Shabbat Tractate, Chapter One – Lesson 37

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[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And this is in the middle of a public domain. How does it become an exempt area? If it isn’t separated from the public domain, then it’s a public domain. If it is separated, then it’s a private domain.

[Speaker B] But that’s exactly the point Maimonides makes, that three partitions or two and a half make it an exempt area, right? So Rabbi Yehuda also says that two partitions make it an exempt area.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, not at all.

[Speaker C] If it’s part of the public domain.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If it’s in the public domain then it’s

[Speaker C] a public domain.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If it’s not in the public domain, then it depends. If it has four partitions, it’s a private domain, and if it has two and a handbreadth, then it’s an exempt area.

[Speaker B] Or three. But we already understood that the Taz distinguishes there.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The Taz—

[Speaker B] distinguishes whether it’s open to the public domain or not.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The Taz argues that when it’s open to the public domain, that removes from it the status of a private domain. But here I’m saying: that’s in a case where the walls themselves create a private domain. Then the Taz says that if it’s open to the public domain, that won’t cancel the status of private domain. But according to Maimonides, three walls don’t create a private domain even somewhere else. So if you put three walls in the public domain, it certainly turns it into a public domain. Not turns it into one—it remains a public domain. Okay? Meaning, in order to take out a certain area that belongs to the public domain, demarcate it, and define it as a separate area, you need four partitions. If you make less than that, it’s not an exempt area; if you make less than that, it’s a public domain.

[Speaker B] So when is it an exempt area?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Not in the public domain. In a field, over the sea, whatever you want. Provided it’s above a height of ten handbreadths.

[Speaker B] But that’s always an exempt area. So what difference does it make whether I put partitions there or not? In any case it’s an exempt area.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, not at all. If it has an area of four by four, it’s a private domain. Something above the public domain—a mound above the public domain that’s ten handbreadths high—its top is a private domain, not an exempt area.

[Speaker B] I’m asking myself—something here doesn’t fit for me. When do three partitions turn something into an exempt area? In what situation?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I’m saying: when you’re in a field.

[Speaker B] Yes. What is the field considered? When I’m in a field without partitions, what is the field considered? A karmelit. A karmelit is an exempt area on the Torah level, right? On the Torah level.

[Speaker C] But not rabbinically.

[Speaker B] So what difference does it make if I put partitions around it and turn it into an exempt area? Even without the partitions, even without three partitions?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right, actually it makes no difference.

[Speaker B] So you don’t need partitions at all. I don’t understand the…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I’m saying again: if you have a field and you put four partitions there, it’s a private domain. But four partitions—even if you put them in the public domain—make it a private domain. Less than four partitions has no significance according to Maimonides.

[Speaker B] But we said that Maimonides says that three partitions turn something into an exempt area.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] They don’t turn it into an exempt area; they leave it as an exempt area. They don’t turn it into an exempt area. In the public domain, they’ll leave it a public domain. In a field, or a karmelit, or whatever it may be, it remains a field or a karmelit, which is an exempt area.

[Speaker B] In Maimonides there’s no inference. It doesn’t change the status.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It—

[Speaker F] It doesn’t create something positively. It’s just not enough to make it a private domain.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So then why make the inference?

[Speaker B] So why mention the three and the two-and-a-half? You don’t need the two-and-a-half either.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right, there’s nothing there. According to Maimonides there’s no inference.

[Speaker C] And according to Maimonides it doesn’t change the status of the place except with—only four partitions.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Only four partitions. Because four partitions separate the area inside them from what’s around it, or from what it was before. If there are fewer than four partitions, then it remains what it was. Fine. So basically what I’m asking is: why, in that Mishnah where Rabbi Yehuda and the Sages disagree, do they bring the dispute specifically about two walls? That implies that with three walls there’s no dispute. Otherwise, give me the bigger novelty—that even three walls are not a private domain. What’s the novelty in saying that with two they are not a private domain? Therefore it would seem, at least at first glance, that with three walls there’s no disagreement and according to everyone it’s a private domain, and that goes against Maimonides. That’s one difficulty with Maimonides. Now, of course, who says they really didn’t bring in the baraita the—sorry, not that they didn’t bring in the baraita. What examples appear in the baraita as private domain? A ditch and a fence. A ditch and a fence—how many partitions do both have? Four. Four. Four, right? So now something strange happens here. Because from the examples at the beginning of the baraita, it actually does imply like Maimonides. The fact is that the examples they gave for a private domain are examples that have four partitions; they didn’t bring an example of three.

[Speaker C] That’s a fully-fledged private domain.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, but wait—we haven’t read the “fully-fledged” yet; we’ll get to that in a moment. So the examples they gave for a private domain are Maimonides’ private domain. And from there I would actually learn that three walls are not a private domain, because the examples they gave are examples of four. But later in the Gemara, when the Gemara says, “this is the private domain,” and that comes to exclude Rabbi Yehuda, that’s very strange. Because to exclude Rabbi Yehuda, you’re trying to prove that two walls are not a private domain. In order to prove that two walls are not a private domain, you should have brought examples where three walls are a private domain. Why are you bringing an example of four? An example of four is too weak. Bring a better example. That strengthens even more the question of why, in the examples of private domain, they didn’t bring an example of three partitions. After all, if your whole purpose is to exclude Rabbi Yehuda’s opinion, since Rabbi Yehuda says that two walls make a private domain, then the example I would expect is an example of three walls, and about that tell me: this is a private domain, implying that two are not. But if you tell me that four is a private domain—those are the examples you bring—then you’re teaching me much more strongly not only that Rabbi Yehuda’s two is not a private domain; even three is not a private domain, only four is a fully-fledged private domain.

[Speaker F] Apparently there are intermediate cases, because we saw that even according to Rabbi Yehuda there are superior partitions and there are defective ones.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] We’ll get to that in a moment, simply with the Gemara. Where?

[Speaker E] Beyond the example Rabbi Yehuda gave—two houses on either side of the street—how do we know that this is our conclusion? Where did we see that Rabbi Yehuda says two partitions are enough?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The Gemara says that. It’s the Mishnah brought in our Gemara, in tractate—

[Speaker C] Eruvin, with—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] upright boards—

[Speaker C] around wells.

[Speaker E] About the upright boards around wells.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no, not upright boards around wells, no. Two houses on either side of the public domain.

[Speaker C] He says a crossbeam—

[Speaker E] He says a side-post here and a side-post there.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But that’s what Rashi explains, and that’s how all the medieval authorities (Rishonim) learn it: that the side-post is effective only because two walls already make a private domain, because in a public domain a side-post is ineffective.

[Speaker E] But that’s our conclusion.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, that’s not our conclusion; that’s what’s written in the Gemara according to the interpretation of the medieval authorities (Rishonim). Because the fact that the side-post is effective says that without the side-post it was not a public domain—because otherwise a side-post would not help—but rather a private domain.

[Speaker E] We’re talking here about two.

[Speaker C] Yes, right.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Not about one.

[Speaker E] Two. Meaning, if it were only two, then I wouldn’t even have a discussion of private domain, not even according to Rabbi Yehuda, without the side-post, without the side-post.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, Rabbi Yehuda says that two are a private domain without a side-post. There is a Mishnah in the tractate, and therefore it helps to put a side-post there in order to permit carrying there, because even without the side-post it is a private domain.

