that is hard to frame halakhically but is evident in its damage and conduct, while comparing it to secular messianism such as communism and to internal Zionist debates between a political-secular goal and a redemptive-religious one.
Calculating the End-Times in the Talmud in Sanhedrin
The Talmud in Sanhedrin opens a discussion about calculating the end-times and brings Rabbi Natan’s words on the verse, “For the vision is yet for the appointed time, and it speaks of the end and does not lie; though it tarry, wait for it, for it will surely come, it will not delay,” from Habakkuk, in contrast to various interpretations that set calculations for the time of the Messiah’s arrival. The Talmud expounds “and it speaks of the end and does not lie” through a saying of Rav Shmuel bar Nahmani in the name of Rabbi Yonatan: “May the spirits of those who calculate the end-times expire,” because they say that once the end has arrived and he has not come, then he will never come; and from here comes the call to wait: “rather, wait for it.” The text proposes two ways to understand this: either as a prohibition/deterrent against the very act of calculation out of fear of losing faith when the date fails, or as a warning against concluding that the Messiah “will no longer come” if the calculation proves false, while allowing that the calculation itself may simply have been mistaken without damaging faith.
The Medieval Authorities and Maimonides in Light of the Warning Against Calculating the End
The text points to a difficulty in the fact that some medieval authorities (Rishonim) made end-time calculations even though the Talmud says, “May the spirits of those who calculate the end-times expire,” and suggests the possibility that they read the warning as directed at the despairing conclusion rather than the calculation itself, or that they saw it as language that is not a formal halakhic prohibition but rather a warning against harm. It gives the example of Maimonides, who on the one hand writes against such engagement in the Mishneh Torah, and on the other hand makes a calculation in the Letter to Yemen in order to encourage a community in distress. It notes that even when calculations are presented as an interpretation of Daniel and not as a sermon for the masses, the question still remains what justifies such engagement in light of the warnings.
The Limits of Knowledge About the Signs and the Authority of the Verses
Maimonides, in Laws of Kings chapter 11, halakha 4, rules that “human beings do not have the power to grasp the thoughts of the Creator of the world,” and therefore one should not engage in definitions and signs of the coming of the Messiah, even though the Sages themselves gave signs, as at the end of Sotah. In chapter 12, halakha 2, Maimonides writes that all these things “no person knows how they will be until they happen,” that they are “obscure matters,” and that “even the Sages have no received tradition about these matters, only according to the implications of the verses,” and therefore there is dispute in these matters. The text uses the example of Rabbi Hillel, who said, “Israel has no Messiah, because they already consumed him in the days of Hezekiah,” and the Talmud’s response through a verse from Zechariah, to show that the clash is presented as an interpretive clash over verses, not as a violation of a clear received tradition, and it emphasizes that tradition is stronger than verses because verses admit many interpretations.
Maimonides Against Engaging in Aggadic Literature and Midrashim About the Messiah
Maimonides rules that “the sequence of these events and their details are not fundamental to religion,” and adds that “a person should never occupy himself with aggadic statements or dwell on the midrashim stated concerning these matters,” because “they lead neither to fear nor to love.” Maimonides adds, “and one should not calculate the end-times,” and quotes the Sages, “May the spirits of those who calculate the end-times expire,” setting as central instead the obligation that “one should simply wait and believe in the matter as a whole.” The text sets this against contemporary engagement with signs of redemption in Religious Zionist thought, arguing that according to Maimonides the very engagement is not helpful and may even be harmful, even if there is a feeling of a “redemptive process” and ingathering of exiles.
Realism, Practical Preparation, and the Fear of Disappointment
The text distinguishes between practical preparation for future questions and dependence on signs, and raises the issue of whether in different eras there is a difference between building expectations and preparing things like priestly garments. It describes the concern that failed signs or dates will lead to loss of faith, and brings historical examples of “updates” to end-time calculations, as well as a literary account of messianic rumors in Jerusalem that led to conversion to Christianity when the expectation was not fulfilled. It emphasizes that the language of the Talmud and Maimonides is not presented as a clear halakhic prohibition but as a warning against religious and social harm.
The Expectation of Prophecy as a Criterion for Identifying the Messiah
The text presents an intuitive sense according to which identifying a person as the Messiah ought to rest on prophecy attesting to his selection, or on his being a prophet himself, or another prophet in his generation confirming it. It notes that in practice the “great later authorities” who related to Sabbatai Zevi and other cases do not seem troubled by the absence of prior prophecy as a binding criterion, and raises the difficulty of how one can set a standard when anyone can claim prophecy and messianic status. It also mentions Chabad as a group that is meticulous about Maimonides, yet says he has not seen any explicit discussion there of a requirement of prophecy as a measure, concluding that this criterion is not actually treated as binding.
Actions to Bring Redemption and the Building of the Temple
The text cites Rabbi Yehuda’s words in Sanhedrin about the three commandments upon entering the Land: “to appoint a king for themselves, to wipe out the seed of Amalek, and to build for themselves the chosen house,” and presents the commandment to build the Temple as a commandment for all generations that Maimonides counts among the commandments. Against this it brings Rashi in Sukkah 41: “the future Temple… will be revealed and come from heaven,” based on “the sanctuary, O Lord, which Your hands established,” and sets up a fundamental dispute over whether the future Temple will be built by human beings or “descend from heaven.” It cites the Arukh LaNer, who explains that the Temple will be built by human beings, while a “spiritual Temple” will descend and enter into it “like a soul within a body,” similar to the “heavenly fire” entering the “ordinary fire” kindled by human beings.
Haredi Judaism Versus Religious Zionism as a Dispute Over Initiative Versus Waiting
The text describes how modern thinkers tied the dispute between Rashi and the Arukh LaNer to the tension between Haredi Judaism and Religious Zionism: Haredi Judaism is identified with passive expectation in which “everything will come down from heaven,” while Religious Zionism is identified with a view that one must act and initiate in order to advance redemption and the building of the Temple. It gives a practical example in the form of the Temple Institute and Rabbi Yisrael Ariel as representatives of an approach that prepares vessels and even calls for actual construction, and raises the question how far such action should operate within “realistic tools” as against an approach of “why involve yourself in the hidden counsels of the Merciful One?”
False Messianism as a Problem Not Framed as a Formal Halakhic Prohibition
The text argues that it is difficult to discuss false messianism in halakhic terms because “there is no halakhic prohibition against being a false messiah,” and even if there is a prohibition against a false prophet, a person may sincerely believe his own claim and therefore is not lying in the simple sense. It describes how throughout history figures and movements arose that were regarded as messianic, at times with “broad rabbinic agreement” or prolonged uncertainty, and the determination that they were examples of false messianism was not always unequivocal. It explains that this ambiguity also stems from the lack of an orderly “received tradition” about the signs and from dependence on interpretation of verses, and sets this against the fact that the phenomenon is “highly charged” and brings “serious harms.”
Criteria for Determination and the Problem of “Actual Realization”
The text expresses skepticism toward the simple criterion according to which, if the expectation did not materialize, then this is false messianism, because one can always offer excuses such as “we did not merit it” or “we were not worthy.” It brings Maimonides’ framework regarding the principle of faith in the coming of the Messiah and the ruling that one who doubts it “denies the Torah, which promised it explicitly in the section of Balaam and in ‘You are standing this day,’” and at the same time emphasizes the claim that the verses themselves are open to interpretation and therefore do not provide certainty comparable to tradition. It sharpens the point that the diagnostic difficulty remains even when there is a dogmatic declaration about denying a fundamental principle, because the question remains factual and is not settled simply by “majority” or authority.
Modern Discomfort with Messianism: Leibowitz and Ben-Gurion
The text cites statements by Yeshayahu Leibowitz: “I believe in a Messiah who will come; he will always come. A Messiah who has come is a false messiah,” and presents this as a position that empties the Messiah of factual content and turns him into a psychological mechanism of hope, out of a discomfort with disappointment. It also cites Ben-Gurion: “The Messiah has not yet come, and I do not long for a Messiah who will come. The moment the Messiah comes, he ceases to be the Messiah,” as well as the claim that once “you find the Messiah’s address in the phone book,” he is no longer the Messiah. The text interprets the motive as fear of disappointment and public damage when messianic hope collapses, and points to the absurdity of trying to “instill belief” in something presented as unreal.
“It Is Jewish Law, but We Do Not Instruct That Way,” and the Tension Between Publication and Public Guidance
The text uses the concept “it is Jewish law, but we do not instruct that way” to illustrate how certain positions can be viewed as knowledge passed on to Torah scholars but not intended for broad public guidance, and raises a principled difficulty: if something is written in books, then people can in any case derive practical action from it without direct instruction. It connects this with the example of Pinchas as “the reader of the letter,” to describe a situation where knowledge of the law exists but is not given as standard instruction. In the context of the Messiah, it argues that halakhic ruling does not resolve a factual dispute, because even where there are practical implications, the disagreement concerns what is true in reality and not merely a matter of formal authority.
Secular Messianism: Communism, Modernism, and Postmodernism
The text describes the modern use of the term “messianism” for secular movements as well, such as communism, in the sense of striving toward utopia at a heavy price, along with the negative connotation of “trying too hard to bring the Messiah.” It tells an anecdote from a conversation with a professor of economics identified with Rakah, who described contemporary communism as a stance that no longer has a “clear utopian model” but rather a desire to keep searching for improvement, and presents this as the breakdown of secular messianism once it realized that the great utopias had failed and done harm. It connects this break to postmodernism as despair of modernism and the great ideologies, and identifies the problem already in the conduct of ideological dogmatism that becomes a kind of “religion” and does not stand up to critical testing.
