חדש באתר: NotebookLM עם כל תכני הרב מיכאל אברהם

Teshuva – Elul 5783 – Lesson 4

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This is an English translation (via GPT-5.4). Read the original Hebrew version.

This transcript was produced automatically using artificial intelligence. There may be inaccuracies in the transcribed content and in speaker identification.

🔗 Link to the original lecture

🔗 Link to the transcript on Sofer.AI

Table of Contents

  • Repentance, choice, and weakness of will
  • The process of repentance versus its outcome, and the superiority of the penitent
  • The commandment of repentance, confession, and Meshekh Chokhmah
  • Repentance as the essence of “being a chooser,” and why free choice appears in the laws of repentance
  • Zeno’s arrow paradox, “standing” versus “being located,” and velocity as a force
  • The value of movement in repentance: a camera versus an “ideal movie camera”
  • Rabbi Kook: perfection, perfecting, and a “higher need”
  • The Book of Jonah, kindness, interest, and “Give strength to God”
  • Hypnosis, repeated falls, and effort as a value
  • Midrash Tanchuma, the Angel of Death, and the “governance of the Awesome Plotter”

Summary

General Overview

The text presents a view according to which the main point of repentance is first to return to being a person who chooses, one who holds the “reins” and is not ruled by weakness of will, and only afterward to choose the good. It raises the question whether the goal of repentance is the result—that a person becomes “more righteous”—or whether the process of repentance itself has intrinsic value, and it suggests that the intrinsic value of the process explains how “penitents” can stand in a place where “completely righteous people” do not stand. Through a discussion of the words of the Sages, Maimonides, Meshekh Chokhmah, and Rabbi Kook, the text develops the idea that the world was originally created for a dynamic of lack and growth, so that repentance is not an after-the-fact repair but part of the very essence of creation, and even fits with the “governance of the Awesome Plotter” in the midrash, which presents sin and death as part of the primordial plan.

Repentance, Choice, and Weakness of Will

The text argues that most sins and failures are not a direct choice of evil but the result of dropping the reins and weakness of will, and that a person usually wraps his actions in a story that allows him not to see himself as doing evil or as doing something he himself does not want to do. It distinguishes between evil as something that contradicts my values and an action that I do not want to do, and claims that doing something “evil in my own eyes” is rarer than a situation in which an interest overcomes values. It proposes a model in which factors like genetics and environment influence but do not determine, using the image of a topographical map that determines the path of a little ball, as opposed to a person, for whom the map merely exacts “costs” but the decision remains in his hands. It concludes that the two demands made of a person are first to be a chooser and only afterward to choose the good, grounding this in Elijah’s call on Mount Carmel, “How long will you keep hopping between two branches?”, and in the idea that even choosing evil is preferable to not choosing at all.

The Process of Repentance Versus Its Outcome, and the Superiority of the Penitent

The text asks whether the purpose of repentance is to become “more righteous,” or whether the process of repentance itself has value, and brings Rabbi Abbahu’s statement, “In the place where penitents stand, the completely righteous do not stand,” alongside another interpretation attributed to Rabbi Yohanan of “Peace, peace to the distant and to the near.” It quotes Maimonides in the laws of repentance, who adopts the view of the superiority of the penitent and explains it by saying that the penitent “has tasted the taste of sin, separated from it, and subdued his inclination,” and that “their level is greater… because they subdue their inclination more than the others.” It challenges this explanation by arguing that the completely righteous person fights his inclination just like others, only he did not fall, and brings the author of the Tanya, who distinguishes between the completely righteous person and the intermediate person, though even there the righteous person reaches that state through struggle. It suggests that the key is the intrinsic value of the act of repentance itself, so that the penitent is superior because he has “the added advantage of the path” in addition to the result, and in that light interprets the initial thought of “I will sin and repent” as the desire to attain the very greatness of repentance itself, even though the Talmud rejects the practical implementation of that move.

The Commandment of Repentance, Confession, and Meshekh Chokhmah

The text returns to the dispute between Maimonides and Nachmanides over whether there is a commandment to repent, and presents Maimonides’ view, which sees the verse “And you shall return to the Lord your God” as a promise rather than a command. It brings the difficulty raised by Meshekh Chokhmah in the portion of Vayelekh: why is a commandment of repentance needed according to Nachmanides, since even without a special commandment a person is already commanded not to commit sins, and the original warning that prevents him before the sin also prevents him after the sin. It quotes Meshekh Chokhmah, who places the unique commandment mainly on confession—“and they shall confess their sin”—and on the claim that “repentance itself should not be counted as a new commandment beyond the commands they were already commanded in.” It then adds, in Meshekh Chokhmah’s name, an additional dimension of repentance following Maimonides in chapter 4 of the Eight Chapters, according to which the sinner is required to incline himself to the opposite extreme in order to return to the middle path, even to the point of abstaining from what is permitted, as in the example, “David would adorn his concubines every day… ‘By your life, I will make even what is permitted repulsive to you.’” It raises the question whether a person is allowed to place himself in temptation as part of the process of repentance, and notes that he does not fully understand why even the tendency to the opposite extreme is not already implied by the prohibition against sin itself—unless one understands that repentance is an independent process-value.

Repentance as the Essence of “Being a Chooser,” and Why Choice Appears in the Laws of Repentance

The text argues that the commandment of repentance—or the essence of repentance according to Maimonides—is the demand “to return to being a chooser,” and that this has value beyond the question of what one chooses. It explains that one who chooses evil bears a deficiency in his choice, but still has the advantage of being a chooser as opposed to one who does not choose at all, and connects this to “If Baal is God, follow him.” It explains why Maimonides devotes two chapters (chapters 5 and 6) in the laws of repentance to free choice and not in other legal contexts, because in repentance choice is not an external condition for the commandment but the very essence of repentance itself. It argues that the “laws of repentance” are an unusual collection, containing few actual laws and many prophets, discussions of serving out of love and fear, and words of persuasion, because repentance does not fit into the normal halakhic corpus but rather constitutes the human being as one who can be commanded, from which point halakhic discourse can begin. It presents Rosh Hashanah as an earlier stage of returning to being one who is “subject to command,” and accepting divine kingship, before the Ten Days of Repentance and Yom Kippur, and maintains that adding more commandments during those days is not the main point, because repentance deals with a fundamental change of direction in the person’s being a chooser.

Zeno’s Arrow Paradox, “Standing” Versus “Being Located,” and Velocity as a Force

The text presents Zeno’s paradox of the flying arrow and asks when the arrow “moves” if in every photographed instant it is “standing” in a particular place, and rejects solutions that are satisfied with the language of limits or with adopting a language that prevents paradoxes from being formulated, in the style of Russell and Whitehead and type theory. It also suggests the uncertainty principle as a way of bypassing the paradox but argues that this is like an “English-English dictionary,” which does not solve the difficulty but only transfers it. It proposes a linguistic-essential solution according to which Zeno is making a mistake in Hebrew: the arrow is not “standing” but “located” in a certain place, and being located is not equivalent to zero velocity. It argues that there is velocity at a point in time, and that one must distinguish between motion and change of place, where change of place is a result of motion and not identical with it, and velocity is a potential for change of place even if change of place does not occur at the point itself. It presents the derivative as an operational definition for calculating velocity and not as an essential definition of the concept, and illustrates the measurement of velocity by means of the Doppler effect, along with the example of a body hitting a wall, where the potential for a change of place is not realized in the intended direction even though the velocity exists.

The Value of Movement in Repentance: A Camera Versus an “Ideal Movie Camera”

The text distinguishes between a “camera-like” perspective, which sees only states and successive spiritual levels, within which repentance is just interpolation, and the perspective of an “ideal movie camera,” which sees the movement itself and the person’s being in process. It argues that a penitent is defined not only by the state he is in but by the direction and spiritual “velocity,” and that there is value in the very fact that a person is in motion even if he has not yet reached the result of a higher spiritual level. It gives an example from the world of management, where dynamism and change in an organization are themselves considered valuable even if the immediate result is equivalent, and claims that the conception fails only if one identifies movement with transition between states and denies any intrinsic value to movement itself.

Rabbi Kook: Perfection, Perfecting, and a “Higher Need”

The text cites passages from Orot HaKodesh, volume 2, in which Rabbi Kook describes “the inner foundation of reality” as unceasing elevation and “running and returning like the appearance of a flash,” and presents the idea that “unceasing perfecting rises above complete perfection.” It explains that absolute perfection leaves no room for addition, and therefore there is a special perfection in the “addition of perfection,” which cannot be actualized in divinity when divinity stands alone, and from that the appearance of a deficient world makes possible an infinite process of ascent. It interprets “the secret of service as a higher need” as the claim that human service completes the glory of its Creator, because in it the power of constant ascent is actualized, and formulates the purpose of creation not as arriving at static righteousness but as existing continuously in a movement of growth. It states that the purpose of creation is that there be penitents and not completely righteous people, and that the completely righteous person is a utopian-typological figure used for analysis, not a concrete goal for whose realization the world was created.

The Book of Jonah, Kindness, Interest, and “Give Strength to God”

The text interprets the Book of Jonah as an ideological confrontation over the attitude toward penitents, and dwells on the a fortiori argument at the end of the book from the gourd to Nineveh. It suggests one possibility that Jonah really did pity the gourd and not only himself, and another possibility that the comparison is meant precisely to say that the Holy One, blessed be He, also “needs” Nineveh and therefore pities it, similar to Jonah’s own interest, and ties this to the idea that the Holy One, blessed be He, “needs” the world in order for the process of growth to be realized in it. It places this under the concepts “Give strength to God” and “Bring us back in complete repentance before You,” as describing a relationship that is not full identity between the human being and divinity, but also not absolute separation, where the potential for growth “with Him” is actualized “with us.”

Hypnosis, Repeated Falls, and Effort as a Value

The text argues that if it were possible, through hypnosis, to turn a person into someone who would never sin and would fulfill commandments perfectly, that would not seem intuitively right, because the goal is not the final product but the work and the progress. It interprets “According to the effort is the reward” to mean that the effort itself is the reward, and not only a factor that increases reward for an action, and presents the falls and the return as an inherent component of the human being’s deficient condition, which is meant to grow. It rejects a Sisyphean view of meaningless repetition and argues that the very return is part of the progress, where striving is the main thing and not only the target of “not sinning” in an absolute sense.