[Speaker E] But even without the side-post would I be allowed to carry?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Not rabbinically. There’s a problem because it resembles a public domain, and the rabbis nevertheless forbade it. So Rabbi Yehuda says: in order to solve that rabbinic problem, put a side-post there. But all that can be said only because on the Torah level it really is a private domain according to his view. If on the Torah level it were a public domain—that’s what the Sages argue against him—if on the Torah level it were a public domain, what good would a side-post do for a public domain? Right. Correct, that’s the source. The source is here, where Rabbi Yehuda says that two walls are enough. In short.

[Speaker B] Wait, but if we say that a side-post is a partition, then it does help, because now we’ve created four full partitions.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But the Gemara says that a side-post cannot serve as a partition in the public domain. In the public domain you need a full partition; you do not make an eruv for a public domain that way.

[Speaker B] Meaning, and when Maimonides says the side-post is a partition, he means it’s not a full partition?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What do you mean, not a—

[Speaker B] full partition?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] After all—

[Speaker C] We said that Maimonides—

[Speaker B] says that a crossbeam is merely a marker, and a side-post is a partition. What does he mean that a side-post is a partition? That if—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] if you put it at the entrance of an alleyway, where there are three walls, and you put a side-post there, then it becomes four. The alleyway is not a public domain. But the alleyway—

[Speaker B] is open to the public domain?

[Speaker C] So what? But it’s not a public domain, that—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] He doesn’t care whether it’s open to the public domain. From his perspective the alleyway is an exempt area or whatever it may be.

[Speaker B] So then he says the side-post is a partition only regarding an alleyway.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes. “You do not make an eruv for a public domain that way”—that’s the point. If I were to say that three walls in the public domain separate it and turn it into an exempt area, then there would be room to say that a side-post works there. But simply speaking, according to Maimonides that doesn’t happen; it remains a public domain. And that’s what the Sages say to Rabbi Yehuda: you do not make an eruv for a public domain that way. The rabbis would not accept even one side-post, not only two. In the public domain, you can’t put side-posts; side-posts are not partitions in the public domain. In the public domain you need a partition that actually stops people in order for it to count as a partition. So now the point, in short, is that the reading of the baraita is problematic. On the one hand they want to exclude Rabbi Yehuda and teach me that two walls are not a private domain. But all the examples they bring to teach that are examples of four.

[Speaker C] If you—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] want to teach me that two is not a private domain, bring an example of three, not four. So in short, there’s some problem here in reading the baraita. Here, of course, we need to return to the answers we gave in the previous lecture—why the simple private domain is indeed not brought as an example, yes, the area surrounded by partitions.

[Speaker C] The Pnei Yehoshua explained that it’s brought in the chapter.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right. So the Pnei Yehoshua says there are two explanations. One explanation is that they brought only the novel cases. And the Vilna Gaon says? A simple private domain is not a novelty, okay. And the second answer says that for a private domain made by partitions, three partitions would also have been enough; you don’t need four. Okay, now according to the Pnei Yehoshua this actually becomes even stranger. Because if they didn’t bring the private domain because there three partitions were enough, that’s completely absurd. On the contrary, if you want to exclude Rabbi Yehuda, that’s exactly what you should have brought. You should have brought an area surrounded by three partitions—not a ditch or a fence, but an area surrounded by three partitions—and then you would say, “and this is a fully-fledged private domain.” That would come to exclude Rabbi Yehuda, who says that two are also enough. They’d tell you: no, you need three. So this answer of the Pnei Yehoshua doesn’t even get off the ground. According to this answer of the Pnei Yehoshua, it’s an answer under which I would have expected them specifically to bring the example of a fence and not of a ditch or a mound, because after all you’re trying to teach me that two walls are not a private domain. The best example that would do the job, that would teach me this, is the example with three partitions, not with four. That would be a reason specifically to bring it. More than that: three partitions also contain a novelty; it’s not obvious either. You’re telling me the regular private domain is obvious, so they wanted to bring the novel cases. There’s a novelty there! On the contrary—in a ditch and in a mound there’s no novelty, because there are four partitions around. Bring me the area enclosed by three partitions, and the novelty is that three are enough and you don’t need four. That’s a major novelty.

[Speaker B] But I could say—if I go with the first rationale of the Pnei Yehoshua, where he says it’s simply obvious, obvious to everyone—then I could say that’s exactly why the Gemara doesn’t bring three partitions. It also didn’t bring the four partitions; it brought a fence and a ditch for other reasons. And afterward it deals with Rabbi Yehuda on the case of two, because that was where there was a question. But regarding three and four, there’s no question at all.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But he asks a question: if the Gemara explains that all these examples were brought in order to exclude Rabbi Yehuda, right? And that’s what it says: “and this is a fully-fledged private domain,” right? In order to exclude Rabbi Yehuda. Meaning, your goal is to teach me that two walls are not a private domain, right? That’s the goal. What examples did you bring to teach me that? Specifically examples of a ditch and a mound that have four partitions. And in fact I’m saying the opposite: according to the views that are not Maimonides—the views that say that even three partitions are a private domain—I would have expected that to be what’s brought in the baraita, because that’s exactly the way to teach me that you need three and two is not a private domain. But a ditch and a mound don’t teach me that, because both a ditch and a mound are structures with four partitions. There I would think that two certainly are not enough—but even three are not enough.

[Speaker B] But maybe they brought the ditch and the mound for other reasons?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] A novelty—

[Speaker C] of another kind, not a novelty of the number of partitions.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And the Gemara here explains that they brought them in order to teach against Rabbi Yehuda.

[Speaker C] So maybe that’s why the Gemara added the word “fully-fledged”?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Wait—we’ll see “fully-fledged” in a moment.

[Speaker C] No, but that’s the reason.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Could be; we’ll see in a moment. So I’m saying: according to the Pnei Yehoshua it becomes sharper. According to Maimonides, everything remains fine. Why? Because according to Maimonides they indeed didn’t bring the example of an enclosed area because it’s obvious. And to bring an area enclosed by three partitions—you can’t, because according to Maimonides that is not a private domain. So therefore there’s no question why they didn’t bring an enclosed area in order to exclude Rabbi Yehuda’s view. According to Maimonides it’s obvious. According to the other medieval authorities (Rishonim), it’s not obvious that they didn’t bring an enclosed area with three partitions. First, there’s a novelty there; it’s not something self-evident, since the fact is that three are enough and you don’t need four. Second, it’s the best example to teach me that they are excluding Rabbi Yehuda—that two is not good enough. Here, bring an example of three and tell me three is good, two is not. Don’t bring examples of four. On the other hand, even according to Maimonides we still have to understand: if indeed according to Maimonides four partitions are good—only four partitions are good—then what does it mean to exclude Rabbi Yehuda? It’s also excluding the idea that three is good.

