Tractate Shabbat, Chapter 1 – Lesson 42

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[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, it doesn’t matter, but a karmelit is like a public domain, only on the rabbinic level. So all the Torah-level laws that apply in a public domain will apply rabbinically in a karmelit. So if the holes of the public domain are considered like the public domain on the Torah level, then the holes of a karmelit would be like the karmelit on the rabbinic level. I’m duplicating all the laws of the public domain, only rabbinically. So the later authorities point out that this Rashi is strange, because as a matter of Jewish law we rule like Rava. And according to Rava, the holes of the public domain are not like the public domain. So what is the Talmud trying to learn here from the holes of the public domain to the holes of a karmelit? The opposite. If you’re learning from the holes of the public domain, then what?

[Speaker B] Maybe he agrees with Abaye’s view? I can’t hear. Maybe he’s going according to Abaye’s view?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, but as a matter of Jewish law we rule like Rava. So the Talmud is raising a difficulty here from a position that isn’t the practical ruling? And Rashi says nothing about it. Rashi says, just as we learned that the holes of the public domain are like the public domain. We didn’t learn that, and nothing of the sort; the Jewish law is not like that. That’s Abaye’s view, and the Jewish law is not like that. More than that: you could say that Rashi only brought an example; he didn’t mean to say that the Jewish law follows Abaye. But then I would have expected him to bring the example of the holes of a private domain, not the holes of a public domain. Because the holes of a private domain really are like the private domain. So if you already want to bring an example of a hole that has the same status as the domain, you should have brought it from the holes of the private domain, not from the holes of the public domain, because as a matter of Jewish law the holes of the public domain are not like the public domain. Why?

[Speaker D] Maybe the intention is that with the public domain, after all we said that if he throws it against a wall, if it’s lower than ten handbreadths then it’s called a public domain, and the same thing here with this water channel because it’s low.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no, I didn’t understand.

[Speaker D] After all, there is a situation in which the holes of the public domain are like the public domain. When? What happens if the hole is low?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And what does “low” mean?

[Speaker D] Less than three handbreadths.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Less than three handbreadths is lavud; that has nothing to do with the public domain.

[Speaker B] So—

[Speaker D] It’s lavud, so it belongs to the public domain,

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It’s simply sitting on the ground.

[Speaker D] And this water channel is also on the ground.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Fine, but this water channel could be very high; the water is flowing inside some kind of trench.

[Speaker D] Yes, it could be high.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right, nobody made any distinction there between a high channel and a low channel. The point is that perhaps the Ritva, for example—I brought the quotation here, the wording of the Ritva—“Since we find this with the holes of the private domain, and the holes of the public domain do not have the same law as the domain itself, so too with a karmelit.” Very strange, like Rashi, because that isn’t true. The holes of the public domain do not have the same law as the domain itself. Fine, so what is it? The Talmud is apparently speaking according to Abaye, which is very strange, but that’s what seems to come out. And it could be that really the Talmud is saying that the holes of a karmelit certainly resemble the holes of a private domain in the sense that they would have the same law as the karmelit itself. The holes of the public domain too, on the conceptual level, have the same law as the domain itself, except that the public domain is a domain defined negatively, unlike the private domain. So therefore you can’t append to it things that are found at its side. And therefore Rava says that the holes of the public domain are not like the public domain. But in this sense a karmelit could be like a private domain. So what Rashi really wants to say is that this is similar to what Abaye says, that the holes of the public domain are like the public domain, because we see that this wasn’t said only about the private domain but also about other domains. Except that here, when we’re talking about the holes of a karmelit, even Rava would agree. He brings Abaye’s statement because he has no other one; he can’t bring Rava. Rava says the holes of the public domain are not like the public domain. But he doesn’t mean to rule like Abaye. Rather, he means: according to Abaye’s reasoning, who says that the holes of the public domain are like the public domain, so too in a karmelit the holes of the karmelit would be like the karmelit—but here even Rava would agree. Because all that Rava disagrees with Abaye about is that Rava argues that holes can attach themselves to a domain that has some unique character, one that is defined as a private domain. So if there is something next to it, it is appended to it, it is part of it. But the public domain is defined negatively. Whatever is not a private domain—all the rest—is a public domain. So if the public domain is defined that way, then it makes no sense to append things to it; it has no positive characteristics of its own. Therefore there Rava says that the holes of the public domain are not like the public domain. But if so, it could be that with a karmelit Rava would agree that the holes of a karmelit are indeed like the karmelit. Meaning, Rava also agrees that this was not said only about the private domain; on the contrary, it was not said about the public domain, not that it was said only about the private domain. And what Rava—what the Ritva… only Abaye can be cited as a statement we can rely on, because Rava has no such statement. But the claim is that here Rava would also agree, so it’s not that we are ruling here like Abaye. You could have said that, but in truth, when you look further in the passage, this whole discussion among the later authorities is really not understood by me. Look: I blackened part of the passage here: “Then let it be like the holes of a karmelit.” What the Talmud asks is: let this water channel have the law of a karmelit, like the holes of a karmelit. Then Abaye bar Avin and Rav Chanina bar Avin both said: “There are no holes for a karmelit.” What is the answer? You ask me that it should be like the holes of a karmelit—there are no holes for a karmelit. Why? Because it’s like the holes of the public domain; we rule like Rava. Everything Rashi explained—Rashi explained the question. After all, the Talmud asks, “Then let it be like the holes of a karmelit,” meaning, let it have the law of a karmelit because these are holes of a karmelit. Here the Talmud really asks this because at this stage it thinks like Abaye. Therefore Rashi brings what Abaye said, that the holes of the public domain are like the public domain, and in the answer that itself is what they say back: what do you want? The Jewish law is like Rava. So what inference are they making from Rashi, and what is this whole discussion? It’s unnecessary.

[Speaker F] But the explanation could have been given about the private domain. Why does he really get into the whole public-domain story? I didn’t understand. No, because now I’m saying—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I’m dropping everything I answered before because we don’t need it. Let’s go with Rabbi Akiva Eiger’s difficulty. So what is the claim, really? That a karmelit is supposed to be like the public domain, right? So when the Talmud asked, “Then let it be like the holes of a karmelit,” that fits according to Abaye’s opinion, and therefore Rashi brings, in line with Abaye, that the holes of the public domain are like the public domain, and so the holes of a karmelit are like a karmelit. Meaning, this wasn’t said only with the private domain; it was also said with the public domain, so also with a karmelit. Therefore at this stage, when the Talmud raised the difficulty, it raised it according to Abaye. And now the Talmud says: right, but what do you want? That isn’t the practical ruling.

[Speaker F] But that’s what Rashi explains—Rashi explains that the holes of a karmelit are like the public domain. Why didn’t he explain that the holes of a karmelit are like the private domain?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Because it’s not true that they are like the private domain; it is true that they are like the public domain.

