Rabbi Dr. Michael Abraham, Founder of the Third Path Movement – Home Gathering in Kfar Saba
This transcript was produced automatically using artificial intelligence. There may be inaccuracies in the transcribed content and in speaker identification.
🔗 Link to the original lecture
🔗 Link to the transcript on Sofer.AI
Table of Contents
- Stereotypical and non-substantive thinking
- “Rotating the coordinate system” — the central idea
- Elections to the Chief Rabbinate — misunderstanding the map
- Jewish law, worldviews, and dispute
- Customs and conservatism without a source
- Exponential processes and COVID
- “Lite” versus a real alternative
- Haredi enlistment and the army
Summary
Overview
A home gathering in Kfar Saba with Rabbi Michael Abraham, founder of the Third Path movement. The Rabbi lays out in detail the analysis underlying the movement: religious identity in Israel is split along an irrelevant line, the attitude toward the state, while the real line cutting across the public is the question of modernity. The Rabbi proposes a “rotation of the coordinate system” — instead of Haredim versus Religious Zionists, the relevant division is conservatives versus moderns, with both Haredim and Religious Zionists on each side.
Stereotypical and non-substantive thinking
The Rabbi shows through many examples that people do not think substantively but according to “labels.” In the controversy over the state conversion system, the Rabbi showed that there were 13 independent questions requiring 8,192 combinations of answers — but in practice there were only two types of positions: Haredi rabbis answered “yes” to everything, Religious Zionist rabbis answered “no” to everything. Another example: the sticker “Rabin has no mandate to return the Golan” mixed together two independent questions — a position on the agreement and a moral-political question — but in practice there were only two groups instead of four.
“Rotating the coordinate system” — the central idea
The Rabbi proposes a model of a coordinate system: one axis is attitude toward Zionism, Haredim versus Religious Zionists; the second axis is attitude toward modernity, conservatives versus moderns. Today the dividing line is drawn on the Zionism axis, but the relevant line is precisely the modernity axis. The conservative wing is already connected, conservative Haredim and Hardalim work together in the coalition. The goal of the Third Path: to connect the other side — modern Haredim with modern Religious Zionists.
Elections to the Chief Rabbinate — misunderstanding the map
The Rabbi analyzes the elections to the Chief Rabbinate as a clear example: Religious Zionists cry that they did not unite, but in practice conservative rabbis were elected because the majority in the electing body is conservative. The struggle was never about Zionism, but about modernity versus conservatism. Six out of seven candidates were conservatives — and they won because that is what the majority wants. The lament afterward shows that people “do not understand themselves.”
Jewish law, worldviews, and dispute
In the discussion with participants, the Rabbi explains that worldviews are an inseparable part of halakhic ruling. Nachmanides wrote in the introduction to Milhamot Hashem that “the wisdom of our Torah” is not like mathematics — it has no conclusive proofs. Different rabbis reach different conclusions because they have different judgments, and that is completely legitimate (“these and those are the words of the living God”). Only when the Sanhedrin ruled (“do not deviate”) was there an absolute obligation to obey; on any other question — there is a range of opinions and no obligation to adopt one view.
Customs and conservatism without a source
The Rabbi brings examples of conservatism with no halakhic basis: customs of Krakow that the Rema inserted into the Shulchan Arukh, such as menstruating women not touching a Torah scroll, are not relevant to someone living in Lod. The prohibition on eating rice on Passover among Ashkenazim — the Rabbi argues that “it is utter nonsense.” The general claim: there is a religious model presented as binding, but it has no basis, and anyone who checks the sources systematically will discover this.
Exponential processes and COVID
The Rabbi uses the example of folding paper 40 times, which yields a thickness that reaches the moon, to illustrate that people do not understand exponential processes. This is the same problem that lay behind Rabbi Chaim Kanievsky’s ruling during COVID — an instruction to open Heders and synagogues that caused the deaths of hundreds of people. The Rabbi argues that leading Haredi Torah figures do not understand large scales and long ranges, and do not consult experts.
“Lite” versus a real alternative
The Rabbi describes how the Haredi world lives in peace with “lite Haredim” — as long as it is clear that the ideal model is conservative Haredi Judaism. The problem begins when someone defines himself as an alternative and not as “lite.” The Third Path is trying to create exactly that: to give people legitimacy to think differently, not as weakness but as an independent ideological model.
Haredi enlistment and the army
On the issue of enlistment, the Rabbi argues that the reason for Haredi opposition to the army is not anti-Zionism but fear of a “melting pot” — fear of exposure to a non-Haredi environment. He rejects the claim that the Haredi way is “safer” in terms of preserving religiosity: “all the secularization of the Jewish people came from the Haredi world” — when it could not cope with the Enlightenment. He also notes that there is a great deal of secularization under the surface in the Haredi world.
Full Transcript
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay, so really this isn’t some formal lesson or anything, but rather an attempt to get a bit acquainted with the direction of the Third Path. Of course you’re welcome to jump in in the middle, ask, comment, whatever you feel like. Maybe I’ll start with the basic description. When we think about religious identity today, not only today but also today, you ask a person: who are you? What do you belong to? People often ask me what camp I belong to, and I don’t know what to answer. Usually the answer is either that I’m Haredi, or I’m national-religious, Religious Zionist, national-religious, something like that. What line separates national-religious from Haredi? So people usually think it’s the attitude toward the state. Right? Meaning, Haredim somehow oppose the state, in one way or another, in varying degrees, but let’s say in general they oppose the state, and the national-religious are in favor. Okay? By definition, the question of Zionism, the state, something like that. Now, the feeling is that this line of attitude toward the state is an irrelevant line. It’s irrelevant. I mean, today you talk to Haredim who say they’re anti-Zionist, and they’re leading the Zionist project today. Half the government. In my time there were elections to the religious council in Yeruham. There was a secular woman candidate against a religious man. And the Haredim supported the secular woman. In Yeruham, in Yeruham, where originally the whole High Court petition was about the fact that a woman couldn’t serve, that a religious woman couldn’t serve, suddenly now a secular woman can too. In short, these stories change pretty easily. In any case, bottom line, somehow it seems ridiculous to see attitude toward the state as a central question.
[Speaker B] What?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What’s the practical difference today between someone who opposes the state and someone who supports it? What’s the difference? Let’s say you do or don’t say Hallel on Independence Day, okay, so you said a few fewer chapters of Psalms. Where does that show up in practice? Nowhere. There’s nowhere, there isn’t. Maybe in feelings. Feelings are something else. Fine, feelings. But what does it mean in practice? In practice it means nothing. Is there anyone on earth who doesn’t want the state to succeed? There isn’t a normal Haredi who doesn’t want the state to succeed. You want the state to be secure, you want the economy to flourish, you’re also part of the whole thing. After all, you can oppose Zionism in general, but you want the state to have money, you want life here to be safe. Obviously, every sane person wants that, right? So where’s the difference? Are we arguing today whether to establish a state when the state has existed for eighty years, and our whole identity rests on the question of whether to establish a state? I mean, I ask you who are you, and you answer: I’m in favor of establishing a state, national-religious. Who are you? I’m against establishing a state, Haredi. The state was established eighty years ago, we’re already sleeping here, there’s no difference between us, and that same person who didn’t want to establish a state is already in the government. So what exactly? This is the question on which we’re building our fundamental religious identity? It’s crazy. Now around this question you have to understand that all the religious frameworks are divided according to it. Yeshivot — there are Haredi yeshivot and non-Haredi yeshivot; Heders, school systems, these and those; of course for girls, boys, everything. Newspapers — there are Haredi newspapers, non-Haredi newspapers. There are matchmaking circles, of course — Haredim with Haredim, national-religious with national-religious. The groups, the neighborhoods, the rabbis, everything, the clothing of course, everything. Only one thing is missing: a difference. There is no difference. I mean, you have two groups, each with its own newspapers, institutions, social circles, everything; each is identified with itself. But if you ask what the difference is —
[Speaker D] Meaning, where the difference is, is in the worldview that basically the state is not run according to Jewish law and Torah, and therefore they don’t…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] feel that they belong to it.
[Speaker D] Money they have no problem accepting, but the rule itself.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But everyone is aware that the state is not conducted according to Jewish law, and everyone wants to change that too.
[Speaker D] They also don’t want to go into the army because they claim that there it’s not according to Torah.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The army isn’t connected to this. I’ll get to the army later. In my opinion the army isn’t connected to this at all.
