Symposium Marking the Launch of the Trilogy by Rabbi Meir Yitzhak Yavetz

[Speaker A] All right, you also wanted to speak about the second book at the beginning, if I understood correctly, but I tried to convince him anyway that it can’t be that people will think I was right only in the third book. So I’m inviting him, a rabbi from the Derech Chaim yeshiva, and I’m inviting him to say a bit about the third book as well.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Good evening. By now it really is evening. I understood that the first book isn’t interesting, we’ve already chewed over the second book, so I’m left with the little matter of refreshing Jewish law in the third book, to say a few things. The third book is more legal; it’s the jurisprudence of Jewish law. I studied in the Brisk yeshiva for two years, and there was a joker in the yeshiva who, when people asked questions during the lecture, would say — there was always someone there who would claim, “What is there to ask here? What do you mean?” In Brisk, the structure of the lecture is basically this: you don’t come there necessarily to learn what he himself innovated, but mainly what he quotes from grandfather, from the Griz, and what father answered him. So they would ask a question, and he’d say, “I don’t understand what you’re asking. Didn’t grandfather say it?” In Yiddish that’s called “a difficulty on a story.” What are you asking? I’m telling you that grandfather said it, and father told him no, and grandfather agreed, or grandfather didn’t agree. What’s your question? Did he say it or not say it? I’m telling you what he said — what do you want? In all kinds of arguments that have been going on, even before the books, inside the books, and after the books, there’s this kind of statement: “We are not obligated” — the author tells us, “This is my opinion.” So what are we left to say? “It isn’t your opinion”? Presumably it will remain his opinion. So what exactly are we arguing about — whether it’s his opinion or not? Rather, the question is: what is going to be our opinion, if we are persuaded? That’s what we’re discussing: whether we were persuaded, when the author tells us, “I myself am not persuaded by my predecessors.” So okay, fine, I understand, you presented your view, very good. So what is the motivation, really? The motivation is apparently indeed to check who is right, so let’s bring into the discussion some other people who are also trying to be right. But in the third book — I’ll get to this as well — in some sense I can stand on firmer ground, because Rabbi Miki also writes that in this area authority certainly has significance, and there are also more sources in the book. It’s also built as a dialogue, but there are more sources in the book because we are coming to discuss halakhic jurisprudence, and there you can certainly discuss to what extent the system of precedent is binding or not binding. But if you come to discuss what Jewish law says, then you will have to ask Jewish law what it says. Otherwise I can just say “Jewish law” by myself. If I’m not bound by the ancients, not by the medieval authorities (Rishonim), not by the Amoraim, not by the Tannaim, not by the Hebrew Bible, then okay — not even by Moses our teacher. Then we have nowhere to stop at all. In matters of opinion I understand that in some place even Moses our teacher is not the final word, in the earlier books. But in the third book the whole discussion is what Moses our teacher said, and what was said after him, and what developed from that. In the end, if we’re talking about norms — I’m using more of the language of the book here — then normatively we have to arrive at some agreement, and there also has to be some basis for the discussion.