Midrash Tanchuma, the Angel of Death, and the “Governance of the Awesome Plotter”

The text concludes with a Midrash Tanchuma on the portion of Vayeshev, as brought by Leshem, in which Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korcha expounds “Awesome in plot against the children of man” as meaning that the awesomeness comes “through a plot,” and presents the creation of the Angel of Death on the first day, even before the sin of Adam. It brings the parable of the divorce document, in which the document is prepared in advance and the plot is created in order to justify the divorce, and Adam’s claim that death was written in the Torah two thousand years before creation and therefore is not merely the result of his sin. It rejects a deterministic reading according to which the Holy One, blessed be He, causes a person to sin, and suggests that the point is that the world was created deficient from the outset so that failures and repair would occur, so that sin is expected as part of the structure of creation even though personal responsibility is preserved in each individual sin. It concludes that the concept of repentance preceded the world because the entire world was created for the work of spiritual progress, and ends with the blessing, “May you be sealed for a good year.”

Full Transcript

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay, let’s begin. We talked about two processes of repentance. I started with the commandment of repentance. After that we talked about two processes of repentance and about the central principle of great repentance, which is self-change, and that involves a kind of paradox—what I called weakness of will, what people usually call weakness of will. And in the course of that we also got a bit into the broader topic of choice, and I briefly suggested some kind of model, some kind of model for reconciling the different influences acting on us with the claim that we choose freely. The claim is that basically all the factors that influence us—genetics, environment, home, whatever you want—basically all of these are a whole set of influences acting on us. And of course even a libertarian doesn’t deny that such influences exist. But unlike the determinist, he doesn’t think these influences determine what he will do; rather, they influence what he does. We talked about the person in relation to a topographical map, as opposed to a little ball or a stream of water, where the topographical map actually determines what will happen to it, as opposed to a person, for whom the topographical map merely tries to influence him or exacts costs from him for every step he takes, but in the end the decision is still in his hands. And at the end I came to the conclusion that what is demanded of us is first of all to be choosers, to hold the reins in our hands, not to let go of the reins. Because in the end, our sins, our failures, most of them—if not all of them—are the result of dropping the reins and not of choosing evil. Choosing evil in the direct sense is something fairly rare to find. Again, you wrap that evil in some kind of story you tell yourself—right, we talked about the story of the turkey—and in the end you basically cause yourself to think that you’re not doing something evil, and certainly not something that you yourself do not want to do. The difference between evil and not wanting to do something is a big difference. Evil means something that contradicts my values, but it may be that I’ll do something for the sake of an interest even though it goes against my values. I’ll steal even though I think stealing is wrong, because I want the money more than I want to be good and not steal. But to do something I don’t want to do—that’s already almost absurd. To do something that is evil, or very evil, even in my own eyes—that’s very rare, even if it isn’t impossible. Usually you wrap it in some kind of story with the turkey, right, the story of the turkey, what we talked about. In any case, for our purposes, what I concluded from this is that there are two demands, or two claims, upon a person. The first is to be a chooser, and after that of course also to choose the good. But first and foremost, to be a chooser. We talked about Elijah on Mount Carmel: “How long will you keep hopping between two branches?” Now I want to look at this thing itself. Right, this is the last session, and I want to devote this session to looking at the matter from a somewhat different angle and to talk a bit about the process of repentance as against its result. In other words, is the goal of repentance to be more righteous—that is, the product that comes out of the process of repentance—or does the process of repentance itself have some intrinsic value even before the question of where it leads me? So there is—may you have a complete recovery, Moshe.

[Speaker B] Moses our teacher left the desert, and from heaven they’ll also let him enter the Land.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay, that’s the question. So there is—here, from here, take the chair of honor, that was—yes, I didn’t understand, I’m only now suddenly seeing that it appears here. Right. So I want to start maybe with a midrash in Yalkut Shimoni, a well-known midrash—it’ll show up in a moment. Rabbi Abbahu said: In the place where penitents stand, the completely righteous do not stand. Right, there are those who say because of the crowding, as it says, “Peace, peace to the distant and to the near.”

[Speaker C] Some also say because of the smell.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay. “To the distant” first, and then “to the near.” First the distant, and then the near. Meaning, the penitent is superior to the righteous person. So Rabbi Yohanan apparently holds that the completely righteous are superior to the penitent, unlike Rabbi Abbahu. Right. And Rabbi Yohanan—what does he derive from “to the distant”? Distant from sin from the outset; near—near to sin from the outset and then distanced himself from it. That’s another exposition. There is a dispute here between Amoraim about who is preferable—whether the penitent is preferable, or the completely righteous person is preferable. It’s an aggadic dispute, but as you know, we are usually used to reading the quotations of Rabbi Abbahu, not those of Rabbi Yohanan. Maimonides, in the laws of repentance for example, writes: A penitent should not imagine that he is far from the level of the righteous because of the sins and transgressions he committed. This is not so. Rather, he is beloved and cherished before the Creator as though he had never sinned. And more than that, his reward is great, for he tasted the taste of sin, separated from it, and subdued his inclination. The Sages said: In the place where penitents stand, the completely righteous cannot stand—that is, their level is greater than the level of those who never sinned, because they subdue their inclination more than those others. So Maimonides brings Rabbi Abbahu’s view, and it seems that once again—I’m hesitant to say he rules like him—but yes, he adopts his conception, and that’s how we usually know this, by quoting Rabbi Abbahu. The question is really how to understand this. If we see the process of repentance as some kind of means by which in the end you can become righteous, then it’s quite clear that the penitent cannot surpass the completely righteous person. At best, in the most optimistic case, he can reach his level—he can become completely righteous. How can it be that the penitent becomes more than the completely righteous person? So Maimonides writes there that it’s because he fought his inclination more, and so on. Even that reasoning, in my eyes, is somewhat questionable, because I don’t think the completely righteous person doesn’t fight his inclination. The completely righteous person fights his inclination exactly like the wicked person; he just didn’t fall.

[Speaker D] He succeeded.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Always, that’s all—he didn’t fall. But why assume that the completely righteous person doesn’t struggle? There’s the author of the Tanya, whom I mentioned in the first lecture. The author of the Tanya distinguishes between the completely righteous person and the intermediate person, and he says a completely righteous person is someone who doesn’t even have an inclination. But even there he’s talking about someone who slaughtered his inclination, not someone born without one. So there was a struggle. So because he succeeded in the struggle, that makes him less good? On the contrary, he fought harder—he succeeded completely. How can it be that the penitent is preferable to the completely righteous? It seems to me that what Rabbi Abbahu wants to say is something more essential. Rabbi Abbahu basically wants to claim that the penitent is preferable to the completely righteous person because the very act of repentance has meaning as well. Repentance is not only a means to become righteous; repentance is also an act or a process that has value in itself. That’s really the point, and therefore the penitent is preferable to the completely righteous person. Because the penitent, even if he has become completely righteous, has two advantages: he is also completely righteous, and in addition he has the advantage of the path.

[Speaker D] So the completely righteous person never went through any process of repentance in his life?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] A process of repentance he didn’t go through. He may have had a struggle—again, this is obviously a typological figure; it’s not someone who necessarily has to exist in the world, right? But I mean on the conceptual level. I once saw, or heard once, I think Hasidic thinkers explain it this way: what is the initial thought behind someone who says, “I will sin and repent, I will sin and repent,” and they say, “They do not give him the opportunity to repent”? What is the idea of “I will sin and repent”? Usually we understand it this way: he wants to enjoy life, and afterward also enjoy all worlds—have fun and afterward repent and erase the whole thing. But in light of this conception, maybe there really is a more essential statement here: a person wants to sin and return in order to become more than the completely righteous person—that is, to become a penitent. In other words, there is some value that the completely righteous person cannot claim for himself: the value of having repented. And that is what this super-extra-righteous person wants to gain when he says to himself, “I will sin and repent.” And to that the Talmud says: the initial thought is correct—that’s very nice—but don’t do it that way. In other words, don’t do it in practice—that’s the point. But conceptually it really is a correct idea. Don’t worry, you’ll probably sin anyway even without deliberately trying to sin in advance. In other words, you don’t have to help things along; you’ll manage fine without that. But that’s only practical advice. On the conceptual level you can definitely remain with the idea that there is something about sinning and then returning that gives you some kind of added value, an added spiritual advantage that the completely righteous person doesn’t have. In light of this I want to look a bit at Meshekh Chokhmah on the portion of Vayelekh. Right, he discusses there the dispute—we saw the dispute between Maimonides and Nachmanides over whether there is a commandment to repent. Okay? According to Nachmanides there is a commandment to repent, because this commandment—“it is not too wondrous for you, it is not far from you,” and so on—and according to Maimonides, “And you shall return to the Lord your God.” And according to Maimonides there is no commandment to repent, as we saw, if I remember correctly in chapter 7. Maimonides writes there that the Torah has already promised that Israel will ultimately repent, as it says, and so on, “And you shall return to the Lord your God.” So Maimonides understands this as a kind of promise, not a command. Once it’s not a command, it’s not a commandment. And I talked about this—so how does it nevertheless appear as a commandment in the Mishneh Torah even though in the Book of Commandments it doesn’t appear as a commandment? But Maimonides says there is no commandment, and Nachmanides says there is. Meshekh Chokhmah asks: why is such a commandment needed at all according to Nachmanides? We are commanded not to commit sins even without there being a commandment to repent, or to distance ourselves from sins even without there being a commandment to repent. “And he said on that day, ‘Is it not because my God is not in my midst that these evils have come upon me?’” Many have struggled over this—why doesn’t repentance help? And let us reflect: the term repentance, insofar as the term indicates that one should turn back from his folly and not sin again—how can that be considered a commandment? Even without this commandment, he already stands commanded not to transgress the commandments of the blessed God. Would one think that because he transgressed and repeated it, it became permitted to him? The first warning that restrained him from sin before he sinned restrains him from sin after he sinned as well. See Sifrei at the end of Shelach on this, and so too our teacher wrote in his commentary to the Mishnah on Nazir, and so on. In other words, why do we need a commandment of repentance at all? We are commanded to distance ourselves from sins by virtue of the fact that they are defined as sins.

