The Mitzvah of Fasting on Yom Kippur – Lesson 2 – Rabbi Michael Abraham

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Okay, last time I talked about the differences between positive commandments and prohibitions. We saw that the accepted definition of the difference is a procedural one — meaning, a positive commandment is something you fulfill through positive action and violate through passive omission, while a prohibition is fulfilled through passive omission and violated through positive action. What I called the procedural definition. We saw that this doesn’t stand up to reality, because there are all kinds of positive commandments that require us not to do something, and prohibitions that require us to do something. For example, “do not stand idly by your neighbor’s blood” — that’s a prohibition, but it requires us to perform an act of rescue. When we see someone in distress, we have to take rescue action. So that’s a commandment that requires action, and yet it’s defined as a prohibition. As for positive commandments, there are positive commandments that require me to refrain. For example, the commandment to rest on the Sabbath. Resting on the Sabbath requires me not to do labor. Or resting on Yom Kippur, or fasting on Yom Kippur. These are positive commandments that require non-action, omission. So by the procedural definition, these should have been prohibitions. And if the halakhic decisors define them as positive commandments, that means the difference between positive commandments and prohibitions is not procedural. So what is it? I spoke about the fact that the difference between positive commandments and prohibitions lies in whether the Torah is pointing to a positive state, one it wants us to be in, or whether it points to a negative state, one it wants us not to be in. And if it points to a positive state, then it’s a positive commandment. If it points to a positive state, then it’s a positive commandment. If it points to a negative state, then it’s a prohibition — where the state itself, whether positive or negative, can be a state in which I do something, and it can be a state in which I don’t do something. Okay? So it has nothing to do with whether I do or don’t do, but with whether I am in a desirable state or avoiding an undesirable one. For example, when the Torah gives me a positive commandment to rest on the Sabbath, I say: this is a positive commandment, not a prohibition, even though what it imposes on me is not to do labor. So why is it defined as a positive commandment? Because the act of rest, or the state of rest, is a positive state. I rest on the Sabbath not in order to avoid the negative state of doing labor, but in order to be in the positive state of rest. By contrast, if you define it as a prohibition, that basically means that rest has no value in itself. It’s only my way of escaping the state in which I do labor, which is a negative state. Okay? So the accepted definition, at least among those who distinguish between positive commandments and prohibitions, is not a procedural definition but what we might call a normative definition: am I pointing to a positive state or a negative state? And the state itself can be a state of action or omission — literally positive action or passive omission — that doesn’t matter. I do want maybe just to complete the picture with one comment, and say that this intuition that links positive commandments with action and prohibitions with inaction is not totally groundless. It’s not correct, not precise, but it’s not completely groundless either. Think, for example, about the positive commandment to rest on the Sabbath. The positive state is a state in which I am resting. Okay? So when I do labor on the Sabbath, I still haven’t necessarily done something negative, right? I’ve just failed to be in the positive state, because I was not in a state of rest. Okay? So basically the transgression here, even though it was done through action — I did labor — in fact it’s a transgression of passive omission. It’s a transgression of passive omission because I am not going head-on against God’s will. I’m not doing something that the Torah defined as negative; I’m not doing something that the Torah said is positive. So you understand that my clash with God’s will is not direct — it’s indirect. Therefore, conceptually, even though it is done through action, conceptually it’s a transgression of passive omission. I’m not doing something the Torah wants me to do; it’s not that I’m doing something it does not want me to do. Understand? What? Right, it’s less severe. Yes. It’s neglect of a positive commandment. Neglect of a positive commandment is always less severe than violating a prohibition. On the Sabbath there is also a prohibition in addition to the positive commandment, but from the standpoint of the positive commandment in it, yes, it’s less severe. Okay? And similarly with prohibitions, for example “do not place bloodguilt in your house.” So what does it mean that this is defined as a prohibition? The Torah isn’t telling me to save; it’s telling me: I do not want you to be in a state where you stand there and do not save. That’s a negative state. And if I stood there and didn’t save, then ostensibly that’s a transgression of passive omission, a transgression by inaction, right? No — that’s a transgression of positive action. Why? Because the Torah is basically saying to me: this state is a negative state. The passive state, where you don’t act, is a negative state — not that you are simply failing to be in a positive state. So the clash with the Torah’s will is a frontal clash. When I fail to do something, the complaint against me is not, “if only you had acted, you would have been a good person.” No — the problem is that the fact that you didn’t act makes you a bad person. Meaning, it goes directly against the Torah’s will. Therefore it’s a transgression of positive action, even though it’s a transgression we commit by omission, by inaction. But conceptually it’s a transgression of positive action, because it goes directly against God’s will. So there is something to this intuition that says there is a difference between positive commandments and prohibitions in the sense that one is a transgression of passive omission and the other is a transgression of positive action. That’s true — only the passive omission and positive action here are conceptual, not physical. Meaning, passive omission is not simply when I don’t do something, and positive action is not when I perform a physical act; rather, the question is whether I am clashing head-on with God’s will, or merely failing to fulfill God’s will. Clashing with God’s will indirectly — that’s really the root of the distinction. So why was this whole introduction necessary? Because now we come to the commandment of fasting, which is our topic. The commandment of fasting on Yom Kippur — so what commandments are there in fasting on Yom Kippur?