So, about the need and the possibility of refreshing Jewish law. I דווקא want to begin from the points I do agree with, and more than that, I’m a bit surprised. First of all, honestly, full disclosure: I didn’t read the book. It takes a great deal of time, and unfortunately — or fortunately, both — I’m busy, and I didn’t manage to go through his whole book, let alone the previous books. I was given this challenge, this task, and I tried to deal with parts of it. I’ll touch on several parts, but I’m also speaking on the basis of previous discussions, also here at the institute I think around a decade ago or something like that, and before that and after that and around these issues and correspondence and so on. So I’m not promising that every single thing is anchored in the book itself, but I think the spirit of things is the same. In any case, I did go through certain chapters and several examples. When Rabbi Miki speaks about the need to refresh Jewish law, basically the grim picture today — I think that much one can agree with. At least I agree. We have a problem. Now, I am not coming to this problem from outside Jewish law; I’m coming to the problem from within Jewish law. Jewish law itself says there is a problem. Jewish law says — again, you can’t speak for everyone; maybe those present here will agree, maybe not; outside, certainly across the street, certainly not everyone will agree. There are people who would say that we are living in a halakhic paradise. I think the Written Torah and the Oral Torah say clearly that we are stuck. There is definitely a problem; Orthodox Jewish law as it exists suffers from degeneration. I think that is by definition. Where is that written? In the Torah: “If a matter of judgment is too difficult for you — between blood and blood, between law and law, and between lesion and lesion, matters of dispute in your gates — then you shall arise and go up to the place that the Lord your God will choose.” Okay, I want to apply that. A legal matter is beyond me; I ask the Torah what I’m supposed to do. “You shall arise and go up to the place.” I arose, I went up. I got there — there’s a security guard at the entrance, a judge is standing there. The Torah says there is a need for a mechanism that will deal with this complicated thing, because this wagon has to keep moving. Obviously, if over the years mud has accumulated on the road, and there is no one to clear away the mud and no one to put chains on the wheels, then the wagon will get stuck. This is built in. I really think that anyone who learns this from within the Torah learns the problem from within the Torah: there is definitely a problem. What kind of question is that? Otherwise, if we can manage for two thousand years without the supreme religious court, then why for a thousand years was there a supreme religious court? A useless institution; what a waste of salaries. Why do we need it? Of course we need a supreme religious court — how can you do without it? No law can function without a legal system, without authority; it doesn’t work. You need a parliament, you need someone to deal with it. Of course we are stuck. That’s not even a question. The motivation is obvious. True, we suffer from post-trauma over motivation — maybe over-motivation — which may well have begun in the right places; it probably did begin in the right places. What happened in Europe, with the proto-Reformers, the Enlightenment figures, and so on — they probably also came with good questions, and we are suffering from post-trauma. There is no doubt about that. I think one can honestly agree about that point. In any case, I have no disagreement on that point.

When Rabbi Miki draws the lines of where we are aiming, when he already tries to apply things, or at least to crack open a conceptual toolbox, which we’ll discuss in a moment, he also draws the red lines. And to my surprise, his red lines are defined as “a matter the Sadducees admit” — that, we do not touch. That is the formulation that appears in the book. Meaning: the verses we do not touch. I want to tell you that on this point too, I disagree. I disagree with that. First of all, as a definition — “a matter the Sadducees admit” — I’ll ask you a simple question: do the Sadducees admit that “an eye for an eye” means literally an eye for an eye? I don’t think so. There isn’t a clear proof, but still. But the Sadducees certainly — or at least the Boethusians certainly — did not agree that “the morrow of the Sabbath” means the day after the holiday. So maybe that isn’t the supreme religious court, maybe it’s a law given to Moses at Sinai. But it’s not the case that if things are written in the verse and the Sadducees admit them, we cannot touch them. I definitely think the supreme religious court was authorized, and will be authorized, to address even things that the Sadducees admit. The Torah was handed over to the Sages. Of course I can’t say that we shouldn’t recite the Shema. But to do things properly — again, and I emphasize this — to come from within Jewish law and say that Jewish law is in distress, not that human beings are in distress. Human beings in distress — that is a question of permitting an agunah. That’s a question for a halakhic decisor: how do I deal with this within the system? But when Jewish law is in distress, because the goal of Jewish law is to live, and today in certain places — many places — Jewish law is not succeeding in living, or not succeeding in living as it should; there are weights on it. It is the job of the supreme religious court to discuss that. And I don’t know exactly where the red line is. There are red lines, but I do not agree with the line of “what the Sadducees admit.” I’ll tell you, just as an illustration: I personally raised — I put in writing — a proposal. I think I should really write a more developed position paper on this and submit it to the supreme religious court at its first convening, or at least when they open the drawer for proposals. I propose discussing when the day begins. I have not seen it stated explicitly in the Torah that the Sabbath must begin at the appearance of the stars. I would have no problem if the court announced that, in light of cultural change in the modern world, the Sabbath begins at midnight. I know Ibn Ezra’s Sabbath Letter, where he cries out about this and all that, in his time. There’s a lot to discuss. I don’t think this is called harming “a matter the Sadducees admit.” Not that the Sadducees are my standard — again, I’m saying, they are not my standard. I think one can definitely discuss what the Torah wants from us. As long as we are discussing what the Torah wants from us, I have no problem. I’m not even sure I said anything here that is a disagreement with something written in the book, but I’m saying this really is critical to the discussion. I’ll get later to the question of how much we are working from within the Torah.