Religious Messianism: Problematic Conduct and Unrealistic Steps
The text argues that in religious messianism the problem is not only whether the story “succeeds” or “comes true,” but also that there are problematic patterns of conduct that can be identified in real time, similar to criticism of secular messianism. It defines one of the main characteristics as a movement that takes “unrealistic” steps out of confidence that “the Holy One, blessed be He, is with you,” and gives as an example extreme ideas such as violent action on the Temple Mount. It compares this to the claim that in communism the problem does not depend only on the result but also on cruelty and the attitude that “the end justifies the means,” and raises the possibility that even if a messianic goal were achieved, the conduct along the way could still be judged illegitimate.
Success After the Fact Versus Decision-Making in Real Time: Entebbe and Rabbi Shach
The text brings the story of Rabbi Shach’s opposition to the Entebbe operation on the grounds that the chances of success were low and therefore one should not undertake it, and his response after the success that it was still not something one does on “five percent.” It distinguishes between a dispute over the probability itself and a normative dispute over whether it is proper to act even at low probability, and applies this to messianism: some actions rest on a claim of “heavenly assistance” that raises the probability beyond realpolitik, and then success after the fact may be seen as some confirmation of the factual claim. It thus offers a framework in which the messianic dispute can concern both assessment of reality and norms of action under uncertainty.
Secular Zionism Versus Religious Zionism: Two Different Kinds of “Messianism”
The text concludes by distinguishing between secular Zionism as “messianism” in the sense of a historical-political movement to improve the condition and rights of the people, and Religious Zionism as “messianism” in the sense of a redemptive process directed from above and tied to the end of days. It argues that the two movements walk together but operate out of different aims, and defines the focus of the discussion as the question whether Religious Zionism is a messianic phenomenon in the negatively perceived sense, that is, a movement that takes steps to bring redemption that may be unrealistic or have a dangerous dynamic, even without presenting this as a formal halakhic prohibition.
Full Transcript
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] This is part of a series of lectures on messianism and the Messiah. Last time I began, right, with belief in the coming of the Messiah, and with Rabbi Hillel, and we talked about authority regarding facts, and that was the time before. In the Talmud, in tractate Sanhedrin, a discussion begins about calculating the end-times. Calculating the end-times is basically where we start getting closer to the question of messianism. Meaning, I’m getting as close as possible through the sources. It was taught: Rabbi Natan says—this is a baraita in the Talmud in Sanhedrin—this verse pierces and descends to the depths: “For the vision is yet for the appointed time, and it speaks of the end and does not lie; though it tarry, wait for it, for it will surely come, it will not delay.” That’s a verse in Habakkuk. Not like our rabbis who used to expound “until a time, times, and half a time,” and not like Rabbi Simlai who used to expound “You have fed them the bread of tears, and given them tears to drink in triple measure,” and not like Rabbi Akiva who used to expound “Yet once, a little while, and I will shake the heavens and the earth.” In other words, all kinds of calculations about when exactly the Messiah is supposed to come. Rather: the first kingdom seventy years, the second kingdom fifty-two, the kingdom of Ben Koziva two and a half years. So all these people were interpreting and calculating the end-times. And this verse in Habakkuk is saying: not like our rabbis who used to expound—the verse says not to expound. Now that’s interesting, because those Jews also read the verse in Habakkuk, so why did they do it? Fine, maybe they didn’t interpret it that way, but it doesn’t say that here; the verse is brought, and then “not like our rabbis.” So what did our rabbis say? Apparently there are two interpretations of the verse here. In the Talmud it’s presented as though this is the interpretation of the verse; there’s no alternative here. What does “and it speaks of the end and does not lie” mean? The Talmud there explains. Rav Shmuel bar Nahmani said in the name of Rabbi Yonatan: that verse in Habakkuk means, “May the spirits of those who calculate the end-times expire,” because they would say: once the end has arrived and he has not come, then he will never come. Rather, wait for him, as it says, “though it tarry, wait for it.”
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Here you can read it in two ways. Meaning, you could read it that “may the spirits of those who calculate the end-times expire” is because of the concern—meaning, if you calculate the end and reach the conclusion that the Messiah must arrive on such-and-such a date, and he doesn’t arrive, then you’ll lose faith in the Messiah altogether, maybe even in the Torah altogether. And therefore, don’t make calculations. Right, like “do not test”—you’re not allowed to test the Holy One, blessed be He—something like that, don’t make the calculations. But you could also read it differently. You could read it that “may the spirits of those who calculate the end-times expire” refers to those who draw conclusions from their calculations and reach the conclusion that if the Messiah didn’t come, then he’s never going to come. Go ahead and make the calculation, but know that you can make a mistake. In that case it wouldn’t be forbidden to make the calculation; it would just be a warning that your calculation may not be right, and if it proves false, that doesn’t mean you should lose faith in the coming of the Messiah. It seems to me that the accepted explanation is not to make the calculations at all, but there are medieval authorities (Rishonim), quite a few of them, who did make calculations like these. And then the question is how exactly they understood the matter. At one point I thought—though I never saw anyone say this explicitly—that maybe that’s the explanation. Meaning, they really read the Talmud differently: not that “may their spirits expire” applies to the calculation, but to the one who draws the conclusion from the calculation, meaning who ends up concluding that the Messiah won’t come.
[Speaker D] Maybe “may their spirits expire” isn’t a prohibition? What? Maybe it’s something like they’re telling you it won’t work out well for you, but it’s not actually forbidden?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Fine, no, I also think the wording is not the wording of a prohibition. In another moment I’ll comment on that too. But still, if the Talmud says “may the spirits of those who calculate the end-times expire,” I wouldn’t expect the medieval authorities to engage in calculating the end-times, even if it isn’t technically a prohibition.
[Speaker E] Maybe they said there’s no authority over facts?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes.
[Speaker F] And it’s not facts; on the contrary, it’s guidance, not fact.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] “May the spirits of those who calculate the end-times expire”—you’re saying that even if I reach the conclusion that the Messiah will come in a hundred and twenty-two years, I still shouldn’t make the calculation. That is about a fact. If I reach the conclusion that the Messiah will come in a hundred and twenty-two years, that’s a factual conclusion—correct or incorrect, but that’s my conclusion. I assess that this is what will factually happen. You’re saying that “don’t make the calculation” is a normative instruction. There’s room to discuss that.
[Speaker F] You could also say—I don’t know if the medieval authorities themselves, when they gave all kinds of hints, were actually sure it was true. It could be they said it more in order to encourage the masses.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But then it’s actually
[Speaker F] even more
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] difficult. Then why are they doing it at all?
[Speaker F] Presumably in order to encourage the masses.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I don’t know. There are places—for example, when Maimonides does this in the Letter to Yemen, that really is the accepted explanation. Maimonides makes a calculation there. So that is the accepted explanation. Maimonides himself writes against this in the Mishneh Torah, and he does it in the Letter to Yemen, and people say it was because of the distress and the difficult situation there, so he did it in order to encourage them. And there are those who do it in a commentary on Daniel; that doesn’t seem like something directed to the masses in order to encourage someone, but simply an interpretation of verses. So, fine, I don’t know. In any case, Maimonides writes in Laws of Kings, chapter 11, halakha 4: “Human beings do not have the power to grasp the thoughts of the Creator of the world, for our ways are not His ways, and our thoughts are not His thoughts.” So therefore all the signs and characterizations of the coming of the Messiah and so on—we shouldn’t engage in them; we can’t know. Even though, once again, the Sages do give such signs. So that’s a bit strange. What does it mean not to engage in it? Not to study the Talmudic passages that do engage in it? At the end of Sotah there are signs that the son of David is coming—“insolence will increase,” and all the lists there—and it starts already in the Mishnah. So what does it mean not to engage in this? Then why did the Sages engage in it? So one could somewhat say that indeed we are not supposed to engage in it. Meaning: the Sages did it; they had some source of information from heaven or something, I have no idea. They did it, and you shouldn’t engage in it because nothing but trouble will come of it. Not a prohibition—the wording really isn’t the wording of a formal halakhic prohibition—but don’t engage in it, it only causes trouble. It’s like “it is law but we do not instruct that way”—not law but aggadah, and we do not instruct that way. Don’t learn it.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Also in chapter 12, halakha 2 there, in Laws of Kings, he writes: “All these matters and the like, no person knows how they will be until they happen, for they are obscure matters to the prophets. Even the Sages have no received tradition about these matters, only according to the implication of the verses.” That’s a very interesting point. Meaning, the signs the Sages brought—just as I said when I spoke in the previous lecture about the coming of the Messiah, the arguments against Hillel. Rabbi Hillel said: “Israel has no Messiah, because they already consumed him in the days of Hezekiah.” That’s in the Talmud in Sanhedrin. And the Talmud says, “May the Master forgive Rabbi Hillel,” and it brings a verse from the prophets. So, as I said there, that hints at or expresses the point that apparently there is no orderly tradition about this. If there were some clear tradition, some law given to Moses at Sinai—I don’t know exactly what—that the Messiah comes, then Hillel would simply be denying a fundamental principle. But what they said to him was: listen, this is against verses, just like the calculations of the end here are against verses. There’s a verse that says otherwise. Fine—but verses can be interpreted differently, who knows. All kinds of other things become possible. So here there’s room for uncertainty. In that sense, tradition is something stronger than verses, because from verses, as we know—even “an eye for an eye” is written in a verse; lots of things are written in verses. We interpret verses. So that’s why, in my opinion, one of the reasons I’m very reserved about studying the Hebrew Bible (Tanakh) is that you can’t learn anything from it. Because in the end, whatever you want, you insert into the Hebrew Bible, so what’s the point of learning it? Whatever I want, I already know by myself; I don’t need to insert it into the Hebrew Bible. It doesn’t help me to insert it there. I’ve never in my life seen someone actually learn something from the Hebrew Bible, by the way. I can almost not even imagine such a thing. So I don’t really understand why they engaged in this.