[Speaker B] According to Maimonides, Rabbi Yehuda shouldn’t have brought the example of the two houses. He should have brought, say, three partitions, and then asked the question about that.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Exactly. That’s what the dispute should have been about, because that’s the real dispute. With two, it follows all the more so. Okay. Maybe we need to say this: if we’re talking inside, say—if we had three walls and a side-post, according to Maimonides that is a private domain,

[Speaker C] right?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Now if it’s in the public domain, then there’s an additional problem, because side-posts can’t work in the public domain. So it could be—and I’m just suggesting this tentatively—it could be that the baraita should be read like this: I basically have two houses on two sides of the public domain. In that situation, the basic area in between is a public domain, not an exempt area. In that case, if you were to put one side-post there—that is, one wall and one side-post—maybe even Maimonides would agree that it would turn into, maybe not a private domain, but a karmelit, or something intermediate. Rabbinically there would still be some status there.

[Speaker E] If I put a wall there, I’m turning it into three and a side-post. What?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If I put a wall—if you put a wall—but that’s what the Sages say. But you’re not putting a wall; you’re putting two side-posts.

[Speaker E] Two—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] side-posts. But—

[Speaker B] It’s located in the public domain, but how does that fit according to Maimonides?

[Speaker E] According to—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Maimonides, I’m now offering a suggestion to resolve these difficulties, and what I’m saying is this: in principle, two side-posts can’t work. Now it could be that even in the public domain, if there were one side-post here together with three walls, that would do the job. “Do the job” not in the sense that the area would become a private domain,

[Speaker C] but rather—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] it would stop being a public domain.

[Speaker E] It would be a karmelit. Yes, say, something like that.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And then what happens is this: Rabbi Yehuda comes and says two walls and two side-posts can work, because it’s like three and a side-post in the public domain. The Sages say to him: three and a side-post in the public domain might solve the Torah-level problem, but two and two side-posts can’t do that, because there’s no such thing as two side-posts. And maybe that also explains the wording “that way”—you do not make an eruv for a public domain that way, meaning with two side-posts. One, maybe yes, but not two. Okay? And then what comes out is this: the dispute between Rabbi Yehuda and the rabbis is only in a place that is a public domain. In a place that is a public domain—then I really can say that Rabbi Yehuda, who claims that you can solve the problem with two side-posts, is answered by the rabbis: you can’t do that. Now when our Gemara brings the examples that come to exclude Rabbi Yehuda’s opinion—after all, the fence and the ditch are apparently located in the public domain. Because if you’re coming to exclude Rabbi Yehuda, then you show me that in the public domain you need four partitions, because in the public domain you really do need four partitions. What happens with three and a handbreadth? With three and a handbreadth it could be that it would solve the Torah-level problem and leave a rabbinic problem, perhaps. And therefore the examples they brought did not bring an example of three partitions. Three partitions—if it were not in the public domain—maybe that’s what they would have brought. In the public domain that wouldn’t help. But of course, that requires a number of assumptions. What happens to a public domain when I put side-posts there? According to Maimonides, three walls and a side-post in the public domain—what’s its status? I don’t know, I don’t know.

[Speaker B] But it’s a little hard to say that, because it seems that the Gemara here is not dealing with Torah law; it’s dealing practically with rabbinic law. Because if—the question is, Rabbi Yehuda says you’re allowed to carry inside, right? He conducts carrying inside. Meaning, here they’re practically speaking on the rabbinic level; it doesn’t say liable or exempt. They’re not dealing with that Torah-level question. It’s clear they’re ultimately dealing with a rabbinic question.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Why? I don’t understand why.

[Speaker B] Because then maybe Rabbi Yehuda wouldn’t have said that it’s permitted to carry there.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Well, of course he would. Rabbi Yehuda says it’s permitted, and the Sages say it’s a Torah prohibition.

[Speaker B] But according to the approach that three and a side-post—even when it’s in the public domain—turns it into an exempt area, then would it still be forbidden to carry there?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Well, okay. I mean, I think—

[Speaker B] that if you go with that approach, you have to go with it all the way through: is the discussion here on the Torah level or on the rabbinic level?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So I’m saying—come, you know what, let’s read the next passage in the Gemara for a moment. Because the next passage in the Gemara apparently rules out the possibility that this is a rabbinic discussion. What does the next passage in the Gemara say? “And why did they call it fully-fledged?” You might have said: when the rabbis disagree with Rabbi Yehuda that it is not a private domain, that is only regarding carrying, but regarding throwing they agree with him—therefore it teaches us otherwise. Why does it say “a fully-fledged private domain”? The Gemara says: because if it had not written “fully-fledged,” I would have thought that the entire dispute between the rabbis and Rabbi Yehuda is on the rabbinic plane. Even the rabbis agree that it is essentially a private domain; they only claim that there is still a rabbinic prohibition to carry in it. So they come to say: no, the rabbis say it is a Torah prohibition, not a rabbinic prohibition. This is a fully-fledged private domain, and the rabbis say it is not a private domain at all. Rabbi Yehuda? The rabbis. No, Rabbi—

[Speaker C] Yehuda says it is fully-fledged, and the rabbis say it is not.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And the rabbis say it is forbidden on the Torah level, not the rabbinic level. And therefore they brought the cases of four partitions—the ditch and the mound—to tell me that this comes to exclude Rabbi Yehuda. Because what they want to say is that if you have two walls, it is not a private domain at all—not that there is some rabbinic problem here. No, it is not a private domain; it is a public domain; it is a Torah prohibition.

[Speaker B] So why does it say “fully-fledged”? Then I didn’t understand why it says “fully-fledged.”

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If it hadn’t said “fully-fledged,” I would have understood “and this is the private domain” to mean: Rabbi Yehuda, you’re right that two walls make a private domain, but that doesn’t solve the problem; there is still a rabbinic prohibition to carry. When is there no rabbinic prohibition either? When there are four partitions in the ditch and on the mound, or four partitions around—there, not just tall walls. Okay? That’s what I would have thought. But the baraita says, “this is a fully-fledged private domain.” What does “this is a fully-fledged private domain” mean? They come to say that basically only four partitions make a private domain; fewer than four partitions are not a private domain at all—not that it’s a private domain but there is still a rabbinic prohibition.

[Speaker B] So why do we need the word “fully-fledged”?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] To teach me that. There’s nothing in between.

[Speaker B] Either there is or there isn’t, and there’s no dispute about that.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If it hadn’t said “fully-fledged,” then I would say the whole dispute between the rabbis and Rabbi Yehuda is only on the rabbinic plane; they also agree that two walls make a private domain. And the Gemara comes to say: true, but there is a rabbinic prohibition; if there are four partitions then there is no rabbinic prohibition, so it is a private domain. That’s what I would have thought if the word “fully-fledged” had not been written. The word “fully-fledged” comes to say: no, no, we’re talking here about the basic law of private domain itself, not about a rabbinic problem. Without four partitions, it is not a private domain at all, not that it’s a private domain but there is a rabbinic prohibition to carry in it. Now, of course, this raises the difficulty that the medieval authorities (Rishonim) raise here—Tosafot and Rashba and Pnei Yehoshua and all those Rishonim—because they ask: linguistically this works the opposite way. “This is a fully-fledged private domain” means the examples with four partitions are a fully-fledged private domain. That implies that less than that is a private domain, just not a fully-fledged one, right?