[Speaker C] Meaning that basically if a person sinned and said to himself, “I won’t sin,” that is already repentance.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes. Abandoning the sin and accepting for the future—even regret, if you want, yes, that too is really part of the matter. You did something wrong, so what—is there now a commandment to regret it? You ought to regret it simply by virtue of the fact that it was wrong. Seemingly all the ways of repentance, maybe with the exception of verbal expression, all the ways of repentance are basically redundant; they follow from the mere fact that the thing is defined as a sin. However, the commandment of repentance, for which a specific commandment is needed, is this: if he sinned and abandons his sin, there is a commandment to confess and say before the blessed God that he knows himself to have sinned and asks for atonement. Therefore the wording of our teacher in the laws of repentance is, “When he repents and returns from his sin”—meaning, he resolves not to sin because of the command by which he was already commanded not to transgress the first time, before he sinned. And in truth this is a negative commandment. He is obligated to confess before the blessed God, as it says, “And they shall confess their sin.” The fact that at that time he must think that he will not return to his folly and will not transgress the command of the mouth of God is included within the confession—see there. Because in itself there is no need to command him about that. Obviously he is not supposed to return to his folly and sin again. And so too the Sefer HaChinukh came and clarified his words. “Repentance itself should not be counted as a new commandment beyond the commandments that they have already been commanded in,” and this is clear. Therefore, that is how he explains Maimonides in the Book of Commandments, which counts only confession as a commandment and not repentance, because there is nothing to command regarding repentance. But in fact, there is a measure of repentance that may indeed be newly required only after one has already transgressed, and this is as our teacher explained in chapter 4 of the Eight Chapters: just as a sick person will be healed by bitter things contrary to his nature, in order to restore his temperament and balance to the middle way after one side had gained strength in him because of the earlier cause, so too a person sick with sin, who has already sinned, needs to conduct himself by inclining toward the opposite path. For example, someone overpowered by lust should separate himself even from what is permitted, as the Sages said: David would adorn his concubines every day and said to his inclination, “Behold, you desired what was forbidden to you; by your life, I will make even what is permitted repulsive to you.” And consider the wording “by your life,” for the central intention is the middle path. And one who castrates transgresses a negative commandment, and one who refrains from marriage transgresses a positive and a negative commandment if he has no wife—“He did not create it for emptiness”—but since he breached the boundary, one must heal him through the opposite thing so that he may continue on the necessary path intended in creation by the blessed Creator, and this is his life—this is “by your life”—understand it. In this way it is called repentance: that he sets the powers of his soul at the opposite extreme against what he did in his sin and transgression of the commandment. And so he wrote.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The opposite, in order to become balanced in the middle. That’s not something you would have had to derive merely from the fact that it is forbidden to do something. And abandoning the sin—it’s not only abandoning the sin, but you need to do something opposite as part of the process of repentance. By the way, this suggests a little bit—and this is discussed by a few later authorities on Maimonides. Maimonides says: How is a penitent defined? When he is in the same situation and at the same age, and so on and so on, and nevertheless he does not transgress. Then we know that he is a complete penitent. There is a discussion about this—the Sefat Emet, I think, talks about it, and others—whether a person is allowed to place himself in a situation where his inclination tempts him as part of the process of repentance, in order to verify that he is a penitent, or in order to help himself become a penitent. Ordinarily, as a matter of law, you would be forbidden to do that, but as part of repentance maybe it’s allowed, and here it somewhat sounds like he thinks so too. Right? That he is essentially saying: do things that in themselves would have been forbidden, but as part of the process of repentance you are allowed to do them, and maybe even need to do them, in order to arrive at the middle way. But in any case, according to his view, what he wants to claim is that there are certain acts that are part of repentance, besides confession, that perhaps also do not follow in any simple way from the mere fact that these things are defined as sins. I don’t fully understand why. Because if indeed the way that later on I will avoid sin is by inclining in the opposite direction—well then, that too follows from the fact that I’m supposed to reach a state in which I won’t sin. Why is there something different here? So it seems to me—I don’t know if that’s what he means—but it’s definitely possible. What? I’m saying that even this point, I wouldn’t understand as something newly added beyond the definition of these acts as sins or commandments, because in the end, if you think that inclining in the opposite direction is the way by which you will succeed in reaching a state where you won’t return to sin, well then that too follows from the mere fact that sin is forbidden. So it’s not some additional novelty for which you need an independent commandment of repentance. So what did you gain? In the end, it still follows from the fact that these acts are defined as sin and that you’re not supposed to do them. Therefore I don’t completely understand his addition—unless he means what I’m about to say now, and then maybe, maybe he’s right. And the claim I basically want to make—and I’ll jump ahead—is what I said at the beginning: if I really understand the matter, his question was based on the conception that the process of repentance has no value in itself. You simply need to make sure you don’t have sins and that you do have commandments. And in the end, the value of repentance lies in the product it creates. And then the question really does arise: fine, obviously I need to be without sins and with commandments—that follows from the fact that they’re defined as commandments and sins. Why then do I need an additional commandment of repentance for that? Okay? That’s his question. But if I am right in what I said earlier, that repentance has value in itself, not only as a means to become righteous, then I think it becomes quite simple why, at least according to Nachmanides, one needs a commandment of repentance. You need a commandment of repentance because you need to repent not only in order to reach a state in which you won’t sin or in which you will perform commandments, but because the very process of repentance itself has value. And that is what the commandment of repentance reveals to us. If there were no commandment of repentance and only other commandments, I would understand that I need to make sure that I don’t sin or that I perform commandments, but then indeed there would be no need for the commandment of repentance. But if they tell me, “Look, the process itself has value in itself, not only the result,” then there is room for a commandment of repentance. By the way, even Maimonides, who does not count repentance as a commandment, that is not necessarily because he agrees with the difficulty raised by Meshekh Chokhmah, but because he argues that this value of the process of repentance does not itself require a command—it is self-evident, it is a matter of reason, as I said in the first lecture. Or alternatively—and I may get to this later—what is involved here is being a chooser. And I connect this to what I spoke about before. I said before that the conclusion of the previous lecture was that first of all there is value in being a chooser, in holding the reins in your hands. That, basically, is repentance. Repentance means making sure that you are a chooser. Afterward you will also need to choose good and not choose evil, to perform commandments and not commit sins, but first of all the whole process is basically to return to being a chooser. That is the process that has value. And the value being discussed here—so the commandment of repentance is basically telling you: return to being a chooser. That’s what the commandment tells you. And that has value beyond the question of what you choose. There is value first of all in the very fact that you are a chooser. After that, of course, choose the good as well. That’s Elijah and everything we talked about in the previous lecture.

[Speaker F] Wait, wait, wait—what? A completely righteous person does—there, what? That he chooses all the time.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, the commandment of repentance is to be a chooser. But why? Are you asking why the penitent is preferable to the completely righteous person? Because the penitent goes through a process in order to become a chooser. He takes the reins into his hands. The completely righteous person never let them go.

[Speaker G] Wait, but before that—before he repented—wasn’t he choosing? We already talked about weakness of will. Most sins are basically situations where you let go of the reins.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] You weren’t really choosing. And what is demanded of you is to take the reins into your hands first of all. After that, also direct the horses to the right place. But first of all, hold the reins in your hands; don’t let them go. That is the basic demand. And that is the demand—basically, the process of repentance means going back to holding the reins.

[Speaker H] But afterward you’re also supposed to choose good, so what then?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right, that’s the second level.