[Speaker G] When Hillel says “Israel has no Messiah,” what does that mean? That there is no redemption for Israel? Or that there isn’t…?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s what it says. Now you can interpret it as you understand; I don’t know what he understood. He understood it to mean that no Messiah would come.
[Speaker G] No redemption? No—what does “no redemption” mean? No Temple? What does that mean for us?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That apparently there won’t be…
[Speaker G] There won’t be a Messiah, there won’t be a herald.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] There won’t be a persona? Fine, okay, that doesn’t seem so significant to me. I assume the intention is that, nowadays in this generation, there are all kinds of interpretations according to which the Messiah isn’t a persona but a period, or something like that.
[Speaker F] What? What do you mean, what interpretations like that?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Today, even in Rav Kook there’s discussion of Messiah son of Joseph there. At one point he talks about Herzl, and elsewhere in a eulogy. But somewhere else he says maybe it’s a period and not a persona.
[Speaker F] About Messiah son of Joseph, but not about…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Even about Messiah son of David, I’ve already seen all kinds of sayings—you’d have to look, but there are such sayings. What lies behind this, basically, is the question whether we are aspiring to monarchical redemption. Today there’s a kind of instinctive opposition to monarchy, and basically people see democracy as a better form of government. So what about Messiah son of David, who will come and once again be our king? Are we going back to monarchy? No, no—there’ll be democratic government, and the coming of the Messiah means there will be redemption. He’ll be the prime minister.
[Speaker C] Maybe he’ll be prime minister.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Or maybe he won’t exist at all, and it’ll just be a period called the messianic era, but it doesn’t have to be specifically… If you get to that level of interpretation, then you understand that it becomes difficult. “Only according to the implication of the verses.” Granted, maybe we’re talking about the signs of redemption, not the coming of the Messiah itself. Here I don’t know what he thinks. But regarding the signs of redemption, he says: even what the Sages wrote—and they did write it, that’s what I noted earlier, after all they wrote it. There’s the end of Sotah and elsewhere. There’s also Sanhedrin. So it’s according to the implication of the verses. That’s how they understood the verses. But how do you know? Verses can be interpreted in all kinds of ways. “And therefore they have disputes regarding these matters.” And in any case, “the order in which these events occur and their details are not fundamental to religion.” It’s not that important anyway. Why are you occupying yourself with it? Fine, when it comes, then we’ll see what’s there. “And a person should never occupy himself with aggadic statements or dwell on the midrashim stated concerning these matters and the like.” I assume he means aggadic passages dealing with this. I don’t think he means aggadah in general. I don’t know. Maybe the Nefesh HaChaim would really think that. “And one should not make them central, for they lead neither to fear nor to love.” In short, it’s of no use, so why engage in it? “And one should not calculate the end-times. The Sages said: May the spirits of those who calculate the end-times expire. Rather, one should wait and believe in the matter as a whole, as we have explained.” Believe that the Messiah will come; signs and details and whether this does or doesn’t materialize—there’s no point engaging in it.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Now I’m already jumping to our own time. In our time quite a few people do engage in this. Certainly in Religious Zionist thought, right? “You, O mountains of Israel, shall give forth your branches,” and the Talmud at the end of Sotah, and “insolence will increase,” and all the signs the Sages gave. And the whole debate all the time is whether the signs are being fulfilled or not being fulfilled. But Maimonides claims that regardless of whether the signs are being fulfilled, don’t engage in it—it’s not helpful. Meaning, maybe the concern is that the signs won’t materialize, and then there’ll be damage. Fine. But in the end, the question isn’t whether the Sages were right or wrong. This isn’t a received tradition. It doesn’t add fear of Heaven. So why are you engaging in it? It’s just an empty matter.
[Speaker G] If you’re in exile, don’t engage in it. But maybe when you’re here and you see the process of redemption—wait, if you see the process of redemption, then how are you supposed to sew the garments for the High Priest? You do need to engage in it.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So he says: based on the signs, you need to sew the garments for the High Priest?
[Speaker G] If you see signs that yes.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What? When the Messiah comes, we’ll deal with that issue.
[Speaker G] This was written a thousand years ago. When you’re in exile, when you don’t see the light at the end of the tunnel.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What does “the light at the end of the tunnel” mean? When you see the light at the end of the tunnel, in the end it still may not happen. What? What? I don’t know, I’m asking—what is known? The same consideration. The same consideration. Now this is a practical question. The prohibition—it’s not a prohibition. In exile he says there is no prohibition against engaging in calculations of the end-times. From both the language of the Talmud and the language of Maimonides it doesn’t sound as though there is some halakhic prohibition here. Rather, it’s not recommended, because who knows—if that’s the meaning in the Talmud, in the end it won’t materialize and everybody will lose their faith.
[Speaker G] There’s a difference between preparing the garments of the High Priest in Maimonides’ time, when you still weren’t seeing any ingathering of exiles, and today, when you see the process of ingathering of exiles—call it whatever you want, the beginning of redemption or whatever you want—and you see it. What do you see?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And what if in the end it can be disappointed? Right. So if it can, then why engage in it? Same consideration. The chance that it will be disappointed is smaller. Okay, but it still exists, right? So why are you engaging in it? Who knows. We’ll talk about this later. I said that I once mentioned that Rabbi Kalner, from circles associated with Har HaMor, once said—I heard this quoted in his name—that if the State of Israel is destroyed, he’ll take off his kippah. I’m sure he’ll stay here just long enough to take off his kippah. But he’ll take it off. Now, I actually appreciated that statement, because at least he’s willing to stand behind the thesis that everybody basically declares. I believe that in the end he too won’t stand behind it if that happens, but at least he says it; he’s willing to put things to an empirical test. Meaning, unlike those who always find excuses in the end. Right? Redemption won’t happen, but then afterwards in the end it did happen, and this is redemption, whose way is to go up and down and… thus is the dawn.
[Speaker C] Yes. About immigration to the Land in 1840—Arie Morgenstern wrote about it—that it was based on some calculations of the end. And it didn’t happen. So every time they corrected the calculations. Yes, right, there were updates.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But there were all kinds of phenomena, all kinds of phenomena. I think it’s Shulamit Lapid—in her book Like Broken Clay. I think in Like Broken Clay she writes there about the period of World War I, or even before World War I, in Jerusalem, that there was mass conversion of Jews to Christianity there in Jerusalem. Why? Because there was some rumor that the Messiah was coming before World War I. It was also a difficult period there, with severe famine during World War I; there was really terrible hunger there. People were reduced to bread rations. In the nineteenth century, I think it was even before, or during the war, I don’t…
[Speaker C] remember exactly when they roasted the horses.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, the famine yes, but I think the book deals even with the earlier period, it seems to me, and there was some mass conversion there of Jews who… and there was a rumor about the Messiah, and when the Messiah didn’t arrive, people said: forget it, it’s all nonsense, that’s it, we’re leaving. Now there were periods like that in various places. So this isn’t a concern without basis. That’s why I’m saying: we are not talking here about a prohibition. I don’t think the language of the Talmud or the language of Maimonides implies that this is a halakhic prohibition. Rather, there is some concern about damage, about problems that will happen as a result of this matter. That’s one point regarding calculating the end-times.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] A second point: I’m just trying to gather what can be extracted from the sources, because as I said, the phenomenon of false messianism is very hard to discuss in light of the sources. We’ll see that more later as well. But I’m trying somehow to arrange the framework, more or less, of what can be extracted from sources.
[Speaker F] Something here seems to be missing. Assuming we understand it at least in the standard way, or almost universally accepted way, of understanding the Messiah—that the Messiah is a specific person chosen to be the Messiah—
[Speaker C] then
[Speaker F] I would expect—I took this from Maimonides, but it seems reasonable to me—that in order for us to determine that someone is the Messiah, meaning in order for us to determine that God chose someone to be the Messiah, there has to be prophecy that testifies to it. Once there is prophecy, then obviously it’s true. Whether he himself is a prophet—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What, Elijah there? Something where he says…
[Speaker F] Or he himself is a prophet—that would be the most expected—or if not he himself, then another prophet who is alive at the same time.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It turns out that apparently the great later authorities didn’t think that way. No, there are tests for prophecy; Maimonides writes how to test whether a prophet is a true prophet. But the great later authorities spoke about Sabbatai Zevi, and about various others where at first they did think he was the Messiah, and they weren’t troubled by the fact that no prophet had appeared beforehand to announce it or anything like that. Meaning, it doesn’t seem that people actually understand it that way.
