Israel Is Not a Jewish State — It Is a State of Jews, and Why Believe in God — Rabbi Dr. Michael Abraham – Da’at – Beliefs and Opinions
This transcript was produced automatically using artificial intelligence. There may be inaccuracies in the transcribed content and in speaker identification.
🔗 Link to the original lecture
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Table of Contents
- [0:00] Traditionalism as a criminal ideology and the need to separate religion
- [1:30] Why is belief required? The question of the need for faith
- [5:15] Religion as opium: Marx and the connection to beliefs
- [7:12] The book “The First Existent” — four proofs and the connection to Torah
- [8:23] The difference between philosophy and metaphysics and a historical proof
- [10:10] Bertrand Russell’s parable and the teapot
- [11:12] Doubt about the existence of a divine teapot
- [18:09] The providence discussion: a metaphor of parents and children
- [24:20] The only Jewish thing — Jewish law with no additions
- [26:32] Defining Judaism by genus and species — the structure of the definition
- [28:01] Morality does not derive from Jewish law — there is no Jewish morality
- [29:31] Halakhic obligation and the connection to social and state life
- [30:50] Defining conservatism in religious and secular terms
- [32:15] Opposition to abortion — a moral, non-halakhic consideration
- [34:04] Democratic values versus religious attachment — no coercion
- [36:49] Separation of religion and state — beneficial to Judaism
- [38:55] The connection between the Shas party and the traditionalist condition
- [41:59] The law you would repeal — personal status according to Jewish law
Summary
General Overview
The speaker opens with the assertion that traditionalism as an ideology is a criminal ideology and worse than atheism, and supports separating religion from the state on the grounds that religious monopolies bring corruption and cause a desecration of God’s name. The conversation with Rabbi Michael Abraham presents belief in God as a position that does not stem from psychological need but from a claim about truth and existence, while distinguishing between philosophical proofs for God’s existence and the move to theism through historical-traditional claims. Abraham argues that today there is no overt divine involvement, nor even hidden involvement in the accepted sense; he sees the world as operating naturally, attributes historical evil such as the Holocaust to human beings and not to God, and defines Judaism as observance of Jewish law alone, with a complete separation between Jewish law and morality. Later he presents a full democratic commitment to non-coercion and equal rights, supports separating religion from the state even if Judaism would be harmed by it, and sharply criticizes the religious-political establishment and the rabbinate, including a demand to abolish halakhic personal-status legislation.
The Series Framework and Opening Position on Religion and State
The speaker presents the episode as part of a series to be called “Da’at Emunah,” in which he will invite different people to speak about their faith and how they view Israeli society through it. The speaker states that traditionalism as an ideology is worse than atheists, because atheists act according to what they actually believe. He argues that separating religion from the state would do a lot of good for Judaism, and that religious monopolies bring only corruption, presenting recent years as proof of that.
Introducing Rabbi Dr. Michael Abraham and the Tension Between Education and Faith
The speaker describes a world in which it seems that to be educated you have to give up faith, and presents Rabbi Dr. Michael Abraham as a physicist, philosopher, and religious thinker trying to hold those two worlds together. The speaker says he read God Plays Dice and is in the middle of The Science of Freedom, and is very impressed by his books.
Why Believe, and the Claim That Faith Is Not About Filling a Need
Abraham rejects the assumption that faith is meant to fill a lack or a need, and presents belief in God as recognition that He exists and that there is an obligation to obey Him even if that does not improve life. Abraham says the question “Why believe?” sometimes stems from the fact that the questioner does not believe, and therefore assumes religion is adopted to fill some need. Abraham uses the phrase “because He’s there” to describe faith that stems from recognition of reality and not from utilitarian purpose.
Uncertainty, Different Paths to Faith, and Marx on Religion as Opium
Abraham says he is not certain of God’s existence and that a person cannot be certain of anything, clarifying that there is room for questions and that he deals with them extensively. Abraham presents a variety of paths to faith, including philosophical arguments, intuition, tradition “from our fathers and from Sinai,” and sometimes emotional need. Abraham agrees with Marx “to a considerable extent” that religion is opium for the masses when people adopt religion for the bonuses, calm, and order it gives them, and argues that someone who adopts it that way does not really believe but is just “smoking opium,” whereas he himself believes because he thinks it is true and not out of conscious need.
From Deism to Theism: Philosophy Versus History and Tradition
Abraham describes a two-stage structure and refers to his book The First Existent, which contains four discussions on proofs for God’s existence and a fifth on the transition from the philosophical dimension to the religious one, “from deism to theism.” Abraham states that philosophy deals with the question of God’s existence as a metaphysical matter, whereas questions about revelation at Sinai and what was said there are factual-historical questions that do not belong to philosophy. Abraham says the stages are separate but connected, because philosophical recognition of God turns the claim of revelation into something that is not dismissed in advance as nonsense.
Bertrand Russell, the Celestial Teapot, and Tinker Bell as a Parable for the Threshold of Plausibility
Abraham presents Bertrand Russell’s parable of the “celestial teapot” and the comparison to Tinker Bell in order to explain that a claim without any evidentiary basis is not treated as “fifty-fifty” but rejected in the absence of any reason to assume it. Abraham says that if someone directly claimed that God had revealed Himself to him and told him to put on phylacteries, without any prior basis for God’s existence, he would dismiss it like Tinker Bell and the teapot. Abraham argues that when one first arrives at the philosophical conclusion that there is a transcendent being who created the world, then the claim that this being also revealed itself is not accepted as certain, but neither is it dismissed out of hand, illustrating this with an analogy to a Black president in the United States and to Barack Obama and Obamacare.