[Speaker B] Let’s just take a look. Not recovering? There is. Is it working? Yes, but…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s the armored-corps method for solving problems. In the armored corps, that’s how you solve problems: you take it apart and put it back together. Right. So now look at Maimonides’ introduction to the laws of resting on the tenth day. The laws of resting on the tenth day include four commandments: two positive commandments and two prohibitions. And these are the details: 1. to rest from labor on it, 2. not to do labor on it, 3. to fast on it, 4. not to eat and drink on it. And the explanation of these commandments is in these chapters. Four commandments: for refraining from labor, a positive commandment and a prohibition; and for fasting as well, a positive commandment and a prohibition. Okay? Now notice an interesting point: first, the positive commandment and the prohibition have the same content and still they are counted as two commandments — we talked about that in the previous lecture. Second, how does he define the… the positive commandment he defines as fasting, and the prohibition he defines as not eating and drinking. Why doesn’t he say that not eating and drinking means that the commandment is… that the commandment is not to be in a state where you are not fasting? He doesn’t use the term fasting; he uses the term eating and drinking, right? Third: for the positive commandment he doesn’t say the commandment is not to eat and drink — a positive commandment not to eat and drink — rather he says the commandment is to fast. And for the prohibition he says the commandment is not to eat and drink. What is the meaning of that difference in wording, between fasting and eating and drinking? Either you eat or you don’t eat, either you fast or you don’t fast. No — on the positive-commandment side he says fasting, and on the prohibition side he says not eating. Okay? So that’s the first point. Beyond that, let’s take a look at the formulations. Here: the positive commandment, number 164, “The 164th commandment is that He commanded us to fast on the tenth of Tishrei.” And that is His exalted statement: “תענו את נפשותיכם” (“you shall afflict yourselves”). And the explanation comes in the Sifra: “תענו את נפשותיכם” — affliction that means the loss of the self; and what is that? Eating and drinking. And likewise, by received tradition, that it is forbidden in washing, anointing, and so on. All from His statement there: “שבת שבתון היא לכם ועניתם את נפשותיכם” (“it is a Sabbath of complete rest for you, and you shall afflict yourselves”), as if to say that there is an obligation of the kind of rest specific to labors and actions, and a rest specific to bodily nourishment and maintenance. And therefore He said: “שבת שבתון” — rest from labor and rest from pleasures. Okay? So that’s the positive commandment: that He commanded us to fast on the tenth. Okay? The prohibition is prohibition 196: “that He warned us against eating on the Yom Kippur fast.” Notice? He doesn’t speak about fasting; he speaks about eating — not eating. Okay? Just as we saw in the introduction to the laws. “And the Torah did not explicitly bring a warning concerning this act, but it mentioned the punishment and made one who eats liable to karet. And we know that eating is something against which there is a warning, from His statement: “כי כל הנפש אשר לא תעונה בעצם היום הזה ונכרתה” (‘for every person who is not afflicted on that very day shall be cut off’).” Okay? What is he saying, basically? We have no warning in the Torah concerning the fasting — concerning eating on Yom Kippur. There is only a positive commandment in the Torah. In the Torah there is no prohibition. Okay? Now, usually the rule is that without a warning in the Torah there is no prohibition. Okay? But what do we have in the Torah? In the Torah we have the punishment, right? “כל הנפש אשר לא תעונה ונכרתה” (“every person who is not afflicted shall be cut off”). Okay? So there is the punishment, but that is not a warning. It only says that someone who does not fast gets karet — but where is it written that it is forbidden not to fast, forbidden to eat? That is not written. Okay? Now Maimonides’ view is that punishment is not enough. In fact this already appears in the Talmud. The Talmud says: we have heard the punishment; from where do we know the warning? Okay? Meaning, there is some underlying assumption that even if the Torah punishes, that still doesn’t mean the thing is forbidden. For the thing to be forbidden, there has to be a verse that also warns against it, not only punishes it. Okay? And therefore, for example, there is a whole discussion regarding the stubborn and rebellious son. The stubborn and rebellious son is brought to the elders of the gate, and there his punishment is explicit — but nowhere does it say that it is forbidden to be a stubborn and rebellious son. There is no warning. Only the punishment is described there in the passage, in Ki Tetze. Two weeks ago. Only the punishment is described; the warning does not appear. And in fact the Sages look for a warning — from where? They derive it from “לא תאכלו על הדם” (“do not eat over the blood”), I don’t know, they bring all kinds of verses so that there will be a warning. Meaning, without a warning, even if the punishment is written, there is no prohibition. Okay? Maimonides says like this: “And at the beginning of Kereitot, when they counted those liable to karet” — okay? — “at the beginning of Kereitot, when they counted those liable to karet, they included among them one who eats on Yom Kippur. And there they explained that everything for which one is liable to karet belongs to the category of prohibitions, except for Passover and circumcision. So it is already confirmed that eating on Yom Kippur is a prohibition, and therefore one is liable for its deliberate violation to karet and for its inadvertent violation to a fixed sin-offering, as we explained at the beginning of Kereitot and as is explained in tractate Horayot.” What is he saying? One might have said there is only a positive commandment here, no prohibition. Ah, but there is karet? Fine — there is also karet for Passover and circumcision, and those are positive commandments. There are two examples where we get the punishment of karet for neglecting a positive commandment, not for violating a prohibition. So maybe fasting on Yom Kippur is like that too? He says: yes, but the Mishnah there in Kereitot says there are only two such examples, only Passover and circumcision. So what do we see from here? That the karet given for fasting on Yom Kippur is apparently not for a positive commandment but for a prohibition. From here it is clear that the Sages at least understood there to be a prohibition concerning fasting on Yom Kippur, right? Because otherwise there would be no proof, since one could have said the karet comes for a positive commandment — there really is no prohibition, only a positive commandment, and the karet comes for that positive commandment. Okay? By the way, for example, Rabbi Yerucham Fishel Perla apparently counts here only a positive commandment, to fast; he claims there is no prohibition. Then that is hard to reconcile with the Talmud there, because the Talmud there says we did not find in the Torah a positive commandment that carries karet except for Passover and circumcision. According to him, fasting on Yom Kippur is also a positive commandment that carries karet. Maimonides is careful about this, and therefore he says: we must say that there is a prohibition concerning fasting on Yom Kippur, not only a positive commandment. Okay? What does that mean?

[Speaker C] What does it mean to afflict?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Not to eat and not to drink. That is the concept of fasting — the concept of fasting is not to eat and not to drink.

[Speaker C] The Torah established “ועיניתם את נפשותיכם”, okay.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The Torah also wrote “והיו לטוטפות בין…”

[Speaker C] The Torah…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] The Torah wrote “והיו לטוטפות בין עיניך” (“and they shall be frontlets between your eyes”) — what is that?

[Speaker C] I don’t know.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Fine, so there is an explanation in the Oral Torah that tells you that means phylacteries. So here too there is an explanation: affliction means eating and drinking. Again, the five additional afflictions are a dispute among the medieval authorities. Some want to say that they too are included in “ועניתם את נפשותיכם”, except that there is no karet for them. Others say they are rabbinic, from the words of the prophets, doesn’t matter — all kinds of things like that. In any case, Maimonides says he brings proof that there is a prohibition here, even though there is no warning; he brings proof from the Talmud. But that does not solve the problem. Why doesn’t it solve the problem? Because how did the Sages know there was a prohibition here? You brought me proof that the Sages apparently understood there was a prohibition here, because otherwise they would have said fasting on Yom Kippur is also a positive commandment that carries karet. So it is clear that the Sages understood that there is a prohibition here. The question still remains: where is it written? Without a warning in the Torah there is no prohibition. So Maimonides still hasn’t told us that. And then he says this: “And the language of the Sifra…”

[Speaker D] If there is punishment but no warning, then what’s the conclusion — that it’s a positive commandment? Is that the only conclusion? It’s hard for me to understand how we can say there is punishment but no prohibition.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What’s the problem? Punishment for a positive commandment.

