What Is Modern Orthodox Judaism Anyway, and Why Is It Critical for All of Us? Michael Abraham in “A Manifesto for the Nation” – Dr. Roy Yuzvitz

This transcript was produced automatically using artificial intelligence. There may be inaccuracies in the transcribed content and in speaker identification.

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[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, so it depends. If you tie it to the woman’s education or her involvement in life, then once again we’re talking about facts. If you tie it to the value of equality, then we’re already talking about values. So it depends what midrashic reading you’re proposing, what consideration you’re proposing. It’s very subtle.

[Speaker A] Right, and here you’re pulling a move, and here you’re pulling a move that I don’t like, and you’re saying the following. The Modern Orthodox we had in mind was American Modern Orthodoxy, the American version, which is seemingly what it was, because you say “modern religious,” so give us an example—who am I supposed to look at and say, okay, like that. So you say we thought it meant American religious. In the manifesto you only say this is not what exists in the United States, and in lesson ten you expand on it. Really expand on it. So what’s the problem with American religious Jews—that they’re not Modern Orthodox?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I have no problem at all. It’s just not the model I’m talking about. The American religious world—I go into this more in the lectures. In the booklet I can’t get into all of that.

[Speaker A] Right, right, but I’m saying, wait a second—so if you don’t have anything against it, then I need to come and say, okay, he’s talking about something like this. So I want to understand: what exists at Yeshiva University is not the hypothetical model you’re proposing.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No. No. Why? I don’t know Yeshiva University very deeply. What I encountered is not that. They are people who cling very, very closely to the sources and to interpretations of the sources. They’re aware of what’s happening around them, but at the end of the day, the halakhic tools they use are completely conservative, like Haredim. They’re just less afraid of Reform in the sense that they’re willing to make the changes required by an interpretation that sticks to the sources exactly like the Haredim do, but takes the surrounding circumstances into account. I’ll give you a simple example of where the penny dropped for me. There was a conference of the Orthodox Forum, where they wanted to establish some kind of branch of Modern Orthodoxy in Israel, to create that model here. And they invited me to give one of the lectures there. So I spoke there about the attitude toward gentile courts—that is, really toward our courts here in Israel. And the question was whether they count as gentile courts or not. And I proposed there some idea that wasn’t based on sources but on reasoning—or not even on reasoning, more on the simple claim that you just can’t ignore a legal system if you’re a citizen in a modern state. It’s simply not an option. I have no halakhic way out. In that sense I completely agree with all the great Haredi authorities. I do not accept all the halakhic loopholes; in my view they don’t hold water.

[Speaker A] It’s not “the law of the kingdom is law,” it’s not the king’s law, it’s not that? Meaning, the Ran’s homilies that there’s some legal system of the king that does whatever it wants—that’s not parallel to…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Fine, but the question is: where can the king’s law do that? Our courts are not the king’s law. Our courts deal with substantive law too, not just all kinds of side matters the king handles. We do not have a religious system and a royal system in parallel, as the Ran says. We only have the king’s system. That is plainly unlawful. Halakhically unlawful, yes? Meaning, the excuses people give in order to oppose this do not hold water in my view. On the other hand, the conservative approach also doesn’t hold water—even the conservatives themselves don’t behave that way. One of the astonishing things is to see the massive rush of Haredim today to study law.

[Speaker A] Or that in Ponevezh—or in the inheritance struggles of Ponevezh—they went to the civil court. That’s a point…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Sure, but I’m saying this as a social phenomenon. The profession that should have been the most problematic in Haredi eyes is the profession they are going into. Why? Because everyone understands that you cannot ignore a legal system if you are a citizen in a modern state. There is a legal system here; without it society can’t function. Now it’s very hard to fit this into some halakhic pattern, but on the other hand you can’t ignore reality. This is reality. So what do the Haredim do? They wink. And so do the conservative Hardalim. They wink. They go to the courts, they send their children to study law, but they keep talking in the language of gentile courts and heaven forbid, and laying hands on the Torah of Moses, and planting an Asherah next to the altar, and things like that. It’s a double discourse, really a double-double discourse, that’s very common in the Haredi world. Everyone understands that nobody means any of it, and they keep talking as usual. The slogans always stay the same. We cling to the ways of our ancestors—at the level of slogans. But in practice the Haredim are very pragmatic, much more than the Hardalim incidentally. They are very pragmatic, and that’s why they go to court and send people to study law and everything is fine. And I argue that this has to be put on the table. I say that today’s circumstances do not allow us to uphold this Jewish law about gentile courts in relation to the courts.

[Speaker A] I have to ask you one precise question about Haredim abroad, because that’s an issue that will lead me further. On the one hand you say that Haredim abroad are much less afraid to make changes—you know, from the fact that Rabbi Moshe Feinstein said you can make Havdalah over Coca-Cola, look what a treat, all the way to, say, the issue of education. If you see a Haredi in the United States—take Ben Shapiro, who wears a yarmulke, you know, a black yarmulke—the connection between him and the average Haredi in Bnei Brak is more or less like the DNA connection between two human beings. But on the other hand you say the fear there of identifying as Reform is so great that they have to distinguish themselves very sharply from the Reform. So where do those two things work together?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s a freedom we have and they don’t. And therefore I suspect that many of them, in their hearts, actually do fit the model that I… I am calling for and calling to use. That is the purpose of this booklet and these lectures—I’m calling to use it. I’m saying that this fear of the Reform ties our hands and feet and turns us into idiots. Now what happens? One of the ways I propose to deal with this is to define very carefully, conceptually, what counts as Reform and what does not count as Reform. Because once the concepts are clear to me, it’s much clearer where the boundary line is, where I agree with them and where I disagree with them. When the concepts aren’t clear, then anything that looks Reform you won’t do, because you’ll be afraid. And so paradoxically, precisely the conceptual clarification of what change within a halakhic framework is, what Reform is, what Orthodoxy is, what all these things are—precisely that gives me greater freedom, because I don’t need to be afraid of vague lines. I can explain where I argue with the Reform and where I agree with them. I don’t need to distinguish myself on the sociological level, or on the balebatish level, let’s call it, yes? Without entering definitions. And that’s what happens in the United States. And I think that once you make this definition, which is what I tried to do in this series of lectures, then you see that you can define this identity of modern religiosity well, and there’s no need to panic over the image that the Hardalim and conservatives always throw at us: you’re Reform, lightweight, or whatever. No, we’re not. You just don’t know how to define things.

[Speaker A] So I have a question, and it’s clear to me that against my question you’ll bring me the swimsuit parable, so go ahead and bring it now and then I’ll ask the question. Let’s do it backwards.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, the claim is yes, the swimsuit parable is only the beginning of the story. But the swimsuit parable basically says: a group of people is walking through the desert in swimsuits. Their ancestors also walked through the desert in swimsuits. At a certain point they reach a cold region. Now one subgroup says: we continue the tradition of our ancestors—we keep walking in swimsuits even though it’s cold. Another group says: what are you talking about, we’re cold, we’re switching to parkas. You ask who the Reformers are here. On the face of it, the second group are the Reformers and the first are the conservative Orthodox. Right? And I claim that’s not necessarily so. The ones who say we’re switching to parkas—the question is what their reasoning is. If their reasoning is we’re switching to parkas because we don’t care about the tradition of our ancestors, then they’re Reformers or heretics or whatever you want to call them. But if they say we’re switching to parkas because the principle we want to preserve is not that one must wear a swimsuit, but that one must wear clothing appropriate to the weather—our ancestors were in a hot region, so the weather-appropriate clothing was a swimsuit. We are in a cold region, so the weather-appropriate clothing is a parka. Now, we are preserving the tradition of our ancestors no less meticulously than the group that keeps walking in swimsuits—and even more so—even though the practice looks different, because our ancestors wore swimsuits and we wear coats. But if you think the principle that has to be preserved is wearing a swimsuit, then you’re right. But I, as a midrashically conservative person—I called it midrashically conservative—I, as a midrashically conservative person, claim that the principle that must be preserved is not the obligation to wear a swimsuit, but the obligation to wear clothing suited to the weather. And I’ll guard that zealously. So now the question is: who here is the conservative and who isn’t?