[Speaker F] Because there are no holes for a karmelit?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, because the holes of a karmelit, relative to the karmelit, are like the holes of the public domain relative to the public domain, only rabbinically. Therefore, when you raise the question, you assume Abaye’s view: just as the holes of the public domain are like the public domain, so too the holes of a karmelit should be like a karmelit. And that itself is what the Talmud answers: what do you want? Right, according to Abaye you’re correct, but the Jewish law follows Rava, and there are no holes for the public domain, and therefore there are no holes for a karmelit either. Then there is no difficulty at all. Rashi is just explaining the hava amina in the Talmud, the question. But in the conclusion, really, yes—correct—we rule like Rava, and that’s all. Look at what follows: Rav Ashi gives a second answer. Rav Ashi said: even if you say there are holes for a karmelit, that is only when they are adjacent; here it is when they are distant. Yes, it’s talking about when it is adjacent to its domain, and then there are holes for a karmelit. Now look at Rashi there—what does he explain about “adjacent”? Rashi in Eruvin, yes: “Adjacent, such as a hole in a wall adjacent to a karpef larger than a beit se’atayim.” Why did he suddenly bring in a karpef? A hole adjacent to a karmelit—what do you want with a karpef?

[Speaker B] But a karpef is a private domain on the Torah level.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Exactly. Rashi here is speaking about a kind of karmelit that on the Torah level is a private domain; it has partitions. It’s only the karmelit of a karpef, and about that he says that if there are holes for a karmelit, there could be. But that is only in a karmelit of that kind, one that does not resemble the public domain at all, but rather the private domain. Rabbinically they gave it the law of a karmelit. Meaning, even the first answer says: what do you want? There are no holes for the public domain. The second answer says: leave it—even if you say there are holes for a karmelit, that’s conceivable only in a karmelit that is very unlike the public domain—rather, like the private domain. A karmelit that does not resemble the public domain, one that is a private domain on the Torah level, namely a karpef larger than a beit se’atayim. It has partitions and it is an enclosed domain. There one could have said that it would be like the holes of the private domain. After all, we said that the holes of the private domain are secondary to the private domain, because the private domain is a well-defined domain, so whatever is beside it is secondary to it. You can say that about a karpef too: it is a clearly enclosed domain, and therefore whatever is attached to it is secondary to it. That’s fine. But we are not talking here about an ordinary karmelit in general—a valley, or the sea, or whatever. Meaning, we see that even when they raise the possibility that there are holes for a karmelit, Rashi takes it specifically in the direction of a karpef.

[Speaker D] So that means Rashi also sees it like Rava. In any case, you can really see here that he is like Rava, not like Abaye.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Exactly. And I claim that this is the proof that Rashi does not mean to rule here like Abaye. I don’t agree with those comments of the later authorities.

[Speaker E] But Rashi doesn’t issue rulings; he explains. No, obviously.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But if you explain the anonymous layer of the Talmud according to Abaye, then you’re basically telling me that the anonymous layer of the Talmud here follows Abaye. And when there is an anonymous Talmudic presentation like one of the opinions in a dispute, we usually rule like it. Right. So Rashi says: what are you talking about? That was a question; its answer is different. And even Rav Ashi, who says that maybe there are holes for a karmelit—even that is only in a karmelit that essentially resembles a private domain, not in an ordinary karmelit. And then something else: if you remember, in the previous class we saw that on 7a there arises a possibility that a karmelit might even require partitions. Remember? And then they prove from a house that a karmelit does not need partitions. But there was a hava amina, at least according to Rashi—Tosafot disagrees with him—that a karmelit would require partitions. Meaning, you see that there is an approach that sees a karmelit as not fundamentally similar to the public domain, even though apparently it is just a public domain on the rabbinic level. No, no—it has characteristics. It might even require partitions, or at least in a karpef which has partitions; and only there does the possibility arise that the holes of the karmelit would be like the karmelit. Meaning, in short, it does not go like Abaye. And this is Rashi himself. So you can’t say here, I think, that Rashi rules like Abaye. In any event, for our purposes, what we see here is that the basis of the law of holes is their nullification to the primary domain beside which they are located: private domain, public domain according to Abaye, or karmelit in contexts where there can be holes for a karmelit. Okay? But the idea behind the law of a hole is its nullification to the primary domain, and therefore it receives the name of the primary domain. So let me ask a question, for example—I think I asked you—what happens if they hollowed out in our house an area that is less than four by four?

[Speaker B] It would not be a private domain. Why?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But the overall area of the house is much more than four by four.

[Speaker B] But you mean in the description of the lower floor, like in our passage?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I’m talking about our passage, where what was hollowed out does not have four by four.

[Speaker B] But there wasn’t there—the question is whether it has height.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] There is a height of ten handbreadths, but the area of the hollow is less than four by four.

[Speaker D] Where is there any private domain here at all?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] All together—what’s the problem?

[Speaker D] There is no “all together.” You need a private domain. The holes of the private domain are like the private domain, but if I still don’t have the private domain because it hasn’t yet been defined, then how can I add the holes to it?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That is exactly the answer. Meaning, basically, notice: the idea is not that the holes of the private domain are seen as part of the hollow, and this whole business together is the private domain. It doesn’t work like that. It goes locomotive and cars. First of all, you have to define a place that is itself, on its own, a private domain. Once I have such a place, then the surrounding holes will also be a private domain. But if I need the holes in order to turn the middle into a private domain in the first place, that won’t happen. Meaning, this is an important point; we’ll see implications of it later. The holes are in a subordinate status relative to the primary thing. It’s not that the whole space altogether is simply a private domain, period. If that were so, then there would have been room to say that even a hollow of less than four by four—after all, there is here a place with a height of ten handbreadths, and the total area is more than four by four. True, not the whole area has that height, but what difference does that make? Look at the whole thing together—you could call it a private domain. The answer is no. Why? Because first you have to decide that the hollow is a private domain. First. Once the hollow is a private domain, it will pull after it—that’s the locomotive—it will pull after it all the holes, and they too will be considered a private domain. But first of all you have to decide that the hollow is a private domain. Therefore there really is here a law of the holes being secondary to the primary domain. First of all you have to establish the status of the primary domain in itself, and then the holes can follow after it. This is really what the Meiri writes here in his first sentence. He says as follows: “A hollow in a house that is four by four, once from the ground of the hollow up to the ceiling there is ten, it is permitted to carry in the whole of it. For here there is a private domain with the measure of the hollow, and the rest becomes secondary to the hollow and like the holes of the private domain, which are like the private domain.” Up to here he is expressing the reasoning. The reasoning is that the hollow first has to be a private domain, and therefore it has to have four by four. Therefore the Talmud sets it up as a hollow with four by four; hollowing out less won’t help. Why? Because the hollow has to be a private domain, and the rest becomes secondary to the hollow. Now look at the implications further on. Immediately afterward he continues and says: “And the holes of the private domain have no required measure; whatever they are, they are like the private domain.” Meaning, whatever area the holes have, it doesn’t matter; they will be considered a private domain. What is he coming to say here? He is coming to say that when you say that the hole is like the private domain, you don’t mean that it is itself a private domain. You mean that it is secondary to the hollow, and since the hollow is a private domain, so is the hole. Therefore the hole itself does not need to satisfy the conditions of a private domain; even if its area is less than four by four, it doesn’t matter. It is considered some sort of extension or branch of the private domain in the hollow. Once again?