[Speaker D] Punishment for a positive commandment?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Yes, that’s what Maimonides says here. That’s why he brings the Talmud saying we found no punishment for a positive commandment except Passover and circumcision, so clearly here there has to be a prohibition. But in principle one could have said it is punishment for a positive commandment. More than that — I’ll say even more than that — in a moment we’ll see that in a place where there is no warning and also no positive commandment, and yet a punishment appears — for example, “one who strikes his father or his mother shall surely be put to death.” Okay? “One who strikes his father or his mother shall surely be put to death” is not a warning; that’s a punishment, right? If he strikes — he shall be put to death. Where is the warning? There is no warning. Okay? What happens there? There there isn’t even a positive commandment, so you can’t attach the punishment to a positive commandment — there is nothing. Fine, we’ll see in a minute. Okay? “And the language of the Sifra: ‘כי כל הנפש אשר לא תעונה ונכרתה’ — this is the punishment for affliction, but the warning for affliction on the day itself we have not heard.” “The day itself” means not the extension of Yom Kippur before and after the day, but Yom Kippur itself. “When it says the punishment for labor — which need not be stated, for it could be learned by an a fortiori argument: if for affliction, which does not apply on festivals and Sabbaths, one is punished, then for labor, which does apply on festivals, is it not obvious that one should be punished? If so, why is the punishment for labor stated? To derive from it a warning for affliction. Just as the punishment for labor comes after a warning, so too the punishment for affliction comes after a warning.” So there is some kind of derivation here that says there is an “if it is not needed for one case” kind of move, yes? The warning for labor is redundant, so we transfer it to become a warning for affliction. Fine? But there is some kind of derivation here saying that there is nevertheless a warning. But there has to be some source that provides a warning; it is not enough for the verse just to establish the punishment. Okay? That’s Maimonides. So we’ve seen several things here: first, there is a positive commandment here, and it is explicit in the Torah: “תענו את נפשותיכם”. The prohibition does not appear in the Torah — only the punishment: “נפש אשר לא תעונה ונכרתה”. The punishment appears; the warning does not. Okay? But the warning has to exist, because without it there is no prohibition, and here there is a prohibition. Maimonides proves that in affliction on Yom Kippur there is a prohibition, so he brings some warning out of a derivation. A derivation — “if it is not needed there” — so there is nevertheless a warning for affliction on Yom Kippur. Now I want to move to another kind of introduction. Let’s now look at Sefer HaChinukh on commandment 69. Not to curse a judge, the prohibition of blessing God — “אלהים לא תקלל” (“you shall not curse God”) — the Talmud says “אלהים” there means judges. In many places in the Torah where it says “אלהים”, as in “ונקרב בעל הבית אל האלהים”, it means the judges — that is what “אלהים” means. Okay? Also at the beginning of Sanhedrin, where they derive a court of three — from where? Because the word “אלהים” appears three times in the passage, and “אלהים” means judges. “Not to curse the judges, as it says ‘אלהים לא תקלל’, and its meaning is judges, as in ‘אשר ירשיעון אלוהים’ and so on. And Scripture used the term ‘אלהים’ so that another prohibition would be included within this prohibition, namely the prohibition of blessing the blessed Name.” So the fact that it calls them “אלהים” and not judges comes to teach that there is also a prohibition concerning blessing God, not only concerning judges. Right. “ונוקב שם השם מות יומת” — one who pronounces the Name shall surely be put to death. So he says like this: what is written elsewhere, “ונוקב שם ה’ מות יומת” — can that serve as the warning? He says no, that is the punishment. Right? “מות יומת” is the punishment; there is no warning. But the warning is from here: “אלהים לא תקלל”. “For the mention of punishment in a commandment is not sufficient for us without a warning.” Now he enters a discussion that explains to us the role of the warning. Why is punishment not enough, and why do we also need the warning to be written? So he says: “For the mention of punishment in a commandment is not sufficient for us without a warning, and this is why our Sages, of blessed memory, always say: ‘we have heard the punishment — from where do we know the warning?’” The fact that the punishment is written is very nice, but there also has to be a warning. Where is the warning? They always look for a warning too. “And the matter is this: if we did not receive in the matter God’s restraint — the warning, that it is forbidden to do it — but only that it says one who does such-and-such will be punished in such-and-such a way, it would imply that permission is in the hands of anyone who wants to accept the punishment and not care about the pain of it, to transgress the commandment, and by doing so he would not be going against the desire of God, blessed be He, and His commandment; and the commandment would become something like a commercial transaction. Meaning: whoever wants to do such-and-such should pay such-and-such and do it, or should put his shoulder under such-and-such suffering and do it.” What is he saying? Suppose it only said the punishment, “ונוקב שם ה’ מות יומת”, and there were no warning. What would we think? We would think that the Torah is setting a price, like a commercial exchange. You want to pronounce God’s Name? No problem — but know that this is the price; there is a price tag attached. So you are not doing something against God’s will, but if you do it, you receive a punishment in some technical sense. Not punishment for the transgression you committed, because there is no transgression here — but that is the price tag if you do it. And Sefer HaChinukh says: that’s what would happen if we had only punishment and no warning. Therefore the Sages always ask: “we have heard the punishment — from where do we know the warning?” What does that mean? Because they want a source showing that the action itself is problematic, not just that it has a price tag attached. Okay? Therefore there always has to be a warning written, and not just punishment. That’s what he says: “And this is not the intention of the commandments, but rather that God, for our good, restrained us from these things, and informed us in some of them of the punishment that will come to us immediately, aside from violating His will, which is harder than all. And this is what they said, of blessed memory, everywhere: ‘He does not punish unless He first warned,’ meaning, God does not inform us of the punishment that will come upon us for violating the commandment unless He first informs us that His will is that we not do the thing for which the punishment comes.” The Holy One, blessed be He, has to tell us that He does not want us to do a certain act, and then the punishment has meaning; the punishment suddenly becomes a genuine punishment, not just a price label. It is a punishment for your having violated the will of the Holy One, blessed be He. Okay? That is basically the claim. Therefore you need a warning too, and a verse of punishment is not enough. Now, the truth is there’s a lot to discuss in this formulation, because basically what Sefer HaChinukh is saying is that if, say, we didn’t find a warning — okay? — we saw a verse of punishment and didn’t find a warning. Let’s say on Yom Kippur, okay? We saw “כל הנפש אשר לא תעונה ונכרתה”, and we’re looking for where the warning is — there isn’t one. What happens in such a situation? It would seem that this really is only a price tag, right? It’s not punishment. No — for the moment I’m speaking conceptually. Okay? So it would seem that it’s only a price tag, right? It’s not punishment. Therefore in every case we look for a warning in order to make sure that this thing is a punishment and not just a price tag. Now it turns out there are places where we may actually find this phenomenon, or at least the possibility of it. I once saw this in an article by Rabbi Dov Lando, many years ago already, a short article that I haven’t found since — I don’t know where it is. Once I read some sort of review piece or something. He brings there two examples. One example: there is the Minchat Chinukh, and he talks there about suppressing one’s prophecy — a prophet who receives a prophecy and does not pass it on to its intended audience, who suppresses his prophecy. What happens in such a case? The Talmud in Sanhedrin says that one who suppresses his prophecy receives lashes. Tosafot there asks: why does he receive lashes? There is no warning about this. Where is there a written warning that a prophet must not suppress his prophecy? Now, there are people who claim — interpreters who claim — what does Tosafot want? The very fact that the Holy One, blessed be He, told him to go and tell the prophecy to its audience — that itself is the command! What, do you need an additional command in the Torah that a prophet who receives prophecy should go and prophesy it? The fact that the Holy One, blessed be He, tells him “go prophesy” — that is the command! You don’t need another command here. But that’s not correct. Why is that not correct? Because in order to get lashes there has to be a prohibition. If the Holy One, blessed be He, tells him “go tell them such-and-such,” that is a positive commandment. But why would he get lashes? To receive lashes you need a warning; a command is not enough. A command is a positive commandment. The question is: where is the warning? By the way, is there air conditioning here or not?