[Speaker A] Maybe both are conservatives.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Wait, look, I—

[Speaker A] Want to ask something, but before the question—you know I appreciate you, right? Really, a lot. I’ve read all the books, really, really appreciate you. Do you believe yourself? Completely. I’ll tell you why. Why this seems crazy to me. Because I got to know you through the lecture series on the hermeneutic principles. Okay? And I know that in logic you can do whatever you want, yes? To this day I remember the amazing example that in Ireland it’s forbidden to sell two-liter alcohol and permitted to sell three-liter alcohol, yes? I remember everything. And with logic you can do anything. When a person keeps wearing a parka—or as Kopel would call it—he has very serious signals, and as they say he keeps wearing a parka in the heat, that’s one thing. But when a person says, and makes lomdus out of this move, that I am preserving what my ancestors… again, in the swimsuit example it’s nice, but it’s completely clear to you that with that logic, two more steps, yes? you can go wherever you want. Exactly the way with Brisk you can go wherever you want. Meaning, are you willing to accept that your move is a slippery slope—and I know you hate the term slippery slope, but no choice, I’m going to use it now—a move that can easily take us almost wherever we want if I say I’m preserving the essence behind the things?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So I’ll answer you in two ways.

[Speaker A] First answer.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] In any case they do it anyway. Even if I don’t reveal to you that Jewish law does this, that’s what it does. Do you know of one place in the world that is careful not to have two synagogues in one city? “Do not form separate factions”—a Torah-level prohibition, ruled by Maimonides, by the Shulchan Arukh. No? Why not? Because today it’s obvious that this no longer applies; it’s obvious that “place” is not a geographic place but an ethnic place, let’s call it—origin, community, whatever. That is a very far-reaching interpretive move, but everyone is silent. Why? Because they keep winking. I mean, everyone does it.

[Speaker A] I know the changes regarding the prohibition of new grain, yes, where among Eastern Jews it was relevant, not relevant, and in the West they did backflips in the air. Incidentally, Adam Baruch of blessed memory said it’s the same regarding attitudes to homosexuals—in societies where it was common, the halakhic attitude was completely different.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay, that I don’t know. But the claim is that all I’m saying is what everyone does, only they don’t dare say it. Now what happens—you have to understand, in a minute we’ll get to the slippery slope—but you have to understand that there is a very heavy price, because when people suddenly realize this, they completely lose trust in Jewish law and in the rabbis who lead it. Because essentially they say: you’re doing whatever you want. By contrast, I say: let’s put on the table that there are such considerations, let’s try to define them—where yes and where no—and at least there is transparency. At least I’ll do it, stand behind what I’m doing, and also be willing to explain in a place where I won’t do it, why in my view not to do it. But you, who don’t define it, won’t be able to explain anything. They’ll ask you: why do you do it here but not there? Wait, no, no, you’ll wink—you’ll say no, no, I don’t do it here. You’ll deny it, you’ll lie, like people usually do. They just lie, that’s all.

[Speaker A] And therefore, just like, say, a generation ago many went off the religious path because people asked, wait a second, why is mopping the floor permitted on the Sabbath but turning on the light is forbidden? Meaning, from the moment there isn’t—now there maybe there is a halakhic reason there—but if you don’t know it, you ruin everything. So you’re basically saying that the other side of the slippery slope is that people come to you and say: wow, they fed me nonsense, as Pinker says, they fed me nonsense. If I learned that girls who enlist in the IDF—this is an example my friend Haim Katz loves—if I learned that girls enlisting in the IDF is like eating pork, yes, and suddenly I look and say: no, enlisting in the IDF is not exactly like eating pork, then everything kind of—wait a second, but you told me it was exactly the same. And the damage is greater than the benefit.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And what about women studying Torah? And what about women studying Torah? And what about, you know, women on religious councils, the famous Supreme Court case of Leah Shakdiel, where there was wall-to-wall consensus that this was raising a hand against the Torah of Moses—which is complete nonsense, of course. The Supreme Court, with religious judges—Elon, Menachem Elon there—did not accept the claim, and lo and behold, afterward it suddenly became permitted. The Haredim in Yeruham, where I lived, opposed a religious man and supported a secular woman for the religious council. The Haredim in Yeruham—the same ones who were the subject of that court case. You understand? So they don’t change? Only I change? They don’t say they change—they lie. And I argue: stop lying. In our world everything is exposed, everything is transparent, and every lie is eventually discovered. So I say, leave aside even if you’re discussing this with me only tactically, because slippery slope is a tactical question. So even if you’re discussing it with me tactically, even tactically you’re wrong, because conservatism will pay a heavy price for that tactic. I think the great secularization we are in is not a result of Religious Zionism; it is a result of Haredism, because Haredism could not cope with the ideas of the Enlightenment, and we are paying for that to this day. If there had been people there willing to cooperate with it in a controlled way, maybe the price—I don’t know, hindsight is easy—but maybe the price would have been entirely different. There’s this feeling that conservatism is something safe. That’s a big mistake. Our world teaches us every day מחדש that conservatism carries very heavy prices.

[Speaker A] And I’m the arch-conservative here, so I ask, yes? According to Haaretz, according to the newspaper Haaretz, I’m an arch-conservative, so I ask. Haaretz said—they said I was at the conservatism conference, so the Haaretz reporter said to me, wait, but what are you doing here? I told him, what can I do?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay, the idiots from Haaretz, leave it.

[Speaker A] Wait a second, so you know what, fine, give me one more question, give me one more question—and again this is a question where I also debated whether to put you and Sherner under the same hat, because you really are more fanatical than he is, and he can’t answer now, but again, many times you refer to him and he refers to you, and it seems that on many things you see eye to eye. And against what’s happening here, another question. Another question that kind of comes up for me in this whole story: you’re trying to come and present some sketch of a thin theology, yes, in the last two volumes of the trilogy—both No Man Rules the Spirit and Walking Among the Standing. And there you say all kinds of very interesting things, yes? About the definition of the leading sage of the generation, and about attitudes toward women and attitudes toward gays and attitudes toward gentiles, and you also bring ideas—meaning, what existed until the sealing of the Talmud was one thing, and what existed after that was another thing, and so on and so on and so on. But I look at your life de facto. Maybe, you know, as a rabbi in a judicial forum with Rabbi Bigman you do allow yourself to do things, but as a person—you’re a total religious guy. A religious guy who relates to the religious public with contempt, to the knitted-kippah public. By the way, one of your funnier and more awful jokes—and I’m quoting you, yes?—is that, oh dear, this is really terrible.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That it’s a collection of particulars.