An important matter here, something fairly fundamental in the process through which Rabbi Miki is trying to develop a toolbox — and he challenged me yesterday with a column in Ynet, I think. Someone sent me today — no, before today — someone sent me a link to a column that went up yesterday saying that one really does need to develop the toolbox in order to give us the ability, as it were, not to wait for the Messiah, but to examine what we can already do. And there is a mechanism here that I want to discuss for a few minutes, as they say, on the body of the Jewish law itself — simply a plain disagreement over the straightforward meaning of Maimonides. Rabbi Miki proposes — I didn’t come equipped with it, there’s a Maimonides there in Judges, the Laws of Rebels. Do we have Maimonides there? Here I also have — I’ll manage with this. The Laws of Rebels is of course the source. If there’s Maimonides from Judges there it would help me a bit, but I apologize for not bringing it. My mistake. Maimonides discusses the ability of one court to disagree with previous courts. Rabbi Miki also deals with this at length in several places, also in the book on Maimonides that I once took part in together with Rabbi Miki — a long discussion there of the authority of the Sages vis-à-vis their predecessors, the question of precedent. And Maimonides writes — fine, I’ll manage with this. “If the supreme religious court interpreted one of the principles according to what seemed right in their eyes, and ruled accordingly, and after them another court arose and found another reason to overturn it, then it may overturn it, as it says, ‘to the judge who will be in those days.’” Meaning, in Torah-level law, in the thirteen interpretive principles, okay, in words of the Sages and so on — but these are not rabbinic decrees — then any court can disagree with the previous one. Further: “If a court decreed a decree, or enacted an enactment, or established a custom, and the matter spread throughout all Israel, and after them another court arose and wished to annul the words of the first and uproot that enactment, that decree, or that custom, it cannot do so unless it is greater than the first in wisdom and number.” And then Maimonides explains how this can be, and explicitly refers only to the supreme religious court of seventy-one. So how can one be greater in number? Seventy-one against seventy-one? He means public acceptance. Fine. And after that Maimonides says: if they did this in order to decree or prohibit, to make a fence — if its prohibition spread throughout all Israel, the supreme religious court cannot uproot it and permit it, even if it were greater than the first. Up to this point, basically, we are pretty boxed in. We have no agreement, and basically no way to move from this position. And here Rabbi Miki found a trick. “But a court may uproot even these things temporarily, even though it is smaller than the first, for these decrees should not be more severe than the words of the Torah itself, for even the words of the Torah any court may uproot as a temporary emergency ruling. How so? A court that sees a need to strengthen the religion and make a fence so that the people not transgress the Torah may flog contrary to the law and punish contrary to the law, but they do not establish the matter for generations and say that this is the law.” Good. So one can make a temporary enactment. What’s the problem? Of course the problem is: temporary — and then another temporary, and another. How long is “temporary”? Is “temporary” sixty minutes? Is it a year? A generation? Until the need passes? What is “temporary”? “And similarly, if they saw a need temporarily to suspend a positive commandment or transgress a prohibition” — there are no limits; if it’s temporary, anything can be done. “Just as a doctor amputates this one’s hand or leg so that the whole may live, so a court instructs at certain times to violate some commandments temporarily so that all of them may endure, in the way that the earlier Sages said: ‘Desecrate one Sabbath for him so that he may observe many Sabbaths.’” Excellent. So here, Rabbi Miki tells us in the book and brings us good news. Listen, I suddenly found out — how long is “temporary”? No limit. A temporary emergency ruling, as long as they declare that it is a temporary emergency ruling. Does that sound reasonable? Honestly, no. A temporary emergency ruling is, by definition, temporary, right? An emergency. Rabbi Miki comes and says: it is written in Maimonides, proven. Where is it written in Maimonides? Now this is cardinal, because there is a huge question here: can it now be — later I’ll have restrictions about who, only a recognized court and so on that has authority — but we have already gotten rid of the need for the supreme religious court. Excellent, no need to wait for the supreme religious court. Why? Because there is a temporary emergency ruling. A temporary emergency ruling has far fewer restrictions; in principle it can even apply to Torah law. Here: we do not blow the shofar on Rosh Hashanah when it falls on the Sabbath, already for thousands of years — temporary emergency ruling. Wonderful. That really is a terrific solution. It just doesn’t sound reasonable. Again — a temporary emergency ruling for two thousand years? That’s not a temporary emergency ruling. By definition it isn’t. It’s not reasonable. So what do we do? But it’s written in Maimonides.