“Validity” in History and the Plausibility of Traditional Arguments Compared with Other Traditions
Abraham rejects using the term “valid” for historical arguments and instead speaks of arguments as “more plausible and less plausible.” Abraham confirms that, in his view, the arguments from tradition are plausible, and describes comparison with other traditions such as Islam and the disciples of Jesus as a matter of plausibility rather than absolute truth.
The Absence of Divine Involvement, a Policy Change, and the Parents-and-Children Metaphor
Abraham says he does not see divine involvement around him and that all indications point to “the world following its natural course,” and he casts doubt on common religious explanations that attribute events to hidden divine involvement. Abraham states that he does believe in the authenticity of certain parts of the Hebrew Bible (Tanakh) and in the existence of historical events at a basic level, such as the creation of the world “at some level or another,” the Exodus from Egypt, and the revelation at Mount Sinai, and therefore concludes that the Holy One, blessed be He, “changed policy” and was more involved in the past and is gradually detaching from the world. Abraham explains this with a metaphor of parents and children, in which parents accompany a small child and gradually loosen the reins until independence, and also formulates it with the phrase, “The heavens are the heavens of the Lord, but the earth He has given to human beings.”
The Holocaust, Human Responsibility, and Prophets and Open Miracles
Abraham says that questions like “Where was God in the Holocaust?” could have been answered by intervention that he would certainly have welcomed, but he does not think that the Holy One, blessed be He, caused the Holocaust; rather, the Nazis caused it, and human beings run the world for good and for ill. Abraham says that other religious people also admit there was a policy change, because “there are no prophets” and “there are no open miracles,” and he merely expands that claim by saying that there are also “no hidden miracles,” and that God withdrew “completely” and not just “partially,” while arguing that this does not contradict tradition but extends an already accepted trend.
Reward and Punishment, “There Is No Reward for a Commandment in This World,” and Longevity in the World to Come
Abraham quotes the Talmud as stating, “There is no reward for a commandment in this world,” and interprets this as meaning there is no reward in this world, only in the world to come. Abraham says the Sages often interpret “so that your days may be prolonged” as referring to the soul’s long life in the world to come and not necessarily to lengthened life in this world.
Religiosity Without Religious Experiences and Defining Judaism as Jewish Law Alone
Abraham argues that religious experiences are unrelated to religiosity, since atheists and artists also report them, and presents Einstein and pantheism as “atheism in disguise.” Abraham says he himself belongs to the group that does not have religious experiences, and argues that they are not an essential dimension of religiosity. Abraham defines Jewish religiosity as observance of Jewish law alone, saying, “There is no Jewish morality, no Jewish experiences, no Jewish psychology,” and adds that there is no such thing as “secular Judaism” as a worldview, even though there are certainly “secular Jews.”
Morality Versus Jewish Law: God’s Will, Independence, and the Logical Distinction in Definition
Abraham says that God also wants morality, but morality and commandments are “two independent categories that do not speak to one another,” and there is no connection between them, including in commandments that appear moral. Abraham explains that Judaism is defined through what is unique to Jews and not through what is important and shared by all human beings, and brings an Aristotelian example of genus and species in order to argue that morality does not distinguish Judaism, whereas kashrut does. Abraham denies the existence of “Jewish morality” and argues that there is only “morality,” and that what appears moral to him is also God’s will for him, while emphasizing that the moral content is shared by him and by secular people and therefore does not define Judaism.
Same-Sex Marriage, Conservatism in Context, and Abortion as Murder
Abraham says he is halakhically bound by the prohibition on same-sex marriage, but does not see it as a moral problem, because morality and Jewish law are not dependent on one another. Abraham argues that the concept of “conservatism” depends on the value system and context, and distinguishes between conservatism in the social-secular sense and conservatism in interpreting halakhic sources, in which he describes himself as not conservative and even accused of that religiously. Abraham says his opposition to abortion is moral and not halakhic, and he defines abortion as murder and says that even without a kippah he would say so.
A State of Jews Versus a Jewish State, Democracy and Non-Coercion, and Support for Separation of Religion and State
Abraham states that Israel is “a state with a Jewish majority” and “a state of Jews,” but “not a Jewish state,” because in his view it is not run according to Jewish rules, which for him means Jewish law. Abraham opposes state coercion of religious norms and presents a full commitment to democratic values and equal rights regardless of sex, gender, and sexual orientation, even when there is a conflict between religious and democratic values. Abraham says he supports separating religion from the state, and argues that his considerations are not merely instrumental even if Judaism were to be harmed, though he also believes that separating religion from the state “would do a lot of good for Judaism” because the current situation creates a desecration of God’s name. Abraham describes the institutional religious leadership in recent years as “a collection of people desecrating God’s name” and “a collection of criminals,” and says this is proof of the need for separation.
Traditionalists, Shas, and Traditionalist Ideology as a Criminal Ideology
Abraham rejects the claim that traditionalists truly support a blanket exemption for Haredim from military service, and suggests that some of them vote for Shas for other reasons despite opposing the exemption. Abraham argues that Shas does not represent a traditionalist position but is sliding in a Haredi direction and becoming extreme, and cites the Guetta affair as an example of the gap between the party and traditionalist voters. Abraham distinguishes between traditionalism as a sentiment of “Jewish atmosphere, father’s home, nostalgia,” toward which he has neither criticism nor sympathy, and traditionalism as an ideology that claims commitment to Sinai and to Jewish law but avoids observance for reasons of convenience. Abraham calls traditionalist ideology “a criminal ideology” and worse than atheism, because atheists do what they actually believe, while traditionalists believe one thing and do another, and adds that he does not attribute good or bad to belief as a fact but to practical decisions.
The Law He Would Repeal: Personal Status, the Rabbinate, and Religious Monopolies
Abraham says that the obvious laws to repeal are religious laws, first and foremost the fact that personal status is governed according to Jewish law and the mechanisms of the Chief Rabbinate. Abraham calls these laws “absurd laws” and argues that all religious monopolies bring only corruption.