[Speaker B] It joins to the area of the hollow.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So this is actually a consequence of what he said earlier. Earlier he explained that it is secondary to the hollow. Now here is the consequence: even though the hole itself does not satisfy the conditions of a private domain, it does not have an area of four by four, I don’t care, because I am not treating it as a private domain on its own; I am treating it as part of the hollow. Consequently, all of this is the private domain. Now look, he goes on even further, and you’ll see that it all runs along the same line. “And this is not only in the wall of a roofed house, where one may say that a house is considered as if full, and so it is like the rest of the house; rather even in the wall of an unroofed courtyard, where it is considered like a place of four by four to make one liable who throws from the public domain into it.” The Meiri says: does this house have a roof? In our case, yes. But what would happen in a courtyard without a roof? It has four surrounding walls, no roof—so it is a private domain, right? A private domain does not need a roof; this is not like a sukkah. Four walls—that is what defines a private domain. What happens if there is a hole in one of the walls? So the Meiri says that there too it will be the holes of the private domain, even if the hole does not have four by four. Why is this a greater novelty than in a place that has a roof? I’ll explain. If there is a roof, then I see the whole space enclosed by the roof and the partitions as one big private domain. But if there is no roof, then I don’t see it as one big domain. So why should the holes be considered a domain? “A house is considered as if full up to the sky.” The meaning of the phrase “a house is considered as if full” is that the framework determines that all the space inside it is one unit. Okay? But that’s only when there is a complete framework—roof and walls. Then I say that the whole space is one entity. But the Meiri says that even if there is no complete framework, no roof, only walls, it still works. Why does it work? Because the point is not that everything is one unit; rather, there is attachment here. The holes attach themselves to the private domain, and since the middle is a private domain, the holes also receive the name private domain. And this continues the line of thought I mentioned earlier. It’s not that everything is perceived as one unit. If everything were perceived as one unit, then maybe there would be room to say that even in a hollow of three by three, the whole thing would be a private domain. There is here a height of ten, and the whole business is one unit, and its area is more than four by four. True, in the hollow itself, where the height is ten, the area is not enough. But if everything is one unit and I see everything together, it could be that the holes would help the hollow and the hollow would help the holes, and everything together would be considered a private domain. And that is what the Meiri says: not so. The hollow must be a private domain, and the holes attach themselves after it. Therefore he says, on the one hand the holes do not need an area, because they attach themselves after the hollow. On the other hand, says the Meiri, this is true even when there is no roof, because I do not need everything to be one unit; I need the holes to attach themselves after the hollow.

[Speaker C] Okay, Shalom says, I want to say that we didn’t get to this passage; we read a different Meiri. Okay, I don’t know what—wait, yes, really—

[Speaker D] Something here doesn’t work for me,

[Speaker C] Yes, we didn’t read this passage; we read two other passages.

[Speaker B] But why not say, in a private domain, that the sky is like a roof? Meaning, even if it’s not roofed, after all the private domain rises to the sky.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But then—then also. Thank you. But inside the house you still need—so then—

[Speaker B] That’s only—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] the sky.

[Speaker B] What about the private domain?

[Speaker E] I have a question. What happens? Until now I thought that even within a private domain I could still have a separate area that is an exempt place. Suppose it doesn’t have four by four and you can place something small on it, but it isn’t part of the private domain.

[Speaker F] Suddenly now the whole topic according to Rav Chisda—it’s not—

[Speaker E] So really it’s not like that? Meaning, they do attach themselves to the domain itself even though they don’t have the required measure.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Of course. Not “even though”; because they don’t have the required measure.

[Speaker E] Right. So is there no scenario where within a private domain there is an exempt place? We saw that such a possibility exists.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I said: if Rava really accepted the distinction between convenient use and inconvenient use—I don’t know whether he accepts it—but if he does accept it, then such a hole, where the use is not convenient and it does not have an area of four by four, would be an exempt place.

[Speaker E] But in practice that doesn’t happen.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I don’t know. Who said not? I don’t know; I have no proof. Let’s check with Rav Chisda.

[Speaker E] So there could also be holes of a—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Rav Chisda is a question of a place of four by four; we’ll see in a moment.

[Speaker E] So there could be a hole that is in a private domain and it is an exempt place and not a private domain?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] In principle, yes, such a situation could exist. I don’t know whether Rava holds that way or not. Abaye’s distinction—I don’t know whether Rava accepts it; the Talmud doesn’t say. Look, I marked the Meiri here. Yael, do you see? The Meiri appears in the passage about the holes of the house opening toward the private domain and the public domain. So he says: “And the holes of the private domain have no required measure; whatever they are, they are like the private domain.”

[Speaker D] Ah, but you didn’t direct us to this passage. There were two “and the holes.” One was “and the holes of the private domain,” and the other was the one about the holes opening through, and we took the upper passage because you wrote “in the holes of the private domain.”

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Ah, okay, so maybe I didn’t—

[Speaker D] And we read that, and we really wondered what you meant. We went according to what you wrote.

[Speaker C] Yes, that’s the first passage.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] In any case, let’s see—let’s read it now. It doesn’t matter. Okay, yes. In short, the Meiri—throughout, we see his whole move. The Meiri is trying to show us the rationale behind these things. He really wants to claim: there is a locomotive here, and once the status of the locomotive is determined, all the cars are pulled after it. The holes are pulled after the private domain. Now he continues and says an interesting novelty: “And it is considered like a place of four by four, so as to make liable one who throws from the public domain into it.” And this is a huge novelty. Because after all we know that beyond the rule that you have to place in a private domain or a public domain, there is another rule: you have to place it on top of a place of four by four. Now even if you say that the hole is considered like the private domain because it attaches itself to the hollow, but if it does not have a place of four by four, then if I placed it there, basically I placed it in a private domain but in a place that is not four by four. That is not considered a placement. But the Meiri says: no, this too is considered a place of four by four—which is a huge novelty. Where did he get that from? For apparently a place that is not four by four within a private domain…

[Speaker F] But it’s connected to it, attached to it. That’s what he says.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So what? So what if it’s attached to it? Then it is also considered a private domain. Fine. But how does it become a place of four by four? The Meiri is really presenting an extreme approach here. He really wants to claim that if you place in the hole—say from the public domain you placed into a hole of the private domain—it is as if it were resting on the floor of the private domain. This attachment is as if we are simply ignoring the fact that these are holes. There is only a private domain here; the holes are as if they do not exist. Someone who placed it there, as far as we are concerned, it is as if it is lying on the ground of the private domain. That is a big novelty. Because on the face of it, why say that? What is written here, that the holes of the private domain are like the private domain, means that the hole too has the law of the private domain. Fine, I understand that. But it could still be a private domain and yet be a place that is not four by four, and therefore one would not be liable. One would not be exempt because he did not place in a private domain—he did place in a private domain. But it is within a private domain in a place that is not four by four. The Meiri claims that the nullification is so strong, so radical, that we basically see the hole as though it does not exist at all. It is placed on the floor of the private domain, excuse me. Okay? This whole matter is very strange. Now—

[Speaker B] But the moment the hollow projected the name private domain onto the whole area, then it isn’t strange. I didn’t understand. Once the hollow projected the name private domain onto the entire area—yes—then it does make sense.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Why does that make sense? Why on earth? Maybe it projected that someone who places in the domain… I’ll give an example: suppose there is a reed stuck into a private domain… but he placed it on a place that is not four by four.