[Speaker F] Even the Chabad people, right?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The Chabad people who thought their Rebbe was the Messiah, and they’re always precise about everything according to Maimonides and all that—really, I’ve never seen any discussion, though surely there is some
[Speaker F] discussion of it—but say they also see him as having been a prophet.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] At least some of them see it that way; I don’t know if all do. If so, then it’s not a criterion for anything, because anyone can be a prophet and declare himself a prophet and the Messiah and everything is fine. It has to be checked in some way. If it’s enough just to think that he is also a prophet, then there’s no problem. The burden of proof is on them, but how did they establish it? If he declares that he is the Messiah and also declares that he is a prophet and therefore it’s all fine—okay, then you haven’t added anything here.
[Speaker G] I never heard that.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Hm? I never heard them say he was a prophet. Right, I also didn’t hear it, but I’m saying—bottom line, I don’t see that people strongly treat this criterion, that there has to be a prophet beforehand, as some binding criterion. That’s one point.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] A second point has to do with actions to bring redemption, the Messiah. This too touches on the question of false messianism. I’ll define that more later, but for now I’m just circling around the issue. On the one hand, the Talmud in tractate Sanhedrin brings: Rabbi Yehuda would say, “Three commandments were commanded to Israel upon their entry into the Land: to appoint a king for themselves, to wipe out the seed of Amalek, and to build for themselves the chosen house.” Okay? This commandment is a commandment for all generations; it’s not only upon entry into the Land. Maimonides even counts it in his enumeration of the commandments, the twentieth commandment, that we were commanded to build a house of service. Regarding a king, that’s a more complicated question. But certainly regarding establishing the Temple, that is an ongoing commandment; meaning, one must build the Temple. It’s an obligatory commandment.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But Rashi, in tractate Sukkah 41a, writes: “But the future Temple, which we await, is built and complete; it will be revealed and come from heaven, as it is stated: ‘The sanctuary, O Lord, which Your hands established.’” What? Rashi. Rashi. As it is stated: “The sanctuary, O Lord, which Your hands established.” So Rashi says that the future Temple will descend from heaven, even though there is a commandment to build the Temple. The future Temple will descend from heaven. As is well known, on this matter the Arukh LaNer there, in the same sugya in Sukkah, writes as follows: “Therefore it appears to me, in my humble opinion, that certainly the Temple in the future will be built as an actual structure by human hands—there is a commandment to build the Temple—and what is stated, ‘The sanctuary, O Lord, which Your hands established,’ which is expounded in Tanhuma to mean that it will descend below as if from heaven, refers to a spiritual Temple that will come into the physically built Temple like a soul within a body. And just as in the Tabernacle and in the Temple, the heavenly fire descended into the ordinary fire kindled with wood.” We kindle the fire below, and the heavenly fire somehow descends, like a soul in a body. “And so too it appears in the Mekhilta, which expounds from the verse, ‘The place for Your dwelling, O Lord, which You made,’ that the heavenly Temple corresponds to the earthly Temple. And of this it says, ‘The sanctuary, O Lord, which Your hands established’—that in the future, when the Lord reigns forever and ever before the eyes of all who enter the world, He will dwell below within a Temple that is already built and aligned with the Temple below. And this is what it means that it will descend below into the Temple that will be built.”
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The scriptural interpretations he gives here aren’t important for our purposes right now, but on the basic level he doesn’t accept what Rashi writes, or perhaps he offers a reinterpretation. Though in Rashi it doesn’t work that way, by the way. Rashi doesn’t say this ambiguously; it’s clear. Because Rashi there is speaking about actual building, in terms of constructing it, and whether it would be on the Sabbath or not on the Sabbath, meaning in Rashi it is clear that this is not what he means. And the Arukh LaNer offers another interpretation. The claim is basically that we will build it by human hands, and the heavenly Temple will somehow enter the Temple we build here like a soul in a body. And so there is a dispute here over what exactly awaits us in the future: whether we are supposed to build the Temple, or whether the Temple is supposed to be given to us. Somehow, “descending from heaven” doesn’t have to mean literally that. Here too it can be interpreted in various ways. “Descending from heaven” could mean that it will be given to us; we won’t have to make some special effort. Then you can somewhat reconcile the two possibilities. Meaning, we will build it, but it will be like a declaration of Cyrus—that is, they’ll give us the permission; we won’t need to fight for it. It won’t be something we have to do against the natural order. But in the straightforward sense, there is a dispute here over whether it descends from heaven or we are supposed to build it.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And quite a few thinkers in the modern period tied the disagreement between Haredi Judaism and Religious Zionism to this matter. Religious Zionism thinks that one has to take action so that the Temple will be built, maybe even to bring the Messiah in general, but also to build the Temple. And Haredi Judaism basically sees things as something we are supposed to wait for: the Temple and the Messiah and everything else will come down from heaven; we are not supposed to take action to bring it. This already touches more directly on the question of false messianism. Because actions to bring the Messiah already connect in some way to false messianism. I’m not saying that everyone who acts is engaged in false messianism, but this is where it starts getting closer to the sugya.
[Speaker G] What messianic actions to bring the Messiah? Rashi says the Temple will descend from heaven.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Rashi says that, but—
[Speaker G] Religious Zionism claims—it doesn’t accept that, right? Not everyone. Why? They don’t accept Rashi? Not at all.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] There’s the Arukh LaNer here. There are disputes. The Arukh
[Speaker G] LaNer
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] doesn’t accept Rashi.
[Speaker G] People take action—but who says people are taking action?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] They do take action. Here—Rabbi Yisrael Ariel with the Temple Institute. They prepare the vessels. He wants—they act in order to build the Temple. They want to build the Temple. Clearly. Not to bring the Messiah, to wait for it to descend from heaven.
[Speaker G] No, they want to build the Temple, prepare all the equipment that… no no no, to build the Temple.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The equipment they’re already making, because that doesn’t depend on the location. But there’s the Temple Movement there that wants to build the Temple.
[Speaker G] Have they already chosen a quarry or…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] They haven’t chosen any quarry because it’s still not realistic, I think, as far as I know, because it’s not realistic. But they want to, they’re trying to pressure… no, that’s what I’m saying. Not only that.
[Speaker G] They see the light at the end of the tunnel and are getting ready.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no, no. There’s an approach there that says we need to build it, that they demand that the government of Israel carry out the construction of the Temple, which for the time being obviously hasn’t gotten much of a response. But yes, that’s an approach. By the way, also a great many—I think much broader circles than just this Temple Movement support this in principle. They support it in principle. They say, look, right now it’s not realistic, Bibi won’t do it and the world won’t allow it, so we have to be realistic. But they have no principled objection to the view of Arukh LaNer, that we are supposed to be the ones who initiate and build the Temple. The question is to what extent—and this will also bring us to the question of false messianism—the question is how much this should be done through realistic means. Or not: what do you have to do with the hidden matters of the Merciful One? There is a commandment to build the Temple, and don’t worry; you do what you were commanded, and with the problems we’ll have to cope.
[Speaker G] According to Rabbi Ariel’s approach, even if the Temple comes down from heaven, still—you do need to prepare the priestly garments, you do need to prepare the Temple. No, he says even…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right, but he also claims more than that. He claims that even the building itself has to be done by us.
[Speaker G] But are the two things dependent on each other? What? The building of the Temple and the coming of the Messiah?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Simply speaking, yes, that’s part of the matter, part of the redemption. I don’t know who will do what and in what order. There are all sorts of statements like that from the medieval authorities (Rishonim). I never read that stuff because it doesn’t interest me; it’s the kind of speculation that I don’t understand why anyone needs to deal with.
[Speaker G] Why not? That’s the class.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Why am I giving a class on why it doesn’t interest me? That’s the point of the class. I’ll get to that too, but that is the point of the class. Maimonides writes this. Again, here I’m in good company. Maimonides writes that it doesn’t add fear of Heaven and there’s no point dealing with it, and not for nothing, it’s not…
[Speaker G] And nevertheless he calculates the end-times. In the Epistle to Yemen?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, in the Epistle to Yemen. And here he writes that it is forbidden to calculate the end-times. Because there he thought it was necessary because of the troubles they were experiencing there.
[Speaker G] He writes that there. Also in the Laws of Kings he explains the order of things. He writes there what has to happen: to strike down the seed of Amalek, the Temple. You can’t say Maimonides doesn’t deal with it.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, what are you talking about? He issues Jewish law, he’s not “dealing with it.” Obviously, the Talmud wrote it, so he rules on all the laws. When King Messiah arrives, he’ll read Maimonides and know what he needs to do.
[Speaker G] Okay, is it permitted to disagree with Maimonides? Not any…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, yes, it’s permitted.
[Speaker G] He does provoke discussion about it.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No problem, it’s permitted, everything’s fine. I didn’t say this approach is illegitimate. Rashi says it too, or disagrees, I have no problem with that, yes. I have no problem—these are legitimate opinions. Right now we’re studying the topic / passage. Okay. Now, as I already said in the past, in previous classes, false messianism is a subject that is hard to discuss in halakhic terms. There is no halakhic prohibition, on the face of it, against being a false messiah. In a minute I’ll bring some Yad Ramah that maybe does claim there is such a prohibition, but there is no prohibition on being a false messiah; there is a prohibition on being a false prophet. A prohibition on lying? A prohibition on lying, yes, we discussed that. But fine—if, for example, a person sincerely believes that he is the messiah and that we should follow him, then he isn’t lying. Right? So that’s okay. He is lying unintentionally, yes, he’s not… The question is whether a lie has to be reflexive, or whether saying something untrue is always a lie, even if you don’t know—so then you’re lying under duress.
