Tzimtzum, Lesson 3
This transcript was produced automatically using artificial intelligence. There may be inaccuracies in the transcribed content and in speaker identification.
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Table of Contents
- Tsimtsum as a dispute between Hasidim and Mitnagdim and its implications
- Religious Zionism, Haredi Judaism, and the relationship between metaphysics and practice
- Optimism and pessimism: Rabbi Kook and Rabbi Soloveitchik
- The Lubavitcher Rebbe’s letter: light and source, and four conceptions of tsimtsum
- The origin of the concept of tsimtsum and the Lurianic kabbalistic system
- Kabbalistic harmonization: Rabbi Dessler, Leshem, and Maimonides versus Avodat HaKodesh
- Nefesh HaChayim, the Vilna Gaon, and “there is nothing else besides Him” alongside sharp limitations
- The danger of the Hasidic experience: filthy alleyways, ratzo va-shov, and preserving the foundations of Jewish law
- “A time to act”: revealing the secret in a later generation and spreading Kabbalah to the masses
- Memaleh kol almin and sovev kol almin: divine truth versus our mode of conduct
- The name “the Holy One, blessed be He” as a combination of two aspects
- The author’s critique and an alternative reading of Nefesh HaChayim: the soul-body analogy and the dimensions analogy
Summary
General Overview
The text presents the dispute over tsimtsum between Hasidim and Mitnagdim as the question whether the tsimtsum is literal or not, and connects it directly to the way one understands human religious work in the world: in the Hasidic view, divinity is present everywhere, and therefore one should act in all areas of life in order to repair and elevate the sparks; while in the Lithuanian view there are areas one should distance oneself from, because they were created as realms “outside the boundary.” The author argues that Religious Zionism largely continues the Hasidic line of repairing all of reality, and emphasizes that the connection between metaphysical theology and practical consequences is complex, but still helps illuminate practice. Later he presents the Lubavitcher Rebbe’s letter, which formulates four positions on tsimtsum through the distinction between light and source, describes the harmonizing tendency of kabbalists through examples, and then turns to Nefesh HaChayim, which declares “there is nothing else besides Him” in a way that sounds Hasidic, yet places severe limits on experiencing this consciousness so as not to breach the foundations of Jewish law. Finally, he proposes an interpretation according to which Nefesh HaChayim is not pantheistic, but coherent with literal tsimtsum in the sense of the existence of the worlds, explaining this through an analogy of “dimensions” that allows for full divine presence without canceling practical reality.
Tsimtsum as a dispute between Hasidim and Mitnagdim and its implications
The text states that the accepted explanation, as seen in the letter by the Lubavitcher Rebbe that was read, is that the foundational point of the argument between Hasidim and Mitnagdim is whether the tsimtsum is literal or not. The text explains that in the Hasidic outlook, divinity is present everywhere, so one should not close oneself off but rather spread out geographically and across fields of activity, and everywhere one must “repair” and extract the sparks hidden there. Following a question from Arik, the text interprets “extracting the sparks” to mean uncovering and removing masks, because there is no such thing as secularity as opposed to holiness; everything is holy, and there is only an illusion of secularity that must be exposed.
The text defines the Lithuanian view as one in which the tsimtsum is literal, and therefore there are realms of engagement with divinity and realms from which one must distance oneself, indeed realms that were created so that we should distance ourselves from them rather than repair them. The text uses the halakhic phrase “filthy alleyways” as a metaphor for realms in which “there is no divinity” and with which one is not supposed to engage, presenting here a theological conception of a world that includes “something whose entire purpose is negative,” namely temptation, whose purpose is that we not be there and not repair it. In contrast, the text presents the Hasidic claim—and following it, in part, Religious Zionism and modern religiosity—that “there is no such thing”: everything created can also be used for good, depending on how it is used, and that is the meaning of repairing reality and elevating the sparks.
Religious Zionism, Haredi Judaism, and the relationship between metaphysics and practice
The text argues that the Religious Zionist outlook is to a large extent a continuation of Hasidism, even “the more authentic” continuation among what exists today, because it rests on the view that our role is to repair all areas of life and activity, rather than shutting ourselves up in “closed circles” and study halls. The text says that the portrayal of the Hasidic-Mitnagdic dispute is schematic and poster-like, and that there are “lots of shades in the middle,” even implications that can go in the opposite direction, but still it describes the root of the argument “not badly.”
The text describes the connection between theological-metaphysical disputes and their practical expressions as a “complex relationship,” and gives as an example Religious Zionism versus Haredi Judaism, where the deepest point of dispute may perhaps “not even be found at all,” even though in practice things look very different. The text justifies dealing with the metaphysical root because it “illuminates the practice in a way that makes more sense.”
Optimism and pessimism: Rabbi Kook and Rabbi Soloveitchik
The text associates a tendency toward optimism with the outlook of repairing all of reality, though it notes that there is no necessary connection and one can be pessimistic and still think one’s role is to repair. It notes that articles have been written about this, especially in a memorial volume for Rabbi Soloveitchik, presenting a comparison between Rabbi Soloveitchik’s pessimism and Rabbi Kook’s optimism.
The text describes Rabbi Kook as “a very optimistic type” who saw history as a positive deterministic process with only marginal setbacks, and says this is an outlook that sees the world as a broad field for repair, which is why he is a central guide of Religious Zionism. The text describes Rabbi Soloveitchik as “a very pessimistic type,” torn and conflicted, and links this to his Lithuanian-Brisker roots, even though he knew Chabad, was influenced by it, and was deeply engaged with modernity. The text brings expressions of a Lithuanian mentality through statements like “presumptions descended from Mount Sinai” and the Torah’s independence from reality, and the Chazon Ish’s remark that what matters is “the oilem” and not “the world,” linking this also to the image of Tisha B’Av versus Simchat Torah.
The Lubavitcher Rebbe’s letter: light and source, and four conceptions of tsimtsum
The text recounts that in the letter, the Lubavitcher Rebbe proposes four conceptions of tsimtsum by distinguishing between the light and the source, where the source is “the flashlight” and the light is its product; in kabbalistic terms, “Ein Sof light” versus “the essence.” The text says that the question of whether tsimtsum is “literal or not literal” translates into four possibilities rather than two: non-literal tsimtsum in neither the light nor the source; literal tsimtsum in the light but not in the source; non-literal tsimtsum both in the light and in the source; and non-literal tsimtsum only in the light, while in the source “there is no tsimtsum at all—not even non-literal tsimtsum.” The text identifies the questioner as Rabbi Dessler, and presents his understanding that Rabbi Dessler sees the possibility that this is a terminological dispute, where each side is speaking about “tsimtsum” with regard to a different object.
The text states that the Chabad Rebbe argues that clearly “we have only position D,” namely that the tsimtsum is not literal, and even that only with respect to the light and not the source, presenting this as the “least constricted” view. The text uses this to reframe the polarity of Lithuanianism versus Hasidism through gradations of tsimtsum.
The origin of the concept of tsimtsum and the Lurianic kabbalistic system
The text answers a question by saying that tsimtsum comes from the Ari, while distinguishing that the Ari did not invent the sefirot, but did present a new picture of worlds, partzufim, and the overall order. The text says that Atzilut also appears earlier, but “not as one world out of four worlds,” and that the system of worlds/partzufim as it is known is an innovation of the Ari, “at least as far as I know.”
Kabbalistic harmonization: Rabbi Dessler, Leshem, and Maimonides versus Avodat HaKodesh
The text characterizes a common kabbalistic tendency to reconcile disputes and see them as two faces of one truth, as part of “harmonization.” It gives an example from the Leshem regarding the dispute between Maimonides and the author of Avodat HaKodesh (Maharam Gabai) over whether every creature has its own independent purpose, or whether all were created to serve humanity. The text describes how the Leshem claims there is no dispute at all, because the purpose of the creatures is to serve human beings, and in that way they fulfill their own purpose.
The text generalizes that the academic approach tends toward separations, classifications, and distinctions, while a Torah approach tends to reconcile contradictions and harmonize. It adds that in the author’s view, many disputes in the history of philosophy also turn out not to be real disputes once one understands that each side is talking about something else.
Nefesh HaChayim, the Vilna Gaon, and “there is nothing else besides Him” alongside sharp limitations
The text notes that the Vilna Gaon is commonly seen as the father of the view that tsimtsum is literal, even though the concept itself comes from the Ari and the argument over its interpretation came later. The text says that when one reads Nefesh HaChayim, one discovers that it seemingly “defects” to a Hasidic position, even though the book was written against Hasidism, and explains that part of the surprise has to do with the fact that in Rabbi Chaim of Volozhin’s time the controversy was still in the process of taking shape, and it was not yet entirely clear “who says what.” The text argues that the conflict itself causes each side to move somewhat closer to the other, by exposing weak points and refining formulations.
The text quotes from Nefesh HaChayim the verses “Do I not fill heaven and earth,” “And know this day that the Lord is God… there is none else,” and “There is nothing else besides Him,” and interprets them as stating “literally” that there is no reality whatsoever besides Him, blessed be He, “in any respect or particular point,” including “all creatures.” The text also cites the teaching that “even the void of the world is filled with Him” and “He is the place of the world, and the world is not His place.” It notes that this formulation sounds extreme, but remarks that the continuation introduces the language “as though they do not exist in reality,” which allows for a less absolute reading.