[Speaker D] It’s against Torah. I asked people what the
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] reason is, it’s not…
[Speaker D] according to Torah, and it’s some kind of melting pot for the army for some reason.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I’ll tell you, later on, what I think the problem is. The melting pot is a different issue; it’s not the issue of Zionism. I’ll get to that in a minute. So in short, there’s something here that’s very strange. Very strange. And we’re so used to it, and everything revolves around it. I mean, if you’re Haredi, there are a hundred questions where it’s obvious what you’ll answer on every one of them. If you’re national-religious, a hundred — those same hundred questions — you’ll answer the other side. Okay? It’s just obvious. Now, if there’s no difference, then why do you answer the questions differently? This whole thing is so absurd. It reminds me of something from not so many years ago — there was a controversy over conversion, the state conversion system. There was a judge in Ashdod who invalidated all the conversions carried out by the state conversion system. We’re talking about thousands of conversions. He invalidated all of them. Why? Because the judges are all wicked. Why are they wicked? Because they don’t require acceptance of the commandments. You need acceptance of the commandments in conversion, they don’t require it, therefore they’re wicked. Once they’re wicked, then even someone who converted properly still needs a religious court. If the court is wicked, then it’s not a court. If there was no court, then there was no conversion, so the conversion isn’t valid. It got to the High Rabbinical Court, and they too ruled that he was right. Then Rabbi Amar intervened and changed it. He was Chief Rabbi at the time. Now, during that controversy, I sent a letter to Makor Rishon, a response letter, and I pointed out an interesting phenomenon that’s connected to what I mentioned, connected to what I was saying before. I told them: look, on this question — whether these conversions conducted in the state conversion system are being done properly — I, for example, thought they were not. I agreed with the judge in Ashdod. I just don’t claim they’re wicked. Someone who thinks differently from me isn’t therefore wicked. But I agreed with him completely in terms of what he said. But I discovered that there were many rabbis who also thought like I did, exactly the same. Once the discussion became a public-social-political discussion, it split into two groups. The Haredi rabbis were with him, with that judge, and the religious rabbis were against him. Now wait a second — a moment ago you said you thought like me. Suddenly you don’t think like me. So I wrote there in that letter: look, without thinking for more than a minute I can write down — and I did write it there in the paper — thirteen independent questions that you need to answer in order to formulate a position on whether this conversion is valid or not. Now what would you expect? If there are thirteen questions, how many types of answers can there be? That’s very simple mathematics: two to the thirteenth power. Eight thousand — eight thousand types of positions should exist. Not people — eight thousand types of positions. How many do you think there were in practice? Two. In other words, there were those who said yes to all thirteen questions, and those who said no to all thirteen questions. Okay? That’s exactly what I said before too. My claim isn’t that there weren’t many people; there were many. My claim is that people don’t think substantively. People think by stereotype. Meaning, if you’re Haredi, you have to answer yes to all the questions; if you’re national-religious, you have to answer no to all the questions. And I’m not willing to enter these niches. I say: let’s examine each question on its own. On this question I think yes; on this question it seems to me no; this question like this, that question like that. In the end, I have all thirteen questions, or however many there are — there are more, but that’s what I wrote there — and then I’ll have to decide what, in my opinion, the bottom line is. Fine, you have to decide — valid or invalid. But there are thirteen questions, and each one needs to be considered and decided. And nobody did that. Nobody did that. In other words, these decided all yes, those decided all no. And by the way, that’s what happens in all our arguments. I’ll give you another example, where the penny first dropped for me. I was traveling to the Weizmann Institute. I was at the Weizmann Institute for a certain period. On the way there, from the bus — actually I was in a car driving down — there was a sticker. It said: “Rabin has no mandate to return the Golan.” This was in the period of Rabin’s government, and there was an argument, like every few years, whether to make an agreement with the Syrians, not make an agreement with the Syrians. I asked myself whether that car owner was a man of the left or a man of the right. And I answered myself that I had no idea. I couldn’t know. Couldn’t know. Why? Because the question whether Rabin has or doesn’t have a mandate to return the Golan can be interpreted in two ways. One question is: are you for or against an agreement with the Syrians? That’s probably left and right, okay, but it doesn’t matter — religious reasons, political reasons, policy, security, whatever you want, each person and his reasons. That’s one question. The second is a question of political morality. If you promised something before the election and after the election you changed your mind, and you think something else should be done, are you allowed to act according to what you think, or do you need to go back to the public and say, friends, I’ve changed my mind, let’s hold new elections and let the public have its say? That’s a good question, right? That’s a question of political morality. There’s no connection between the two questions, right? Which means that how many groups should there be in the population? Simple question: four. Right? Those who say yes on the moral question and yes on the political one; those who say yes-no, no-yes, and no-no. Right? Four groups, because these are independent questions. How many were there? Two, of course. Those who were against the agreement also said Rabin had no mandate to do it — morally no as well — and those who were in favor of the agreement said Rabin did have a mandate, there was no moral problem.
[Speaker D] A super simple deal. What do you want to get?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I drank, thanks, in a minute. So again, same point: people don’t think substantively. They can’t say, look, I think this agreement is excellent, let’s say for the sake of argument, okay? But he has no mandate — he promised something else before the election, there are moral questions here. Why can’t such a position exist? You didn’t hear that in public. Or the opposite: I’m against the agreement, but he’s the prime minister; if he decided, then he has a mandate. You didn’t hear it. Because we have this human tendency — we’re all human beings. We have this tendency to harness the wagon before the horses. Meaning, we shoot the arrow and then draw the target around it. If we want to arrive at a negative answer in the end, then to all the questions we say no. If we want a positive answer, then to all the questions we say yes. Okay? And that ruins the discourse. It ruins the discourse because you can’t convey ideas that are a bit more complex. A little more nuanced — you have to weigh considerations this way and that. In the end you do need a bottom-line decision, yes or no, but the world has complexity. Same thing, if I return to our issue — these were just examples — our issue: same thing with the division between national-religious and Haredim. All kinds of people can answer all kinds of questions in all kinds of ways. I personally, for example, on certain questions people identify me as Haredi; on other questions people identify me as Religious Zionist; others identify me as Reform. I don’t know, all kinds of things. Why? Because each person chooses the question on which I think a certain way and immediately puts it into the appropriate stereotype. And right now what I’m trying to do is simply relate substantively to each question separately. I don’t want a package deal. I’m not willing for someone to dictate a series of answers I have to give. Each question on its own. Okay? So let’s get back to our issue. What this really means is that we’re being forced into some kind of framework, a binding framework, where if you’re Haredi you’re supposed to have one set of principles, and if you’re national-religious you’re supposed to have another set of principles. But what about someone who thinks one way on this principle and another way on that principle? Where does he belong?
[Speaker B] That’s the problem.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right? That’s basically the question. So I want to suggest to you an initial analysis of the matter.
[Speaker B] Wait, what exactly is the question? I didn’t understand.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Someone who thinks like the Haredim on one question and like the national-religious on another — which group does he belong to?
[Speaker B] You don’t always have to belong to a group. You can…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Exactly! That’s precisely the answer, I completely agree. But among us that doesn’t happen. Because with us, you have to be divided — either you’re here or you’re there. Right? That’s how we’re built, on every issue, in every area, including religious identity.
[Speaker B] What’s the practical difference?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I’ll explain in a minute what the practical difference is.
[Speaker F] But is there a set of questions that really are the defining questions? What, again? Is there a set of questions that really are defining questions, such that only someone who answers them in a certain way…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I don’t care — let everyone make whatever set of questions he wants. But when someone answers the questions, let him answer each one separately, not according to the heading written above the questions. Then you can decide whether he’s this or that or neither — decide whatever you want. But I want the label to come after you’ve answered the questions, not for the answers to the questions to be given according to the label. Okay? So now I’m saying: let’s go back a bit. Let’s try to understand what it means to be Haredi. Okay? I’ll start there. Broadly speaking, being Haredi is a heading for two kinds of ideas — and again, they’re independent, almost independent. One idea is opposition to Zionism, the state, or something like that. The second idea is opposition to modernity — separatism, let’s call it that. Okay? These are basically the two deep ideas of Haredi thinking. Now if that’s really true, then in the non-Haredi group I would expect it to be divided into two subgroups. A lot of combinatorics today. It should be divided into two subgroups. One subgroup is the people who are in favor of Zionism, right? But what is their attitude toward modernity? Could be this way, could be that way, who knows. Another group is the people who are in favor of modernity, against separatism, who want more involvement in their surroundings. Not “progressive” — those are labels I don’t like. What is their attitude toward Zionism? Could be like this, could be otherwise, I don’t know, right? So I would expect the non-Haredi world to be divided into two groups. But it isn’t. Why isn’t it? For the same reason I said before. Because if you’re not Haredi, you’re supposed to answer all the questions according to procedure. If you’re not Haredi, you’re supposed to be in favor of modernity and in favor of Zionism. If you’re Haredi, you need to be against modernity and against Zionism. But what about someone who’s in favor of modernity and against Zionism, or in favor of Zionism and against modernity? He has no place on the map. He has no place on the map. Because our map is dichotomous, split into two, and we’re used to that. There are Haredim who are Zionist. I think all Haredim are Zionist. Because what?
[Speaker B] What are you talking about? There are Satmar, there are Neturei Karta.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s exactly the problem: they don’t have the concepts to define themselves that way. I’ll get to that in a minute. So let me give you an example, an example that illustrates this point. There were elections for Chief Rabbi, for the Chief Rabbinate — not the most recent ones, the ones before that. It happened now too, but there it was more obvious. There were several candidates: Rabbi Stav, Rabbi Shmuel Eliyahu, Rabbi Yaakov Shapira, I don’t remember anymore, there were a few others, that judge from Be’er Sheva, I forgot his name. Igor? Huh?