[Speaker C] And then—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] that is exactly what the Gemara wanted to deny. Right? After all, the Gemara wanted to deny the possibility that according to the rabbis two walls are also a private domain, just not a fully-fledged one, because there is a rabbinic prohibition to carry in it. It wanted to show us that according to the rabbis it is simply not a private domain on the Torah level. But apparently the word “fully-fledged” points in the opposite direction. The examples brought in the baraita with four partitions—this is a fully-fledged private domain. Meaning: completely, with no concern and no issue. But what does not have four partitions—two or three or something like that, what Rabbi Yehuda says—that is a not-fully-fledged private domain. What does that mean? It’s a private domain in principle, but rabbinically they still forbid carrying there; it’s not completely a private domain. That is the plain meaning of the wording. And therefore Tosafot says: so the Gemara is reading it backwards. The inference from the Gemara is not a correct inference.

[Speaker B] I didn’t understand the Tosafot and all the others; I just didn’t understand the Gemara itself. What I’m not managing to understand is what you said the word “fully-fledged” means.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So I’ll explain again, but without mixing in the difficulty of—

[Speaker B] Tosafot and the other medieval authorities (Rishonim), because that’s exactly…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The other Rishonim and the Pnei Yehoshua I understood; that one, no. The Gemara itself I didn’t understand. So I’ll explain. The Gemara said: “this is a fully-fledged private domain,” the baraita said. What does it mean? So it says like this: if it had not said “this is a fully-fledged private domain,” if it had written only “this is a private domain” but not fully-fledged, what would I have understood? I would have understood that the rabbis and Rabbi Yehuda disagree only on the rabbinic plane, not on the Torah plane. The rabbis agree that two walls are also a private domain, only not a fully-fledged one. And a private domain with four partitions is a fully-fledged private domain. Okay? That’s what I would have understood. But it says “and this is a fully-fledged private domain,” implying that the dispute between the rabbis and Rabbi Yehuda is about whether it is a private domain at all, not whether it is fully-fledged or not. That is the Gemara. Again, it’s hard to explain this because Tosafot and Rashba themselves point out that this is not correct; that’s not the inference that comes out of the Gemara. The language of the Gemara says the opposite. “This is a fully-fledged private domain” means the examples with the four partitions brought in the baraita—that is a fully-fledged private domain. Which implies that less than four partitions—two or three or something like that—

[Speaker C] what Rabbi Yehuda says—is a private domain, just not a fully-fledged one.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So that would actually mean that the dispute between the rabbis and Rabbi Yehuda is on the rabbinic plane. Okay? Now what I want to claim—maybe—is the following claim: the Gemara brought, or rather the baraita brought at the beginning, two examples of four partitions. And about that it said, “and this is a fully-fledged private domain.” Why—people asked earlier—why did it bring four and not three in order to exclude Rabbi Yehuda, who says two? Exactly because of this. Four partitions are a fully-fledged private domain, and three partitions are a private domain but not a fully-fledged one. And two partitions are not a private domain at all; they are a public domain. And then you can read the baraita straightforwardly; that resolves everything I said before. Because earlier I asked: why does the baraita bring examples of four partitions in order to show that two are not a private domain? It would make much more sense to bring an example of three partitions. Alternatively, if four partitions are a private domain, then three partitions are also not a private domain according to Maimonides—not only two; three also are not. What I’m saying now is exactly the point. The baraita brought examples that are a fully-fledged private domain, and that exists only with four partitions. By the way, that’s according to the other Rishonim too, not only according to Maimonides. Only four partitions make a fully-fledged private domain. Three partitions, as in an alleyway, are also a private domain on the Torah level, but they are not fully-fledged; they require adjustment. Okay? Three partitions require adjustment?

[Speaker C] No, no—one thing at a time, Yael.

[Speaker E] I said: that’s what we read earlier in Tosafot, a partial private domain.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Where did we read that in Tosafot?

[Speaker C] In Tosafot it said that. Yes.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I didn’t understand. Which Tosafot?

[Speaker C] “And why did they call it fully-fledged?” What? “And why did they call it fully-fledged?” What is that? And then it continues: but it is somewhat of a private domain.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Wait, we haven’t read the Tosafot yet. You read it, fine. What you read is fine, I haven’t read it—wait, one second, I’ll get there in a moment.

[Speaker C] I just want to say something else. So—what you said, the inference from “fully-fledged,” is that there is another one that is not fully-fledged and needs adjustment, right? And then they think that two cannot receive adjustment.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right, that’s what I’m saying, and then that resolves all the difficulties. After all, I asked why they brought an example of four in order to exclude Rabbi Yehuda. To exclude Rabbi Yehuda they need an example of three. Alternatively, if they brought four, that implies that three are also a private domain, unlike Maimonides—not only two.

[Speaker D] Wait, wait, I didn’t understand. What isn’t fully-fledged—you thought that was rabbinic, no?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What? I didn’t understand. Again.

[Speaker D] I thought what the Rabbi said earlier was: it’s not really fully-fledged—it’s a private domain but not fully-fledged—meaning, rabbinically it’s not really a private domain, but on the Torah level it is. Right, right, okay.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And then I say like this: they brought four partitions because that is a fully-fledged private domain. And three partitions may be a private domain according to the medieval authorities (Rishonim), but not a fully-fledged one, and it requires adjustment. There is still a rabbinic prohibition; therefore, according to the Rishonim, an alleyway requires adding a side-post to fix it. It’s true that in principle it’s a private domain, but it’s a not-fully-fledged private domain. And all this comes to exclude Rabbi Yehuda, who speaks about two partitions, where it is not a private domain at all, and therefore it doesn’t help to fix it with side-posts. Okay? And then indeed this is how it can be read according to the other Rishonim, because the other Rishonim say that even three partitions make a private domain on the Torah level. According to Maimonides you can’t say this, right? Because according to Maimonides three partitions are also a private domain on the Torah level—sorry, they are not a private domain on the Torah level. You can’t say that three partitions are a private domain but not a fully-fledged one. According to Maimonides, three partitions are not a private domain at all.

[Speaker C] Not a private domain.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right? And then according to Maimonides it may be that what needs to be said is to place all of this in the public domain. And to say: in the public domain itself, it may be that two walls and two side-posts, as Rabbi Yehuda says, could theoretically be a private domain because there are four partitions here, just not a fully-fledged one. But when it is situated in the public domain, it can’t do the job. And that’s what the rabbis say to Rabbi Yehuda: if I were to put two walls and two side-posts in an exempt area, then maybe that would turn it into a private domain even according to the Sages. But the Sages dispute Rabbi Yehuda about what happens when all this is done in the public domain—that’s what they say to him: after all, you do not make an eruv for a public domain that way. And in the public domain, such a thing doesn’t help.

[Speaker D] Rabbi, why can’t we say according to Maimonides that he too would think that on the rabbinic level even two side-posts would work, but it’s not fully-fledged because we rule that way only not rabbinically—but on the Torah level maybe it would be a private domain even in the public domain? What?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And when they say to him, “you do not make an eruv for a public domain that way,” you mean that’s only a rabbinic prohibition?

