Probability and Statistics – Lesson 31
This transcript was generated automatically using artificial intelligence. There may be inaccuracies in the transcribed content and in speaker identification.
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Table of Contents
- The connection between statistics and doubt
- Rabbinic doubt leniently, and the stringency of a conscientious person
- An item that will later become permitted as an indication of risk
- Nullification by majority and an item that will later become permitted
- Cost considerations: why the permission remains optional and not obligatory
- Object-based and person-based prohibition, and the reasons for prohibitions
- Monetary doubt leniently, and possible theft
- Maimonides: Torah-level doubt, rabbinic-level doubt, and "do not turn aside"
- The second root: derivations and law given to Moses at Sinai as rabbinic teachings
- Law given to Moses at Sinai and its doubtful cases according to Maimonides
- Netivot, unintentional violation of a rabbinic prohibition, and doubt as a "possible rebellion"
- Command and essence: Ramchal, Rabbi Elchanan, and "greater is one who is commanded and does"
- Proof that Torah-level doubt is ruled stringently from the distinction between command and essence
- Resolving Maimonides' structure: derivation versus law given to Moses at Sinai
- Reasons for the commandments, Guide for the Perplexed, and Euthyphro
- Closing questions and the example of "an eye for an eye"
Summary
General Overview
The text presents the laws of doubt as a continuation that begins only after statistics has "run out," but then reconnects them to statistics through considerations of utility, expected value, and cost in decision-making. It proposes understanding the rules of rabbinic doubt leniently, an item that will later become permitted, and nullification by majority as situations in which Jewish law allows one to take a risk or rely on a permissive mechanism, even though there is still a conceptual problem that justifies stringency for someone who is able. In that context it develops a distinction between the dimension of command and the dimension of essence in commandments and prohibitions, and uses it to explain various distinctions in Maimonides' approach between different types of laws that he classifies as rabbinic teachings, especially the treatment of doubt in derivations versus law given to Moses at Sinai.
The connection between statistics and doubt
The text states that statistics deals with uncertainty and resolves questions through majority and probability, whereas doubt is a state in which it has been decided that statistics has nothing to say, and therefore one moves to the rules of doubt. It adds that in practical decision-making, statistics alone is not enough, because one must also take into account the costs of the options and the utility function, illustrating this with a fair die in which one chooses according to expected value and not probability alone. It argues that the considerations of the laws of doubt can be understood as considerations of cost and utility, and therefore there is a positive connection between statistics and doubt, and not only a negative one.
Rabbinic doubt leniently, and the stringency of a conscientious person
The text presents two conceptions of ruling leniently in a rabbinic doubt: one view says there is no prohibition, and therefore stringency is unnecessary and even resembles "one who is exempt from a matter yet does it is called a fool"; the second view says this is permission to take a risk, not a cancellation of the problem. It illustrates this with a doubtful case of poultry with milk, which is a rabbinic prohibition, and argues that on the possibility that it is prohibited, there is indeed a problem, since the Sages prohibited it, and therefore there is value in being stringent even though there is no obligation. It disputes the suggestion that this depends only on "they prohibited it and they permitted it," and distinguishes between the halakhic definition and the meta-halakhic rationale for why there is still room for stringency.
An item that will later become permitted as an indication of risk
The text uses the law of an item that will later become permitted to establish that ruling leniently in a rabbinic doubt is not a completely smooth permission, but rather permission to be lenient when stringency has a cost. It describes a case of doubtful leaven on Passover, where the Sages are stringent because one can wait and eat it permissibly, formulating the principle: "Instead of eating it in prohibition, eat it in permission." It concludes that the stringency in an item that will later become permitted shows that there is still a problem even when one is allowed to be lenient, and therefore someone who is stringent when able is worthy of blessing.
Nullification by majority and an item that will later become permitted
The text compares the law of an item that will later become permitted to the law of nullification by majority, and presents the understanding that nullification by majority does not turn the prohibition into full permission, because if it were fully "smooth," there would be no room for stringency in the case of an item that will later become permitted. It describes leaven on Passover as something that is not nullified even in the tiniest amount, and presents an interpretation linking this to the law of an item that will later become permitted, requiring one to wait until after Passover rather than rely on nullification by majority. It suggests that one may rely on nullification by majority, but it is still fitting to be stringent, and offers as a possible explanation the idea that prohibited foods "dull the soul," so perhaps this spiritual dulling remains even when the prohibition has been nullified in halakhic terms.
Cost considerations: why the permission remains optional and not obligatory
The text asks why, if there is still a problem, nullification by majority or leniency in a rabbinic doubt was nevertheless permitted, and answers with the proposal that Jewish law balances the severity of the prohibition against the cost required to avoid it. It argues that a prohibited mixture requires not only refraining from the prohibition but also losing the permitted part of the mixture, and therefore a large loss is not demanded in order to avoid one prohibited piece, which is why the rule of majority was established. It distinguishes this from ruling stringently in a Torah-level doubt, where the cost is smaller and therefore stringency is required, illustrating this with one kosher piece and one non-kosher piece, from which one may not take because there is no majority. It addresses the claim that this halakhic flexibility does not fit with the idea of spiritual dulling, and answers by analogy to corpse impurity for Jews, which is not prohibited even though it has a spiritual dimension, arguing that the Torah ranks obligations and leaves certain levels of purity to human choice.
Object-based and person-based prohibition, and the reasons for prohibitions
The text raises the possibility of tying the discussion to the question whether rabbinic prohibitions are object-based prohibitions or person-based prohibitions, but argues that even if it is a person-based prohibition, there is still an essential reason behind it, and therefore stringency still has value. It explains that poultry with milk was prohibited as a concern lest one come to meat with milk, and therefore even in a doubtful case there remains concern about weakening one’s attitude toward the more severe prohibition. It notes that the very concept of an object-based prohibition is itself not agreed upon even for Torah law, citing the Talmud at the beginning of tractate Nedarim that a vow is an object-based prohibition and an oath is a person-based prohibition, and describing a dispute among medieval authorities (Rishonim) whether vows are the exception or oaths are the exception relative to the rest of Torah prohibitions.
Monetary doubt leniently, and possible theft
The text explains that monetary doubt leniently usually means leniency for the defendant who is in possession, but notes that in many cases the doubt exists in the religious court and not among the litigants themselves, and therefore it is not relevant to demand that the one in possession be stringent out of concern for theft when he himself claims certainty. It cites Maharai Basan’s question, brought by Rabbi Shimon Shkop, that in doubtful theft one should seemingly be stringent as in a Torah-level prohibition, and answers that the question becomes sharp mainly in a case of certainty versus uncertainty, when even the one in possession himself claims uncertainty. It states that in such a case it is fitting for a conscientious person to return the money even though he is not obligated, because there is a real concern of stumbling into the prohibition of theft.
Maimonides: Torah-level doubt, rabbinic-level doubt, and "do not turn aside"
The text moves to the framework of Maimonides’ approach and notes the dispute among medieval authorities (Rishonim) whether the rule that Torah-level doubt is ruled stringently is itself of Torah origin or rabbinic, and presents Maimonides’ view that Torah-level doubt ruled stringently is a rabbinic rule. It raises the logical possibility that according to Maimonides one might even say that rabbinic doubt ruled leniently is a Torah-level rule, because rabbinic prohibitions rest on "do not turn aside" and the Torah created the category, though it presents this as an aside. It emphasizes that rabbinic doubt ruled leniently is a clear rule, and that the stringency of an item that will later become permitted shows that this is permission to be lenient, not denial of the problem.
The second root: derivations and law given to Moses at Sinai as rabbinic teachings
The text presents Maimonides’ view in the second root that laws derived by interpretation are rabbinic teachings, and describes Nachmanides’ criticism in his glosses to the second root that "Maimonides’ book is sweet to the palate and altogether lovely," but that the whole thing is undermined by this mistake. It rejects a later interpretation by the Tashbetz and later authorities (Acharonim), according to which the source of the derivation is rabbinic but its authority is Torah-level, and argues that Nachmanides understood Maimonides correctly and that Maimonides meant that the law is rabbinic. It raises a central difficulty: if derivations are rabbinic teachings, then their doubtful cases should be ruled leniently, whereas both the Talmud and Maimonides seem to rule them stringently.
Law given to Moses at Sinai and its doubtful cases according to Maimonides
The text states that in Maimonides’ opinion even law given to Moses at Sinai is called rabbinic teachings because it is not written in the Torah, and cites his commentary to the Mishnah on tractate Kelim chapter 17, where Maimonides asks why the doubtful cases of fixed measures are not ruled leniently. It explains in Maimonides’ name that the measures are not an independent law but a detail defining an existing Torah-level prohibition, and therefore their doubtful cases are ruled stringently; but this implies that in principle a doubtful case involving law given to Moses at Sinai that introduces a new law would be ruled leniently. It mentions examples such as the willow and the water libation as cases that are, according to one view, law given to Moses at Sinai introducing a new law, and from this there emerges a structure in which some kinds of rabbinic teachings have doubtful cases ruled leniently while others are ruled stringently.
Netivot, unintentional violation of a rabbinic prohibition, and doubt as a "possible rebellion"
The text cites Netivot in section 234, that one who violates a rabbinic prohibition unintentionally does not need repentance, and brings proof from the Talmud’s statement that when we see a rabbi violate a rabbinic prohibition, "we act first and only afterward raise the objection." It explains an interpretation according to which a rabbinic prohibition is only an obligation of obedience, and therefore in an unintentional case there is no disobedience and thus no transgression. It cites later authorities who explain rabbinic doubt ruled leniently in the same way, as a situation in which "a possible rebellion is not rebellion," because there is no certainty that there is a clear command one can rebel against; and it adds that even according to this, there is still a reason for the prohibition, and therefore stringency has value even though it is not obligatory.