[Speaker C] It’s a lie, but you’re not a liar.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay. In any case, there’s no halakhic prohibition here, and therefore it’s very hard to discuss these things with halakhic tools. It’s something that needs to be discussed more with sociological tools. And indeed, throughout history all kinds of people and movements arose that declared themselves messianic, and at some stage they were declared false messianism, but many times that was very unclear. There was broad rabbinic agreement with some of these movements, and that’s exactly the point.
[Speaker C] Like Shabbetai Tzvi?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What? Yes, there were many. There was Alroy, there were all kinds—Molcho, Solomon Molcho—there were all kinds. I’ll bring examples.
[Speaker C] There was agreement to…?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes. There was agreement, there was hesitation, yes, all kinds of things. With Molcho all the way, even more so. And in the end this stems from the fact that there really are no unequivocal tools, because there’s also no agreement on the signs and there’s no point in dealing with the signs, and Maimonides says we have no tradition about this. The Sages derived it from the verses, and the verses can be interpreted in all sorts of ways. So basically the issue is very vague. On the other hand, it’s also very charged. It’s very charged because it’s fairly clear that this is a phenomenon with severe damage. It’s a very problematic phenomenon, even though there is no formal prohibition you can point to. But there are significant harms here; that is, we need to deal with it. And therefore this is a very vague topic. By the way, I hardly know of any treatment of this issue of false messianism. When we did this work with my daughter, we looked around a bit—there are almost no orderly discussions of this matter. How do you diagnose false messianism? By what do you determine false messianism? People assume a huge number of assumptions without being aware that they’re assuming them. We talked about actual realization. The fact that it didn’t actually materialize—is that the sign that he was a false messiah? Who said realization is the criterion? After all, afterward there are always excuses, like with the Lubavitcher Rebbe, right?—that we were not worthy, or all sorts of things of that kind. There are those who think he already came.
[Speaker G] On what verses do they rely to say that the Messiah will come?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What? I brought that. Maimonides writes it, and also in the Talmud. In the Talmud… no, the Talmud brings verses. There’s the statement of Rabbi Hillel—I brought that Talmudic passage. Rabbi Hillel says, “Israel has no messiah, for they already consumed him in the days of Hezekiah.” Rav Yosef said, “May his Master forgive Rabbi Hillel. When was Hezekiah? In the First Temple. And Zechariah, who was after the First Temple, prophesied in the Second Temple and said: ‘Rejoice greatly, daughter of Zion; shout, daughter of Jerusalem. Behold, your king comes to you, righteous and victorious is he, humble and riding on a donkey, on a colt, the foal of a donkey.’” And that is a verse he brings to say there is redemption, and that is already after Hezekiah, already in the Second Temple—Zechariah, sorry, is prophesying about it, and that’s already in the Second Temple. Maimonides himself also writes that there are verses about this in the portion of Nitzavim and… with Balaam too, verses in the Torah itself—not one verse in the Torah, verses in the Torah itself—from which it appears that the Messiah will come. Maimonides understands belief in the coming of the Messiah as something anchored in verses; I think we also read that. Here: “The Sages said, ‘May the spirit of those who calculate the end-times expire.’” To believe in him and to love him greatly and pray for his coming—that yes; not to calculate the end-times, but to believe in him—that is the twelfth foundation among Maimonides’ thirteen principles. In accordance with what was said about him by every prophet from Moses to Malachi. And one who doubts him or belittles the matter denies the Torah, which promised him explicitly in the portion of Balaam and ‘You are standing today.’ So Maimonides claims there are verses in the Torah about the Messiah, yes. Fine. As he himself writes, verses can be interpreted, so therefore…
[Speaker F] But regarding the verses, Maimonides writes—if I’m not mistaken—that since the verses can be interpreted, if something is proven against them, against the plain meaning, then they can be interpreted otherwise; not that that’s how they must be read.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, fine, in any case you can never be certain. Even before he comes, maybe there’ll be proof. Once it’s based on tradition, you can’t… when there’s a tradition, that’s what is supposed to be. And if there’s proof against it, then apparently the whole business isn’t correct. And if this is a verse interpretation that can later be disproved in light of evidence or factual indications, then from the outset you cannot have full belief in that verse even beforehand.
[Speaker F] Not full belief, but at least the assumption that…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Fine, okay, but you can’t say that someone who doesn’t believe this is denying a principle on the basis of those verses.
[Speaker F] Yes, and therefore.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay. Now, as a result of these dangers I mentioned earlier—dangers that overall we know from history, including examples related to this issue—there is a very great aversion to false messianism in Jewish thought. Again, I’m saying, this is not… “those who calculate the end-times” appears in the Talmud too, though not as a prohibition, but it appears. False messianism is a much broader concept, and there it’s something that simply developed after the damage occurred. Meaning, it is not anchored in some halakhic prohibition, some halakhic prohibition. Perhaps the most extreme expression of this matter—and again, of course I’m not including him among the later authorities (Acharonim), namely Yeshayahu Leibowitz and Ben-Gurion, two of the greatest Acharonim—but Yeshayahu Leibowitz, yes, so I’m bringing a quote from him here: “I believe in the Messiah who will come; forever he will come. A messiah who has come is a false messiah.” Meaning, the messiah always comes in the future. What he meant to say is: he will not come. Meaning, once the messiah has arrived, then no—that’s a false messiah. And this isn’t a factual belief. Presumably it’s supposed to spur them to action, to give us hope, but there is no factual claim here. He says: “A messiah who has arrived is not the messiah,” or “is not a Jewish messiah,” he writes elsewhere—obviously an allusion to the Christian messiah, who did arrive. Meaning, he understands the problem in Christianity not as being that their messiah is not the true messiah, but that he is true—in that he was realized. Meaning, a messiah who is realized is a false messiah. That was supposedly the proof for the Christian, because their messiah was realized. It really reaches absurdities. Ben-Gurion says the same thing.
[Speaker G] So why not just say nothing—basically he is making Rabbi Hillel’s claim, “there is no…”
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] “Messiah for Israel.”
[Speaker G] Yes, right. So why not say that? Why not say that? And he himself of course says it, and he says it and once again breaks…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] In this way he breaks the whole principle that you need to give people hope, to leave them with hope.
[Speaker G] Fine, he doesn’t say it—he sort of says he will come. Yes, but he says he won’t come.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] He doesn’t say.
[Speaker G] When he comes then he’ll…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] “A messiah who has come is a false messiah.” What? He says that a messiah who has come is…
[Speaker G] A false messiah.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Ben-Gurion writes: “The messiah has not yet come, and I do not long for a messiah who will come. The moment the messiah comes, he ceases to be the messiah. When you find the messiah’s address”—without the ‘et,’ right? notice that—“you will not find the messiah’s address, you will find the address of a messiah. In the phone book he is no longer the messiah.” I mentioned HaGashashim, right? Here, where is it—how do you get onto the Ayalon? When the messiah wants to go up to Jerusalem. What drives them to this idea? I think what drives them to it is the fear of disillusionment. They also of course assume that it will be disproved, because they don’t believe in… or at least Ben-Gurion doesn’t believe at all in the principles of faith / belief. So from his point of view, beyond the deception involved in adopting principles of faith / belief that you don’t need because they aren’t true, there is harmful deception here, because once it is disproved everyone will basically abandon the messianic hope on which he built his whole project. After all, he harnessed the entire project to it, he harnessed the public to his project, when a large part of the public came on the basis of messianic hopes. So this is not a simple matter as far as the beginnings of Zionism are concerned. Now this whole thing is strange. Let’s talk about Leibowitz. Ben-Gurion simply didn’t believe in it, so there’s no point discussing it. But Leibowitz’s claim basically says that you need to implant belief in something you know is false in order for it to give you hope. But if I know it’s false, then I also won’t have hope. So what then? For idiots who don’t know it’s false, it’s better to keep quiet, don’t reveal to them the truth that you wise one know, and don’t reveal to them that it won’t happen.
[Speaker F] But he does say it, that’s why he wrote it.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Now, it’s true that there are precedents. Maimonides brings laws of “we do not instruct accordingly,” and the Talmud also writes laws of “we do not instruct accordingly.” I assume that the assumption of the Talmud and Maimonides was that the ignoramuses do not open those books, neither Talmud nor Maimonides. Therefore you can teach it to Torah scholars, because that’s fine; the ignoramuses in any case won’t open the books. That seems to me to be the case, because otherwise it is really hard to understand.
[Speaker F] Or maybe it is permitted to teach it—“we do not instruct accordingly” is in the practical context. You teach it in the sense of studying Jewish law, but you don’t instruct it to someone who comes to ask you right now what to do right now.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, fine, but the Talmud says it, so I will draw the practical conclusion myself about what to do now. After all, when the Talmud states a law in the laws of Sabbath, I don’t need to go to a halakhic decisor to tell me what to do now. If it’s written in the Talmud and I understand that this is the situation, that’s what I’ll do.
[Speaker F] Fine, and then that’s okay. Like the matter of zealotry—Pinchas comes to Moses and says, “You taught us, Moses, that zealots strike him.” And then Moses says to him, “The reader of the letter should be the one to carry it out.” Meaning, that was okay. But the Talmud says, “It is the law, but we do not instruct accordingly,” meaning it’s not something that should come…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, but Moses our teacher also did not reveal this law to him, not just that he did not instruct him to do it. Apparently this is something that… He knew this law despite…
[Speaker F] When did he know? From where did he know? Moses our teacher was the source of the entire Torah. The version I know is that Moses… that he said to him, “Moses our teacher, you taught us…”
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, “you taught us,” he says that. But I’m saying, still—I assume the intention is that you teach this to Pinchas, do you understand? You don’t teach this law, even without a practical instruction, to the broad public. Torah scholars will already know what to do with it, so to them you can reveal it; otherwise this law would simply be lost. You can’t not pass it on, because otherwise how would they know? They wouldn’t know. Even a law of “we do not instruct accordingly” needs to be known, even if not instructed. But on the other hand, if you publicize it broadly, what is the difference between that and instructing? Meaning, people who know it will carry it out.