The danger of the Hasidic experience: filthy alleyways, ratzo va-shov, and preserving the foundations of Jewish law
The text quotes Nefesh HaChayim warning that the words of the Sages are “like fiery coals,” and one must be careful not to enter into excessive contemplation of matters one is not permitted to contemplate. The text explains that contemplation of “there is nothing else besides Him” is intended only “in the measure of the heart” in order to “inflame” one’s prayer, but too much immersion in it is “a tremendous danger.” The text links this to the Lithuanian fear of halakhic deviations in the Hasidic world, and brings a story about Rabbi Akiva Eiger and his grandson Rabbi Leibele Eiger regarding preparing negel vasser beside the bed as a sign that observance of Jewish law was still being maintained.
The text explains that Nefesh HaChayim proposes a framework of “ratzo va-shov,” meaning one contemplates the metaphysical truth and then “returns to one’s place” rather than living it out practically, so as not to arrive at practical permissions such as thinking Torah thoughts in “filthy places,” which here also functions as a metaphor for permitting transgressions by blurring the boundaries between good and evil. The text also connects this to phenomena of false messianism and Shabbetai Tzvi as examples of a conclusion in which “everything is holy,” erasing the meaning of Jewish law and distinction.
“A time to act”: revealing the secret in a later generation and spreading Kabbalah to the masses
The text quotes Nefesh HaChayim saying that the medieval authorities (Rishonim) concealed the matter “through hints,” out of the principle “a faithful spirit conceals a matter,” but that “now the days are many without a guide,” and each person goes after the inclination of his own mind, and therefore “it is a time to act for the Lord; they have violated Your Torah.” The text formulates that Hasidism turned the secret into “the teaching of every person” and “a parable even in the mouths of fools,” with the result that even “shaken-up youths” determine practical conduct on the basis of their own understanding from the claim that “in every place and in every thing there is complete divinity.” The text describes the risk as the destruction of “several foundations of the holy Torah” through permissions that will appear “in the web of the evil inclination” on the basis of this idea, and quotes Nefesh HaChayim’s wording about the danger of losing one’s share in the World to Come through “thinking words of Torah… in filthy places” as a metaphor for a view that leads in that direction.
Memaleh kol almin and sovev kol almin: divine truth versus our mode of conduct
The text presents Nefesh HaChayim as reconciling the claim that “He, blessed be His Name, fills all worlds equally,” despite the multiplicity of worlds and levels, and quotes from the Tikkunim: “the ten sefirot of Atzilut… He and His vessels are one… which is not the case in the ten sefirot of Beriah.” The text explains, through the author’s interpretation, that the uniqueness of Atzilut lies in the intimate union of Ein Sof light with the vessels, in contrast to the lower worlds of Beriah, Yetzirah, and Asiyah, where “He is one” does not apply in the same way, and expands on the concept of vessels as the basis for distinctions between levels and revelations.
The text quotes Nefesh HaChayim as formulating two complementary perspectives: “from His side,” He is in the category of memaleh kol almin, while from our side, and in the conduct of Torah and commandments and sensory apprehension, He is in the category of sovev kol almin. The text shows that the practical perspective is built on “our apprehension” of the world as a differentiated reality with holy and impure, and upon that basis all “the entire order of our obligatory conduct… an unbreakable law” was constructed, whereas from His side, “there is nothing else besides Him in the most literal sense” and “I the Lord have not changed.”
The name “the Holy One, blessed be He” as a combination of two aspects
The text quotes Nefesh HaChayim’s explanation that the name “the Holy One, blessed be He” includes two aspects together: “holy” means separate and exalted, corresponding to simple unity and complete equivalence from His side; while “blessed” refers to His connection to the worlds, which require flow and blessing through human action. The text emphasizes that the blessing, the divine names, and the attributes spoken of in the Torah speak “from this aspect” of our conduct and our apprehension, not about the essence of unity as it is from His side.
The author’s critique and an alternative reading of Nefesh HaChayim: the soul-body analogy and the dimensions analogy
The text presents the author as identifying a “duality” not only in the language of “from His side and from our side” but also in the analogies themselves, especially the analogy of soul and body, and formulates that the analogy does not mean the body does not exist, but that the body does not block the soul and does not occupy space with respect to it, because the soul is not physical. The text argues that the correct conclusion is that Ein Sof light “remains the same all the time” and is present everywhere without the worlds canceling their own existence, and therefore the claim that this is a “Hasidic conception” in the pantheistic sense is, in his understanding, “simply not correct.”
The text offers an explanation by means of the book The Dimensions, Prophecy, and Earthliness by Rabbi Shem Tov Gafen, and cites from it the idea that the relation between divinity and the world is like the relation between dimensions: a two-dimensional sheet occupies no volume in a three-dimensional world, so there is no contradiction in saying that the two dimensions “exist” in the same place without blocking one another. The text analogizes from this that the world can exist “literally” in its own dimension, while relative to a higher dimension it “takes up no space,” and thus “from His perspective… nothing exists,” while at the same time “we fully exist.” The text concludes that in this reading Nefesh HaChayim continues the Vilna Gaon and literal tsimtsum in the sense of the existence of the worlds and Jewish law, and thereby resolves the practical question of “why keep the commandments,” because in our dimension things really do repair reality, while the higher truth does not negate action, but simply is not measured by the same yardstick.
Full Transcript
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] We talked about the question of tsimtsum in its philosophical formulations and its kabbalistic formulations, and last time I spoke a bit about the implications of this question. Meaning, why—why at all, I don’t know why at all—why it’s also relevant. Not just that it has purely intellectual interest. The accepted explanation—and we saw it in the letter we read from the Lubavitcher Rebbe—is that the foundational point of the dispute between Hasidim and Mitnagdim is basically the question whether the tsimtsum is literal or not, with the Hasidim tending toward the view that it’s not literal, and the Mitnagdim saying that the tsimtsum is literal. If we put it very briefly—we talked about this at length last time, but very briefly—this basically means that in the Hasidic conception, divinity is present everywhere. Meaning, that’s why we’re not supposed to shut ourselves in, but on the contrary, to spread out everywhere—not only geographically, but also in terms of fields of activity or areas of occupation—and everywhere one has to repair, to extract the sparks hidden there. And when we speak—this was Arik’s question, I think—about “extracting the sparks,” in this outlook it means uncovering, or removing, the masks. Meaning, really these are not sparks of holiness hidden inside the secular; rather, there is no secular. Everything is holiness. We just live under the illusion as if there were something secular, and we’re supposed to expose that illusion, remove the screen of ignorance. And the Lithuanian conception says that there was a literal tsimtsum, and since that’s so, there are realms that are, let’s call them, engagement with matters of divinity, and there are realms from which one should keep away. Meaning, there are realms that were created so that we would keep away from them, not so that we would repair them. Maybe in one word, that’s the difference. And I said that I think the Religious Zionist outlook, to a large extent, is a continuation of Hasidism—or even, I think, the more authentic continuation among those that exist today of the Hasidic outlook—because it rests on a certain conception that says our role is to repair all areas of life and activity, not only to focus on Torah study in the narrow classical sense, to shut ourselves away in closed circles, in study halls, and be careful not to enter all kinds of other places. In the metaphor, this is what are called “filthy alleyways”—the filthy alleyways—which of course is a halakhic term: filthy alleyways where it is forbidden to speak words of Torah, bathrooms or bathhouses or things like that. But as a metaphor, in the context of this discussion of tsimtsum, it serves as a metaphor for all those realms in which there is no divinity, in which we’re not supposed to engage. In the parable, those are the places where we’re not supposed to speak words of Torah; in the lesson, those are really the places where we’re not supposed to be, not supposed to occupy ourselves with, places that are out of bounds. There’s really an interesting theological conception here, because it says that the Holy One, blessed be He, created a certain part of the world not for its own sake but on the contrary, in order to place before us a temptation, let’s call it, or something like that, where the purpose is basically that we not be there and not repair it. Something whose entire purpose is negative—that it not be used. And that is exactly the point that Hasidism—and following it, I think, also Religious Zionism and maybe modern religiosity too, though there are some differences here—do not accept. Meaning, they argue there’s no such thing. Everything created in the world can also be good; it’s just a question of what you do with it. And that is the meaning of elevating the sparks, repairing reality. There can be such a conception, and as I said last time too, obviously this description of the Hasidic-Mitnagdic dispute is a bit poster-like, schematic.
[Speaker C] Meaning—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] There are lots of shades in the middle, and implications—as we saw last time too, I think people asked a few things—sometimes the implications can be the opposite. So I still think this does a pretty decent job of describing the root of the dispute. There can be all kinds of such things, but I’m speaking in general terms, broadly, and I think this is a correct description. Last time too I spoke exactly about this point: to what extent philosophical or theological, metaphysical roots of practical disputes really have to be connected to their practical expressions. I spoke about the example of Religious Zionism versus Haredi Judaism, and said that it is connected to the issue but it’s not exactly the same thing; that there too, when you look for the deepest point of the dispute, maybe you won’t find it at all. But in practice it looks different, the phenomena are different. So the relationship between theological-metaphysical disputes and their practical expressions is a complex relationship. But I still think it’s worth putting a finger on it, and it does illuminate the practice in a more understandable light, I think.
[Speaker D] Is there any connection between optimism and pessimism?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What do you mean?