Command and essence: Ramchal, Rabbi Elchanan, and "greater is one who is commanded and does"
The text cites in the name of Ramchal, via Rabbi Elchanan Wasserman in Kovetz Maamarim, that every commandment and transgression has two aspects: the command and the essence, where fulfilling a commandment includes both obeying the command and producing a positive result by the act itself. It illustrates this with a red traffic light without a formal law: even without a command there is an essential danger, and therefore there is value in not stopping—rather, in not crossing. It explains on this basis the principle that "greater is one who is commanded and does than one who is not commanded and does," because the commanded person gains two positive outcomes, while the one not commanded but acting gains only the dimension of essence. It notes that women are not obligated in time-bound positive commandments, but there is still value in performing them, thereby showing that the essence can exist even when the formal command does not obligate.
Proof that Torah-level doubt is ruled stringently from the distinction between command and essence
The text argues that Torah-level doubt ruled stringently does not stem from doubt about the command, because rabbinic doubt ruled leniently shows that doubt about a command does not require stringency. It concludes that the stringency in Torah law comes from doubt about the essence—that is, the possibility that one may eat pork or perform an act problematic in itself. It links this to considerations of utility and cost as the basis for understanding the laws of doubt, such that Jewish law prohibits taking a risk where the dangerous essence still remains.
Resolving Maimonides' structure: derivation versus law given to Moses at Sinai
The text proposes an explanation of Maimonides according to which a Torah-level law is defined as a law that has both command and essence. It argues that in law given to Moses at Sinai there is command but not a sufficiently strong halakhic essence, and therefore its doubtful cases are ruled leniently like doubt about a command; whereas in a law derived by interpretation there is essence as an extension of a Torah idea, but no explicit written command. It illustrates this with "You shall fear the Lord your God"—including Torah scholars—as an example of an existing essence even without an explicit command, and therefore in a doubtful case one rules stringently. It adds a category in Maimonides of a tradition from Sinai that also has a textual derivation, where command and essence are both present and therefore it is Torah-level, and cites Nachmanides’ formulation of the paradox, "How can zero plus zero equal one," with the answer of the distinction being "half plus half."
Reasons for the commandments, Guide for the Perplexed, and Euthyphro
The text argues that commandments have reasons even if we do not know them, and cites Maimonides in Guide for the Perplexed part 3, who rejects the claim that commandments have no reason and argues that this makes the Holy One, blessed be He, worse than human beings who do nothing without reason. It distinguishes between fulfilling a commandment because of the command and fulfilling it because of the benefit, and argues that the motivation is the command even though the benefit exists. It declines to enter into the discussion of the Euthyphro dilemma and refers to column 457, "A look at the Euthyphro dilemma in light of the debate," and adds that among later authorities (Acharonim) there is inquiry regarding rabbinic Sabbath restrictions, whether they are neutral on the Torah level or have a weak Torah-level dimension that the Sages completed into prohibition.
Closing questions and the example of "an eye for an eye"
The text concludes with a discussion of the relationship between Torah law and rabbinic law in halakhic rulings and definitions, and with the question of "an eye for an eye," which the Sages interpreted as monetary compensation. It answers that this is the interpretation of the verse and therefore Torah-level law, and adds that according to Maimonides there is a type of law transmitted by Sinaitic tradition and also derived from a verse that is Torah-level. It returns and concludes by stating that according to Maimonides there is a continuum of levels within rabbinic law, and not one uniform rule for all areas of rabbinic teachings.
Full Transcript
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay, we’re dealing with doubts. In the previous lecture I talked about the fact that really the connection between the two parts of this series—the first part dealt with statistics, and what I’m starting now deals with doubts—it’s much shorter, but it deals with doubts. The seam between these two parts of the series, or the connection between them, apparently doesn’t really exist, because statistics handles situations of uncertainty. And we use statistics, majority, right—it doesn’t matter—we talked a bit about the relationship between majority and statistics, and then we decide our question, a halakhic question in this case. But a situation of doubt is a situation where we’ve decided that statistics has nothing to say. We have no tools to decide the question, and so we remain in a state of doubt, and only where statistics ends does the world of doubt begin. Meaning, after we understand that we have no way of using statistics to solve the problem, then we basically declare that this situation is a situation of doubt and use the rules of doubt in order to conduct ourselves within it. So really, defining the series as dealing with statistics and doubt is a definition of two things that are not really—certainly not identical—but even the connection between them is some kind of negative connection. After we finish the matter of statistics, the matter of doubt begins to be born—that’s the initial perspective. And after that I said that there is actually another connection between these two parts, because at the end of the day, when we make decisions in the practical world, statistics by itself is never enough to make decisions. Ultimately you also have to take into account the different costs of each option. Say I have equal chances—a fair die—an equal chance that it will land on each of the faces, fine, but if it lands on five, I get a million dollars, and if it lands on one, two, three, four, and six, then I get only a thousand dollars. Okay? Now obviously I’m going to put more money on the number five, even though the chance of getting it is equal to the chance of any of the other faces. Why? Because the utility or the cost—right, or the expected payoff in this case—is higher. Meaning that in our decision-making considerations, besides statistics, there are also considerations of the utility function or expected value. Expected value is basically the product of the probability times the utility. And therefore if we look not at statistics in the narrow sense but at statistical thinking, then within statistical thinking we also have considerations of costs, considerations of utility, and not only considerations of statistical or probabilistic calculation. Why am I mentioning this? Because if we look at the issue—the topic of doubt—from this perspective, then suddenly we see that there’s another connection between statistics and doubt, because the considerations of the laws of doubt can at least be understood as considerations of cost. I brought up considerations of cost or utility, which basically completes the picture. Statistics plus doubt basically tells me this: the probabilistic and statistical calculation plus the utility function, so that overall there actually is a positive connection between statistics and doubt, and not only a negative one, that when statistics ends, doubt begins. What do I mean? We talked about the question whether the rule that one can be lenient in doubtful cases—say in rabbinic law—means that there’s no problem at all because there is no prohibition, so there’s no point in being stringent in a rabbinic doubt. If rabbinic doubt is ruled leniently, there’s no prohibition at all, so why be stringent? Seemingly, anyone exempt from something who nevertheless does it is called a fool. Meaning, there’s no reason to prohibit something to yourself when there’s no prohibition concerning it. So if rabbinic doubt is ruled leniently, then that means that from the standpoint of Jewish law there is no prohibition, so why be stringent, apparently. On the other hand, others will come and say no, there is some point in being stringent, and the law that rabbinic doubt is ruled leniently is only permission to be lenient. It doesn’t say there is no prohibition; rather, there is permission to be lenient. At the end of the day, let’s say I’m in doubt whether what is before me is poultry cooked with milk. Poultry with milk is a rabbinic prohibition. Meat with milk is a Torah prohibition; poultry with milk is a rabbinic prohibition. And I have a doubt. Now, on the possibility that I ate poultry with milk, then I ate poultry with milk—I did something problematic; the Sages prohibited it. We won’t talk now about whether this is object-based or person-based, we’ll leave that for now, but I did something problematic because the Sages prohibited poultry with milk. So why do they tell me that doubtful poultry with milk is permitted? They tell me: you’re allowed to take the risk. We won’t come complaining against you if you don’t act stringently. But that doesn’t mean there’s no value in stringency. And if you want to be stringent and be righteous, blessings on you. That’s a different conception of this idea of ruling leniently in rabbinic doubt. It doesn’t mean there’s simply no problem at all and it’s a full permission. It means they don’t want to burden you, so they say: you may be lenient if you want. If you want to be stringent, you’ll be blessed. Since at the end of the day you really can fail here with a prohibition. You can’t ignore that. But since it’s only a rabbinic prohibition, we allow you to be lenient; we don’t obligate you to be stringent. Those are the two possibilities I presented, and I said that one of the indications that the laws of doubt should be understood in the second sense—that there really is reason to be stringent, it’s just that one is allowed to be lenient—one of the indications of that is the law of something that will later become permitted. A thing that will later become permitted is a prohibition such that if you wait a certain amount of time, the prohibition expires. Leaven on Passover, or muktzeh on the Sabbath or a Jewish holiday, or something like that. The time passes, and there’s no prohibition. Now if I have before me something prohibited, but it’s a prohibition that will later become permitted—meaning if I wait a certain time, there will come a time when it will be permitted—then in this matter the Sages were more stringent with something that will later become permitted than with an ordinary prohibition. If I have a doubt about rabbinic leaven, say for the sake of discussion, since I can after all wait until after Passover and eat it with no problem at all, they don’t allow me to eat it during Passover. Even though it’s a rabbinic doubt. Rabbinic doubt, apparently, can be ruled leniently. But the fact that the Sages say, no, if you have the option of eating it in a totally smooth way, with no problem at all, why should we let you be lenient in a case of doubt? After all there still is some possibility that you’ll violate a prohibition. So why do the Sages say that with something that will later become permitted we are stringent? If you have doubt about a prohibition that will later become permitted, instead of eating it in prohibition, eat it in permission. Wait and eat it permissibly. Why use this after-the-fact permission of rabbinic doubt ruled leniently? What stands behind this approach, this stringency, of something that will later become permitted? That basically, rabbinic doubt ruled leniently is not a totally smooth permission. It’s not fully permitted. It’s not something where there is no reason at all to be stringent. No, on the contrary, there is a risk here that you may violate a prohibition. True, since it’s only a rabbinic prohibition, you’re allowed to take the risk. You’re allowed to take the risk, but it’s a risk. You can’t ignore the fact that it’s a risk. So if you have the option of losing nothing at all, just waiting until after Passover and eating it without taking any risk, why should we allow you to take a risk? So you see that the rule that rabbinic doubt is ruled leniently is really a rule that tells me: you’re allowed to take a risk, but there is a risk here. It’s not that rabbinic doubt ruled leniently means there is no prohibition whatsoever and do whatever you want. Or in other words, there is also reason to be stringent; whoever can, blessings on him. You’re allowed to be lenient, but—but.
