Messianism, Lecture 4
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Table of Contents
- Belief in the coming of the Messiah, calculations of the end, and whether this is a task incumbent upon us
- Two types of messianism: the original meaning and the borrowed concept
- Maimonides, Laws of Kings: presumed Messiah, trial, and Jesus and Muhammad
- Possible definitions of false messianism and a messianic movement
- Three failures in the mode of conduct: transgression, deviation from tradition, and lack of realism
- Implications for Religious Zionism and for metaphysical considerations versus realpolitik
- Historical ambiguity and the danger of error in real time
- False messiahs and their opponents: Hamburger and the assumption of a possible resemblance to Zionism
- Christianity as a precedent: Jesus, passages, Maimonides, and an outcome-based criterion
- Maimonides against signs and wonders, and the implications for later figures
Summary
General Overview
The text presents belief in the coming of the Messiah alongside a reservation about calculating the end and about the tendency to turn messianism into a human project that is practically incumbent upon us, and raises the question of upon whom the “messianic mission” is imposed and in what form. It distinguishes between messianism in its religious-eschatological sense and “messianism” in the borrowed sense of movements for repairing the world in modernity, and argues that it makes no sense to call every aspiration to repair the world “false messianism,” although one shared feature of different messianic tendencies is zealotry and an unwillingness to accept criticism. Throughout, the text presents Maimonides’ words about one who is “presumed to be the Messiah” and about the role of phenomena that appear false as part of the Creator’s plans, and proposes ways of defining a messianic movement and false messianism, with implications for Religious Zionism and for realistic conduct in the face of metaphysical considerations.
Belief in the coming of the Messiah, calculations of the end, and whether this is a task incumbent upon us
The text presents belief in the coming of the Messiah as a binding framework, but hesitates over whether bringing the Messiah is a task incumbent upon us or whether our role is to wait and not intervene in the process. It connects this hesitation to questions about Or HaChayim and Rashi and to the image of the Temple descending from heaven, and suggests that the Temple here serves as a symbol for the general question of how a process of redemption is supposed to occur and upon whom responsibility for it rests. It emphasizes that the focus is not a technical discussion about the Temple itself, but a clarification of “how” and who bears the messianic dimension in general.
Two types of messianism: the original meaning and the borrowed concept
The text states that messianism in its original sense is religious, eschatological messianism, whereas messianism in the borrowed sense describes movements to repair the world characteristic of the modern and modernist world, such as communism. It argues that it is unreasonable to speak of “false messianism” in the sense of the very desire to repair the world, because no one would see that desire as illegitimate or as a task not incumbent upon us. It warns that movements to repair the world can become fanatical around a model of a “repaired world,” which can lead to violence, suppression of other ideas, and delegitimization of alternatives, but presents this as only indirectly related to the traditional concept of “false messianism.” It formulates a shared root between false religious messianism and secular ideological messianism in the form of a sense of absolute truth and an unwillingness to accept intellectual criticism.
Maimonides, Laws of Kings: presumed Messiah, trial, and Jesus and Muhammad
The text quotes Maimonides, Laws of Kings, chapter 11, law 4, about a king from the house of David who “studies Torah and occupies himself with the commandments” and compels Israel to walk in it and strengthen its observance, and fights the wars of God, who is “presumed to be the Messiah,” and about the conditions under which he becomes the “definite Messiah” when he “built the Temple in its place and gathered the dispersed of Israel.” It emphasizes that in Maimonides there is a mechanism of a potential Messiah such that even if in the end “he did not succeed until now or was killed,” he is considered like all the proper and complete kings of the house of David who died, and highlights Maimonides’ phrase “the Holy One, blessed be He, only caused him to arise in order to test many through him” as a troubling point. It presents the lack of clarity as to what “to test” means in the case of a figure who meets the criteria of one “presumed to be the Messiah,” and raises the possibility that the test is not the very act of joining him, but rather the public’s responsibility for observance of the commandments and maintaining a critical perspective until full success, alongside another possibility that the test is the examination of whether the generation is worthy. It adds the example of Hezekiah as fit to be the Messiah, but “the generation was not fit,” and concludes that throughout the generations there may be several potential candidates who are never realized.
The text adds the censored passage that appears in the Frankel edition of that same law, in which Maimonides writes that “the thoughts of the Creator of the world are beyond the power of man to grasp” and that “all these matters of Jesus the Christian and that Ishmaelite who arose after him are only to straighten the way for the King Messiah and to repair the whole world to serve God together.” It interprets Maimonides as seeing Christianity and Islam as acts of providence that spread throughout the world “the words of the Messiah” and words of Torah and commandments, even though the nations claim that “these commandments were true, but have already been nullified” or that these things are “hidden matters” and not to be taken literally, until “when the King Messiah truly arises” everyone will understand that “their fathers inherited falsehood.” It emphasizes that Maimonides presents even phenomena that seem false or misleading as part of a positive divine plan preparing the ground for redemption, and asks how this connects to the phrase “to test many through him” in relation to a king from the house of David who did not succeed.
Possible definitions of false messianism and a messianic movement
The text proposes three suggestions for characterizing “false messianism” or a “messianic movement” in the negative sense. It cites, in the name of Leibowitz and Ben-Gurion, an extreme conception according to which a messiah who actually arrives is by definition a false messiah, and the messiah is supposed to remain a motivating idea and not a concrete reality, and presents this as implausible in a traditional context. It proposes a less far-reaching approach according to which any practical effort to bring the Messiah, whether political or mystical, creates a messianic movement with a negative connotation, and connects this to the question whether we are supposed to act or wait. It offers a third possibility according to which it is permitted, and perhaps even desirable, to act to bring the Messiah, but the negative criterion lies in the form of the action and the mode of conduct.
Three failures in the mode of conduct: transgression, deviation from tradition, and lack of realism
The text details, within the third possibility, three types of problems. It defines one problem as actions involving a halakhic prohibition, and cites the rabbi of Brisk, who infers from the Talmud in tractate Pesachim 43 that the Messiah will not come on the Sabbath or on a Jewish holiday because he will not violate the prohibition of travel limits. From this he derives a principled view that redemption does not come by way of transgression, not even a rabbinic one. He compares this to the idea that “repairing the world cannot come by way of corruption,” and connects it to extreme examples such as Shabbetai Tzvi, who deviated to the point of converting to Islam, alongside the possibility of more “local” transgressions such as desecrating the Sabbath.
He defines a second problem as actions that are not accepted in the tradition even without an explicit transgression, and gives as an example claims against Religious Zionism that it cooperates with heretics and secular people and therefore “it cannot be that redemption will come through such people,” as well as the discourse of “they shall not force the end” and “they shall not rebel against the nations” in the context of the Three Oaths in tractate Ketubot. He presents the Three Oaths as guidance perceived as a traditional mode of conduct rather than as a sharp halakhic criterion, and describes the book VaYoel Moshe as a tendentious text whose use of midrashim he does not consider serious, although the interpretation of the Three Oaths itself is, in his words, “still something one can listen to.”
He defines a third problem as actions that have no realistic justification, such as taking excessive risks out of confidence that the Holy One, blessed be He, or the Messiah will “arrange” reality, and gives examples of selling property out of immediate expectation of redemption and the economic loss that results. He tells stories about rabbis who swore that the Messiah would not arrive in the near future in order to stop unrealistic behavior, including a story about Rabbi Yaakov Gesundheit of Warsaw, a mention of Rabbi Shmuel Salant in Jerusalem in connection with “like a broken shard” and the phenomenon of mass conversion to Christianity following messianic collapse, and a mention of a story reported about Rabbi Aharon Kotler and another figure associated with the Tzemach Tzedek. He attributes to these cases a conception according to which even around real potential one must not take unreasonable steps before the process is actually realized, and sharpens the distinction between a “false messiah” as a false claim made by a person and a “messianic movement” as improper public conduct even without deliberate falsehood.
Implications for Religious Zionism and for metaphysical considerations versus realpolitik
The text states that the criteria for a messianic movement have implications for judging Religious Zionism, because it contains an element of acting to bring redemption alongside integration into a broader national project. It presents the claim that one can attribute to Zionism and to the state halakhic irregularities by the very fact of sovereignty that enables Sabbath desecration, immodesty, recognition of Christianity, a judicial system not based on Torah, and recourse to secular courts, and admits that these claims cannot simply be dismissed out of hand even if he himself tends not to accept them. He presents a personal position according to which an effective legal system is necessary in a society that does not accept the authority of Torah judges, and connects this to the idea of “courts in Syria” and to the strategic decision not to go in the direction of “separation of communities,” while mentioning Rabbi Samson Raphael Hirsch, the Ketav Sofer, the Netziv, and a discussion among halakhic decisors on the subject.
He describes the dispute between Haredi thinking and Religious Zionist thinking around the question whether it is permissible to factor promises of redemption and metaphysical considerations into security and policy decisions, and presents the Haredi position as emphasizing human effort and realistic considerations without inserting “the Holy One, blessed be He, will help” into the calculation itself. He illustrates this with anecdotes about human effort, with the “lottery ticket” story, and with the story of Mushke and the landowner as a metaphor for the way political-practical assistance is perceived by them as a tool of providence. He formulates the “messianic movement” as a mode of conduct that mixes metaphysics into practical decisions, and cites the story about Rabbi Herzog and the rabbi of Brisk during the War of Independence regarding the tradition that “the Third Temple will not be destroyed” versus the principle that “when they shoot, you run away.” He compares this to criticism of Nachmanides in his explanation that Joseph did not inform Jacob in order that “the dreams would be fulfilled,” and argues that there is a position according to which even if metaphysical considerations are correct, they should not be taken into account in moral, halakhic, and realistic decision-making.
Historical ambiguity and the danger of error in real time
The text states that diagnosing messianic movements is difficult in real time, and that throughout history great Torah figures were drawn after movements that in retrospect turned out to be mistakes. It argues that one cannot rule out the possibility that even in the present people are living inside an error that does not appear that way from within, and cites in the name of Rabbi Kalner a statement he heard according to which if the state is destroyed he will “take off the kippah,” as a position that puts the messianic interpretation to an empirical test.