Full Transcript
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Traditionalism as an ideology, in my view, is a criminal ideology, much worse than atheists, much worse, because atheists at least do what they actually believe. So I think separating religion from the state would do a lot of good for Judaism, and religious monopolies bring nothing but corruption. And I think that if you need proof of why religion and state should be separated, it seems to me you’re getting it straight in the face.
[Speaker B] I’m recording this episode as part of a series that will be called “Da’at Emunah.” In each episode I’m going to invite different people to talk about their faith and how they see Israeli society through it.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If you enjoyed it, please subscribe to the channel and share. And if in your opinion there are also points to improve, then write to me in the comments below. Thank you very much, and enjoy watching.
[Speaker B] We live in a world where it seems that if you want to be educated, you have to give up faith. Today I’m speaking with Rabbi Dr. Michael Abraham, a physicist, philosopher, religious thinker, and someone who tries to hold these two worlds together. We’ll talk about God, about faith, about miracles, and about the big question of whether it’s possible to be a rational person and a believer at the same time. First of all, hello Michael. I have to say, I’ve got this trilogy, these three books. I’m in the middle of The Science of Freedom, I already read God Plays Dice, and it’s very impressive. So far I’ve been very positively impressed. Today’s questions are actually going to be more about God, but still. So how are you, Michael?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Thank God, excellent.
[Speaker B] Michael, you deal a lot with the question of proving God’s existence, but I want to start even earlier. Like, why believe at all? I can live a good life without faith. What am I missing that I should discover God?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The truth is, if you’re already starting earlier, I’ll start even earlier. Meaning, why do you think it’s supposed to fill some lack or need? Why, in your view, do people choose to believe or decide to believe because it fills some need for them? It improves their life in some way or something like that. That’s actually the assumption in your subtext. And I, by contrast, claim that I believe in God simply because He’s there. He exists. And that there is an obligation to obey Him even if it doesn’t improve my life. Meaning, I don’t do it in order to improve my life. In some ways I would even say—again, I don’t know where this comes from in your case, we don’t know each other—but very often this assumption that faith comes to fill a need itself stems from the fact that the person making that assumption doesn’t believe. Once you don’t believe in God, you ask yourself, wait a second, so why do people adopt this improbable or strange outlook? You say, okay, it probably fills some need for them, and then you ask them what need. But notice that when you speak with a person who believes, of course his starting point can at least be different. Meaning, he does believe in God, so he doesn’t ask himself why believe or why seek. I believe because I think it’s true, because He’s there. You know, there was once a British mountain climber named Thomas Mallory, I think—I don’t remember anymore—who was asked why he climbs Everest, and he said, because it’s there. Meaning, people assumed that he climbs Everest because it fills some kind of need for him.
[Speaker B] God exists because it’s self-evident? Or do people arrive at that assumption through some path, some journey they went through, some experience they had? Like, how are you so sure that God exists? Why isn’t there room for that question?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no. First of all, a few comments. First of all, I’m not sure. I’m not sure of anything. Not of God’s existence and not of anything else. A person can’t be sure of anything. Whoever tells me he’s sure either doesn’t understand, or is lying to himself or to others. There’s no such thing. A person cannot be sure of anything. Second, I didn’t say I’m sure, and I also don’t claim there’s no room for that question. There’s a lot of room for that question; I deal with it quite a bit. I don’t think there’s no room for that question. And finally, when you ask what the ways are to arrive at faith, maybe I can tell you what my path is, but there are many people and each has his own path. Meaning, there are those for whom it may be self-evident; for me it isn’t self-evident, and that’s why I need arguments. Others say it’s a simple intuition, it’s obvious, what do you mean? Sometimes it’s even my own arguments, just in a more intuitive form, without formulating them—they just find it obvious, say, that a complex world did not create itself. So I present it as a philosophical argument; someone else says no, it’s obvious. He basically means the same thing, it’s just obvious to him, you understand? Others say it’s the result of tradition—we received it from our fathers, and so on. From our fathers and from Sinai, and therefore we simply received this information through tradition. Each person his own way. And there are some, by the way, who arrive at faith in God for the reasons you assumed earlier, that it fills some need for them. Yes, like Marx said, religion is the opium of the masses. And to a considerable extent he’s right. Meaning, very many people really… what?
[Speaker B] Marx is right? Marx was right when he said religion is opium… okay.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, I think to a considerable extent he’s right. What does it mean, right? I mean that those people who adopt religion because of the bonuses it gives them, because it improves their life, gives them some calm, some order in the chaotic world we live in, then they really are adopting it because of a need. But if that’s so, then from my point of view they’re just smoking opium. Meaning, they don’t really believe, because as I told you before, I adopt belief in God not because it fills some need for me—at least not consciously. Psychologists can come and analyze me, but when I give myself an account of why I adopt belief in God, it’s simply because I think it’s true. It doesn’t fill any need for me. So in my case I think it’s not opium, at least not consciously. But there are many people for whom religion really is opium, and the assumption you made in the first question you asked was actually Marx’s assumption—that religion is the opium of the masses—and okay, tell me what need this opium fills for you.