[Speaker E] Exactly what I asked earlier. Yes.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That is the Meiri’s novelty. The Meiri claims that it is not only that this attachment turns the hole into a private domain, but from my perspective it is also a place of four by four. Now why? After all, things that are part of the private domain—that still doesn’t mean… they could still be less than four by four. That they are part of the private domain is true, but even within the private domain there is still another rule, namely that it must be a place of four by four. So where does that rule come from here?

[Speaker C] Maybe it is considered four by four? Again? In a private domain the minimum is four by four. What? In a private domain the minimum is four by four.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right, so here there is less.

[Speaker E] And in the hole there is—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] less than four by four.

[Speaker C] Yes, but it is resting next to the private domain.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It isn’t resting; it is at the side. So it receives the status of a private domain, I understand. That I understand. Its definition is private domain. But the fact that you placed it in a private domain is still not enough to make you liable. After all, there is another requirement: that it be resting on top of a place of four by four.

[Speaker D] And that requirement is not met here. So we said: maybe here the intention is that it is considered like a place of four by four, even though in practice it is not four by four.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So why? Why is the reed not considered like a place of four by four?

[Speaker D] Because apparently a wall, an actual partition that is part of the ground, has greater significance.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But that’s strange. What? Where does that come from? Why? Why? What’s the problem? There isn’t four by four there. That’s the fact. So where does this invention come from, that it is considered like a place of four by four? There isn’t even a hint of that in the Talmud.

[Speaker E] Maybe this idea of attachment—because it’s literally part of the same wall. It’s not like a reed, which is something separate stuck into the domain, but part of the same wall.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The wall? What? What is in the wall? The wall is nothing. The private domain is the hollow in the middle.

[Speaker D] If they mean the case of the hollow, then it does make sense. Because with the hollow, after all, we said that if afterward the gap between the hollow and the walls is less than three handbreadths, then basically there is some kind of—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] attachment, as if it belongs to the wall.

[Speaker D] Are we talking about a gap of three handbreadths?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Three and a half handbreadths is the gap.

[Speaker D] Ah, so between three and four that’s… for example, yes.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That is only to illustrate the difficulty. Yes. So I’m saying: in the Meiri you see that the hole is so nullified to the hollow that we don’t even see it as a separate place; rather, from our perspective, you placed it in the private domain inside the house. That’s it. And apparently this is not similar to the matter of the reed. So let me not ignore the matter of the reed here. Briefly, let’s just look at it for a moment.

[Speaker F] Is that considered like Rav Chisda, or not?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, we’ll see in a moment. That is exactly the point. “Returning to the matter itself, Rav Chisda said: If one inserted a reed in a private domain and threw from the public domain and it came to rest on top of it, even if it was a hundred cubits high, he is liable.” Yes, that is obvious, because a private domain rises up to the sky. The Talmud asks: shall we say that Rav Chisda holds like Rabbi? For it was taught: “If one threw and it came to rest on top of any projection whatsoever”—this case is in the public domain—“Rabbi makes him liable and the Sages exempt him.” Evidently, we do not require a place of four by four. Yes, meaning that according to Rabbi one does not need a place of four by four, while according to the Sages one does. And in Rav Chisda’s opinion we see that he does not require a place of four by four, because in fact if it rested on top of that reed, which does not have a place of four by four, one is liable. The Talmud says—I move to the next page—Abaye said: “In the private domain everyone agrees with Rav Chisda; here they disagree in the case of a tree standing…” and so on. What does Abaye say? In the private domain everyone agrees with Rav Chisda that what? According to most medieval authorities (Rishonim), they agree with Rav Chisda that one does not need placement on a place of four by four. Okay? So now this could explain the Meiri. Because basically what the Meiri claims is that there is no problem, since in a private domain there really is no requirement that you place it on a place of four by four. But if you look at the wording of the Meiri, it doesn’t seem that way.

[Speaker B] And it seems that the Meiri thinks the hole is considered four by four.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Exactly. In the Meiri’s language it does not seem that way. Because in the Meiri it appears that he specifically does not rule like Rav Chisda, and the Meiri claims that this place of the hole is considered like a place of four by four. Meaning that basically you do need a place of four by four even in a private domain. He only claims that in a hole this requirement is indeed met. But such a requirement exists. Meaning, he wanted to claim that even without Rav Chisda’s rule—perhaps he even does not rule like Rav Chisda, even though there it says that everyone agrees. But it is not so simple; there may be those who do not share that, who do not rule that way. In the Meiri it is implied that he does not rule like Rav Chisda; rather, he claims that one needs a place of four by four even in a private domain, except that he has the novelty that the holes are considered like a place of four by four. To sharpen even more what I said earlier—this is how far the Meiri’s novelty goes. If he had said: I rule like Rav Chisda, fine, then there would be no novelty at all, because you do not need a place of four by four and everything is fine. He does not say: because Rav Chisda said you do not need four by four. On the contrary, he explains: because the hole is considered like a place of four by four. Meaning, you do need a place of four by four.

[Speaker F] In the Rashba it clearly looks like that, that it’s—right.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Maybe even before I get to the Rashba: with the Meiri, it could be that what he means to say is simply that he rules like Rav Chisda, and Rav Chisda’s own claim is this. Not that one does not need a place of four by four, but that in a private domain there is no such thing as placing in a private domain and it not being a place of four by four, because anything that is part of the private domain is considered placement in the private domain, and therefore you have placed it in a place of four by four. And this reasoning that the Meiri says regarding holes is itself Rav Chisda’s reasoning, and that is why he does not require placement on a place of four by four. Meaning, the claim is that theoretically he does require placement on a place of four by four—even Rav Chisda—but he claims that this requirement is always met. Because every reed, a reed in a private domain, is after all part of the private domain, so placing it on the reed is like placing it on the floor. It is simply a continuation of the floor; the floor just goes like this. That’s all. And then you placed it on the floor, and that is called a place of four by four. If that is Rav Chisda’s own reasoning, then it could be that this is indeed how the Meiri understands it. Fine. But then the novelty really is that Rav Chisda does not say that one does not need a place of four by four in a private domain. One does need it; it’s just that it is always met, and it always happens, so the requirement is redundant, but theoretically such a requirement still exists. Okay. The Biur HaGra here brings in the name of the Rashba’s Avodat HaKodesh. He says, “And this is the language of the Rashba in the book Avodat HaKodesh: ‘And what are the holes of the private domain? A hole in the walls,’ etc. ‘If there were holes in them open outward and not passing inward’—and the Beit Yosef brought this. But the Rashba is speaking only above ten, and the hole is not four wide, and even so it is a private domain because of the rule of the holes of the private domain, even according to the Rabbis.” Who are the Rabbis? The Rabbis who disagree with Rabbi, whom we just read, “and we hold like Rav Chisda, that in the private domain one does not need placement on a place of four.” He explains: the Rashba says, why is one liable for a hole even if it does not have four by four? Because in a private domain you do not need four by four. That is not like the Meiri. The Meiri claims: because the hole is considered like a place of four by four. The Rashba claims: you do not need a place of four by four, period; therefore one who places in a hole is also liable. In Tosafot, under the heading “and the law is,” I won’t read it, but in Tosafot here it is implied against both of them. He claims that you do need a place of four by four even in a private domain, and the hole has to have four by four. If it does not have four by four, it does not help. Unless you go like Rabbi Meir, who holds “we carve out to complete.” Later in the passage, yes, so that even if there is a small hole, if it could be expanded then we regard it as though it were expanded. But in Tosafot you see in the clearest way: first of all, Tosafot does not rule like Rav Chisda. Tosafot claims that even in a private domain there is a requirement that this be a place of four by four. And second, Tosafot says that not only do I not rule like Rav Chisda, but in the case of holes I do not accept either the Rashba’s reasoning or the Meiri’s reasoning. The Rashba’s reasoning is that the Jewish law follows Rav Chisda. Tosafot says: I do not rule like Rav Chisda. The Meiri’s reasoning is that even if you do not rule like Rav Chisda, it does not matter, because the hole is secondary to the hollow or to the private domain, and therefore it is considered like a place of four by four even if it does not—