[Speaker C] Rabbi Yehuda Deri.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I don’t think Rabbi Yehuda Deri was a candidate. No, it was Judge Igra, Igra. Today he was already on the High Rabbinical Court; he started in Be’er Sheva, and there were others. And two were elected, namely Yitzhak Yosef and David Lau, and there was another elderly Sephardic rabbi, I forgot his name, Boaron, Rabbi Boaron. Okay, so there were seven candidates. Fine? Basically four of them were defined as Religious Zionists, the other three were broadly defined as Haredi. Okay? Now the Religious Zionists had all kinds of turmoil, intrigues and so on, and they decided to oppose Rabbi Stav’s candidacy, doesn’t matter right now, and in the end Rabbi Yitzhak Yosef and Rabbi David Lau were elected. Okay, and then in the Religious Zionist press they started crying — how stupid we were, we weren’t wise enough to unite and concentrate our forces so that all Religious Zionism would go behind an agreed candidate, and then Religious Zionist Chief Rabbis would have been elected. Where’s the mistake? That lament is just a failure to understand reality. Why? Because the struggle wasn’t about yes-Zionist or no-Zionist at all. Do I care whether the Chief Rabbi is Zionist? What practical difference does it make? If he says Hallel on Independence Day, let him say it, let him not say it, do I care? The question is what he does. The question is how he relates to women in rabbinical courts, for example, just things like that. Right? Questions of, let’s call it, modernity more than questions of Zionism. Right? Now on the question of modernity, the division among the candidates wasn’t three against four. It was six against one. Rabbi Stav was more identified with the modern side, and all the others with the conservative side. Right? So the majority won — what’s the problem? The majority was the conservative majority, the non-modern one, and they were elected, they won. But people, when they read the map, were convinced that the struggle was whether there would be a Zionist rabbi or a Haredi rabbi. Why does that matter? People also don’t understand something else. Among rabbinical judges, for example — I spoke a little with people who know better, but that was also my own impression — there is no connection at all between whether you’re strict or lenient, or modern or not modern, and whether you’re Haredi or not. On the contrary, many times Haredi judges are more lenient and more open. There are good reasons for that, but that’s how it is; factually that’s how it is. And therefore, if I had to decide, I would actually prefer many Haredi judges rather than Religious Zionist ones.
[Speaker C] The power of leniency is preferable.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, because what really matters to me isn’t whether he says Hallel on Independence Day — who cares, let him do what he wants. The question is what he does in his role, how his role is actually implemented. Now this misunderstanding shows you — and people don’t get this, neither the Haredi side nor the Religious Zionist side — they don’t understand themselves. They themselves cried over what they themselves had done, and they don’t understand that what they did is exactly what they meant to do. Next time they did the same thing. What happened now? A friend of mine was a candidate to be Chief Rabbi, Meir Kahane, a good friend of mine, yes? Full disclosure. Okay, I told him I wished him not to be elected, that they should have shut that institution down yesterday. But fine, he ran, and he was chosen as the agreed representative of Religious Zionism. Right? You remember that? And it was sabotaged. And it was sabotaged — why? Because the conservative Religious Zionists opposed it, exactly what happened in the previous election, with all the lamentations afterwards, right? And therefore he simply wasn’t elected, that’s all. Now everything is fine. Who was elected? Kalman Bar, I think, who is effectively Haredi. Yes, he has a past in Yeshivat Kerem B’Yavneh, but effectively he is Haredi. And two Haredim were elected again, after all the lamenting. Now… because people are acting correctly. This isn’t criticism, by the way. People acted correctly. This really is what they want. They want a conservative Chief Rabbi there. That’s what they want. So if they want that, they elected him. Everything is fine. The majority was for him and he was elected. But people don’t understand what they themselves want. Because afterward they look at themselves and say, wait, how can it be that a Religious Zionist rabbi wasn’t elected? What did we do? Why didn’t we unite? Same thing. Exactly what happened in the previous election. Because people can’t understand what motivates them themselves, not other people. People don’t understand that conservatism matters much more to them than Zionism. And to others, liberalism or modernity matters much more than Haredi identity. Be a modern Haredi — great, I’m completely with you. Be Chief Rabbi, be a judge, be prime minister. Because I don’t care that you’re Haredi. Why should I care that you’re Haredi? I want your halakhic approach to be more open. Personally, at least, but it doesn’t matter, everyone has his own worldview, okay? So first of all, this case is interesting because it helps us see that we don’t see. Meaning, to see that we don’t grasp reality correctly. We keep moving through reality along the line between Haredi and Religious Zionist, when in fact that isn’t the line at all. And we ourselves don’t even really think that’s the line — it’s just that this conceptual world is so deeply ingrained in us, so strong, that we keep thinking in terms of whether he’s Zionist or Haredi. That’s not what interests us at all. What interests us is the question of what his halakhic policy is.
[Speaker B] Fine, but in the end, Jewish law is determined according to truth, not according to — what difference does it make whether he is
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] modern
[Speaker B] or not modern?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] “Truth” is a very, very vague concept. No, there are rules. Those rules lead to all kinds of conclusions. And the fact is that different rabbis arrive at different conclusions. By the way, this didn’t start with us. Also in the Talmud, also in the Mishnah, everywhere, right? In the end, this illusion that there are rules and therefore clearly we can reach one answer — it doesn’t stand the test of reality. Not today, never.
[Speaker B] I didn’t say one answer. I said there are rules with which you can reach many answers.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And how do you get to this answer or that answer? What determines it? Those same rules.
[Speaker B] One person has this reasoning, another has that reasoning. How? Why? What is that?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Because they have different worldviews. Worldviews take part in halakhic ruling, there’s no way around it. That’s life. It’s not necessarily different worldviews. Rather what? You can also see it in understanding, in understanding.
[Speaker B] If you sit and understand his reasoning, you’ll connect to that reasoning. If you connect to that reasoning…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Everyone understands all the lines of reasoning, and for some reason these connect to this reasoning and those connect to that reasoning. They all know all the arguments. Worldview is part of halakhic ruling; it’s part of life. In the end, where there are the clear lines of Jewish law, nobody disputes that you can’t just not put on tefillin. Obviously. But that’s not where the argument is. There is no dispute there. You don’t hold elections for the Chief Rabbinate over the question of whether to put on tefillin.
[Speaker B] What are you talking about? No, someone could say, look, I made a derivation, look, I proved how I can find a derivation that you can’t put on tefillin; that’s called distorting the Torah illegitimately.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, but we’re not talking about that.
[Speaker E] But if it is a dispute. What? Not putting on tefillin? Whether it’s permitted not to put on tefillin? You have to put on tefillin every day.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, every day is a different matter. There is no source at all for every day. That’s what’s accepted, but there’s no source for it at all. But in general, of course one is obligated to put on tefillin.
[Speaker E] What about the later authorities — whether one may refrain from putting them on, there are discussions about that too, their whole topic.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, not about not putting on tefillin every day; the question is…
[Speaker E] what’s distinct on the Sabbath.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, every day is a different passage. In any case, the disputes are not in the place of whether selecting is permitted on the Sabbath. Nobody is there. That’s not the point. Everyone agrees on that. In the places where there is dispute, and over which elections are conducted — elections are not conducted over what everyone agrees on. If everyone agrees, then what difference does it make who’s there? They’ll all write the same thing. We’re talking about those places where there are differing opinions, and those differing opinions are a function of the rabbi’s worldview — there is no way around it. The Torah was not given to ministering angels. The Torah was given to human beings. Human beings have worldviews, and those worldviews take part in halakhic ruling. It’s very simple.
[Speaker B] For the Rabbi it’s simple, but for us as ba’alei teshuvah it’s not so simple. Because we perceive that Jewish law means no worldview — there’s no worldview in Jewish law. No, that’s how we were brought up. It’s naive. No, that’s how it is. What do you mean? No worldview, none — there’s Jewish law. It’s like one plus one. What worldview is there in one plus one?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] There isn’t.
[Speaker B] Beit Hillel say this and Beit Shammai say that, fine, but it was decided in the Shulchan Arukh.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What does “decided” mean? But how did they get there? How did they think?
[Speaker D] But Rami, one
[Speaker B] plus one is…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] How do Maimonides and Rashba disagree? How do the Mechaber and the Rema disagree?
[Speaker B] They disagree — there is a dispute.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The whole Torah is based on dispute.
[Speaker B] But in our day too, in our day too there is dispute.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The disputes never ended. There are more disputes than there used to be.
[Speaker B] One…
[Speaker D] plus one is a proof, not a matter of reasoning. It’s a proof, there is a proof here. Of what? A thousand pages, but a proof.
[Speaker B] Yes, but everything — for example, whether women may be integrated into rabbinic roles — that’s already reasoning. Woman, Shulchan Arukh, Talmud, everything. So these will say, that’s already reasoning. Woman, Shulchan Arukh, Talmud — all of those will tell you, no way, no such thing at all.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No problem, but others will tell
[Speaker B] you that it’s forbidden by Torah law!
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And the others will tell you that it is possible, and they too will bring proofs for what they say.
[Speaker B] That’s exactly the point. The question is whether the proofs are real, and so on, or whether we say no, they want it because they’re like this and like that.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If we’re not dealing with ignoramuses but with Torah scholars, then the proofs are real. In the end there is judgment involved, and you have to decide, and your worldview enters into that judgment — there’s no way around it, no way around it. You can’t escape it.