[Speaker H] Fine, but if I become a chooser and then choose evil, then what is that?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Then you have the advantage that you are choosing, and you have the deficiency that you chose evil. That’s what I talked about in the previous lecture. That doesn’t erase the advantage of your being a chooser. I talked about the fact that someone who chooses evil has a certain dimension in which he is preferable to someone who doesn’t choose at all, because at least he chooses. That’s what Elijah said: “If Baal is God, follow him.” Choose Baal—that’s better than not choosing at all. I think that’s also the reason why Maimonides devotes two chapters—chapter 5 and chapter 6 in the laws of repentance—to the issue of choice. Why not in the laws of Grace after Meals? In the laws of Grace after Meals too there is the issue of being a chooser—whether to choose to say Grace after Meals, or honor parents, or keep the Sabbath, or whatever you want. Why specifically in the laws of repentance? Because Maimonides wants to say that the whole idea of repentance is returning to being a chooser. In Grace after Meals, choice is not part of the essence of the commandment of Grace after Meals. Of course, every commandment requires you to choose to do it, and to choose to refrain from transgressing it, okay? Obviously every commandment and every transgression is somehow connected to your being a chooser and your use of the power of choice. That is why Maimonides even defines repentance as not being a commandment at all, because repentance means that you are required first of all simply to return to being a chooser. After that, use your choice to do good and not do evil. Therefore in the process of repentance choice is not something external; it is the essence of repentance. Repentance is returning to being a chooser. That’s the idea. Therefore Maimonides places the discussion of our choice in the laws of repentance and not elsewhere. By the way, all of the laws of repentance—and I had planned to talk about this in the second series but didn’t manage to get to it—the whole idea of the laws of repentance: there are almost no laws there at all. I spoke a little about this in the first lecture. There are almost no laws there. There are stories from the prophets and this and serving out of love and serving out of fear and all kinds of conceptual matters—very few actual laws will you find in the laws of repentance. It’s a very strange legal collection. And the reason for that is that according to Maimonides—and I talked about this in the first lecture—the whole idea of repentance does not belong to the halakhic corpus. It does not belong there. Repentance means returning to being someone for whom Jewish law is relevant because you are choosing, because you have the reins in your hands. Now it is possible to tell you: do this, don’t do that. But what is demanded of you in repentance is not one particular commandment or another. All commandments assume that you are a choosing person. Repentance demands that you return to being such a person. Once you are that, now one can speak to you in halakhic terms. And therefore what is called “the laws of repentance” is really just a borrowed name; there aren’t really laws there. Not because it’s not binding—it is very binding—but because you can’t command this. You command someone who is a chooser. You cannot command someone to be a chooser. Right? He has to be a chooser. It is demanded of you to be a chooser, but that cannot be counted as a commandment within the system of commandments. Okay? So that explains the whole strange character of the laws of repentance in Maimonides, and therefore also the two chapters—chapter 5 and chapter 6—that appear there in the middle of that collection, which really discuss this idea of being a chooser. And therefore also chapter 7 and chapter 8 and so on up to chapter 10, where Maimonides is basically trying to persuade us to choose the good, trying to persuade us to perform commandments—that doesn’t happen anywhere else. Persuading us to repent, to serve out of love, to repent. In the laws of Grace after Meals you won’t hear any poetry about how great a person who says Grace after Meals is, and how bad a person who doesn’t say Grace after Meals is, and how many wonderful virtues Grace after Meals has, and so on—or honoring parents, or keeping the Sabbath. Why not? Because with commandments, if you didn’t say Grace after Meals, then you neglected a positive commandment. That’s all. It’s a halakhic accounting. I’m speaking to you in halakhic language. But in repentance, in the laws of repentance, Maimonides doesn’t speak to us in halakhic language, because this does not belong to the halakhic corpus at all. Here, you are supposed to return to being a chooser. That’s the infrastructure from which point onward one can begin talking to you. It seems to me that this is also the reason why Rosh Hashanah comes before the Ten Days of Repentance and Yom Kippur. First of all you are supposed to return to being a chooser. The Day of Judgment—that’s the first stage. To accept the kingship, the yoke of the kingship of the Holy One, blessed be He, means to understand that you are basically being commanded to return to being a creature that is commanded, or capable of being commanded. And now begin repenting in the Ten Days of Repentance and be atoned for on Yom Kippur. There is a process here that comes even before the halakhic process. And therefore, as I said in the first lecture, no additional commandments that you do during the Ten Days of Repentance will help, because that’s not relevant. The process of repentance does not deal with the question of how many commandments and how many sins you have done, but with the question of to what extent you are truly a choosing person. That’s the point. Therefore adding commandments won’t help. Maybe it will be credited to the accounting of next year, but here you need to change your essential direction. And a change of essential direction—that’s what I basically mean by returning to being a chooser. And of course also choosing the good. That is the framework of the discussion. Now I want to get a little more into the meaning of this matter. What does it mean, the value that exists in the process of repentance beyond the result created by it? I’ll give a kind of philosophical introduction—philosophical, mathematical, scientific, I don’t know what to call it. It’s an article I once wrote—you can look at it, maybe I’ll send you on WhatsApp the column I wrote about it, and there are links there to articles as well. I’ll start perhaps with the paradox—Zeno’s paradox of the flying arrow. Zeno was a Greek philosopher, from Elea, who presented several paradoxes in which he challenged the concepts of motion. He claimed that motion is a fictitious concept. It is basically a fiction or a subjective perception of ours. In the world as such there cannot be motion, since the concepts of motion involve paradoxes, and therefore it cannot exist. There is the well-known paradox of Achilles and the tortoise—that one is easy, right, those are the easier ones. The paradox of the flying arrow is harder. And basically the paradox goes like this, in one formulation. Look for a moment: I shoot an arrow. The arrow flies. At every moment it is in a place—take a picture of it, right—it is in a different place. So when does it pass from one place to another? At this moment it stands here, at the next moment it stands here, at the next moment—when does it move? Right? When does it pass from place to place? There is no moment at which it moves, because at every moment you photograph it, it is simply standing in a different place. So when does its motion occur? That’s what Zeno asked. Now the truth is that— I’m looking at the definition of a limit—what?

[Speaker E] The definition of a limit…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What? Because you need to look at a more— you get a point. What is that? Take a point. Without infinity. Look at a point, a point in time. At which point in time does it move?

[Speaker E] It’s not here at all. But it moves all the time.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What? It moves all the time. At every moment you see that it stands in a different place. So when does it pass from here to here? So what? In what way is it not a valid question? Apparently it’s not a valid question.

[Speaker I] In what? Because you looked at time tending to zero.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What does “tending to zero” mean? I’m talking about a point in time. What does “tending to zero” mean? Why isn’t there a point in time?

[Speaker I] A point in time—what’s the problem? Why isn’t there a point in time?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Of course there is.

[Speaker I] Nothing. He is looking at the transition; you need to look at the result.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] T equals pi. What is the time point? Time doesn’t tend toward anything. Why not? Suppose you take a millionth of a second… no, don’t take a millionth of a second, I’m taking a point in time, don’t drag me into a millionth of a second. A point in time, a point. A millionth of a second is infinitely many time points. And on a continuous axis there are also points. Isn’t x equals pi a point? When I really tend there… no, you’re not tending toward anything. At x equals pi, that’s a point; you’re not tending. Do you know the difference between a point and an infinitesimal? An infinitesimal is a segment of dimension one and length zero. A point has dimension zero. It has no length. Its length is not zero; it has no length. And there are mathematicians who wanted to claim that a point also has… there are mathematical models that… but that’s the simple conception. The simple conception is that a point has no length, not that it has length zero. Because length is something that characterizes things of dimension one, and a point’s dimension is zero. Okay, now, the fact that the time axis is continuous, and space too is continuous, that’s true, but there are points of time and of space. There is a point on the x-axis, there is a point on the t-axis. T is time, right? So we can talk about a point in time and a point in space, and therefore I ask: at which point in time is it moving?

Now, there are all kinds of possible ways to try to answer this. I poked around a bit when I wrote the article, and it turned out to me that they haven’t really solved this paradox, in my opinion. Unlike Zeno’s Achilles and the tortoise, which is just a convergent infinite series—but this paradox they haven’t really solved. Usually they solve it somehow—fine, it’s infinitesimal, as you said, with the limit, yes? What infinitesimal—what’s clear? I mean, try to define exactly what, and you’ll see that at most, if you look at it through the spectacles of infinitesimals, then maybe you’ll speak in a language that won’t allow you to present the paradox—but that’s not a solution.

It kind of reminds me of—do you know Principia Mathematica? There’s that work by Russell and Whitehead, a work that apparently nobody ever got through except the authors themselves. It’s three volumes this thick, and it’s just formulas, there’s hardly a word there, only formulas. I once took it on as a challenge; I got about a quarter into the first volume or something like that, and I shattered into pieces. It’s considered a mathematical masterpiece, and in the end it turned out that apparently there’s a fundamental mistake in it; Gödel’s theorem showed that there’s a fundamental mistake in it. But in the introduction—this I did manage to read—there appears there the theory of types, type theory. And what does it say? He tries to solve all the paradoxes of self-reference. Right? The liar paradox. Right? “All Cretans are liars,” whatever, “I am a liar”—that’s self-reference. A paradox that stems from my referring to myself. Okay? Or the barber who shaves all the people who do not shave themselves, the barber of Seville, right? So the question is whether he shaves himself. If he shaves himself, then he belongs to the group of people who are not shaved by him, right? Because he doesn’t shave those who shave themselves, only those who do not shave themselves. And if he doesn’t shave himself, then he belongs to the group that is shaved by him. So yes, no—in short, there is a whole family of such paradoxes whose basis is self-reference, self-reference to oneself.

Okay, now he proposes a solution, Russell and Whitehead. I say “he,” because you know how with physics books by Landau and Lifshitz the legend says there isn’t a single idea there by Lifshitz and not a single word there by Landau. Meaning, all the ideas are Landau’s and Lifshitz was the one who wrote them. I actually met Lifshitz at the Technion; he came to Israel. But there are legends like that also about Russell and Whitehead—I don’t know if it’s true—that the ideas are all Russell’s. In any case, they wrote—let’s say they wrote—in the introduction to the first volume, they proposed a way to solve the problem, the problems of self-reference. They proposed dividing statements in the language into different levels, different types, and the rule is that every statement can refer only to statements that belong to lower types, not to types at its own height, its own level. Now you understand that statements with self-reference cannot appear, because you can’t refer to yourself, because by definition you belong to your own type, right? You can only refer to lower types.

Is such a thing a solution to these paradoxes? In my opinion, obviously not. All you’ve done is create an artificial language in which it is forbidden to formulate the paradox. If you formulate the paradox—it’s illegal, they’ll put you in jail, you spoke incorrectly, not according to the rules. Fine, that’s always Stalin’s technique for solving paradoxes—whoever says them gets his head cut off. That’s not a solution. When you build a language that doesn’t allow a paradox to be formulated, that isn’t solving the paradox; it’s simply ignoring it. You choose not to look at it, or not to present it.

Okay, and in this context too, my feeling is that when people talk about infinitesimals here, what they’re really saying is: I adopt for myself some kind of language in which it is forbidden to formulate Zeno’s sentence, and then I’ve solved the problem. That is not solving the problem. You built a language in which the problem won’t appear. Okay, that’s good for mathematicians, it’s good—we don’t want a language that contains paradoxes—but it can’t really count as a solution to the paradox, because I formulated the paradox in everyday language, it’s perfectly understandable, and there really does seem to be some kind of problem here.

There’s another suggestion I thought about, namely the uncertainty principle in quantum theory. The uncertainty principle basically says that you cannot know the position and velocity of a particle at the same moment simultaneously. Okay? You understand that if so, then there’s no room for the paradox of the flying arrow, because if you know its position then you can’t talk about its velocity, and if you know its velocity, then you can’t talk about its position. So you can’t say that at every single moment you photograph it and it stands in a different place, because if you choose what’s called the position picture—that is, you choose to look at things in terms of their position—then you’ve prevented yourself from talking about their velocities. And vice versa. That is one of the findings of quantum theory.