[Speaker B] Okay. So you’re saying there are lots of ways to arrive at God’s existence, and that’s maybe a less relevant question. You arrive through philosophy and through maybe more rational arguments, you could say, less emotional and less traditional. And as it seems, like, how do you get from the definition of God—from “the world is complex so there must be some component” or an argument in that style—how do you get from there into some proof of tradition, of the existence of Sabbath observance, observance of commandments, putting on phylacteries? How does that work? Is it still a philosophical argument or do you also jump to tradition?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, there really is—this structure is very complex. I devoted a book to it, meaning, it’s called The First Existent. And there I try to explain it. The book is made up of five conversations. The first four conversations are different proofs for God’s existence—different kinds of proofs, different shades of proofs for God’s existence. And the fifth conversation is indeed devoted to the transition from the philosophical dimension of God’s existence to the religious dimension. From deism to theism, you could say. Meaning, to faith in God, to obligation to the commandments, and so on. Now, many times people really raise your question, but even more sharply, and they say: wait a second, I’m willing to accept that there is even a God in the philosophical sense, but that has nothing to do with putting on phylacteries. Meaning, I have no way of getting from there to phylacteries. And there are many people who are not religious in the practical sense, but are religious in the sense that they believe in God. Meaning, such people exist. And therefore many atheists have asked me more than once: even if I accept your philosophical arguments, how do you get to those conclusions? So I’ll say a few things about that. First of all, it’s true that this is no longer in the domain of philosophy. Philosophy can deal with questions to which philosophical tools are relevant. Whether there is or isn’t a God is a question in metaphysics. Metaphysics is a branch of philosophy, and philosophical tools are supposed to deal with that question. You can believe in His existence, not believe in His existence, but dealing with that issue—it’s very natural to do it with the tools of metaphysics, with philosophical tools. By contrast, a question like whether He revealed Himself at Mount Sinai, or what He said at Mount Sinai, is simply a factual historical question. It has nothing to do with philosophy. That doesn’t mean it isn’t true. It doesn’t mean it’s arbitrary or subjective. It only means that the set of tools that deals with it is not the philosophical toolkit, because it’s not a philosophical question. But I do think there is a certain connection between these two stages, between deism and theism. Philosophy deals with deism. Philosophy can prove God’s existence, in my opinion. It can prove God’s existence, but it’s a very abstract kind of God, and at the philosophical stage He has no clear demands of us. And tradition tells us one step further. It says this is a religious God, not a philosophical God. He demands various things—what to do, what not to do, all kinds of things like that. The question is whether these are two independent stages, each treated with a different set of tools. So in principle yes, but I still want to say there is a connection between them. And the connection is this: there is… a very well-known example from a philosopher named Bertrand Russell, a British philosopher-mathematician named Bertrand Russell, who was a proud and well-known atheist. And he argued that if someone came to him and told him that God—whatever—revealed Himself to him and told him, I don’t know, to turn the other cheek, then he would say to him, yes, and Tinker Bell revealed herself to me and told me to stand on one leg every day and scream cock-a-doodle-doo. Meaning, he basically gives a parable for this: the celestial teapot. He says, yes, if someone comes to me and says there’s a little teapot orbiting the planet Jupiter—and that’s it, that’s his claim. Now, what am I supposed to do with such a claim? I have no idea, so what, fifty-fifty, maybe yes maybe no? Of course not. It’s not fifty-fifty, and no, I have no information, and even so it’s not fifty-fifty. Why not? Because why should I assume there is such a teapot? I mean, you also have no way of knowing it exists, not just me. I ask you why I don’t see it, and you say because it’s small. Yes, you understand, that’s a claim that can’t be disproved, but on the other hand if it’s small then how do you know that? Meaning, what do you want from me? I mean, I have no reason to assume it exists, so even though I have no information, I don’t treat it as some doubt that maybe this way maybe that way. No, my assumption is that there is no such teapot. I may be wrong—if they bring evidence, I’m willing to change my position—but at least for now, if there’s no evidence and someone makes a claim, then he makes a claim, and Tinker Bell also said cock-a-doodle-doo. Meaning, so he claims. Now what happens here with regard to God—the parable works fine with the teapot. But its analogue, which is belief in God, in my opinion is not similar. Why isn’t it similar? If someone came and said, look, God revealed Himself to me at Sinai—or not at Sinai—and told me that every morning you need to put these black cubes on your head, I’d say to him yes, and Tinker Bell and a teapot and so on—yes, I’d brush him off exactly like Bertrand Russell. But if I arrive at the philosophical conclusion that there is a God, meaning that there exists a transcendent being who created the world and I don’t know what, all kinds of things of that sort—now if someone comes to me and says, look, and that being also revealed itself to me and said such-and-such, then I don’t dismiss it out of hand. Meaning, there’s a difference between a situation where someone comes to me and says, look, there is such a thing as God, He revealed Himself to you and told you to put on phylacteries—I have no reason to assume there is a God, why on earth would I accept that He revealed Himself to you? Teapot. Meaning, that’s just nonsense. But if I’ve reached the conclusion that there is a God—a philosophical conclusion, still without religiosity and without phylacteries and without anything—but I’ve reached that conclusion, then now someone comes and says, look, He also revealed Himself and said such-and-such, then that’s no longer so terrible. That still doesn’t mean it’s true, but I don’t dismiss it out of hand; meaning, it’s not nonsense on its face, okay? It’s like this by analogy: think of it this way—if thirty years ago someone had come to you and said, look, in the United States there is a Black president called Barack Obama, and he passed some reform called Obamacare—yes, the health law of the United States—then I’d have said to him, Tinker Bell, teapot, and stop talking nonsense, because thirty years ago saying there was a Black president of the United States was about like talking about a celestial teapot. It was simply science fiction. I still remember when he was elected—it was simply unbelievable, I was stunned. In any case, a few years later I already know that a Black president was elected in the United States; I’ve already crossed that line. Now someone comes to me and says, look, his name is Barack Obama and he passed Obamacare. Okay, maybe it’s true, maybe not, but I already know there is a Black president in the United States—that line I’ve already crossed. From here on you have to discuss it, fine. Therefore I argue—and now I’m coming back to us—that although the two sides, these two floors, are two separate floors, and each is handled with a separate set of tools, the philosophical floor with philosophical tools, the historical-traditional floor with historical tools or others, there is still a connection between the floors, because the existence of the first floor means that when I come to discuss the second floor, it is no longer self-evident that it’s all nonsense. The discussion is now open. You need to discuss yes or no, but you can no longer dismiss me out of hand. In that sense, the philosophical discussion is important before we move on to discussing the religious God.