[Speaker B] Sorry Rabbi, can I ask? Yes. Maybe it’s unrelated? Maybe "they prohibited it and they permitted it"—when they permitted rabbinic doubt where there isn’t the factor of something that will later become permitted, then "they prohibited it and they permitted it" completely, the prohibition is gone entirely. When there is—when it’s something that will later become permitted—then they just didn’t say it in the same way they said it in the other case.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What you’re suggesting here is a halakhic definition; I’m first of all asking about the philosophy. Meaning, on the meta-halakhic level, is there some point in being stringent? I think that regardless, for the moment, of the halakhic definition of "they prohibited it and they permitted it," true, they can completely cancel this prohibition, but obviously if they established a prohibition on poultry with milk, they see some problem in eating poultry with milk, right? They didn’t just establish that prohibition for no reason.
[Speaker C] Now if you’re in doubt, but it’s only a person-based problem—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Just one second, there’s some chance that you’ll end up eating poultry with milk. You can’t ignore the fact that there’s a chance here that you’ll end up doing something problematic. And therefore even if they define this as something fully permitted—"they prohibited it and they permitted it"—still, on the conceptual level at least, I can definitely understand that there is a reason to be stringent. Okay, I didn’t hear what Eliav said before—how is this connected to object-based and person-based prohibition?
[Speaker C] No, no—the rabbinic prohibition, at its core, is a person-based prohibition.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right, so yes, that’s the obvious comment here. It would make sense to tie this to the question whether rabbinic prohibitions are person-based prohibitions or object-based prohibitions. Meaning, if rabbinic prohibitions are object-based, then let’s say poultry with milk—does poultry with milk have something problematic about it in itself? Like meat with milk, which people commonly think is problematic in itself, meaning that it’s an object-based prohibition? Or no, there’s nothing problematic about poultry with milk at all—otherwise the Torah would have prohibited it—except that the Sages prohibited the person from eating poultry with milk. Once they don’t prohibit it, there’s no problem. If the prohibition is object-based, then regardless of whether they prohibit me or not, I should be careful because of the reality of the prohibition itself. But if there’s no problem in the reality of the prohibited thing, then all that’s needed here is simply to obey the Sages who prohibited it to the person. Fine—when it comes to a rabbinic doubt, they didn’t prohibit it, so what’s the problem? So there is room to tie this to the question whether it’s a person-based prohibition or an object-based prohibition, but that’s not an agreed-upon question. Meaning, some people understand rabbinic prohibitions as object-based prohibitions; some understand them as person-based prohibitions. But I’m not even completely sure that it really is right to tie it to the question whether it’s person-based or object-based. Because even if it’s person-based, still, behind the person-based prohibition there is an idea, as I said before. Let’s say there’s no problem at all in poultry with milk, and the Sages only prohibited me from eating it. Okay, but why did they prohibit me? They prohibited me because if I eat poultry with milk, I may come to eat meat with milk, right? Meaning, there is some rationale here, some reason why they prohibited poultry with milk to me. Now I have before me a doubt: maybe poultry with milk, maybe not. Do you understand that even if I ate doubtful poultry with milk, there’s still a possibility that it was poultry with milk, and that could somewhat weaken my attitude toward the prohibition of eating meat with milk. And therefore even if the prohibition is person-based, there is room for the claim that there is still reason to be stringent. It’s not a total permission, even if it’s person-based. So in the sense of the halakhic definition, you’re right—in the halakhic definition, you can say "they prohibited it and they permitted it," and once they permitted it, what’s the problem? There’s no prohibition. But if you look at the rationale behind the halakhic definition, then even if they can permit it, why would they do that? After all, if the problem really exists, then it makes much more sense to say that they didn’t really make use of their ability to permit it. They could have permitted it because "they prohibited it and they permitted it," but why assume they actually did so? There really is a problem here, so there’s no reason why the Sages would do that—why they would say it as something overridden rather than as something fully permitted. And therefore the practical difference is that if a conscientious person wants to be stringent, blessings on him. You’re not obligated.
[Speaker D] What? Some time ago you also wrote a post on this topic connected to person-based and object-based prohibition in this issue.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] There I brought the approach of Netivot.
[Speaker D] Right—regarding the matter of unintentional violation?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, of person-based prohibition and unintentional violation, yes.
[Speaker D] So it kind of clashes with what comes out here, no? Because the conclusion there establishes that if it was unintentional, then in any case nothing happened—from the standpoint of the truth, in reality nothing happened.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Nothing happened, right. Nothing happened on the halakhic level, but there still definitely is room to say—I’m saying, one can hesitate about this—as I said earlier, there is room to say that overall there is some sort of problem here. Not a problem defined as a prohibition on the formal halakhic level, but there is some problem here. The reason they prohibited poultry with milk to me is because they were concerned that I might come to eat meat with milk. That concern—the probability of it—increases if I ate poultry with milk; the chance that I’ll come to eat meat with milk. So even if the Sages defined this as something not halakhically prohibited, one can definitely say there is value in being stringent.
[Speaker D] So when we’re talking here about some kind of problem of a different sort, is it a problem that will always go in the direction of distancing a person from transgression? Or is there something here that’s really—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] In this case it’s distancing a person from transgression, but you can imagine other problems in rabbinic prohibitions. Each one on its own—each prohibition can be—I’m not committing myself that it’s specifically about distancing a person from transgression. In this case the real problem is distancing a person from transgression. But if you bring me another prohibition where the issue is not distancing a person from transgression—because it’s not a fence, a rabbinic prohibition that isn’t a fence but something else—then straightforwardly it’s not in order to distance a person from transgression, but for example to preserve a higher level of purity, hand washing, I don’t know exactly what. Okay? Fine? But still, you want to preserve a higher level of purity—not because you can, not in a slippery-slope sense that you might come to a more severe prohibition—but still there is some real problem here because of which they defined the thing as prohibited. Because after all, they don’t define prohibitions for nothing. They define prohibitions because there is some sort of problem here, even if you understand the prohibition as person-based in its halakhic definition. That’s why I’m saying it doesn’t have to depend on the question whether it is person-based or object-based. Now that’s regarding rabbinic doubt ruled leniently.
[Speaker E] Is it even at all a clear, unequivocal thing that there is such a concept as object-based prohibition even in Torah law? It’s not necessary. You can also learn the whole Torah without any concept of object-based prohibition, that it’s some side issue.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The Talmud says there is. The Talmud at the beginning of tractate Nedarim says that a vow is an object-based prohibition and an oath is a person-based prohibition. And among the medieval authorities (Rishonim) there is a dispute about the rest of Torah prohibitions. Are oaths the exception, in that they are person-based and everything else is object-based? Or are vows the exception, in that they are object-based and everything else is like an oath, meaning person-based? So that’s a dispute among medieval authorities (Rishonim). There’s a Kehillot Yaakov on Nedarim… what?
[Speaker E] Even vows—even vows, with a little effort you can explain that from the person’s point of view it’s as if it’s object-based, but not that there really is something resting on the object.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s already the question of what is called an object-based prohibition. So I once explained in a column several interpretations of the concept of object-based prohibition. Fine, that’s a different discussion, but for the moment I’m assuming object-based prohibition without getting into the question of what exactly that means. Is there some metaphysics there? Is it simply a problem, as I said earlier—even a person-based prohibition actually has some dimension of object in it? At the end of the day you can arrive at a problem, and there is some real issue here beyond merely the duty of obedience to the Sages and that’s it. So you can call that kind of thing an object-based prohibition too, if you want.