Maimonides continues and says: “Since a court has the authority to decree and prohibit something permitted, and its prohibition will stand for generations, and likewise they have the authority to permit Torah prohibitions temporarily, then what about ‘do not add’ and ‘do not subtract’?” He says they have to make clear — they have to say: if they come and say this is what the Torah meant, that is “do not add” and “do not subtract.” But if they come and say the Torah said one thing but we are placing an asterisk on it, that is permitted. Well then, if we see that poultry cooked in milk has been prohibited for two thousand years and they are not violating “do not add,” that means it is a temporary emergency ruling. Meaning, it is written explicitly in Maimonides that even two thousand years can be a temporary emergency ruling, right? Explicitly in Maimonides, the authority of the court to change Torah law is through a temporary emergency ruling, and if we know that the rabbis did things contrary to the Torah and they have lasted for thousands of years, that means a temporary emergency ruling is not limited in time. Fantastic solution. I just have one small problem. This is based on Maimonides, we said, right? Poultry cooked in milk, Rosh Hashanah falling on the Sabbath — otherwise it simply makes no sense that two thousand years would be called temporary. But if it is written in Maimonides, then let’s read. “Since a court has the authority to decree and prohibit something permitted, and its prohibition will stand for generations, and likewise they have the authority to permit Torah prohibitions temporarily.” Then what about “do not add” and “do not subtract”? “Since a court has the authority to decree and prohibit something permitted, and its prohibition will stand for generations, and likewise they have the authority to permit Torah prohibitions temporarily.” There are two categories here. With all due respect, there is a mixing up within the sentence here. Maimonides said two things, and there is a comma between them. One can prohibit something permitted for generations — there is no violation of “do not add” there if they make clear that it is a rabbinic prohibition. They can do that, and it is not under the law of a temporary emergency ruling. In his introduction, in his introductions and here in the laws, everywhere Maimonides divides Jewish law into five parts, three principal ones — yes? There is Torah law, there is rabbinic law, and there are decrees. That is not subject to a temporary emergency ruling. That is simple: the authority of the Sages. The mechanism of a temporary emergency ruling is the “and likewise.” Before that it was: since they have the authority to prohibit something permitted and its prohibition will stand for generations. And likewise they have another authority: they have the authority to permit Torah prohibitions temporarily. I do not know of any Torah prohibition that the Sages permitted for more than a temporary emergency ruling. Bring me one example from the Shulchan Arukh. All the examples brought in the book are rabbinic laws that came to prohibit something permitted, or to uproot something from the Torah through passive omission. That is not subject to the category of temporary emergency ruling. That is the sugya in tractate Yevamot — for example, uprooting the blowing of the shofar on the Sabbath out of concern that one may carry it. That is an internal Torah consideration. I do not know of a case where the Sages came and permitted a Torah prohibition that would have to be placed under the category of temporary emergency ruling. There is no such thing. And if there is no such thing, then of course it is not reasonable. A temporary emergency ruling is temporary. There is no such Maimonides here, with all due respect. So if there is no such Maimonides, we need another source. In the book I saw that the source is Maimonides. I learned Maimonides inside, and I do not find such a Maimonides. There is a comma. The book ignores the comma. So in the second book they ignore the hyphen; in the third book apparently they ignore the comma. But for our purposes — what do the Hasidim call it? The Maimonidean passage flew away. It is gone. You know that story that the Baal Shem Tov once argued with a law in Maimonides? It’s a well-known Hasidic tale. He argued with a law in Maimonides, went up to heaven, met Maimonides there, argued with him, proved to him that he was wrong, Maimonides conceded, and the Maimonidean passage flew away — in all the books of Maimonides that law was deleted. There is some Hasidic legend like that; I don’t know its source. So on that it may be said: the Maimonidean passage flew away. In my humble opinion, there is no such Maimonides. If there is no such Maimonides, then a temporary emergency ruling is a temporary emergency ruling. One can indeed uproot things temporarily. I agree that even today — look, in our own time we merited to see the Chief Rabbinate issue an instruction not to kiss mezuzot. Amazing — a temporary emergency ruling. Not kissing mezuzot because of the coronavirus panic. A temporary emergency ruling — we can uproot words of the Torah, Heaven forbid. Okay, fine, that wasn’t really the point.