But once again, I feel that this doesn’t really solve the problem either. It’s like an English-English dictionary. An English-English dictionary takes one word you don’t understand and explains it with ten other words you understand even less. Okay? In other words, you take something I don’t understand and explain it with the uncertainty principle, which itself makes everyone tear out their hair and not understand what anyone wants. So what did we gain? At most, you can say that the same problem that exists in the flying arrow also exists in the uncertainty principle, and if we understand that, maybe we’ll understand this too. Maybe. But that doesn’t solve the problem, okay? Because now I also need to understand the words in the dictionary entry, not just the word it came to explain. And then I really will understand everything, maybe.

So I’ll offer you the following suggestion. Basically, the claim—maybe this is what you meant earlier. Think about how I presented the paradox. I said: I photograph the arrow at a certain moment and I see that it is standing in a certain place. Then I photograph it at another moment; it’s standing in a slightly different place, and so on. And at every moment it is standing in a different place—so the question is, when is it moving? You said: it’s moving all the time. And the claim I want to make here is indeed that it is moving all the time. And Zeno’s formulation is simply wrong in plain Hebrew. Not mathematically, not in any other way—he is simply wrong in Hebrew. The arrow does not stand at every moment in a different place; rather, it is located at every moment in a different place. There is a difference between standing and being located. When you are located somewhere, that does not mean your velocity is zero. It means that is your position. But it is entirely possible that you have some velocity and at every single moment you are located in a different place. You are not standing in the same place because you have velocity. But you are located at every moment in a different place. When are you moving? At that very moment when you are located in that place, you are also moving.

Now, what confuses people? In my view, infinitesimals actually confuse people here. Why? Because in infinitesimal calculus—or in mechanics, because those are the uses of infinitesimals—we are very accustomed to thinking that there is no such thing as a body moving at a point in time. Or having velocity at a point in time. A moving body moves over an interval—if you like, as small as you wish—but you need an interval in order to talk about motion. You cannot talk about motion at a point in time or a point in space. And that is what leads to all the confusion here. And I claim that you can. A body has velocity at a point in time; the body moves at a point in time. What it does not do at a point in time is change place. And we have to be careful not to mix up the term motion with change of place.

My claim is that saying a body is in motion and saying it changes place are not saying the same thing. “It changes place” is a result or consequence of the fact that it is in motion. It is not a translation. It is not the same statement. To say that the body moves and to say that it changes place are not the same statement. “It changes place” is a consequence of the fact that it is in motion. It is not identical with the claim that it is in motion. And there can be situations in which it will be in motion and will not change place. In a moment we’ll talk about that too. But on the conceptual level, that is what I want to claim.

What am I really saying? Think for a moment—when we define in mechanics, first year physics or anything parallel, anyone who studies physics at the beginning of their studies, they talk to him about concepts like velocity. Say I have some body, a body whose position as a function of time—its position as a function of time is, say, like this, okay? This line here. I ask what its velocity is. They tell him: let’s choose two points, drop them onto the axes, and see how much distance it traveled, how much time that took, and the ratio between those two is the velocity. Right?

Now what happens when the graph is not a straight line? Something more complicated. Okay? For that we have infinitesimals. So what do we do in infinitesimal calculus? I say: let’s say I want its velocity here. Okay? So I take two points on both sides, do exactly what I did here, project them down here, project them down there, calculate the velocity. Then I reduce the distance even more, bring them closer, calculate the velocity again. Bring them closer still, calculate the velocity again. The claim is that when I reduce this to zero—if there is some limit, if there isn’t some problematic sharp corner here—if there is an existing limit, that will be the velocity at that point in time.

But how is this usually understood? Usually it is understood—one writes it like this: velocity at a point in time is the derivative of position with respect to time. Never mind, the point is, delta x over delta t as these intervals tend to zero. Tend to zero. Okay? How far you advanced in distance divided by how far you advanced in time, the delta x and delta t, and you take that to zero. Okay? In the limit, when delta x and delta t go to zero, when delta t goes to zero, then we get the velocity at that point in time. But if you ask a physicist, he’ll tell you that this is a fiction. Meaning, “the velocity at a point in time” means: what is its velocity in a small interval around the point. We call it velocity at a point in time, but really we mean what its velocity is in a very, very small interval around the point. Okay, that is what we really mean. In language we say this is velocity at a point in time.

Therefore the claim that this function, that is, V as a function of T, velocity as a function of time, is basically interpreted as: what will its velocity be around each such and such point in time—but it is always over an interval. A small interval around that point in time, or around another point in time. But then, in principle, this function can give a different value for every point in time. Every point in time will get a different value. That is very strange, because if this speaks about a very small interval around the point, then I would expect that around the point it would have the same value, right? Arbitrarily close to the point, it would give exactly the same value. I’m speaking here in plain, nontechnical language—my apologies to anyone sensitive to precision in infinitesimal calculus. But never mind; the principle is what matters, I only want to explain the principle.

I want to claim something else. I want to claim that velocity exists at a point in time. And the definition I gave here, delta x over delta t when delta t goes to zero, is an operational definition, not an essential one. It is a definition of how you calculate velocity; it is not a definition of the concept of velocity. The concept of velocity exists at a point in time, not only over an interval. How do you calculate it? So I go to a small interval around that point, check the distance divided by the time, and take the interval to the limit where its length is zero, and I get the result. But that is the way to calculate velocity. The concept of velocity itself exists at a point, not in a small interval around the point—in a point. And what is its meaning?

After all, it’s obvious that I can’t be in two places at the same point in time, if we’re talking about a point-particle right now, yes? I can’t be in two places at the same point in time. So what does it mean that it has velocity? The claim is that change of place cannot happen at the same point in time. Meaning, to move from place to place in zero time—not time tending to zero, but zero time, at a point in time—cannot happen. By the way, that’s a logical contradiction, not… moving very fast, at a speed beyond the speed of light, that is a physical limitation. Meaning, you can’t move faster than the speed of light. But to be in two spatial points at the same time point is not a physical limitation; it’s a logical contradiction. Meaning, if you are here, you cannot be there. It’s not a problem of transition speed; you are in two places at the same point in time. There is no speed here at all; it is simply being in two places. That is a logical contradiction. It cannot be. Therefore there is no such thing as a change of place at a point in time. But there is such a thing as velocity at a point in time.

How can that be? Because velocity is the potential for change of place. And it is wrong to identify velocity with change of place. When I want to calculate velocity, I look at changes of place, the rate of change of place, and that is how I calculate velocity. But that is a computational definition—how one calculates velocity. The concept of velocity itself is defined also at a point. We observe change of place if we wait for some interval of time, and then if the body has velocity we will see that it also changes place. But change of place of course requires an interval, and change of place will not happen at a point. But velocity can exist at a single point.

I once thought of an example for this, although they don’t really teach it this way, at least not in physics—I need to think whether this really works—but you know the Doppler effect, how they measure the speed of a car? Right? Once radar devices were built this way; maybe today too, I don’t know. So you send an electromagnetic beam toward the car, the beam comes back with a frequency slightly different from the frequency at which it went out. The difference between the frequencies is proportional to the velocity of the car, and you do the calculation and that’s how you find the velocity of the car. Now here, if you think about it, I measure the velocity of the car by touching it at a point. I hit it at a point in time, it returns, and I know the velocity of the car. It’s not like what I described here, where you have to look at an interval, see where it was before, where it is afterward, and divide by the time that took. So that is seemingly a direct measurement of velocity, not through calculation by way of change of place. So maybe that illustrates—though I’m not sure it’s exact, as I said—but it illustrates this concept I’m talking about, of velocity at a point in time and not over an interval. Okay? It looks at velocity as something not calculated through differences in place divided by differences in time, but something that can exist even at a single, discrete point in time.

Now what is this really saying? It says that the velocity of the body does not mean that it changes place; rather, if it has velocity, that is its potential to change place. How does that potential move from potentiality to actuality? If we wait a little time. If now you track the body for a little time—no matter how small a time you wish—you’ll see that it changes place. That is an indication that at every point in time along that interval it had velocity. At a point. Change of place exists over an interval, but velocity exists at a point. And what I’m basically claiming in order to solve Zeno’s problem is that he asked: when is the body moving? The answer is: it is moving at that very point in time at which you measure it when it is standing. Without infinitesimals and without anything. It has velocity at that point in time where it is located in the place at which you are looking, because it is not standing at that point, it is located at that point and it has velocity. Therefore there is no problem. You don’t need to arrive at any infinitesimals or anything; you simply need to distinguish between being located and standing, and that is a simple distinction in Hebrew. Okay? In my opinion, infinitesimals actually confuse matters in the context of Zeno’s paradox and do not help solve it—quite the opposite.

It may be that from this one can perhaps also understand a bit what the meaning of infinitesimal calculus is, maybe from this also understand the uncertainty principle. In the article I proposed an explanation of the uncertainty principle along these lines. I claimed that one can understand—or at least the complementary principle between position and velocity can be understood through this model. Basically, when you look at a body, the way Zeno looked at it and the way we all look at it, we are basically equipped with a camera. Our eyes are a kind of camera. And this camera sees the body each time fixed, as located in another place. The fact that the body moves is an interpolation we perform. We see that it was here, then we see that it’s here, then we see that it’s here, so from our point of view we see it moving. But really—think about it—that’s how movies are made too, right? How are movies made? You photograph static images one after another at a very, very high frequency, and to the eye it looks as though there is motion here, but really it is a collection of static images photographed at a very high frequency, photographed and projected at a very high frequency. We do not see motion; we see position. That is all we see. Motion is an interpolation our brain performs as a result of viewing the sequence of positions. We simply see one image and then another image and then another image, and in our brain some picture is formed of continuous motion. That is the perspective of a camera.