[Speaker C] Rabbi, and what about monetary doubt ruled leniently? Again—what about monetary doubt ruled leniently? Is that too some kind of overridden state, or is it the law from the outset?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It depends under what circumstances. Say in a place where someone claims money from you, okay? And you are the one in possession. So usually that’s what’s called monetary doubt ruled leniently. Because after all, in monetary doubt, whenever you’re lenient to one party you’re stringent to the other, right? There’s no such thing as just lenient. So usually when people say monetary doubt is ruled leniently, they mean monetary doubt—
[Speaker C] Leniently for the defendant—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] For the one in possession, who can keep it in his possession. Now here the question doesn’t arise because the doubt is a doubt in the religious court. The litigants themselves know the truth. One of them is a liar, one is telling the truth, whatever—but they know the truth. So you can’t say to the one in possession, look, be stringent because there’s doubt here, who knows, maybe this money isn’t yours? What do you mean? I know it’s mine. The religious court is in doubt because it doesn’t know whether I’m the liar or whether the claimant is the liar. So that’s why it’s not relevant. It’s like the question of Maharai Basan, what Rabbi Shimon Shkop brings: why in a case of possible theft do we go leniently? After all, it’s a possible Torah prohibition, so one should be stringent. How can it be that we don’t obligate a person to be concerned about the prohibition of theft in a doubtful case? The one in possession—so what if he’s in possession? There’s a possibility that you’re violating the prohibition of theft; you should be stringent about that. So why are they lenient with him? Why do they allow him to keep the money? So he himself, Rabbi Shimon Shkop, already notes there that usually this question isn’t really a question at all, because in most cases the one in possession is not himself in doubt; the doubt is in the religious court. The one in possession knows the money is his—that’s what he claims. The only place where Maharai Basan’s question can be set up is in a case of certainty and uncertainty. Practically speaking, we rule that certainty versus uncertainty—certainty is not automatically stronger. If the uncertain party is the one in possession, then he can continue to keep it even though he claims uncertainty. Now understand: the other person tells you, the money is definitely mine, and I say maybe you’re right, maybe not, I don’t know—uncertain. Since I’m in possession, they leave the money with me. About that, Maharai Basan is right in his question, and he says: wait, but there’s a possible prohibition of theft here, and now even I myself am in doubt, not just the religious court, because I myself am claiming uncertainty. So here there is room to discuss whether there is reason to be stringent. I think clearly yes, clearly yes in such a case. After all, he says to you that the money is certainly his, and you don’t know. True, you’re allowed to keep the money with you; you’re not obligated to return it, but obviously a conscientious person who is willing to return it—blessings on him. It is definitely proper to be stringent here. He may fail with the prohibition of theft. So that’s regarding rabbinic doubt ruled leniently. I said that the law of something that will later become permitted also applies to nullification by majority, and that’s already in Torah law. By Torah law, a majority of permitted substance nullifies a minority of prohibited substance. So if a piece of prohibited food falls into a pot that is full of permitted food, I can eat the dish. There is nullification by majority. Now if that thing is something that will later become permitted—say leaven, I said there’s a dispute whether leaven is something that will later become permitted, but for the sake of abstraction, let’s assume it is leaven—then if it fell into a mixture of permitted food, it is forbidden to eat it. Why? Because leaven on Passover is not nullified even in the tiniest amount. Some commentators claim that this is because of the law of something that will later become permitted; that’s why it’s not nullified. What does that mean? Wait until after Passover. After Passover there’s no longer a prohibition of leaven—eat it permissibly. Why should we let you rely now on nullification by majority? Wait until after Passover and you won’t need the permission of nullification by majority. Eat it with no problem at all—it will be totally smooth. I’m ignoring for the moment the rabbinic prohibition of leaven over which Passover has passed. So this law of something that will later become permitted is a stringency both in rabbinic doubt, where one must be stringent, and in nullification by majority in Torah law, where in principle one could rely on nullification by majority and eat everything, but if it is something that will later become permitted, then you have to be stringent rabbinically. Now the question is: what do we really see here? That nullification by majority—and all this I said briefly in the previous lecture, I’m expanding a bit because I feel I rushed—but nullification by majority in the end, just like what I said about rabbinic doubt, also apparently does not turn the prohibition into permission. If it did turn the prohibition into permission, then why should I care that it is something that will later become permitted and I can wait until after Passover and eat it totally smoothly? Even now it’s smooth. Meaning, if they tell me, look, if it’s something that will later become permitted and you have the option of waiting and eating it freely, then don’t rely on nullification by majority—what does that mean? That in nullification by majority there is still something problematic. True, halakhically it’s permitted, it’s nullified, you can eat it—but there is something problematic here, and therefore if you can bypass the need to rely on nullification by majority, then they obligate you to bypass it—so wait until after Passover. So the same claim I made about the law of doubt, rabbinic doubt, I’m now making about nullification by majority in Torah law. From the very fact that we are stringent with something that will later become permitted and say it should not be nullified by majority, it appears that nullification by majority also is not totally smooth. It’s not that now you’re eating permitted food and that’s it. If you want to be stringent and not eat despite the fact that there is nullification by majority, blessings on you. It is fitting to be stringent; not obligatory. There is nullification by majority, but it is fitting to be stringent, because there really is some kind of problem here. With prohibited foods, it is commonly said that they dull the soul. Food dulls the soul. So it is commonly thought that they dull the soul. So if you ate the prohibition that was nullified in the permitted food, it may be that the dulling of the soul will still happen. True, you’re allowed to do it; they do not prohibit you from doing it. But if you want to avoid it, that is definitely something of value. It’s not simply that anyone exempt from a matter who does it is called a fool. It’s not that there is no problem here. There is a problem. You are allowed to ignore it, and if you don’t want to ignore it, then you are righteous—blessings on you. Therefore this consideration of something that will later become permitted is basically an indication that both doubt and nullification by majority are in fact not totally smooth permissions. And I think—why am I saying all this? Now let’s try to think: if that’s really true, then why did they permit it anyway? Fine—so you tell me there’s a problem. Say a piece of pork fell into the dish I’m cooking. So I say there’s a problem; overall I’m eating pork, that’s—
[Speaker C] It’s not even a doubt—I am definitely eating pork—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If I eat the whole dish. So I’m definitely eating pork here, and yet—
[Speaker C] They still permitted it for me. Why did they permit it? After all, I’m eating pork; it would be proper to be stringent.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So if it would be proper to be stringent, why don’t they obligate me to be stringent? The answer probably—I’m proposing an answer. There’s a stringency here? What? Would it still be a stringency if it were obligatory? Obviously. But why did they leave it as a stringency and not as an obligation, and not establish it as an obligation—that’s my question. Because when you impose an obligation, you set a certain threshold. Rather, I propose this: maybe what the Sages are saying is, look, the question is what price they require you to pay in order not to eat pork. After all, once they prohibit the dish to me, then not only do I not eat the pork, but I also don’t eat all the permitted food in which it was nullified. So they tell me: look, we don’t require you to lose too much in order to avoid eating pork. So if you have one piece against one piece, then you lose one permitted piece—that they do require of you. But if there are several permitted pieces here, then in order to avoid eating one prohibited piece, they don’t require you to give up several permitted pieces. And they established the rule of majority, because if there is more permitted than prohibited, then they permitted it to you. Someone asked—I don’t remember, maybe Eliyahu—asked in the previous lecture: but for a prohibition one has to spend all one’s wealth. So what—why shouldn’t I give up two or three or five permitted pieces? So I said that clearly, with nullification by majority there is also something else. The prohibition itself is also weaker. It’s not just plain eating pork. And still there is some prohibition here, and therefore it is fitting to be stringent; the only question is why they don’t obligate me to be stringent. And the answer is: because they don’t obligate me to lose too much money for that. What happens in doubt? Rabbinic doubt is ruled leniently, but Torah-level doubt is ruled stringently. Why? Because in doubt there is no majority. In doubt there is no majority, and therefore once the possibilities are equal, fifty-fifty, then you have to be stringent, because there is a fifty percent chance that you will encounter a prohibition, and therefore you have to be stringent, and they are prepared to pay the price of that stringency. Okay? I have two pieces, one kosher meat and one non-kosher meat. It’s not a mixture, because it’s one piece from two pieces. One piece is forbidden, one piece is permitted, and whichever one I take is doubtful. It is forbidden to take. Torah-level doubt is ruled stringently. That’s not a law of nullification; that’s Torah-level doubt ruled stringently. Now what happens here? They don’t permit me to eat the permitted food—they don’t permit me to eat one piece, because the loss I’ll suffer from that is only the loss of one piece. But if there were more than one piece here, two pieces, then the loss is already two pieces in order not to eat the permitted food—so that they don’t require of me. Okay? What—
[Speaker F] Is that reasonable? Is it reasonable that suddenly there’s such a consideration, and with two pieces they permit you to eat an outright prohibition with all its implications?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I said it’s not an outright prohibition—not an outright prohibition. I said earlier that it’s not an outright prohibition. If it were an outright prohibition, I would have to spend all my wealth to avoid it. So what—
[Speaker F] So what does it mean that it’s not an outright prohibition?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Nullification means that it weakens the prohibition, that’s clear. That’s not just something I’m saying. But even after it weakens the prohibition, there’s still some level of prohibition here. Therefore they tell me it is proper to be stringent, and if it’s something that will later become permitted, then one is obligated to be stringent. In other words, there is a problem here.
[Speaker F] And if it were something in the object itself—if there were something in the object itself, then that really wouldn’t make sense. Still, I’m saying: even if the Rabbi says they didn’t obligate you not to dull the soul, does that sound reasonable?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It doesn’t sound reasonable that the Torah didn’t—the question whether this is object-based or person-based is a different question. I said earlier, person-based prohibitions can be defined in all kinds of ways. I don’t think it necessarily depends on that, as I said before. But there is something problematic about eating this piece. Fine, it’s something problematic. So conceptually, it is proper to be stringent; whoever is willing to be stringent, all the better for him. But there is no obligation to be stringent, because the Torah does not require it of you; it leaves it to your own decision. So this is not a case of “one who is exempt from something and does it is called a fool”; it’s not that kind of neutral matter. There is a problem here, it’s just that they permit you to take the risk. What happens in a rabbinic-level doubt?
[Speaker C] Apparently that’s exactly like the difference between ideal practice and after the fact. Ideally, by strict law, you have to do X and Y,
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And after the fact—
[Speaker C] the cost of fulfilling X and Y is too great, so—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] After the fact—no. After the fact, usually both are on the formal halakhic plane. It’s just that sometimes you’re obligated ideally, and sometimes you’re obligated even after the fact. Here I want to make a claim that isn’t really halakhic. On the halakhic level, there is no prohibition. Nullification by majority is not forbidden. But there still remains the problem that created the prohibition. Fine? That’s what I want to claim. Therefore there is a reason to be stringent, and in something that will later become permitted, the Sages even obligate me to be stringent. And notice: that is rabbinic. It’s not that if it’s something that will later become permitted, then on the Torah level I’m forbidden to eat it. Only rabbinically am I forbidden to eat it. Why? Because the Torah-level problem does not really exist here halakhically. The factual problem does exist here. What led to the halakhic prohibition—that’s what exists here. So the Sages decide to impose a rabbinic prohibition on that. There is no Torah prohibition here of eating pork. Nobody claims that. Okay? What exists here is the problem that created the Torah prohibition. There is something problematic about eating pork. It’s called spiritual dulling.