[Speaker G] In the High Court, for example, they compare religious people and all that…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] In the High Court it’s exactly the same. People constantly think the High Court does whatever it wants, and they don’t notice that rabbis too do whatever they want in exactly the same way. And that’s not true there and not true here. It’s not true here and not true there. In the end, clearly a person rules — both in the legal world and, mutatis mutandis, in Jewish law — among other things according to his worldview. It’s not mathematics. In mathematics there are no worldviews; in mathematics there are proofs, okay? But there are fields that are not mathematics. Nachmanides writes in the introduction to Milhamot Hashem — yes, Milhamot Hashem is his glosses on the Rif — in the introduction he says there that the wisdom of our Torah is not like astronomy and geometry, meaning mathematics and physics, whose proofs are conclusive. They have clear proofs, mathematics. The wisdom of our Torah is not like that; the proofs are not clear. There are considerations this way and considerations that way, and in the end you have to decide according to how you think. And that’s perfectly fine — these and those are the words of the living God. That’s what it says in the Talmud too. Everything is fine.
[Speaker B] But among us, these are wicked and those are righteous; that’s how we divide things.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So that’s what I’m saying — it’s a big mistake. A big mistake. There are no wicked and righteous here; there are different conceptions, and that’s fine. Let each person go with his own conception, that’s fine. I can disagree with him completely, but if that’s his conception, that’s his conception, all is fine.
[Speaker B] So now what happens in practice — but there is coercion in Jewish law on someone who doesn’t think like me, someone who doesn’t think like the majority, there is coercion. No. What do you mean no? There are bans, excommunications, rebukes. The Shulchan Arukh is full of cases where if someone isn’t this then they don’t let him…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] There is no such thing. What there is, is that when Jewish law was ruled by the Sanhedrin, then there is “do not deviate.” So the Sanhedrin decided the dispute. Once it decided the dispute, it closed the matter, because that’s what the Torah says: “Do not deviate from all that they instruct you.” And that was said only about the Sanhedrin. If someone thinks like Rashba and I think like Maimonides, am I going to excommunicate him? What, because he thinks like Rashba? Of course not. Who ever heard of such a thing? Never in life. And anyone who does that is a criminal. What do you mean? Right, in the cases of Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel they married one another’s women, right? Yes…
[Speaker D] Yes, but… but there was the story of Rabbi Yonatan Eybeschutz and the Ya’avetz over suspicion of Sabbateanism.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] There it was a dispute over when Yom Kippur was, and he said to him, you’ll come with your staff and your satchel, and so on…
[Speaker B] But his students weren’t allowed to cross over.
[Speaker G] There it was the head of the Sanhedrin.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The head of the Sanhedrin, when he determines when Yom Kippur is, the Talmud expounds: “you — even if intentional, you — even if mistaken, you — even if coerced.” Meaning, whatever the Sanhedrin determined is the calendar, even if they erred. So if you disagree with the head of the Sanhedrin, your opinion doesn’t count, you can’t. Not because you’re not right — you may be right — but it doesn’t matter, because what the head of the Sanhedrin determines is the calendar. But that’s specifically regarding the calendar. And besides, that is the Sanhedrin. Once the Sanhedrin determines something, it is binding. You can’t disagree with the Sanhedrin. But all the open questions, the questions on which there is no Sanhedrin ruling — which is almost all the questions in our day — there are different opinions, and that’s perfectly fine, each river follows its own course, yes?
[Speaker B] The question — forgive me, I’m interrupting the Rabbi’s flow for a moment, but it’s important for me to understand — what is the attitude of the movement of Paths of Peace, or of the Rabbi, it doesn’t matter, regarding acceptance of the Shulchan Arukh? Acceptance of Jewish law. Are we bound by the Shulchan Arukh? Not bound? Is it a recommendation? Is it nice to have? Is it not obligatory? What is the movement’s approach to this matter?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay, let’s leave that for a moment, because I still want to complete this point, since the answer to that is complicated, so hold on to the question and I’ll come back to it. So in the end, what I want to say is this: think of it like a coordinate system. Okay? A coordinate system. We have a coordinate system; let’s say on this side are the Haredim, on this side are the Religious Zionists. In the middle, the line that separates—yes?—separates between Zionists and non-Zionists, okay? Now on both sides there are four quadrants in the coordinate system, right? So the first quadrant is the conservative Haredim, anti-Zionist conservatives, okay? The second quadrant is conservative Religious Zionists, okay? The third quadrant is modern Religious Zionists, liberals, as people call them, and the fourth quadrant is liberal Haredim, okay? Now we draw the line on the Y-axis, right? Meaning Haredim versus Religious Zionists, but we’ve already seen that this line isn’t relevant, this line… the truly relevant line is precisely the X-axis. Right? And therefore what needs to be done—and this is the basic idea of the Third Path—is to rotate the coordinate system. Simply raise the X-axis and turn it into the Y-axis. And now I’m saying the division is this: between conservatives—Haredim and Religious Zionists—and between modern Haredim and modern Religious Zionists. Okay? And the distinction between conservatives and Religious Zionists—sorry, between conservatives and moderns—is the relevant distinction, not Zionism or one’s attitude to Zionism. And therefore the distinction between the quadrants really isn’t important; what’s important is this axis. You have to rotate the coordinate system. That’s the idea. And that basically means that what needs to be done is to create a conceptual framework, a different conceptual framework. Not Haredim versus Religious Zionists or national-religious, but modern versus non-modern. I don’t like the term liberals because it has all sorts of connotations, so I speak about modern and non-modern, okay? When on both sides there are both Haredim and Religious Zionists. And there are, obviously there are. There are large Haredi groups that are modern, and there are large groups of Religious Zionists who are conservative. Okay? A modern religious person? Modern—I’ll maybe answer that in more detail in a moment, okay? I just want to finish. What I basically want to say is that the goal of the Third Path—or maybe I’ll start before the goal—the conservative wing is already on the way there. You can see today politically in the coalition there is cooperation between the conservative Haredim and the conservative Religious Zionists; people sometimes call them Hardalim. Okay? There, in fact, this connection has already been formed. What the Third Path is trying to do is create the other side, to the right of the Y-axis. Okay? To connect the modern Religious Zionists and the modern Haredim. Because there are both kinds. Now why is this important? First, it’s important because truly the questions over which the argument is being conducted are not questions of attitude toward the state, so why conduct them through Haredim or Religious Zionists? Even at the level of parties—but I’m not specifically talking about parties, rather about circles, about groups, okay? That’s not where the arguments are taking place. We should have been in coalitions between Haredim and Religious Zionists, conservatives and moderns on both sides, and argue over the question of how modern or how conservative to be—that’s where the argument should be conducted. Now on the conservative side this is already happening. And we want it to happen on the modern side too. We want the modern people on the Haredi side and on the Religious Zionist side to connect together as well. Why is that important, beyond the fact that it’s true? But why is it also important on what we might call the tactical level? Because a great many Haredim, if you ask them—Religious Zionists too, but Haredim more so—are basically there, but they won’t tell you that they’re there, and they won’t tell themselves that they’re there. Because from their point of view, the ideal model is to be conservative. That’s what they were raised on; all the leading rabbis of the generation in whose light they were educated and so on—they are in fact conservatives, okay? And therefore even if a person doesn’t think that way, it’s obvious to him that he’s kind of light, you know—he’s not… okay, I’m not there, but obviously that’s the ideal model, okay? Now if I say to him, listen, it’s not true that that’s the ideal model, there is another model. It’s okay that there are people who think yes; that’s their right. But there is another ideal model. I’m not willing to be the light version of the Haredim or the light version of the Hardalim. No. I’m a third model, a Third Path. Not the Hardal path and not the conservative Haredi path, okay? A Third Path. If we manage to create this conceptual change, I think we’ll discover a great many people who are there. Far more than what we can see today. Because what we can see today are those people who are willing to admit that they have a different model from the leading rabbis of the generation. Those are the leading rabbis of the generation—how could I have a different model? Who am I? But if I say, wait a second, there are leading rabbis of the generation and there are leading rabbis of the generation—which leading rabbis are yours? You have to decide. Everyone has to decide which rabbis he follows, or what outlook he follows—not necessarily rabbis. And it’s not right to force people into a certain model they don’t identify with, while they keep identifying with it because people tell them, listen, this is Judaism, there isn’t anything else. So you’re just light. Fine. And by the way, the Haredi world lives very peacefully with light people. Why? Because for light people it’s clear that their ideal model is conservative Haredism, it’s just that we’re second-class, okay, we’re a little sloppy, it doesn’t suit us right now, so we’re off to the side. With that, the Haredi public has no problem at all. They do have a problem with someone who defines himself as an alternative. He’s not your light version. He’s someone else; he thinks differently. With that exactly—with that, it’s total war. Yes, the state-Haredi schools—look at the wars against the state-Haredi schools, that’s an example of it. A small example, because they’re not really different, but it still smells like something different.
[Speaker B] Anyone who comes out against the… exactly. Puts himself forward as an alternative, exactly.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And therefore I think we have to try to create some legitimacy. First of all, to define the terms, to give a person legitimacy to think differently. If you don’t think differently, keep being conservative, that’s fine, that’s what you think.