Now, as for the red lines, as I said — on precisely that point I want to say that I’m willing to be even bolder. For example, I think changes are not necessarily changes at all. Meaning, when a court comes and proposes proposals — and here we can indeed discuss whether anyone ever said we need a court — there are things that, to some extent, Rabbi Miki also discusses in the book: one can simply offer a renewed interpretation, which is not even really a renewed interpretation but a more correct definition of the matter. When we get there, then the question will really be asked: suppose you agree with me that the mechanism Rabbi Miki proposed does not exist. But maybe we don’t even need a mechanism. And then maybe we’ll need to give an answer from the other direction. Let me give an example. Rabbi Miki deals with the question of the status of women in Jewish law. For example, the question of women being disqualified from testimony. Women are disqualified from testimony in the laws of testimony. A simple, familiar, accepted matter. Rabbi Miki says this is not a stringency. If I’m right, it’s a leniency. After all, if someone committed a transgression in front of women, he won’t be punished? Women testify that someone owes money, and he won’t have to pay? Why? So let’s discuss it. Maybe we need to reexamine it. Maybe it’s no longer justified. Once, women were not involved in commerce, women were not in the marketplace, there was no reason to rely on them. Let’s say, for the sake of argument, that they did not understand the economic significance of their testimony, just as it is also written regarding men that someone who does not work is disqualified from testimony because he does not appreciate the value of his testimony and therefore does not take it seriously. So there are reasons, and if we identify the reason, then we can say that today it no longer applies. But what’s the problem? We can’t change it. I’m not at all sure that this counts as a change. What is written in the Talmud? Why are women disqualified from testimony? What is the source? The Talmud asks: from where are these words derived? “Our rabbis taught: ‘And the two men who have the dispute shall stand before the Lord.’” And from where do we know that these are men and not women? The whole Torah is spoken in the masculine form; Scripture equates woman with man. “Man” — the medieval authorities (Rishonim) there mention this. A bit later in the Talmud it is already stated that there is some logic here, that “all the glory of the king’s daughter is inward,” and it is not fitting. It is not fitting that a woman — the Talmud discusses whether the verse refers there to litigants or to witnesses. I’m not going into the whole topic in tractate Shevuot 30 here. But it is fairly clear that if it speaks of “men,” that excludes women who are not within the definition of those “men” being discussed there. I think one can absolutely interpret this easily to mean that “men” is not a biological definition; “men” is a cultural definition. By definition. I’m not simply expounding the verse freely; I’m saying that this is all that was stated. Because it doesn’t say “men and not women”; it says, “And the two men who have the dispute shall stand,” and that refers to a certain cultural status. Now discuss it. What is this comparable to? It is like a rabbinic law that the Rema in the Shulchan Arukh brings in the name of the medieval authorities (Rishonim), that “our women are important and therefore require reclining.” Yes — “a woman need not recline,” but “our women do need to recline.” Why? Because “a woman need not recline” does not mean a woman in the biological sense; it means a woman in terms of status. A woman did not practice the custom of freedom, and our women do. And “our” is not only “our” in our own time — it has already been this way for five hundred years. Women do belong to the customs of freedom. Maybe here there is a difference between the Shulchan Arukh and the Rema because of genuine cultural differences — perhaps the ban of Rabbenu Gershom caused this, and therefore it was more true in Ashkenaz than in the lands to which the Shulchan Arukh referred. But today it applies to everyone. On the other hand, those who do not recline rely on the Raavyah — it’s a whole sugya. But again, this is not a biological definition; it is a cultural definition.