[Speaker D] Yes, parallel to what we just explained now, the way the Rabbi just explained “not fully-fledged,” because theoretically according to Maimonides it is—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] a private domain because there are four partitions here. So a private domain is indeed a private domain according to Maimonides, but there is a rabbinic prohibition. That could also be an option; I hadn’t thought of that. It could also be an option, that the whole reason two side-posts don’t help in the public domain is only a rabbinic law, not a Torah law. Okay. In any case, the medieval authorities (Rishonim) here, when they ask this question, there is Rashi; Tosafot says—look at Tosafot’s wording: “And why did they call it fully-fledged? On the contrary, the opposite seems more likely: this is a fully-fledged private domain, but that is not a fully-fledged private domain; rather it is somewhat of a private domain. And Rashi answered this with difficulty.” Yes, that is his difficulty, and Tosafot leaves it unresolved. Okay? The Rashba here—wait, not here, the next Rashba. “And why did they call it fully-fledged? One may ask: on the contrary, from the fact that it teaches ‘fully-fledged,’ it implies that this one is fully-fledged, and you have another that is not fully-fledged, but is somewhat like a private domain. And it seems that for this reason Rashi, of blessed memory, explained: this one whose count of partitions is completed on every side. Interpreting his interpretation: ‘fully-fledged’ does not refer to the domain but to the partitions. Meaning: this is a private domain whose partitions are completed. Another domain whose partitions are not completed, which has only two partitions, such as this case of Rabbi Yehuda, is not a private domain at all, even to make one liable who throws from the public domain—”

[Speaker C] into it. Meaning, you can’t make him liable.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Meaning, he is essentially arguing—after all, Rashba follows the approach of the other Rishonim against Maimonides. In his view, three partitions or two and a side-post are also a private domain. So what is he basically saying? “This is a fully-fledged private domain” means: this is a private domain whose partitions are fully completed, meaning it has four partitions. That is a fully-fledged private domain. A private domain of three partitions is also a private domain, just not a fully-fledged one. For the same reason, in the public domain, with two side-posts, you can’t fix it, because two partitions and a side-post are not a fully-fledged private domain. Consequently, the fourth side-post cannot fix it.

[Speaker C] No, he says that if it has two partitions, it is not a private domain at all.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right—and then what? So if you add a side-post to it, after all, if you add a side-post to it, then according to Rashba it is a private domain, because two partitions and a side-post are like three. But since two partitions by themselves are not a private domain at all, then two partitions and a side-post are at most a not-fully-fledged private domain. Consequently, if you now add another side-post, that won’t help, because in the public domain, adding another side-post—at least in the public domain—won’t help. If you have an alleyway with three partitions, you can add a side-post on the fourth side. But if you have two partitions and a side-post, you can’t add a side-post on the fourth side. Okay? Even according to the Rishonim who say that two partitions and a side-post are a private domain, still it is a kind of private domain for which, on the rabbinic level, we will not allow adding another side-post and solving everything, because what comes out is a structure with two of its partitions being side-posts. Okay?

[Speaker F] And if you make that same structure in an exempt area?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s what I’m not—I’m uncertain, I don’t know. The question is whether he says this only about the public domain because it’s in the public domain, or whether he says it about any structure with two side-posts. A structure with two side-posts won’t help. Because I think, in the simple reading, when you’re in an exempt area and you put there two walls and a side-post—if a side-post is considered a partition, then you have three partitions. Right.

[Speaker C] So those three—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] partitions, those three partitions, are basically a private domain. Right. So why would you now need another side-post?

[Speaker C] At least it’s not worse if it doesn’t help.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Exactly. So I’m saying: you don’t need another side-post—not that another side-post wouldn’t help; you don’t need it. Right. What happens in an alleyway is that although it’s true that it has three partitions, many people pass through it and use it and have rights over it. Therefore, although according to Rashba and his camp and the Tur and so on it is a private domain, the rabbis still require adding a fourth side-post.

[Speaker F] Because another criterion enters here.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But in a place that is not under public ownership—if you had three partitions under the ownership of one person—then certainly that would be a fully-fledged private domain and there would be no need to add a side-post or anything. Okay? An ordinary private domain that has three partitions, or two and a side-post, is enough on its own; there’s no need to add a fourth side-post.

[Speaker B] A fourth—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] side-post needs to be added either in the public domain, in a structure like Rabbi Yehuda’s, where you need two side-posts and two walls—and there the rabbis say that doesn’t help—or in an alleyway, where the three partitions are three full ones, not one of them being a side-post; they are three full partitions. But since the alleyway belongs to the public and is used by the public, the rabbis required adding another side-post before they would permit you to carry inside it. But that’s only in the pathology of an alleyway, because it is under public ownership.

[Speaker C] But this takeover by the individual of the public domain by means of two side-posts seems to me…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Fine, that’s the question: whether in fact two side-posts don’t help at all, or whether specifically because it’s a public domain, the Sages say that two side-posts won’t help.

[Speaker B] Why, according to Rabbi Yehuda, are the two houses considered a private domain at all? Where does he get that from? After all, the public domain passes between them in the middle. Why does he hold that at all?

[Speaker C] He—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] claims that two walls, whether in an L-shape or opposite one another, basically demarcate an area. Once the area is demarcated, it is already an area unto itself. After all, if I were to put four partitions there, you would agree that it’s a private domain, right? Now think that basically there are four partitions here. In terms of recognizability, if I told you to complete the boundaries of the enclosed area, that would be unambiguous. You would know where to complete them, right? From the end of one wall to the end of the other, and from the other end to the other end. There isn’t an actual wall, but it clearly defines the area from four sides. According to Rabbi Yehuda, defining the area is enough; you don’t need to seal off the area. If there is an area that is defined as a specific area, that is enough to turn it into a private domain. In other words, the purpose of the partitions is not to stop people, but to mark the area unambiguously.

[Speaker C] To allow me to use it as a private domain.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I can say to people: look, up to here my domain extends, up to here and here, and everyone understands that. Not that this will physically stop people from passing there. Think of a doorway form or a side post—these are all just markers. The beam you put on top, is it going to stop people? It also won’t stop people; they can walk right under it. But it marks the area. So Rabbi Yehuda says: for marking, you don’t need the beam; put up two walls opposite each other, and that marks a definite area, the area is marked. So in his view, that too is a private domain, only on the Torah level. On the rabbinic level they told you: add two more side posts. Okay? I’m moving on to the section of the public domain because I want to finish this today too. So regarding the public domain, there’s a line of thought that seems completely parallel to what happens with the private domain. The Talmud says: And what is a public domain? Some extra word slipped in here. And what is a public domain? A main road, a large plaza, and open alleyways—this is a full-fledged public domain. And one may not carry out from this private domain to this public domain, nor bring in from this public domain to this private domain; and if one carried out or brought in unintentionally, he is liable to a sin-offering; intentionally, he is punished with karet and stoning. That’s part of the baraita. That is the definition of public domain in the baraita. A main road and a plaza—yes, these are intercity roads or marketplaces or a major street within the city—and open alleyways, we spoke about that; this is basically the same structure as Rabbi Yehuda’s structure. Open alleyways, right? It’s exactly Rabbi Yehuda’s structure: there are two walls here, and on both sides it opens to a public domain. Okay? Now later the Talmud says this: The master said: “This is a public domain”—what does that come to exclude? What is it excluding? Again, like we asked above. It excludes that other case of Rabbi Yehuda. For we learned: Rabbi Yehuda says, if a public thoroughfare passed through them, he should move it to the sides; and the Sages say, he need not.