False messiahs and their opponents: Hamburger and the assumption of a possible resemblance to Zionism
The text mentions Hamburger from Bnei Brak and his work on Ashkenazic customs, and presents him as a serious scholar but one with an obsession for reconstructing customs. It notes that Hamburger wrote a book called False Messiahs and Their Opponents, which is the most comprehensive work on the phenomenon that he knows of, but describes it as tendentious in its aim of portraying Herzl and Zionism as false messianism. He argues that even if the agenda is obvious, it is not right to dismiss the book as nonsense, and that one can see from it that comparing historical characteristics to the Zionist movement is not “far-fetched” and requires discussion.
Christianity as a precedent: Jesus, passages, Maimonides, and an outcome-based criterion
The text presents Christianity as a central phenomenon of early false messianism and emphasizes that at its beginning it adopted the Hebrew Bible (Tanakh) as the “Old Testament.” It notes a scholarly claim, and also rabbinic writing, that Jesus was a Pharisee and committed to Jewish law, and that it is not clear that he saw himself as the Messiah, but that the messianic myth was built around him only afterward. It quotes Rabbi Yehudah Aryeh of Modena in the book Magen VaCherev as describing Jesus as admitting even the Oral Torah and saying, “I did not come to change the Torah but to fulfill the Torah,” and “Heaven and earth may pass away, but one word of the Torah will not pass away,” and concludes that a messianic figure can begin with the appearance of strengthening Torah, and therefore it is hard to diagnose in real time.
He quotes Maimonides describing Jesus as one “who imagined that he would be the Messiah and was executed by a religious court,” and connects this to the prophecy of Daniel, and emphasizes Maimonides’ claim that the great stumbling block is the historical result in which the movement caused Israel to perish by the sword, scattered their remnant, humiliated them, replaced the Torah, and misled most of the world into serving a god other than the Lord. He points out that this is an outcome-based criterion in retrospect that is hard to use in real time, and adds that the phenomenon of wonders appeared around Jesus as his disciples described, and it recurs among other messiahs too, even though according to Maimonides it is not a criterion.
Maimonides against signs and wonders, and the implications for later figures
The text concludes with a quotation from Maimonides: “Do not let it enter your mind that the King Messiah must perform signs and wonders, innovate things in the world, or revive the dead,” and explains that Maimonides writes this against those who tied messianism to miracles. He connects this to Maimonides’ approach in Laws of Idolatry and in the Guide for the Perplexed, where divination and sorcery are treated as “sleight of hand” and not as real powers, and therefore wonders are not merely a non-criterion but are even suspect as a violation of “You shall be wholehearted with the Lord your God.” He notes a dispute among the medieval authorities (Rishonim), some of whom held that there are powers from the “other side,” and therefore wonders are possible but forbidden, and concludes with an example about the Lubavitcher Rebbe and the relationship between leadership and followers in a messianic context through the story of Dr. Ephraim Shach and Rabbi Shach’s reply.
Full Transcript
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] About belief in the coming of the Messiah, about the problem with calculating the end, about the question whether this is a task incumbent upon us, Or HaChayim and Rashi, or whether it’s the Temple that will descend from heaven—where I think the Temple here is some kind of symbol, and not really a discussion about it itself, but rather the question of how, and upon whom, the messianic mission is imposed in general. In the end I finished with two types of messianism: one is the original meaning and the other is a borrowed concept, a borrowed meaning. Messianism in the original sense is messianism in the religious, eschatological sense, as they call it. And messianism in the borrowed sense is some kind of movements for repairing the world, which are part of the essence of the modern, modernist world—movements that want to change the world, like communism. And I said that I don’t think you can speak of false messianism in the sense that anything that repairs the world is false messianism. Meaning, nobody will see the desire to repair the world as something illegitimate or as a task that is not incumbent upon us; that sounds unreasonable. Even though there are certain aspects of the desire to repair the world that maybe can lead to problematic things. Whether we call that false messianism or not—we saw communism and various movements that believe with excessive fanaticism in a model of the repaired world toward which they are striving. And then of course that can lead to problematic conduct, to violence, to suppressing other ideas or other activities. But that’s already a somewhat remote connection to the question of false messianism; I don’t think that’s usually what people meant. Meaning, not this kind of problem, even though it may indeed reflect a common point between false messianism and these problems of messianism in quotation marks, and that’s a certain kind of unwillingness to criticize the process, to relate to it critically. And that does characterize both messianic movements and secular, ideological messianism—say, communism. In both cases a feeling develops that we have some absolute truth in our hands, and therefore we’re unwilling, first, to hear anything else, and second, to give legitimacy to anything else. And of course if you go one step further, then you also suppress whoever is different—or kill him, in extreme cases. So the phenomena are not identical, but they have shared roots, similar roots. Meaning, there is something in this unwillingness toward intellectual criticism that I think is also part of the problem of false messianism. We’ll still see that later on. Another remark before I just summarize the opening: Maimonides, Laws of Kings, writes as follows in chapter 11, law 4: “If a king shall arise from the house of David, immersed in Torah and occupied with the commandments like David his ancestor, according to the Written Torah and the Oral Torah, and he compels all Israel to walk in it and strengthen its observance, and fights the wars of God, he is presumed to be the Messiah.” Chabad made a lot of tsimmes out of this—there’s a messiah and there’s someone presumed to be the Messiah, all kinds of fine distinctions in Maimonides. “If he did this and succeeded, and defeated all the nations around him, and built the Temple in its place, and gathered the dispersed of Israel, then he is definitely the Messiah. But if he did not succeed until now, or was killed, then it is known that he is not the one promised by the Torah, and he is like all the proper, complete kings of the house of David who died. And the Holy One, blessed be He, only caused him to arise in order to test many through him, as it is said: ‘And some of those with understanding shall stumble, to refine among them, and to purify, and to whiten, until the time of the end, for it is yet for the appointed time.’” Meaning, in Maimonides here it seems there really is a mechanism of a potential messiah—what he calls someone presumed to be the Messiah—even if in the end he did not succeed. Why didn’t he succeed in the end? So I already mentioned the explanation that the generation was not worthy—a common explanation in many contexts, including the Chabad context. But here Maimonides says something a little different: “the Holy One, blessed be He, only caused him to arise in order to test many through him.” So that’s a little interesting. Meaning, what—the Holy One, blessed be He, created this messianism, or this false messianism, whatever we want to call this whole phenomenon—and for what purpose did He do it? Maimonides doesn’t say here that it’s because the generation was not worthy,
[Speaker C] On the contrary, he says to test.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So there’s someone from the house of David, right? He gathers the dispersed of Israel, he keeps the commandments, he does everything he’s supposed to do, he has lineage, yes, all the way back to King David. Like in our family, as I told you, soon I’ll reveal myself—for now I’m just telling you. In our family it’s Shlomo David, Shlomo David, every generation, and my grandmother used to say it was from King David. She said it was from King David. Okay, anyway—so what am I supposed to do with someone like that? Fine, so he’s the messiah, I join him. What is the test I’m supposed to pass or fail? It’s a bit strange, this thing. Meaning, what, am I nevertheless supposed not to join him? Why not? He’s from the house of David, he keeps the commandments, he does what he’s supposed to do—so what’s the problem? He’s presumed to be the Messiah; Maimonides himself calls him presumed to be the Messiah, even before he succeeds. If he succeeds then it turns out he really is the Messiah, and if not then not—but he is presumed to be the Messiah. So what is the test? What does it mean, to test Israel? I don’t know, I don’t understand what Maimonides is writing here.
[Speaker B] To test Israel whether they will be worthy, whether they will be worthy—whether the generation… after all, what does it mean not to test Israel?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What? Not to test Israel—to redeem Israel. Only if they are not worthy it won’t succeed. To test—ten tests the Holy One, blessed be He, tested Abraham with. “Test” means something like a false prophet who is sent to test us, and if we believe him then we are sinners, and if we don’t do what we are supposed to do then we won’t believe him.
[Speaker B] Why? To test—suppose someone worthy like this one comes, and Israel keeps two Sabbaths, say, as people say, okay? But if such a worthy person comes and Israel does not keep two Sabbaths, then we tested you and you didn’t succeed in keeping two Sabbaths. The messiah was a messiah, the king was worthy—you were not worthy. I tested you and you didn’t succeed.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s not the simple plain meaning of the word test. You may be right, because I don’t have a better interpretation. Test—yes, maybe you’re right. To test Israel, I understand that to mean…
[Speaker E] He brings you someone who has messiah-potential, okay, and now it depends only on you.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] A test in the sense of whether you’ll repent?
[Speaker E] Yes. Now it depends on you, and if you fail then you didn’t
[Speaker D] stand
[Speaker E] the test.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But then standing the test here is not actually joining the messiah, but observing the commandments—just ordinary observance of the commandments. Basically we’re saying to observe the commandments and keep the Sabbaths even without the messiah having come. Meaning, it’s not…
[Speaker D] Yes, but
[Speaker E] now
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] it only sharpens the issue.
[Speaker E] You have a messiah—here, now this is
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] a special opportunity to observe the commandments, and you
[Speaker E] don’t take advantage of it.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Maybe. I don’t know. I don’t have…
[Speaker D] In the sense that no matter how much this king succeeds and seems to be getting along—notice, you always have to look at it that way, with some kind of preserving the doubt. A critical view. Yes, even toward him you need a critical view until he succeeds in this and this and this—keep the critical view.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Meaning, basically you have to wait for success in order to declare him the messiah?
[Speaker B] No, Maimonides tells you he is presumed to be King Messiah.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, and Yossi is saying it could be that even when he is presumed, we still need to keep that same attitude of treating it as a doubt. Yes. So those are two interpretations, but both are possible.