[Speaker B] have four—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] by four. Tosafot does not accept that either. Right? Tosafot accepts neither of the two possibilities. Meaning, basically we have here three views among the medieval authorities (Rishonim). The Rashba’s view is that the Jewish law follows Rav Chisda: in a private domain one does not need a place of four by four, so the question about the holes doesn’t arise. What do I care what their area is? It doesn’t interest me. The Meiri’s view is that in principle we do not rule like Rav Chisda; even in a private domain one needs a place of four by four, and therefore in the case of a reed, for example, perhaps the one who threw and it rested on the reed would indeed be exempt. But in holes, since they are secondary to the hollow or to the private domain, they also have the law of a place of four by four, and therefore one is liable. And Tosafot’s view is that with holes that do not have a place of four by four, one is indeed not liable; only with holes of four by four is one liable. Now in the Biur Halakha in the Mishnah Berurah, there he says: “Now the opinion of Tosafot is that there is liability only if the hole was four by four handbreadths, but the opinion of the Rashba and the Meiri is that with the holes of the private domain it need not be four wide, for they have the law of the private domain itself in every case.” What is he saying? At first I thought—first of all, he brings the Rashba. And he brings the Rashba and the Meiri together. Now that is true in terms of the practical law: they say the same law, that a hole need not be four by four. But the reasoning is opposite. So if we say what I suggested above, that maybe the Meiri is claiming that this itself is what Rav Chisda says—that Rav Chisda basically says that in a private domain there is always the law of a place of four by four—then according to that the Rashba and the Meiri are indeed saying the same thing. Right? Yes. Then when he says that with the holes of the private domain it need not be four wide because they have the law of the private domain itself in every case, he means exactly the Meiri’s reasoning of secondary attachment. So how are you connecting the Rashba here? Surely the Rashba does not accept that. The Rashba claims simply that according to Rav Chisda one does not need a place of four by four. He apparently understands that the Rashba also learned this way. Meaning that all of this is Rav Chisda himself. The Rashba rules here like Rav Chisda, but what does Rav Chisda say? Rav Chisda does not claim that one does not need a place of four by four in a private domain. Rather, he claims that this requirement is always met. Because everything belonging to the private domain is considered part of the private domain, so there is no problem of a place of four by four either. And in the Mishnah Berurah that is certainly so, because he joins the Meiri and the Rashba—and not only does he join the Meiri and the Rashba, but he joins both of them to the Meiri, not both of them to the Rashba. Meaning, he turns the Rashba into the Meiri, not the Meiri into the Rashba. So according to everyone, one does need a place of four by four even in a private domain—it’s just that this is always met. Wait, so if that’s the case—

[Speaker C] We said… meaning the definition of a private domain is always… okay, sorry, I got it. It clicked for me.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Now, in principle, if—

[Speaker F] if that really is Rav Chisda, then all the discussions we had at the beginning of the year about whether the hand is four by four and all that, then it isn’t relevant at all in the case where the homeowner is standing in the private domain.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Correct. So the commentators here already point that out. That it is relevant only when we are talking about the hand of the poor person, not the hand of the homeowner. Because the hand of the homeowner does not have a place of four by four, but since it is in a private domain, you don’t need a place of four by four. But the hand of the poor person is in the public domain, so there you do need a place of four by four. That is one of the reasons, by the way, why Tosafot apparently does not rule like Rav Chisda. Because in those passages it is plainly talking also about the hand of the homeowner. So you see that there is a requirement of a place of four by four even inside a house. Fine, but that is a topic in its own right. Now I want to move on to the second part of the class; I don’t have much time left. So let’s see. Tosafot asks as follows: “And the Rivah found this difficult.” Yes, we said that a hole need not be a place of four by four because, after all, the whole business is a private domain. What about the hollow? In the hollow we saw that it does need a place of four by four, right? Because the hollow itself has to be a private domain, and after it is a private domain it draws the holes to itself. Now I ask: how does the hollow itself have the law of a private domain without the holes? After all, it has no partitions. “And the Rivah found this difficult: what is different from a sukkah that is not ten high, where we say in the first chapter of Sukkah: if one hollowed it out to complete it to ten, if from the edge of the hollow to the wall there are three handbreadths, it is invalid; less than three, it is valid. But here the hollowing helps even if it is far from the wall by a great distance.” What is he saying? A case like ours, only in a sukkah. The sukkah has a height of nine handbreadths. Someone hollowed out an area in the sukkah of seven by seven—because with a sukkah you need seven by seven, not four by four—seven by seven, and now the interior space is ten handbreadths high. He says: if the bench-like ledge at the side, yes, the width around the hollow, is three handbreadths or more, the sukkah is invalid. Why? Because the distant walls are not the walls of the hollow. They are distant from it. Less than three handbreadths is lavud, but if it is more than three handbreadths, then there is no law of lavud. So basically it comes out that the hollow, which has the ten-high space, has no walls. The walls need to be adjacent to the hollow. But in our passage there is no such limitation of three handbreadths. Even if the distance is large, the hollow itself is still a private domain, and therefore the holes too are drawn after it and they too are a private domain. He asks: how does this begin? How does the hollow itself become a private domain? After all, it has no partitions.

[Speaker D] But on the Sabbath you don’t need a roof, while for a sukkah you need the roofing. On the Sabbath we have no practical implication at all regarding the roof.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I’m not talking about the roof; I’m talking about the walls.