[Speaker C] Meaning, according to Rabbi Yehuda, if the public passes through there, that cancels its ability to be considered a domain.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] We’re talking, as I wrote for you on the page, either about the well-enclosures, right, or about those corner pieces that we place in the public domain in order to define the area enclosed by those corners as a private domain. And again, by the way, you see that marking is enough; you don’t need a full seal.

[Speaker C] Four—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Those posts are just a marker. There’s space between them; people can pass through. But if it’s clearly marked, for our purposes that’s enough. So that also shows that Rabbi Yehuda is not so far-fetched. Okay? In any case, the Talmud says: what happens when there is a road there for the pilgrims? What happens is that there is a well there, and it is considered a private domain. If you draw water from the well into the public domain, you’ve carried from a private domain to a public domain. So what do they say? Put posts around it. The area enclosed by the posts is a private domain, and then you’re allowed to bring the water into it. Now true, ideally they tell you not to do this, because it’s still kind of like an alleyway, the public passes through there. On the Torah level it’s fine; on the rabbinic level, no. For the pilgrims they permitted it, because of the pilgrims’ need they suspended this rabbinic prohibition. So they permitted it only for the sake of the pilgrims, but of course that’s only because the whole problem is rabbinic. Meaning, on the Torah level it is completely a private domain and everything is fine. Now the question that comes up here is: what happens when some public road passes between these two posts here and then cuts across two more posts? It doesn’t matter whether it bends, in which case it’s like two walls in an L-shape, or whether it goes straight, in which case it’s two walls facing each other—but it cuts across, it crosses these walls. So Rabbi Yehuda says that removes the designation of private domain from the place.

[Speaker C] So it kind of contradicts itself? Right.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I don’t know if it contradicts itself, but it cancels it, yes, seemingly. And the Sages say no, we have no problem with that. Okay?

[Speaker C] Which means they also contradict themselves.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Seemingly there’s a contradiction here both in Rabbi Yehuda and in the Sages; there’s a contradiction between this baraita, between this Mishnah, and the previous Mishnah—

[Speaker C] Rabbi Yehuda against Rabbi Yehuda—

[Speaker E] And the Sages against the Sages.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So in fact the Talmud in Eruvin already asks this contradiction.

[Speaker E] What? Maybe Rabbi Yehuda wants some starting point of two partitions?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What do you mean? I didn’t understand.

[Speaker E] I mean, in a public domain, and I need to put up these well-posts—well-posts? I don’t know. But maybe that’s not enough for Rabbi Yehuda because he wants some initial basis, some actual partition to rely on? No?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So the Talmud in Eruvin says the answer explicitly; no need to speculate. The Talmud in Eruvin asks about a contradiction in Rabbi Yehuda and a contradiction in the rabbis.

[Speaker E] Yes, okay, but fine. The Talmud says that—what exactly is the contradiction?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] According to Rabbi Yehuda, in the previous example—two houses on opposite sides of the public domain—that counts as a private domain. Right? And it doesn’t bother him that a public route runs between those two walls. And here suddenly it does bother him. So what’s the answer?

[Speaker C] There there are partitions; here in our case—what do you mean there?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] There, the two partitions are complete partitions. Here, even the two partitions that the public doesn’t cross are also not complete partitions. That isn’t enough for Rabbi Yehuda. You see again that the discussion here is about how unambiguous the marking has to be. It’s obvious that the area is not physically blocked off from the public, and still some significant level of marking is needed. Fine—that’s the answer for Rabbi Yehuda. And according to the rabbis, why does it bother them there? Why is it that there—

[Speaker C] There there were four partitions, and there are only two here.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] There there are only two partitions, and here there are four, because here we’re talking about posts that extend a cubit on each side—it’s a corner. So there are actually four partitions. In a case where there are four partitions, it doesn’t bother the rabbis.

[Speaker C] And there’s another reason, because in our case it’s only for recognition, while there it’s an actual partition. Again? In our case the side post and side post are only for recognition, while in Eruvin the posts are really like partitions, not just for recognition.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s not relevant, Ruti. When we talk about the previous dispute between Rabbi Yehuda and the rabbis, we’re talking about the status of an area with two houses on either side and no side posts or beams. That’s where the discussion starts. According to Rabbi Yehuda, that itself is a private domain even without side posts and beams. According to the rabbis, it is not a private domain. Now since it is a public domain, the rabbis also say that a side post and beam won’t help. But the discussion is about what happens without the side post and beam. So I’m comparing the disputes without side post and beam.

[Speaker C] So Maimonides here fits the view of the rabbis in Eruvin.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What do you mean?

[Speaker C] He said four partitions.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, fine, because four partitions—certainly, according to everyone, in a public domain you need four partitions. Even Rabbi Yehuda says you need four partitions; he just thinks that two side posts also do the job. On the rabbinic level at least, everyone agrees you need four partitions there, even Rabbi Yehuda. So what’s going on here, in short, is that there is no contradiction between Rabbi Yehuda here and Rabbi Yehuda there, or between the rabbis here and the rabbis there. Okay? Now the Talmud says: so in our case, what does “a full-fledged public domain” mean? It comes to say that in our case this is a full-fledged public domain, excluding that which is not a full-fledged public domain. Fine, it comes to exclude Rabbi Yehuda’s opinion.

[Speaker B] No, no, wait, I didn’t understand. Exclude what? When they say “a full-fledged public domain.”

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Rabbi Yehuda says that if a public road passes through the well-enclosures, then it is a public domain. That cancels its designation as a private domain. Our Talmud comes to say that that is not correct.

[Speaker C] But—

[Speaker B] But the Talmud itself doesn’t explain the word “full-fledged” that way with respect to public domain.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Why not? That is how it explains it. No, why—

[Speaker C] Not “full-fledged”?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] “This is a public domain,” without “full-fledged.” What are they teaching me with the words “this is a public domain”? It comes to exclude Rabbi Yehuda’s view.

[Speaker B] Yes, but that has nothing to do with the word “full-fledged” at all.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, that’s a separate point. “This is a public domain” comes to exclude Rabbi Yehuda’s view, that what Rabbi Yehuda says is not a public domain, because there there are four walls. Fine? Also, “this is a full-fledged public domain”—a main road and a plaza and open alleyways—that is a public domain, and not what Rabbi Yehuda says. Right. Now we move on to “full-fledged.”

[Speaker C] Meaning there are two inferences here: first, “this is a public domain,” and second, “full-fledged.” Yes. Each one teaches—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Now about “full-fledged,” the Talmud says: and why do they call it “full-fledged”? Since the first clause taught “full-fledged,” the latter clause also taught “full-fledged.”