[Speaker F] It could be that the problem at the point of “we do not instruct accordingly” is not something intended so that unworthy people… so that it won’t be implemented, so that people won’t… that it wasn’t meant for practical implementation at all, according to one view. It is for practical implementation, but it shouldn’t… it shouldn’t come from a halakhic ruling, but only from something already known from the past.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But if it’s written in the Talmud, then it comes from halakhic ruling. The Talmud says “the law is…” and I implement it—what’s the difference? The Talmud is the Maimonides of that period. It was the law book.
[Speaker G] But there’s a more fundamental question here. Suppose Rabbi Hillel had said something on a purely halakhic topic, okay? He would say, “There is no messiah for Israel”; or he would say, “There’s no problem with doing labor on a Jewish holiday.” Then the Talmud would say, “May his Master forgive Rabbi Hillel,” and that would be it. So what would we say? Fine, there is some lone opinion of Rabbi Hillel, but the Jewish law was ruled otherwise, that he is an extreme lone opinion, and that’s all. Now, once the Talmud is structured with him saying “There is no messiah for Israel,” and all… and this is brought as a lone opinion, and the Talmud says “May his Master forgive Rabbi Hillel,” and no one presents any opposing position or… that’s a sign that he was just saying something off the mark, let’s call it that. So fine—then Leibowitz supports him, which you really strengthened…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] He doesn’t bring him as supporting evidence.
[Speaker G] No, but fine, it wasn’t ruled as Jewish law.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, but that’s exactly what I’m saying, and that’s why I brought all the introduction in the first class about halakhic ruling in relation to facts. Meaning, there is a difference between doing labor on a Jewish holiday and belief in the coming of the Messiah. Belief in the coming of the Messiah is a fact. True or not true, fine, you can argue about it, but it’s a fact. What does halakhic ruling have to do with it? If he is right, then he is right. I don’t care that the majority think differently from him.
[Speaker E] Here the majority is wrong. What, and Rabbi Hillel would also say that.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, of course. What does that have to do with anything? Also against belief in the coming of the Messiah I don’t need to rely on Rabbi Hillel. If that is my conclusion, then that is my conclusion. What relevance does halakhic ruling have here? Maimonides himself writes that there is no halakhic ruling on something that does not pertain to practice, although the thirteen principles he does present as some sort of determination, and incidentally he apparently even sees it as something halakhic, because someone who does not accept it is a denier of a principle, and that has halakhic implications for how one treats a denier of a principle.
[Speaker E] That’s my tactical explanation.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right, therefore…
[Speaker E] The thirteen principles—therefore it makes sense to rule on them.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, but it’s still a factual matter. The question is a factual question. If I disagree with it, then it’s…
[Speaker E] Not that I don’t accept the authority of Jewish law,
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] but rather that I reached the conclusion that this fact is not true. Maimonides says a matter that does not pertain to practice; the thirteen principles do pertain to practice. I understand, but I’m saying, what stands behind that? What stands behind it is the view, apparently, that there is no authority in… So here too, even if there is a practical implication, we are still talking about a fact. So if I came to the conclusion that it is true, what help is it that all the sages of Israel say it is not true? That is my conclusion. There is nothing I can do unless I am persuaded, as we discussed in the first class. So on this point I don’t think there is any difference. I’ll maybe bring an example I once thought of; maybe someone even said it to me, I no longer remember, but it’s an interesting point. Think about reward and punishment in the World to Come, say. Basically, the Holy One, blessed be He, punishes sinners in Gehenna and in the World to Come. Why would He do that? What good does it do? None of us knows what happens there. By the time we get there, it’s too late for us; we’ve already done our commandments and transgressions. Right? So what’s the point of doing it? What’s needed is to tell us that there is punishment in the World to Come, not to carry it out. Right? To tell us there is punishment in the World to Come, because that can lead us to keep commandments here—but not to carry it out.
[Speaker F] If the purpose is to get us to keep commandments here, then it seems to me He could have given something more tangible.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What do you mean?
[Speaker F] Some kind of fire…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, He didn’t want to. We already discussed that once. He didn’t want to deviate from the laws of nature in the conduct of this world. Fine. “The reward for a commandment is not in this world.” So He tells us, fine, in the World to Come you’ll reap it. Fine, so I understand: if He tells us, then I understand, it has a purpose, it will improve our ways. But according to this logic, it means that basically He should tell us, but not actualize it. Why do evil for no reason when it doesn’t help? The Holy One, blessed be He, would harm us for no reason even though it doesn’t help?
[Speaker G] Maybe He has some other kind of mode of governance…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What? What do you mean, that He has another mode of governance?
[Speaker G] What do you mean, He doesn’t do it as reward and punishment? It’s a mode of governance.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What do you mean, He doesn’t do it as reward and punishment? Reward and punishment. What do you mean?
[Speaker C] We don’t understand the concept of reward and punishment, but in any case… we understand that the Holy One, blessed be He, has an interest in how we behave.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But I’m asking—let’s analyze this. What do you mean, “we don’t understand”? Here, we do understand: He is trying to get us to perform commandments, and in fact He could have achieved that just by saying it without carrying it out. And therefore it could indeed be that the statement exists even though in the end it is not realized.
[Speaker H] So maybe it really is not realized?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Maybe it really is not realized. Except what?
[Speaker H] They won’t say that.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Obviously they won’t say it, because if they say it then we also won’t… it also won’t achieve its effect. But on the other hand, when I make that calculation and truly come to the conclusion that in the end it is not realized, then with me too it won’t achieve its purpose. So how can that be? Meaning, somehow it does have to be carried out, because otherwise it won’t achieve the goal. But I don’t know… again, it’s a kind of wheel like that, and I don’t know where to stop it. But it’s the same thing. Leibowitz—it’s even worse with Leibowitz. Leibowitz says a messiah who arrives is not the messiah. So what do you expect—that we should believe in the messiah but know that he will never arrive? Then I won’t believe in him. In what sense can it operate on me subjectively if objectively I know that this fact is not true? You can’t dance at two weddings. You can say: don’t reveal it to the public, because the public is idiotic and thinks the messiah really will come. Yes, fine. But you say it openly, so you are also preventing it from functioning. You can’t… Now it’s true, of course, that he can count on the public not accepting what he says, and that’s fine. And those who do accept it, that’s fine, it probably also won’t harm them because they’re among the wise. And the fools around them won’t accept it in any case, because they’re used to what they were educated on, and everything is fine. So you can even say—and our eyes see it—that even when he says it publicly people don’t accept it. Maybe rightly so. I’m not judging at the moment; I’m only saying factually that this is a correct assessment.
[Speaker H] The statement is only a statement. In the end we don’t know what will be.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Of course. Fine. No, but if Leibowitz says this thing and people were to accept it, then according to his own view it would ruin it as well. He probably counted on people not accepting what he says, if he counted on anything at all.
[Speaker F] I don’t know specifically regarding Leibowitz, but it seems to me that this kind of claim—for not only Leibowitz made claims from that family, specifically regarding the messiah and maybe also regarding other beliefs—it seems to me that what they mean is… it’s not that one should believe it even though it isn’t true, but rather to give some sort of statement that it should be a kind of…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] You have to assume it is true even though it is not certain.
[Speaker F] No, it seems the direction is more to replace belief in the messiah in the traditional sense—some king who will rule over Israel and build the Temple—with some kind of belief in hope, or progress, or striving for perfection, or some abstract kind of thing, I think.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Fine, then that’s not the messiah.
[Speaker F] Fine, it’s not the messiah.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I’ll get to messianism in broader senses in a moment.
[Speaker F] No, I’m not saying that that means it’s correct. I’m saying it seems to me that… again, I don’t know specifically about Leibowitz, but claims from that family—many times at least—that’s what they mean. But is there improvement in the end?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] In the broad sense of messiah—is there improvement?
[Speaker F] There is improvement, but it’s not that the messiah arrives, because simply… right, and then you want to say there will be more improvement.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So you interpret the concept of messiah differently, but you still claim it is a factual claim. Only the factual claim is not that a person will arrive, but that there is some improved state.
[Speaker F] No, but it’s not even that. The improvement does happen.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The improvement does happen, but you’re saying it never ends. I don’t care, it doesn’t matter, but in the end you’re still saying there is improvement. That is still a factual claim. The claim is that there is improvement.
[Speaker C] Maybe it’s like what we learn from the Binding of Isaac: human sacrifice is forbidden, but still the Binding of Isaac is presented as a model. The Rabbi gave a class on that.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, no, but there it was a direct instruction from the Holy One, blessed be He, so that is something else. I’m not…
[Speaker F] But that’s it—it’s a factual claim, but it’s not… and still, according to that view, the messiah isn’t just a person; the improvement too never actually arrives.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It’s not a single point. No, it does arrive; it just keeps arriving all the time.