[Speaker G] Somebody here… Weak. It’s not working. There’s no air. It’s on. I increased it so it would be normal. There, now it’s working, working. What you did worked. Why turn it off? No, I didn’t turn it off. What you did — suddenly cool air is coming. There’s a remote that gets… Want the opposite? Cold? Oh, now… Very good.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Armored-corps apps always work. So, one who suppresses his prophecy gets lashes, and Tosafot looks for a warning. The Minchat Chinukh there says, bringing this Sefer HaChinukh, what does Tosafot want? There, the lashes really are not a sanction for a transgression he committed; they are a price tag. You want to suppress your prophecy? Fine. But know that the price tag is that you get lashes. Okay? It’s a bit hard to say such a thing, because punishments we find in the Torah are never the punishment of lashes — never lashes specifically. Because the punishment of lashes does not appear explicitly in the Torah. For every prohibition you violate, the default is that you get lashes for it. The Torah does not need to write that you are liable to lashes. “והפילו השופט והכהו” (“the judge shall cast him down and strike him”) is the general source for all prohibitions. Only punishments that are not lashes — there the Torah has to write: here he is liable to death, stoning, burning, a fine, all kinds of things like that, double payment, conspiring witnesses, and so on. But lashes are not written in the Torah. Now if they are not written in the Torah, how do the Sages know that he gets lashes? If it were written in the Torah that he gets lashes, I might say: fine, he gets lashes, and that’s only a price tag, not… But there is no verse in the Torah saying that one who suppresses his prophecy gets lashes. So something doesn’t work here. Meaning, you have to say there is a warning here — there is no choice. You have to say there is a warning here, because otherwise why does he get lashes? If lashes had been written, then you could have told me: fine, it’s lashes, but it’s only a price tag, not a punishment, because no warning is written. But if neither lashes nor warning are written, then how do you know he gets lashes at all? Only if there is a warning — and if there is a warning then there are lashes, because he violated a prohibition. So what is that prohibition? Anyway, the Minchat Chinukh wants to argue — we spoke about this in the morning, in the morning lecture — that Jonah the prophet receives from the Holy One, blessed be He, an instruction to go to Nineveh. Now he runs away. Right? He goes down to Jaffa and flees. What is he, a little child — running away from the Holy One, blessed be He? You were told you are a prophet, you were told to go prophesy, so go do the job. What kind of flight is this? So the Minchat Chinukh wants to argue — as I said this morning — he wants to argue that Jonah the prophet ran away because he opposed it on principle. Fine, I’m adding that. But because he did not agree with the rationale of the Holy One, blessed be He. Sinners should get hit; there is no such thing as repentance helping them; sinners should get hit. And he also understood that one who suppresses his prophecy gets lashes only as a price tag; he is not violating God’s will, because there is no warning. So he says: no problem, I’m willing to pay that price. It’s like conscientious objection. Meaning, I am not willing to go prophesy, and the price tag is that I get lashes. Fine, okay, then I’ll get lashes. There are discussions there about how they would administer lashes to him — after all, what is the warning they gave him? Who heard that he received a prophecy and did not go prophesy it? There the Talmud says that his fellow prophets warn him, meaning they did hear. Right, no, more than that — a person cannot incriminate himself, so even if he says that he suppressed his prophecy, he is not believed.

[Speaker D] In any case, so the… Right, but how would a court give him lashes? What? How would a court give him lashes? Yes, but he has an argument with the Holy One, blessed be He, like Abraham with Sodom.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] He has an argument with the Holy One, blessed be He, and he engages in conscientious objection. He says: no, I’m not going, and lash me. Conscientious objection. And the Minchat Chinukh says: according to this Sefer HaChinukh we just read, we can understand what happened with Jonah. Jonah basically did not go against a command of the Holy One, blessed be He. It was conscientious objection, and he was willing to bear the price, receive lashes, because there is no warning — the lashes are only a price tag. Okay? So that is exactly the implication of what we were discussing here in Sefer HaChinukh. He rejects it afterward. He says it is not plausible. There is no such thing as lashes merely as a price tag, and I have proof of it. What is the proof? Because Sefer HaChinukh itself is difficult. Sefer HaChinukh basically says: why do you need a warning? To tell you that otherwise you would think the lashes are a price tag, or the punishment is a price tag. Okay, but why then does the Torah say “we have heard the punishment — from where do we know the warning?” The Talmud always asks that. Why? If there is punishment and no warning, then it is only a price tag — what’s the problem? Yet the Talmud presents it as a difficulty: “we have heard the punishment — from where do we know the warning?” So it assumes that there always has to be a warning. There are no situations where the punishment is only a price tag. Punishment is always a sanction; it is not a price tag. And if we didn’t find the warning, that’s a difficulty — we need to look for where the warning is. So when the Talmud asks that question, it has an assumption in the subtext. It is really saying: there cannot be a situation with no warning. Where is the warning? How can that be? Why can’t that be? According to Sefer HaChinukh it can be — the punishment is only a price tag and there is no warning. What’s the issue? So the Talmud assumes there is no such thing. By the way, now I’ll continue the difficulty against Sefer HaChinukh. If there is no such thing — once again — then why do you need to write the warning at all? After all, if you already know on your own that there is no punishment that is only a price tag, and therefore if you didn’t find the warning it is obvious to you that it exists, you just don’t know where, then forget it. So why write the warning at all? Just write every punishment, and assume that every punishment given is always a sanction and not a price tag, and that’s it. Then warnings would not have to be written, because it would be obvious, because there is no other kind of punishment. In other words, Sefer HaChinukh undercuts itself; it cuts off the branch it is sitting on. Because if you say there has to be a warning, then you are basically saying there is no case where the punishment is only a price tag — punishment is always punishment. But if you know punishment is always punishment, then… yes, then why do you need to write the warning? So it becomes redundant again, because I already know. I had no reason to think the punishment was only a price tag, because every punishment is truly a punishment. Okay, so there is room here for intricate analysis. In any case, for our purposes, that’s one example. He brings another example there. In the Talmud at the beginning of Temurah, the Talmud discusses how one gets lashes for an oath. One of the possibilities raised there as an initial suggestion, on page 3b, is that one might get lashes for a true oath — the court administers an oath to him, he swears, and gets lashes for that. Now not only is it a true oath, he was also obligated to swear — the court required him…