[Speaker B] Yes, but he says—he brings the verse about “those with understanding,” meaning he’s fine; it’s not that he wasn’t okay according to the verse Maimonides brings.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] He was okay, but that still doesn’t mean he’s the Messiah. And the moment you already decide that he’s the Messiah and you take steps, say—
[Speaker B] Potentially. After all, everyone—even Hezekiah, King Hezekiah, was a potential one. Yes, he was fit to be the Messiah. It’s not as if they said to Hezekiah, “Wait, Hezekiah, if you had done this or that then you would have been the Messiah.” But you weren’t—the generation didn’t…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] keep two Sabbaths.
[Speaker B] No, that’s just an example.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, but I’m saying Yossi’s interpretation is also possible. Again, none of this is written explicitly in Maimonides, so I don’t know—I don’t have a clear interpretation of Maimonides’ words here. But it may be that the meaning is: he is presumed to be the Messiah, but you still have to maintain some critical perspective. Meaning, as long as you don’t see that the thing is really being realized, you can’t truly decide that he’s the Messiah—I don’t know—and take all kinds of steps, as we’ll see later, improper steps. Unrealistic steps—I already mentioned this—unrealistic steps, or doing things that you should do only once you really know.
[Speaker E] But the concept, the term “to test”—what is it? Why is it relevant?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If that’s the test—to test whether you go after him or don’t go after him.
[Speaker B] After all, it’s a test for the people of Israel, not for the King Messiah.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Of course, for the people of Israel. You’re forbidden to go after him even though he is presumed to be the Messiah, until it becomes clear that he is the Messiah. Presumed Messiah is not enough. He is a potential messiah, but keep a critical way of thinking. Look, it may be that it’s not so simple. Meaning, I don’t know—I’m saying, I hear both directions, I don’t have an explanation of my own, so two have been raised here. So I’m willing to hear both.
[Speaker B] Take the example of Hezekiah. Someone who held until the day of his death that Hezekiah was fit to be the Messiah—yes, he was fit.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What did he do with that belief? Did he sell his property and start flying through the air to get to the Land of Israel?
[Speaker B] They were already in the Land of Israel. No—what’s your claim, that he was mistaken? The Talmud says he was not mistaken, that Hezekiah was worthy to be King Messiah, but the generation was not fit.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay, fine. So what does that prove?
[Speaker B] No, what it proves is that there is a possibility that there can be King Messiah. King Messiah is not just one person. It could be that there are several potential ones throughout the generations
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] who are not realized.
[Speaker B] And why are they not realized?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Two possibilities. Either because the generation was not worthy, or because that simply was not the plan of the Holy One, blessed be He. He brought it about as a test, and that wasn’t His plan. Fine—but what does “to test” mean? “To test” means: don’t create a messianic movement. That’s what it means to test. Meaning, a messianic movement is following someone who seems to you to be the Messiah without really checking through to the end that he is the Messiah; it’s enough for you that he is presumed to be the Messiah. That’s what Yossi is suggesting. I’m saying I don’t reject your interpretation; I’m only saying this is also a possible interpretation. Now this continues, because Maimonides writes in that same law—later in the same law there is a censored passage, though in Frankel it already appears. He says: “But the thoughts of the Creator of the world are beyond the power of man to grasp, for our ways are not His ways, and our thoughts are not His thoughts. And all these matters of Jesus the Christian and that Ishmaelite who arose after him are only to straighten the way for the King Messiah and to repair the whole world to serve God together, as it is said: ‘For then I will turn to the peoples a clear language, that they may all call upon the name of the Lord and serve Him with one accord.’ How so? The whole world has already been filled with talk of the Messiah, and with words of Torah, and with words of the commandments, and these matters have spread to distant islands.” The Hebrew Bible (Tanakh), basically, spread through Islam and Christianity, and among many uncircumcised nations. “And they discuss these matters and the commandments of the Torah. Some say: these commandments were true, but they have already been nullified in this time and were not intended for all generations. And others say: there are hidden meanings in them and they are not to be taken literally—they’re some kind of allegory, it was not really intended that we should do this. And the messiah has already come and revealed their hidden meanings. But when the true King Messiah arises and succeeds and is exalted and uplifted, immediately they will all return and know that their fathers inherited falsehood, and that their prophets and fathers misled them.” So in the continuation of that same law, Maimonides connects Islam and Christianity to the phenomenon of false messianism as well. He is basically saying that this too is actually an act of the Holy One, blessed be He, like what he said above. It’s an act of the Holy One, blessed be He; it’s not just somebody’s evil inclination. You might have thought this is a sinful person with some evil inclination who generates such a problematic movement. Maimonides writes: no, this is an act of the Holy One, blessed be He. Above he writes that it is in order to test us, according to one of the two interpretations you suggested, and here he speaks about Jesus and Muhammad and basically says that they too are acts of the Holy One, blessed be He, in order to pave the way for the King Messiah. What does that mean? They spread the Torah and the idea that there are commandments and that there is God. And the fact is that this really did spread throughout the world—something the Jews did not succeed in doing on their own, but only through Jesus and Muhammad. And then he says: true, they distorted it and in the end said that it’s basically not relevant, or that it’s allegorical, or not for all generations, or all kinds of things like that. But they prepared the ground in such a way that when the true Messiah comes and everyone understands that this really is the true thing, it will fall on fertile ground. Meaning, they will understand that in fact their fathers inherited falsehood and they will join this process. Now what is this? Is it a continuation of the previous description? If it is a continuation of the previous description, then basically this is some act of the Holy One, blessed be He. The Holy One, blessed be He, brings about this thing in order to achieve certain goals He wants to achieve through Jesus and Muhammad. How does that connect to what we saw above in that same law? Meaning, with that king from the house of David who in the end did not succeed, or was killed, or something like that. There too—is it coming to achieve something? That’s the point. If it’s coming to achieve something, then it’s a little similar to what you said: that it’s coming to achieve our repentance. It didn’t work, fine, but it’s some kind of test from the Holy One, blessed be He. Maybe that supports a bit the quotation you quoted earlier; I don’t know. In any case, here in this law Maimonides is already touching on the issue of false messianism, or at least messiah-ish-ness. I don’t know whether the first one is called a false messiah or not, because he is presumed to be the Messiah and in the end he didn’t succeed for one reason or another. According to Yossi’s interpretation, he’s a false messiah. According to your interpretation, he’s not a false messiah; on the contrary, we were not worthy—an unrealized messiah, exactly, a potential messiah. Jesus and Muhammad probably are false prophets and false messiahs, but still with some positive purpose. Meaning, it’s not just some evil inclination and that’s it. Regarding a false prophet, for example, there’s room to hesitate a bit. I don’t recall at the moment a formulation of Maimonides—maybe there is one, I just don’t remember—whether the Holy One, blessed be He, also raises them up, false prophets, in order to test us. Or not. Maybe a false prophet is the initiative of the person himself, who sins and has an evil inclination and presents himself as a false prophet. True, it is a test for us, but it’s not necessarily an act of the Holy One, blessed be He. I don’t know—we’d have to look and see whether Maimonides has some statement about false prophets. Okay. In any case, what Maimonides is talking about at the beginning of the law is a king from the house of David who does not deviate from Torah and commandments—on the contrary, he strengthens the Written Torah and the Oral Torah and fights the wars of God and things of that sort. These are not the false prophets, not the classic false messiahs. The classic false messiahs, as we’ll see later, are people who deviated from the path to some extent or other—I’ll sketch the possibilities in a moment—but nevertheless deviated from the path. Here Maimonides describes someone who is completely fine in terms of his conduct; on the contrary, he even has some presumption of being the Messiah. So what about someone who really is a false messiah? Maimonides doesn’t address that phenomenon here. Here, someone who is entirely a false messiah, or really going in a different direction entirely—then of course there is nothing to discuss. Meaning, he is talking here about someone who strengthens the repair of Torah observance and fights the wars of God—
[Speaker D] And he’s from the house of David.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And he fulfills all the conditions, and even he… fine. So the question is which of the two interpretations we adopt here. But someone who doesn’t even do that—then obviously this is false messianism and there’s nothing to talk about, except for Jesus and Muhammad. Okay. Now this really brings us to the question: so what exactly is false messianism? It seems to me that we can suggest three possibilities—the third will itself be divided—in order to characterize this phenomenon of false messianism. First possibility: Leibowitz and Ben-Gurion—that a messiah, by definition, is a false messiah. A messiah who arrives, a messiah who acts, is a false messiah. Meaning, messiah must always remain some idea that is supposed to motivate us, but not something concrete. But we said that does not sound like a plausible interpretation in the traditional context. A less extreme approach, but still quite far-reaching, says that anyone who takes practical action to bring the Messiah is a kind of false messianism or a messianic movement. Again, false messianism is too strong a phrase. False messianism means there is some messiah here presenting himself and it’s not true. I’m talking right now about a messianic movement in quotation marks. Meaning, that too has acquired a kind of negative connotation over the generations, “messianic movement,” and I’m trying to characterize what gives rise to that negative connotation. So I’m saying it could be that the very practical actions taken to bring the Messiah are what’s called a messianic movement. And this is something we are not supposed to do, and that of course brings us back to Or HaChayim and to Rashi there—the question whether bringing the Messiah is a task incumbent upon us, or whether we are supposed to wait for him, but not to be involved in the process. Again, that’s an extreme approach. I’m presenting it as a possibility because I don’t know—I don’t know how to decide which definition is correct. So I’m offering the different possibilities, and afterward we’ll try to see what can be extracted from history or from historical attitudes. So again, actions to bring the Messiah—this could mean either political actions to bring the Messiah, meaning concrete actions, not prayers. Or even, I don’t know, practical Kabbalah actions—there were all kinds of those too. Some rebbes even did this for a period; there was once some union of four rebbes, I think, who tried to carry out some acts to bring the Messiah. So it could also be mystical activities of one kind or another. That too might perhaps come under the heading of a messianic movement. That’s the second possibility. The third possibility is that it is proper to act—obviously the Messiah is supposed to come, and the Messiah is not just an idea. It is also permitted to take action, or maybe even desirable to take action, to bring him. The question is: which actions? And here, the criterion for a messianic movement is that the actions, or the mode of conduct we choose in order to bring the Messiah—that is the problem. Now what could the problem be according to this third approach? One of three possibilities. First possibility: actions involving a halakhic prohibition. Meaning, you are basically doing things that run against Jewish law. It’s well known about the rabbi of Brisk—well known that he infers from the Talmud in tractate Pesachim, page 43. The Talmud there says that the Messiah will not come on the Sabbath or on a Jewish holiday because he has to come from above, and there are travel limits—there are travel limits even above ten handbreadths—and he will not violate the prohibition of travel limits. So the rabbi of Brisk asks: what, a prohibition of travel limits? All of Israel is waiting for redemption, all our troubles, all these things—and okay, so there’s a prohibition of travel limits? The question whether travel limits are Torah-level or rabbinic—but the rabbi of Brisk infers from here that the Messiah will not come even if there is only a rabbinic prohibition involved. Meaning, in short, bringing the Messiah cannot involve any prohibition. Even though on a purely halakhic level one could have said there is room to commit halakhic prohibitions in order to save the Jewish people—there’s no greater emergency than that. A rabbinic prohibition in a pressing situation, or in a case of great need, or in a case of major loss, is at times set aside. Meaning, the point is, there is apparently some principled point here: redemption cannot come in a way that contradicts Jewish law. It’s not a question of contradiction, not a question of a halakhic problem—it’s—
[Speaker E] It’s not a question of priorities.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes. But I’m saying, this isn’t a problem of halakhic override—whether a rabbinic prohibition is overridden or not overridden; that’s not the point. This is probably some conception that says that messianism cannot exist—meaning, repairing the world cannot come by way of corruption.