[Speaker A] No, no, no—you wrote that. You wrote it. You wrote that the excitement in the religious public over completing the Daf Yomi cycle—you suspect it’s because that’s the only thing they do in Religious Zionism. So now, really that’s true, there is something there. You’re a Litvak through and through. Where does this show itself? Do you eat legumes? Do you use an umbrella even though it’s not—well now there are all kinds of umbrella gadgets. But it seems like you’re giving a lot of ideas, you say Amos Oz is right that we brought in a lot of junk and didn’t take anything out, yes? and come on, we need to take things out. But it seems that in your private life, aside from writing, you only talk. Is that true?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] There’s something to that. It’s not entirely true, but there’s something to it. The pace of practical change is much slower than the pace of conceptual change for me. I think that’s usually the case, but for me it certainly is. Legumes I’ve been eating for several years already. I even wrote that, and I took a lot of heat for it, from friends too. But yes, that’s a good example of the matter. There are things where even if I think they should be changed, I understand that a certain social-religious framework requires some kind of consensus. Now there are certain questions people ask me, and I answer them the way I think. Not every such thing do I immediately translate into my practical life on a permanent basis. Some of it is habits, some of it is that I haven’t yet thought that this is really something worth changing, some of it is that I think it should go through some kind of consensus before I change, and some of it I do change a bit.

[Speaker A] But you’re saying there are things—you know, aside from an umbrella on the Sabbath, yes, even though now there are tricks with umbrellas—but it seems, and this brings me to the second issue, the people who change—you know, an Ashkenazi who eats legumes is known to be lightweight, yes? Forget anomalies. But as How Bigs told us and as Laplace told us, wait a second, probabilistically I’m willing, as they say, to bet that if there is a religious Ashkenazi who eats legumes, I’m willing to bet he’ll be lightweight, and I think that’s a good probabilistic bet. Now you are anomalous. Anomalous in many aspects. You should see how you write about love—look, people say love is a good emotion, so it seems to me we should deal with it, yes? Some Litvak who goes by the head in a crazy way—I’m just talking about your blog, I’m only quoting things from your blog. But your move—of a person who is deep inside halakhic lomdus, who was in the Hazon Ish kollel while doing a doctorate or postdoc at Weizmann, yes?—that’s an anomaly. There’s no such thing. So then I ask myself: can there be such a person who brings a modern religious identity and he’s not lightweight, but he’s also not Michael Abraham? To me that seems super hard. Now you’ll say that’s not a first-order question, it’s a second-order question, not a deep one. So answer a second-order question.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Excellent question, because it takes us back to the booklet. And I even explain this a bit in the booklet. My claim is twofold. First of all, those who are called lightweights—A, they are not always lightweights; rather, that’s a label the conservatives stick onto anyone who isn’t conservative. And today it’s common to divide the Religious Zionist public into Hardalim and lightweights, which is outrageous. It is surrender to vile conservative propaganda, and the most easily absorbed kind. That’s one thing. Second, many of the lightweights are lightweights because they were pushed there. When you understand that people don’t avoid legumes just because they’re stupid, and you say, wait, I’m not willing to worship that God—then you become lightweight. But the truth is that if I now tell him, listen, I’m also not willing to worship that God, and therefore you don’t need to be lightweight for that. Come, I’ll give you a thin Jewish law, a thin theology, and behind it you can stand and be serious, not lightweight. Now the conservatives will call you lightweight, just as they call me lightweight. Actually they don’t call me lightweight—lightweight is Reform; they call me much worse than that. But I say, who cares about their criteria? They mean nothing to me. What I’m trying to offer—

[Speaker A] By the way, your grandmother wasn’t lightweight, let me tell you that. Far from it. Your grandmother was not lightweight.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And neither am I.

[Speaker A] Right, but your students are—that’s the point, you understand? You’re the rabbi of—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, I disagree.

[Speaker A] Listen, I’m willing to accept—wait a second—there is something I’m willing to accept from you. Meaning, one of the examples of sex education, or the lack of sex education in the religious public—and I heard this on a bus—is that once a religious girl or young woman is no longer observing no-touching rules, yes, at that level, then from her point of view everything is lost, finished, everything. And that gradualness which the secular public recognizes in many aspects—it doesn’t exist. Meaning, once something breaks, yes, once you went to the army, once you ate legumes, once you weren’t careful about a tertiary vessel, once you voted not according to what the great Torah sages said, then that’s it, everything is gone. And then you say no, no, no, wait, listen, there are things that are at the core and things that aren’t at the core. Come know that there are things—you know, it doesn’t make sense that there’s a ranking of commandments. It doesn’t make sense that you’d be careful about the dairy part in chicken before you’d be careful about the dairy part in meat. Just an example.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I object to what you just said and completely disagree. In my view there is no ranking at all. In that sense I’m completely Haredi.

[Speaker A] Even though sociologically you agree with me.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Sociologically I can agree with many things; sociology doesn’t interest me. My claim is that someone who violates Jewish law violates Jewish law. I agree it’s not a package deal, but not because of ranking, not because of some hierarchy, but because someone who doesn’t keep one thing should at least keep the others. If someone ate garlic, should he go back and eat more garlic? Meaning, that’s something else. I’m talking about something completely different. I’m not talking about something less important or more important. I’m talking about something that is simply incorrect. I’m talking about the fact that not eating legumes is not less important—it is stupidity not to eat legumes. That’s my claim. I’m not saying that if someone eats legumes we should forgive him and not lose him, as long as he keeps the Sabbath. No, I’m saying we all ought to eat legumes because whoever doesn’t eat legumes is being stupid. That’s my claim.

[Speaker A] Yes, but okay, then in response I’ll say there are really two prohibitions—one is legumes, one is soaked matzah—and apparently soaked matzah is something you can keep if you’re super-righteous. So could there be, in your imaginary world, a person who doesn’t keep the legumes prohibition because it’s stupid, but does keep soaked matzah? Right. And my claim is that such a person does not exist.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What do you mean doesn’t exist? So right now I’m writing booklets and books and lectures so that he will exist.

[Speaker A] But you agree with me about this story?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, I don’t agree categorically. I agree there isn’t a large group like that, but in my view there are very many people who inwardly are exactly like that. And because this identity is not presented as an option on the map of identities, they don’t find themselves anywhere and they say, okay, if I’m not Haredi then I’m lightweight. But I claim no—there is a third identity. That’s the title of my booklet. There is a third identity, and once I think this identity is presented to people—by the way, both Haredim and Religious Zionists—a great many people on both sides of the divide will find themselves there. And they’ll stop defining themselves as lightweights. They won’t not eat legumes—they’ll eat legumes now; before, they ate legumes without understanding the halakhic basis, but they understood it was stupid. And now I’m saying to them: listen, you’re right, it really is stupid. So they’ll continue to eat legumes, but now they won’t be lightweights. So they’ll do some of the things—I’m not naive, obviously there are many people who are just plain lightweights and don’t care. But I claim, and to that segment I direct my words, there are people to whom it does matter. They revolt against the conservative religious picture, which they are unwilling to belong to. And therefore, since there is no third identity, they remain lightweights. And I say no—there is another identity option, and in my view that option contains a great many people both from the camp called Haredi and from the camp called Religious Zionist. Once it is put before people as a legitimate option, in which they are not required to be stupid, then very many people will not be lightweights, and inwardly, in my view, they are not lightweights.

[Speaker A] The Haredi sociological definition, as I understand it, is such that it won’t allow a person to be Haredi, or in a Haredi environment, in the constellation you’re talking about.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Then those concepts need to be shattered. Why should I care about those concepts? So they won’t allow it. So what? Fine. They’re anachronistic concepts. They’re concepts that need to be killed.

[Speaker A] No, okay, wait, before we start killing things here. In all these issues we always have legumes as really the example that maybe is an unfair example because it’s so crazy, really because it’s so crazy.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What a battle is being fought over it, though.