[Speaker F] Fine, so it never really arrives, because it never ends.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That doesn’t matter, that says nothing. In the end, though, you are saying that there is improvement—that is a factual claim. There is improvement, it just never ends. No problem. But that’s not what he says. He claims, no, this is not a factual claim at all; it is a claim whose purpose is psychological, not factual. You are proposing a different interpretation of the concept of messiah. That’s somewhat close to what I said earlier—messiah as a period—only you add another layer: you say not only that messiah is a period, but also that it is a process that never ends. Fine, that is still at the level of interpreting the concept of messiah.
[Speaker F] Isn’t that more than interpretation? Because obviously that’s not what is meant.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Fine, it doesn’t matter, but what you proposed is an interpretation. Whether you accept it or not is something else. Here, again, the accepted view is not like that, and in my opinion it is also implausible. I mean, how can you plant hope in people on the basis of something that is just false? It simply doesn’t sound plausible to me. So that is the accepted approach. And still, among the accepted approaches—in a moment I’ll separate them. But before that I want to make one more conceptual distinction, which really came up in what Arik said a moment ago. Today people speak of concepts of messianism also in borrowed senses. For example, communism was a kind of messianism. So every such movement that tries to bring about, to advance some idea or create a better world, is also often perceived as a messianic movement, and sometimes even with the negative connotations. Certainly following communism, because very often when you try too hard to bring the messiah—the “messiah” in quotation marks—there are heavy prices. A lot of oil gets spilled on the wheels of the revolution, so to speak. So that is why these things are called messianism, and not for nothing, because of the negative connotation of the term messianism. Meaning, this too is a kind of false messianism in the sense that you act too decisively on behalf of some utopia given in advance. Some time ago I spoke with some communist activist, a professor of economics, a redhead—I forgot his name—in Jerusalem. He is a communist from the people of Rakah; there are still a few isolated ones like that, very frustrated. My brother-in-law’s father was one of the dinosaurs of Rakah, and when he died, the whole family there were still communists in one form or another. And when he died it was very interesting—there was a funeral at Yad Hannah, at Kibbutz Yad Hannah, which is also a communist kibbutz. And there—it was touching, because there stood, I don’t know, fifty or seventy people, which is probably more or less all the activists and voters of Rakah today, those who still hold those views.
[Speaker F] In New Discourse, Rakah, yes, that’s the party that entered the Knesset, Hadash, yes,
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, among Jews I mean, it’s a tiny minority. Fine, it wasn’t all of them, but it was a substantial portion of them. All the central activists were there. There was also some Arab Knesset member who eulogized him there, from Rakah, from Hadash, I forgot his name. In any case, it was very touching because it was like a kind of mourning for a vanished world. Meaning, they understand that they are no longer relevant. The world is not with them. They are sure they are still right, but the world is not with them. And then when we got to his house afterward, after the funeral—no, not after the funeral, it was already during the condolence visit—so I spoke with that economist, and he really said that original communism had a very clear model of what ought to be, what the utopia is, what is correct. And all that remained was simply to strive as much as possible toward the model, the dictatorship of the proletariat. But in the model of now, he claims they don’t have—that is, in the picture now they don’t have—a clear utopian model. Even he understands that complete collectivism and communism are not a realistic option; it’s not correct—he’s over the age of twenty-three, as the saying goes. But he claims that in the course of progress he hopes it will become clear what the correct model is. And then I tried to extract from him in what sense he is a communist, because behind that statement I too can stand, but I’m not a communist. Behind that statement I too can stand. Okay, I agree that today things are not ideal, and if something better becomes clear I’m willing to cooperate with you in bringing it about. As long as you don’t impose the communist model on me, then in what sense are you a communist? Meaning that all that remains is Marxism in its underground sense, not in the sense of the outcome you are striving toward, but in the sense that you are striving. And in the end that is what we are left with. Meaning, this activism that says we are constantly looking for a model because we are dissatisfied with the current situation, even though at the moment we do not really have the model toward which we are striving—that, in his view, is what communism means today. It’s very interesting because I think it’s also philosophically inconsistent in its definition. I mean, how can you define such a thing? You can call it communism, but it has nothing to do with the ordinary meaning of the term.
[Speaker G] But it’s interesting, because in a way it is consistent that the ideology leads him, that he doesn’t surrender to practical life, he doesn’t surrender to practice.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What does it mean for it to become clear what the truth is? Practice will determine what’s right; what works and what doesn’t work, that’s what practice determines. Today the situation is not ideal—everyone agrees about that. There is no ideal situation. Do you want to propose some concrete proposal for something that would improve it? If you convince me, I’ll work with you to bring it about, no problem. But as long as you’re not proposing anything, then what are you saying? Let’s search and be with the people, let’s search—okay, we’ll search and see. If you’re not saying anything beyond that, it’s hard to call that communism. Meaning, it’s some remnant of the activism that existed in communism—that is, you want to keep searching, it matters to you to turn over every stone and see whether there’s a better model. Fine, there is some characteristic here that also characterized them, but to call that communism today is ridiculous. And I think that voting for Hadash because of such a thing is nonsense, because a lot of people are looking for all kinds of models. Fine, that’s not what characterizes Hadash—the model they found, not what they’re searching for. Meaning, they are proposing a certain model. I’m talking about Hadash not in the political sense but in the socio-economic sense. So I’m saying: this fracture marks the fracture of messianism in its secular sense. In other words, there is some loss of confidence in the concept of messianism—not in the religious sense, but it’s the same thing, because the fracture of religious messianism stems from the destructive results when it doesn’t materialize. And that’s exactly what happened there. In the end, secular communist messianism did not materialize, it caused damage, and as a result people developed a kind of extreme response: we don’t want to know what will be at the end, we’ll search and see, we’ll try constantly to improve reality, but we’re no longer striving toward a point that we already know today where it lies. In other words, we no longer know where we are headed; our faces are no longer turned toward the rising sun, right? So no, we’re no longer there. And that is the same fracture of messianism that I’m talking about here. But the concept of messianism in its secular sense is still not the concept of messianism I’m talking about here, because there we’re not talking about some eschatological process, some kind of process in which some metaphysics bursts into the physical world and somehow takes control of it—that’s at least the common religious conception. The Holy One, blessed be He, somehow starts moving things here, and it’s not just ordinary historical processes. To bring the Messiah—to bring the Messiah means that something will happen here that is directed from above. I mean, not that—because I don’t think anyone would think to say that people are forbidden to take actions that improve the world. Is that called a messianic movement? What, forbidden? On the contrary, I think the most basic thing is that one should try to improve as much as possible. So what is this whole idea of a messianic movement? It is fundamentally connected, as opposed to the conception I mentioned earlier, not to despair over ideologies and not to abandoning those absolute models, but really to the religious meaning of the matter. And therefore I don’t think it’s correct to automatically project it there, even though the phenomenon is a similar phenomenon. There is one similar aspect, and I’ll get to it in a moment: that in a messianic movement in the religious sense too, it’s not only the question of what might happen as a result; apparently there is also a conception that there is something mistaken in messianism itself, and you can even identify it in real time, before you know what happened with it in the end—whether it succeeded or failed, and what damage it did or didn’t cause. Something in the conduct itself seems problematic. And here perhaps there is a similarity—I’m returning to the similarity—to secular messianism. What is called modernism. Essentially postmodernism is the despair over modernism, over secular messianism. Modernism said: yes, we will destroy the old world to its foundations. Meaning, we will create a better world. And postmodernism is basically the fracture that this messianism brings in its wake. That is, despair over the grand ideologies, the utopias, the perfect models. Now this despair—I actually identify with it. That is, even though I don’t like postmodernism, because they took it too far. Because really, to go with a model—even if it may be correct, and cooperation sounds very nice and really seems beautiful, and if it were realized it could be that it would be a wonderful world. I don’t know, I’m not sure, but maybe. But it is certainly a good aspiration. You can argue whether you’re for it or against it, but it is a good aspiration, good things. The problem is that when you strive for a good aspiration too resolutely, it’s very dangerous. Because you kill for it and you fight for it and you’re unwilling to hear any criticism; it turns into a religion in the bad sense of the word. And in that sense it is negative even before the question of whether it will succeed or not. The process, the messianism, the movement within that messianism is problematic—not the question of whether it will succeed or fail. And in that sense I want to argue that this is also true of messianism in its religious context. That is, it’s not only the question of whether it is realized in the end, whether it causes damage in the end, but something in the conduct itself is very problematic. In the case of secular messianism, it is really this resoluteness that sometimes leads to cruelty, and to an unwillingness to see additional sides and reconsider, and to turning these principles into some kind of religion that does not stand up to critical examination, and so on. In the religious context this appears in the form of unrealistic actions. And again, I am not in favor of prohibitions right now; now I’m talking about realpolitik. That is, taking unrealistic actions. And many times, when one hears the accusations against Zionism itself, part of the claims are that it isn’t realistic. Rebellion against the nations—even in the religious discourse, I’m saying. It’s rebellion against the nations. What is the problem with rebellion against the nations? There is no prohibition against rebelling against the nations. There are the Three Oaths, fine, but there is no prohibition. The problem is that it’s not realistic. That is, one must not take unrealistic actions. Now very often the movement—I’m trying to gather characteristics, because we said: what is a messianic movement? This is also an important characteristic. One of the characteristics of a messianic movement is when that movement begins to take actions that are unrealistic in the existing circumstances. That is, once you are sure that you are the Messiah and the Holy One, blessed be He, is with you, then you launch a world war, because no problem—the Holy One, blessed be He, is with you and you’re all set. Okay? Which is actually very similar to what happened in communism and to the criticism of what happened in communism. Because it too took actions—not in the sense of unrealistic, but in the sense of immoral, of cruel. Its mode of conduct, as a result of the confidence and resoluteness it had in its path—so the conduct itself, even if in the end it had succeeded and it had brought redemption and we would all have lived in one big kibbutz and everything would have been wonderful and the wolf would dwell with the lamb, etc. And the lamb would dwell with the lamb, because we already said: the wolf dwelling with the lamb—as long as I’m the wolf. But even if in the end it reached the result we want, something in the conduct itself is problematic. Because even the result—the end does not necessarily sanctify the means. In communism they held that the end sanctifies the means. That is, in order to bring world peace and eternal equality and absolute justice, you are allowed to kill everyone who disagrees with it and not listen, and throw them into gulags and do all kinds of terrible things. And also, suppose we are inside it and it could be that communism is on its way to winning and it will succeed in the end. Can I already determine now that such a thing is invalid, or do I have to wait and see whether in the end it materializes or not? My claim is that there too—I’m not saying, there are means that sometimes the end does sanctify, sometimes yes. I’m not ruling it out; I’m not saying categorically that an end never sanctifies any means. But sometimes there is some feeling that you’ve crossed the bounds of good taste. And then I say that even if in the end you succeed and it is realized in the end, that will not be the sole measure. It can still be that you acted incorrectly. And it is forbidden to do that, even at the price that maybe you won’t succeed in realizing your great idea. And even if I agree with your great idea. And the same thing in a messianic movement. That is, a messianic movement also has criteria—we’ll see this—there are also criteria in the mode of conduct that are not connected to the question of what will happen in the end. Maybe you really are the true Messiah; even if you are the true Messiah, you are not allowed to behave like that. There is an important point here, because the arguments very often revolve around the question: wait a second, let’s see what happens in the end, and then we’ll see who was right. That is not necessarily the measure. Even if in the end—even if there really will be a Messiah and Bibi will repent and it turns out that he is a direct descendant of the house of David and he will be the King Messiah, as some people indeed hope, and maybe many people hope not, the claim is that this does not confirm, or give a stamp of approval to, the whole path as having been correct. If you say that it’s unrealistic and it’s rebellion against the nations and so on, it could be that even if you are the true Messiah, it is forbidden to do that.