I’ll give you something that is maybe, on the one hand, a bit bolder, but on the other hand could also be more persuasive. The Talmud says that women are exempt from sukkah, not within the general framework of time-bound positive commandments — that is a different discussion — but women are exempt from sukkah because there is a verse. The Talmud asks why the verse is needed, but what is the verse? “All the citizenry in Israel” — to exclude the woman. How does “citizenry” exclude a woman? Because a woman did not vote in elections, right? That’s how I understand it. A woman was not a citizen. What? Because she is a female citizen? No — the whole Torah is spoken in the masculine because the Torah addresses citizens. And in the ancient world the men were citizens; the women were not citizens, male or female. I understand this as speaking about status. “All the citizenry in Israel” — I think that for something like this, in principle, one does not even need the supreme religious court. In principle, we need to apply what is written: “All the citizenry in Israel shall dwell in sukkot.” If you are a citizen — or if you are a female citizen — then you are obligated in sukkah. In principle, it seems to me that this argument is even more valid than what is presented in the book. So five minutes, okay? So on this point I’m willing to be the reformer, yes? I think this is not reform in the way the book presents it — “midrashic conservatism,” that’s what it’s called. I think it is simply understanding things as they are at their source. I do not expect the Sages to say yes or no when they spoke in their own world. They talk to me about an ox that gored a cow; I’m not supposed to conclude from that that if a car hits another car there is no liability, okay? Obviously we are only applying the principle. On this point, you don’t even need the supreme religious court. So why shouldn’t we just get up and do it? Maybe really yes? De facto it will happen — it could be. But what? Here the big question is: where are we going with all this? If this is a motion on the agenda, then the question is: to whom are we submitting this motion? The halakhic norm is addressed to the Jewish people. If I need to know how I serve God — fine. There is a question: maybe many of the commandments burden me, weigh me down, create a barrier between me and God in terms of my personality structure. That may well be. Maimonides also writes things like that in the Guide for the Perplexed. But that is not the discussion. The discussion is how the Jewish people, if necessary, change — or better, live correctly — how the Jewish people correctly weigh halakhic considerations and apply them in accordance with the circumstances of here and now. Therefore I think that any call — I see two possibilities for how this can happen. A call for a revolutionary move is impossible. How do I know? Because they already tried it in the last two hundred years, probably more than once, and all it succeeded in doing was creating rupture. I think an evolutionary process could be a healthy process. But an evolutionary process must arise from within Jewish law, according to the rules of Jewish law, and the distress is first and foremost the distress of Jewish law, not the distress of human beings. I’m not all that moved by the distress of human beings. A local hardship has to be solved — that too is a halakhic directive, by the way. But still, it doesn’t really bother me that something is a little difficult, a little inconvenient — we’ll manage. If it’s genuine distress, there are also issues of that sort here, but I won’t have time to touch them, maybe in a sentence or two — issues that really are distress, and already broader distress. But the approach has to come from inside, from what is troubling Jewish law, and how I apply Jewish law correctly. In a revolutionary move, in a revolution, it won’t happen. In a long evolutionary process — very long — it can happen, or through a catastrophe method. That too can be positive. For example, the establishment of the State of Israel was a window of opportunity in which one could have established a supreme religious court and begun to deliberate. But, as they say, the moment was lost. Why? For well-known reasons. Fine. So what, shall we wait for the next upheaval that comes? Or proceed through a long and creeping process. There is no other solution if we want Jewish law to remain in its place.