[Speaker A] By the way, I once heard a lecture from a Sephardi rabbi who was trying to calm Ashkenazim down. He said that in recent years he has been dealing with the subject, and he once asked why Ashkenazim eat legumes? And then he said, now I see what’s going on, and I ask why Sephardim—now why do Sephardim eat legumes? But he still eats legumes. I agree, but can you give me other examples besides legumes where you say, listen, this is the marital, family, value equivalent of legumes? What? The issue of women on a religious court, women as testimony?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Of course. Women as testimony—I’m actually not fully closed on that. I definitely think there’s a basis for it, but I’m not fully closed on it. By the way, women are accepted as testimony today in rabbinical courts, and of course nobody says this, but they do it all the time. Those same winks—they do everything I’m saying.

[Speaker A] Women as wedding witnesses, for example.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] They accept them because, you know, it’s not testimony in the formal sense and so on, things like that. The point is, for example, prenuptial agreements, conditions in marriage—those are the basic things, because they really create distress. I’m not talking about things that are just nonsense and don’t interest anyone. Fine, let it stay; everyone has his nonsense. But there are things that create distress, and there is no reason in the world that this should happen. Those are the first things I would change. Now do you understand? When I married a couple with a condition, okay? And then she came—of course I demanded that they register, because I don’t like the trend today where people marry—I very much like marrying outside the rabbinate, I don’t like marrying outside the rabbinate and not registering. Because that creates a very serious halakhic, legal, and social problem. And somehow—the rabbinate is the one creating this, of course, because even though in slogans it tries to prevent it—

[Speaker A] What does it mean to marry with a condition? That means there can’t be a case of agunah, right? Meaning that a person cannot—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] At least many cases of agunah are solved, yes. Now what happens in such a situation? There is no opinion in Jewish law that kiddushin with a condition are invalid. There is no such opinion. There is no opinion that the condition is void. So what do they tell you? That it is not proper to make a condition. Most halakhic decisors think it’s improper to make a condition. Now this couple, whom I required to register, went through the rabbinate, which of course refused, and then they went to the Supreme Court. The rabbinate submitted a defense brief to the Supreme Court full of lies. They simply lied brazenly. Rabbis with well-known names simply lied brazenly. I’m not talking about a dispute where he thinks one way and I think another—there are disputes in Jewish law. They simply lied. To claim that the kiddushin are invalid because there is a condition—that is a lie. But they do not hesitate to lie. Now in other places they will do what I do, as long as it’s them doing it because they are the monopoly. But they also won’t say it. Do you understand? There is some kind of—everything that I say, in my view, ultimately happens in Jewish law and happens today too, by the way.

[Speaker A] By the way, when Rabbi Cherlow talks about women denied a get and says the phrase “there is law but no judge,” does he mean the techniques you’re talking about?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I don’t know, you’d have to ask him. If I were saying that phrase, I would mean this. Okay, now—

[Speaker A] Fine, now those are the significant things, and basically again—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The significant thing, and the other significant thing, is saving a gentile’s life on the Sabbath. Again, everyone does it, but everyone does it while saying that on a deserted island they supposedly wouldn’t do it, and I say that even on a deserted island they would do it. But of course, no one was ever on a deserted island, a Jew and a gentile alone, so we are very happy that we can keep making declarations of loyalty to Jewish law as it used to be, when in practice it demands nothing from us. Everyone does this in a large part of the cases, except for the cases that become some kind of touchstone over which World War III is fought. In most other cases, in the end people do what makes sense, without saying it, let’s call it that.

[Speaker A] So I want to sharpen something here from the Reform side, because I think you’re saying something that is really so unintuitive for a lot of people, and you bring it up several times in your writings. For instance, regarding what the Sages knew and what the Sages didn’t know. In those contexts, we’re basically saying, wait a second, you’re going against the Sages—the Sages said something specific, and you’re basically smarter than the Sages. The example you often bring is the topic of… the topic of “a person does not repay before the term.” Meaning, if the loan—if I gave you a one-year loan, chances are, there’s a presumption that you won’t repay before the year is up. And then you make an interesting move—I’ll say it briefly and you expand on it—that this was true in the time of the Sages. But today, today people with interest, a person might repay during the term. So what do I do with the statement of the Sages that is no longer true? I say that where there is a presumption, I can extract money without an oath. So if you could please sharpen this issue—where do the Sages make statements about human beings, and where do they make statements that are truth, and where do I listen and where not? Because why am I supposed to listen to the presumption that a person does not repay before the term and say okay, here they weren’t right, but the statement that if there is a presumption then you exempt from an oath—that’s an eternal statement.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay, so let me explain for a moment—this really is a whole Torah in itself, I’ll try to do it briefly. First of all, it’s not true that they weren’t right. The example you gave is actually the opposite example. It’s an example that says reality changed, not that they weren’t right. They were right for their time. Reality changed, and that’s completely reasonable. Even religious courts would rule that way, in my opinion, because if reality has changed then obviously no one will say there is a presumption that a person does not repay before the term. Reality is different—it’s a factual claim, there is no holiness in that claim. I only ask: if that’s true regarding the presumption that a person does not repay before the term, why is it not true regarding the presumption of “better to sit as two than sit alone”? There, for some reason, religious courts are very hesitant to say that women today are not willing to pay any price to be in a relationship. No, there are things women do not want. That’s just a fact. And there they won’t say it. Now I say: there is of course no explanation for this except the sociological explanation, because it becomes some point around which there is an ideological confrontation between the innovators, the Reform, whatever, the modern religious, and conservatism—so it becomes ideology. But that is stupidity, because it is exactly the same as the presumption that a person does not repay before the term. There is no difference at all. And both of these examples, incidentally, are not examples of the Sages not knowing; they are examples of a situation where reality changed. They spoke about a reality they knew, their own reality, in their own time. Reality today is different. When I speak about things the Sages didn’t know, that’s for example like killing a louse on the Sabbath, yes, where they thought a louse does not reproduce sexually, whatever, and therefore they decided it was permitted to kill it. Today we have different knowledge. There is no reason in the world to assume that the Sages knew better than we do; they knew less than we do. There are quite a few mistakes of the Sages in the Talmud on scientific and other matters, and anyone who denies that is denying facts, denying facts. And therefore there is no—I’m not belittling the Sages because of this either. They were righteous and wise people for their time, and they knew what was known in their time. That’s all. No more and no less.

[Speaker A] You don’t think it’s like Maimonides says, that the things they say there are parables? Or are there things where you say, forget it—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s a mistake.

[Speaker A] I’ll say—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That it’s parables in those matters where even in their time that knowledge already existed. So if they say something that contradicts the knowledge they themselves already had, then apparently it’s a parable. But if they say something that goes against quantum theory, then I don’t need to say it’s a parable—they simply didn’t know quantum theory. When Maimonides says these things, or Rabbi Abraham son of Maimonides says these things, he means things that were known in their own time, where the Sages say nonsense in terms of their own time. So he says: don’t be a fool—they didn’t say nonsense; apparently it was some kind of parable to convey one idea or another. But when they said something that in their time really was what people thought, and it was the best knowledge available then, and today we think differently—then why should I cling to what they said?