[Speaker F] But, Rabbi, honestly, it’s still hard for me to understand. If there’s a problem of spiritual dulling, something extremely problematic, I would never imagine telling a sick person, listen, something got mixed in and there’s a doubt, so you can eat it. Is that the kind of thing where suddenly people are so ready to permit it? Spiritual dulling, with all the implications that we don’t know exactly what they are, and suddenly this kind of liberalism? If it’s in the majority then it’s fine on the Torah level? That’s hard to accept. It’s really clear proof that there is no issue of spiritual dulling at all, really. Well, you’re getting carried away.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] In the end that’s how you concluded—with that sentence, you really got completely carried away. So what if there is spiritual dulling? There is spiritual dulling in many other things too. Spiritual dulling is a spiritual matter of spiritual purity, and the question is at what level they obligate you halakhically, and what of that they leave to your own decision. You know, I’ll give you another example. Let’s talk about actual impurity—not impurity of the soul. Regular halakhic impurity. Corpse impurity. Okay? A Jew who is an Israelite, not a priest—there is some issue that he not touch a corpse? There is no prohibition of impurity, right? Only a priest is forbidden to become impure. But there is no prohibition to become impure. So there is no prohibition. Is there still some value in being stringent and not touching one? Clearly yes. The whole concept of—
[Speaker F] Guarding oneself from matters of impurity and purity.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But why? Why? After all, impurity imparts impurity, yes? It does something spiritual, I don’t know exactly what. And nevertheless, on the halakhic level they tell me: you, as an Israelite, are not obligated to guard against it. A priest yes, an Israelite is not obligated.
[Speaker F] Rabbi, does the Rabbi really believe there is actually something, some kind of metaphysical thing resting upon him, and that’s what’s problematic? Or did the Torah want to distance us from the dead, from a cult of the dead? And therefore it did this in different degrees—but it’s all person-based, there is no issue in the object itself. A corpse is matter, simple molecules like anything else.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I understand, but I answered that earlier. I said I’m not going into the question of object-based versus person-based because in my opinion it doesn’t depend on that. Even if it’s a fight against a cult of the dead, then the Torah also has an interest that an ordinary Israelite fight against a cult of the dead. Right—it’s not defined as a halakhic prohibition, but there is still an issue for the Israelite too. So you call that person-based, fine, it doesn’t matter—but the underlying idea of the prohibition exists. And therefore it is proper that an Israelite too… but then you need gradations.
[Speaker F] If it’s an issue from the person’s point of view, then you can make gradations. There is a problematic element.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s what I’m talking about. What difference does it make? Spiritual purity of the soul can also be graded. Not everyone is obligated to maintain absolute purity. What, aren’t there people who preserve greater purity than others? Of course there are. So what happened? There are things the Torah obligates and things the Torah leaves to your decision—at what level you want to be. I don’t see any problem with that. Certainly not any decisive proof of anything you said before. No, absolutely not, I don’t see any problem with it. The claim I ultimately want to make—if I’m right in this proposal—then it means that the laws of doubt and nullification by majority—nullification by majority is really the statistical branch, and if there is no nullification by majority then we are in doubt. Once again we see doubt versus statistics. Basically we’re talking here about considerations of utility, expected value, or cost—it’s all synonymous. Basically, in nullification by majority they tell me: look, the cost is high, therefore they don’t obligate you to be stringent. In doubt, the cost is not so high, therefore they do obligate you to be stringent. By cost I mean what you lose by being stringent. Because the cost that you might eat a prohibition is of course high in both cases. But the question is what you have to pay in order to avoid that cost, and whether that payment is high or not. And then suddenly we see that the laws of doubt and nullification by majority—which are really the two sides of this whole lecture series, statistics versus doubt—so nullification by majority versus doubt are distinguished from one another by considerations of utility or considerations of cost. And in that sense they really do belong to the same field of statistical thinking, which… Now I want to continue a bit further regarding the laws of doubt. Really, all this I said last time, I just expanded on it a little here, but I want to continue a bit more about the laws of doubt, again around the same axes I’ve been talking about until now. In Maimonides—I’ll now speak specifically about Maimonides, because there there is a structure that seems clearer to me. Maimonides basically says—well, not he says, the Talmud says—a Torah-level doubt requires stringency, a rabbinic-level doubt allows leniency. Okay? I already mentioned that there is a dispute between Maimonides and other medieval authorities—Rashba and Ran and others—on the question whether this rule itself, that a Torah-level doubt requires stringency, is itself a Torah-level rule or a rabbinic one. Okay? We’ll get to that in a moment. But a rabbinic-level doubt allows leniency is a clear rule, and of course it is a rabbinic rule, because all the prohibitions under discussion there are rabbinic. Here there is no dispute. And once, once I wanted to claim even more than that. I once wanted to claim that one could say that the rule that a rabbinic-level doubt allows leniency is a Torah-level rule, as a mirror image of what Maimonides says about Torah-level doubt. Maimonides says that Torah-level doubt requiring stringency is only a rabbinic rule, and there there is no conceptual problem in saying such a thing—it’s disputed, but there’s no conceptual problem in Maimonides’ view. But the reverse seems obvious: that a rabbinic-level doubt allows leniency is certainly a rabbinic law, because the whole prohibition is one the rabbis invented, so your ability to be lenient in a doubtful case is surely a rabbinic determination. How could the Torah speak about a prohibition that, from its perspective, does not exist? But specifically in Maimonides’ approach there is room to say not so. Why? Because according to Maimonides, rabbinic prohibitions have a source in the Torah: “do not deviate.” Unlike Nachmanides, Maimonides says that the authority of rabbinic prohibitions is learned from the verse “do not deviate.” Which means that the Torah itself created the category of rabbinic prohibitions; the rabbis are only the ones who filled it with content. They say: after the Torah authorized them to establish things as rabbinic prohibitions, now the Sages can determine, for example, that poultry with milk is a rabbinic prohibition, that going outside the eruv is a rabbinic prohibition—various things of that kind. So that is the content with which we fill the category of rabbinic prohibitions, but the category itself is one created by the Torah, not by the Sages. If that is so, then in principle there is no obstacle to saying that the Torah itself said that a rabbinic doubt should be treated leniently. Once it created the category that there is such a thing as a rabbinic prohibition, it could also have said—I don’t know whether it did say it, but in principle it could have—that in cases of doubt we may be lenient. Therefore there is no conceptual obstacle to presenting such a view, as a mirror image of Maimonides on Torah law, and saying this about rabbinic law—that a rabbinic-level doubt allowing leniency is a Torah-level rule. Okay, that’s just a logical anecdote. But let’s get back to our issue. Maimonides in any case, yes, Maimonides like everyone else says that a rabbinic-level doubt allows leniency. However, Maimonides in the second root says that laws derived from hermeneutical expositions are also rabbinic laws, words of the Scribes. That is a very great novelty; all the medieval authorities disagree with him, but that is Maimonides’ view. Some teachers of Rashi there at the beginning of Ketubot on page 3 also apparently say something like this. There are a few sources for it among the medieval authorities and among the Geonim, but it is almost a lone opinion, certainly among the medieval authorities. So Maimonides’ view is that laws learned from expositions are laws of the Scribes, not Torah law. Nachmanides, in his glosses to the second root, says that Maimonides’ book is “sweeter than honey and entirely desirable,” a wonderful book, delightful, marvelous—and all of it is worthless because of this mistake: that he says things derived from expositions are rabbinic prohibitions, rabbinic laws.
[Speaker C] Because it’s something—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Truly devastating. It’s unreasonable. He is not willing to accept such a conception at all. But that is Maimonides’ position.
[Speaker C] Not because Nachmanides did not properly understand Maimonides. Maimonides says this regarding the source of the exposition—that it is from the Sages—but the authority is of course Torah-level, no question.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That is what the Tashbetz claims, and all the later authorities who followed him, and they are all mistaken. What? Nachmanides understood Maimonides perfectly, and he understood Maimonides very correctly. Maimonides meant that it is rabbinic law. I have several indications; I wrote about this. Half a book. Well. “Or HaMiv” in volume 9—I’m forgetting the name. “Ruach HaMishpat.” “Ruach HaMishpat,” and also in the article on the second root in “Yishlach Sharashav.” It’s a long article, about the size of half a book. Anyway, there I explained why I think they are all mistaken. Nachmanides understood Maimonides very well. Maimonides means words of the Scribes. But this basically comes out—and this is one of many difficulties Nachmanides raises against Maimonides—that it should follow that a doubt regarding laws derived from expositions should be treated leniently. It is rabbinic law. Now in the Talmud there are very many places showing that this is not so. And even in Maimonides there is no indication at all that he says it is so—that doubt in laws derived from expositions is treated leniently. So this is a difficulty, or a whole collection of difficulties, that Nachmanides raises against Maimonides. If it is rabbinic law, then its doubtful cases should have been treated leniently. Why do we see that they are treated stringently?