[Speaker E] Meaning, with messianism—we have the Jewish law that impurity is permitted in the community, so why specifically look for a flask of pure oil?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What? Again?
[Speaker E] We have the Jewish law that impurity is permitted in the community, so why specifically look for a flask of pure oil? So people say that the Holy One, blessed be He, wanted redemption to come in a smooth way and not in the sense of…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay, yes, but there are already all kinds of answers to that—
[Speaker C] There are messiah-damages, as if—some ordered thing that says…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no, no. If there were, our lives would be easy.
[Speaker C] How are we going to diagnose what actions he is supposed to do?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So that’s the law in Maimonides I brought earlier; it’s a general
[Speaker C] reference.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, right. He strengthens Torah observance, fights the wars of God, unites Israel to keep Torah and commandments—
[Speaker C] That’s only presumed status.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, he is presumed to be the Messiah. And then according to your view, Yossi, you have to wait and see that it is really realized. Okay?
[Speaker C] And with today’s factionalism, I don’t really see that happening.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Fine, that’s a different discussion. Look, there was always factionalism. I don’t need—“Do not say that the former days were better than these,” that’s already written in the verse. What?
[Speaker E] He didn’t come then either. When? Even then he didn’t come when there was factionalism.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, no, I’m saying, fine, factionalism is always there. If you wait until there’s no factionalism and only then the Messiah comes, it seems to me that… I don’t see how he’s ever going to arrive. Fine. So the first possibility is that we’re talking about halakhic prohibitions. And halakhic prohibitions can of course reach an extreme level, like Shabbetai Tzvi—soon we’ll get to examples where he actually converted to Islam, he completely leaves the Jewish and halakhic framework. But I’m saying that even without that, there can be local halakhic prohibitions: desecrating the Sabbath, or I don’t know, various more local things. That’s one possibility within, one shade within the third possibility, yes—that the mode of conduct defines the messianic movement, in quotation marks. Yes, I’m now distinguishing between a messianic movement without quotation marks—which according to this possibility is legitimate, it’s permitted to act and maybe even desirable to take actions that will advance the coming of the Messiah—and a messianic movement in quotation marks, which is what we usually see as something negative. Okay? So the first possibility: why is it negative? Because it involves transgressions, halakhic prohibitions. The second possibility is that we’re talking about actions that are not accepted in the tradition. Meaning, some deviation from the accepted mode of conduct. It’s not actual prohibitions, but it’s something out of the ordinary. For example, there are often references to the Zionist movement, and then people say that Religious Zionism is accused of cooperating with heretics and secular Jews, and redemption cannot possibly come through such people. There were such claims; even Rabbi Shach wrote this somewhere, there are all kinds of claims like that. Now, some people want to say this too is a halakhic prohibition, but I don’t see what the halakhic prohibition is here. I’m cooperating with heretics and secular Jews, but I myself can still observe all of Jewish law, so it doesn’t necessarily involve halakhic prohibitions. There’s some claim that it’s just not done—that is, it cannot be. So you didn’t violate a halakhic prohibition, but redemption cannot come in such a way. And that’s not the reasonable path, from the standpoint of our tradition, for bringing the Messiah. Or, as is known, that one should not force the end and should not rebel against the nations. Is there a prohibition against forcing the end and rebelling against the nations? The Three Oaths, yes, in Ketubot: the Holy One, blessed be He, adjured Israel with three oaths. There is no such prohibition. Rather, what is there? We have received by tradition that this is not how one acts. One does not rebel against the nations, one does not force the end—some kind of ‘it’s just not done,’ as I said. But tradition says that this is not the accepted form of conduct. And with him this turns into a prohibition?
[Speaker E] What? The oaths themselves are not a prohibition?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What prohibition would that be?
[Speaker E] The Three Oaths. What is an oath?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What about ‘It is not in heaven’? When exactly were we sworn to this? At Mount Sinai they made us swear this? Where is this counted by Maimonides? It isn’t counted by any enumerator of the commandments. There’s some kind of statement: the Holy One, blessed be He, adjured Israel with three oaths. What exactly does that mean?
[Speaker B] They relate to it as a prohibition, the Satmar people and so on.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The Satmar people relate to many things in all sorts of ways; that proves nothing. Vayoel Moshe is a ridiculous book. I mean, fine, he’s a Torah scholar, he knows a lot, Rabbi Yoilish, but the book is ridiculous—the tendentiousness of it is laughable. He takes every midrash and builds all sorts of little inferences out of it, and there’s no real source for what he’s saying; you can see that the book isn’t serious. So yes, of course he also takes the Three Oaths—that may be the least novel part; that interpretation of the Three Oaths you can at least hear out. All the rest is nonsense. Well, not all the rest; a lot of the rest is nonsense. So I’m saying: but even the Three Oaths—you still see in it some kind of guideline. Still, it’s not a prohibition or a sharp criterion. But still, it is written in the Talmud, so there is some kind of guidance here. What is that guidance? That guidance says: look, there is some normal way in which redemption is supposed to come. This is not about prohibition and permission. But when something doesn’t go by the accepted path, the old Jewish people, then it probably isn’t supposed to be. So that too could be defined as a messianic movement. These are all just suggestions; I’m offering suggestions. A third possibility, which is perhaps related to the second, is actions that have no realistic justification. Which is of course maybe a subsection of the previous one, like ‘they should not rebel against the nations’ and so on—not only because this is not our accepted tradition, but because it simply is not logical to act that way. It’s not logical to act that way. Now you’ll say to me: what do you mean? The Messiah is here, don’t worry, the Holy One, blessed be He, is with us, so we’ll go to world war against the United States. Fine? They have nuclear weapons and all the capabilities, and of course we have no realistic chance whatsoever, but the Messiah is with us and the Holy One, blessed be He, is with us, and we’ll go to war against the United States and Russia together too, if you want. What?
[Speaker D] Have you seen the movie The Mouse That Roared? No.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay. In any case, yes—‘who makes dust like me and you,’ the mouse and the elephant are walking together, and ‘look how much dust we’re making,’ says the mouse to the elephant. Meaning: I’m saying, once you take actions that are unrealistic, you are acting forcefully in a way that is not justified on the realistic level—and again, with no violation of anything, no prohibitions, nothing—that itself is perceived as a messianic movement. There are clear sources that see it that way; that is, the Haredi attitude toward the Zionist movement was in part like this. Part of their diagnosis of why they saw it as some kind of false messianism was this: that they rebelled against the nations and in effect did forceful things that were not really justified by realistic political considerations, and therefore this was a messianic movement. That was essentially the claim. Or when you take excessive risks, exaggerated risks. You sell all your property in order to go up to the Land of Israel when really it isn’t logical; you sell it at a low price or in some way such that if it doesn’t happen, you’re in trouble. All kinds of things like that. It’s not necessarily rebelling against the nations; rebellion against the nations is just an example. There were periods when some messianic movement spread, and the public sold off its property—and as you know, when you sell property in such a way, of course you get a low price, right? There’s high supply and low demand, so you get a low price. But what do you care? The Messiah is coming, you no longer need money, you don’t need anything. That’s an unrealistic action, even though it’s not provoking the nations and not entering into security risks, but it is entering into economic risks, irrational considerations. So in that sense too—by the way, in the book Knesset HaGedolah, I think; we’ll see this later—he describes that his father sold the brick oven from which he made his living because he understood that they were going to the Land of Israel, I think in the time of Lamlai or something like that. Meaning, these are very widespread phenomena, and there are documented cases of people who did this. And by the way there are stories—I once mentioned this—I heard of three such stories. The documented story, which I looked up online, is about Rabbi Yaakov Gesundhayt of Warsaw, where such a rumor spread and people began selling their property and packing up their belongings, and then he stood in the synagogue and swore that the Messiah would not come that year, or I don’t know, during a certain period. That’s pretty far-reaching, because what he meant was that he was decreeing upon the Holy One, blessed be He, not to bring the Messiah even if He had planned to—because he understood there was some sort of problem here. That is, he saw conduct that was unrealistic because of the rumor of the Messiah, and he said: this cannot be, this cannot be the Messiah. And therefore he swore that the Messiah would not come. There are several more stories like that. I heard such a story also about Rabbi Shmuel Salant in Jerusalem—that was, I told you about Shulamit Lapid there, in Like a Broken Vessel, her book, where she describes the mass conversion to Christianity that took place in Jerusalem, and that was historical in the old yishuv in Jerusalem. Among the major Haredi figures of the old yishuv, many people converted there because of that kind of messianic collapse—there was a rumor that the Messiah was coming, there was of course great distress and they were waiting for him, and in the end he didn’t come. So Rabbi Shmuel Salant there swore that the Messiah would not come in the coming year. Someone once told me a similar story about Rabbi Aharon Kotler; I don’t know, I didn’t find documentation for that. And there was someone else, I no longer remember—I also heard perhaps a story about the Tzemach Tzedek, I think, that there was some such story too. The Tzemach Tzedek is from Chabad, which makes it even more interesting. But there too I think there was some story like this. What I’m saying is that the common denominator in all these stories is that those rabbis decided that this Messiah was not the Messiah because the conduct was unrealistic. Meaning, the diagnosis of a messianic movement is this third diagnosis I mentioned here: when you do something that makes no sense from ordinary rational, economic, or general considerations.