[Speaker A] Okay, let’s move to a question that I think really does contain something that divides the religious public from the Haredi public, and I’m interested to hear your angle on this story precisely because you talk about this issue in either the third part of your book or the second, I think the third—the issue of the leading sage of the generation. Yes, the issue of what gives us, what will grow for us the great Torah figures? Yes? Now, a Haredi friend once told me that in the end, from his point of view, what really separates the religious public and the Haredi public is that every Haredi mother secretly, really, in her heart, simply wants her son to be Rabbi Kanievsky. Plain and simple. And a religious mother, if her son is doing a physics matriculation, and he leaves everything and starts learning Talmud, she’ll say: what happened to the kid? Meaning, learn, it’s really great that you’re learning Talmud, yes, but let’s make sure you’ve got your matriculation and your studies, that everything will be fine, yes? The idea—David Weiss Halivni, yes, who passed away not long ago—he is not the ideal of Haredi culture, and on the other hand between us he’s also not the ideal of Religious Zionist culture, which would have preferred Amnon Shashua or would have preferred Kahneman. And that’s a statement that can be—I think in many cases it’s true. You can come and say the Hardalim sit somewhere in the middle. And this is the issue of the leading sage of the generation, and you talk about how we produce the next leading sage of the generation. And my question is whether, in your view—and you can say this is a self-interested question or a question of what I get out of it—whether in your view a leading sage of the generation, and we had a conversation back then about Rabbi Kanievsky of blessed memory, can emerge from such an identity? Or do you say no, there are still other identities, and the leading sage of the generation will emerge from there. I—you—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] There are several different questions in what you said. Different ones. The question is whether you mean great Torah scholars or the leading sage of the generation. Those are two different things. The question of where the leading sage of the generation will come from is an individual question. In my opinion, only from this identity. Because in my view Rabbi Chaim Kanievsky was not the leading sage of the generation. Nor were any of his peers. And I am far from belittling them, as I told you then as well. But that is not greatness. It is greatness of a certain kind, a certain aspect—mastery of sources, diligence, devotion to Torah—all true. But the narrowing was so severe that to call such a thing the leading sage of the generation is a distortion beyond measure. In my view, young Religious Zionist rabbis are a thousand times greater than Rabbi Chaim Kanievsky. We have ten to the kilo who are greater than Rabbi Chaim Kanievsky—not in knowledge, but in greatness in Torah. Now the question is, what is greatness in Torah? Rabbi Chaim Kanievsky knew everything by heart. Already Rabbi Chaim of Volozhin writes that today information itself has less value. Because we already have information repositories, we have books—the value of holding the information in your head is no longer what it once was, though it is still important.

[Speaker A] Look, I tell all my students that there’s a very high correlation between people who know library functions in MATLAB and Python by heart and people who are good programmers. Not that if you spend all day studying library functions you’ll become a good programmer, but a good programmer can be presumed to know the library functions by heart. You’re saying to review a hundred and one times—this goes beyond nostalgia or that nice old-fashioned thing. I have the responsa database, because I say: the responsa database—if you don’t live inside these things, if you can’t make those transitions in your head, it won’t give you the answer.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So then—I’ll answer you on that again in two senses. Every model has a price. Every model of greatness in Torah, every model of serving God, has a price. Nobody is perfect. The price of the kind of greatness I’m describing is that, yes, there usually isn’t absolute command of all the sources by heart, unless you’re really a phenomenon. Okay? The price of Haredi greatness is much heavier. Meaning, you keep describing the prices of liberal greatness—or I don’t know what to call it, the more open, more modern kind—but you ignore those prices. And those prices are that a Jew like Rabbi Chaim Kanievsky, who knows all the sources by heart, makes decisions on the level of a child in kindergarten. And that’s called greatness in Torah? The man doesn’t know what an exponent is. Can he make decisions? Now I’m saying that’s not his role, and that’s perfectly fine—that he dedicates his life to knowing the sources, and that’s all good. But to see him as a person who should make decisions, or to see him as the leading sage of the generation, is a distortion beyond measure. I’d rather have an average rosh metivta in a hesder yeshiva make decisions than Rabbi Chaim Kanievsky.

[Speaker A] Oh wow, that’s going to be an interesting story.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, unequivocally. Unequivocally. And that’s why I’m saying—there are prices. He can miss things, like you said earlier; there are things he doesn’t know, maybe he’ll miss them; you don’t always know what to look for in the responsa database. But Rabbi Chaim Kanievsky misses things even though he knows everything written in the responsa database. He misses them because of his intellectual ability and because of his education—his lack of education. And again, I’m not criticizing him; I’m criticizing the society that put him in a position, or a status, or a role that doesn’t suit him. I myself appreciate him very much. I think we need lots of people like that. It’s worthy of admiration—his devotion and his knowledge.

[Speaker A] Holy people, if that phrase means anything. Because the rosh metivta in the hesder yeshiva isn’t holy.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s an article in philosophy, between saint and—I don’t remember what—something.

[Speaker A] Right, but the point is, again, one of the things you say very interestingly in the trilogy is that with halakhic decisors there’s ruling from the outside and ruling from the inside. If I don’t know your world of content, then I can’t issue a ruling for you. If I don’t understand the value of art and poetry and, yes, music for example, in culture, then everything is the evil inclination, right? You want to listen to women singing—it’s the evil inclination.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I’m making an even more far-reaching claim. There are things that, if they’re missing in you, then you can’t issue rulings even for your own flock. Obviously you won’t be able to issue rulings for people in a completely different cultural world, in matters that belong to that specific culture, if it’s far from you and you don’t really understand it. But what I claimed earlier is something even more far-reaching. I—I don’t think Rabbi Chaim Kanievsky could issue rulings for Haredim, not for me. Because he made mistaken decisions, simply because of lack of education or lack of access to sources of knowledge, acquaintance with concepts. So spare me all these mysticisms that you can derive everything from the Torah through letter skips. I don’t buy it. And I think most Haredim don’t buy it either, by the way, deep in their hearts, even though many times what is in the heart does not reach the mouth—they don’t dare say it.

[Speaker A] Fine, leave it, you know—we don’t want to get into those places of whether that’s really what they think. Even the phrase “false consciousness” was hard for me. But basically what you’re saying is that if I look, for example, at the recent controversy around Rabbi Melamed’s books and rulings—and he’s really, really, really religious—then in practice he’s going in a direction pretty close to the one you’re going in.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Correct. By the way, Rabbi Melamed—even before he made this shift that everyone is talking about, and I don’t know him personally, and before he made this shift in direction—I’m not even sure how much of a shift there really is here, but never mind, things matured. Already years ago I told my guys: the man is not my cup of tea. He comes from a completely different study hall, from a hardal world, from the home of Rabbi Melamed the father, right? Meaning, really not my cup of tea. And I identify in him an intellectual honesty and straightforwardness that I value very much. According to his own method—I don’t always agree with him. And those things suddenly came out from potential into actuality, and suddenly he became closer to me in practice too. And I think that’s a result of his honesty. Because I accuse a lot of conservatives of dishonesty. Because I claim that many of them understand that I’m right. And here I return to the slippery-slope question you raised earlier, which I want to answer now because I didn’t answer it then. The slippery slope is the weapon of the weak. Because I think: first of all, debate with me about whether I’m right. After you debate with me about whether I’m right, and we reach the conclusion that I am right, then you can raise the slippery-slope claim—which I don’t dismiss out of hand. You can hear it. I think it’s exaggerated many times, but it’s not baseless. It needs discussion. But many times people skip over the discussion of whether I’m right or not, and they tell me, wait, wait—but if you’re right, then the whole Torah collapses. Okay, so the whole Torah collapses—what can you do? But first tell me whether I’m right. After that let’s try to think how the Torah won’t collapse. I think it also won’t collapse; on the contrary, it will collapse if we don’t do what I think. It is collapsing, not just will collapse. It’s already collapsing. But the main thing I have against the slippery slope is that people discuss it before discussing the thing itself. I say: discuss it at stage two. But first address what I’m saying. What I’m saying with the swimsuits—am I right logically? Meaning, is it true that a change like this is consistent? Is it true that changes like this can be found by the thousands in halakhic literature? Anyone who says no simply doesn’t know what halakhic literature is. Rather, what do you say? Yes, but when you formulate it as a general principle, you can use it to dismantle all of Jewish law and nothing will remain of it. So first, I don’t agree with that. But even if you’re right—okay, then let’s now discuss what to do with it. But you can’t tell me on the basis of that argument that I’m not right. That’s just demagoguery. You understand? Now say: okay, you’re right, but let’s think what to do with it. And the option of “you’re right, but let’s not reveal it” in my opinion doesn’t exist today. Because today everything is transparent; today everything comes out. An anecdote: in the last class I gave in this series, last Thursday, on conservatism and tradition—the series is still continuing—I spoke there about the status of a convert. I wrote an article for Tehumin; I sent an article on the status of a convert to Tehumin, and the Tehumin editorial board refused to publish it. Not because they disagreed with my argument, but because I started with the question: how can it be that Jewish law doesn’t give equal status to a convert and a born Jew? There is discrimination. Unequivocally in Jewish law—in treatment, in appointments to positions of authority, and in all kinds of things like that. And after that I explained that this is not correct—that Jewish law does give equal status, and in my view the contrary interpretation is a distortion. You need to dismantle, again, a midrash—I did a conservative midrash there; that’s another example, you were looking for examples earlier. That’s another example. And I showed—and by the way, this midrash I can even show from the sources themselves, prove it. So that makes it even stronger. Because I accept such a midrash even without proofs. But there I even have proofs. And I reach the conclusion that it’s perfectly fine—Jewish law behaves excellently toward converts. The details don’t matter now, I’m just giving the schema. Now Tehumin told me: look, wonderful, but you’re raising the question, and people will read the question and not read the answer, and there’ll be criticism, and once again Jewish law and what it does, and so on and so forth. I told them: look, this is a different era. We’re not living in the Second Temple period. There’s the internet, there’s a multiplicity of views, people know both from outside and from inside. It comes out, it will come out, it’ll be exposed at some point. And when it’s exposed at some point, the answers you’ll give will look like apologetics. But if you publish my article, where an honest question is put on the table and a shattering answer stands beside it—that is, you also provide the answer—it no longer looks like apologetics. Then a person who asks the question can find the answer beside it. So if you’re talking tactics—but slippery slope—I think that tactically too, it’s wrong to be so afraid of the slippery slope.