Let’s try to imagine an alien creature, okay? Unknown to us. A creature whose visual sense is based on an ideal camcorder, not an ideal camera. An ideal camera is a camera whose exposure time is zero. A point in time. Its exposure time is a point. Okay? A fictional thing, but I call it an ideal camera, okay? What is an ideal camcorder? An ideal camcorder is a camcorder that captures the velocity of a body at a point, not by seeing that it changed place and making the calculation and the derivative and basically making the interpolation and reaching the conclusion that it is moving. On the contrary, we see the motion itself, we see the velocity at a point in time. Such a creature would not see place. It would see only velocities. It’s a different type of sensing; we can’t really imagine it, a different type. These are simply two quantities that do not speak to one another. So you can—we basically use a camera, take a derivative, and infer that there is velocity. That creature uses an ideal camcorder, and it would do an integral in order to reach the conclusion that there is place—it is the opposite of what we do. Okay? A different creature, never mind, a fictional creature.

The first perspective is the perspective of a camera, which talks about positions, and velocity is calculated by differences between positions because we have no direct access to velocity; we have access to positions. That other creature, the fictional one, has direct access to velocity. It does not know what position is. Position for it is an integral of velocity. It does not see positions; it sees velocities. In quantum theory, by the way—for those who studied it, never mind, I’ll say it—in quantum theory one studies the uncertainty principle; it is presented within a conceptual framework called the momentum picture and the position picture. These are two different pictures through which one can look at the world. In one of them everything depends on positions, everything is a function of positions. In the other, everything is a function of velocities, of momentum—velocity, never mind. Okay? Each of these pictures is orthogonal to the other. Meaning, they do not speak to each other. If you are in the momentum picture, you have no clue about position. If you are in the position picture, you have no clue about momentum.

The interpretation I presented in that article is that an ideal camcorder and an ideal camera are two forms of perception, one of which gives me the position picture and the other the momentum picture. And if one looks at it this way, then the uncertainty principle is a natural consequence of the concepts themselves. In classical physics I could have reached this conclusion—that there is an uncertainty principle. You don’t need quantum theory for this. I wouldn’t have produced h-bar, for those who understand, but I would have known that you can’t simultaneously know position and velocity. It simply cannot be. And the problem is due to the fact that you are trying to approximate a point by an arbitrarily small interval, as though an infinitesimal is basically the point in your world-picture. But no: in the world-picture of the ideal camera, of the ideal camcorder, the point exists there. It is not some limit of an infinitesimal. It speaks about points; the infinitesimal is an integral over points. Okay? So I hope this came out clear even for those unfamiliar with these concepts. At the professional level I don’t care right now; I only want the idea to be understood.

The claim, in the end, is that when a body has velocity, the velocity exists at every point. The consequence of that is the fact that it changes place. The consequence. It is not equivalent, not the same thing; one is the cause and the other is the effect. Velocity is the potential for change of place, and velocity is not change of place—it is not. For example, I’ll give you an example—and again, in plain, nontechnical language; physicists would be very upset that I present it this way. You take a body and throw it at a wall. So it comes at high speed to the wall, but the wall does not let it continue onward. What does that mean? That it basically has a potential for change of place, but that potential does not manage to move from potentiality to actuality. It has velocity, which is a potential for change of place; it does not succeed in changing place in the direction that the potential wants. So it will come out in another way, through heat or other conversions, okay? But that is an indication of the fact that velocity and change of place are not the same thing.

Physicists, if you ask them, will tell you that when the body hits the wall its velocity is zero. It doesn’t hit the wall at a certain velocity and yet stop anyway, because there once again we are talking about an infinitesimal, not a point. But I claim that is not correct. It hits the wall at a certain velocity and the wall does not let it bring that potential into actuality, does not let it change place. So it will emerge in another form. And that is an indication that velocity and change of place are not the same thing. Velocity is the potential to change place, but velocity is not change of place. Okay, that is basically the claim.

Now what do I want to infer from here? I want to claim that very often when we look at some process, what we see in that process is nothing more than a change of states. A process of repentance—let’s look at a process of repentance. I was wicked, and now I’m more righteous, and more righteous still, until maybe I become completely righteous, okay? So from the camera’s perspective, all I see is successive spiritual levels, right? He is at a low spiritual level, then higher, then higher, then higher, until he reaches perhaps the highest spiritual level if he succeeds in completing that process. In this perspective there is no such thing as repentance. Repentance is an interpolation. All there is is movement between spiritual levels. There is no dynamic, no process; there is movement between spiritual levels.

But it is clear to us that such a transition does not just happen on its own; it just happens. We talked about weakness of will: does the Holy One, blessed be He, do repentance for me, or do I do repentance? And this process, this transition between levels, happens because I am in some sort of process. But in the eyes of a camera you cannot see a penitent. You can see a person at such-and-such a spiritual level, at such-and-such a spiritual level, such-and-such and such-and-such or such-and-such. How can you see a penitent? Only if you look at him with an ideal camcorder. And this person is a penitent even at a certain point in this process. He is a penitent. How will you see that he is a penitent? Because if you wait a moment, you will see that in another moment he will be at a higher spiritual level. But that you will see in the next moment. Now this difference affects our perception of these two things. Because you can look at this process as a process that is basically a systematic transition between different spiritual levels—that is from the perspective of the camera. And you can look at this process with an ideal camcorder, and then I don’t see spiritual levels at all—I’m not interested in spiritual levels. What I see is that the person is in a process. He has velocity. At every point in time he is moving, he is in motion.

Okay? When I say that a person’s movement has value, I am basically claiming that in the transition between spiritual levels there is significance also to the very fact of being in transition, not only to being at the higher spiritual level. A person who has velocity—even if, say, he is also under a wall, he won’t be able to move forward, he won’t reach the higher spiritual level—but if he is in a process, he is a penitent. And he won’t reach the higher spiritual level. But he is a penitent. And his being a penitent has value. That value is measured through the very fact that he is a penitent, not through the fact that repentance leads him to become more righteous. There is value to the very fact that he has velocity, not to the fact that he changes positions because of that velocity. Okay?

Even if he’s going backward? Yes, because still, I’m saying, he chooses, he is in a process; there will be a claim against him—why are you going backward? Just as someone who chooses evil as opposed to someone who chooses good. So he chooses, he chooses evil. Okay?

You know, often they say, for example, in management—you know that every three letters are a management method. Pick any three letters from the ABC, every set of three is a management method. It’s one of the known facts. So never mind, but there are many such management methods that say that the dynamism of a company, of a factory, has value in itself. Usually companies are in a dynamism that looks for how they can improve the situation more. Meaning, the current situation is such-and-such, there are certain problems, I can optimize them, so I can make some change that will let me work more efficiently. What happens if I can make a change in such a way that its output will not be more efficient? It will be different, the same overall, but it won’t change things. Say one link—suppose I have a chain of ten links in the production line, I improve link two but at the expense of link eight, okay? So overall I haven’t improved the process. There is a claim that there is something in dynamism that helps a company. The dynamism itself. The dynamism is not a tool for reaching higher efficiency, better achievements; rather, there is something in movement itself, in the very fact of being in motion, that also has value.

Of course in the end, from the factory owner’s point of view, even that value is measured in money. But in the end people will feel better, more refreshed, more open-minded; that too will probably bring him more income. But I’m saying that the change as such is a result. In the end, what matters is that they were in motion, not that the motion led the factory to a better state, but the very fact that they moved—that itself has significance.

Now this cannot be understood if you understand motion only as transition between states. If you understand motion only as transition between states, then there is no significance at all to your being in motion. You are in one state, then afterward in another state, and if they are equivalent, what did you accomplish? Okay? When you speak about the value of your very being in motion, you are basically saying: I recognize the existence of the concept of motion beyond the fact that it moves me from one place to another, namely the very fact that I have velocity.

And I think that is the meaning of “the penitent is preferable to the completely righteous person.” The penitent is not merely moving from this level to a higher level. If that were all, then he would be on the level of those who are already there. But if I say that the very fact of his being in motion is itself an added value, itself a spiritual advantage, then that means that a penitent is by definition preferable to a completely righteous person. You don’t need all the cute explanations of why yes and why no. It is simply because he has a certain wholeness that the completely righteous person does not have. What is that wholeness? That wholeness is the becoming-whole, yes—the fact that he is in motion toward wholeness. To be in motion toward wholeness is itself one of the forms of wholeness.

And for anyone to whom these last concepts sound familiar—right, this is Rabbi Kook in Orot HaKodesh, part 2. Wholeness and becoming-whole. Exactly. He speaks about wholeness and becoming-whole, and he says this:

“The slowness in the order of reality, the limitation in nature, the external laxity of the constriction within spiritual ascents, the temporariness of miracles—all these uphold the foundation of unceasing elevation, which is the inner foundation of reality, whose boundary lies in its boundedness, so that the descent of the revelation of worldly reality down to its lowest depth and its darkest darkness may suffice for an eternal ascent without any doubt. And in every slow period there is a preparation of power for a faster period”—yes, every standing still is an accumulation of energy for the next movement—“until the highest speed, worlds shall lead us, maidens in quickness, as in ‘the maidservant hurried’; running and returning like the appearance of lightning. And never will the phenomenon of elevation cease, and the additions of light, delight, and life go on growing fragrant and becoming ever more filled with higher and more exalted value, until the form of complete perfection and the form of unceasing becoming-perfect, which comes because of the prior deficiency, become equal together. And the becoming-perfect, whose whole basis lies in the fact that you were lacking, itself, in essence, turns into perfection—the very fact that you are becoming-perfect, that you move toward complete perfection. And the memory of past deficiency will suffice to provide a constant push toward ever-increasing becoming-perfect. And the form of unceasing becoming-perfect will rise above complete perfection.”

That is “the penitent is preferable to the completely righteous person.” Unceasing becoming-perfect rises above complete perfection. Why? Because you have the dimension that you also were becoming-perfect, not only that you reached the state of complete perfection. “A woman of valor is the crown of her husband,” and “the righteous sit with their crowns on their heads,” and so on.

Further on there: “The aim of all being, from the side of the hidden will, the hidden infinite will, as it is revealed to us, is a great counsel of elevation and eternal addition. For if there were no reality of smallness and deficiency, there could only be greatness and fullness, but not constant growth and perpetual treading onward and added blessing.” Yes, if reality were perfect, then it could not become perfect, right? It could not become more perfect. “And even though there is no end to the exaltation of full perfection, which because of its infinity has no exaltation from one level to another, still, included within it also is this sublime power of perpetual ascent. And this is considered as though absolute perfection becomes perfected through the becoming-perfect that comes by way of the appearance of smallness that comes into greatness, and this service is a high need.”