[Speaker C] …to swear.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Who is this? No, no — a person comes to court, not connected to… I’ve left the prophet now; this is a different example, a different example. So I’m saying: the Talmud says there there is an initial suggestion that when do you get lashes for an oath? When you swear a true oath. The court made him swear, he swore, and he gets lashes.

[Speaker C] What is that? Just some person who came to testify?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] They made him swear and he gets lashes, yes. He gets lashes for the fact that he swore. So Rabbenu Gershom and Rashi there have a dispute, but according to Rabbenu Gershom at least, it seems there really is an understanding here that these lashes are not punishment. How could they be punishment? He did what he was obligated to do. The court required him to swear; it’s not only that he volunteered — the court required him. He had to swear. So what are you lashing him for? The lashes are a sanction? No, they are not a sanction; they are a price tag — that is the understanding. But he himself rejects it. He says it is very implausible. In the end there is no such thing as lashes that are just a price tag. And why not? The basic idea is that in every commandment and every transgression — this is what the Ramchal writes in The Way of God — in every commandment and every transgression there are two aspects. One aspect is this: let’s say we are commanded not to eat pork. Why not eat pork? Because it causes some sort of spiritual damage, one way or another, and therefore it is forbidden to eat pork. What happens if I ate pork? First, I brought about the spiritual damage — that is one problem. Second, I rebelled against the command. The Holy One, blessed be He, said not to eat pork, and I ate it anyway. Two problems. The same thing when I fulfill a commandment — take the four species, for example. First, I am commanded to take them because it probably brings some sort of spiritual benefit. Okay? So if I took them, then first, I brought about the spiritual benefit; second, I responded to the command. So in every commandment and every transgression there are two aspects: the aspect of content — benefit or damage — and the aspect of command — fulfillment of the command or rebellion against the command. Okay? Now, if the Torah had not commanded it, it could be that the thing would still be forbidden, or there would still be a problem, damage would result from that act, but without the command there would be no transgression in the formal sense, because you are not violating a command. For something to be a transgression, you have to violate a command, right? Here’s an example: suppose there were no law against running a red light. It would still be dangerous to run a red light. It would still be proper not to run a red light, even if there were no law. Okay? So what difference does the law make? Everyone already knows that you’re not supposed to run a red light. Because without the law it would not be a legal prohibition. True, it wouldn’t make sense to run a red light, but there would be no legal prohibition here. Therefore, for example, we could not punish without there being a law. And the law turns it into a binding legal norm. The law, the command, does not come to tell me there is a problem here — I know there is a problem even without it. The command comes to turn that problem into a transgression, in the formal legal sense. So very often we ask: why do we need a prohibition of murder? We know murder is evil. The Holy One, blessed be He, complains to Cain even before the command “you shall not murder” or “one who sheds human blood, by man shall his blood be shed” was given. Right? “קול דמי אחיך צועקים אלי מן האדמה” (“the voice of your brother’s blood cries out to Me from the ground”). What does God want from Cain? There was not yet any command against murder. Because Cain should have understood on his own that murder is forbidden. That is obvious. So what does the command add? Why do I need a verse? Reason tells me! What does the command add? The command turns it into a transgression in the formal halakhic sense, not into a moral wrong. As a moral wrong, I already know even beforehand that it is wrong. What? From reason. Reason that such a thing is not okay. And if I answer you why, I’ll answer because of some reason X, and then you’ll ask me about that: why? Okay. And if there is a command, you’ll say: there is a command, fine? Why obey the command? So what? Why?

[Speaker D] Why should you obey His voice?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, so what is rational about that? There is no logic in it at all — explain it to me. Everything needs to be explained, we said that, right? So explain that to me.

[Speaker D] No, it’s endless.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] You say it’s endless, I say it ends somewhere. You say that every explanation I offer, you’ll ask “why” about it too. Okay, so let’s ask you too about the command: why?

[Speaker D] It’s different — there is God, but no command. Right.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, He didn’t say it, but that’s what He wants, even without saying it. Everyone understands that’s what God wants. No problem — I know that by reason. Yes. After all, they complained to Cain, right? Why did they complain to Cain? What do you want — there was no command, there was nothing. What command? Huh? No, what? No, “שופך דם האדם באדם דמו ישפך” was said afterward. No, that is the prohibition of murder for Noahides; there is no other prohibition. There is “לא תרצח” and there is that. Afterward.