[Speaker B] Okay, okay, so you separated between the philosophical God and the historical proof. For you, a historical proof is some kind of tradition, like a witness argument—that there were several hundred thousand people at Mount Sinai, and they passed it from father to son, father to son—and that argument, in your opinion, is a historically valid argument?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What does “valid” mean? Valid is a strong word; it belongs to logic. Historical arguments are not valid. Nor is history. There are historical arguments that are more plausible and less plausible. Meaning, I don’t usually speak in logical language about softer fields like history. Not even history—I don’t even speak that way about history concerning Napoleon, not only history concerning God, which is an even murkier and more problematic field. So I don’t like the term valid. I do speak about plausible arguments. And in my view, yes, the arguments are plausible.
[Speaker B] Okay, so it’s just a matter of plausibility. And then, like, different traditions of revelation are presented to you—say, for example, Islam—and then you have the disciples of Jesus who saw him resurrected or crucified or performing miracles. And from there you compare between the traditions, or between—yes, we can call them traditions—and say what is most plausible. Not “most”—there’s no absolute truth here, it’s just a matter of plausibility. Right. Okay. So, like, if I compare current reality to the biblical reality, biblical reality is a little more about God intervening, acting in the world, speaking to people, and in my opinion at least, that’s not something you see today. How do you see that? Like, what is it—does God still reveal Himself? Or where did that change come from?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] You’ve burst through an open door a bit here, because one of my well-known and controversial theses is exactly this. Meaning, just like you, I don’t see divine involvement around me. Again, I didn’t live a hundred or two hundred or three hundred years ago, but I also think that in the generations—certainly throughout modern times and onward—it doesn’t seem to me that there was any involvement I can really point to. All the indications are that the world follows its natural course; meaning, in the end the world behaves the way any sensible person sees it. And I don’t see divine involvement, even in areas where other religious people do see divine involvement. I cast a lot of doubt on that; in most cases there’s some statistical explanation or another. We can get into examples if you want. So I see the situation, reality, the same way you do. And my claim, unlike perhaps yours—again, I don’t know your outlook—unlike those who don’t believe in the Bible or in the Jewish faith, is that I do believe in certain parts of the Hebrew Bible (Tanakh), in the authenticity of certain parts of the Hebrew Bible (Tanakh). Meaning, that there are events there that probably were historical events. The creation of the world at some level or another—not in the details—
[Speaker B] The revelation at Mount Sinai as described there—historical or not historical?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The revelation at Mount Sinai, the Exodus from Egypt perhaps, other things like that. And again, I’m not talking right now about all the details, but in principle that such events happened. Now that means, basically, that from my perspective as a believer, apparently the Holy One, blessed be He, changed policy. Meaning, He was more involved in earlier periods, and gradually He’s disconnecting from the world and leaving it to operate in a more natural way, leaving us to function in the world in a more natural way. And the parable I give for this is the parable of parents and children. When the child is small, the parents hold his hand, go with him everywhere, do the work for him, because they can’t let him operate on his own—it wouldn’t be responsible. Gradually the child grows, they give him more slack. He grows more, they give him even more slack. When he’s really standing on his own feet, when he’s already an adult, then the parents no longer manage anything for him—they leave him, hoping they prepared him well for life—
[Speaker B] And he’s supposed to function independently.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] A kind of maturation, in other words?
[Speaker B] God raised the world, and it matured, and once it matured, then it needs less and less of that—
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] —that providence?
[Speaker B] Yes.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And the claim is that the Holy One, blessed be He, somehow disconnects and says, friends, I gave you the tools. You also have modern humanity; today you have more tools to cope independently. That’s it: “The heavens are the heavens of the Lord, but the earth He has given to human beings.” Meaning, you need to run the show. So from my point of view, for example, questions like where was God in the Holocaust, or all kinds of theological problems of that kind—I’d have been very happy if He had intervened, but I’m not one of those who think He caused the Holocaust. Meaning, those who caused the Holocaust were the Nazis. Meaning, people run the world, for good and for bad. And if we suffer, we suffer because human beings behave badly toward one another. I don’t place the blame on God, even though again, He can always intervene and save us, or save whoever is in distress. And apparently He doesn’t do that, according to my view, because I truly don’t think He intervenes. So there is a question why He doesn’t intervene, and that too can be discussed. But certainly He is not the one doing these things. These things are done by human beings; they run the world. Let me add perhaps one more point, a point I would say more to my religious interlocutors who always protest when they hear these statements. I tell them, look, even you admit that there was some change of policy on God’s part. Everyone agrees there are no prophets today, right? Everyone agrees there are no open miracles today either. Even someone who talks about divine involvement is talking about hidden divine involvement. You don’t see the sea splitting in two or anything like that, or direct frontal involvement appearing before your eyes. And therefore, basically, even someone less radical than I am, who argues that God still remains involved and thinks what I’m saying is heresy—and there are quite a few people who think that—I tell him, listen, you too have to admit that this policy change exists. After all, you also agree there are no prophets, there are no open miracles. All I’m claiming is that there are also no hidden miracles. Meaning, He withdrew completely and not just partially. But this is not a principled dispute. Meaning, you too agree there is a policy change. So what’s the problem with the claim that the policy change is more sweeping than you think? Only in the sense of—is it heresy? Is it something that contradicts tradition and can’t be said? So regardless of whether it’s true—I also think it is true—but here I’m dealing with another question. Not the question of who told you it’s true, or bring proof that it’s true, but the question of how you can say this and still remain religious. After all, you’re contradicting tradition. I said, not true—it doesn’t contradict tradition. It only extends further what everyone agrees on: that there is a policy change as the generations go by.