[Speaker A] Did you convince them? No. So there you go. I want to ask you here, because in the end, you know, for our purposes we know there’s something maybe inherently conservative, right? The word “conservative” comes out of your mouth as if it’s a dirty word. Let’s put things on the table. There is, in the end, something conservative in the tradition of Israel, right? Later authorities don’t disagree with medieval authorities, and the Talmud doesn’t disagree with the Mishnah—at least, wait, at least not in its Mishnaic form. Could the Talmud present the Mishnah in a ridiculous light because the Talmud thinks the Mishnah was wrong? Suppose we think yes. But we’re playing some kind of game. Who thinks yes?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What? Who thinks yes?

[Speaker A] Meaning, you’re not saying the Talmud sometimes…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The Talmud did not disagree with the Mishnah.

[Speaker A] It didn’t disagree with the Mishnah. So there—you know what, fine, then another…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I wrote an article on forced interpretations, and there I explained the concept of a forced interpretation, which people misunderstand.

[Speaker A] So then another—so then it’s completely clear that there were things, right? So there were—even more so, then you strengthen me even more. There were obviously things that probably in the Talmud they did not agree with the Mishnah, and if it had been an Amora they would have disagreed with him, because Rav is a Tanna and can disagree, but if it’s the Mishnah then they don’t disagree. They give honor to tradition. There is intrinsic respect for conservatism. So after you trashed conservatism for over an hour, what’s the other side of it? What do I take from it? The fact that Michael Abraham will write in Parashat Ki Tetze what he’s going to write, and then everyone will go after him, or Rabbi Melamed will write and then they’ll go after him, and then another three years later it’ll enter the loop? Meaning, is that part of the game we have to play?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Look, first of all I’ll give you a preface. I have nothing specifically against conservatism any more than against innovation. I’m against ideologies. I think a person should do what he thinks is right, and not do what was done because he’s conservative, and not do what wasn’t done because he’s innovative. A person should act substantively, and conservatism and innovation are non-substantive paths. So I’m not going out against conservatism; I’m going out against lack of substance. I go against innovation exactly as much as against conservatism. I’m not claiming there are no conservatives and no innovators, or that I’m conservative and not innovative. I’m claiming that my consideration is not that I need to be innovative; rather, I tell you what I think. A scholar may come from the side and say, ah, this is an innovative halakhic thinker. Fine, maybe he’s right, but that’s the scholar’s business. When considerations of conservatism and innovation enter into the discussion, that’s a distortion. I go out against both of those sides simultaneously. Therefore I don’t see anything good in conservatism—there is no other side. It’s purely bad. But innovation is the same. Purely bad. Because I think a person should rule according to what he understands, to the best of his knowledge, and that’s it. Not go with agendas. People talked about Ruth Gavison, right, that she had an agenda. I’m against people with agendas too. I’m against people when the agenda plays a role in the considerations they present. An agenda can lead you to look for something, to look for considerations, but the consideration itself cannot be “I’m conservative” or “I’m innovative.” The consideration itself has to be a halakhic consideration that holds water. And therefore I go against this; I don’t see any positive side to it. It’s entirely negative. Because in my eyes all conservative arguments are non-substantive arguments, by definition, by virtue of being conservative arguments. If someone says we should do what was done because he thinks it’s right even today, that’s not conservatism. That’s conservatism by coincidence. Meaning, he thinks this is correct today; it just so happens to come out the same as what was correct yesterday. That’s not called conservatism.

[Speaker A] There’s no connection at all to what happened yesterday—that’s exactly the point. The point is that ostensibly you’re granting, you know, I did my doctorate in Bayesian filters, right? So the question of what happened yesterday is a question that occupies me very, very much all the time. Meaning, there is a connection to what happened yesterday. Where is the added value of what happened yesterday?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I’m saying: I can understand what happened yesterday the way one understands Talmudic reality. Scholars deal a lot—academic scholars deal a lot… I’m not interested in that whole story. Talmudic reality is something through which you can, however, understand the Talmud’s way of thinking, and then apply that here. And in fact, that very occupation can explain to you how to apply it today differently from how it was there, if you understand correctly what happened there. So I can be interested in what happened yesterday, but not because it happened yesterday. Rather because from what happened yesterday I’ll better understand what our sages thought, and I’ll apply it correctly for today.

[Speaker A] But a little while ago, at the beginning of the conversation, you told me that the reason that even for you intellectual changes happen faster than practical changes—right, in your own private life this happens, right? Meaning, it’s not clear: I don’t care what happened, and it’s not conservative and it’s not this—so why don’t you do things you believe in? It takes time.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, because what I’m really sure about, I’ll do—as long as it isn’t public. Public matters need consensus. But on the personal plane—still, I have considerations this way and that, and now my considerations tilt me in this direction or that direction, so I don’t immediately say, okay, that’s my consideration, so that’s what I do. There’s a certain caution or responsibility that exists even for someone who follows what he thinks. I don’t have a clear, unequivocal position or conclusion on everything.