[Speaker D] Whether belief in man as all-capable basically, as opposed to the approach—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Once you’re trying to repair all of reality, it helps if you’re optimistic. Meaning, you don’t despair of any place. Yitzhak, I think the air conditioning upstairs is working—I don’t know exactly what’s not working here. Here it is. No, it’s working, working, working, really working, yes. I don’t know if it’s supposed to shut off with a Sabbath timer or something, but I felt the air conditioning there when I was there, so if you want to check there maybe. In any case, optimism and pessimism. So if you’re going to repair things, it’s good to equip yourself with a measure of optimism. But I’m not sure it has to be so. You can be pessimistic and still think your role is to repair; it’ll just be harder. Meaning, maybe you’ll think you won’t succeed, but fine—your role is to try. Again, there’s no necessary connection, but I can see it, I can see a difference. I think several articles have been written about this, mainly in the book that came out in memory of Rabbi Soloveitchik, a collection of scholarly essays on his thought. One of the essays—I don’t remember who wrote it anymore—deals with Rabbi Soloveitchik’s pessimism versus Rabbi Kook’s optimism. It makes a comparative study of the two, and the claim is that Rabbi Kook was a very optimistic type. Meaning, he tended to see things in a very, very rosy light, very much so. He thought everything was moving in the positive direction, and it was just some deterministic process whose direction was clear, whose end was clear, and you could simply rejoice in the meantime; and even if there’s an occasional fall here and there, that’s marginal, not really interesting. Rabbi Soloveitchik, on the other hand, was fundamentally a very pessimistic type. Meaning, torn, broken, pulled in many directions—he presents this in his books pretty straightforwardly. And maybe it really is connected to this point, because Rabbi Soloveitchik was in fact a Brisker, meaning he was a Litvak. True, he had a Chabad teacher, and he was introduced to it—you can see he’s influenced by Chabad—but he was a Litvak at root. And a Litvak is a person who doesn’t see divinity everywhere. And specifically as someone who really was immersed in many fields of activity that aren’t standard for ordinary Torah scholars, or for religious people generally, that dimmed him a bit; he didn’t quite know what to do with the whole business. Because on the one hand, he felt a kind of Hasidic sense, yes—that there’s truth everywhere, and that one should be involved in everything and repair everything, and it’s not right to shut oneself away, and things like that. That’s the transition he made from Agudat Yisrael to Mizrachi. But on the other hand, something Lithuanian remained in him. The Lithuanians, you know, their greatest celebration is Tisha B’Av. Meaning, you’re supposed to pray with Lithuanians on Tisha B’Av and with Hasidim on Simchat Torah—that’s the famous line. For Rabbi Soloveitchik, the world is Tisha B’Av.
[Speaker F] On Tisha B’Av it’s forbidden to study Torah. Why? To pray.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I said to pray, not to study Torah. They enjoy that finally there’s something sad you can really cry over properly. The Rogatchover did actually study on Tisha B’Av, or so they say, I don’t know. In any case, I think this really is an expression of the point that Rabbi Kook truly came from a Hasidic root, and it’s no wonder he’s one of the guides of Religious Zionism, because it’s an outlook—an optimistic outlook, an outlook that sees the world as a broad field for repair, as a potential for repair. Rabbi Soloveitchik, basically, was Lithuanian. For all that he joined Religious Zionism and Mizrachi, and dealt deeply with all fields and all that, he came with his Lithuanian mentality. Meaning, you know, it’s hard to free yourself from things you grew up in, were born into. And many of his conceptions really remained Lithuanian conceptions. Sometimes these are things—I don’t know—sometimes really puzzling, yes? His statements, I think I already mentioned, about presumptions—like tav le-meitav tan du—that the presumptions descended from Mount Sinai and don’t depend on reality and don’t change. That’s a clearly Lithuanian conception, because it basically says reality is not supposed to affect anything. We’re with Mount Sinai, in the study hall, and he’s not interested in anything going on among the Zionists outside. Meaning, we’re not supposed to be influenced by things outside—yes, the oilem and the world—the Chazon Ish’s remark, that what interests us is not the world but the oilem. The oilem means the Torah scholars, those sitting in the study halls. Right—people say, the world—we don’t care what the world says; what matters is what happens in the study hall. And this conception that says the Torah came down from Mount Sinai and does not change and is not influenced by its surroundings and so on—that’s a clearly Lithuanian conception. And in that sense he preserved it. For all that he was deeply immersed in modernity and knew all the thinkers and quoted them—he wasn’t embarrassed, he didn’t hide it, quite the opposite—from his standpoint that was part of his worldview. But something of the Lithuanianism remained in him, and so did the pessimism. Meaning, there’s something in… okay, so we were with the letter of the Lubavitcher Rebbe, where he basically proposes four conceptions regarding tsimtsum. He divided there between the light and the source. Right—the source is the flashlight and the light is what the flashlight produces. And in kabbalistic language, Ein Sof light and the essence, His hidden essence. The assumption there is that Ein Sof light—I said there’s some dispute whether Ein Sof light is the essence or not—he apparently assumes that Ein Sof light is not the essence, but the discussion here revolves around the issue of the essence and Ein Sof light. And the question whether the tsimtsum is literal or not now translates into four conceptions rather than two. There can be a view that the tsimtsum is not literal in neither the light nor the source. There can be a view that the tsimtsum is literal in the light but not in the source. Because the Holy One, blessed be He, in His essence is not constricted—that can’t be. The light, meaning His first revelation, could have been literally constricted, truly constricted, not only seeming constricted to us. Yes, there is a view that says the tsimtsum is not literal, but also in the source. Right, meaning there is a tsimtsum that is not literal both in the light and in the source—that’s number three. And non-literal tsimtsum only in the light, but in the source—sorry—the tsimtsum is non-literal only in the light, and in the source there is no tsimtsum at all, not even non-literal tsimtsum. Even non-literal tsimtsum is still something. Meaning, the illusion still exists only there. Right, okay, yes.
[Speaker G] One last question in Torah. All these concepts of tsimtsum and so on—is that purely from the Ari, or are there earlier roots already?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Tsimtsum is from the Ari. Tsimtsum is from the Ari. Precisely what it means—it’s built on a conceptual system that already existed earlier; he didn’t invent the sefirot. But the worlds, say—I think this conception of worlds, partzufim, and the like, all that is in my opinion innovations of the Ari.
[Speaker H] The concepts of the world of Atzilut and Beriah—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Atzilut appears earlier too, but not as one world out of four worlds. Meaning, he placed it into a certain picture that is his picture, at least as far as I know. Maybe I’m missing something here, but I’m almost sure. In any case, those are the four possibilities, and I mentioned that the questioner here is Rabbi Dessler, who asked the Lubavitcher Rebbe. And Rabbi Dessler basically said—the letter begins, “What he writes on the matter of tsimtsum, that one of those familiar with it says that all the approaches here lead to one place.” So these disputes are semantic disputes. Behind them there really sits one conception, because there can’t truly be a real disagreement. Someone who says the tsimtsum is literal doesn’t mean the same thing by the term “tsimtsum” as those who say the tsimtsum is not literal; rather, he means something else. Yes, things of that sort. By the way, this is a very common tendency among kabbalists as part of harmonization, which in general I think is a kabbalistic tendency: to see in all disputes two non-conflicting facets. Yes, for example… for example, the author of Leshem brings the dispute between Maimonides and the author of Avodat HaKodesh, Maharam Gabai, over the question whether every creature in the world has a purpose of its own—or is an end in itself, sorry—or whether all were created for the service of man, and man is basically the purpose of creation. Now surprisingly, this is rather surprising—which one says what? Maimonides is the one who says that everything has a purpose of its own, that not everything exists for the sake of man.