[Speaker B] So also reward and punishment for commandments, and commandments that are also supposed to prolong your days—that too, from your point of view, is no longer something relevant?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Look, there is reward and punishment. In the Talmud itself it says that there is no reward for a commandment in this world. In the Talmud—I’m already talking about two thousand years ago, almost two thousand. “There is no reward for a commandment in this world” means there is no reward for a commandment in this world, only in the world to come. So it’s already written in the Talmud. Now there are various answers—so wait, what about the fact that we pray, and we do think that the Holy One, blessed be He, is supposed to answer and intervene in various matters? So there are various answers: maybe that’s for the public and this is for individuals, or I don’t know, all kinds of such answers. But these statements are statements that exist in the space of religious thought. I didn’t invent them. And regarding long life and all that—because “so that your days may be prolonged upon the land,” and so on—that is said about several commandments, and the Sages already say that prolonged days often refers to the world to come and not to this world. So interpretively…
[Speaker B] Meaning, it’s not really something that belongs to our life at all, but something that will come in the world to come? Yes.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Your days will be prolonged—your soul’s days will be prolonged, because it will continue living in the world to come.
[Speaker B] For you, then, what is Judaism at this point? Like, if there’s no miraculous revelation and no emotional experiences, then what defines a person as a religious person or a person who fulfills the divine will?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Look, atheists also have religious experiences. Many artists report that they have religious experiences. Einstein talked about religious experiences, and people claim he believed in God. I don’t think he believed in God in the sense we usually mean, some pantheistic God that he identifies with nature in some sense. But that’s not really belief in God—it’s complete atheism; Spinoza’s pantheism is just atheism in disguise. Therefore, in my view, religious experiences are in no way connected to religiosity. Meaning, there are religious people who have religious experiences, and there are people who don’t. I belong to the group that doesn’t. Now the question of whether that’s important is another question. The question of whether it exists or not is a factual one. The question of whether it’s important—meaning, whether it’s an essential dimension in order to be a religious person, or in the world of a religious person—I think not. Why are these experiences necessary? In the end, in my view Jewish religiosity—and this is unlike other religiosity—Jewish religiosity is observance of Jewish law. That and nothing else. Nothing besides that. There is no Jewish morality, no Jewish experiences, no Jewish psychology; all the rest simply does not exist. These are word pairings with no content. The only Jewish thing is Jewish law. Therefore, for example, I also don’t believe in secular Judaism—there is no such creature. I wrote a booklet about this; it came out in Ivrit publishing on this matter, and there I explain in a very orderly way why there is no such thing as secular Judaism. There are secular Jews, but there is no secular Judaism. Secular Judaism is a worldview. Secular Jews certainly exist. There are many people who are Jews and secular in their outlook. But secular Judaism as a worldview—there is no such thing. Meaning, if it is secular, then it is not Judaism. Someone may think there is a God and that He supervises, but he is not religious. If he does not observe commandments, then it doesn’t matter—it has no significance. The fact that he thinks… okay.
[Speaker B] So the only value that belief in God—belief in the Jewish God—has, is commandments. And from there, how do you take that into your life? Are you a conservative person? Like, do you think of yourself as socially conservative?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, look, first I want to comment on the assumption before I answer the question. I’m not claiming that God wants from us only commandments. God also wants morality from us, for example. And in my view, morality and commandments are two independent categories that do not talk to each other. Meaning, there is no connection between commandments and morality, including commandments that look like moral commandments. No connection at all. These are two independent categories. But in my view, both are the will of the Holy One, blessed be He. He expects us to observe Jewish law, and He expects us to be moral people. Okay? Therefore I’m not claiming that what God wants is only Jewish law. What I claimed is that Judaism is only Jewish law. What does that mean? If you want to define Judaism—after all, definition, as we already learned from Aristotle, always has to give the genus and the species. Let’s say I want to talk about what a human being is. A human being is an animal—that’s the genus—that speaks—that’s the species. Right? I want to distinguish him from the other species that belong to the same genus. Correct? Whenever I define something, I have to say what group it belongs to and what distinguishes it from others in that group. That’s how a definition is built. When you want to define Judaism by that method, then I say: Judaism is humanity with special characteristics that distinguish it. Right? That’s how a definition of Judaism should be built. Now, if I define Judaism that way, I can’t put morality in there. All the inhabitants of the world believe that one should be moral. All normal people. Okay? So it makes no sense to use that as a definition of Judaism. Because that’s like defining a Jew by the fact that he has two legs. It’s true that he has two legs, but that doesn’t distinguish him. All human beings have two legs. In the same sense, all human beings are obligated to morality. So commitment to morality is not a religious characteristic. Even though in my view it is the will of God. The Holy One, blessed be He, wants me to be moral. But I would not define Judaism through commitment to morality. I would define Judaism through eating kosher. Because that distinguishes only Jews. So that’s a relevant definition. That doesn’t even mean that eating kosher is more important than being moral. It isn’t. But it is more distinctive. And in that sense, when I look for definitions, when I want to define something, I have to define it through the things that are unique, not through the things that are important. Important things, if they are shared with it and with others, are not useful as a definition for it. Right? Because that won’t be a definition that distinguishes it. You need things that distinguish it. Now eating kosher distinguishes only Jews. Our kashrut. Islam also has some dietary rules somewhat like kashrut, but our kashrut distinguishes only Jews. Okay? Morality does not.
[Speaker B] Morality is not something learned from Jewish law? Is it something objective that everyone is obligated to?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Absolutely not from Jewish law, in any way whatsoever. There is no connection at all between Jewish law and morality. Again, that’s my view, and also a minority view. But in my opinion, there’s no dependence whatsoever.