[Speaker D] Therefore no—but what we saw in sukkah is that the law regarding a sukkah is that you need walls attached to the roofing.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right, that’s Tosafot’s answer. Now I’m reading: “And he answered that it’s different there regarding a sukkah” — a sukkah is different. Why? “Because we require the walls to be adjacent to the roofing.” In a sukkah there is a rule that the walls have to be attached to the roofing. “For we derive there walls from ‘in booths, in booths,’ as we say there” — never mind, in any case that’s the rule. “And therefore we require…” and therefore it has to be less than three handbreadths from the edge beyond the carved-out area. Why? “Because you need to combine the ledge of the carved-out area with the walls so that they will be adjacent to the roofing opposite the opening.” Okay? Meaning, the walls of the carved-out section — the one handbreadth around the carved-out area, or the two handbreadths around the carved-out area — are not adjacent to the roofing of the sukkah, and therefore you need this to connect to the outer walls so that it will count as adjacent to the sukkah roofing. If it’s not connected to it, then it turns out that the lower part of the walls of the carved-out area is simply not adjacent to the roofing, and in a sukkah that is invalid. But in a private domain there is no rule at all of roofing; you don’t need a ceiling, and certainly not adjacency to roofing. So there it doesn’t bother me, and it doesn’t have to be within three handbreadths; it doesn’t have to be lavud. He adds something further there about a bent wall, but that’s not important right now. Okay? That’s what Tosafot says.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Now here, notice: here there was room to discuss which of the two conceptions from the previous lesson Tosafot is following. Let me remind you again — this is what someone commented at the beginning of the lesson, I don’t remember who — what is the disqualification of this house? What is the defect? Meaning, why is it not a private domain before the carving? Why is it a karmelit? So we saw that according to Rashi it’s because

[Speaker B] it doesn’t have

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] walls. And we explained that according to Rashi, the walls are determined by their height for someone looking from the inside. According to the Rosh and the Ran, the height of the walls is determined for someone looking from the outside. So if that’s the case, then there are walls here — what’s the problem? Right, but there’s no interior space here. Right? At least according to the Ran. With the Rosh we discussed that it’s not completely clear. But at least according to the Ran, there’s no interior space here, and that’s what invalidates it. Now, is Tosafot’s question going according to Rashi’s approach or according to the Rosh’s? Tosafot’s question that we saw here.

[Speaker F] It seems to be according to Rashi’s approach, because he requires walls.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right. Because according to the Rosh, what does the Rosh say? The carved-out area has walls; the house has no problem of walls. All that’s missing is interior space. The moment I carve, interior space is created; so there are walls, there’s interior space, everything is fine. What’s the question? The whole discussion arises only according to Rashi, because according to Rashi, inside the house it is not a private domain because it has no walls. Meaning, Rashi does not see the outer walls as the walls, but rather the inner walls. And on that Tosafot can now ask: okay, but the carved-out area also has no walls, because the lower part of the wall and the upper part of the wall are not within three handbreadths, so they are not considered one wall, they are not connected. So it turns out that the carved-out area has no walls. But according to the Rosh and the Ran, the carved-out area does have walls. Why do I care whether it’s three handbreadths or not? The wall is from the outside. From the outside there are ten handbreadths, and that’s the wall of the whole thing. There’s no problem at all. Therefore, Tosafot’s entire question can arise only according to Rashi’s view, and in my opinion this Tosafot is proof that Tosafot too learned the previous passage like Rashi, against the Rosh and the Ran — that the problem is with the walls and not with the interior space. Because otherwise there would be no basis for their question.

[Speaker F] I just remember that with sukkah, from this Tosafot we concluded that the Raavya doesn’t require walls in a sukkah at all. What was it there? I really remember it because it seemed absurd to me, but I really remember that from this Tosafot we saw that the Raavya doesn’t require walls in a sukkah at all, as opposed to Sabbath. The very fact that he doesn’t validate it as a bent wall — what?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The Raavya is talking about the Gemara there on page 7, where it says that according to Rabbi Yoshiyah the walls have to be made from the waste of the threshing floor and winepress. And whoever disagrees with Rabbi Yoshiyah and says the walls do not have to be made from the waste of the threshing floor and winepress — the claim there is that there are no walls.

[Speaker F] I’m really sure — not there, here, right here in this Tosafot.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It

[Speaker F] was the conclusion then, I really remember this passage.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, I don’t remember. It’s possible; I just don’t remember right now.

[Speaker F] In any case, he doesn’t accept that this can be completed into a bent wall, this…

[Speaker C] And we also talked about a bent wall.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No — that’s what Tosafot says here, that we only say bent wall if there is already a wall to begin with. But that’s fine; it’s not relevant for us. It’s a question of bent wall, which is why I didn’t read that part of Tosafot. Okay, I don’t remember; we’d have to look, I don’t remember right now. In any case, this is what Tosafot says, so it basically comes out like this: from the outside there is a wall here of ten handbreadths even without the carved-out area. There’s no problem of walls, right? Therefore the only problem is the height of the interior space. Once he carved it out, according to the Rosh and the Ran, the moment I carve it I also have interior space and everything is fine. What happens in a sukkah? In a sukkah, according to the Rosh — I’m now speaking according to the Rosh and the Ran — in a sukkah it’s not certain that the thickness of the roofing completes it to ten, so it could be that in a sukkah… from the outside, a sukkah has no walls at all. Do you understand what I’m saying? And this is not a difference between sukkah and Sabbath, but rather that in a sukkah we are not talking about a case where the thickness of the roofing completes the wall to a height of ten handbreadths. In our case with the house, that is the situation; the fact is that on top of the roof of the house it is considered a private domain. But in a sukkah that’s not the case. Theoretically, if in a sukkah the thickness of the roofing were ten handbreadths, I claim that according to the Rosh and the Ran it could be that the carving would not need to be within three handbreadths of the walls. I wouldn’t care whether it was close or not close. Why? Because the walls exist — that’s from the outside — and the height exists because I carved it, and that’s it, everything is fine. Okay? Therefore, according to the Rosh and the Ran, there is no necessity to say that there is a difference between Sabbath and sukkah. It could be that in a sukkah too, if the situation were like ours — where the thickness of the roofing completed the wall to ten, so that someone looking from the outside would see a wall of ten — then when I carved from the inside I would have done it only to solve the problem of interior space, not to solve a problem of walls. And if so, it need not be that the carved-out area be within three handbreadths of the outer wall. Because it does not need to combine with it into a wall; it itself is not the wall. The outer wall is the wall.

[Speaker D] But how does that work with Rashi? If Rashi requires walls from the inside?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s what Tosafot says. And therefore Tosafot says there is a difference between sukkah and Sabbath: in a sukkah the walls need to be adjacent to the roofing, and therefore there it has to be within three handbreadths. On Sabbath you don’t need that, and therefore even if they are far from each other, it’s fine. Now notice: according to Rashi’s explanation, it comes out even more clearly that the relevant wall is what you see from the inside. Because when I see from the inside, what am I looking at? I’m standing inside the carved-out area. So I see, say, two handbreadths — that’s the ledge of the carved-out area — and another eight handbreadths up to the height of the roofing — not the roofing, the roof, right? And the distance between them could be five meters. And according to Rashi that’s fine. Why is it fine? Because from the inside I see a total height of ten handbreadths. I don’t care that it’s split up. As long as I see around me ten handbreadths enclosing me, even if those ten handbreadths are split — next to me there are two handbreadths and far from me there are another eight — that’s fine, no problem. As long as that’s what I see from the inside, it’s fine. So that basically means that I need to see around me a height of ten handbreadths, but not really one wall, because it’s hard to see all these ten handbreadths as one wall, because it’s hard to combine these two parts. But then — yes?