[Speaker E] But if the Messiah really had been true, wouldn’t it have been okay to do that? What? Even if the Messiah were true, it still wouldn’t be okay?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Apparently not. After all, you’re supposed to do things in a certain way. I mean, you know, we won’t know until—as Maimonides writes—we won’t know until we’re there. But yes, their assessment was that one does not do things like that; that’s just not how it works.
[Speaker E] That they thought there was such a high chance that the Messiah would come, and therefore they
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] did it. Even if—he says—I’m saying, when you do something, let’s say I go back to the interpretation Yossi suggested earlier in Maimonides. Basically he says: there is someone who has the presumption of being the Messiah; he is already king, he gathers in the dispersed of Israel, fights the wars of God, restores religion to its proper state, and all sorts of things of that kind—and still, as long as you haven’t seen that he is truly the Messiah, don’t take irrational steps. It may be that once it is already clear that yes, maybe yes, I don’t know. When we get there, then maybe we’ll understand it; I don’t know.
[Speaker E] No, but maybe the fact that they swore the Messiah wouldn’t come was because even though they thought there was a chance he would come, nothing had changed except that if you tell people now that the Messiah won’t come, they wanted to prevent that situation.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But if it’s really the Messiah, then what do you mean, you swear that the Messiah won’t come? But what if it really is the Messiah?
[Speaker E] I don’t know if it would happen—they didn’t see it, they didn’t think it was—why are you swearing?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Can you swear about something you aren’t sure of?
[Speaker E] So that people won’t sell—so that people will sell all their assets, I mean they—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] They deliberately took a false oath in order to keep people from getting into trouble?
[Speaker E] It’s a symptom of a false
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Messiah—how else would you do it? I assume that’s part of the issue. That is, once you take unrealistic steps when it still isn’t clear that this is the Messiah, what does that have to do with the Messiah? No, no—that’s why I say, I’m talking about a messianic movement, not a false messiah.
[Speaker E] There is
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] a difference. That’s why I made the distinction earlier between a false messiah and a messianic movement. A false messiah means that someone comes and declares himself the Messiah even though he is lying to us; he is not the Messiah at all, he’s just fooling us. A messianic movement is not that. A messianic movement could perhaps even arise around a messiah who genuinely has the potential to be the Messiah. And still, there are forms of conduct in which we are not allowed to behave this way. Meaning, as long as it is not clear to you that this is already the real thing, you must behave rationally. Yes?
[Speaker E] They swore about the messiah, not about whether this messianic movement was not a real messianic movement.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No. Once there is a messianic movement, then they swore that this messiah would not come to fruition. Because a messianic movement is a mode of conduct that will not allow the Messiah to come, because you are behaving incorrectly. A messianic movement is incorrect messianic behavior. Now that does not mean that the messiah in question was necessarily a false messiah; I don’t know, not necessarily. They are only saying that in the end he will not turn out to be the Messiah—that it will not be realized in the end, like Hezekiah. It could be a true messiah, but it won’t be realized. Why? Because that mode of conduct will not allow it. Suppose the true Messiah comes, and now the Jewish people violate some rabbinic prohibition about travel limits or something like that. What the Brisker Rav was essentially saying there is that even if this is the true Messiah, in the end it won’t happen. Because redemption cannot come in such a way.
[Speaker E] The Brisker Rav said that about the Messiah, so he thinks that it’s… I understand.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right. And that’s why I shift the issue from the question of the false messiah to the question of the messianic movement.
[Speaker E] Are you sure that’s really so?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, nothing is certain. I’m offering suggestions here. But I’m saying that I’m trying to diagnose, in light of attitudes that existed in the past, how people saw this thing called a messianic movement. That is, they saw a messianic movement as something involving actions that are irrational. What does that mean? Does that mean the messiah himself was also really a false messiah, or not? I don’t know. Maybe yes, maybe no. As you say, it’s entirely possible that the messiah himself who was there may have had real potential, but they said: this is a messianic movement, it cannot happen, it will not be realized. And then you suggested an explanation that perhaps you can’t even learn from what they did. It could even be that it would have been realized, but they preferred to swear falsely, as long as the Jewish people would not get into trouble on the chance that it would not be realized. Maybe, I don’t know. The question is whether one says to a person: sin so that your fellow may benefit. A small sin and a great sin—there is Tosafot in tractate Shabbat on page 3 there, with removing bread from the oven. There is room here to deliberate whether one says to a person: sin so that your fellow may benefit. In other words, you swear falsely—which is a prohibition—in order to save people.
[Speaker E] That they behaved in a way that breaks the prohibition, and precisely… the claim is that there…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, the claim is that there really was an oath there, and that is what convinced people. Meaning: I swear, that’s it, I stand behind it, no stories. At least that is the claim; I don’t know, I don’t have solid evidence for it. Okay, all of this of course bears on the question of the Zionist movement or Religious Zionism. Yes, the question of what the criterion is for a messianic movement will project onto the question of how we judge the events we are living through. So the very activity of bringing the Messiah is certainly present here. That is, whoever sees such a thing as a messianic movement, then Religious Zionism is a messianic movement in every respect. That’s possibility B. But I’m saying, fine—who said that’s the definition? Possibility C. And I also said earlier that a messianic movement is not necessarily a prohibition, so the whole discussion here is a somewhat amorphous discussion. The third possibility is that the mode of conduct is problematic; here we need to understand. If we are talking about transgressions, then there are people who want to argue that this too exists here. Even the most extreme criterion exists here, and Zionism and Religious Zionism are a messianic movement. Why? Because, for example, look, it isn’t completely baseless. For example, the fact that you establish a state here, and by force of the state’s rule you enforce—I don’t know what—Sabbath desecration, immodest acts, recognition of Christianity, a judicial system that does not operate according to Torah, the law of non-Jewish courts that obligates the whole public to turn to it—you cannot entirely dismiss the claim that there are departures here from Jewish law. And Religious Zionism cooperates with this. It wouldn’t want this to happen, fine, but practically it is part of the matter; it cooperates with it. So I’m saying, in criterion C-1, meaning the improper mode of conduct, where ‘1’ means a halakhic prohibition—even that may exist here. This is not something you can rule out categorically. Again, I phrase myself cautiously because I personally do not tend to think that it does exist. I’m saying: you cannot dismiss these claims out of hand, but if you ask me, I do not tend to think that it exists. Why? Because regarding the prohibition of going to non-Jewish courts, for example, in my opinion the king’s law… yes, no, beyond the king’s law—the king’s law, fine—but still, almost all the rabbis of Religious Zionism also say that going to civil court is still a matter of non-Jewish courts, despite the king’s law. Personally I disagree with them on this, because I think there is no choice. There has to be an effective judicial system. It is impossible for us to be such purists and forbid access to the courts when we really have no other way to run society effectively. There must be some judicial system accepted by the public; there’s no help for it. That is the basis of non-Jewish courts in Syria. The basis of non-Jewish courts in Syria is exactly this: if you don’t have suitable Torah scholars, then appoint whoever you do have. Now the problem in our case is that we do have suitable Torah scholars. There are people who are fit to serve as judges and can adjudicate, and they are not appointed. So it isn’t exactly like the case of non-Jewish courts in Syria. But it seems to me that the idea of non-Jewish courts in Syria does apply here, since those people who are fit to judge are not accepted by most of the public. What can you do? It’s very bad, fine—so what shall we do, have a society without an effective legal system? Or separate communities, as Rabbi Samson Raphael Hirsch suggested, or the Ketav Sofer, it doesn’t matter—separation of communities. Okay, we’ll run a community according to Jewish law and appoint suitable judges there, and everyone else can have another society. Strategically, we chose not to separate the communities. Once we chose that, we have no other option; there really has to be a judicial system here. Fine, there really was a major dispute about the separation of communities, involving the Ketav Sofer and Rabbi Samson Raphael Hirsch, and there are responsa of the Netziv on this matter, and responsa of great halakhic decisors who opposed this—including Haredim—who opposed it and said it is not right to separate the communities. There was a dispute about this, and once you do not separate the community, then it seems to me that the law of non-Jewish courts in Syria must apply, even in a place where there are suitable judges—which is always the discussion, they always distinguish between non-Jewish courts in Syria where there are no suitable judges and a place where there are suitable judges. It seems to me that this is an incorrect distinction if you are talking about a community that does not accept the authority of the suitable judges. So what will you do—that there should be no judicial system? You can’t live like that. A society cannot live without a judicial system. That is the basis of ‘the law of the kingdom is law’; that is the basis of non-Jewish courts in Syria. There’s no choice. Therefore, if you ask me, I do not think it is a halakhic transgression to establish here a judicial system foreign to the Torah system. In that sense there is no halakhic transgression here. But I cannot say that someone who argues that is an ignoramus or talking nonsense, because almost all the halakhic decisors say it. That is, I disagree with them, but you can’t say it’s nonsense. So even this criterion. If we go to the more moderate criterion—acting in a way not accepted in our tradition—here too there is room for hesitation, because they created here some movement that came, took the Jewish people, brought it into not-simple risks, came to an unsown land, yes, with not such a high chance of success. Sometimes there was also some kind of provocation toward the population living here, risks, and all sorts of things like that. Fine, one could say that this was still within the reasonable range, not something bizarre—but here too there is room for assessments. And therefore I say: there were those who assessed this as unreasonable action. Here I’ve actually already moved to the third level. The second level is something not in our tradition. It is not in our tradition to do anything. We were used to doing nothing regarding the coming of the Messiah. The moment you do something, it is already against what we were used to, and therefore I moved straight to section C, that is, to the third possibility: unrealistic actions, rebellion against the nations. People talked about these things; yes, the Haredim talk a lot about this matter, that Zionism contains a kind of rebellion against the nations. Against that, people say: what do you mean? There was a vote at the UN, and the UN gave a mandate and did permit it. Okay, there is a not-simple question here. Today we certainly do somewhat rebel against the nations, at least according to how the nations relate to us today, which sounds like a very unfair attitude. Fine. But still, that is what the nations say, so if you are supposed to bow your head and not rebel against the nations, then some people claim that you are still rebelling against the nations.
