Interview about the new trilogy on Yaron London’s show
This transcript was generated automatically using artificial intelligence. There may be inaccuracies in the transcribed content and in speaker identification.
🔗 Link to the original lecture
🔗 Link to the transcript on Sofer.AI
Table of Contents
- [0:00] The struggles in the world of faith and Yair Ettinger’s book
- [2:03] The swimsuit-in-the-desert example – tradition versus change
- [3:52] The slow development of Jewish law over time
- [5:13] Conflict between Jewish law and morality – the chocolate example
- [6:51] Normative duality – collision between different value systems
Summary
General Overview
Within the Jewish world of faith, fierce struggles are taking place over internal fragmentation and separation, and Yair Ettinger drew attention to this through a book he wrote. Rabbi Michael Abraham, who holds a doctorate in theoretical physics and serves as head of the yeshiva at the Beit Midrash for Advanced Torah Studies at Bar-Ilan University, presents original perspectives on the timelessness of Jewish law and the tension between liberalism and faith through three books. He argues that debates about heresy and Reform suffer from a lack of basic analysis and conceptual definitions, and he offers a criterion of fidelity to the sources through interpretation. He describes a double commitment to Jewish law and to morality even when they conflict, and emphasizes that decisions in such conflicts are not algorithmic.
Struggles in the world of faith and the public context
Fierce struggles are currently taking place within the Jewish world of faith, and atheists are not all that aware of them. Yair Ettinger, formerly a journalist at Haaretz and now at Kan, drew our attention to this through a book he wrote, and this world is gradually breaking apart and splitting internally. Rabbi Michael Abraham manages to inject these debates with original perspectives and stirring insights because he has one foot planted in the religious sphere and the other deep in the kingdom of science.
Rabbi Michael Abraham’s identity and books
Rabbi Michael Abraham is a theoretical physicist, with a doctorate in theoretical physics, and head of the yeshiva at the Beit Midrash for Advanced Torah Studies at Bar-Ilan University. Recently he published three books examining questions of the timelessness of Jewish law and the tension between liberalism and faith.
When does reflection become heresy, and the criterion of interpretation
The interviewer presents the tension between “see and sanctify” and “see and renew,” and asks when reflection becomes heresy, schism, or division—especially whether this is a proposal to start thinking independently instead of heeding the great sages. Rabbi Michael Abraham says his books were written more or less to answer exactly that, because the discussion is usually conducted on the level of whether something is heresy or not, Reform or not Reform, without the basic analysis needed to define concepts. He gives the example of a group walking in the desert wearing swimsuits as a tradition; they reach a cold region, some put on parkas and some continue in swimsuits. He argues that classifying the first group as Reformists and the second as conservatives depends on the reasoning: if the reasoning is indifference to tradition, that is Reform; but if the reasoning is that the tradition itself requires clothing suited to the weather, then fidelity to tradition requires what looks like change. He concludes that the criterion for departing from the framework is whether one relies on interpretation. Anyone who relies on interpretation is, in his view, not outside the halakhic framework—no matter what interpretation—whereas someone who says he does not bother interpreting because he is not faithful to the sources and is willing to deviate from them is outside the framework.
The response of religious society and the claim of change over time
He is told that in some sectors of the religious world they “stone” him, and he replies that as time passes there is less stoning and more listening, and that overall he feels there is some reward for his labor. He says people are willing to consider well-reasoned arguments, and that he goes into the details, defines and explains things in a theoretical and detailed way that is sometimes heavy but understandable. The interviewer adds that Jewish law does change over time, though slowly—not like a policy shift in a single election cycle—and it develops gradually while still remaining valid.
Who determines the boundaries of the framework and of heresy
When asked who decides when one has departed from the framework of Jewish law and become a heretic, Rabbi Michael Abraham makes the radical claim that no one decides this except the person himself. He says he does not recognize boundaries drawn by other people; as a believing person he is obligated to the Holy One, blessed be He, and what he understands God to be saying is what he must do. He adds that if others want to classify him as outside the fence, they are welcome to it, but he does not accept external boundary-setting.