[Speaker D] Yes, afterward.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So what does the command add? The command turns it into a transgression. Before that it is a moral wrong, and rationally wrong, everything is fine, but it does not become a transgression until there is a command. That is why you need a warning. That is the idea of why you need a warning. So in this context, for example, I asked earlier about Sefer HaChinukh: if you know there is no punishment unless the matter is problematic in terms of violating God’s will, then why do you need a warning? The answer is: I need the warning not to tell me that it violates God’s will — I know that already. I need the warning in order to turn it into law. In order to turn it into law, it has to be written in the law book. Because without that I understand it is wrong, but it is not a transgression in the formal sense, and you cannot punish for it. Therefore you need the warning. So the difficulty I raised earlier against Sefer HaChinukh isn’t really difficult. If you tell me there is no such thing as punishment that is only a price tag, but every punishment is a sanction, then you already know that — therefore you ask, “we have heard the punishment — from where do we know the warning?” Then why do you need to write the warning? You need to write the warning because there is no punishment unless there is prior warning, and you need a warning because the law must state that this is forbidden, even regarding things that we know by reason are forbidden. That doesn’t matter. Right, exactly — a price tag is not violation of God’s will. It just means if you want, do it and bear the sanction — that is, bear the price tag. Bear the cost, that’s all. It’s somewhat related to conscientious objection, say, or things like that. Conscientious objection, for example, is a case where you basically do not fulfill the law or the military order, okay? And there is no disgrace in it; it is not seen as a transgression in the sense that you are a non-normative person,

[Speaker F] okay?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] but you did violate the law in the formal sense, because the law commands obedience. Okay? So this is an opposite example: a case where you are not a criminal in the essential sense, but you are a criminal in the formal halakhic sense. Fine? Therefore, for example, nothing prevents such a person from holding public office. It’s not a moral stain. He is not a bad person. He violated the law, but he violated it because he believes in other values, and he has the right to stand by his values. He will bear the consequences, because we have no choice — we have to punish someone who violates the law, otherwise we turn the law into a band-aid — but it is not punishment in the sense of a sanction because he is bad and therefore got punished. It is punishment in order to preserve the framework, that’s all. That is the closest thing I know to punishment that is a price tag rather than a sanction.

[Speaker E] There’s no other ruling for an example like that,

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] doesn’t harm…

[Speaker E] the public. Is it compensating, not harming? Not harming the public — it compensates…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What do you mean a case like that doesn’t harm the public?

[Speaker E] What you said, about a person’s pacifism — you’re talking about a prohibition…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Not specifically pacifism — any conscientious objection.

[Speaker E] Conscientious objection, okay. As long as it doesn’t harm the public.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, but it can harm. If you refuse, for example, to go fight — even if you’re a pacifist — then that harms the public. We’re missing soldiers. What do you mean? We need soldiers, we need defense.

[Speaker E] If no soldiers were lacking and…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If no soldiers are lacking, that’s different. But I’m saying that even if they are lacking, I still claim it’s the same. Even if you did cause harm, because those are your values and we respect that. You have to bear the consequences — meaning, you will get the punishment because there has to be order — but we do not see you as a negative person, and it won’t be a moral stain such that afterward you can’t hold public office or something like that. You are a normative person with values, and you stood by your values. That’s perfectly fine. Once in Yerucham, in the second cycle, some guys came who were about to go to officers’ training, and they went around to the teachers for conversations before leaving. I told them that I would not go to war with a platoon of soldiers if I knew none of them would ever refuse me. Terrible soldiers. Terrible in many ways. Soldiers need to be educated to refuse in places where it deeply conflicts with their values. That doesn’t mean wholesale refusal — refusing everything you don’t like — but yes, a person needs some backbone, so that if it contradicts his values in a very deep way, he should stand his ground, refuse, and bear the consequences, yes? Go to prison properly, okay? But refuse. By the way, it also improves the army. Because an army that is entirely obedient is a bad army. It’s an army where the commander doesn’t think twice before giving an order, because he knows: they’ll do what I say; why should I care, why invest another thought in it? A commander who knows that if he crosses certain lines he’ll have trouble in his platoon because some people will refuse to carry out that order — he’ll think ten times before giving the order, and that’s perfectly fine. That’s how it should be. A commander should think before giving orders. All the way up to the chief of staff. The whole issue of refusal, for example over evacuating settlements, or service, from right, from left, from wherever you want — it’s very important. It’s very important because the chief of staff or the prime minister, whoever it is, needs to weigh very, very carefully the order he gives. If that thing fundamentally contradicts the conscience of, I don’t know, 20% of the population — a minority — the order may be legal, so what about the 80%? Fine. One second. I still want them to think very carefully before giving such an order, and the way to ensure they think very carefully is to give legitimacy to refusal where it is extreme enough against your values.

[Speaker C] Refusal like there was before October 7, which was non-refusal, non-volunteering. What? Non-volunteering, something like that. That can already be overdoing it — like, I don’t like that my commander is drinking coffee, so I…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] No, with them it wasn’t about drinking coffee. For them it crossed red lines, and therefore in my view it completely meets the standard of refusal.

[Speaker C] No, but that’s not… why?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] They were given orders regarding the army to do things they disagreed with. What do you mean?

[Speaker C] Even before, they said, if you do…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Judicial reform — no, still, so what? A government that rules illegitimately — if I have, say, a dictator king, from their point of view that’s a dictator king, then I’m not willing to serve in his army. What, he’ll send me wherever he wants as a dictator? Absolutely not. No. Completely legitimate refusal. If that’s really how you perceive reality — I’m not even saying, doesn’t matter — so what if he’s a good dictator? I don’t want dictators. I’m not willing to obey dictators, whether they’re good or bad. I don’t care what order he gives me — I’m not willing to serve dictators. That’s it. Completely legitimate, I’m saying, from their perspective. You can say their perception is mistaken, fine, but that’s the whole point. Conscientious objection is measured by the objector’s conscience, not by absolute truth. You can argue with him and tell him that his conscience is wrong, that the values he believes in are wrong — fine, legitimate debate. No, that’s not anarchy. Everyone always tries to scare me with anarchy — no! No. Anarchy is when people do this wholesale, when they do it casually, not because a real red line was crossed, but simply because they don’t feel like it. That’s anarchy. But when people know there are red lines, that’s not anarchy — that’s human dignity. It depends how dramatic the law is, and how fundamentally it contradicts red lines. Perfectly fine — then refuse. Right.

[Speaker D] No, you can’t — there has to be.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] There is a government! There is a government. And if we don’t come — and if we don’t come — to a shared conclusion, then indeed there is no government. We really are not a public that can function as a public, fine, because that is the situation. That’s exactly the point. That’s exactly the point. In order to function as a public there have to be some shared lines. If the refusals reach such a level that life together can no longer be managed — Israel and Judah. Then you split the… that’s what you do. Yes, we can no longer function as a public, and that’s okay. And the refusals merely expose a situation that already exists anyway. And one has to notice very carefully that the price of the alternative is worse. If there are no refusals and everyone obeys everything, you will get Nazi Germany. Isn’t that a dangerous price too? That’s also dangerous. Everything is dangerous. Life isn’t guava, as our Sages said, and therefore you have to find some balance. When there is a very significant red line, you refuse, yes. And democracy recognizes the legitimacy of such a thing.