[Speaker D] If there’s no roof, that’s a problem.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Why? There’s no problem at all.

[Speaker D] Because from the outside, according to the Rosh…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Because the Rosh is something else — that’s what I said. According to the Rosh, clearly if there is no roof then there is also a wall problem, not just an interior-space problem, right? And therefore in a sukkah, where there is roofing, but the roofing is not necessarily as thick as the roof we have here on Sabbath, there it could be that there would be a problem even according to the Rosh, since according to the Rosh, when one looks from the outside one also does not see a wall of ten. Okay?

[Speaker D] So according to Rashi, basically it doesn’t matter whether there is or isn’t a roof.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] According to no one does it matter whether there is or isn’t a roof — you don’t need a roof on Sabbath; everybody agrees about that.

[Speaker D] No, but in terms of completing it.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] In terms of completing the wall, it doesn’t matter, because Rashi doesn’t relate to what is seen from the outside. Right. Let’s say the roof were thinner, so that altogether it didn’t reach ten in height — then what is above would not be a private domain. But what is below, after the carving, would be a private domain. Yes. Look at the Tosafot Yeshanim. “And one can further say” — Tosafot Yeshanim — he asks the same question as Tosafot: “For here there are walls of height from the outside, and there is no need to combine the ledge” — the edge of the carved-out area. “Rather, there is no airspace of ten”; what is missing is only the interior space of ten. “And when he carved, so that there is airspace of ten in one place, it is a private domain.” This is really the approach of the Rosh and the Ran, right? This is exactly what we showed: that Tosafot, in both his question and his answer, followed Rashi. The Tosafot Yeshanim brings another answer, and that answer says: leave it — according to the Ran and the Rosh, the question does not arise at all. What’s the question? There’s a wall here; the wall is from the outside. And if I carved, I only completed the interior space to ten, so everything is fine. What does that have to do with a sukkah? But the Tosafot Yeshanim asks: then why in a sukkah is it necessary? Say the same thing in a sukkah too. So he says no, but in a sukkah you need to combine the ledge. Why do you need to combine the ledge? So that it will be adjacent to the roofing, no? That’s what… no, he doesn’t write that. According to Tosafot, it is so that it will be adjacent to the roofing; he doesn’t write a word about that. He says that in a sukkah… he says in a sukkah you need to combine them. In my opinion what he means is: in a sukkah, the thickness of the roofing is not a handbreadth; it’s not enough to complete it. In a sukkah, from the outside there is no wall of ten handbreadths. It’s not like our case. So there you really need there to be a wall of ten, and therefore you need to combine them. Not because it has to be adjacent to the roofing, but because otherwise there is no wall. In our case, says the Tosafot Yeshanim, there is a wall anyway because of the outside. All I’m missing is the interior space, so there’s no problem at all — why would I need to combine the carved-out area with the walls outside? Let there be whatever distance you want. But in a sukkah there is no wall from the outside, because the height from the outside also is not ten handbreadths. So then what will be the wall of the sukkah? The part of the carved-out area plus the wall standing outside — so you want to combine them, and for that the distance has to be less than three handbreadths. And then you really see that the Tosafot Yeshanim holds that there is no fundamental difference between sukkah and Sabbath. In both, if there had been ten handbreadths from the outside, then even in a sukkah it would not have needed to be within three handbreadths, because there would be no need to combine them, right? That’s what seems to come out from the Tosafot Yeshanim. There is no difference between the laws of sukkah and the laws of Sabbath. Rather, in tractate Sukkah the reality in that passage is simply that from the outside there is not a height of ten handbreadths. And in our case there is. The difference is not that here we are dealing with the laws of Sabbath and there with the laws of sukkah. The difference is simply in the physical situation. In our case there is a wall of ten handbreadths outside, and there there is no wall of ten handbreadths outside. It sounds as though he does not see a difference between a discussion of sukkah and a discussion of Sabbath: whatever would be valid here would also be valid there. The difference is just in the actual case itself, in how the case is described, and that’s all. Because there was room to say — and in truth I myself would have thought — that in a private domain, say according to the Rosh, why is the outer wall the wall? Because the purpose of the wall is to stop those in the public domain from breaking through into the private domain, so that the traffic of the public should not pass through. So what determines matters is what the pedestrian in the public domain sees in front of him — what barrier does he see? Does he see a barrier of ten handbreadths? Then that is a good wall, because it stops him at the level of ten handbreadths. But according to that, one could have said that in a sukkah even the Rosh and the Ran would agree that the outer wall does not help. Because in a sukkah, the function of the wall is to indicate to me, the one sitting inside, that I am enclosed within a sukkah framework. And therefore from the inside I need to see ten handbreadths, not from the outside. And according to that, it could be that in a sukkah even the Rosh and the Ran would agree that the relevant height, the determining height, is the height seen from the inside, not from the outside. In the Tosafot Yeshanim you see that this is not so. In the Tosafot Yeshanim you see that on the fundamental level, in a sukkah too, if there were height from the outside, that would be a good wall. The entire difference between the passage in Sukkah and the passage here is simply that there the case is not one where the height from the outside is ten handbreadths, because the thickness of the roof — of the roofing — does not complete the wall to ten.

[Speaker F] By “from the outside,” you mean including the carved-out area, right?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no. “From the outside” means without the carved-out area. No — “from the outside” means the wall plus the part that is the thickness of the roof.

[Speaker B] Exactly. From the outside they don’t see the carved-out area.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] They don’t see the carved-out area from the outside.

[Speaker F] So how can that be? Then I don’t understand anything here.

[Speaker B] Because you have the overhanging branches.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What’s the problem? I didn’t understand.

[Speaker F] If on Sabbath I have, from the outside, say nine and the thickness of the roof — right, sorry — that’s not like a sukkah.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Exactly. In a sukkah there are overhanging branches. In a sukkah it does not say that the thickness of the roofing completes it to ten. Why not? Because in a sukkah there is no discussion of whether there will be a private domain on the roof. Why was that important in our case? Because here they had to say that on the roof there is some law of private domain, because the roof has walls of ten. But in a sukkah the discussion is whether the sukkah is valid, not whether it is a private domain. So there, what happens on the roof is irrelevant — there’s nothing on the roof. Therefore there is no reason to assume thick roofing that completes the wall to a height of ten. Therefore, says the Tosafot Yeshanim, if that’s so, then there the parts of the wall have to be joined. But notice that he is not willing to distinguish between the laws of sukkah and the laws of Sabbath. That means that in his view, if by chance there were thick roofing there, then there would be no problem at all; it would not need to be joined, it would be a valid wall. Okay? Yes. So that is the Tosafot Yeshanim.