Jewish law versus intuitive morality and normative conflict
The interviewer raises the constant conflict for a believing person between Jewish law and intuitive moral imperatives and asks how one rules for oneself. Rabbi Michael Abraham says he is subject to two categories even though they can conflict, and he does not try to reconcile them because the reconciliations do not convince him. He illustrates this with an argument over whether to eat chocolate: “it tastes good” and “it’s fattening” are both true, but they belong to different categories. Once one option carries a sanction and the other carries a benefit, a clash arises that requires a decision. He defines the relationship between Jewish law and morality as like the relationship between health and pleasure, and argues that a halakhic principle can be completely anti-moral, and he is not willing to define it as moral if it does not seem moral to him.
The example of homosexuals and the possibility that Jewish law does not always prevail
As an example, he brings up attitudes toward homosexuals and says that in his view Jewish law does not mandate any particular attitude toward them; it prohibits the act, which is a different matter. But the prohibition itself seems to him “anti-moral” and “a moral wrong.” He says that on the simple level he sees no way out, and that at the moment he is in a conflict between a halakhic prohibition and a moral wrong. He argues that even when there is a conflict, Jewish law does not always have the upper hand for him, because he is committed both to Jewish law and to morality, and sometimes this one will prevail and sometimes that one.
State law, normative duality, and non-algorithmic decision-making
When asked whether the same is true of a collision between state law and Torah law, he answers yes and expands on “normative duality,” which can include two or more normative systems, such as state law, morality, the bylaws of the basketball association, and the Torah. He says one can definitely be committed to two systems even when there are contradictions between them, and he distinguishes between types of conflicts that have a “school solution” and those that do not. He notes that even someone committed only to morality also faces conflicts, and the interviewer adds that there is “incommensurability of values,” and that this is not an algorithmic decision.
Conclusion and praise for the philosophical work
The interviewer says he is reading all three books and compliments the philosophical work that has been done, and Rabbi Michael Abraham thanks him. The conversation ends with mutual thanks and a break.
Full Transcript
[Speaker A] Within the Jewish world of faith, fierce struggles are taking place right now. Atheists aren’t all that aware of it, but Yair Ettinger, for example, formerly a journalist at Haaretz and today at Kan, drew our attention to it through a book he wrote, which we discussed here—that this world is breaking apart, splitting internally. Rabbi Michael Abraham, who is a theoretical physicist by one profession, manages to inject these arguments with original points of view and stirring insights, and that’s because one of his feet is planted, as I said, in the religious sphere, while the other is deep in the kingdom of science. He has a doctorate in theoretical physics and is head of the yeshiva at the Beit Midrash for Advanced Torah Studies at Bar-Ilan University. Recently he published books—three books—examining questions of the timelessness of Jewish law, and the tension between liberalism and faith. He’s with us this evening, thank you for coming. Thank you. Tell me, a phrase or saying I come across very often in discussions of faith is something like “see and sanctify” versus “see and renew,” and it’s a phrase familiar to me from many books I’ve read. So my question is: when does reflection become heresy? In other words, are you suggesting to your interlocutors not to heed the words of the great sages, the great interpreters of the Torah throughout the generations—start thinking for yourselves? That’s the question: when does shifting your frightened gaze away from what our sages said begin to become schism, or heresy, or division?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The truth is that my books were written more or less in order to answer that, because usually the discussion on these topics is conducted on the level of whether this is heresy or not heresy, Reform or not Reform. And my feeling is that what’s missing is the basic analysis: define the concepts, and then we’ll be able to classify things instead of speaking from the gut. I’ll explain it through an example. The Torah is pretty complicated, so I’ll explain it through an example that I once got from a mutual friend of ours. A group of people is walking through the desert in swimsuits. Their ancestors also walked that way; that’s their tradition. At some point they reach a cold region. Some of them put on parkas because it’s cold; another group keeps going—you have to pay a price for faithfulness to tradition—and continues in swimsuits. The first group is perceived as, say, Reformist, and the second as conservative, but that’s not accurate, or at least not necessary. If those who put on parkas justify it by saying, “We don’t care about tradition,” or “We care less about tradition,” then maybe they’re Reformist. But if they justify it by saying that the tradition says not to walk around in a swimsuit, but to wear clothing appropriate to the weather, then as long as we were in a hot region we wore swimsuits; once we reached a cold region, the tradition itself tells us to put on a parka. So faithfulness to tradition requires what masquerades as change. Therefore, in brief, the criterion for when you depart from the framework and when you don’t is whether you rely on interpretation. Anyone who relies on interpretation is, in my opinion, in no way outside the framework, no matter what interpretation. Someone who says, “I don’t bother interpreting, because I’m not faithful to the sources, I don’t need interpretation, I’m willing to depart from them”—he is outside the halakhic framework.