[Speaker E] Doesn’t the messianic movement have to build on the fact that in the end there will be some messiah who protects it too?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What? I didn’t understand.
[Speaker E] The messianic movement has to build on there being some messiah or something?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] A person, you mean? There will be an actual person?
[Speaker E] Not necessarily right now, but if they are rebelling—if there’s a problem with rebelling against the nations in order to establish a messianic movement, that’s only because we think the Messiah will save us from those nations.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Fine, the Messiah is free-floating, like a daily dream, daily expectation. We’re not talking about secular Zionism. I said secular Zionism is a messianic movement in quotation marks because it is messianism in a national sense, not a religious sense, like communism as a national movement. Fine. But the movement—Religious Zionism has an agenda of bringing the Messiah too, meaning bringing redemption, and they join this wagon or climb onto this wagon when they have an additional aim. The Messiah’s Donkey—that’s the title of Seffi Rachlevsky’s book. They climb onto the wagon of secular Zionism, but their goal is not only national sovereignty and things of that sort; there is also some idea of bringing the Messiah. Therefore, for example, today in the debate over compromises with our neighbors—territorial, diplomatic, security compromises—there are often statements saying: there’s no need to fear, ‘why do you need the trouble that the Merciful One imposes?’ You do what you need to do and the Holy One, blessed be He, will help. What is it that you need to do? To compromise? No—to bring the Messiah. You need to bring redemption. You need to conquer the Land of Israel. So therefore you should not be troubled by such things. So yes, these are statements that incorporate into our considerations the fact that at some point the Messiah will come.
[Speaker E] It’s a promise?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, they are sure that in the end the Messiah will come. And if he doesn’t come by then, in the end he’ll come? Yes, yes, certainly. All the signs of prophecy, the signs prophecy gave—‘And you, mountains of Israel, shall give forth your branches’—all these things, in the end we got here, the signs are being fulfilled, and in the end the Messiah will be here. The end of this process is the Messiah.
[Speaker D] That this is Zionism itself?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Of course, it’s part of the considerations. I’ll say more, and we’ll get to this later. Meaning, beyond the claim that this will happen in the end—which is itself still a question, a metaphysical speculation that it will happen in the end, and about that one could say maybe these are calculations of the end, I don’t know whether that’s a messianic movement; these are end-time calculations. But there are also statements that take this into account in practical considerations of how to behave. Meaning, the question is whether I am willing to take security risks because I know this is what is incumbent upon me and the Messiah is here and the Holy One, blessed be He, is with me and everything will be fine—or whether I need to make the calculation. This is often a dispute, say, between Haredi thinking and Religious Zionist thinking. Haredi thinking says: you are forbidden to make such calculations; you have to make the realistic calculation. Okay, fine, we established the state, we are already here, Zionism succeeded, everything is fine. But still, how do we conduct ourselves? Do we conduct ourselves in a way that says the Holy One, blessed be He, will help, or do we conduct ourselves in a way—yes, somewhat opposite to the agenda? The Haredim say: do not rely on the Holy One, blessed be He, to help. You need to do things that are realistic. And very often they accuse the conduct of the state, and certainly of Religious Zionism or the religious and non-religious right, of being some kind of forceful, unrealistic conduct. And why does the religious right do this? Because the religious right relies on the Holy One, blessed be He, to help it because it needs to bring the Messiah.
[Speaker F] In Haredi public conduct they don’t rely on the Holy One, blessed be He, and in the opposite kind of conduct they do?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Exactly. I’m saying, that’s why I said there is some kind of absurdity here, a sort of reverse-double-reversal, but it’s not exactly that. Because they really do say: you need to make your effort, also on the private level. They don’t actually rely on the Holy One, blessed be He; they just always say ‘with God’s help.’ But they go to the best doctor and pay him as much as they can afford. Meaning, also on the private level they don’t rely on Him, because the agenda behind it is that you have to make the best effort you can, according to realistic, medical or security considerations, depending on the context, both privately and publicly. Along with that, pray and trust that the Holy One, blessed be He, will help—but do not take that into account in your practical calculations. You are not allowed to take it into account. For example, someone who stays home and doesn’t go to the doctor—that doesn’t fit the standard Haredi conception. Though I have known such people. But it does not fit the accepted Haredi conception. There is the idea of effort; you have to do everything you can to make this business succeed. Help the Holy One, blessed be He, yes? Like I think I once mentioned our electronics lecturer, when we were terrified of the electronics exam. It’s not a hard course, but it’s a disorganized course; there aren’t orderly techniques for solving the problems. That was very disturbing, especially to me—I don’t like things that are not systematic. So we were really afraid of the exam, and he said: look, and told us about this Persian fellow who speaks with the Holy One, blessed be He—forgive me if someone here is Persian; yes, they tell these stories about Persians. I don’t think it has any real connection to the traits of that group. But he comes to the Holy One, blessed be He, with complaints about why he never wins the lottery. So the Holy One, blessed be He, says: because in order to win the lottery, you have to buy a ticket. So he told us: friends, fine, I’ll help you, in the role of the Holy One, blessed be He, but you have to buy a ticket—you need to study. So in the Haredi conception I’m describing now, that is exactly what it means: you have to buy a ticket. That is, do the work the way it should be done, with sensible real-political and economic considerations. In the end the Holy One, blessed be He, will help and it will happen. But that does not exempt you from responsibility for realistic considerations. I don’t think you can find such a thing in the Haredi world; on the contrary, they are often accused of being too realistic. The slogans are heavenly—the Holy One, blessed be He, will help, everything is from Him, and ‘my strength and the might of my hand’ is nothing, and so on—but in practice they are entirely ‘my strength and the might of my hand.’ Everything depends on them. They leave nothing to the Holy One, blessed be He. Everything is done by fully down-to-earth effort. I think this is very characteristic of Haredi conduct. So I don’t think there is any dissonance between the private and the public level; they are consistent on both levels. What? Also in livelihood? Also in livelihood, in certain senses and within certain limits. There it really is an exceptional place, where people go and become full-time kollel students and so on, but even there they send members of Knesset to make every effort; they do not leave it to the Holy One, blessed be He, to provide for the kollel students.
[Speaker D] The in-law says, ‘God will help,’ and the father-in-law says, ‘Does he think I’m God?’
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, like the story about Mushke and the landlord—I told this once. The landlord calls Mushke and says to him: you, Mushke, always say that the Holy One, blessed be He, helps you all the time. Let’s see. I’m sending you to the forest, and we’ll see if your Holy One helps you. So poor Mushke goes to the forest. He doesn’t know where help will come from for several weeks, however long, and where he’ll get food, he doesn’t know what to hunt and things like that—those are Gentile matters, not work for a Jew. So he doesn’t know what will happen there. The landlord calls his servant and says: listen, leave him a basket with breakfast, and he’ll think the Holy One, blessed be He, is taking care of him. When he comes back, I’ll explain to him who really took care of him. Still, he liked Mushke, so he didn’t want him to die of hunger. So he left him a little basket with food every morning. Mushke comes back cheerful and glad-hearted to the landlord. You can understand the end of the story. The landlord says: well, Mushke, did your Holy One help you? He says: you won’t believe it, your honor the landlord—every morning there was a basket with food. Unbelievable, I couldn’t believe it, I couldn’t believe it. He calls his servant and says: tell him who really helped him. So he tells him the story, and of course Mushke says: yes, that’s how the Holy One, blessed be He, decided to help me—through you. In the end it has to happen in some realistic way. In any case, that’s the story here, of course. They make the most forceful and sometimes ugliest human efforts in order to ensure that kollel students can make a living. You take a risk when you send many people not to earn a livelihood and you don’t let them study things that prepare them for work, and so on—but you make very, very strong efforts to help them in this matter. So you ask the person: wait, why are you doing all this? The Holy One, blessed be He, will help him, what’s the problem? Right—that’s how He helps. Meaning, the story of Mushke and the landlord is exactly the same thing. In the end, the success of these political efforts is perceived there as the way in which the Holy One, blessed be He, helps us. That’s how they understand it. Someone standing on the other side of the barricade gets a bit annoyed, and it’s exactly the same story as the landlord and Mushke. It’s the same—because when we tell the story about the landlord and Mushke, we all identify with Mushke, because the landlord is an idiot. He didn’t understand that the Holy One, blessed be He, used him to help Mushke. In this case, we are the landlord. ‘We’ meaning the general non-Haredi public, say. We are the landlord, and suddenly Mushke is not so lovable to us. But it is exactly the same claim—that’s the claim, that’s Mushke’s claim. That’s it. Anyway, for our purposes: as I say, these criteria for a messianic movement—their application to our time is not so simple. And if so, we should not be so surprised that throughout history there were various messianic movements surrounded by great ambiguity, and many of the great sages of Israel—actual halakhic decisors and the most prominent rabbis in history in those periods—fell for them, were led astray by those movements, and supported them. Today we know that this was being led astray; they were led astray by those movements and agreed with them. So the diagnoses are very difficult diagnoses. I say this all the time with an eye toward here, because whoever lives inside this reality is completely certain that this is nonsense—what, me, a messianic movement? Obviously not. But that was also true then, and in the end, in retrospect, after history has said what it has said, it becomes clear to us that we lived inside a mistake. So one cannot dismiss out of hand the possibility that the same is true of us—that we think this is not a messianic movement in the negative sense, but a messianic movement in the positive sense without quotation marks, and not a messianic movement in the negative sense—but how do you know? It could turn out otherwise. And I mentioned before, I think, what Rabbi Kalner said—I heard this, I didn’t read it myself—but I heard he said that if the state is destroyed, he will take off his kippah. One of those rabbis from the Merkaz HaRav / Har HaMor world and its offshoots. In a certain sense I actually appreciate his honesty, because he is really willing to put things to an empirical test—not only to declare it and then later invent excuses if it doesn’t work out. Though I assume, as I already said, that if it happened he would also invent excuses. But at least he says it sharply. That is, he is not willing to take into account the possibility that history will in retrospect have its say and it won’t come to fruition. Okay? It reminds me a bit—and maybe it also relates to our discussion—of the famous story, which I told, about Rabbi Herzog and the Brisker Rav. During the War of Independence there were rumors that the Brisker Rav was about to flee Jerusalem. The situation there in Jerusalem was not simple, so Rabbi Herzog was afraid this would demoralize the public, and he went to persuade the Brisker Rav not to go, not to flee. So he said to him: we have a tradition from our rabbis that the Third Temple will not be destroyed. He chose quite a person to say that to. So Rabbi Herzog says to the Brisker Rav: we have a tradition from our rabbis that the Third Temple will not be destroyed. And it’s not clear to me where this came from; it’s not clear to me what exactly the source is for this tradition. Some attribute it to the Chatam Sofer or the Vilna Gaon, I don’t know exactly. I truly don’t know the source of this tradition.