[Speaker C] Fine,

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] so you say that if there is a good result, then very nice, but still I don’t obey… sometimes. But I don’t obey tyrants even for good outcomes. I don’t obey them, I don’t recognize their authority.

[Speaker E] Even…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] even if King David and the Holy One, blessed be He, together, are backing him.

[Speaker E] Yes, but still, never mind…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] But still, yes, it’s not that he was noble in soul, but still the outcomes were positive outcomes, that’s clear. And the Russians don’t surrender so quickly. Yes. Okay, anyway, for our purposes: what I want to say is that there is some basic infrastructure here that says every prohibition fundamentally requires a warning. Without a warning there is no prohibition. And I explained why: because a prohibition means part of the law code, formally, and therefore one can also punish for it. Anything that I know is wrong but is not in the law book is not law, not binding. It may be wrong, but you can’t punish for it, like running a red light. That is why you need a warning. Maimonides’ approach, by the way, is even more extreme. Maimonides’ view is that a warning has to be written explicitly in the Torah. If there is a warning learned by derivation, or by a tradition from Moses at Sinai, or from reason — that doesn’t help. Meaning, the warning has to be an explicit verse in the Torah. In the second root, for example, Maimonides says that if I learn the warning from a derivation, then it is not a Torah-level prohibition. Because a derivation is, yes, rabbinic teaching, because a derivation is not something written in the Torah according to Maimonides. And Nachmanides disagrees with him, and there are all kinds of debates and different interpretations of Maimonides. I’m not getting into that here.

[Speaker D] It is part of it. According to Nachmanides, yes, yes.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] According to Nachmanides, yes; according to Maimonides, no. Some people want to claim that even according to Maimonides it is Torah-level, only not part of the 613, but that’s not right. It isn’t Torah-level at all. In any case, what I want to say is that Maimonides’ view takes this to an extreme. It basically says: anything learned from a derivation is not Torah-level. And why not? Maimonides says: because there is no punishment unless there is prior warning. What does that mean — but you were warned; there’s an a fortiori argument, there’s an analogy, whatever. No. A warning is something written in the Torah. If you learn it from an extra particle that comes to include something, then it’s not written in the Torah — it’s a derivation. That’s not enough to serve as a warning. The derivation tells you: listen, the Holy One, blessed be He, does not want you to do this. Fine, I understand, but there is no command here. There is a difference between understanding that the Holy One, blessed be He, does not want me to do something, and that the Holy One, blessed be He, commands me not to do it. And that can happen only through an explicit verse. Okay? So basically you need a warning. Now let’s look at fasting on Yom Kippur. The Talmud in Yoma, on page 81, gets badly tangled up with this. Look at the twisting and turning. Right, Mishnah: if one ate and drank in one lapse of awareness, he is liable only for one sin-offering; if one ate and did labor, he is liable… okay, never mind. Resh Lakish says, in the Talmud, right? Resh Lakish says — whoop, it’s acting up today. Resh Lakish says: Why was no warning stated regarding affliction? We saw in Maimonides, right, that for affliction there is a positive commandment, but no warning. For the prohibition he has no source. Why was no warning stated regarding affliction? Because it is impossible. There is no way to write it. Technically, there just is no way to write it. Why? How should Scripture write it? If Scripture wrote “do not eat,” or “it shall not be eaten,” that would imply eating in the measure of an olive’s bulk. And how much does one need on Yom Kippur? The measure of a large date. Fine? A date — larger than an olive’s bulk, okay? So if the Torah had said “do not eat,” I would have thought the measure is an olive’s bulk. In fact it is a large date. Should Scripture write “do not be afflicted”? That means the exact opposite. “נפש לא תעונה” — so what do you want from me, not to fast? Meaning, that sounds like “go and eat.” Rav Hoshaya objects: let Scripture write “הישמר פן לא תעונה” — “take heed lest you not be afflicted.” Fine? If so, there are too many prohibitions there. Because “הישמר” and “פן” are each prohibitory terms. In fact there are three: “הישמר”, “פן”, and “לא”. The Talmud says “הישמר”, “פן”, and “אל” indicate a prohibition. So if it says “הישמר פן לא תעונה”, that’s three prohibitions. But how do you write one single prohibition, one, about fasting in the language of the Torah? How is that possible? Rav Bibi bar Abaye objects: let Scripture write “take heed concerning the commandment of affliction” — take heed regarding the commandment of affliction. The Talmud says no: if so, a “take heed” attached to a prohibition is a prohibition; a “take heed” attached to a positive commandment is a positive commandment. The commandment of affliction is a positive commandment. So now “take heed regarding the commandment of affliction” remains a positive commandment, not a prohibition. You have to take heed regarding the positive commandment to fast. So for it to become a prohibition, there would first need to be a prohibition concerning affliction itself. But if the commandment of affliction itself is positive, then “take heed regarding the commandment of affliction” is also positive. There is no prohibition. Rav Ashi objects: let Scripture write “do not depart from affliction.” Difficult. Okay? You know there’s a difference between “difficult” and a full refutation. “Difficult” means that the Talmud ends with a difficulty but in fact there is an answer, and for some reason it doesn’t bring it. That’s why sometimes when the Talmud concludes with “difficult,” you can still see Maimonides ruling in accordance with it. But not where there is a full refutation. If there is a full refutation, that means it has been rejected. Okay? So I don’t know exactly what answer is suggested here, but apparently even that isn’t possible, for some reason. For some reason even that formulation isn’t possible, without spelling out why. What does that actually mean? It means there is no way to write it. Now why really is there no way to write it? Notice — I’m taking you back to the opening of the lecture, where we looked at Maimonides’ wording, that for the positive commandment he writes “to fast,” and for the prohibition he writes “not to eat.” Right? Why does he write that there is a prohibition not to fast? Because of this Talmudic passage. Because a prohibition of not fasting is two prohibitions, right? It’s two prohibitions; and beyond that, that’s simply not how you phrase a prohibition not to fast. You have to put “not” on something positive. So what are you going to say, “not to fast”? No, write “not to eat,” that’s what you can write. Okay? But notice that eating — and even then, if the Torah writes “do not eat,” right, not “do not fast” but “do not eat” — and the Talmud here says why not, right? Why? Because then it would come out as an olive’s bulk. Behind that there is an idea. It isn’t arbitrary. What does it mean? A regular prohibition of eating is violated when one eats an olive’s bulk — that’s true of all prohibitions of eating. So why on Yom Kippur is it really a large date and not an olive’s bulk? Why is someone who eats an olive’s bulk on Yom Kippur not considered to have violated the Torah-level prohibition? He has violated half a measure — and half a measure is Torah-level — but he has not violated the prohibition carrying karet. Because on Yom Kippur this is not a prohibition of eating at all; it is an obligation to fast. What’s the difference? A prohibition of eating means that if you eat, you committed a transgression. An obligation to fast means that if you eat, that means you are not fasting. The problem is not the eating; the problem is that you are not fasting. Okay? So you understand that the idea is basically that this is a positive commandment of fasting, such that if you do not fast, you have nullified the positive commandment. Therefore this is not a technical issue of “we would have thought olive’s bulk” and so on. If they had written “do not eat,” it would have become simply a prohibition of eating. It would not be a commandment of fasting. You can’t write this prohibition in the form “do not eat.” Why is it a large date? Because with a large date, what happens is… Rashi writes here on this Talmudic passage — he says because with a large date it is… what’s the phrase… “settling the mind” or something like that, just a second, I’ll find it.