[Speaker A] That’s the short answer. Oh, so with a worldview like that, I assume in certain sectors of the religious world they stone you.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] True, but I think that as time goes by there’s less stoning and more listening, and overall I feel there’s some reward for my labor. People are willing to look at reasoned arguments, and precisely because I do go down into the details, trying a bit to define things and explain them in a very theoretical and detailed way—maybe sometimes a little heavy—but I think very understandable.
[Speaker A] Yes, you used the phrase “over time,” and over time Jewish law really does change, and anyone who doesn’t understand that doesn’t understand how the whole thing works—but slowly. It’s not like in one election cycle you can decide that your social policy will be different. Jewish law develops slowly and still remains valid. So my question is: if that’s the case, who decides when you’ve departed from the framework of Jewish law, when you become a heretic?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I have another radical statement: nobody. You decide for yourself. I don’t recognize boundaries drawn by other people. I’m obligated to the Holy One, blessed be He, as a believing person. From my point of view, what I understand Him to be saying—that’s what has to be done. There are people who will of course immediately classify me, or immediately place me outside the fence—good health to them. If they enjoy it, fine. But I do not accept external boundary-setting.
[Speaker A] Look, let’s take up a few of the clashes in which a believing person constantly finds himself. Not me—I’m an atheist, or an apikoros if you like. Jewish law versus intuitive moral imperatives, for example. A big question. Right. What do you do with that? How do you rule for yourself?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, on that matter too, again, there is a kind of orderly, systematic analysis, and again I’ll try to do it briefly through an example. As far as I’m concerned, we’re dealing with two categories that I feel subject to, even though they can contradict each other. Meaning, I’m not trying to reconcile them; in my opinion the reconciliations are unconvincing. What I really want to say is this: take an example—there’s an argument over whether to eat chocolate. Reuven says eat it because it tastes good; Shimon says don’t eat it because it’s fattening. Who’s right? They’re both right. It both tastes good and is fattening. Now the question is whether one person can say both things. Of course he can. There’s no problem at all. A person can say it both tastes good and is fattening. Why? Because these are two different categories.
[Speaker A] But what if there’s a sanction attached to one of the alternatives you choose?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And what if there’s a benefit to the other? Then I’m in a conflict and I have to decide. For me, the relation between Jewish law and morality is like the relation between health and pleasure in the previous example. That means a halakhic principle can be completely anti-moral, and I’m not willing to define it as moral if it doesn’t appear that way to me. For example? For example, the attitude toward homosexuals. By the way, the attitude toward homosexuals is something that, in my view, Jewish law does not require any attitude toward them. Jewish law prohibits it. That’s a different matter. The prohibition itself definitely seems to me anti-moral. Anti-moral. But at the moment—I do have some proposal in the book—but let’s say on the simple level I don’t see a way out. Jewish law prohibits it. As far as I’m concerned, I’m in a conflict. It is halakhically forbidden, and it is a moral wrong. So now I’m in conflict. And more than that, I would also argue that even in situations where there is a conflict, it’s not always the hand of Jewish law that prevails for me. Since I am committed both to Jewish law and to morality, sometimes this will prevail and sometimes that will.
[Speaker A] Maybe that’s also true with a clash between state law and Torah law?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes. Yes. In that context too, I actually speak there much more broadly and theoretically about what is basically normative duality. Normative duality can contain any two normative systems, or several normative systems: state law, morality, the bylaws of the basketball association, and the Torah. And I can absolutely be committed to two systems even though there are contradictions between them.
[Speaker A] Which one do you obey?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] There I distinguish between all kinds of conflicts. There are conflicts for which there’s a textbook solution, and there are conflicts for which there isn’t. But you know, you, as someone committed only to morality, let’s say, and not to Jewish law—you’re also in conflicts. How do you decide between two values in the moral sphere? There is what’s called the incommensurability of values, in philosophical language. That decision is not an algorithmic one.
[Speaker A] Beautiful. You wrote three books. I’m sorry I forgot to bring them from home, because I’m reading them. Imagine that. I’m glad. I won’t read all of this—it’s this and that—but what philosophical work you’ve done, really, all credit to you. Thank you. Fascinating. Thank you very much. Thank you. We’ll go to a break.