[Speaker I] As far as I remember, I understood that he says that only about the stars and the spheres.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no, no—animals too, everything. Not only for the service of man; at least as far as I remember, that’s how it’s presented there. And Maharam Gabai says everything is for the service of man. So Rabbi Elyashiv in Leshem Shevo Ve-Achlama, the elder, argues that there is no disagreement at all. The other creatures serve man, and that is their purpose. And through that they attain their own purpose. Meaning, if the product itself were needed for man, then they wouldn’t have been needed; the Holy One, blessed be He, would have made it so that man could do it directly. Why did He create all kinds of creatures around that serve man? Because they have a purpose of their own. What is it? Their purpose is to serve man. That kind of thing. Meaning, there is a certain tendency among kabbalists to reconcile, to harmonize between differing opinions. By the way, I think this is true more generally of traditional Torah conceptions as opposed to academic conceptions. Academic conceptions tend more to make separations, distinctions—this is here and that is there—and categories, classifications, and so on. And a Torah conception reconciles differing topics, harmonizes contradictions, and the like. I think this is generally true of traditional conceptions, not only of Kabbalah, though there it is stronger. In any case, here he says all the approaches lead to one place, meaning that really there is one truth, and they use different terms to describe that same truth. Because, as I said before, for example one could say that the tsimtsum is literal and mean tsimtsum in Ein Sof light, while not speaking of the essence. One could say that the tsimtsum is not literal and speak about the essence—sorry. And that looks like a dispute over whether the tsimtsum is literal or not, but each one is speaking about tsimtsum in something else, and therefore there’s really no actual disagreement here, but rather a difference in terminology. Okay? That’s basically what I think Rabbi Dessler means to ask. By the way, I think this is true also with regard to… maybe I think this way like a traditional thinker, but it seems to me that a great many disputes in the history of philosophy that are presented as disputes, and all kinds of practical implications are drawn from them and they’re discussed and taught and so on—when you look at them carefully, they don’t necessarily disagree. Meaning, you can see that they’re actually talking about different things, and they can agree with one another once you present a fuller picture. Fine. In any case, he himself—the Chabad Rebbe—argues that clearly we have no option but approach number four: that the tsimtsum is not literal, and even that is not in the source but in the light. All right? There was a tsimtsum, a tsimtsum that is not literal, and that too only in the light, not in the source. The least constricted approach, yes—that’s basically the approach he defends, and that’s exactly what I said before, Lithuanianism versus Hasidism. Now let’s look at Nefesh HaChayim. Because he has an interesting conception, which I already started to speak about last time—I don’t remember. Nefesh HaChayim—that is, it’s accepted that the Vilna Gaon is the father of the view that the tsimtsum is literal. Tsimtsum originates with the Ari, of blessed memory, but interpretations of tsimtsum as to whether it is literal or not literal are later developments. The Gaon is considered the father of the view—I don’t know the source, by the way, it’s just commonly thought—that the tsimtsum is literal, which is of course the father of the Lithuanian view. So it’s no wonder the Gaon holds this view. And the Hasidim, as we said—we just saw—and as I said, hold the view that the tsimtsum is not literal. But when you read Nefesh HaChayim, you discover that he defects. Meaning, yes, he deviates from the path of his teacher, the Vilna Gaon, and supposedly joins the Hasidim. And what is even more surprising is that this book was written against Hasidism. This book was written against Hasidism, so it is very surprising to discover precisely here a statement that is basically a Hasidic statement. Of course, one must remember—and I don’t think I said this last time—that the Hasidic conceptions too, or this whole dispute in general, was still taking shape. It’s not certain that in the time of Rabbi Chaim of Volozhin, which was pretty early in the process, it was very clear who said what. Meaning, even the Hasidic conception—what the Lubavitcher Rebbe says here—I’m not sure that if you had asked the author of the Tanya, he would have said the same thing. Because… the question is what exactly you mean—whether it’s in the light or in the source, whether there is literal tsimtsum or non-literal tsimtsum—these are things whose implications and consequences take time to be understood. The Lithuanians, of course, with this hysteria that Hasidism was going to lead to a situation where basically everything would be permitted and all would be allowed, and we’d be above Jewish law, and one could recite the morning Shema in the afternoon instead of the morning, and make Havdalah on Monday, and pray the evening service the next morning, and all sorts of things of that kind—some of which we know a little today, but back then they were much more prominent. And that fear led to Lithuanian opposition and to the development of a certain theology, which in the end, once it had taken shape, was not really all that far from the Hasidic one. Because even the Lubavitcher Rebbe here, when he says—he too doesn’t say there is no tsimtsum. He stays with the conception of non-literal tsimtsum, but he too qualifies it. He tries to define where in between he stands. He doesn’t just say simply that everything is divinity, period, that’s it. He too understands that you can’t say such a thing. So once the battle is joined, each side, ironically enough, moves a little closer to the other side. Because each one exposes the weak points of the other side, and therefore you refine your own position in light of the criticism, and in the end you arrive at formulations that are closer than they seemed at first glance. So one says, yes, I mean that the tsimtsum is literal—but in the light, not in the source. Another says no, the tsimtsum is not literal, but maybe even in the source, meaning not only in the light. So suddenly you can find opinions that are much closer once they become crystallized. Meaning, it sharpens the dispute very much, but precisely where the dispute is very sharp, it can allow itself to be closer. When the concepts aren’t sharp, you use formulations that sound more extreme because you need to clarify where you differ from the other side. So we’ll see later on whether there’s really a dispute here, or whether it’s similar, or whether it’s identical. Okay. And this is the meaning of the verse: “Do I not fill heaven and earth,” and still more explicitly in Mishneh Torah—and I think we already started reading this, I don’t remember how far we got. “And know this day that the Lord is God in the heavens above and on the earth below, there is none else,” and likewise, “You have been shown to know that the Lord is God, there is nothing else besides Him.” And this is really quite literal—that there is nothing else besides Him, blessed be He, at all. Yes? Meaning, non-literal tsimtsum. Right? There is nothing else besides Him, blessed be He, at all, in any respect or any particular point in all the upper and lower worlds, and all creatures. The creatures too, meaning human beings too, created beings too—everything is divinity. Meaning, this is the most extreme Hasidic conception, right at the opening of the discussion in Nefesh HaChayim. He really sets out the most Hasidic conception possible. Only the essence of His simple unity, blessed be His Name, alone. And this is the inner meaning of what they said in Devarim Rabbah, “the Lord is God”—Yitro gave literally—I don’t remember, Moshe shmei? Ah yes, “His Name is there even in the void of the world,” meaning that they place the Holy One, blessed be He, even in the void of the world. The void is of course the void of the tsimtsum, now that we know the Ari, of blessed memory. And then the Holy One, blessed be He, is found even in the void; there was not really a tsimtsum. That is the meaning of non-literal tsimtsum. And this is also included in their saying of blessed memory that He, blessed be He, is the place of the world and the world is not His place. Meaning, even though all the places perceptible to the senses exist, the places are not autonomous places; rather He, blessed be His Name, is the place of all places, and from His side they are all considered as though they do not exist in reality at all, even now as before creation. So “considered as though they do not exist in reality at all” is an expression that can of course be interpreted in two directions. You can say the truth is that we’re not here at all, reality does not exist. But the wording here doesn’t say exactly that. It says that from the perspective of the Holy One, blessed be He, it is as though we are not here—but maybe in truth we are, yes. I don’t know what “as though” means. What is that “as though”? So here this is a somewhat less extreme statement than the way he opens this paragraph. However, we have already stated at the beginning of our words that the Sages, of blessed memory, compared their words to fiery coals—that is the concern, yes? Up to this point he says: this is the Hasidim, and basically in principle I’m with the Hasidim. However, we have already stated at the beginning of our words that the Sages compared their words to fiery coals, that one should be very careful with their coals, not to enter into contemplation and inquiry too much concerning matters for which permission has not been granted to contemplate extensively, lest one be burned, God forbid. And so it is with this awesome matter. It is not said except to one who is wise and understands on his own the inwardness of the matter, in the measure of the heart alone, in ratzo va-shov, so as to inflame by this the purity of his heart in the work of prayer. Right—if you want to become inflamed in the work of prayer, then it’s good to contemplate the idea that there is nothing else besides Him and everything is divinity and so on. That’s why the Hasidim also love this so much, because the work of prayer is of course central in the Hasidic world. But most contemplation of this—it’s good as a tool for becoming inflamed in prayer—but too much contemplation of it is a tremendous danger. That’s what Rabbi Chaim of Volozhin says here. I started earlier to talk about deviations from Jewish law in the Hasidic world—that’s really the danger here. As I recall, in Kotzk—and there was a casualty. Even today there are Hasidim, right? It’s a dynasty of rebbes—well, I don’t remember which Hasidic court it is. It’s his. Lublin? Peshischa? No, Lublin… Aleksander? No, Aleksander is Vizhnitz.
[Speaker J] Rabbi Akiva Eiger.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Rabbi Leibele Eiger—he was the first rebbe, and afterward a dynasty until today. There is such a Hasidic court. In any case, Rabbi Akiva Eiger sat shivah for him. Rabbi Akiva sat shivah for him, and at some point he went to visit him, went there to visit. What? The grandson? For the grandson. He sat shivah. He tore his garments and sat shivah—meaning he mourned for him; I don’t know if he actually did the full shivah procedure.
[Speaker D] His messengers were—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Those, yes. There, at some point he went to visit him—I don’t know exactly how it happened, whether Rabbi Akiva Eiger visited the grandson or the grandson came to visit him. I think he went there. He apparently went to see what he was doing. And then he saw him sleeping at night, and next to him was a bowl with a washing cup. Some people prepare the hand-washing by the bedside in the morning, so as not to walk four cubits before washing their hands.
[Speaker C] Negel vasser. What does that mean?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It’s the negel vasser.