[Speaker B] Begging your pardon, is it permitted to think differently? What does it mean to think differently? There’s Moses our teacher, Joshua son of Nun, the Torah was transmitted to Joshua, all the way to Rabbi Chaim, all the way to Rabbi Ovadia. Okay, you understand these approaches.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Of course, but I’m saying, that’s part…
[Speaker B] I wasn’t privileged, I wasn’t privileged to be there, but they—I won’t say that they’re…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] You know, that’s part of the very same outlook exactly. What you’re basically saying is, look, what the Haredi world is taught is this: the Torah came down from Sinai and arrived at Rabbi Chaim Kanievsky. Yes, exactly, with an Olympic leap it went straight to Rabbi Chaim Kanievsky. Okay? He represents what was given to Moses our teacher at Sinai, and therefore even if you think differently, obviously you’re wrong, because that is the absolute truth. But that’s part of the Haredi outlook, which is itself Rabbi Chaim Kanievsky. But if I don’t accept that, then don’t tell me that Rabbi Chaim Kanievsky doesn’t think like I do. I know he doesn’t think like I do, and with all due respect—fine, an important Jew—I think differently. I think differently.
[Speaker B] But what—it feels to me like this is in the air, like it’s… like you’re fighting a war that doesn’t exist here.
[Speaker C] No, what do you mean it doesn’t exist?
[Speaker B] You don’t understand… like who deals with these questions? I’m trying to understand.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Who doesn’t deal with these questions? What are all these wars about?
[Speaker B] For example, say, what influences… he lives in Kfar Saba, he doesn’t understand it that way, but he lives in Bnei Brak, he became
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] religious, he doesn’t understand at all… no, I’m saying, leave aside your own little environment where you do whatever you want. What do people care in…
[Speaker B] Why should I care about Haredi society, why should I care, there’s Jewish law, there’s this… what Jewish law? You could be called a heretic next to him. What do you mean Jewish law and all that? Who’s going to call me a heretic?
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Of course, of course there’s something you can see…
[Speaker B] He hasn’t experienced it…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, no, so that’s why I’m saying, forget it, I’m not talking about personal experience at all. I’m not talking about what happens next door to me. That’s not the point. Look at what happens socially, generally, not in Kfar Saba. What’s happening in the state? What’s happening across the whole country? Not in Kfar Saba. Okay? And you’ll see that the religious outlooks accepted today, and among other things imposed on the public, are very conservative outlooks. They’re not agreed upon. Like what? Like, for example, the status of women; like, for example, whether you can make a condition in marriage, for instance, or a prenuptial agreement that… to prevent a woman from becoming chained to a marriage—if the husband refuses to release his wife, there is a halakhic mechanism that can deal with this, for example. Now the rabbinate fights an all-out war against this even though there is no halakhic problem with it at all.
[Speaker D] What’s the halakhic problem with it? It’s unbelievable. To get the woman out of there.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, making a condition is already a more extreme mechanism, but there is an agreement, a prenuptial agreement.
[Speaker D] Not with his permission. It’s something everyone knows.
[Speaker E] A chained woman, we’re talking here… the husband is refusing to release her.
[Speaker D] He lives a modern life, and he doesn’t live…
[Speaker E] No,
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I’m saying, I live a modern life, so why should I care? I’m in my own four cubits.
[Speaker E] Secular people and religious people and traditional people are full of this; it’s very hard when you’re fighting against an establishment that won’t allow you to live your life. But say in Bnei Brak, if someone says an opinion—I personally go through this—you say an opinion they don’t like, they remove you in a second, there’s nothing to talk about.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And the point is that even on the Religious Zionist side, where you’re in less distress because it’s not a Haredi environment when you live in a more general area, still, you need to give legitimacy to people who are under that pressure. And there are many people who are under that pressure, and that perpetuates or entrenches this problem. People in severe distress. I’ve met people in very severe distress. They are in very severe distress not only because of society, but also inwardly, because they do not accept what they themselves think as legitimate.
[Speaker B] And that is legitimate. Wait, but if the conservative approach, as you call it, ruled something regarding the status of women, okay, which seems puzzling to you or… as if they didn’t think about the other side…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] They thought about it and decided differently, but I also thought about it and decided differently from them. What… I don’t understand.
[Speaker B] No, so it’s as if it’s in doubt…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] It’s not in doubt, I simply disagree with it.
[Speaker B] That it’s as if Jewish law was written because of their personal opinions and not because that’s how Jewish law is supposed to be.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] We’re back to the previous question, right? Correct, the answer is yes. The answer is of course. Of course that’s the case. What do you mean? Of course that’s the case.
[Speaker E] There’s no problem that it’s a personal opinion; he’s saying, I think something else, and therefore I want to state my opinion.
[Speaker D] They don’t agree with us, they don’t accept it. Where’s the proof for it? According to the Torah, a woman can’t choose, a woman can’t express an opinion, a woman can’t go out to work. A woman can’t testify.
[Speaker E] There is no
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] such opinion at all, what do you mean?
[Speaker D] That’s the tone, that’s
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Exactly—conservatism. Religious conservatism does not need sources. No, they don’t need sources. When you bring some quote from a later authority, from your perspective that’s a proof. That later authority lived in Poland in the 16th century and… and that’s all fine, I respect him greatly, I also study him, but I don’t derive it from you. Why does the Shulchan Arukh, in the Rema’s glosses, include the customs of Krakow, that a menstruating woman should not touch a Torah scroll? I don’t know, I don’t live in Krakow. I live in Lod. Why are the customs of Krakow relevant to Lod? Is it because I’m Ashkenazi? What, were all Ashkenazim born in Krakow? So because the Rema composed the Shulchan Arukh and brought the customs of Krakow into it, now I’m supposed to restrict women from touching a Torah scroll or something like that because the custom in Krakow was not to do that? There is no source for it whatsoever. But that was the custom in Krakow, and that’s perfectly fine—whoever lives in Krakow should behave that way. But why does everyone have to do it? Because there is this conservatism that says that if it’s written in the Shulchan Arukh or if that’s how people acted until now, then that’s how it must continue. This conservatism has no source. It has no source. That’s part of the issue people are educated into, and it itself has no source.
[Speaker B] But all customs, in the end, don’t really have a source.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Also not eating rice on Passover among Ashkenazim.
[Speaker B] Right, you’re preaching to the choir. Of course. People keep it, right, and don’t eat rice on Passover.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] And I claim that’s utter nonsense.
[Speaker B] But even according to them, even the Sephardim, Rabbi Ovadia also says—he says that’s not…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I claim that’s utter nonsense, but that’s a different discussion. He—but I’m saying it’s utter nonsense. Fine.
[Speaker B] In any case, there are customs that need to be kept.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Let each person decide which customs he wants to keep. That’s all fine, but I’m trying to make a general claim. You can argue about each custom separately. My claim is that there is a certain pattern here: they present us with a binding religious model, that everyone is supposed to behave this way, and there is no basis for it whatsoever. Now people are allowed to think that way; it’s fine that they think that way. But don’t tell me that this is what must be, that anyone who thinks differently is not—this is not what Moses received at Sinai. Nonsense. Anyone who examines the sources in an orderly and systematic way, and doesn’t just say, well, that’s what the leading rabbis of the generation said, or that’s the custom, or whatever—it is always the slogan people use when they don’t have answers. Okay? Examine things on their own merits and you’ll see that it’s not true. Not true. Many things—I can give many examples of these things. And that’s part of the issue. Now I say again, I need to distinguish here between two things, and this is somewhat connected to the questions you asked earlier. There are my views, personally. That is not necessarily the outlook of the Third Path. My views in the world of Jewish law are more far-reaching than the views accepted by people in the Third Path. In the Third Path there are all kinds of people: more halakhically conservative, less halakhically conservative, more inclined toward the Haredi side, less inclined toward the Haredi side. That’s all fine. But everyone agrees on one thing: that we can live together with these different outlooks. And we don’t have to take our own outlook and say that anyone who says otherwise—that’s not Moses our teacher, that’s a Christian or Reform or I don’t know exactly what. In that sense at least, I think there is some common denominator. Within that, there is diversity. There is diversity. Now a great many distortions stem not from what people think, but from what people do even though they understand—or they don’t think that way. They don’t think that way, and that’s what they do because that’s what was said, that’s what the great… When Rabbi Chaim Kanievsky gave instructions—you mentioned him earlier—Rabbi Chaim Kanievsky gave instructions during COVID to open the cheders and the synagogues, and everyone ignored the instructions and so on—he has the blood of hundreds of people on his hands. Now I assume he did what seemed best to him; I don’t think he wanted to kill anyone, of course. Okay? But he has the blood of many people on his hands. And he did it without checking things properly. Because he was operating from within a conception that says that if I sit in a room full of books, then I know everything better than everyone else. And I don’t need to check what this person says and what that person says. There are experts; it’s worth consulting them. They don’t decide—you decide—but hear what they have to say. Get the facts first. I’ll give you an example that I once wrote when I addressed that ruling of Rabbi Chaim Kanievsky. Look, take a sheet of paper. Okay? Fold it in half. Now fold it in half again, and again, and again, and so on. Okay? You fold the paper forty times, say. You can’t, because in the end it gets terribly small, but let’s say we manage to fold it forty times. How thick do you get? Just throw out a guess, don’t calculate. A centimeter maybe, two.
[Speaker B] No way. A sheet of paper.
[Speaker D] A centimeter.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What do you say?
[Speaker B] Ten centimeters.