[Speaker F] In the case of the Ran and the Rosh, if I had exactly the sukkah case — meaning five and five — that also wouldn’t help.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Again? I didn’t understand.

[Speaker F] If I have the sukkah case of five and five, but on Sabbath — not nine and one thickness — that also wouldn’t help.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It wouldn’t help according to the Rosh, no. It wouldn’t help, because from the outside there is no wall of ten, right. They would need the distance between them to be three handbreadths — less than three handbreadths — because then… Let’s say indeed the depth of the carved-out area is five handbreadths and the height above it is also five handbreadths, okay? Then there I would say that the five handbreadths of the outer wall need to be close to the carved-out area, less than three handbreadths, right? According to the Tosafot Yeshanim. But even according to that, it still needs explanation. After all, someone looking from the outside does not have a wall of ten handbreadths to cross, right? He sees only a barrier of five handbreadths in front of him, not ten. So why does that help to constitute a wall? Do you understand what I’m asking?

[Speaker F] Because they don’t require a wall, at least not the Rosh; they require only interior space, and if there is interior space…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no — they do require a wall. My claim was not that. They require a wall, only the outer wall is the wall, and what remains is only the requirement of interior space. I didn’t say they don’t require a wall.

[Speaker E] So how do you answer that?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So that’s a problem, right. Seemingly you see from here that if there is a ledge of five and a wall of five — that’s the Tosafot in Sukkah I referred you to — a ledge of five and a wall of five is in fact a valid wall. Think about a pit five handbreadths deep with a pile of earth around it five handbreadths high. So if that pile of earth is adjacent to the pit, it joins together, and altogether you have a wall of ten handbreadths. But that wall is a wall for someone looking from the inside. Someone looking from the outside sees only a barrier of five handbreadths in front of him, not ten. And if what determines matters is what the person looking from the outside sees, then how and why is such a thing a valid wall? So that really is not simple.

[Speaker D] For the same reason — for the same reason that a trench ten handbreadths deep is a private domain. Right? Why? What happens? Someone comes from the outside and sees a wall of five. In order to enter inside, he has to climb that wall, and then when he gets to the top he encounters a depth of ten, so he has a barrier. It’s exactly like a trench.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] After he climbed the outer five handbreadths, we’re back to the case of a trench, and since there is a trench ten handbreadths deep, that is considered a wall that separates from the outside person. So the novelty is that separation from an outside person can be downward too, not only upward. Not as I described until now, that since he sees a barrier of ten handbreadths in front of him, that’s fine. What I described is true, it’s just not the full picture. Even if he sees a drop of ten handbreadths in front of him, that counts as a separation vis-à-vis him. Okay.

[Speaker D] And therefore the width of the area between the carving and the wall also matters. Right — if it’s more than three handbreadths, then from his standpoint it’s a barrier. If it isn’t too narrow but is wide, then it could be that when he enters he has somewhere to place his feet.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It’s not connected, right. Those two fives are not connected, and then he has two barriers of five, not one barrier of ten. And two barriers of five are not enough.

[Speaker F] Or maybe you don’t need walls at all on Sabbath — that’s something one could say.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] You don’t need walls on Sabbath? I don’t understand that. Then what do you need?

[Speaker F] No, there is no law of walls on Sabbath; there just needs to be something so that I know that now I’m entering a private domain.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Ah, fine, okay — but still there has to be a separation. Even if not a wall, there has to be a separation. Now, Tosafot in Sukkah is discussing — look, I’ll read only the last line — “And one can say that a Sabbath domain, whose purpose is to prevent the feet of the public, is not comparable to a sukkah, where we require walls adjacent to the roofing.” It’s somewhat similar to our Tosafot, but there is an addition here. He wants to say that on Sabbath the whole purpose of the wall is to prevent the passage of the public — which is exactly the Rosh’s conception, right? That the person outside should see that he has a barrier of ten handbreadths stopping him. But in a sukkah it’s not the same. Why is it not the same? Because you need walls adjacent to the roofing. Meaning, there too the wall is to prevent the feet of the public, as on Sabbath, but in addition there is a law of walls adjacent to the roofing. Or an alternative reading: in a Sabbath domain the wall is to prevent the feet of the public; in a sukkah the wall is not to prevent the feet of the public but to be viewed inwardly — only that one needs walls adjacent to the roofing, and therefore it has to be less than three handbreadths. Two possible readings in Tosafot. Does he understand it like the distinction I made earlier — that on Sabbath the wall is determined by the barrier vis-à-vis those outside, while in a sukkah what determines matters is what you see from the inside, a difference between sukkah and Sabbath? Then if I go with the Rosh and the Ran, in our case this would have nothing to do with sukkah. In a sukkah even they would agree that what determines matters is… what is seen from the inside, not what is seen from the outside. What they said, that what determines matters is the view from the outside, is only with regard to Sabbath; with regard to sukkah, no. But the plain sense of Tosafot here does not seem to mean that. He means to say that Sabbath is to prevent the feet of the public, period. In a sukkah too it is to prevent the feet of the public, but in addition one also needs walls adjacent to the roofing. Not that on Sabbath the purpose of the wall is different than in a sukkah; it is the same purpose, namely what is seen from the outside — only that in a sukkah there is also the law of walls adjacent to the roofing. And one final sentence, if you’ll allow me: the Rosh, after he brings an answer overall very similar, says: “But with regard to Sabbath, so long as the domain is protected by the walls, even if they are very far from it, it is called a private domain. Therefore, by means of the outer walls, which are ten high, it is called a private domain” — like the Ran, right? “But not by means of the inner one.” Why not? “Because the edge of the carved-out area does not combine with them since they are three handbreadths away from it.” What is he saying? He is saying that on Sabbath, the determining walls are the outer walls, right? Meaning including the thickness of the roof. But what about the fact that the inner walls do not help? He does not say because what determines matters is the outer side, but because from the inside it is not joined. That implies that if from the inside it had been joined, then the inside too could have determined the height of the wall, even if from the outside there were not ten. Say, think about the case of a sukkah. From the outside there are not ten, right? Because the thickness of the roofing does not complete the height of the wall to ten. Now I made a carving. According to the Rosh, the determining wall is what is seen from the outside. Seemingly that should not have helped. The Rosh says: no, it would help if there were sufficient closeness. Why? Because the view from the inside too can determine a wall, not only from the outside. From the Rosh it seems that there are two possibilities: either ten handbreadths as seen from the inside or as seen from the outside. This addition — “but not by means of the inner one” — says that there really is some addition in the Rosh. He says: yes, but if the inner one had been close to the outer one, then even if the outer one did not have ten handbreadths, it would have been fine. Why would it have been fine? After all, what determines matters for Sabbath is what we look at from the outside, and from the outside there are not ten handbreadths here. He says: no, it’s either when looking from the outside or when looking from the inside. Two possibilities. Either the Ran or Rashi. That’s a third approach. Okay, I’ll stop here. Those are basically the main points. The rest is only the approach of the Meiri, and there is also the approach of the Ritva, but I’ve already explained the principles here; you can see them in the summary. Okay? Thank you very much.

[Speaker G] Thank you very much.