[Speaker B] So how would you define it? Define what?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Morality. What you define it as. I don’t believe in—there’s no such thing as Jewish morality. There is morality. Now, there are disputes in morality of course. Between any two people there can be disagreements about various moral issues. But there’s no such thing as Jewish morality. Whatever morality obligates in my view, because my reasoning tells me that that is what is moral, then as far as I’m concerned that is what the Holy One, blessed be He, wants from me. And on this issue I think like any non-Jew—or not like every non-Jew, but like many non-Jews. And not like many Jews. Meaning, there is nothing Jewish in my thinking about morality. I don’t see morality as a Jewish category.
[Speaker B] Okay. So morality is a secular thing that you’re obligated to, as a human being…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no, not secular—it is the will of God. Ah, it is the will of God. But the content of the moral commands, or the obligation to morality, is shared by me and by every secular person as well. Meaning, as far as I’m concerned, I’m obligated to it because it is also the will of God. He probably won’t accept that, but he is still also obligated to morality. So you can’t define me by the fact that I’m obligated to morality. Okay? It’s simply not a successful definition on the logical level. Because it doesn’t distinguish me.
[Speaker B] Okay. So I want to go back to what I asked earlier; maybe it wasn’t all that clear. What I mean is that once you’re a religious Jew who is committed to Jewish law, then you’re committed to the prohibition on same-sex marriage or to, as it were, a kind of conservatism, religious conservatism. Is that connected? Does the obligation… does the obligation to Jewish law connect to how I conduct myself within society? As a state, should I aspire for the state to be as conservative and Jewish as possible, or rather is it that each person follows what he is obligated to, according to what seems to him that he is obligated to?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] There are a lot of questions here. I’ll try to separate them and answer them, but there were a lot of completely different questions here. Meaning, I am committed to the prohibition on same-sex marriage. I’m committed to it because it is a halakhic prohibition. I’m not claiming there is anything immoral here. As I said earlier, morality and Jewish law are two independent categories. In my view there is no moral problem at all with same-sex marriage or same-sex couplehood, but it is halakhically forbidden, so there’s nothing I can do. Jewish law forbids it even though there is no moral flaw in it whatsoever. That’s one point. A second point: you asked about conservatism. You are assuming something about conservatism. You are assuming that anyone who does not accept the secular value system is conservative. By the same token I could say that someone who does not accept the religious value system is conservative. These are simply two value systems. I don’t know how to define who here is conservative and who is not conservative. Meaning, in the end, my claim is that conservatism and non-conservatism are always measured relative to a certain system. So, for example, relative to the religious system, I am very, very non-conservative. I’m often accused of that compared to other people who hold a conservative religious outlook. You, when you look at me, call me conservative because I oppose same-sex marriage—oppose it halakhically, not morally. I think that halakhically it is forbidden. Okay? So call that conservative, but that is not the concept of conservative when I talk about it in a religious context. When I talk about it in a religious context, the question is how you relate to the religious sources, the halakhic sources. Do you interpret them the way they have always been interpreted? Then you are conservative. Or are you willing to interpret them in a broader, more creative way, I don’t know whatever you want to call it, and then you are not conservative. Okay? So the concept of conservative is context-dependent. So in today’s sense, a conservative is someone who opposes abortion, opposes LGBT relationships, and things like that. In that terminology I am conservative. By the way, my opposition to abortion is moral; it has nothing to do with Jewish law at all. I think abortion is murder. It’s not connected—without a kippah I would say exactly the same thing. It has nothing to do with it at all, not consciously. Someone may tell me that subconsciously maybe yes, but in my conscious view it has no connection at all to Judaism. In my opinion it is simply murder. Whoever does it is simply a murderer. Therefore I oppose it. So call that conservative. Meaning, in the religious context I am very, very non-conservative. That is, my interpretation of religious sources and religious concepts is very, very non-conservative. Another question you asked—I hope I remember all the questions—another question you asked was how a state should behave. And here again I have a view that is
[Speaker B] A Jewish state with a Jewish majority.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay, so here it’s not—no, no, it still isn’t a Jewish state. Our state is a state with a Jewish majority, but in my opinion it is not a Jewish state.
[Speaker B] What do you mean?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] A state of Jews—it is not a Jewish state. It does not conduct itself according to Jewish rules, which of course in my view means Jewish law. There is clearly a Jewish majority in the state, but most Jews are not committed to Jewish law, so therefore the state is not Jewish. It is a state of Jews, and that is very important; it’s not just wordplay. Exactly the same distinction I made earlier between a secular Jew and secular Judaism. Okay, so here too it’s the same thing. The state contains no Judaism. It contains many Jews, but it contains no Judaism. There are a few weak things, like perhaps the Law of Return, and the fact that the official day of rest is the Sabbath, and that the rabbinate takes over our lives in matters of personal status. All those things, by the way—not all of them, but most of them—I oppose, because my view is that although I oppose same-sex marriage, I do not think it is right to impose that on anyone, and certainly it is not the role of the state to impose religious norms. That simply contradicts my democratic outlook, and I believe in democratic values completely, like any secular person who believes in them. Together with my religious values, and sometimes that puts me into conflicts. That does not mean there are no conflicts, but I believe in these just as I believe in those, and I am committed to this just as I am committed to that. And wearing my hat as someone who supports democracy, I am not willing to impose my way of life—although I think it is correct—on someone else who in my opinion is mistaken, because I oppose coercion, not because I think he is right. He is not right, but I oppose coercion. So if you ask whether the state should behave in the way you earlier called conservative, my answer is no. The state should give full equal rights to every person regardless of sex, gender, sexual orientation, all kinds of things of that sort. That is my democratic outlook. You ask me whether it is permitted to have a relationship.