[Speaker C] What is “negel”?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I don’t know. Washing one’s hands in the morning—meaning, not to walk four cubits without washing your hands—so they put it next to the bed. Fine, there’s a view that the whole house counts as four cubits, but never mind. So he saw that the washing vessel was standing by the bed, and he relaxed. So he renewed his ties with him. Because he was sure the person had stopped observing Jewish law. In other words, the perception was that if you went over to Hasidism, that was a sect that abandoned Jewish law. The assumption was: you left. That’s it. And in fact there were some very unusual phenomena there, at least some of them, which of course the historical rewritings tell less about. Because when Hasidim tell their own story, it always looks better than it really was. And today too everything is more moderated, but there were problems in that period. So that’s the tremendous danger Rabbi Chaim of Volozhin is talking about. And about this it says, “If your heart runs, return to the place”—as in this “ratzo va-shov,” “running and returning,” that we’re learning. We have to look at this thing that way. “Running and returning” means to understand that this is so, but not to live it—in other words, to contemplate it in a mode of running and returning. Meaning, to remember somehow in the background of consciousness that this is so, but not actually to live that way. Because if you also live that way, then you get to the point where you can enter filthy alleyways and say words of Torah there. You can commit transgressions and there’s no problem, because everything is fine—after all, everything is divinity, it’s all illusions. Once you understand that everything is illusion, then you can allow yourself to do a lot of things that really you’re not supposed to do. So his solution is not to say that it isn’t true, but to say that you have to do it in a mode of running and returning. “Running and returning” means always to contemplate it and then flee. What comes out of it? No—to remember in the background of consciousness that it is so, but not to live it. And in that sense this too is already similar to Hasidism. Again, Hasidism after it had already solidified and softened—I said that in the end they don’t remain all that far apart. “And truly I would have refrained from speaking about this matter altogether, because the earlier sages, of blessed memory, concealed the matter greatly, as you will see in the words of the holy Rokeach and in El Shaddai, who spoke of it only by hint, ‘for the spirit of God’s faithful ones is trustworthy and covers a matter’—‘a faithful spirit conceals a matter.’” Meaning, they didn’t speak about it. Again, the perception is that it is true—not that it isn’t true. Contraction is not literal, but it is forbidden to speak about it, forbidden to live it, forbidden to think about it—that’s the approach. “But I returned and saw that this was fitting for them and for their generations, but now the days are many without a teacher, and every man’s way is upright in his own eyes, to go after the inclination of his intellect, and every impulse of man’s thoughts is full only of flying in thought to whatever his mind allows him.” And what this refers to, of course, is Hasidism; there’s no need to say it explicitly. Meaning, Hasidism is dealing with these issues and speaking about them openly, and saying them to ordinary people. And once that’s the situation, you have no choice—you can’t ignore the issue. You have to get into the thick of it and try to define the matter more explicitly. You can no longer leave it as some kind of secret that nobody deals with. Just an interesting point: many times there’s something that is right to do, but then a situation arises in which after the fact becomes the preferred course from the outset. There’s no choice—you have to conduct yourself in a way that ideally would have been considered only after-the-fact, but in this reality there’s no choice, and that’s what has to be done. “For this has become the teaching of every man and even a proverb in the mouths of fools”—yes, the Hasidim are basically revealing these things even to the ignorant masses, even to simple people, not only to outstanding Torah scholars. “Saying: after all, in every place and in every thing there is complete divinity.” “And their heart is all the days to deepen and analyze this, until even young boys, newly shaken from childishness, are drawn after it to establish all their actions and conduct according to this understanding of theirs.” Everyone starts making decisions. Once you tell a person that everything is divinity, that God is present everywhere, that everything is fine, everything is good, everything is holy—you arrive at a situation where people really do everything. And I think overall this is a phenomenon we know very well today too. The more you educate a person toward greater openness, toward a willingness to see more things in a positive light—or at least in a light that is open to repair—the more you reveal that to more people or share it with more people, the more people you also lose. Because a lot of people say: okay, fine, so now we’ll deal with all these things—and then their reasoning says: okay, so if this is good and that is also good, then what makes this better than that? Why observe commandments? After all, someone who doesn’t observe commandments is also good. Meaning, once you grant legitimacy, or see the good everywhere, the risk is that in the end a person won’t make the further judgment of what nevertheless is right or wrong to do. “And how exceedingly careful a person must be in this, and guard his soul with utmost vigilance, lest, God forbid, our heart take this thought and establish for ourselves permission to conduct ourselves in action according to this thought—for from this, God forbid, could be born the destruction of several foundations of the holy Torah, may the Merciful One save us. And he can easily, God forbid, be caught in the net of the evil inclination, which will show him permission on the basis of this thought—for example, to think words of Torah with equanimity even in filthy places.” As I said, filthy places and thinking words of Torah in filthy places are a metaphor in this discussion. He doesn’t mean that you’re going to violate the Shulchan Arukh, section 1, law 6, or wherever it says you may not think words of Torah in filthy places. He means that you will allow yourself to do things that are actual transgressions, because basically it’s all illusion, it’s all holy. If I see divinity in it, then it is divinity. Shabbetai Tzvi was exactly this. Shabbetai Tzvi basically claimed that everything is holy—the kabbalistic idea, supposedly, that everything is holy, that ultimately there is holiness in everything—and he even converted to Islam, because once you lose the distinction between good and not-good, or between divinity and non-divinity, okay, fine, then why keep playing this game? After all, in the end it’s a game. We know—it’s an illusion. So why live in illusions? We’ll come back to that later. “And after it is first established for him that everything is complete divinity—and our sages, of blessed memory, spoke of this very sharply, and cut him off by the holy spirit from having a share in the world to come, may the Merciful One save us.” What is written in Berakhot, that in the category of “for he has despised the word of God” is also one who thinks words of Torah in filthy alleyways. And again: words of Torah in filthy alleyways is a different theological conception; it is not the prohibition of thinking words of Torah in filthy alleyways. You do not lose your share in the world to come over that prohibition. You lose your share in the world to come over the conception that leads a person to think words of Torah in filthy alleyways. “And the latter part of that verse follows by implication: ‘he shall surely be cut off.’ And our sages explained in the chapter Helek: ‘cut off’ in this world, ‘surely be cut off’ in the world to come. And there are several other mistakes that could come out, God forbid, if one were to establish practical conduct according to this path.” Meaning, this path is correct, the conception is correct, but in practice one must not behave this way, and one must not share this with people who aren’t fit for it, and so on. “And this is what brought me to enter into this matter and to warn and distance people from the mistakes that could be born from this, God forbid, and to understand properly all that our sages hinted to us in this, and behold, they are all among the straight ways of God.” What does that mean? “The ways of God are straight; the righteous walk in them and transgressors stumble in them.” “The straight ways of God” means you can fail through them and you can succeed through them—it depends what you do with them. “It is a time to act.” What is “a time to act”? “It is a time to act for the Lord; they have violated Your Torah.” “It is a time to act for the Lord; they have violated Your Torah,” because he is basically claiming: I wasn’t supposed to have this discussion. I am having this discussion because there’s no choice: “It is a time to act for the Lord; they have violated Your Torah.” “And to restore the matter to its proper place, we will explain the saying of the holy sages, of blessed memory, which is explained in Etz Chaim, taken from the Tikkunim in several places: that He, blessed be His Name, fills all worlds equally.” Yes, this is where it all starts—that the Holy One, blessed be He, fills all the worlds equally. What does “equally” mean? With no distinction whatsoever; everything is completely divinity. Not that here there is more divinity and there less divinity. Equally means everything is the same. “But we find that even in the upper worlds each world is divided and different from the other in various aspects.” So how can you say “equally”? I spoke about this, right—that there is the Infinite, and the line, and contraction, and Adam Kadmon, and Atzilut, Beriah, Yetzirah, and Asiyah, and configurations, and sefirot, and so on. So how is everything equal? If everything is the same, then what are we talking about there? It can’t be exactly the same. Okay? So he says like this: “And each world is divided and different from the other in the matter of His blessed connection to them. As it is written in the introduction to the Tikkunim: ‘In the ten sefirot of Atzilut, the King is in them; He and His vessels are one in them; they and their life are one in them; which is not so in the ten sefirot of Beriah, where they and He are not one.’” What is he trying to say? I think I spoke about this—I said that the world of Atzilut, I think it’s the Leshem who writes this, I think it’s his innovation, that “Atzilut” comes from “etzlo,” “with Him” or “near Him.” That the world of Atzilut—the infinite light is present with it, in relation to the world of Atzilut, like a soul in a body. Unlike the worlds of Beriah, Yetzirah, and Asiyah, the lower worlds, where the infinite light is not connected to them in so intimate a union as soul and body are connected in human beings. Okay? Rather there it is still two different things. They do not become integrated into one being. By contrast, in the world of Atzilut, this is called a divine world in that sense, because the infinite light is inside it: “He and His vessels are one.” Meaning, “His vessels” means His body. Right, that’s the point. Just as with a human being we do not say that the human is the soul and the body is just peripheral—even though that’s the truth—because the soul is woven into the body in such an intimate way that we see this totality of soul plus body as one thing: “He and His body are one.” Okay? He and His body are one thing, it’s not that we look at the person and at his body. The person is his body; it’s the same thing. So with regard to Atzilut, the infinite light is “He and His body are one.” Okay? Like in a human being. By contrast, the separate worlds, from Beriah and below, are worlds separate from the infinite light. “And see Etz Chaim, the Gate of the Emanation of the Ten Sefirot, the discourse on the order of Atzilut in brief, where he wrote that the Infinite, blessed be He, in the aspect of His enclothment and extension through all the worlds, touches and cleaves only to the world of Atzilut alone.” Because only there is it “with Him,” and therefore it is called Atzilut. “And not in Beriah, Yetzirah, and Asiyah. Therefore from there downward their essence is changed.” And there, in the Gate of the Discourses on BYA—again, Atzilut, Beriah, Yetzirah, Asiyah—chapter 7, in the explanation of the statement from the Tikkunim above, he writes that the entirety of Atzilut, even in terms of the vessels, is called… “vessels” means body. When we talk about configurations, sefirot, worlds, and so on, that’s