[Speaker E] If the flaw is moral—meaning, if the flaw in the conduct, in the path, was really violence, moral problems—then of course it’s obvious that even if it succeeds, that doesn’t justify it.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But the flaw in messianism—right, I didn’t make the comparison—
[Speaker E] A flaw of judgment—if a person does, if a person, say Herzl, he also made some crazy calculations in terms of the chances against the political realities. Okay.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, but he didn’t do dangerous things; he did things that maybe wouldn’t succeed.
[Speaker E] Declaring a state was problematic, but he didn’t harm. Meaning, if, say, a messianic person does things, takes these crazy gambles on the assumption that the Holy One, blessed be He, is behind you—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So there, I brought the example earlier—
[Speaker E] And if it succeeds?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So I’m saying, I brought earlier the example of a group—which really is a small one—that wanted to build the Temple; I don’t know if you were here earlier, we talked about it—a group that literally wanted to build the Temple, not to mention Yehuda Etzion and those who wanted to blow up the Dome of the Rock there. That was their conception. Their conception was that if we do what is incumbent upon us, and “this is as far as I have seen fit in my heart,” the Holy One, blessed be He, will help. Now that claim is a claim that I don’t know to what extent one can reject it outright, but the feeling says no—you still have to be realistic on some level, and you crossed the line. So here I’m saying: you can relate to all of Zionism as messianism, a messianic movement; you can relate only to this pole, which turns into—takes unrealistic steps—as a messianic movement. I’m raising possibilities here; I’m trying to move forward a bit, but I’m trying to sketch the different possibilities without yet setting anything in stone.
[Speaker E] Was Ben-Gurion not an unrealistic step? I mean, realism didn’t interest him; from his perspective there was something higher driving him—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And pushing him, and therefore he goes all the way with it.
[Speaker E] Same thing, same claim, same claim.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] By the way, Ben-Gurion’s declaration of the state was perceived by quite a few people as something unrealistic, and as Ben-Gurion said, anyone here who doesn’t believe in miracles is not realistic. Ben-Gurion declared a state in a place where there was a serious fear that we would all be annihilated afterward. It’s not clear to me to what extent you couldn’t determine that this was some bizarre messianism—not religious, but never mind, in the sense of lack of realism—and whoever joins him in the religious context, you can also accuse him in the context of messianism in its religious sense. That is, there were steps here that there was room to regard as unrealistic steps.
[Speaker F] But again, look, it דווקא seems to me that specifically in this category of doing unrealistic things, then it seems that at least in retrospect this case, this kind of thing—if it does ultimately succeed, then in retrospect we understand that it was indeed good. We’re not talking about murdering lots of people, where one could say maybe even if you established a good world, maybe that wouldn’t justify it—but if you did something whose flaw is that it’s unrealistic, and it succeeded—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Rabbi Shach wrote that. We once talked about Rabbi Shach’s letter, Letter 2, in one of the—he already has a few books of letters, but one of them, I think the first one that came out, I read. In Letter 2 he talks there about Operation Entebbe. We talked about it once—he opposed Operation Entebbe. And he argued that there was no chance it would succeed, and you are endangering soldiers when the odds are that you won’t succeed, and it isn’t right to do it. Now in the end it succeeded. Yoni Netanyahu was killed, but still, in the end the operation is considered a tremendous success. So they came back to him and said: well, Rabbi, you see—it succeeded? So he said: fine, I also said there was a five percent chance it would succeed, but you don’t launch an operation on a five percent chance that something will succeed. Meaning, you’re bringing me proof that it succeeded retrospectively, but the decision was made in light of the data we had when we made the decision. And when we made the decision, in my estimation the chance of success was very small, and therefore it was forbidden to do it. Now when I talked about this, I commented on it—you asked, so I’ll discuss it now—I said that it depends on what the argument was about. Rabbi Shach’s claim is interesting, but it’s not certain that it’s correct. If the argument was over the question whether it is proper to do something unrealistic, then Rabbi Shach is basically saying: I argued that it is not proper to do something unrealistic; your claim that it succeeded in the end is irrelevant because it was still something unrealistic that succeeded. Even unrealistic things succeed some percentage of the time, but the estimate is that presumably it will not succeed. But if the argument was about the statistics themselves—that is, what is the probability that it will succeed?
[Speaker B] Rabbi Shach claimed a low probability; the others argued about the facts.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Exactly. We don’t know the facts; there are estimates, and the other people claimed that there was a good chance it would succeed. Now if you tell me that it succeeded—well, it succeeded. That is already a kind of certain confirmation of the claim against Rabbi Shach. Right. It’s one case, of course, with limited force.
[Speaker B] Also, whoever said it—he didn’t say zero. If he had said zero percent—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, I understand, but still, when you do the calculation in conditional probability, given that the outcome succeeded, the hypothesis that the chance was high is a bit more probable than the hypothesis that the chance was low. A bit more. Therefore there is some degree of confirmation here for the claim. So if the argument was an argument about what the probability would be, then the claim was a relevant claim. If the argument was about whether it is proper to go out even if the probability is low, then the fact that it succeeded in the end proves nothing. Okay, so that’s by the way—
[Speaker F] No, but regarding messianism, it seems to me that after all, someone making an unrealistic claim—what is he saying? That is, either he is arguing about the interpretation of reality and says it is realistic, or he says: true, materially speaking it is not realistic, but because it is messianic, there is a chance that God will help and we will nevertheless succeed. Now if we do succeed, then what have we seen?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] A certain probability, that God helps. You’re basically saying that the claim is really a dispute about the facts, only the facts of course have to take into account divine assistance, not only realpolitik. Fine as well. And then indeed the dispute can be decided on the basis of what happened retrospectively. Okay, fine as well. Okay, so here I’ll just finish with one sentence: this distinction between the two kinds of messianism is actually also a distinction within the Zionist movement between secular Zionism and Religious Zionism. Secular Zionism is messianism like communism in a certain sense. That is, it is a secular concept—bringing about a state that in our eyes is more correct, more fitting, more—I don’t know—our rights, sovereignty, self-determination, and so on. Religious Zionism, at least that part which is not Zionist and also religious, as we once discussed, but rather Zionist-religious with a hyphen, is basically saying that the goal of this whole thing is not that we have self-determination in the secular sense. That we have self-determination—but not in the secular sense; rather, it is part of bringing the Messiah. It is part of bringing the redemption. So here there are two movements walking together, one of which is messianism like communism and the second is messianism in the sense we are speaking about here. Again, I still haven’t defined whether it is positive or negative, but messianism in the sense of a messianic movement. This is a movement that takes steps in order to bring redemption and the religious Messiah. Okay, and then one has to divide the approach between how I relate to the secular Zionist movement and how I relate to the Religious Zionist movement. And in our case here, in this context, it is of course the second context. The religious context. Zionism as such, like communism, is discussed in terms of realpolitik and the relation of whether the end sanctifies the means, but that is not our discussion here. Our discussion here is really the question of how to characterize, and whether Religious Zionism can be seen as a messianic phenomenon in the negative sense—that is, in the sense that is perceived as negative, yes, again, not a prohibition, but in the sense that is perceived as negative—or not. And that is basically our question.
[Speaker C] Okay.