[Speaker C] Could one say that it is rabbinic law that has a basis in Torah law? What? Could one say that expositions are rabbinic law—granted they are rabbinic law—but they have some basis or hint or something of that sort in Torah law, and therefore… that would be a possible answer.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I think something similar to that, in any case. Maybe in a moment I’ll say something. That’s point number one. Point number two: Maimonides writes regarding a law given to Moses at Sinai—Maimonides writes in several places that a law given to Moses at Sinai is also a law of the Scribes. Even though that has nothing to do with the rabbis at all—it is from the Holy One, blessed be He. But since it does not appear in the Torah and was transmitted in oral tradition, it is a law of the Scribes. It is not Torah law. For Maimonides, Torah law is interpreted literally. What is Torah law? What is written in the Torah. What is not in the Torah is not Torah law. And the heading for that is “words of the Scribes.” So what is not in the Torah? Something derived from expositions, and a law given to Moses at Sinai—both do not appear in the Torah. Therefore they are words of the Scribes. But regarding a law given to Moses at Sinai, in at least two places—there are some contradictions in Maimonides here—at least in two places Maimonides writes that in doubtful cases it is treated leniently. Because it really is words of the Scribes. For example, in chapter 17 of his commentary on the Mishnah in Kelim, in chapter 17 Maimonides speaks there about fixed measures. He brings the statement that measures, interpositions, and partitions are a law given to Moses at Sinai. The Torah’s measures—a measure the size of an olive, and so forth—are a law given to Moses at Sinai. And then he says: so why should we not say that doubtful cases regarding them are treated leniently? After all, if it is a law given to Moses at Sinai, then it is rabbinic law, and doubtful cases should be treated leniently. So he explains: because it doesn’t matter, since these measures are not an independent law. Say, for example, the measure for pork: the prohibition on eating pork applies from an olive-bulk and up. Okay? But the fact that the law is an olive-bulk is not an independent law. It is one of the details of the prohibition of pork—that the prohibition of pork is from an olive-bulk and above. In such a case, the law given to Moses at Sinai merely defines the Torah law. It does not innovate a law of its own. There it is Torah law, and its doubtful cases will be treated stringently. So if there is doubt about an olive-bulk of pork, then the doubt is treated stringently—you have to be stringent. Okay? But from Maimonides’ words, from his remark, what do we see in the subtext? That in fact, a doubt regarding a law given to Moses at Sinai is in principle treated leniently. Here it is a law given to Moses at Sinai that explains a Torah law, so here we do not go leniently. But from Maimonides’ very question we see that on the conceptual level, if there is a law given to Moses at Sinai, then its doubtful cases are treated leniently. That is what we see in Maimonides. A law given to Moses at Sinai that innovates a new law, not one that interprets an existing law—there are few of those, by the way. The willow ceremony and the water libation, according to one opinion among the Tannaim, are a law given to Moses at Sinai—or a prophetic custom; there is a dispute about that. But according to one of the views, it is a law given to Moses at Sinai. So the willow ceremony and the water libation: there the law given to Moses at Sinai creates a new law; it is not a detail within an existing law. There, in a doubtful case, according to Maimonides we would go leniently. Now something very strange comes out. According to Maimonides there are all kinds of types of Torah law. There are decrees and enactments and what everyone calls rabbinic law, where doubtful cases are treated leniently. There is a law given to Moses at Sinai, which according to Maimonides is also a law of the Scribes, and there too doubtful cases are treated leniently—though here there are contradictions, but still, leniently. In laws derived from expositions, it seems Maimonides agrees that doubtful cases are treated stringently. The question is how to understand such a thing. Why? Why is that so? So here I really want to go back a bit to the question of the utility function of the laws of doubt. And here I’ll choose one of the two options I spoke about earlier. I said it’s not necessary, but it is one of the two options. The claim basically goes like this. There is the Netivot in section 234. The Netivot says that one who violates a rabbinic prohibition unintentionally does not need to repent. He brings proof for this from the Talmud. The Talmud says—the Talmud in Eruvin, I think—that if a person sees his teacher violating a prohibition, then if it is a Torah prohibition he must stop him and ask politely, “Did not our teacher teach us that such-and-such is forbidden?”—so that perhaps his teacher got confused, forgot, didn’t notice, in order to prevent him from violating a prohibition. But if it is a rabbinic prohibition, then first let him do it and only afterwards raise the objection. First let him do it, and afterward ask him, in order to learn. The Netivot asks: what do you mean? How can you let him violate a rabbinic prohibition? The Netivot says: we see that if my teacher is violating a rabbinic prohibition, apparently he is doing so unintentionally—he is not doing it deliberately. So one who violates a rabbinic prohibition unintentionally has not violated a prohibition, and therefore there is no issue—let him do it, and afterwards politely ask him whether that is not forbidden, in order to learn. But you do not need to stop him if he is acting unintentionally. That is the Netivot’s claim. Again, this is disputed, not everyone agrees with it, but that is what the Netivot claims. What stands behind it? Some later authorities explain that a rabbinic prohibition is a person-based prohibition. But not only that it is person-based; it is simply an obligation of obedience. What does that mean? There is no inherent problem in eating poultry with milk, but I have an obligation to obey the Sages, who forbade me to eat poultry with milk. And not only is it a person-based prohibition—that is true—but it is a particular type of person-based prohibition: it is an obligation of obedience. And therefore what? If I act unintentionally, then there is no disobedience here, because after all I did not know that this was something the Sages prohibit. So in such a case, what is the problem? The thing itself is not problematic, and there is no disobedience here because I did not know the Sages prohibit it. I didn’t know—that’s what “unintentional” means. And therefore, if so, then when one acts unintentionally one has not violated a prohibition and does not need to repent or anything. That is how some later authorities explain the words of the Netivot. Now there is Rabbi Shlomo Zalman on Shev Shema'teta I, and other later authorities—there is also a formulation like this in Rabbi Shimon Shkop—who explain in this way also the rule that a rabbinic-level doubt allows leniency. They basically say: why does a rabbinic-level doubt allow leniency? Because if the prohibition is rabbinic, then the whole problem here is not the poultry with milk itself—it is not problematic in itself. The whole problem is that I am not obeying the command of the Sages. Now if I am in doubt—or let’s formulate it differently—not that I am not obeying, but that I am rebelling against the command of the Sages. But if I am in doubt—if I am in doubt—a doubtful rebellion is not rebellion. Rebellion means there is a clear command and you go directly against it. But if I do not know whether it is forbidden or permitted—that is, it is not clear to me whether there is or is not a command here—such a thing is not called rebellion, and therefore there is no prohibition on that. That is how they explain it. The same idea the Netivot applies to a rabbinic prohibition committed unintentionally, they also apply to a rabbinic prohibition in a case of doubt—to a rabbinic-level doubt. Therefore one may be lenient in a rabbinic-level doubt. Now, I said earlier—just a parenthetical remark—I said earlier that even if I understand like the Netivot, that a rabbinic prohibition is a person-based prohibition, there is still room to say that there is reason to be stringent in a rabbinic-level doubt. From the rule regarding something that will later become permitted, we see there is reason to be stringent. So how does that fit, according to the Netivot, if it is really only a person-based prohibition? So I said: because the reason for the prohibition exists. The reason for the prohibition exists—even if it is a reason in the person, that doesn’t matter—but clearly one can still say, not only can one say it but it is obviously so, that there is reason to be stringent, but no halakhic obligation to be stringent. Halakhically, a rabbinic-level doubt allows leniency; one may be lenient. Everything I said earlier—that there is merely reason to be stringent—what these later authorities are explaining is not that there is no reason to be stringent, but that there is no obligation to be stringent. They come to explain why the law is that a rabbinic-level doubt allows leniency. Therefore this explanation also exists according to what I said earlier. I only said: don’t think this is just some neutral matter with no problem in it. No—there is a problem here, it’s just that there is no halakhic obligation to take it into account. If you want to take it into account, all the better for you. That is the claim. Now, I’m closing the parenthesis.
[Speaker C] If a doubtful rebel is not a rebel, then what is the problem in the end?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The problem is that the Sages commanded this for some reason. So on the formal level you have not violated a prohibition, since the whole prohibition is a prohibition against rebellion and you did not rebel. But you still have to ask yourself: why did the Sages prohibit poultry with milk? Why did they command it? Because poultry with milk is problematic—you may come to eat meat with milk. And that problem still exists. As I said earlier, that is true even for a person-based prohibition. Well, in any case, for our purposes, I want to claim as follows. There is Rabbi Elchanan Wasserman in Kovetz Ma'amarim; he has an essay on repentance. And there he asks various questions—not important right now—but he explains, citing the Ramchal, who says that in every act of a commandment and every act of a transgression there are two aspects. One aspect is the command, and the second aspect is the essence. For example, if I am commanded—I don’t know—to observe the Sabbath, then if I observed the Sabbath, that has two positive results. One result is that I listened to the command of the Torah and did not rebel. The very obedience to the command is itself a benefit that the commandment has. Beyond that, if the Torah told me to observe the Sabbath, apparently observing the Sabbath is something with positive consequences, something good, something proper. So if I observed the Sabbath, I also did something that is proper in itself, beyond the command. I once talked—I like this example—I wanted to explain the meaning of command in Jewish law. I said: what would happen if traffic lights operated the way we know them—red and green; you go on green, you don’t go on red—but there were no law forbidding it, that was just the custom. There is no law forbidding crossing on red. In principle you could cross on red. Okay, so if I cross on red, no police officer could stop me. Is there still reason to stop at red? Obviously yes, because it is dangerous to cross on red. What does that mean? That when the legislator forbids us to cross on red—true, on the formal plane in principle I am required to do it because the legislator said so. But the legislator also said it for some reason. He said it because it is dangerous to cross on a red light. So if someone crosses on red, he has done two problematic things. A, he did not obey the legislator. B, he entered an unnecessary danger. That is the matter of non-obedience, and the substantive issue in the act itself. After all, the fact that there is a command about something is because there is really some positive value in that thing—otherwise why command it? Or in the case of a prohibition, there is something negative in it—otherwise why prohibit it? Okay? Therefore, every time I do a commandment I have done two things: I obeyed the command, and I also did something positive in itself, which is why there is a command concerning it. Every time I do a transgression, I also do two things. A, I rebel against the command. And B, I do something problematic that the Torah prohibited; it is problematic, and therefore the Torah prohibited it. And therefore the Ritva and the Tosafot HaRosh explain that “greater is one who is commanded and performs than one who is not commanded and performs” is not because of all the moral casuistry and the like, but because of this issue: one who is commanded and performs gets two benefits or two positive results from what he did. He both obeyed the command and his act has a positive result. One who is not commanded and performs has the positive result of his act, but he was not commanded, so the obedience to command is absent. And again, you see that even where there is no command, that does not mean the positive or negative result does not exist. It only means the Torah does not require me to take it into account. For example, women with regard to positive time-bound commandments: according to almost all halakhic decisors, there is still value in women performing them. According to Raavad at the beginning of the Sifra on the positive commandments, it might even override a prohibition, even though they are not obligated in it at all. But they are not obligated. Not obligated—but the benefit they get from fulfilling the commandment still exists. And we see that the formal halakhic command and prohibition—yes, both with positive commandments and prohibitions—do not always come together with the reason. Sometimes the command will not exist but the reason still exists. Usually both the command and the reason exist. But in nullification by majority, for example, the command does not exist—you may eat it if it was nullified in the majority—but the reason does exist: you are eating pork. Or a rabbinic-level doubt: you may be lenient, there is no prohibition, no command, but there is still reason to be stringent, and so on. Yes? So there is this disconnect between the reason for the prohibition and the formal prohibition—whether there is or is not a prohibition, whether there is or is not a command. Now let’s return for a moment.