[Speaker A] Maybe I’ll put it another way. You know that when the Japanese saw they weren’t as strong as the Americans in the 19th century, they said: okay, what’s one reason? We don’t eat meat, we eat only fish; the Americans eat meat. So the emperor announced: from now on everyone eats meat. What had been forbidden in their religion for years—now the emperor said from now on we change it. There, in one day, everyone changed—the Japanese. That doesn’t happen with the Jews, okay? No matter what happens, with the Jews it doesn’t work. The question is what do you expect from this manifesto? Because I’ll tell you what: one of the most frustrating things about this trilogy—I really read it cover to cover and it’s amazing—is that I didn’t see, and I very much hope I’m wrong, a public discussion of the trend you presented. You brought—how shall I put it—you said, you put something on the table, and other than the already convinced, maybe I didn’t really see people relating to it.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So I see it differently, also from the reactions I get, directly and indirectly. For many, many people this helped them crystallize tremendously. When you talk about convincing the convinced, I always think you should convince only the convinced. The problem is that many times the convinced don’t know they’re convinced. You don’t like “false consciousness,” neither do I, but a fact is a fact—there are such things. And a lot of people think like I do and either are afraid or are not aware that they think like I do, because they were educated that it’s illegitimate, that it’s Reform, or whatever. And I’m trying to show them that it is legitimate, and that this is a possible path—and also the correct one, not only a legitimate one. And then many people find it within themselves. So do you call that convincing the convinced? Maybe, but it is definitely something of value. And I think a great many of the people who read it—you know, there was once an anecdote they showed me on Facebook: someone said, “Michael Abraham kept my kippah on my head,” and someone else said, “Michael Abraham kept my head under the kippah.” And there are also those who say, by the way, “Michael Abraham helped me take the kippah off my head”—there are those too. But I meant the first two in this context. There really are many people who will continue this way; they’ll keep doing what they’re used to doing, but there’s no head under the kippah. And eventually they discover that this is the path they themselves really believe in. In my opinion, by the way, that’s the majority of the public. And if it doesn’t go captive after the accepted conservative and innovative propaganda—again, Reform and conservative are the same in my eyes because both are non-substantive—the conservatives and the innovators are the same thing. That’s why people often don’t know how to read me, because there are issues in which I’m super conservative, a Litvak as you called it earlier, who laughs at all the emotional, Hasidic, ideological trends—all that bullshit—and on the other hand some kind of innovator, Reform-like. And I claim that’s exactly the point. People try to put me into a label: are you Reform or are you conservative? I oppose both the Reformers and the conservatives.

[Speaker A] By the way, I have to say in your case that you really manage to annoy everyone, and it’s wonderful, but your lines of logic are clear, and you also formulate them in the trilogy. If this is so, then this is so; if this is so, then this is so—and I run with those lines. In other words, you’re actually fairly predictable. Meaning, what comes after the Talmud, what is written in the Talmud—we do, unless it’s like this. You tried to come and say: I’m not going by what I feel like and what is convenient for me, but rather these are the lines, and these lines produce for me a thin theology. Meaning—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] My main goal, in the trilogy too, which came afterward, and on the website even more so, is exactly that. Meaning, first, to try to create a systematic, consistent worldview, such that someone who knows it can definitely also predict what I’m going to say, even though to someone who doesn’t know me it sounds like a jumble of contradictions. And second, I’m trying to educate people to think substantively, not from the gut. If something looks Reform to you, that still doesn’t mean it’s Reform—think about it. If something looks conservative to you, that still doesn’t mean it’s conservative—think about it. You’ll discover that sometimes you’re Reform and sometimes you’re conservative because you’re neither this nor that—you’re substantive. And someone who is substantive, sometimes he’s this and sometimes he’s that. And once you’re substantive, then you also have a logical line, a consistent and systematic line of thought, an orderly framework within which you think, and then naturally you also become predictable. So it’s not that I’m trying to be unpredictable—on the contrary, I’m trying to be predictable.

[Speaker A] By the way, you should ask your students, whoever read the book—here’s an issue, let’s see if you read it—what am I going to say about it, you understand? Right. Now I want to ask you: at the end of the manifesto you bring questions and answers, and one of the questions is an interesting one. You said you’re not political; well then, where does the funding come from? The funding comes from private people, friends who believe in the importance of this discussion. So in the end, to be in all the synagogues next to the notices for trips abroad and next to “Israel Parnas” isn’t a simple thing. And in the end you say, at least in the title—the title from the start is “Not political, a third identity.”

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Not political? Yes political—just not party-political.

[Speaker A] Yes, sorry, I wrote political, yes political, not—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Party-political.

[Speaker A] Wait a second, I see it the other way around—not party-political. Right? Meaning, I’m not going to vote for one particular person. And if I look at the last sentence in the manifesto, it goes like this: “This little booklet cannot lay the exact infrastructure for constructing what a modern religious person is; it contains an initial direction for renewed thought and for gathering the social and rabbinic forces that identify with the identity extracted from the fog and placed here on the table. Those who espouse it can come from Religious Zionism, with or without a hyphen, and even from factors that do not define themselves as Zionist. The time has come to break free of the straitjacket of conservatism that has been forced on us again and again. In the end I believe we can add the anti-eraser and paint the world green”—this connects to what you said at the beginning—“instead of an anachronistic black and white.” What do you expect or long for—no, I don’t want to say pray for because that’s just an empty word—what do you expect, in your best fantasy, to happen because of this manifesto?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Look, what will happen because of this manifesto won’t be measurable—that’s clear. There is a process that in my opinion is already happening, and it even has certain political expressions. Matan Kahana, Bennett—they are initial political expressions, not fully crystallized, mainly because in my opinion they don’t have an ideological infrastructure. I sent Matan Kahana this booklet, because in my opinion it could definitely help him crystallize his views, because he’s more or less the only one who really speaks this language. But the political expressions are not what interest me. They’re signs that something is happening in religious society itself, and it’s already happening today; the manifesto didn’t create it. It’s happening. But it needs a name, it needs conceptualization, it needs to be defined as a legitimate option. Once that happens, then this phenomenon can expand, can gain legitimacy—or stop expecting legitimacy from the sides, from the black and the white, and whistle at their criticisms—and slowly there will really emerge here some sort of third line of identity, or an updated watershed line.

[Speaker A] Or a party of people who want Ben-Gvir from his nationalist side and want modern religiosity.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, and that’s why I say it’s not party-political by definition. For example, I didn’t write in the booklet whom it’s worth voting for or whom I’m going to vote for. And by the way, contrary to what people got the impression, I don’t think at all that it’s worthwhile to establish a modern religious party. There’s no place for it—what do we need that party for? You can vote for a secular party according to your view on the various issues. I have no interest in having religious things done by the state. So it really isn’t party-political, not at all. It’s not apologetics, some attempt to hide so there won’t be an affiliation; parties don’t interest me. I’m not sure I’m even going to vote in the upcoming elections. What interests me is what happens publicly. I assume there will be political implications in the long run, but what interests me are the public struggles, the identities, the takeover by the conservatives, the silencing and loss of what is in my view the main segment of what today is called Religious Zionist, which is actually modern religious. It has no expression today. All its leadership is Haredi, conservative leadership. The political leadership and the rabbinic leadership—everything. There is no difference between Smotrich and Gafni.

[Speaker A] It may be, but your audience—would you agree that even though you’re saying this lies between, it’s not Haredi or Religious Zionist but conservative versus modern, most of the audience and most of those who buy—let’s say most of those who follow you and buy your things—sit on the knitted-kippah line? You’re writing this more for the Religious Zionist crowd, could that be?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The picture is more complex than that too. First, the booklet is written for the knitted-kippah crowd. But the reason is very prosaic. I have no way of reaching Haredim. Where do you distribute booklets among Haredim? Where do Haredim have internet and Facebook? I have no channels.