[Speaker C] What is the Talmud saying? Stylistically.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That because they used “full-fledged” earlier, they used it here too. Now that’s strange. Why didn’t they say, like above, that if they hadn’t said “full-fledged” I would have thought the dispute between Rabbi Yehuda and the rabbis regarding the well-enclosures was only on the rabbinic level and not on the Torah level—exactly as they said above? Why didn’t they say that here?

[Speaker C] In fact Rashi thinks there is a difference, and that it’s not just a stylistic change.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I see.

[Speaker C] Rashi thinks it’s not merely linguistic or stylistic, but that it has significance.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, the opposite—Rashi explains it exactly. Look, let’s read Rashi. “And what does ‘full-fledged’ mean?” Rashi says: here one cannot say “you might have thought,” as above. Here it is impossible to explain the word “full-fledged” in a substantive sense the way they did above. You’re forced to explain it only stylistically. Why can’t you explain it as above? Because their main purpose is to permit carrying inside it, and when the rabbis say “he need not,” they mean that it is a private domain even for carrying; all the more so one who throws into it from the public domain is liable. Rashi says: in our case it is clear that the dispute is not on the rabbinic level but on the Torah level. When the rabbis say “he need not,” they mean “he need not” altogether—carrying is permitted, it is completely a private domain. There is no possibility of interpreting this as only a rabbinic dispute. Here it is clearly a Torah-level dispute. Therefore there is no way to explain the word “full-fledged” here. So it’s a little strange, because Rashi—

[Speaker B] Didn’t explain the word “full-fledged” at all at the beginning. I understand.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But Rashi is not consistent, because—

[Speaker B] At the beginning he did explain the word “full-fledged” in terms of the dispute between rabbinic and Torah law. He explained “full-fledged” as meaning four complete partitions. I understand. Why does Rashi at the beginning, when he writes the word “full-fledged,” explain that “full-fledged” is connected to four complete partitions? The word “full-fledged” refers not to the laws but to the partitions.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But still, what is written there—no, wait—

[Speaker C] No, he didn’t say not to the laws—that’s a good point.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] In the Talmud there, when it says “a full-fledged private domain,” the meaning was “full-fledged” even on the rabbinic level—that’s called “full-fledged.” You’re right that the medieval authorities (Rishonim) had difficulty with this, because the inference seems to go the opposite way, and then Rashi wrote that “its partitions have been completed”—that is the meaning of “full-fledged.” Your point is a good one; I hadn’t noticed it. From Rashi here you can see against the Rashba there. Because when the Rashba there explained Rashi, he was not correct. If he had been correct, then really—what connection is there? There the issue is that all its partitions were completed. Here, there is no option to explain it that way; Rashi wouldn’t have needed to elaborate here at all. That isn’t an option that arises here. So clearly Rashi explains there that “full-fledged” means halakhically full-fledged, not full-fledged in the sense that its partitions were completed. Good point, I accept that. Okay? It’s not forced in Rashi there; that’s just how the Rashba understood it. Okay, moving on. Now the Talmud says: and let it also count the desert. Why didn’t the baraita also bring the example of the desert? That too is a public domain. For it was taught in a baraita: what is a public domain? A main road, a large plaza, open alleyways, and the desert. Yes, the first three examples are brought in our text, but in that baraita they also bring one more example: the desert. Why is that example not brought here? Abaye said: there is no difficulty. Here, when Israel dwelled in the desert; there, nowadays. When Israel was in the desert, it was a public domain because there were masses of people; today, when the desert is desolate, it is not a public domain. Okay?

[Speaker E] So wait, what is the desert today? How do we define the desert today?

[Speaker C] A karmelit. A karmelit.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] A karmelit. Yes, a karmelit in the baraita, since karmelit is rabbinic.

[Speaker C] Now Tosafot says that when Israel was in the desert, it was a karmelit. Did I get that right? In Tosafot they say, “when Israel dwelled in the desert,” that sounds a bit like it is not a public domain.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, the opposite. An actual public domain—you need 600,000, and then it’s a public domain. So in short, what is written here—what comes out in the conclusion? That the desert, when people are in it, is a public domain; when people are not in it, it is an exempt area or a karmelit. Right? That’s the conclusion. Now I—

[Speaker C] Want to bring Maimonides.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Maimonides writes as follows: There are four domains regarding the Sabbath: the private domain, the public domain, the karmelit, and the exempt area. What is a public domain? Deserts and forests and marketplaces and roads, etc. What matters to me is “deserts and forests.” What do we see in Maimonides?

[Speaker C] That he doesn’t have this criterion.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Not only “when Israel was in the desert,” but simply a desert, when many people dwell there. The Maggid Mishneh and the Kesef Mishneh already point out that this goes against the Talmud. In our Talmud it says that the desert is a public domain only when people are there, while Maimonides states it simply, without qualification. So the Maggid Mishneh indeed remains with this unresolved, and says it goes against the passage; and so too the Meiri remains with it unresolved. But the Kesef Mishneh explains: no. The Maggid wrote etc.—it is puzzling. Rabbi Abraham, the son of our master—Rabbi Abraham son of Maimonides—wrote that there are commentators who reverse the Talmud: when Israel camped in the desert and their camps were arranged, it was for them like a valley or a field; but nowadays, when Israel does not live there and anyone who wants may go and pass through it, it is a public domain. And that reasoning is plausible. He reverses the Talmud. He says: when Israel was there, specifically then it was not a public domain; it was a karmelit. Why? Because it was essentially a residential area, a neighborhood; it was not a place people passed through, it wasn’t really a desert at all, it was an inhabited land.

[Speaker E] But that’s only on condition that they camped there. What if they weren’t camped and were only traveling?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Fine, so I’m saying: in the place where Israel camped, it was not a public domain, because it was really some kind of neighborhood. Now even if they move from place to place, you can still discuss and analyze it—I have no way of knowing exactly what the criterion is. In principle it’s a residential neighborhood; people just change location from time to time, so in general we don’t see that as a public domain.

[Speaker B] So why is Jerusalem viewed as a public domain?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] A public domain is where people pass through in Jerusalem.

[Speaker B] And therefore indeed. And in the desert people didn’t pass through?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] In Jerusalem, that’s only when its gates are open; if its gates are locked, then not. So if it’s closed, indeed then no.

[Speaker B] So they simply didn’t pass there?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right, in the desert people didn’t pass through; only those who lived there walked there. Fine, but that’s not transit.

[Speaker B] But on the other hand the Israelites didn’t only camp in the desert; they also traveled through it.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s what was asked before. So I said: they didn’t pass through; they changed their place of residence.

[Speaker D] But next to where they built—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] You’re simply moving house all the time, so that’s still—

[Speaker F] Even when you go to the market in Jerusalem, that’s—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Something dynamic.

[Speaker D] Wait, but we learn the labor of carrying from the desert, right?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What? I didn’t understand.

[Speaker F] From the Tabernacle, not from the desert.

[Speaker D] The labor of public domain, as it were.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, so I’m saying: according to the Kesef Mishneh, you have to say that this referred to the desert outside their camp. Within their camp itself, it was not a public domain.