What is he basically saying? He says: the Holy One, blessed be He, is perfect. A perfect being cannot become perfected, because it cannot become more perfect, right? If so, that means one of the perfections is lacking in the Holy One, blessed be He: the ability to become perfected, his being in motion—that cannot exist. So there is a problem here. So he says: perfect perfection, the Holy One, blessed be He, becomes perfected through our becoming-perfect. That is, a deficient world was created—us. Why? Because only a deficient world can become perfected, and the creation of the deficient world that keeps becoming perfected completes the Holy One, blessed be He, who is perfect. And because He is perfect, He cannot become perfected; in order for Him also to have that perfection, He basically created us, and our becoming-perfect completes Him. And that is what he calls “this service is a high need.” In the literature of the medieval authorities (Rishonim) and the kabbalists this is called “the secret of service as a high need.” What does that mean? The Holy One, blessed be He, needs us. Without us there is something He could not do; He is not all-powerful. A perfect being has things it cannot do. It cannot become perfected. The very fact that it is perfect makes it limited in that sense—that it cannot become perfected. And for that He needs us.

Therefore, contrary to how we are usually educated—that the Holy One, blessed be He, does not need us, only we need Him—Rabbi Kook says no, that is not true, and this is the secret of service as a high need. Our service is the need of the Holy One, blessed be He; He needs us. Without us He could not have done this.

Look, for example, at the end of the book of Jonah, which we read on Yom Kippur. The end of the book of Jonah—what is the book of Jonah? The book of Jonah basically deals with an argument about what to do with penitents. The Holy One, blessed be He, sends Jonah to Nineveh and says to him: go bring them to repentance. A sinful city and so on; bring them to repentance so that I will not destroy them. Jonah ideologically disagrees; he has an ideological dispute with the Holy One, blessed be He. Right, “they asked Wisdom: what is the punishment of the sinner?” Right? So that is what Jonah says. If they sinned, let them get hit. What do you mean? Why bring them to repentance? And the Holy One, blessed be He, puts him through the fish and… and the Holy One, blessed be He, puts him through the great fish and the ship and all those messes, and in the end he gets to the gourd, right? There by Nineveh, with the gourd. Then the Holy One, blessed be He, brings a fierce east wind all night, the gourd dies, Jonah asks to die, and then the Holy One, blessed be He, says to him: “Are you so greatly grieved over the gourd?” He said: “I am greatly grieved, unto death.” “And you had pity on the gourd, for which you did not labor and did not grow, and I should not have pity on Nineveh the great city?” Right? With much cattle and so on.

What kind of a fortiori argument is that? It is a completely absurd a fortiori argument. Jonah had pity on the gourd? He had pity on himself. A fisherman loves fish, right? So why does he catch them if he loves fish? He loves himself. Did Jonah have pity on the gourd? He did not pity the gourd; he pitied himself. He needed the shade of the gourd. So what kind of a fortiori argument is the Holy One, blessed be He, making to him: “You had pity on the gourd, for which you did not labor and did not grow, and I should not have pity on Nineveh the great city”?

There are two possible answers. One possibility is to free ourselves from our criminal mindset. The fact that Jonah had an interest does not mean he acted out of self-interest. It could be that he needed the shade but also pitied the gourd; he really did pity the gourd. Besides the fact that he also needed it. The fact that he had an interest does not automatically mean he acted because of the interest. Okay? Apropos of Haidt. Very often, especially in political interpretation, we have this tendency: the moment we discover that a politician did something that fits his interest, automatically he is wicked. It could be that he did something that fits his interest, but he also thought it was the right thing to do. That’s also possible. In principle, that can be true, right? We have this kind of criminal mindset that says: the moment we found an interest, we found a villain. But no. It could be that someone had an interest, but that is also what he thinks is right to do. By the way, in politics that is often the case, because in politics why do you have an interest? Because it will strengthen your party. Why will it strengthen your party? Because that is what your party actually thinks is the right thing to do. It is not an accident that it works out that way. That is your ideology. Agree or disagree, it doesn’t matter, argue about it—but you act in that direction because you really think it is right. So it is not necessarily—in politics especially—it almost compels us to reexamine this correlation we always make between interest and wickedness. Fine. And for our purposes, that is one direction. Just a lesson worth adopting.

The second direction is the opposite. Right, the criminal mindset is correct: Jonah acted out of self-interest. The Holy One, blessed be He, also acts out of self-interest. When He has pity on Nineveh, “pity” in the sense of—He needs Nineveh. He does not pity Nineveh. Just as Jonah did not pity the gourd but himself, so too the Holy One, blessed be He, does not pity Nineveh but Himself. Why did He create Nineveh? Apparently He needed it for something, right? Why did He create it? He wants it to exist. So now you tell Him: look, they sinned, destroy them, what do you need them for. You’re telling Me what I need? I created them apparently because I need them. What do you mean, destroy them? I need human beings, I need the world; that’s why I created it. So just as you had pity on the gourd—“pity” in terms of the criminal mindset—apply your criminal mindset to Me too. I have pity on Nineveh because I need it. Exactly like you. Both possibilities exist as explanations of that a fortiori argument.

For our purposes, what Rabbi Kook says here is exactly what is called “Give strength to God.” What does “Give strength to God” mean? It means that what we do gives strength to God. It completes God. Something that He cannot do Himself, He receives from us the power to do. And what is that? So Rabbi Kook offers a beautiful explanation here. He says there is something the Holy One, blessed be He, cannot do: become perfected. And that is what—for that He needs us, because only we can give Him strength, we can give Him that perfection which He Himself cannot possess by virtue of His own nature.

But all this is still not enough. Let’s continue for a moment. “What do we think regarding the matter of the divine purpose in bringing being into existence?” Why was reality created? “We say that absolute perfection is a necessary existence, and there is nothing in it in potential, because everything is actual. But there is a perfection of adding perfection, and that cannot exist in divinity, for absolute infinite perfection leaves no room for addition. And for this purpose—that this addition of perfection too should not be lacking in being—becoming-perfect, the worldly being must come into existence and therefore begin from the lowest possible bottom, that is, from a state of absolute deficiency, in order that it may always keep going and ascending toward absolute elevation. And being was created in such a quality that the step will never cease from ascending, for that is an infinite action. And in order to guarantee the ascent in the essence of being, the whole was created in supreme exaltation, and that exaltation was greater than the measure that limited content could actually contain.”

Complete perfection is infinite, and therefore we will never actually reach it. We will always be in a situation of progressing toward it. And that is what the Holy One, blessed be He, wants. He does not want us to get there; He wants us constantly to strive there, not to get there, because our essential role is not at all to be righteous. The purpose of creation is that there be penitents, not that there be righteous people. Penitents are not something post factum. Penitents are what we were created for. Because the Holy One, blessed be He, cannot repent. He never sinned. He cannot become perfected if He is perfect. And He created the world so that we would sin and repent, if I return to “we will sin and repent.” For that. If there were a completely righteous person, the world would be unnecessary. For completely righteous people, there is no need for the world. Therefore a completely righteous person is a utopian concept; there is no such animal. Because if there were such a thing, it simply would not have been created. It would be unnecessary. Okay? But it is a typological description of a certain type that helps us analyze ourselves. Okay? We strive toward it, and it is a limit—we will never get there. Okay? And why? Because our purpose is always to keep rising and rising and becoming-perfect, because we constantly need to fuel the Holy One, blessed be He—yes, to complete that which in the Holy One, blessed be He, cannot be carried out by His own power.

Yes, repentance was created even before the world was created. Exactly. Because that is the plan for which the world was created. The world was created for repentance. This is not midrash; the argument here is not midrash. This is the plain simple meaning. In other words, the world was created because it is deficient, not despite its being deficient—because it is deficient. Okay? “Truth was cast to the ground,” right? “Truth was cast to the ground” says: forget it, I’m not looking for truth, I’m looking for striving for truth. That’s why the world was created even though Truth objected. Okay?

“Therefore in the appearance of being in actuality, things were corrupted and powers became entangled with one another, and they engage in fierce struggle until the absolute infinite thought of the good will triumph and everything will be rectified,” and so on. “And together with the elevation of giving place to the completion of an unceasing ascent, which is a special delight through which creation completes the honor of its Creator, we understand in absolute divine perfection two values of perfection. One value of perfection, by virtue of whose greatness and completion no addition of elevation applies to it”—the level of absolute perfection. “But if there were no possibility of addition, that itself would be a deficiency, because perfection that keeps on increasing always has an advantage and delight and a certain exaltation that we long for so much, a going ‘from strength to strength.’ Therefore divine perfection cannot be lacking this advantage of the addition of power.” It cannot be that the Holy One, blessed be He, lacks this very fundamental perfection. “And for this there is in divinity the capacity for creation, the unbounded worldly becoming, which rises in all its values. It turns out that the divine self-soul within being, which gives it life, is its constant elevation, which is its divine foundation and calls all beings to become more perfected,” and so on. Okay?

Now let’s think for a moment—there is another important point here that is very easy to miss. The Holy One, blessed be He, is basically saying—and this starts from the fact that it alludes to the Ari. The Ari talks about the fact that creation was created in order to bring the powers of the Holy One, blessed be He, from potentiality to actuality; that too he writes here. Now what does that mean? I also want to bring becoming-perfect from potentiality to actuality, and therefore I created deficient creation.

There is a point here that people miss when they read this in the simple way. When creation becomes perfected, why is that called completing the Holy One, blessed be He? What do you mean? We become perfected—what does that have to do with Him? He created us deficient, we become perfected, all good—but how does that relate to Him? Why does that complete Him? Are we Him? We come back once again to what I discussed in the previous segments: “Bring us back in complete repentance before You”—the question whether there is identity between us and Him, or whether we stand opposite Him, and I said that it is probably something in the middle; otherwise it is hard to understand how we do repentance.