all called vessels. Why is it called vessels? Because there there is distinction between different things. In the light there is no distinction between different things. Light is one thing; there aren’t several kinds of light. But in the vessels there are different distinctions. There are sefirot of wisdom, understanding, knowledge, kindness, judgment, beauty. The moment you make distinctions, that means you are talking about vessels. Because the conception is that different beings differ from one another in the question of how wrapped up the infinite light is within them. The deeper it is, the denser it is, then the being is lower on the spiritual axis. In everything there is some point, some contact with the infinite light, but there are places where it is buried deep and wrapped in many material layers, and places where it is wrapped less. So the distinctions from place to place are not in the question of what infinite light is inside it—it is the same infinite light. The question is how thick the vessel is into which the infinite light enters. If the vessel is thick, the light does not emerge outward, so it is more material. If the vessel is more refined, more transparent, thinner, then the infinite light is revealed; that is considered more spiritual. But still, everything that has some definition, that is defined to be something specific and not something else, is always a vessel by definition. Unlike light, because the nature of light is that everything is light—you can’t distinguish between one light and another, this kind of light or that… there aren’t several kinds of light. Light is one. And the light is the infinite light; really, whenever we speak of light, it’s the infinite light. And so it is explained—okay, in short, he distinguishes among the worlds. “And look carefully at the end of the book Arba Me’ot Shekel Kesef, regarding His blessed foreknowledge of human action.” There too he wants to argue that knowledge and free choice both exist together in higher worlds, but in our world we have to separate them. “And even more than this, we find several verses such as ‘God Most High who dwells in the heavens,’ which, were it not written in Scripture, it would be impossible to say. For what does it mean ‘Most High’ and ‘dwells in the heavens’? And down here He is not?” He wants to claim: yes, down here too, but here He is covered by thicker vessels, by more wrappings. Above, it is “He and His vessels are one,” and therefore they are called divine worlds. “Likewise our sages said: there are ten degrees of holiness”—in the Mishnah in tractate Kelim, “there are ten degrees of holiness.” So how do you divide among different levels of holiness? If something is holy, it’s holy; divinity is divinity. No—there are different levels of holiness, because the question is how thick the vessel is into which this holy light enters. “Three holy camps, one higher than the other”—the camp of the Levites, the camp of Israel, all the camps in the Temple and in the wilderness and the Tabernacle, and so on. “But the truth of the matter—incline your ear and return your heart, and you will go securely—is that it is explained in several places in the Zohar that the singular Master, the Infinite, blessed be He, fills all worlds and surrounds all worlds.” There are two concepts here: fills all worlds and surrounds all worlds. “Surrounds all worlds” is the transcendent, and “fills,” in philosophical language, is the immanent. The problem of transcendence and immanence in philosophical language is the problem of surrounding and filling in kabbalistic language. The transcendent is the way of seeing the Holy One, blessed be He, as something infinite, distant from us, having no contact with us at all. That is the “surrounding,” basically—the transcendent. Now what is the “filling,” which is the immanent? That is the divinity within us. It cannot be that there is something in reality that does not contain some divinity within it; otherwise it could not exist and function. So that is the conception of “filling,” or the immanent. And these are two conceptions that see divinity in contradictory ways. Meaning, if He surrounds, then He does not fill; if He fills, then He does not surround. Transcendent and immanent are two different conceptions. So that is basically the same question he is talking about here. “That is, from His blessed side He is called in the aspect of filling all worlds, and from our side, as we contemplate in our holy Torah concerning our conduct in Torah and commandments and according to our sensory apprehension, He, blessed be His Name, is called in the aspect of surrounding all worlds.” Meaning, “surrounding” is the way we are supposed to look at it. “Filling” is the truth, from the side of the Holy One, blessed be He. Again, non-literal contraction is “filling,” right? Because that means everything is divinity; He fills every point, there is nothing that is not divinity. That is the conception of filling. The conception of surrounding is the conception according to which we are supposed to live, even though it isn’t the truth. The conception that the Holy One, blessed be He, is around us, watching over us from above—He is not ourselves. We are beings living in a world that functions independently, and this is not the Holy One, blessed be He. And therefore he says this is relevant to our conduct in Torah and commandments, because otherwise what is the point of performing commandments or refraining from transgressions? In any case it changes nothing; everything is divinity, and divinity cannot be harmed, so do whatever you want—what difference does it make? Okay? False messianism, by the way, revolves around this point of “filling” instead of “surrounding”: living the consciousness of “filling” all the way through, the immanent, all the way through, is basically to say: okay, so if I commit a transgression, what happened? Nothing happened. Nothing can be ruined because everything is divinity. You can’t harm the Holy One, blessed be He; you can’t damage divinity. So why should I care? Then there is no Jewish law, no good, no evil—just do whatever you want. Okay?
[Speaker K] But how do you answer that? If that really is…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right, so we’ll get to that. There’s a problem here, because if this is the truth, then what does it mean to live otherwise? But really why? If this is the truth, then in fact nothing gets damaged. That really is the big question that arises regarding this conception that says contraction is not literal. Contraction is not literal, but because of the danger, the concept of contraction was introduced into our perception. But the question, in terms of conduct—I mean, there are bigger questions in the logical sense—but the question in terms of conduct is really: why not? If indeed everything is divinity, then truly it doesn’t matter what we do. So what does it mean that I need to work on myself? It’s like trust in God and personal effort, the whole issue of trust and effort. Do I trust in the Holy One, blessed be He, that everything that happens to me is really decided by Him and does not depend on my actions—that’s trust—or is effort, what I do, what determines what will happen to me? So if I trust in the Holy One, blessed be He, completely, then I’m supposed to sit at home with my legs crossed, or learn Torah, or do whatever, and not go to work, not go to the doctor, not make efforts, not go to the army, none of that. Because after all everything is in the hands of Heaven—what do I need to do? They say: no, no, no, there is an obligation to make effort, even though trust is the correct perspective. But there is still an obligation to make effort. Do you understand that this is completely analogous to this problem? Meaning, basically everything is divinity, everything is run by the Holy One, blessed be He, and nothing depends on me—but by some scriptural decree I nevertheless have to behave as though things depend on me, go to the doctor, go to work. But all of this is just effort; it does not really generate the practical results that we think it generates. And again the same question comes up there: if that’s really how it is, why? Then why do I need to do things that aren’t right, and live inside such an illusion that I myself know is an illusion? After all, I know it’s an illusion, and I need “running and returning,” I need to flee—“the heart does not reveal to the mouth,” right? I need to flee from something that I myself know. So why flee? What’s the problem? There’s something very problematic about saying such a thing and stopping there. It’s very strange. Because all the time he says: look what will come out of it, you’ll commit transgressions. And yes indeed—so transgressions, what’s the problem?
[Speaker E] There is a problem with committing transgressions, and it’s not the will of God.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But what is the will of God? After all, everything is divinity, everything is the will of God.
[Speaker E] That’s what He commanded…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, that He commanded is the illusion. After all, He commanded… He commanded not to commit transgressions and yes to perform commandments, right? What does it mean that He commanded? That’s my picture, because that command itself actually contains the assumption that there are things one must not do because they are not divinity. But that assumption, after all, is not true. Even the command is part of that same subjective image within which I am supposed to live. I’m only extending the line of thought; I’m not agreeing with it. I’m only saying: that’s apparently what is supposed to follow from here. So what does it mean, “He commanded”? Obviously He didn’t really command, because apparently it’s not really needed. So what then? What are we supposed to do?
[Speaker L] Why—why can’t you say that He really did command?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It’s some kind of scriptural decree, like trust in God, where by reasoning alone we really wouldn’t… The same reasoning also says that the command itself is part of this subjective hallucination. Everything—the conclusion is obvious. And again, I agree neither with this nor with that. But if you live this way, then indeed—and Rabbi Chaim of Volozhin does not argue with the theological conception; he agrees with it. He only says: it is forbidden to live that way. It must be contracted, hidden, wrapped up—not lived that way. I’m saying: if you really agree with it, then what do you want? That’s one thing. And second, we already spoke about this: what does “illusion” mean? Whose illusion? The fact that the world or we exist—that’s an illusion. Whose illusion?
[Speaker L] Where does he say here that it’s…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Our illusion from our perspective, not from His perspective? Where does he say that?
[Speaker L] He says from our perspective and not from His.