But one final word, really, on the more burning issues, without going into examples because I don’t have the time. When we come to discuss whether something fits our concepts, there is a chapter here on Jewish law and morality, on the tension with moral values by which we live. On tensions involving statuses in society, or the attitude toward others — there are several chapters on that here. If I remember correctly, there are four chapters here: on secular Jews, on non-Jews, on women, and on homosexuals. The attitude — I just read straight through the index, yes? — how do we approach those issues? Here I think — and this is also very much connected to the chapter on Jewish law and morality — here I think we must not reduce things, must not switch off the Torah’s microphone when it stops speaking in terms of “bridge principles,” as the book defines it. It’s as though Rabbi Miki puts the Torah in the role of saying: given A, the Torah says bridge B, therefore C. Meaning, the Torah’s role is to translate values into norms. I do not accept that. The Torah’s role is to establish values. True, there is “and you shall do what is right and good in the eyes of the Lord,” and the Holy One, blessed be He, relies on our conscience — but within limits. Meaning, our conscience is a basis, but the Torah definitely purports, and is supposed, to educate our conscience and our morality, and also to straighten them out. Meaning, if the Torah says about something that it is abominable in its eyes, that it is immoral in its eyes, then wait a second — but why doesn’t it feel immoral to me? Right, because you were educated in a Western moral school, and the Torah does not need to stand in line before Western morality and receive a kosher certification. The Torah has an entire world of values. The Torah also purports — heaven forbid — to establish moral facts. Yes, this thing is not of value. Don’t like it? Too bad — you didn’t understand. As an illustration, there is a sugya in tractate Shabbat where the Talmud asks whether something that encloses a small domain counts as a partition or not. The Talmud says: if it forms a partition for others, all the more so for itself. We learned this in kollel, and someone asked: what is the reasoning? They told him: that is the reasoning — you didn’t understand. If the Talmud gives a definition, you look for the reasoning; when the Talmud gives the reasoning, you don’t look for another reasoning — that is the reasoning. Didn’t understand? Go learn what a Talmudic head is. That is the reasoning. The Torah educates us what to think, what is moral, what is not right. Today morality means harm to another. The Torah does not accept that. Not true — morality is not just harm to another. Morality is harm to a sacred value, which incidentally is also harm to another. Why is the wood-gatherer liable to death? Because he cools off the Sabbath among the Jewish people, and then he harms their faith. So apart from everything else, he is also an immoral person. But harming people’s principles, harming a society’s principles — that is immoral, even if today society does not accept this because everything is by consent. And in truth, even at the margins, today’s society is not exactly like that either, but I won’t go now into a discussion of the philosophy of morality. But the Torah absolutely has a mandate to tell us what is of value, what is right. On this point I, and others, have a disagreement with Rabbi Miki. And I think this is exactly where the importance of studying the Bible really comes out — not only the parts… I think that throughout this whole book, what interests us in the Five Books of the Torah is the verses of do and do not do. Stories and so on — nice, maybe yes, maybe no. My friends, exactly — this is the dispute. Is the whole narrative material in the Hebrew Bible something to study in order to derive principles from it, to derive a point of view from it, or will the point of view always be mine, and the Hebrew Bible merely an illustration? That really is a dramatic part of the question. The Torah does not volunteer to translate values for us into norms. The Torah comes to determine and establish values, and from them derive norms. The Torah is not obligated to anyone else’s norms from outside itself. It is obligated to the divine norms that He planted within us, if we listen to the Torah to understand how to apply them properly.