[Speaker D] Meaning, where the Tabernacle was, for example, that was not a public domain where they gathered?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The Tabernacle is a specific place, but around the camp there was an area that was pure desert, with no people. In such a case, even according to Maimonides, it may be possible to see it as a public domain. But the desert in which the people actually are, the area where they are, is a residential neighborhood.

[Speaker E] What about today, when the Bedouin, for example, are in the desert? Again? The Bedouin who are in the desert.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Meaning that they determine that it is a private—

[Speaker E] Domain, right?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If there is a place where a large group of people is clearly settled, then yes; according to the Kesef Mishneh, that would not be a public domain. Yes.

[Speaker C] But Rabbi, what Nechama is saying—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That between—

[Speaker C] Their living area and the place of the Tabernacle, there it was a public domain. And therefore we learn carrying from the fact that they brought things from their houses to the Tabernacle.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But the question is: by what route did they go from their houses to the Tabernacle?

[Speaker C] They passed—apparently there was a gap between their houses and the Levite camp.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Exactly, that’s what I’m saying: outside their houses it’s a public domain.

[Speaker B] So now I don’t understand the Kesef Mishneh.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Why not?

[Speaker B] Because even when the Israelites camped in the desert, there was a public domain there.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Around it, yes—but not the desert in which they camped.

[Speaker B] The surrounding desert is—

[Speaker E] A public domain.

[Speaker B] So how can we learn the public domain from the Tabernacle?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The opposite! No—from bringing things to the Tabernacle, because they passed through a desert area, and that is a public domain.

[Speaker B] But the Tabernacle was in the middle of the camp—

[Speaker C] It was divided into camps; in the center was the Levite camp. Was there a separation between it and the Israelite camp?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes. When they passed from the residential area to the Tabernacle there was also an area on the way that was not residential. The Levite camp—

[Speaker B] The Levite camp—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That certainly is desert.

[Speaker C] Meaning—

[Speaker B] That the desert is a public domain.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Correct. That’s what he says. That’s what Maimonides says. Their residential area is a neighborhood; the desert as such is a public domain. Now notice what is actually written here—and I don’t really have time left, so I’ll do it briefly. What is written here actually, according to Maimonides, changes the whole picture, because Maimonides holds that a desert is called a public domain, a desolate wilderness is called a public domain. Why? There aren’t people walking around there. Because it is accessible to people—not because people are actually there, but because it is accessible to them. Why do I say this? Because I skipped a passage here—you can look at it later, maybe in the summary—I skipped the part that according to Rashi, who belongs to those medieval authorities (Rishonim) and Geonim who maintain that for something to be defined as a public domain there must be 600,000 people in it.

[Speaker C] But Maimonides says potentially it is—wait, exactly.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] In the physical definitions it must be sixteen cubits wide and not roofed. But according to some of the medieval authorities (Rishonim), Rashi and several Geonim, there also have to be 600,000 people passing through. According to most of the medieval authorities (Rishonim), no. I referred you to the Maggid Mishneh, who brings this dispute; he says there is no source for it at all, it’s an invention. Indeed most halakhic decisors do not think so. But this is Rashi’s view and the view of some Geonim. Now in our Talmud they ask: what does it mean that they are common there, that Israel dwells in the desert? So Rashi says that they are common there. Yes, Rashi explains: nowadays it is not a place where the public travels, since desert travelers are not common. Why do you need to get to that? Because there aren’t 600,000 people there. Even if there were desert travelers, 600,000 certainly do not pass there. So that is Rashi’s view—that you need 600,000 people.

[Speaker C] So what does Maimonides say about Abaye’s view? What? What would Maimonides say about Abaye?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I didn’t understand—what would he need to say about Abaye?

[Speaker C] Abaye says: there is no difficulty; here, when Israel dwelled—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] In the desert, right—he says the opposite. When Israel dwelled there, it is not a public domain; when Israel did not dwell there, it is a public domain. That’s Maimonides. I’m talking about Rashi. Rashi explains the Talmud that nowadays it is not a place where the public travels, so it is not a public domain. Why? Because desert travelers are not common. Leave Maimonides aside; Maimonides reads it the other way. But I’m talking about Rashi’s reading. Now Rashi says “because desert travelers are not common,” implying that if desert travelers were common, then it would be a public domain. Where are the 600,000? What, do 600,000 people pass through the desert? People pass there from time to time.

[Speaker C] Maybe there’ll be another Exodus?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I didn’t understand. I’m saying: if travelers are common in the desert, then it is a public domain, Rashi says. But you need 600,000. So Tosafot indeed writes that this is forced. Tosafot writes: “here, when Israel dwelled in the desert” sounds somewhat as though it is not a public domain unless 600,000 are found there, as in the desert. But Rashi certainly does not write that. He says: they are not common. The criterion is whether they are common or not, not whether there are 600,000. I want to argue that Rashi’s criterion of 600,000—or at least possibly, because in Rashi on Eruvin it doesn’t really sound that way—but the criterion is that it be accessible to 600,000, not that 600,000 actually be there.

[Speaker C] And then he’s like Maimonides.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If there are 600,000 people in the area who could use this space, then it is a public domain. It is an area designated for their use; they don’t actually have to use it.

[Speaker F] Potential. Like Maimonides.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, not necessarily like Maimonides—similar to Maimonides. In Maimonides maybe even that isn’t required; what’s required is that it be accessible to the public. I don’t know whether he wants 600,000. But according to Rashi, even when he wants 600,000, he means accessibility to 600,000; they don’t need to actually be there. And then look at the Ra’ah—I referred you to the Ran, to something he brings in the name of the Ra’ah. “Here, when Israel dwelled in the desert”—the explanation of the Ra’ah of blessed memory—is that perhaps he means to say that when Israel dwelled in the desert, there was a place there that had the status of a public domain even though it was not a fixed place, since sometimes they were here and sometimes there. Or else perhaps at that time even other deserts, which had a route to that desert, were public domains. If the Israelites camped there, then even the desert they did not actually pass through is considered a public domain. Why?

[Speaker C] Because they could also have reached it.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Exactly—because it is a place potentially accessible for their use. If there is a population of 600,000 people and that place is accessible to their use, it doesn’t have to happen in practice; then it is a public domain. And that really brings it very close to Maimonides’ definition, because you don’t need people to actually be there; you need it to be an open place for people’s use. And that resolves a great many difficulties. I’ll say again: in Rashi on Eruvin it doesn’t sound like that’s what he means. Maybe that’s where I’ll stop.

[Speaker B] We—I personally didn’t get to this whole section at all, so I—

[Speaker E] Feel—

[Speaker B] Like I’m disconnected here from the whole discussion.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay, fine, so look—we only got up to page 11.

[Speaker B] Yes, I just feel like I’m missing everything here.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I suggest the following: since there’s no point in devoting another class to this, what I suggest is that I’ll send you the summary; everything is written there in the summary. Set aside some time, at least after you’ve gone through the Talmud, to go over the summary, so that this class will be behind us. Okay?

[Speaker C] I—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I don’t think it justifies another class, another meeting, another session. It doesn’t. Okay then, Shabbat shalom.

[Speaker C] Thank you very much. Thank you very much, Shabbat shalom.

[Speaker E] Goodbye.