[Speaker G] But basically there is something hidden here in that claim—that behind every commandment there is some reason. Exactly. So can you give an example? Like, any commandment I give, can you give a reason for it?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, I can’t give a reason for any commandment you give me—or almost any commandment.
[Speaker G] So how does that claim work then?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But I think there is a reason, because it doesn’t seem to me that the Holy One, blessed be He, does things for no reason. Not because I know what the reasons are.
[Speaker G] Okay, I understand.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Maimonides writes in part three of the Guide for the Perplexed, Maimonides writes that there are those who are pleased to say that the commandments have no reason, because that glorifies the Holy One, blessed be He. Because if there are reasons, then it’s like ordinary human action.
[Speaker G] And that really was also something that crossed my mind, but I didn’t know how to formulate it.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Maimonides says that this is a great mistake, because once you say they have no reasons, you have made the Holy One, blessed be He, worse than human beings, not more exalted than human beings. He does things for no reason. No human being does things for no reason unless there is some cause. So why would the Holy One, blessed be He, do things for no reason? Anyway, almost always, when people study Jewish thought and the issue of the reasons for commandments, you always hear some survey like this: there are those who say commandments have no reasons, there are those who say they do have reasons, and then all the casuistry begins. There is no such thing. There are almost none who say commandments have no reasons. That’s just one of those things people always say in order to lay out the map. I don’t think there is really any serious view like that. Even though I’m not especially expert in books of Jewish thought and don’t think all that much of them either, still, I don’t think there really are such views in any serious way. But Maimonides certainly comes out forcefully against that view. In any case, for our purposes, what I am assuming here—and in this you are right.
[Speaker G] But this is not utilitarianism in Maimonides’ sense. What—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] How are you defining utilitarianism?
[Speaker G] It’s not like, do something and you get feedback, so to speak. There is—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] There is benefit in every commandment; that’s what he says. Whether I act because of the benefit—that is already the question of what my motivation is in doing it. But that there is benefit in a commandment—yes. And presumably because of that benefit we were also commanded. It’s just that, as motivation—why do I fulfill the commandment? I fulfill it because the Holy One, blessed be He, commanded it, not for the sake of the benefit. Understood. And also because the Holy One, blessed be He, commanded it. Fine? Yes, thank you. So if I return to our point, then basically the claim is that every commandment and every transgression has these two aspects. Now I ask myself: why must one be stringent in a Torah-level doubt? Because—
[Speaker C] Because maybe you’ll violate a prohibition.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Ah—or because of the dimension of the essence?
[Speaker C] Because of both, because maybe you’ll violate a prohibition and then—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] —you also won’t obey the command. No. So let me prove to you that this is not correct. Because with a rabbinic-level doubt, after all, we go leniently. Now what is the difference between rabbinic and Torah law? In Torah law you have both things, both the essence and the command. In rabbinic law you have only the command. There is no essence—that is the whole idea I’m discussing according to the Netivot. There is only the command and no essence,
[Speaker C] and we go leniently.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What does that mean? As we saw earlier. It means that a doubtful rebellion is not rebellion. A doubtful command is not problematic to violate. Right? We see that from the law that a rabbinic-level doubt allows leniency. Let’s now take that insight to the other side of the coin, and think now about why a Torah-level doubt requires stringency. I ask myself why there we go stringently. If I am in doubt whether this is pork or not pork, then from the standpoint of the command… I have a doubtful command. Rebellion against a doubtful command is not rebellion. So what is the problem? Why must one be stringent in a Torah-level doubt? Because of the essence. That is the proof. Because if it were because of the command, then I should have to be stringent also in rabbinic law. If in rabbinic law I do not have to be stringent, that means a doubtful command is not a reason to be stringent. So why in Torah law do I need to be stringent? Because Torah law has essence as well, not only command. And doubt about the essence obligates me to be stringent. And what does that really mean? It means that when there is a piece of meat before me and I do not know whether it is pork or kosher meat, why must I be stringent? Because it may be that I am eating pork. That is the doubt in the essence. In the end, there is a chance I am eating pork—a fifty percent chance, if that is the doubt. Okay? Therefore I must be stringent. Again, utility considerations, what we discussed earlier. And therefore it is precisely the essence that is the reason why in the laws of doubt one must be stringent. You have to be stringent because of utility considerations; the consideration of essence is really what I earlier called utility considerations. In the end, you may encounter a prohibition—there is a fifty percent chance you’ll eat pork. So you are not allowed to take that risk. Those are considerations of essence. Now I only want to complete the picture regarding Maimonides. Why—now I want to answer what I asked earlier in Maimonides—why with ordinary rabbinic laws, yes, fences, decrees, enactments and the like, do we go leniently in doubt? And with a doubtful law given to Moses at Sinai also leniently, because it is words of the Scribes according to Maimonides. But with doubt in laws derived from expositions we go stringently, even though they too are words of the Scribes according to Maimonides. My claim is the following claim—and one can bring many proofs to this, but we are dealing here with the laws of doubt so I won’t go into it too much.
[Speaker C] The claim is that there is also a Torah-level problem, but the Torah-level aspect is not—and there is no command.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I claim that Torah law must have both command and essence. That is the definition of Torah law according to Maimonides: if it has both command and essence. Now what? In a law given to Moses at Sinai, is there a command? Certainly there is. The command is transmitted orally; it is not written in the Torah, but there is a command. So why is it not written in the Torah? Why did the Holy One, blessed be He, decide to transmit it in oral tradition? Because it has no essence. In itself, from the halakhic point of view, one can be lenient. There is a command. Therefore, says Maimonides, a doubtful law given to Moses at Sinai is treated leniently, because with a doubtful command one can be lenient, like a rabbinic-level doubt. But with a law derived from exposition—just a second—with a law derived from exposition, why indeed is that law words of the Scribes? There the command is lacking but the essence exists. For example: “The Lord your God you shall fear”—this comes to include Torah scholars. So I expand reverence for Torah scholars, like reverence for God. Now according to Maimonides there is no command, because the verse does not speak about that—it is an exposition. I do not have a command anywhere. But the exposition tells me that the idea of honoring the Holy One, blessed be He, or reverence for the Holy One, blessed be He, also exists in reverence for Torah scholars. The reason exists there too, even though there is no command. That is the meaning of expositions according to Maimonides. So what will happen in a doubt about an exegetically derived law, a law derived from exposition? If I am in doubt, I need to go stringently. True, it is defined as words of the Scribes because it does not have both essence and command. But which of those two is missing? The command is missing; the essence exists. And once the essence exists, in a doubtful case one must go stringently. This is exactly the mirror image of a law given to Moses at Sinai, where the essence does not exist and only the command does. Therefore there, in a case of doubt, we go leniently.
[Speaker H] Okay, but if in rabbinic law there is no essence—in those places where there is no essence—then why exactly do the rabbis intervene? Why do they enter the picture? I said it. What, just for nothing? Just to put us to the test, to command us so we keep their command?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] You can ask the same thing, even more strongly, about a law given to Moses at Sinai: why does a law given to Moses at Sinai forbid something if there is no essence in it? For most of the medieval authorities that is already Torah law; according to Maimonides it is rabbinic. The same question, and the answer is what I gave earlier. Obviously there is a reason for which we were commanded. But on the halakhic level, that reason is not enough to constitute an essence of prohibition. Therefore, on the halakhic level, I see this prohibition as one rooted only in the command. Ask me whether there is reason to be stringent—certainly yes. In a doubtful law given to Moses at Sinai, just like in a doubtful rabbinic law, there is definitely reason to be stringent, even though there is no obligation to be stringent. Since the reason for the prohibition exists. There too the command has a reason; it’s just not a reason strong enough for it to count as an object-based prohibition even on the Torah level. There is a command to be careful. The practical difference is in a doubtful case. Okay?