So here too, if we were created deficient and we become perfected, fine, I understand that we become perfected—but how does that complete the Holy One, blessed be He? What has that got to do with Him? The answer—and this is what he says, and it connects to what he also brings in the name of the Ari—is that the potential to become perfected exists in Him too. Actual becoming-perfect cannot be in Him because He is perfect. Remember the body with velocity that hits the wall? It has velocity, it has the potential for change of place, but it hits a wall and the wall does not allow this to move from potentiality to actuality, does not allow place to change, right? Does that mean the body has no velocity? No, it has velocity. It has the potential for change of place. It’s just that something external stops it and does not let it move from potentiality to actuality.

The Holy One, blessed be He, has the potential of becoming-perfect; He has velocity. The fact that He is perfect means that, as it were, a wall stands before Him; He cannot move onward. There is nowhere for Him to move on to. It’s not a wall; there simply is nowhere. Okay? So what is to be done? The potential for becoming-perfect that is within Him must move from potentiality to actuality through us. The potential is in Him. It is not that our becoming-perfect completes Him; our becoming-perfect is the actualization of the potential for becoming-perfect that is in Him. The potential is in Him. It is not that our becoming-perfect completes Him. Our becoming-perfect is the actualization of the potential for becoming-perfect that is in Him.

And again, “Bring us back in complete repentance before You”—what does that mean? That the potential for becoming-perfect is in Him, but we do the repentance. How? I don’t understand—if we do it, then it’s us; if He does it, then what value does it have? Then He’s doing it. Again I return to that same vague point that I already said is vague: something of His potential is actualized in us. There is some connection between Him and us. We are not identical, but neither are we completely separate. There is something—these two models probably do not capture reality fully. And it simply comes back to us from another direction.

And the point is that the becoming-perfect of this thing is its moving from potentiality to actuality. That is the becoming-perfect. The moving of becoming-perfect itself from potentiality to actuality is basically turning velocity into change of place. Now since the Holy One, blessed be He, Himself cannot actualize His own potential by way of change of place, by way of improving, He created other creatures or another world in which it can indeed be realized, move into actuality. As we said about that body which hits the wall and the wall does not let it move forward, then it comes out as heat. It comes out in some other way, and the potential exists there and in some way comes out. If you cannot bring it out in the form of change of place, it will emerge otherwise. So in our case it emerges through us. In the Holy One, blessed be He, it cannot move from potentiality to actuality. That is basically the claim.

And if that is so, then repentance is not only not post factum but a priori. Not only a solution for someone who sinned, but there is something in this mechanism—that we sin because we are deficient and we try to become perfected—which is itself the purpose of creation. It is not an artifact, not a result, not a bug produced by some problem nobody thought about. It is the source. That is what the whole plan is for.

And therefore it is also clear why there needs to be a commandment of repentance according to Maimonides, or the idea of repentance according to Maimonides, and the Meshekh Chokhmah is not correct. The purpose is not to go back and do commandments or to avoid transgressions. The purpose is to move from the state of someone who commits transgressions to the state of someone who does not. The transition itself is what matters. Not committing transgressions and indeed doing commandments—the commandments themselves take care of that, that is what will happen there, we were told what we need to do. But the obligation or value in being in a process of becoming-perfect—for that repentance is responsible. And if repentance had not been written in the Torah, then we would not know that this too has value, and this is where all the value is. This is the whole story.

The point is not at all to be righteous. The purpose of our being wicked is not so that we return to being righteous, but so that we be in motion toward righteousness. The motion is the goal, not righteousness at all. If right now I could somehow have someone hypnotize me so that I would never commit transgressions and would always do commandments and be meticulous about every minor and major one all my life—am I supposed to do that? I think not. Even though apparently that would bring me to an optimal state—what’s bad about that? Because if that were right, then the Holy One, blessed be He, would have created us that way, without free choice, and we’d all be perfect machines. Why would He not just do it Himself? Why create us at all? This whole story—it’s not written anywhere in Jewish law that one may not, but I think we all intuitively feel that it is not right to do that. It is not right to go to a hypnotist who would do that for us.

Why not? What is the problem, really? That is the best repentance possible. Thus “He who knows hidden things will testify concerning him that he will never return to this sin again.” Wonderful—go get hypnosis. No. The whole story is the progress toward the matter. The work and progress toward it—that is the whole story. The purpose is not to end up righteous; for that you could reach it optimally through hypnosis. The righteousness at the end is a model toward which you strive. Not for nothing do we also never actually succeed in reaching it, and we always fall. “He who knows hidden things will testify concerning us that we will never return,” and yet we do return.

A kind of “according to the pain is the reward”? Yes, but “according to the pain is the reward” not in the sense that because you exerted yourself you deserve some extra prize. Rather, the effort is the value. It is the value. Meaning, it is more than we usually understand it as in argumentative terms, just as there are arguments for punishment and arguments for reward. If I also exerted myself, then I deserve more reward. No—the reward is mainly for the effort. Not only for the act, with the effort merely upgrading the reward. The reward is for the effort itself. That is the reward. That is why we are here.

And therefore, the fact that one falls and rises again and so on—there is no need to panic about that. We are human beings; this is how we were created, this is how we were born, and this is what we are. What is needed is to try, to make an effort. And if we fall, then we fall, and we’ll try again. And this effort again and again is not like some military harassment—filling a barrel with a teaspoon, with a teaspoon of water to fill a barrel—which was the kind of military harassment common in our regions. It’s this feeling that you’re doing nothing, it’s Sisyphus, the myth of Sisyphus, where you keep repeating the same thing without getting anywhere. The repetition itself is progress. It doesn’t matter that we are repeating the same thing. It matters—we should try not to—but we should try not to because the trying is what matters, not so that in the end there really won’t be a “not,” but because the trying is our goal.

Maybe I’ll finish with one remark. The Leshem writes in several places—he brings a certain midrash, Midrash Tanchuma, parashat Vayeshev. And there too, repentance and so on. He is in a process; he simply took the reins in hand. “And Joseph was brought down to Egypt.” “This is what Scripture says: ‘Come, behold the works of God, terrible in His dealings with human beings.’ Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korcha said: even the terrible things that You bring upon us, You bring upon us by pretext. Come and see: when the Holy One, blessed be He, created the world, on the first day He created the Angel of Death.” Right from the start, even before Adam sinned and death was decreed upon him, He already created the Angel of Death. How do we know? Rabbi Berekhiah said: because it is said, “and darkness was upon the face of the deep”—this is the Angel of Death, who darkens the faces of creatures. And Adam was created on the sixth day. The Angel of Death was already created on the first day. How can that be? And we thought that death was a decree upon man because of the sin. “And a pretext was hung on him, that he brought death into the world, as it says, ‘for on the day that you eat from it, you shall surely die.’”

“To what is this comparable? To someone who wished to divorce his wife. When he wished to go to his house, he wrote a bill of divorce, entered his house with the purse in his hand and the bill of divorce in his hand. He was seeking a pretext to give it to her. He said to her: pour me a cup to drink. She poured it for him. As soon as she gave him the cup, he said to her: here is your bill of divorce. She said to him: what is my crime? He said to her: leave my house, because you poured me a lukewarm cup. She said to him: you already knew that I was destined to pour you a lukewarm cup, since you wrote the bill of divorce and brought it in your hand. The bill of divorce was already in your pocket, so what are you telling me, that you took it out because I gave you a lukewarm cup?”

“So too Adam said before the Holy One, blessed be He: Master of the Universe, before You created Your world, for two thousand years the Torah was with You as a cherished one, as it is written, ‘Then I was by Him as a nursling, and I was daily His delight’—two thousand years. And it is written in it: ‘This is the Torah: when a man dies in a tent.’ This was written in the Torah two thousand years before the world was created. Had You not prepared death for creatures, would You have written this there? Rather, You came to hang the pretext on me—thus, ‘terrible in His dealings with human beings.’” And similarly you find that the Holy One, blessed be He, said to Moses, and so on.

This is the conduct of “terrible in His dealings.” What does that mean? Basically the whole game is rigged. This sin—You caused me to sin, Adam says to the Holy One, blessed be He. And the proof? Suddenly You tell me that You decreed death upon me, but in the Torah that preceded the world by two thousand years it is already written that man will die. So what are You telling me, that because of me You suddenly brought death into the world?

Usually people understand from here some sort of deterministic view, that basically even our sins are a result of the Holy One, blessed be He, and the Holy One, blessed be He, is responsible for everything that happens here. To me that is absolutely unacceptable; clearly it is not true. I think what is written here is this idea—the idea that the world was created for sin. You committed the sin and death was decreed upon you, that is true, but from the outset the program of the world was to create imperfect human beings, deficient ones, who would sin, and as a result death would be decreed or some sort of spiritual decline would be decreed, in order that it could be repaired and perfected. That was in the plan from the start. It does not mean Adam sinned because the Holy One, blessed be He, caused him to sin. The Holy One, blessed be He, caused him to be deficient. Now by your own powers, now you failed. You failed because you were deficient. Human beings will always fail because they are always deficient. But we still have responsibility because we could also have chosen otherwise.

In broad terms, of course we will sin, because this whole world was created so that we would sin. And this is the conduct of “terrible in His dealings.” The conduct of “terrible in His dealings” means that the Holy One, blessed be He, comes to us with complaints about sins, but in the end we can say to Him: listen, You created us as beings prone to sin. Why is it, by chance, that all people sin? Everyone, it happens to everyone without exception. So don’t tell me that You suddenly come to me with complaints that I was not okay because I sinned. For every single sin there is responsibility, but in practice, clearly, from the perspective of the law of large numbers, there will obviously be sins. Every person will sin. He was created deficient. And why? Because that was the plan from the start: to create a deficient human being so that he could become perfected, and in this sense the concept of repentance preceded the world, because the whole world was created for this work of spiritual progress, for repentance. That is what the world was created for. Okay? So that we would complete the Holy One, blessed be He, bring His potential of becoming-perfect from potentiality to actuality.

All right, so we have some small comfort as Yom Kippur approaches. May all of us be finally inscribed and sealed for good.

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