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So from His perspective nothing exists, everything is divinity. From our perspective it’s as if He only surrounds—not everything is divinity. From our perspective—what does that mean? But if we too are also divinity, then from whose perspective is this? Because I called it illusion from our perspective—fine, same point. Who is the one being deluded? There is no one being deluded. I don’t understand this language at all. We talked about this when I discussed the philosophical language—pantheism and things like that—then I talked about this issue. That is the philosophical problem. Here there’s the problem you raised earlier, which is the practical one—why really behave that way if it isn’t true? I’m asking also on the conceptual level: what is the logic here? After all, you can’t tell me that all of reality is my illusion if I myself am not part of reality as something that actually exists. So if I myself don’t really exist, then whose illusion is it? My existence or the world’s existence? God’s illusion? What? How can that be? What is this thing at all? And I said about this that it is exactly Descartes’ cogito: I think, therefore I am. Descartes basically makes exactly this argument. He began with methodological doubt—casting doubt on everything that can be doubted. And he tried to find some anchor beyond all doubt, meaning something that even if you wanted to doubt it, you couldn’t. The only point he found was his own existence. And why? Because if I cast doubt on my own existence, I ask myself: who is the one casting that doubt? I think that I do not exist, therefore I exist. Because if I think I’ve reached the conclusion that I do not exist, who is the one that reached that conclusion? So from the very fact that I think about anything at all, no matter what the conclusion is—whether I conclude that I do exist or that I don’t exist—I exist. Therefore he says this is a point beyond all doubt. And in that sense I ask the same question: how can you say I do not exist? After all, there’s the cogito. I think that I do not exist, therefore I exist. Because if I am an illusion, then I have to be someone’s or something’s illusion. Otherwise what does that even mean? What is this thing? There is a language here that I don’t think has any meaning at all. I really don’t understand it. “That in the aspect of filling all worlds, it is the glory of God to conceal a matter”—third line in the last paragraph—“and the matter is that certainly the truth is that from His blessed side, even now after He created and renewed the worlds by His will, He fills all the worlds and places and all creatures equally and in simple unity. And there is nothing besides Him, literally.” This is really a Hasidic conception without any qualification. The truth, meaning from the perspective of the Holy One, blessed be He, there is nothing besides Him. The whole creation did not exist; from His perspective there was really nothing. “As we wrote above from several explicit signs and in the name of the Rokeach”—and as in the analogy that of course wasn’t in existence either—and “as our early sages instituted for us to say before prayer: ‘You are He before the world was created; You are He after the world was created.’” Meaning, although the worlds have already been created by His simple blessed will, nevertheless there is no change or renewal at all, God forbid, and no barrier caused by them within His simple unity. That is really non-literal contraction. The infinite light fills all of reality even now after the contraction. Exactly the same in simple unity. Meaning, there are no distinctions of level. Everything is the infinite light in the same form; reality is completely uniform. There are no separate creatures in it, no different kinds of things; everything is the same. “And He is now too as before creation, when all was filled with the essence of the Infinite, blessed be He, even in the place where the worlds stand—you.” So what is the difference? Big question; I’ll get to that in a moment. “And set your heart to the words of the holy one of God, our master Shmuel, father of the holy Rabbi Yehudah HaHasid, in the Song of Unity that he composed for the second day’s unity: ‘There is no end… and no innerness separating between You.’” Once the conception is non-literal contraction, there is no distinction between one thing and another. As I said, distinction between one thing and another is always in vessels; it is never in the light. When you make different kinds of things, that means they have different bodies. Because the divinity within them is the same thing. But when you make distinctions, that is always vessels. And if “there is no innerness separating between You,” that means everything is light; vessels do not really exist. “And in the third day’s unity: ‘You surround all and fill all, and in all being You are in all,’” and so on. “And this is what our sages, of blessed memory, meant in matters where they compared His blessed connection to the worlds to the connection of the soul to the body.” They compared His connection to the worlds to soul in body. “Just as the soul is pure in the body, so the Holy One, blessed be He, is pure in His world.” Meaning: the matter of the soul, although it spreads through all the limbs of a person, the clean ones and also those full of filth, dirt, and contamination—you remember the filthy alleyways—and nevertheless they do not interpose at all regarding its purity and holiness, and its purity remains. So too the matter is that He, blessed be He, fills everything and every place—holy and sanctified places, and places that are not pure—and nevertheless they do not interpose at all and do not cause any change, heaven forbid, in the holiness of the purity of His essence and His simple unity, may He be blessed. And this is what is meant by “I the Lord have not changed.” And as it is written in Tikkunei Zohar Chadash: “And all Israel who received from Him the Torah make Him one through it, and through all His holy letters and names, and in all the upper and lower dwelling places that were created through Him.” In short, all things alike—it makes no difference. In the end the Holy One, blessed be He, is completely one in all these places. “But nevertheless, these are His mighty acts and His wonders, blessed be His Name: that despite this He contracted, as it were, all His glory, as it were, His blessed glory, so that there could be found the reality of worlds and powers and creatures, created and renewed, in different aspects and divided matters and different places—holy and pure places, and the opposite, impure and filthy places. And this is the aspect that is from our side.” Meaning, our perception through the senses grasps only their existence as they appear. But that isn’t the truth. The truth is that there is no difference between anything and anything. “And according to this aspect were built all the orders of the obligations of our conduct that we were commanded by His blessed mouth, a statute that cannot be transgressed. And from this aspect our sages compared Him, as it were, to the soul in relation to the body, as written in the Zohar that He is the soul of all worlds. And just as in a human being only the body is visible to the senses, while the soul, though it fills the whole body, is hidden from fleshly eyes and revealed to the eyes of the intellect, so too according to our revealed apprehension the reality of all the worlds and creatures appears, and that He, blessed be His Name, spreads Himself and hides Himself, as it were, within all of them to give them life and sustain them, like the soul that spreads and hides within all the detailed limbs of the body to keep it alive. And all the names and appellations and descriptions and attributes applied to Him, blessed be He, that we find in the holy Torah, all speak from this aspect, as He is from our side and according to the order of the obligations of our conduct, which is from the side of His connection to the worlds as they are from their side. Through them are drawn all the changes and all the details of the order of governance, as we wrote above in Gate Two.” And all of this is from our side, but from the side of the Holy One, blessed be He, there is nothing at all. And he continues with this, and it’s all the same idea. So I’m skipping the next paragraph. “And therefore He, blessed be He, is called in all the words of our sages by the name the Holy One, blessed be He.” Why is He called “the Holy One, blessed be He”? Meaning, this honorable name includes these two aspects together. For “holy” means separate and exalted, and that is as He is from His blessed side, that in truth He is distinct and separate and greatly exalted above all matters of distinctions and changes, heaven forbid. Rather all is filled only with complete unity equally, and He is exalted above every blessing and praise and does not need to be blessed, heaven forbid. We do not need to bless Him. To bless means “Give strength to God,” to give Him power. To bless someone is to give him power. To bless the Holy One, blessed be He, as Rashba writes, means to give Him power—“Give strength to God.” But all of that is from our side, not that He really needs the power, just as before creation. As it is written, “To whom will you liken Me that I should be equal? says the Holy One”—this verse is said concerning the essence of His blessed unity, as is known in Ra’aya Meheimna and the Tikkunim. And from the aspect of our apprehension of the existence of powers and worlds He is called “blessed,” as it were, from the side of His connection to them, because they need, for their sake, addition and increase of blessing and flow through desirable human actions. The world of Atzilut—the vessels into which the infinite light enters—they need the blessing that we give them. But not the infinite light itself. Now here I’ll maybe stop, because I hope I won’t end up not getting to this. Look, all through the paragraphs I just read there is duality. But the duality is not only in the distinction between from His side and from our side. Look at the analogies he brings. The analogies he brings are the analogy of soul and body. What is he trying to say? That the body doesn’t exist, only the soul exists? That isn’t true. If so, the analogy is inaccurate. The body certainly exists. The body does not interfere with the soul being present in the same place where the body is also present. The soul is not a physical entity, so there is no question here: if the body is here, how can the soul also be here? Because there is no contradiction between two entities being in the same place if one of them is not physical. Okay? That’s what he means to say. And the same thing with the infinite light entering into the vessels—Atzilut and all that. And what he means to say—it is a mistake when people interpret him as really holding the Hasidic position. That’s simply not true. I think it is just a mistake, or maybe something that can be reconciled, but the infinite light remains the same thing all the time. That’s obvious. The soul—the existence of a body does not affect it at all. It remains what it was before, and it makes no difference whether it has a connection to the soul—sorry, to the body—or is inside a body or not inside a body. The body does not take up space for it; it does not limit it in any way. In that sense the soul did not contract, okay? But that does not mean that the body is not there. In the physical dimension there is a body, okay? It’s just that the body does not conceal the soul in any way. With our physical eyes we see the body; we don’t see souls. But that doesn’t mean the soul isn’t here. The fact that the body is here does not push the soul out from being here. That’s all the analogies he brings here. Look at all the analogies he brings—they are all of this kind. Because otherwise he is just talking nonsense. Meaning, all this “from His side and from our side”—by “from our side” he does not mean to say that contraction is an illusion, that contraction is truly not literal and that all this is just an illusion, because then whose illusion is it? He does not mean that. He means to say that the infinite light really is still present everywhere. But even though it is present everywhere, in that very same place there can also be other things, and there is no contradiction. They do not take up space for it at that point. And therefore you can say that He did not contract anywhere at all. We look at it as if He contracted in the sense that things were created here—bodies, vessels, something like that—that are not the infinite light but something else. But from the perspective of the infinite light, when you look at it, from its side it fills all reality as it did before. The one I mentioned when I described the picture according to the Leshem—he talks about how each such world exists beneath the previous condition. Meaning, there is a world of uncontracted infinite light. Beneath it there is a world in which the infinite light spread to the sides, a vacant space was formed, and a line within it. This whole construction—the infinite light around it, which by the way is what is called “surrounding,” the line is the “filling,” and the surrounding is the “surrounding.” The surrounding and the filling, or the line of contraction—all of that is basically one level below what is above, while what is above looks as it did before creation. And then below that there is Adam Kadmon and Atzilut—but each of these is another level lower. It does not exist in the world above it; rather some world was formed below, and there suddenly something thicker, coarser, less spiritual, came into being. I’ll give an example that I think will be much easier to understand. There’s an interesting book called The Dimensions, Prophecy, and Geology by Rabbi Shem Tov Gefen. If you know it—I don’t know, it came out once through Mossad HaRav Kook. I once found it in the genizah storage of the Midrashiyah; they wanted to throw it out, and I rescued it at the last moment. What? The Dimensions, Prophecy, and Geology. “Adamatanut” means geology. It’s just archaic language, old Hebrew. And the author turned out to be…
[Speaker K] Where does that word come from? If I’m not mistaken, it’s his own invention.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Could be, but that’s what he called geology in Hebrew. I don’t know if he had another word. He tried to coin the concept. Could be. Doesn’t matter. In any case it’s an old thing, a very old book. By the way, the author turned out to be Yonatan Gefen’s great-grandfather. Rabbi Shem Tov Gefen. I checked this with Menachem Finkelstein—I had some clarification with him a while ago, and somehow he asked Uzi Dayan, because it’s all from the Dayan family there. Uzi Dayan told him yes. What?