[Speaker D] And you? Thirty-forty. What
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] you get is the distance from here to the moon. From here to the moon. By the way, it’s a one-line calculation. I can do that calculation—a one-line calculation. Now what does that mean? This example shows us what’s called in mathematics an exponential process. An exponential process means it grows by a factor of two each time. Every time you fold, it’s multiplied by two. And then again by two, and then again by two. Think about it: I folded it forty times—that’s two to the fortieth power. A million times a million millimeters is a million times a thousand meters, right? Which is a million kilometers. A million kilometers, not a centimeter and not ten centimeters. Now anyone who doesn’t understand what an exponential process is—and this is a demonstration of it—cannot issue rulings in the laws of COVID. Because a plague, contrary to what the Talmud in Ta’anit—he probably pulls out a passage from Tractate Ta’anit that says it depends on how many die per day in order to determine what counts as a plague, regarding sounding the alarm and so on—you need to understand that if today there are two sick people in the city, tomorrow there are four, the next day there are eight. If you don’t stop it when there are two, then in another ten days there are a thousand dead. A thousand dead. You can’t assess it based on whether there are two today or there are
[Speaker D] three today, because it’s an exponential process.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If it isn’t an exponential process, fine, then today there are two, tomorrow two, so you have to check from when it’s considered a plague. If it’s an exponential process—and COVID was an exponential process, because once they stopped it then at some stage it calmed down—it was an exponential process. Meaning that this Jewish man could have killed millions of people here because he doesn’t know what an exponential process is. He’s not wicked, he’s not stupid, it’s neither this nor that. But it’s a percentage, it’s not certain death. Exponential infection is not exponential death. Fine, ten percent, three percent of them will die? So if a million get infected, then what’s that? Thirty thousand or three hundred thousand will die. Thirty thousand will die. Okay? Good enough to close the cheders for a few days. In short, that’s just an example. The question is how you relate to the world around you, and that’s the important point. And I said earlier regarding military conscription: military conscription has nothing whatsoever to do with attitude toward Zionism—get that out of your heads. These are slogans of people who simply don’t know what they themselves are talking about. What does this have to do with Zionism at all? Do you want us to be killed? You’re not a Zionist. Do you want us to be killed? You also want us to stay alive, don’t you?
[Speaker B] Let someone else do the work.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Exactly. So it’s not a question of Zionism at all. Rather what is it? It’s a question of separatism. That I’m not willing to mix in, for all sorts of reasons, some of them good, it doesn’t matter. But I’m saying, the point is, the question is why they don’t…
[Speaker D] And that they don’t want
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] to be… I’m not trying to convince
[Speaker D] you that they should be drafted, that’s not the halakhic line.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I’m not trying to convince you that they should be drafted—that’s not the question. I’m using it. I’m using this example to tell you that even this question, which is supposedly at the center of the argument, is not connected to Zionism. It’s connected to modernity, it’s connected to separatism, it’s connected to the question of how willing you are to be involved in the world around you. That’s the important question, not Zionism. They don’t want to mix into the general public. You mentioned a melting pot earlier—a melting pot or things like that—that’s what they fear. And that’s fine, by the way; we need to discuss it. But that’s the claim. It’s not a claim about Zionism, it’s a claim about separatism. And that proves what I said earlier: that we keep using the terms yes-Zionist versus non-Zionist, when that isn’t the point at all. What’s behind it is the question yes-modern or not-modern. That’s the important question. And that is what the argument is about, and it’s a legitimate argument, by the way. A person may say: I’m not modern. Fine, that’s his right. And another person says: I am modern. That’s also his right. But talk about that. Don’t hide behind saying I’m Zionist or not Zionist. You’re the prime minister—what do you mean Zionist? You’re the one forming the government today. You’re not a Zionist? You’re sending the soldiers to this war. You decide whether to send emergency call-up orders and whether to go to war or to some operation or another or not. So you’re telling me I don’t go there because I’m not a Zionist? If you’re not a Zionist, then don’t send them to war either. The war is none of your business. Sit in the study hall, I don’t know, do whatever you do. It’s nonsense; it has nothing to do with Zionism at all.
[Speaker B] He says, I’m returning lost property, I’m returning lost property. I’m not—I go there in order to save, to rescue from the sea’s sweep.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No problem, but why are you making decisions about war?
[Speaker B] A deal with them, but I go to my public to save them with what…
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But why are you making decisions about war and emergency call-up orders?
[Speaker B] They need to decide in order to get what I’m returning as lost property—for the sake of the money. If that’s what needs to be done.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So you’re sending people to die for your money?
[Speaker B] No, for the public.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Good for you—for the public. Sending me to die for the public in order to keep the… okay, so whoever buys that line, good luck to him.
[Speaker B] No, but that’s how it is, ostensibly that’s the claim of the people from Gimel, one hundred percent. But okay, it’s a baseless claim.
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Look, one of the things—obviously there are many
[Speaker B] claims that they make, but all these claims are baseless.
[Speaker I] Baseless claims because you can’t
[Rabbi Michael Abraham] To actually defend a position that is so illogical—you just can’t defend it. And so the moment you start spreading arguments because you somehow have to defend it in public discourse, you hear arguments there that are genuinely shocking in their level. I’m not talking about disagreement—there can be disagreements—and I also understand the concerns, by the way. The concerns are completely legitimate concerns. But that doesn’t help establish their claims. Meaning, it doesn’t create an argument. Concerns are concerns; they need to be addressed, everything’s fine, but… anyway, never mind, I’m not getting into the question of enlistment here. What I want to say is that our goal in the Third Path is to try and offer, just as the name says, a third path. The subtitle is Torah with worldly engagement. Torah with worldly engagement means that yes, we do want to be engaged with what’s happening around us. Now, being engaged with what’s happening around us does not mean—as the two usual paths tell you, the Haredim and the Hardalim—that if you’re engaged with what’s around you then you’re progressive, as you said earlier, or left-wing, or I don’t know what, or all kinds of things of that sort, Reform, and so on. No, that’s not true. Those are labels people use only in order to strip that direction of legitimacy. No—there is a different religious outlook here, an alternative. Now, whoever agrees, agrees; whoever doesn’t, doesn’t—that’s fine. You can argue about anything. But this is a legitimate religious outlook, and I think many people—in my opinion, most of the public, not many, most of the public—is there, and today they don’t have the words to define for themselves that they are there. Because people ask you: tell me, are you Haredi or Religious Zionist? If you’re not Haredi, then you’re Religious Zionist. If you’re not Religious Zionist, then you’re Haredi. That’s it. So wait—but I’m neither this nor that, so what do you do? I don’t know, so you have to decide—either you’re here or you’re there. No. So we want to say: no, friends, there is a third category, there is a third path. Not this path and not that path. And there are many people who need to position themselves there. And once they do, I think we’ll discover that it’s many more people than even we think; it has potential. Because of the war the conservatives are waging so fiercely against these possibilities, people don’t see that it’s even legitimate to think this way or act this way. And therefore you don’t discover what great potential this path has. It has very great potential. People just need to understand that this has religious legitimacy. There is a possibility of thinking this way and acting this way. In practical Jewish law, if you now have some question in Jewish law and you’re deliberating what to do, whom do you turn to? Me? Yes. To myself. Okay, and now you don’t know, you couldn’t decide? So I consult with someone. Fine—what’s the problem? No, because you need some kind of, I don’t know, someone, some Torah figure who… What do you mean, a figure? Why am I not a Torah figure? What is that? Who did Rabbi Ovadia consult when he didn’t know? Who did Rabbi Ovadia consult when he didn’t know? With books, I don’t know. I also consult books, so what’s the problem? So I’ll tell you why: because Rabbi Ovadia wears a long coat. Not that I want to compare—Rabbi Ovadia was a great Jew. But Rabbi Ovadia wears a long coat, right? And I walk around in a short-sleeved shirt with tzitzit. Fine, okay—but the point is that among other things they’ve instilled in us these notions that certain people are the Torah. They don’t need to consult anyone. You do. Wait—which rabbis agree with you? No one would ask Rabbi Ovadia, or I don’t know who, or Rabbi Dov Lando, which rabbis agree with you. Even though in their responsa they always bring support from a million sources. I can also bring you all the support you want. Ask me next time, I’ll give you sources too, if you want. Just kidding—his responsa are… you can’t compare. But that’s not the point. It doesn’t matter—I’m not trying to compete with anyone here. I’m only trying to say—actually, you know what, I’ll go back to the elections for the Chief Rabbinate that we talked about earlier. Do you know why some people didn’t vote for Rabbi Stav—who is no less of a Torah scholar than the rabbis who were chosen, in my opinion much more? They went after him viciously. No, but I’ll tell you where it was at the deeper level. At the deeper level it was that he wears a knitted kippah and sandals. That’s not a rabbi—that’s a toy rabbi. A real rabbi wears a long coat, a hat, looks like that, Haredi. That’s a real rabbi. Someone who isn’t Haredi—I was in the paratroopers, I was a counselor in Bnei Akiva—that’s not a rabbi, that’s a toy rabbi. Now, that’s something we need to try to free ourselves from. Because