[Speaker C] So Rabbi, therefore the formulation “a Torah-level doubt requires stringency and a rabbinic-level doubt allows leniency” is only an incidental formulation; it’s not an essential formulation. The matter doesn’t depend on whether it’s Torah law or rabbinic law?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The concept of rabbinic law according to Maimonides has many shades. And not all of them have the same rules. It is not a sweeping rule for all rabbinic laws. It depends what kind of rabbinic law we are talking about. There is a spectrum of levels of rabbinic law. There are other levels too, but we won’t get into that here.
[Speaker B] Why do you determine—why do you determine—that a law given to Moses at Sinai has no essence? Because it’s—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I’m not determining it; I’m explaining what Maimonides says. I’m not sure—
[Speaker B] No, but that is actually similar to what you mentioned earlier in the name of Maimonides—that those who say commandments have no reason—so no reason means no essence to commandments. It actually negates something.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s what Ezra asked earlier, and I’ll answer you what I answered him. Obviously there is a reason for every command. Also for a rabbinic command, and also for a law given to Moses at Sinai. But that reason is not strong enough for this to be considered a Torah-level prohibition in terms of essence. It is only a Torah-level prohibition at the level of obeying the command. That’s all. But it’s not that the command is arbitrary. Obviously there is a reason. Therefore in a rabbinic-level doubt there is reason to be stringent, even though there is no obligation to be stringent. Because the reason for the command—of course there is a reason—it exists. It’s just not a reason strong enough, like the reason not to eat pork. The reason not to eat pork is an object-based prohibition. That is completely problematic, okay? When the substantive problem that gave rise to the command is not all that strong, then it is not enough to classify it as a Torah-level prohibition, and therefore, in the halakhic perspective, there is no essence here. But clearly, beyond the halakhic framework, there is some element of prohibition here, and there is reason to be stringent and distance oneself from it. Okay?
[Speaker D] Rabbi, what is the difference between expositions of the Sages—what… what is the difference between expositions of the Sages, regarding which we treat the essence as something one must be stringent about in a doubtful case, as opposed to any prohibition or enactment of the Sages, where presumably there is also some kind of essence, sometimes even more openly?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, again—there is essence there, but not on the halakhic level. On the halakhic level, that essence is not enough to count as the essence of a prohibition. It is a reason why the command was created. But now I have the command.
[Speaker D] But the very fact that it’s an exposition—what is that, exactly?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] An exposition basically says… what does the exposition say? It expands a Torah law. “The Lord your God you shall fear”—clearly there is essence in reverence for God, right? And the exposition says that the same essence also exists in reverence for Torah scholars. This is not a law the Sages produced from their own reasoning; it is an expansion of a law that exists in the Torah. A law that exists in the Torah is certainly an essence important enough.
[Speaker D] According to that logic, could one give another specific example, of the final blessing? Of what? I didn’t understand. That the Sages instituted it, say, from their own reasoning, but there is some similarity to Grace after Meals.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And therefore what?
[Speaker D] And therefore to give it some kind of Torah-level force in doubtful cases.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, impossible. Only if they had derived it by exposition from the verse “and you shall eat and be satisfied.” But if they derive it from their own reasoning or from their own decision, then it is not an expansion of a Torah law. It is just plain rabbinic law. It’s no longer… that is not what we do in halakhic interpretation. Only if there is an exposition that anchors that rabbinic law in a verse are you basically saying that this rabbinic law is an expansion of the idea in the verse. Okay?
[Speaker D] But it seems that the overall picture that emerges from Maimonides is not all that convincing. Why? What’s the problem? Also this whole issue of the status he gives to laws given to Moses at Sinai—that is, as something whose essence is weaker.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Why does a Torah-level doubt require stringency and doubt regarding expositions also require stringency? There is a difficulty here; I’m not starting from pure speculation.
[Speaker D] No, I mean about Maimonides himself, not about the explanation.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Ah—how Maimonides came to this, that can be discussed. But just generally, there is room to ask yourself: if a law given to Moses at Sinai is Torah law, as all the medieval authorities understand, then why was it not written? Why was it left oral? What distinguishes… and it’s not that there are so many of them that there was no room to write them. No, there are several such laws—not all that many. So Maimonides offers an explanation: these are laws whose essence is not important enough to count as Torah law, and therefore the Holy One, blessed be He, decided to leave them out and transmit them orally.
[Speaker D] Even though, however, they are indispensable for fulfilling the classical Torah commandments?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Again, if it is a law given to Moses at Sinai that is an interpretation of a Torah law—like the law given to Moses at Sinai about fixed measures—then it is Torah law even according to Maimonides.
[Speaker D] Ah, so also things about phylacteries and the sukkah and—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I’m talking about something innovative, not something that interprets an existing law.
[Speaker D] Okay, okay, that resolves it.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Fine. I suggest we stop here and continue next time.
[Speaker I] Thank you very much.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] May we hear good news. Thank you very much. May we hear good news.
[Speaker D] Rabbi, can I ask a somewhat broader question about the lesson? Yes. There is this issue of relating to a halakhic topic as Torah-level… wait… Sometimes the way halakhic decisors relate to Torah law and rabbinic law is not only regarding the case itself, but whether the matter is… say, according to most medieval authorities it is Torah-level, according to some medieval authorities it is rabbinic. And then they’ll say: if the majority view is that it is Torah-level, then we’ll treat it as Torah-level because… that is, they apply the rule that a Torah-level doubt requires stringency and a rabbinic-level doubt allows leniency to the very ruling itself, not only to a concrete case.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, I didn’t understand the question. Again. Take an imaginary example if you want, it doesn’t matter, make one up. Give me something concrete—I’m not understanding the question.
[Speaker D] Actually it’s slipping away from me right now. I’ll try—I’ll hold onto it.
[Speaker E] Rabbi, for example, “an eye for an eye” means monetary compensation. According to Maimonides, what is that? I didn’t understand. When the Torah writes, “an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth, a foot for a foot,” and the Sages say no, no, it means monetary compensation—would that be considered Torah-level according to Maimonides, or rabbinic?
[Speaker C] That’s an interpretation, not a derashah.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The derashah also interprets the verse. The derashah doesn’t expand it. The derashah says: don’t put out an eye; instead, take monetary compensation. That would be a Torah-level law. By the way, regarding this, it seems to me that Maimonides explicitly writes that this is a sustaining derashah. Meaning, it is a law from Sinai. I think this is the example he brings.
[Speaker E] So if it’s from Sinai, then it’s rabbinic? No. A law to Moses from Sinai… no…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It’s a law that is derived from a verse, but was also transmitted in the tradition from Sinai. And according to Maimonides—and I haven’t yet talked about this category—that’s another category in Maimonides. If there is a law that is transmitted by tradition, but also has a derashah based on it, then it is Torah-level. Nachmanides was puzzled by this. He says: after all, tradition by itself is rabbinic, and something that comes from a derashah is also rabbinic, but if you have tradition and derashah together, suddenly it’s Torah-level? How does zero plus zero equal one? And the answer is that it’s half plus half, not zero plus zero. A law to Moses from Sinai means there is a command, and the derashah means there is substance. Once you have command plus substance, then it really is a Torah-level law.
[Speaker E] Rabbi, if Maimonides’ approach is that everything has a reason, so to speak—this whole Euthyphro thing, that in essence even the Holy One, blessed be He, is so to speak subject to reason…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It could be that He also created the reason. Fine.
[Speaker E] Yes, but then Maimonides is basically creating a certain ranking, where the obligation is…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No.
[Speaker E] I don’t know, you can’t say here that this is the moral obligation, but the obligation stands on its own.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I think the difficulty in this context can of course be raised. You asked whether these reasons—say I perform this or that commandment because it brings about some kind of correction in the world, or in the person, or in society, whatever it may be. But the Holy One, blessed be He, could have created the world, the person, or society in such a way that this correction would not be achieved this way, but in some other way—or that this correction wouldn’t be needed at all. After all, everything is in His hands, and He created the whole framework. That already brings us back to the Euthyphro dilemma. That’s a different discussion; no, I’m not getting into that here. Let’s say that the Holy
[Speaker E] One, blessed be He, could have created a world with no morality in it—that’s a question of whether that’s even possible.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] My claim was in column four-five-seven. There, there I talked about the fact that in my view morality is like logic. It’s impossible to create a world with a different morality.
[Speaker E] Exactly.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But that’s what I say—that’s my own position regarding the Euthyphro dilemma. Here I’m not entering into the discussion of the Euthyphro dilemma. Is it five-four-seven or
[Speaker E] four-five-seven—which column is that?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Do you hear?
[Speaker I] “A Look at the Euthyphro Dilemma in Light of the Debate,” four-five-seven. Four-five-seven, okay.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Did someone ask something?
[Speaker E] No, I’m just saying once again: if we were to accept this idea, the way the Rabbi says it—that it’s something logical that exists in all possible worlds—then there really could be a certain ranking at the level of the reasons, and therefore Maimonides makes the distinction between a Torah prohibition and a rabbinic prohibition much more flexible, because in the end both a Torah prohibition and a rabbinic prohibition depend on something more essential, which is the reason itself.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] At different levels of it.
[Speaker E] Right, absolutely.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Many later authorities (Acharonim) write, for example, about rabbinic Sabbath restrictions. There is a well-known conceptual inquiry among the later authorities (Acharonim): is a rabbinic Sabbath restriction, from the standpoint of Torah law, something with no problem in it at all, and it’s only an innovation of the Sages? Or does a rabbinic Sabbath restriction contain a problem, only it’s not severe enough to be forbidden at the Torah level, so it’s like half-Torah-level, and the Sages decided to forbid even that—but it still has a Torah-level dimension; it’s not neutral from the standpoint of Torah law. So there are, there are many such conceptual inquiries. Is that it? Okay, once again, may we hear good news. Amen, goodbye. Amen.