[Speaker B] Okay, so you are basically proposing a separation of religion and state here.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If you take it far enough, then yes, and I am definitely in favor of separating religion and state, yes.
[Speaker B] And from there, let’s say we separate religion from the state and there is no Chief Rabbinate, or any religious law would be forbidden from legislation in the Knesset as religious intervention—from there, how do you see Judaism specifically progressing toward being more accepted in society, or would it דווקא go in a more extreme direction with the Haredim?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] First of all, I support non-coercion and democracy not because that will advance Judaism or set it back, but because that is truly what I believe in. Even if my Judaism suffers from it, or Judaism in general suffers from it, I believe in it. And therefore, again, it is the same thing as when we opened this discussion: I do not deal with this in consequentialist terms. Meaning, what the results will be. I think a person has the right to live his life as he understands, whether that harms Judaism or helps it. Therefore my considerations are not whether this will harm Judaism or not. But beyond that, if you ask, then I’ll tell you that I think separating religion and state will do a lot of good for Judaism. That is, the lack of separation does a lot of bad things to Judaism. A great deal of desecration of God’s name is born from this. In the last three years, it seems to me I don’t even need to explain this—nothing is clearer than this: the whole collection of the institutional religious leadership is a collection of desecrators of God’s name, every last one of them. There isn’t one who isn’t, there isn’t a party that isn’t, there isn’t a single one who isn’t. They are all just a collection of lawbreakers desecrating God’s name, and it’s a shame they are there. And I think that if you need proof of why religion and state should be separated, it seems to me you’ve been getting it right in the face in recent years.
[Speaker B] Yes, so from there I actually want to focus within Israeli society on a certain population that in my opinion is perhaps among the most influential, if not the most influential, in Israel. And it would seem—people would say the Haredi public or the secular public—but there is the more traditional public, which again doesn’t want to go back to the conservative definition, but is conservative from a religious perspective. It wants not a religious state but a Jewish state with draft exemptions for the Haredim and funding for yeshivot, but they themselves won’t keep the Sabbath and they won’t observe commandments. From a religious angle, how can you look at people like that?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I think the traditional public does not really support exemptions for yeshiva students and for the Haredim in general from the army. It seems to me you are mistaken about that. Religious Zionists certainly—that’s a population I know better—but I also know traditional people, and I don’t think that’s correct. And many times it may be that in the next elections they will continue to vote for Shas even though they oppose exemptions for yeshiva students, because there are other things that Shas promotes and those are important to them. So at the price that this will also exempt yeshiva students, they will still be willing to vote for Shas. But that doesn’t mean they agree with everything Shas does. They absolutely do not agree with everything Shas does. Look at what happened with Guetta, the Knesset member from Shas, who went to the wedding of some relative of his, which was a same-sex wedding of gay people, and they threw him out of the party over it. Now here we are talking about a Knesset member, not the traditional Shas voter. One of their own Knesset members. Meaning, you can’t say that Shas really represents the entire traditional public; that’s ridiculous. It gets a lot of traditional voters, clearly. But it does not represent a traditional position, absolutely not. On the contrary, it is deteriorating more and more in the Haredi direction, becoming more extreme than the Ashkenazi Haredim. Look at the current discussion on the draft: Shas is the most extreme. The most extreme. The rabbinic leadership of Shas—it was never like this. Never. It used to be a moderate party. Absolutely not; they have become super-extreme. That’s the second thing. The third thing, regarding my attitude to traditionalism itself, is that we need to define the concept of traditional. If traditional means someone for whom the Jewish atmosphere is important, the home one grew up in, nostalgia, and so on, I have neither criticism nor sympathy nor anything regarding that. To each person his own nostalgias. It’s a matter of feelings and experiences—good for them. To each person his own sentiments. That’s not an ideology, that’s a feeling. Fine, I don’t argue with feelings. If there is a traditionalist ideology, I oppose it. That is because ideology—traditionalist ideology basically, or at least the central strand in traditionalist ideology—basically says: look, I really know that the Torah was given at Sinai, I am obligated to Jewish law, I think one ought to observe Jewish law, but it doesn’t suit me right now, I’m not in the mood. So in my opinion that is an outlook unworthy of any respect.
[Speaker B] Because you
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] are not doing what you yourself think is right. If you are talking to me about traditional people who do not believe in this whole system, they just want a Jewish atmosphere or something like that, then as I said, that’s the previous type. I have no criticism of them and also no particular sympathy for them. To each person his own sentiments. I have certain sentiments, they have different sentiments, good for them. But if you are talking about traditionalism as an ideology, in my opinion it is a criminal ideology. Much worse than atheists. Much worse. Because atheists at least do what they truly believe in. Traditionalists believe one thing and do another.
[Speaker B] But isn’t belief in God already a good side?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What do you mean by good? Someone who believes in God believes in God—that’s a fact. Good or not, I don’t ascribe good or bad to facts. Good or bad applies to choices. If you choose to do something good, you are a good person. If you choose to do something bad, you are a bad person. But a traditional person who believes in God—it is simply because he believes in God; that is the fact from his perspective. What is there here to admire? There is nothing here to admire. This one believes in God and that one does not believe in God. I can admire what he does. And when he believes in God and also believes in the giving of the Torah, say for the sake of argument, but does not observe what was given there at Sinai, then I regard his choices as bad choices. As for his beliefs, those are facts; I have no evaluation of them whatsoever. So bottom line, he is much worse than the atheist. Because the atheist really does what he thinks.
[Speaker B] Okay, there’s a lot to think about in these issues. One last question. Michael, one law that you would repeal in the State of Israel, and why?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Actually I’d have to think about it, but the obvious answer is religious laws. Meaning, the Chief Rabbinate, the fact that personal status has to be run according to Jewish law—that is what I would repeal first. These are absurd laws. All the religious monopolies bring is corruption. Thank you very much.