[Speaker J] Not his father—he was half Russian or something like that.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It could be that also, I don’t know. I think he had some son or grandson or someone in Tel Aviv in the 1950s. I thought he himself was there, but no, he was much earlier. It seems to me he died in the 1920s or something like that, I think. In any case, he was a very interesting Jew. There’s a diary there in the book. This book contains three essays. One of those essays was published in a Russian mathematical journal, on the nature of prophecy. He tries to explain prophecy using various mathematical tools, in Russian. It was translated into Hebrew. As I understood it, he had no formal education; he was one of those enlightened types who read under the table. He tells there in his diary how, as a child before his bar mitzvah, he started reading books. He hid it from his father because it was forbidden. He read various books in Kabbalah, he was involved in Kabbalah. He describes there, for example, that he talks about Einstein with four dimensions corresponding to space and time, so he says: that’s Sefer Yetzirah. In Sefer Yetzirah it says, “Ten and not nine, ten and not eleven,” I think, that’s in the first chapter of Sefer Yetzirah. “Depth of east and depth of west, depth of beginning and depth of end, depth of up and depth of down.” There you have the x-axis, the y-axis, the z-axis, and time—forward, beginning, and end. And the fifth is depth of good and depth of evil. That’s what in Kabbalistic language is called smoke, world, year, soul. World is the spatial dimensions, year is time, and soul is good and evil, or the spiritual and the physical, and everything in the world is measured in five dimensions: the four dimensions of physics, space and time, and the dimension of good and evil. Meaning every thing also has to be measured in those terms. So he claims that this is what that mishnah in Sefer Yetzirah means. He has all kinds of very interesting things there; he was a many-sided person. He has there, for example, the psycho-physical problem. He brings there the dilemma with—if you know, there are debates among psychophysicists on the question of how you translate stimulus into response. Say when you double the intensity of light, okay? Do you feel light, in the subjective sense—if you double the intensity of the electromagnetic wave, okay—does the subjective light you see become twice as strong? So there’s one thesis that it’s logarithmic, the relation between the increase in the stimulus and the increase in the response. There’s a thesis that it’s polynomial, that it follows some power law, and there are arguments over which power. So he discusses that too, he brings all kinds of things there. A very interesting type. In any case, by the way, it’s a fascinating question, because you can’t measure it. It’s only people’s reports. There’s no way to reach a real answer on that issue, what the law is. The question is how, as a human being, you define for yourself whether this light is twice as strong, one and a half times as strong. I don’t know—how do you measure such a thing? Certainly not with instruments. Instruments can measure an electromagnetic wave; they can’t measure what I see. So this is a question that by definition is inaccessible to science. It’s not a scientific question. It can’t be measured. In any case, among other things, he talks there about the theory of dimensions to infinity. And he wants to claim—and there’s something else interesting here, maybe I’ll tell you about that too. He wants to claim that space and time—there’s an introduction here by Hugo Bergmann to this book, “On a Forgotten Book,” it’s called. It’s some essay he wrote about a book nobody knows and nobody read, and it’s a shame, because it’s really a genuine gem. So he brings there—and this is the example Hugo Bergmann also brings—that Kant, after all, said that space and time are forms of our relation, the way we see reality; they do not exist in reality itself. Then he says: if so, then what is the meaning of the question of the age of the world? As long as there was no human being, there was no time. So if we say that man was created 6,000 years ago, then that’s completely compatible with the traditional description. And everything before that—there was no time. Time is a form of human perception. So that’s how he solves the problem of the age of the world. Never mind, he has all kinds of interesting things. Here I think he’s mistaken—we spoke about this once, it seems to me—because from within subjective awareness I can also look at what happened before I existed. I can ask when my grandfather was born, right? And it’s pretty obvious that I wasn’t there. But never mind. In any case, his claim is like this, and I think it’s a very interesting claim. He also talks about transcendence and immanence, meaning: if the Holy One, blessed be He, exists, then where are we? And if we don’t exist, then what—how? So he says it’s like the relationship between different dimensions. And it’s a wonderful analogy for this issue; the analogy settles many things. Say we’re talking about a three-dimensional world, and in it there is some two-dimensional sheet, for example some plane like this, two-dimensional. Suppose there are two-dimensional creatures moving around on that sheet, yes? They live in Flatland—that book, Flatland, it was translated into Hebrew. So the lives of two-dimensional creatures have fascinating phenomena. We’re not used to it, because there are all kinds of limitations whose existence we don’t even think about. You see that in two dimensions you simply can’t do certain things. For example, if there’s a line there crossing the plane, of course nobody can pass to the other side. We can of course go up along the third axis from above, but the two-dimensional creature can’t pass through. And you also can’t turn over, for example. He can’t flip over and stand on his head. What does it mean to turn over? To turn over, for that you have to leave the plane. Yes, exactly. But even a flat thing apparently has two sides, yet it can’t switch the two sides, turn itself over. All kinds of things. You know, for example, that there are no knots in four dimensions—that’s a theorem in topology. There are no knots in four dimensions. In a four-dimensional world there are no knots, you can’t create one. Any knot you tie, if you stretch it, it opens up. Meaning the concept of a knot exists only in a three-dimensional world. In four dimensions? No, I just mentioned that now as another interesting thing. If one of you ever writes a book on four dimensions, that’s an amusing anecdote. It’s a theorem in mathematics, in topology. In any case, what he says there is that the relation between the Holy One, blessed be He, and us—or the world—is like the relation between different dimensions. Meaning a two-dimensional being, or a two-dimensional creation, occupies nothing at all within three-dimensional space. There is no question, where does the three-dimensional thing exist—after all, these creatures are here, so if they’re here how is He also here? So he says there’s no such question, because the two-dimensional sheet has zero volume. It occupies no volume, in three-dimensional terms. There is a Maggid Mishneh in chapter 17 of the laws of Sabbath; the Maggid Mishneh discusses there whether one can make a side-post for an alleyway from an asherah, from wood of idolatry. A side-post for the matter of carrying on the Sabbath. Then he says: why? After all, the rule in Jewish law is that “its prescribed measure is regarded as crushed up.” So anything that has a certain required measure—if you make it from something from which benefit is forbidden, then it is considered as though crushed up, because forbidden-benefit items have to be burned, and then it is as if crushed up, so you don’t have the required measure. You can’t make from forbidden-benefit items things that require a prescribed measure. He says that a side-post has to be ten cubits. Then the claim is: true, but it doesn’t need width and depth. And if you have a dimension—if there’s a requirement only in one dimension—then there is no requirement for a minimum amount of material. So it doesn’t matter to me that “its prescribed measure is regarded as crushed up.” There are lots of contradictions to this: for example a lulav, four handbreadths, and it says that you don’t use a lulav of an asherah. There are many difficulties with this Maggid Mishneh. But his claim is exactly this claim, namely that a thing that has one dimension occupies no space at all in three-dimensional space. That is—sorry—its volume is not zero; it has no volume. Zero volume is something else. So it has no volume. And that is much stronger. It’s not zero volume in the sense that you take something that has volume and let, say, its depth tend to zero. Here I’m not talking about making it tend to an epsilon, in mathematical language, as small as you like. Period. What’s the difference between a point and a differential? That’s from Klatskin, I think—I once saw it in his book. Yaakov Klatskin—there was Klatskin, some kind of German philosopher, books that came out through Eshkol in Berlin and were later translated into Hebrew. He was a very interesting philosopher, translated Spinoza, the first to translate Spinoza into Hebrew. Yaakov Klatskin. And I think he said—it’s written there, if I remember correctly, because he has a chapter on the infinitesimal. It was mentioned in a book by Aharon Appelfeld; from there I got onto the fact that there were books by Klatskin. So he writes there: what is the difference between a point and an infinitesimal? An infinitesimal is a line as small as you like. An infinitesimal is something with one dimension and zero length. It has length, and its length is zero. A point is not something whose length is zero; it is something that has no length. It has no length, because a point is zero-dimensional, not one-dimensional. In order to have length, you need one dimension. Here this is a very interesting point, because it basically says that I don’t even occupy zero volume relative to the Holy One, blessed be He. I don’t exist there. I have no volume in the four-dimensional or infinite-dimensional world. And now look—this is really a beautiful analogy. Meaning the whole world exists exactly as we understand it, three-dimensionally; everything exists literally, with no problem at all. From His perspective, nothing exists, and that too is literal; everything is true. Why? Because He looks at it through multi-dimensional glasses, and the three-dimensional doesn’t exist through those glasses, that’s all. So from His perspective it doesn’t exist. Nefesh HaChaim says: from His perspective we take up no space; He did not contract Himself, He does not need to contract Himself. Exactly. He does not need to contract Himself in order for us to exist, because the four-dimensional does not need to make room for a three-dimensional creature, and the three-dimensional does not need to make room for a two-dimensional creature. So the contraction is not literal. But that doesn’t mean we don’t really exist. We exist completely; there’s no need to say any such thing at all. I think it’s a brilliant solution, really brilliant. Meaning he explains this matter so beautifully, and I think that’s what Nefesh HaChaim writes. And all his commentators are mistaken—he continues the Vilna Gaon in a totally ordinary way. He continues the Vilna Gaon: contraction literally, literally in the sense that we completely exist and we are not divinity. Divinity exists here just as we are here, because we do not interfere with one another.
[Speaker E] And that doesn’t require contraction, exactly.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] We are not—that’s like him—and that’s all the analogies he brought, that the soul within the body can exist in the same space, and you don’t need the soul to depart from here in order for the body to exist here. Now, yes, we do speak about contraction in the sense that He created a space in a lower dimension, one that didn’t exist at first, let’s say, and He contracted Himself from four dimensions to three dimensions so that things could exist without Him at all… And that is exactly the picture of the Leshem, who says that above—“above” in a metaphorical sense, of course—there is infinite light that is not contracted at all. Below that there is a world of line and contraction. Below that there is line and contraction and Adam Kadmon. Below that Atzilut, Beriah, Yetzirah, and Asiyah. Each such thing is one more phase lower down. Think of it as each time a dimension drops. A dimension drops. Exactly, each time a dimension drops, and one really is below the other in the sense that it takes up no place within the picture of the one above it. And that’s completely irrelevant. I think this is a truly ingenious solution. It seems to me that—and in my opinion, that’s what he means. When you go through his examples and see what he writes, it seems to me that that’s what he is saying. If so, then he continues the Vilna Gaon: contraction literally. It has nothing to do with all the Hasidim. And then he gave an excellent explanation of where the Hasidim are mistaken—that’s what he wants to explain. And then there’s no need even to ask your question, right? Wait a second—if this is all only from our perspective, then really why be careful about commandments and not transgressions and so on? Because after all it doesn’t really fix anything. Not true—it really does fix something. Reality, everything in our dimension, everything is exactly as we understand it. The point is that there are higher dimensions in which this whole business takes up no space. That’s all. And obviously this is the conception of contraction that is coherent with all directions. Meaning, it seems to me that if I had to remain with some conception, this is the best conception.