[Speaker G] The professor writes about it in one of his books. What? Rabbi Shabtai writes in one of his books that he looked for the source and didn’t find it.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes. There’s an article about it in Tzohar—I later saw that Harish Bet, I think, wrote an article there about the source of this tradition. But this is a tradition that was invented at some stage; it has no real source. In any case, Rabbi Herzog says this to the Brisker Rav, and the Brisker Rav says to him: and I have a tradition from my father that when people are shooting, you run away. Which I think is a wonderful story, because it shows exactly the two ways of thinking. Rabbi Herzog has a messianic conception. He is basically saying: in real-political terms, I agree with you that this is dangerous and that in terms of saving life one should flee. But we have a tradition from our rabbis that the Third Temple will not be destroyed, and the consideration of redemption, the metaphysical consideration, plays a role in his practical decision-making—which in that sense contains an element of a messianic movement. Because a messianic movement essentially mixes metaphysics, metaphysical considerations, into its practical decisions. And the Brisker Rav is basically saying: I don’t know, maybe this is the Messiah and maybe it isn’t, but when people are shooting, you run. You need to act realistically. That’s what he’s saying. I don’t think there is a disagreement here about whether the Messiah will really come in the end or not. That’s a different discussion. The question is: even if in the end this movement will bring the Messiah eventually, how should one conduct oneself on the way there? May I take non-realistic considerations into account because the Messiah will come and everything will be fine, or not? Fine, the Messiah will come, the Messiah will come—it’s like the fulfillment of Joseph’s dreams, as Nachmanides discusses. Why didn’t Joseph tell his father that he was still alive? So Nachmanides says that Joseph wanted to make sure the dreams were fulfilled. That’s one of the explanations; he gives two or three answers there. But one answer is that he wanted to ensure that the dreams were fulfilled. And everyone is astonished by this Nachmanides, as if: how far does the Merciful One burden us? Why do you need to make sure the dreams that the Holy One, blessed be He, sent are fulfilled? You do what you need to do. If there is honoring one’s father, tell your father that you’re alive and don’t leave him to live in his sorrow. As for the dreams, the Holy One, blessed be He, should take care of that; if it needs to happen, it will happen and He will ensure it. You are not supposed to take metaphysical considerations into account in your conduct. That is really what lies behind this. You need to conduct yourself according to what Jewish law or morality or realpolitik—the considerations that are supposed to guide you—require. And not take into account all sorts of metaphysical considerations, even if they are correct. Not because they are not correct, but because you are not supposed to factor them in when making decisions. When you make decisions, you should make them the way decisions are made: according to reason, according to Jewish law, according to morality—not by mixing metaphysics into the matter. I’ve jumped ahead a bit, but I’m trying to show that the characteristics of a messianic movement are not so far from certain characteristics that one can also see in contemporary Religious Zionist thought. I’m speaking cautiously, because these are certain characteristics, not at an extreme level, and in general a messianic movement is not a prohibition. So I speak cautiously, but I still say that one cannot categorically determine that there is none of this here at all, and that it is just demagoguery. Because there is a book by Hamburger—you know Hamburger? He’s a Jew from Bnei Brak, I know him, an interesting Jew, a real yekke type. Two Hamburger brothers established the prayer quorum in Ma’ayanei HaYeshua Hospital. There is a yekke prayer quorum there, which is even more extreme, I think, than Mekor Chaim, because they reconstructed from tapes and all sorts of traditions the melodies and all the customs. Hamburger wrote a two-volume book on Ashkenazic customs. They’re crazy, I don’t know why all these customs are so interesting. Once a custom has disappeared, it’s not interesting. The whole idea of a custom is that since it exists, you preserve it. What’s the point of reconstructing ancient customs? I simply cannot understand this obsession. Once it’s gone, it’s gone—good riddance. Why do I need to reconstruct it? Never mind. In any case, they’re crazy about this and make recordings, and they learned it all and then became the prayer leaders there, because they insisted on using only those melodies. You can’t just lead services there casually; only according to the regulations, exactly what they did in Frankfurt am Main in Germany—that is what must be done there. I prayed there several times. It’s a fascinating place, hilariously amusing. And it’s worse than Mekor Chaim.
[Speaker B] On weekdays too? On weekdays too, I mean.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I think there’s a minyan there all the time. I was there on the Sabbath, but I think there’s an active synagogue there. In any case, this Hamburger—like the Yekkes tend to be, and I also spoke with him about tekhelet, I think I told this story once—he researched tekhelet. He’s a kind of scholarly Yekke type. There’s a species like that among the Yekkes, people who research. And he did historical research on Ashkenazic customs, real historical research. The man is serious. It’s not—he wastes his energies on nonsense, but he’s a truly serious person. A Torah scholar and also very smart; meaning, he knows how to get to relevant sources and analyze them. In other words, he’s a historian with real ability. And then he also researched the issue of tekhelet. I called him, after all, about tekhelet, because I had reached the conclusion that at least because of doubt one should wear tekhelet, under the category of a Torah-level doubt. So they told me, speak to Hamburger because he checked it out with all the leading rabbis of the generation. There, apparently, the agenda already took over. But he did produce—he wrote a book called False Messiahs and Their Opponents. It’s the most comprehensive book I know on the phenomenon of false messianism. But of course the whole book is tendentious. Meaning, it’s all meant to show that Herzl is a false messiah and Zionism is a messianic movement, a false messianism; everything is aimed there. But through that, on the way there, he went through a great many false messiahs along the way and tried to identify their characteristics and so on. He’s the only one I know of who really did some actual systematic work on this whole issue of false messianism. Now, he did it in a very tendentious way, and you can see that, but he did do a lot of the work. So in that sense I think it’s a foundational book in this field, even though the last chapter deals with Herzl, meaning that’s really the goal of the whole book, of course. But for our purposes, you can see there that in light of the characteristics of messianic movements throughout history, it really isn’t far-fetched to find such characteristics in the Zionist movement too. I mean, it’s not far-fetched. There’s a certain—you have to beware of the opposite agenda too. Meaning, someone who comes in with a pro-Zionist agenda will immediately dismiss everything written in that book as tendentious nonsense. It is tendentious, but it’s not nonsense. Meaning, it’s a discussion that has to be conducted. It’s not a simple matter. Okay, now I’ll start. I gave the introductions; I already basically gave the conclusions along with the introductions more or less, but I’ll describe a bit of the messianic movements from history and the responses to them, because that’s the only basis we can use to characterize this phenomenon. The first phenomenon is Christianity. I don’t know whether it was the first false messiah, but it was the first prominent false messiah. It was part of the Gnostic sects, yes, at the beginning, in the first centuries of the Common Era. And I’m not going to describe the whole development of Christianity here; I’m also not expert enough to describe that. I wrote down for myself a few points here. At its beginning, at least, Christianity adopted—and to this day adopts—the Hebrew Bible (Tanakh), at least as the Old Testament. And as for Jesus, at least, there’s a dispute among the scholars, but quite a few scholars, and later ones too who wrote about this matter, medieval authorities (Rishonim) and later authorities (Acharonim) who wrote about this matter, said that Jesus was a Pharisee. Meaning, he was part of halakhic Judaism in every sense, against the Sadducees, and meaning he was fully committed to Jewish law, and it’s not at all clear that he saw himself as the messiah. Rather, somehow this was created retroactively—meaning, his students or his students’ students somehow in the end built some myth of messianism around him. Apparently there were some things in his conduct that hinted in that direction, but it’s not entirely clear what of that was a myth created afterward and what of it was really there in real time. I think I once told what—our chirpy, cheerful American friend Eliza, she has lots of jokes like that about Jews and Christians and things like that—so she said that some Jew came to church to his priest friend. So he came to church to hear the priest’s little Torah thoughts, his talk on Sunday. Fine, so he’s sitting there, the priest sees the Jew, and before he starts talking he says: I ask that all Jews leave here; I can’t—it’s intended for Christians only. The Jew stays seated, nothing. The priest says again: I very much ask that all Jews leave here, I said this is only for Christians. Nothing. A third time he asks. The Jew gets up, sees there’s no choice, goes and takes the statue of Jesus and says: Friend, they don’t want us here. Meaning, in large measure that reflects something real. Meaning, Jesus in his own time was probably just an ordinary, kosher Jew. In the end he became some symbol of evil, or messianism, or criminality, or whatever, but it’s not clear how much of that was really him himself and how much was just myths created around him by his students. For example, I’ll read to you from the book Shield and Sword by Rabbi Yehudah Aryeh of Modena, one of the sages of Italy in the sixteenth-seventeenth centuries. So he analyzes Christianity from a historical and ideological standpoint at great length. So he says there: it is found that Jesus acknowledged not only the Written Torah but also the Oral Torah, in what he did acknowledge. Accepted according to his view. He already says there were deviations, but still he had Written Torah, Oral Torah. Again, all this is not necessarily connected to actual