it’s part of that same toolkit in the war by which conservatives preserve their status: we are the people you need to consult. If you didn’t consult them, then it’s not Judaism. It’s not a legitimate position. Rabbi Chaim Amsalem, for example—doesn’t he also look like one of ours? Okay, he also went through it. He went through it—he wasn’t a candidate for chief rabbi. No, not for chief rabbi, but he too was somehow ostracized. He was ostracized for other reasons. But I’m saying: with Rabbi Stav, for many, many people you have no chance—by the way, including not only Haredim, including secular people and Religious Zionists and all… I know about myself: it’s very hard for me to get rid of that prejudice, that when I see someone like that, to relate to him with respect as a Torah scholar. Ah, he was in the paratroopers, so it’s not real. It can’t be real. But it is real. There are very great Torah scholars who look like that. And people need to get used to it. And we always say, wait, wait—which rabbi agreed with you? Why are you asking specifically him and not his opponent from the Haredi party or from the Haredi side? Is David Lau a greater Torah scholar? Or Yitzhak Yosef? Absolutely not. But no one asks them, because they dress in long garments and he’s Rabbi Ovadia’s son. I don’t want to say idle gossip. I don’t want to speak ill of anyone. I can tell you the truth—that’s not idle gossip. In any case, that’s another matter. What I want to say is that these questions—who agrees with you and which rabbis do you follow—are exactly the questions that assume the very thing I’m trying to tell you against. That’s exactly the point. Because someone who is not in this track or in that track—you think he has to get approval either from here or from there. Because there’s nothing else. No—there is a third thing, and I don’t want approval from either these or those, and I respect both these and those. But I don’t want their approval; I don’t agree with them. Just as they don’t want one another’s approval, I also don’t want approval from either of them. That’s all. Now, on this point, you can agree or you can disagree—that’s perfectly fine. To each his own outlook. But it’s very important to understand that there is such an option. You can say: I’m not there, I don’t think that way. Fine. So I say: Haredism is built on Korach and his congregation. There’s no such thing. If you disagree with Moses our teacher, with Rabbi Dov Lando, or if you bring me again the—then you’re Korach. Fine. Well, Korach was also a Torah scholar, he had books, but you’re Korach. Fine—well, they also fight with each other, so they’re also Korach. Fine, so—they’re not Korach? They fight with each other too. Everyone is Korach. Just demagoguery—what am I supposed to do with that? No, so I’m saying, this demagoguery—obviously they use this demagoguery, but that’s exactly why I’m trying to tell you to get over it. You have to get over it. How do I, as a Jew who wants to do God’s will, know that I’m not Korach? I don’t know. And when you go with him, how do you know you’re not Korach? Because the coat is long—Moses our teacher—he says he’s Moses our teacher. Right, exactly. So if Korach wore a long coat, would that be okay? Maybe Korach wore a long coat, I don’t know what coat he wore. Do what you don’t want to do. That’s exactly the point. In the end, the Mishnah says: make for yourself a rabbi. If you’re not a Torah scholar yourself, you can’t decide for yourself—choose some rabbi who speaks to you, that’s fine. And it’s your role and your right to determine who the rabbi is that you consult. That’s all. Now, it’s perfectly fine if you think Rabbi Ovadia, or Rabbi Yitzhak Yosef, or Rabbi David Lau are your rabbis. Fine. Choose them. But you are the one who chooses, not them. If you chose them, then what they say is the halakhic ruling for you. If you didn’t choose them, that’s also fine—you can choose someone else. Therefore those claims are themselves Haredi claims—that is, they are themselves conservative claims, not Haredi. They are themselves conservative claims. And they themselves are claims that need to be overcome. And they have instilled this in us so deeply that it’s very hard to get out of it. And that’s why it’s so hard to grow this third path. Because people don’t feel inwardly—not because they’re afraid of outside pressure, or not only because of that—but inwardly you’re not sure you’re allowed to do what you think. Wait—but that one with the long coat thinks differently, he’s a Torah scholar, he’s the great sage of the generation, I don’t know exactly what. I don’t think like that, but who am I? And then I say, fine, so who are you? So choose a rabbi—but you can choose any rabbi you choose. Yes, and there is a concept of nullifying yourself before a Torah scholar. No problem—nullify yourself, but decide who the Torah scholar is. Right? First decide who the Torah scholar is. Whom you nullify yourself before—that is your decision. In Shas, look, ten seats—there is a public that agrees— What, ten seats is what determines it? You know, Likud has thirty seats, however many they have—so Bibi is the great sage of the generation? So according to that logic, fine. You understand that with that you won’t get very far. No, but Bibi is something else—where are his Torah and commandments? Come on—even some of them also don’t keep Torah and commandments. But in those parties you— No, the Haredi parties do not keep Torah and commandments. Fine, I hear. They do not keep Torah and commandments, absolutely. Today we understand that there are things that are… but when you look at the— No, I’m saying—you see how hard it is for you to deal with yourselves on this matter. Obviously. And that’s why I’m saying, it’s work, it’s work, I agree. A year and less than a year and this whole thing collapsed for me—it’s work of years until I managed to wake up from the Haredi outlook. Then I felt the ground slipping out from under my feet. Right, right. It’s a terrible feeling. Right. But I say, that’s actually what I call genuine repentance. Because, you know, I spent some time in Bnei Brak, and all the time they told me: look, in Religious Zionist education there is a lot of secularization, much more than in Haredi education. Today, by the way, I’m no longer completely sure how true that is. There is more, but not nearly as much as people think. But even if we say that it’s true—I asked the people who spoke with me: tell me, where did all the secular people come from? From Haredi education, of course. Haredism created secularization. Because of the way it dealt with the Enlightenment and Reform and the Enlightenment and that whole period. Questions came up for people; a person has questions, he’s allowed to ask, and you wait for answers. What did they tell him? You’re a heretic, you mustn’t touch this. Now the person was in a dilemma. He said to himself: I have two options. Either be smart and wicked—that is, learn these things, get into them, but then I’m wicked because it’s forbidden to do that. Or be righteous and stupid—that is, not touch anything, not think about the questions, and be righteous. Very many people chose the option of being smart and wicked rather than righteous and stupid, and that’s how secularization was born. Why isn’t there a third option? And the outlook—one second. Righteous and smart. Exactly. That’s the third path. What I’m trying to say is: don’t let them present you with the same two dilemmas today. Even today they tell people: either be smart and wicked or be righteous and stupid. Don’t ask questions, don’t think, and don’t do anything—just do what the people in the long coats tell you. That’s all. “According to the instruction they teach you.” Yes, according to the instruction they teach you—the only question is who teaches you. Fine. And the point is that today people are being presented with the same dilemma they were presented with back then. And therefore I’m telling you that in the long run, secularization in Haredi education is much greater than in Religious Zionist education. Much greater in the long run. In the short run it preserves things, but in the long run they cannot cope with this world. That’s why there’s such hysteria now. They really are not managing to cope with this world. And in that period of the Enlightenment, that’s how all the secularization was created. Eighty percent of the Jewish people are secular because of the Haredi education that existed two hundred years ago. Excuse me. Yes. I think that here, the claims being made—all these things—right now they’re not really to the point. I’ll explain. What would interest me, okay, is that let’s say you have some disagreement with Rabbi Yitzhak Yosef, or with Rabbi I don’t know who, one of the great sages of the generation. Rabbi Yitzhak Yosef or one of the great sages of the generation, fine. Leave it—the point is… Rabbi Yitzhak Yosef is also, as far as I’m concerned, one of the great sages of the generation. Okay. And you have some disagreement, something halakhic on some matter, and you’re sitting in dialogue and talking. Okay. What would interest me would be to see his arguments versus your arguments. If he would do a debate with some rabbi… I have no problem. You understand? Now in the end, bottom line, if there is—what there is is in a book of responsa again. Responsa, questions and answers. He brings reasons to forbid, brings reasons to permit, he tries, he tries to do pilpul, and in the end gives some line of reasoning, and the reasoning seems straightforward, smart reasoning. Look, in the end everybody does this—they bring arguments this way and arguments that way and decide. Everybody does that; that’s how Jewish law works. A debate like that probably won’t happen anytime soon, at least I don’t know, I don’t think it’ll happen anytime soon. Everyone will have to decide. No, but bring someone Haredi—bring, I’m telling you, Rabbi Medan, bring him, let’s see him, bring him please, bring him, let’s see him deal with him. Rabbi, come on, I’m really willing—bring him please. I’m ready for him to come speak with you. Are you really willing? Sure, probably. Unless, I don’t know, on what issue. Whatever you want, bring him. I’m ready, on whatever you want. What are you talking about—on Torah—you know Rabbi Medan, because because of certain things, there’s no, there’s no… you can’t talk, it’s not… In the end, what I want to say is, he can’t, he can’t, he can’t talk. In the end, let’s talk about Jewish law, let’s talk straight, about Jewish law, about some case where you say one thing and he didn’t agree with you, and I want to hear the debate, the discussion: why forbid, why permit. You say permit, he says forbid. I’ll tell you—I’ll tell you now in 400 pages—I’ll tell you not about one specific law; on every law there’s disagreement. He’s talking to you about an approach, about an approach of Haredi leadership. No, but that’s what’s missing for me—that it’s in the air, that it’s in the air, he’s not really, really not… I’m saying, I’m saying something like this: look, I’m saying something like this—the issue is not a detail; the issue is general. You—you’re trying to get other people to decide for you. In that sense it’s like a Haredi approach, meaning I’m not… What do you mean, other people? I didn’t go into the depth of the topic, I didn’t read the medieval authorities, I didn’t read the later authorities, and I’m not expert