[Speaker A] You’re not advertising it in Yated Ne’eman.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] They won’t publish it. I’d love to publish it there. In my opinion—and they asked me this on the website—I think this booklet is intended for Haredim maybe even more than for Religious Zionists, because there the processes are happening more underground and need more crystallization. Among Religious Zionists it’s already beginning to come onto the table slowly, even without me; I didn’t invent the wheel here. I think this booklet is directed at the entire religious public. It’s written in the language of Bennett and Matan and the Religious Zionist public because that’s who I’m addressing, that’s who the booklet will reach. But if you ask me who is exposed to my ideas and whom they influence, it’s really not true that it’s mainly the Religious Zionist world. Not true. In my opinion among Haredim no less, and maybe more. It’s just that these processes don’t crystallize and don’t receive publicity; they’re not carried in the open air. It happens through lots and lots of individuals, or little groups in internet groups and under the table and in meetings with me at home. There are many, many, many people who are sociologically classified as Haredi, and they themselves have no interest in leaving Haredi society. This isn’t people like—you know—what do they call it, Marranos. We’re not talking about Marranos. We’re talking about people who want to remain Haredi. There are also such people, and they still identify completely with my ideas. And many times, by the way, it’s easier for me with Haredim than with Religious Zionists—much easier for me.

[Speaker A] Could it be that in the end—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That they really think like I do.

[Speaker A] Yes, could it be that the Haredim—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That they’re ideological.

[Speaker A] Could it be that the Haredim you know are the Haredim from Tzur Hadassah and so you see—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Wait, I’m not talking about—I didn’t conduct a survey in the courtyard. But there are very many like that.

[Speaker A] No, right, only the issue is, yes—only that a person whose entire acquaintance with Haredim is Dagan and Maimoni—

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I didn’t say all Haredim are like that. That’s an obvious statistical mistake. I’m talking about what I know; it’s not a representative sample—

[Speaker A] Necessarily, and necessarily not a representative sample.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But since I know personally, or am in contact with, very many people, then even though it’s not a representative sample, even as a non-representative sample it means there’s some phenomenon here that is no longer completely negligible. I don’t know its scope, but it’s definitely not negligible. And I’ll say again: in my view these ideas are absorbed much more among Haredim than among Religious Zionists. I would love to adapt this booklet a bit and attach it to Yated Ne’eman and HaModia. There’s no chance they’d do it.

[Speaker A] Right, because it’s also interesting what the manifestation of these ideas among Haredim would be, because as quite a few scholars of Haredi society would say, if people implemented these ideas in practice, the sociological identity of Haredim would dissolve. Now you say, what do I care—but you know, that’s a statement…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] People suddenly—look, sociology is very strong, even though it doesn’t interest me. It’s very strong. And it turns out there are already today many groups that are sociologically defined as Haredi but really are not; they’re modern, and they do many things, including matriculation exams for boys, not just girls. There are already hesder yeshivot, all kinds of things, and this despite all the bans by the rabbis and, of course, the winks under the table.

[Speaker A] Right, there’s Lus from memory and a barbecue on Independence Day and so on.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Haredim are much more complex creatures than they appear on the outside.

[Speaker A] As someone said, we have fifty shades of black.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Exactly. And therefore I think a great many of those Haredim can remain sociologically Haredi with all these ideas. By the way, a large part of the people who approach me and say to me, look, where will the revolution come from? Help us, we’re already searching. I tell them two things. First, you don’t make a revolution without paying prices. And you’re not prepared to pay prices; you want me to make the revolution for you. There are no instant revolutions. You want a revolution without prices. That’s one thing. And second, I told them—even when I was within the Haredi world, true, I wasn’t completely captive because my family was outside, I wasn’t lost, I had education, I wasn’t economically dependent on them, all kinds of things like that, so obviously my situation was better than ordinary Haredim born into it. But still I kept discovering, to my surprise again and again, that the Haredi world digests many things people think it won’t digest. A great many behaviors and statements and outlooks can remain completely inside the Haredi world—if you really say them out of conviction, not out of weakness. You know that this is what you think and this is what you’re going to do. People will respect that. And you’ll remain Haredi. What?

[Speaker A] Do you have one example you can give me?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Tons. Many examples.

[Speaker A] That the Haredi world can contain. I’ll just give one example for anyone who wants to know—anyone who has gotten this far in the conversation should look online at the letter Michael Abraham sent to the mashgiach of his son’s yeshiva, a letter that I happened to read several times. Now I read that letter, and now I hear what you’re saying. It doesn’t fit, my friend, because you’re talking about your commentaries on the weekly Torah portion. What are you talking about?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I spoke with the mashgiach of the yeshiva. I’m not talking about yeshivot digesting such phenomena; I’m talking about Haredi society.

[Speaker A] What can society digest, in your opinion?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It can digest almost anything. Haredi sociology today is in practice an empty shell. Almost anything—so long as a person declares himself Haredi, maybe wears the relevant clothing or something like that, more or less—can still remain within Haredi society. Of course there will be those who go against him, that’s fine; it’s a diverse society. He’ll stay there. There are all kinds of different groups in the Haredi world, some visible, some less visible, but they exist. You know, in our Haredi community in Yeruham it was forbidden for women to drive. A woman who drove got a letter from the rabbi: it’s forbidden to drive, it’s not modest. My wife drove. We never got a letter from the rabbi, because he knew it wouldn’t help him, but nobody threw us out of the community because of it. I didn’t wear a suit, I didn’t wear a hat—not even when I was called up to the Torah in the yeshiva in Bnei Brak. So people kept commenting to me, sometimes jokingly and sometimes not jokingly, but fine, I was part of the society there. I used a computer; the books in the house were books—the whole range of classic books—and fine, they didn’t always put it fully out in the open, the children were a little embarrassed and there was a bit of that, but in the end people knew it was a different kind of home and still recognized us. I took my children out of the cheder on Independence Day to the hesder yeshiva to say Hallel with me, and on Memorial Day to the Memorial Day ceremony at the cemetery at the expense of a day of study in the cheder. Independence Day is the holiest school day there is in the cheder, because you’re not allowed to take a day off. Right? So I went to the principal—after I sent the children in that morning, I went to the principal and told him, I’m taking the children for prayer at the hesder yeshiva. My children were trembling with fear; they were sure they’d be thrown out of cheder. And I told the principal, listen, if you want, throw them out. This is what I think and this is what I’m going to do, and if you think to throw them out, throw them out. He didn’t do it. When people see someone who has a view he’s prepared to stand behind and it’s reasoned—not just some random thing—and to pay prices—

[Speaker A] Exactly.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And sometimes you do pay prices—but in the end, in the end, you’ll find some bubble that will digest you even within the Haredi world, if for some reason you insist on staying there.

[Speaker A] I have to say—so first of all, thank you very much for your time, truly. The second thing I have to say to your credit is that the amount of material you produce for the internet for free is simply amazing. I’m talking about two things. First, the blog, where every week there comes out a non-trivial article, absolutely non-trivial. I was just having a conversation with some professor of deep learning and we talked about your website. I told him, you know, it’s not a simple philosophical issue, but really—from statistics and Pascal’s wager and so many things in an amazing way, for free—it’s on Michael Abraham’s blog, link here. And the second thing is also the series on YouTube, which of course if you’re a person of spirit you’ll pay for, but if not, everything exists for free. The series—the series on modernity, the series on the foundations of faith—those series exist for free, and it’s really very, very, very, very impressive. So in that regard I really have nothing to say except first of all a big bravo, and second, if you still don’t know those series or the other materials, you’re very welcome to take a look, it’s tremendous material. We’re already at column 500.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Everything is on the website; the classes are on the website too.

[Speaker A] So about that I really have nothing to say except thank you very much, and I hope that in the year 5783 we’ll also be able to talk about the first part, about the First Existent. Michael Abraham, thank you very, very much for your time today.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] My pleasure, goodbye.