history, but this is how rabbis understood the history of Christianity, and that’s what matters. It doesn’t matter what really happened; what matters is how we analyze phenomena. And that is what sustained him for some time. Therefore the sages themselves truly did not know how to formulate a position regarding Jesus. For some time the sages themselves related to him—not sure whether as messiah, but as a legitimate Jew. Okay? I don’t know exactly to what extent he was viewed as messiah, but they did not see him as a problematic deviation. Because had he sought to change even one small thing from the Torah, no person would have listened to him, and all would have pursued him and opposed him. Here’s one indication of what I said before: the moment the messiah changes Jewish law or goes against the Torah, then it’s a messianic movement—meaning then it’s obviously a false messiah. But with Jesus that wasn’t the case, at least not in any clear way. Therefore he always said of its fulfillment—Jesus, yes? He now quotes: I did not come to change the Torah but to fulfill the Torah. And he also said: Heaven and earth will pass away, but not one word of the Torah will pass away. Okay? Meaning, all that, I think, are verses from the New Testament, these things. Meaning that Jesus actually came to uphold the Torah, and that is also a characteristic of messianic movements that came later: the messiah starts with that, as Maimonides says regarding a presumed messiah. He comes, he even brings some scrap of pedigree showing that he’s a descendant of the house of David as much as possible, and he brings Israel back to repentance, and he causes the Torah to be strengthened, he acts in such ways that at the beginning—and this happened quite a bit in history—even great rabbis think that this is at least a legitimate phenomenon, and maybe there really is a messiah here. Okay? There are two levels, or several levels, on which one can relate to this matter, and that’s also how it was throughout history, including with Jesus. However, Maimonides in the Laws of Kings—also a passage censored in that same chapter 11 that was censored quite a lot—writes: Also Jesus the Christian, who imagined that he would be the messiah and was killed by a religious court. Maimonides adopts the—there is one place in the words of the Sages where it says that Jesus was executed by a religious court. What the Christians say, that we killed him, is grounded in the Talmud. Meaning, and not for nothing they censored this Maimonides passage, because in the disputes between us and the Christians, according to this Maimonides, they are right: we really did kill him. And not only that—not only did we hand him over to Pontius Pilate, and not only did we not deal with him at all and the Romans killed him—there are all kinds of excuses. But in one place in the Talmud, which was also censored of course, and in Maimonides, which is censored, it says that he was executed by a religious court. Daniel already prophesied about him, as it is said: And the lawless among your people shall exalt themselves to establish the vision, but they shall stumble. Okay? That is basically a prophecy in Daniel. And is there a greater stumbling block than this—that all the prophets spoke of the messiah as redeeming Israel and saving them and gathering their dispersed and strengthening their commandments, while this one caused Israel to be lost by the sword and their remnant to be scattered and humiliated, and the Torah to be changed, and most of the world to err and serve a god other than the Lord. What is he saying there? These are outcome-based criteria. Right, he isn’t addressing the question of what Jesus did, but rather what happened as a result of the movement he set in motion. And therefore this is really a very problematic criterion. In Jesus’ own time it’s entirely possible that people could not analyze things and see all that Maimonides writes here. Maimonides writes this here as hindsight wisdom. Meaning, we know what Christianity led to afterward, but in real time you can’t know that. If the criterion is only a hindsight criterion, and we discussed that, then indeed with many messiahs it’s very easy to get confused. So here the criterion really is an outcome-based one. And that’s what I said earlier with Shield and Sword by Rabbi Yehudah—Rabbi de Modena—there you really see that in real time, before the outcomes arrived, it was very hard to discern the fact that this was messianism, false messianism. At some stage he began performing wonders, at least that’s what his students testify. And again I say, I don’t know to what extent historically that really happened. But his students testify that he performed wonders, and again that’s a hint toward all kinds of future messiahs, who also basically begin by restoring the Torah to its proper standing and by strengthening the Torah specifically, and from the house of David and all that. Little by little, wonders begin.
[Speaker C] Does the messiah need to perform wonders?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, Maimonides writes explicitly that he does not. But this is a very common phenomenon among false messiahs—not all of them, but some of them perform various wonders. And that itself, by the way, according to Maimonides, could be an indication of their falseness, because Maimonides does not believe in these wonders. And that is a dispute among the medieval authorities (Rishonim). A dispute among the medieval authorities (Rishonim), not about false messianism but in the context of idolatry. Because Maimonides writes that all divination, soothsaying, divining, and all those things are really all sleight of hand. There’s no such thing. Basically the prohibition of “Be wholehearted with the Lord your God,” or “you shall not practice divination nor soothsaying,” and all those things.
[Speaker C] Except for those who believe in him.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So I said, if he does such things of sleight of hand, that itself is a problem.
[Speaker C] For example, the Lubavitcher Rebbe, okay,
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] He—
[Speaker C] did not say, I am the messiah.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, I talked about this, I’m not sure he didn’t say it.
[Speaker C] Meaning, I didn’t hear him say it.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] How much did you hear him? I don’t know. But there are those who heard him, could hear him.
[Speaker C] Doesn’t matter, but his Hasidim said it, and he did this wonder, did that wonder. But he didn’t come and say, I am—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I don’t think that’s accurate. There are things that he himself did and he himself said. And it’s easy to describe it that way. I’m saying, with all the respect due to him—that’s one thing. But there was some messianic element in him himself too. I told the story about Ephraim—okay, I’ll just finish with this. Ephraim Shach, the son of Rabbi Shach, was an inspector in the Ministry of Education, Dr. Ephraim Shach. So he said—I once heard on the radio that he said—that he had been with the Lubavitcher Rebbe at the dollar distribution. So he stood there in line, and when he reached the Rebbe, the Rebbe asked: What’s your name? He said: I’m Ephraim. Ephraim what? Ephraim Shach. Meaning, you’re the son of the rosh yeshiva? He said yes. So he said: then wait a moment, I want to tell you something afterward. Fine, he waits at the side, the Rebbe finishes handing out the dollars, and the Rebbe says to him: Listen, when you go back to Israel, tell your father that it’s not me, it’s my Hasidim. That’s what you said.
[Speaker E] Fine, okay, I’ll tell
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] him. He returns to Israel, he goes in to his father—really, I heard him tell this on the radio. He goes in to his father and says: Dad, listen, the Rebbe—I was at the Rebbe’s, and the Rebbe said it’s not him, it’s his Hasidim. So his father, Rabbi Shach, says to him: The next time you’re there, tell him that next time he should say it to his Hasidim, not to me. And that’s a very true answer, because what does it mean, it’s the Hasidim and not him? He didn’t know they were doing this? He knew. Meaning, at least there was passive assent on his part in this matter. In my opinion there was active assent too, but at least passive assent there was. No, no, no—they said he was the messiah while he was still alive. Certainly. The fact that he died—that was a crisis. They said he was the messiah while he was alive, and after he died the excuses started for how he could still be the messiah even though he had already died. It started while he was alive, unequivocally. Okay, so the Christians lay the platform for discussing all kinds of movements that came afterward. It already started with the Christians. Fine, Maimonides writes—I’ll just read his language and with this we’ll finish—what I said earlier: And let it not enter your mind that the King Messiah must perform signs and wonders and create new things in the world or revive the dead. Maimonides doesn’t write this for no reason; Maimonides writes it because there were messianic movements in which a person claimed the crown of the messiah by virtue of wonders he had performed. Now apart from whether that really happened or not, Maimonides says: that’s simply not the criterion. According to Maimonides’ own approach, it’s also clear that it cannot be the criterion, because Maimonides in the Laws of Idolatry or in the Guide for the Perplexed, when he speaks about idolatry, says that all wonders and all divination and “be wholehearted” and everything, it’s all nonsense. However, many other medieval authorities (Rishonim) disagree with him and say no, there is the Other Side, and it too has powers; there are other powers, and there is a prohibition against resorting to them, but such powers do exist. Meaning, one can perform wonders also from the Other Side, not from the side of holiness. According to Maimonides there is no such thing. Meaning, it is impossible to perform such wonders, and therefore for Maimonides it is obvious that this would be a criterion—not only that the messiah doesn’t need to perform wonders, but if he does perform wonders then he is not the messiah, because then he is just a transgressor, violating a Torah-level prohibition: “Be wholehearted with the Lord your God.” And that is according to Maimonides’ approach.
[Speaker E] According to the approach of other medieval authorities (Rishonim), a transgressor in a certain sense—if he says it’s nothing, then he’s a fraud.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, but he’s also a transgressor: “Be wholehearted with the Lord your God.” Yes. And according to the other medieval authorities (Rishonim), then you can say maybe wonders are not a criterion for the messiah, but if he performed wonders that still doesn’t disqualify him. I don’t know, because in principle it is possible to perform wonders. Fine.