in in-depth analysis, so fine, you need someone to come explain it to me. Okay, what I’m trying to say is this: you’re trying to get other people to make decisions for you. That’s not right. Wait a second—and therefore the way that even when you want to decide one way or the other, you want someone to do a debate for you. Okay, now I’m telling you my position. My position is that you need to make the decision, not others. Now how do you make the decision? If you’re not capable, you’re not a Torah scholar, you really can’t decide. What you need to do is make for yourself a rabbi. How does a person make for himself a rabbi? The Mishnah says, make for yourself a rabbi. Now how do you make for yourself a rabbi? Does he stage debates between rabbis? What does he do? How do you decide who your rabbi is? You choose who sounds close to you, who sounds suited to your outlook—you go with him. Right? You don’t stage debates for that. Now if you think that so-and-so is… suited to the path you believe in, fine, everything’s fine. I’m only saying: if someone thinks that this path is right for him, then that’s perfectly fine too, and there’s no need to hold debates for that. If you think differently, that’s fine; there’s no need to hold debates to change your mind. But if you do think this way, you don’t need debates in order to continue thinking this way. Rather, if that’s what you think, then fine, go with that path. But what does the Holy One, blessed be He, think? That’s what we want to know. You don’t know what the Holy One, blessed be He, thinks, because it is not in heaven. You have to decide what, in your opinion, the Holy One, blessed be He, thinks. You have no way to access what He thinks. Right? Exactly, it is not in heaven. So the Holy One, blessed be He, is trying to tell you: in the end, you are the one who has to make decisions. The great mistake of the conservative world—not only the Haredi world, the conservative world in general—is that they try to tell you: you cannot make decisions. There’s no such creature. You always make the decisions. It’s just that when you decide that that Haredi rabbi is your rabbi, then you made the decision that he is your rabbi—but still, you made the decision. So in the end, you make the decisions. There is no one who will make them in your place. And therefore I’m saying, fine, whoever makes the decision that way, everything’s fine. But you can also make a different decision. And if you think differently, there is no reason not to make a different decision. Yes, but it’s like—excuse me, Rabbi, excuse me—it’s like, say, in medicine. I’m not a doctor. If I need to go to the clinic, to a doctor, then I trust the doctor. No problem. No, the doctor also got a license from the Ministry of Health. So there is a Ministry of Health. But what if there are two schools? Wait, but let’s hear—there are two schools. You understand? But now if I were to make medicine for myself on my own—but I can’t instruct someone else to take medicine that the Ministry of Health did not recommend. Let me go with your example. I understand, so let’s go with your example. There are two schools in the world of medicine regarding the disease you’re interested in, okay? What do you do? Go by the Ministry of Health. There is no Ministry of Health. The Ministry of Health says there is a dispute in the medical world. No, you go to Chabad. The Ministry of Health—you go by the Ministry of Health—you don’t do… right. There’s a dispute between two medical schools; there are arguments on both sides. What do you do? You make the decision. You, with your own sense of smell. You’re not a doctor. But what can you do? There’s nothing to do. There is no one to make the decision. Because they gave me two schools, like the rabbi says. Right, so here too there are two schools. Aren’t there two schools in Jewish law? They tell you stories that there are not two schools, but there are. That’s exactly the point. Exactly the point. One school appointed itself to be the Ministry of Health. Right? That’s it. And I’m claiming that it’s a school, not the Ministry of Health. Exactly, it says—sure, I can say that too. But that’s exactly the point. When a school appoints itself to be the Minister of Health, then it’s lying. It’s not the Minister of Health; it’s a school. That’s exactly the point. And that’s fine—such a school is allowed to exist—but don’t tell me that you are the Minister of Health. You’re not. Wait, so excuse me. If I wanted now, let’s say, to take your example—if I wanted, I don’t know, to study mathematics, physics, and I wanted the very best in mathematics, I would go to those who wear themselves out in the tents of mathematics. To MIT, to great universities—there they study best, that learning is the straightest, the best, they really are the best. Okay. If I wanted to study Torah, then I would go to those who wear themselves out in the tent of Torah and not to those who go enlist. Because they study 24 hours, they do it with total devotion—I would say they are more, they are better, stronger intellectually in matters of Torah. I’m not saying that those who study less are less good; they may be very talented, they may be very good, they may be able to issue halakhic rulings too, I’m not saying not. It has nothing to do with being very talented. You have a very basic mistake here. Exactly. Meaning, the point is—look, I sat in kollels in Bnei Brak. Okay? I sat with people. After five years—I studied for five years in a yeshiva for people returning to observance, Netivot Olam, half a day every day. After five years I spent some time in the Hazon Ish kollel, some time in the Ponovezh kollel; I went to some kollel in Netanya and gave a lecture, and in my lecture there were people who were Haredi from home, from birth. Okay? After five years of studying half a day. In Netanya. Which one? Yehuda Levin’s, I don’t remember what it was called, Moshe Bareket, something, Tiferet Moshe, something like that. No, I’m not talking about Haredim—there are many Haredim, most of whom are not deeply devoted. I’m talking about the pillars, the central people. But the central people wear themselves out in the tent of Torah both here and there. That’s exactly the point. The fact that a collection of millions of idlers sit in kollels day and night doesn’t mean they wear themselves out in the tent of Torah; it means they are idle. But people who wear themselves out in the tent of Torah exist both here and there. They exist everywhere. And people who wear themselves out in the tent of Torah and produce crooked Torah—then it doesn’t help me that they wear themselves out. If their Torah is crooked. Who said it’s crooked? Look, listen, go out and see. Maybe, maybe our understanding—maybe our understanding. Right, anything is possible. Right, anything is possible. Right, maybe. You can’t know. Who said—maybe our understanding is the distorted one. But if you can’t know, then you can’t know—yet you decide that you do know. No, so I’m saying, I’m saying there is some brilliant person, he has strong reasoning, a smart person, whether he’s a Religious Zionist guy, I don’t know, wearing sandals, wearing sandals, they are… he doesn’t understand. No, I understand, I understand, I know there are talented people. It’s not connected. Not talented people—people who invest in Torah, not talented. Who invest in Torah, fine. And I’m saying they don’t invest in Torah like the Haredim do. So there’s a disagreement with you on two levels. First, that’s not true, I’m sure of it. First, that’s not true. Say that about Rabbi Stav. It’s not about Rabbi Stav. Then take Rabbi Ovadia and Rabbi Yitzhak Yosef—you see what devotion to Torah is. I certainly see it, and I don’t want to tell you what the result is. What is that? Don’t compare Rabbi Ovadia to Rabbi Yitzhak Yosef. Don’t compare him to anyone—it’s not advisable to compare him to anyone. Fine, anyway, I really don’t want to get into people personally. Not personally—he’s speaking in a more general way… I—there’s a double mistake here. One mistake is that even if people sit fifteen hours a day every day studying Torah—there too there are people who sit fifteen hours every day studying Torah. There are fewer such people, but there are masses of idlers, so what does that prove? If you’re talking about the minority that truly invests itself in Torah, there are such people both here and there. And there are people who sit in kollel for thirty or forty years. Obviously there are, obviously there are. That’s one thing. They have time to enlist. They have time to enlist. Those too, who truly devote themselves to the tent of Torah in Bnei Brak, who go out during the breaks between study terms from time to time and do all sorts of other things—so these go enlist, yes. And didn’t Rabbi Akiva go shepherd sheep? Right, he shepherded sheep, right. And Rabbi Yehoshua the shoemaker, and the blacksmith, and all those fellows—didn’t they go work at various things? Right, but that’s not connected. Why isn’t it connected? Why not? Why did he say, a city that does not have ten idlers? Every city needs at least ten idlers. So I think Bnei Brak is way beyond that—a city entirely… By idlers he means people who sit and study Torah. So there are both kinds; there need to be both kinds. Okay, right, agreed. Who said otherwise? And there’s another point too: if you don’t know whether it’s straight or crooked, then the length of the hours only makes the problem worse. Exactly, that’s the second point I meant to make. That when you invest all your energy in crooked Torah, it doesn’t help that you invest—you just become more crooked. There are those flat-earth people; they invest huge amounts of hours in learning that the earth is not a sphere. Much more than those who invest in learning that the earth is round. If today you graduate with a degree in mathematics from MIT, which is many times better than graduating with a degree from HIT— Academic matters and so on. So let’s not—wait, let’s take your example. Do you think that at MIT they invest more time than at HIT? Time, time, just time. Time? Yes. No, yes, I think they are more devoted. Not true, not true, not true. They’re simply more talented. I know people who were admitted to MIT and did post-doctorates there, and I see that the person is a prodigy. Listen, I assume I know this better—that the people there do not invest more time than in other places. Time is not the issue. In the same amount of time, there is selection there and more talented people, and that is exactly the point: it’s not time that determines it, but what you do with that time, whether you work correctly, whether you are talented—and that you cannot determine. You determine it based on external image, because he wears a long coat and tells you he’s Moses our teacher. No, I don’t determine it based on that; I determine it based on his mastery. If a person comes and you see the mastery, see his books, see this, see his Torah, the person is deeply knowledgeable—you can’t dismiss wisdom. He has wisdom that cannot be dismissed, and anyone who dismisses it has a problem. The question is whether mastery of a tractate produces straight thinking? I’m not speaking specifically—does mastery produce straight thinking? Mastery, reasoning, understanding. Okay, this argument really won’t get us anywhere. I think I’ll stop here. If you now want to discuss questions, then we can discuss questions.