[Speaker C] Here, look.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] “Eating in the measure of an olive’s bulk,” says Rashi, “would imply an olive’s bulk, but the Torah made one liable only for settling the mind.” On Yom Kippur, when does one violate the prohibition? When I eat enough to settle my mind, to calm the hunger. An olive’s bulk isn’t enough for that. So you see that the prohibition on Yom Kippur is not a prohibition of eating; it is a prohibition on the settling of the mind through eating. It is not the act of eating that is problematic, but rather if you ate enough and it calmed your hunger, then you violated the prohibition. So you understand that this is not a prohibition of eating at all — it is an obligation to fast. It is not the same thing. What? No, it becomes a large date. One violates only at the measure of a large date on Yom Kippur, not at the measure of an olive’s bulk.

[Speaker D] Right, a large date is more…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] than an olive’s bulk — that’s a leniency, not a stringency. Okay? But it’s a leniency not because Yom Kippur is lighter than ordinary prohibitions of eating, but because the whole idea on Yom Kippur is that when you reach settled satisfaction, then you violated the prohibition. The prohibition is not on the eating; the prohibition is on the settled satisfaction. Right? After all, the point is to fast. Fasting does not mean simply not to eat. Fasting means to fast, like you said earlier. So when does food undermine the state in which you are fasting? When you feel some kind of satiety. An olive’s bulk isn’t enough for that; you need a large date. So this is a substantive claim. It is not correct to write this as a prohibition of “do not eat” — not because of the measures. The measures are only a sign; they are not the reason. It is not correct to write it that way because what is really required of you is to be in a state of fasting, not just not to eat. And to be in a state of fasting and not to eat are not exact opposites; they are not synonymous. Not eating means not performing an act of eating. Being in a state of fasting means not being sated. To count as not performing an act of eating, if you ate an olive’s bulk, then you performed an act of eating. But for not being sated — only with the measure of a large date are you sated. Only then are you… so you understand that the technical problem, the linguistic twisting in the Talmud here, is substantive; it isn’t technical. There is no way to present fasting as a prohibition. In its essence, fasting is a positive commandment. You can write a prohibition regarding eating, but how do you write a prohibition on not fasting? A prohibition on not fasting really comes out sounding like “a warning concerning a positive commandment remains a positive commandment,” but in essence it is a positive commandment — you have to be in a state of fasting. Okay? So here something very interesting happens relative to the previous lecture. In the previous lecture I said that basically anything can be written either as a prohibition or as a positive commandment, and the content can be either action or omission, right? In fasting it’s not like that, because fasting has no active state that is equivalent to the passive state. There is no positive act that is the opposite of being in a state of fasting. You can eat the measure of a large date and thereby no longer be in a state of fasting, but the act of eating as such is not the opposite of fasting. You can eat and still be fasting; if you eat an olive’s bulk, you are still fasting.

[Speaker B] Only…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] if you eat a large date are you no longer fasting. Fine? So conceptually, the notion of fasting is an exceptional notion. Fasting is a notion that in its essence can only be a positive commandment; it cannot be a prohibition. There is no way — I said regarding phylacteries, one can say “I do not want you to be without phylacteries,” which is the same as saying “I want you to be with phylacteries,” right? Anything can be formulated in a double negative; you can formulate it as a prohibition or as a positive commandment, and the question is whether it concerns action or omission. But not with fasting. Fasting is exceptional. Fasting has only a positive side; it has no negative side. There is something that is “not fasting,” but you can’t describe it positively. Eating is not a positive description of not being in a state of fasting. Fine? Because it isn’t another type of action; the action is eating. There is no action defined as the opposite of fasting. Fine? If you do enough of it, then you simply are not fasting — not because you ate, but because you are not fasting. After all, even with an olive’s bulk you already ate. Yes, but…

[Speaker D] No, I didn’t eat the sufficient amount, the quantity.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Right. So I’m saying: and why does it matter that you didn’t eat the specific amount? After all, you did perform an act of eating. Since you are still fasting, the problem is not that you ate, but that you are not fasting. There is no positive way to describe it; the only way is a negative one. Or in other words: fasting, even though it is passive omission — fasting means not eating, right? — still, in its essence, it really is a positive commandment, not a prohibition. Usually we thought, in the previous lecture we said the opposite: if something requires me not to act, then in essence it is a prohibition. If the Torah wrote it in an active form, then somehow we’ll call it a positive commandment, but in essence it’s a prohibition. Fasting is written in an active form — but passively. It could even be written passively — and in essence it is a positive commandment, not a prohibition, even though it is omission, even though it requires me not to eat. Okay? So basically the idea of fasting is like an active act. Being in a state of fasting is a kind of active action; it is not a passive non-action. That’s what lies behind this twisting and turning of the Talmud here. I’ll give you a few…

[Speaker C] I don’t know — “take heed lest you not fast.” You could say: fast.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] “Lest you not fast.” What? “Lest you not fast” — that’s two prohibitions. So that’s two prohibitions; the Talmud discusses that. As though… “take heed lest you not fast” is actually three prohibitions, sorry. “Take heed,” “lest,” and “not.”

[Speaker C] So then, I don’t know, then you have to fast.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] “You have to fast” is a positive commandment. That is written as “תענו את נפשותיכם” — yes, that’s exactly what they wrote. That’s precisely the point: there is no way to express it as a prohibition. But not because the language is too poor. The problem is not poverty of language. The problem is that the concept of fasting does not tolerate it. “Lest you not fast” is two prohibitions, the Talmud says. And “take heed lest you not fast” is already three. So this isn’t a matter of language limitation or some kind of poverty of vocabulary. The concept of fasting simply does not tolerate that; it is a concept that in its essence exists only positively. When it is not there, it is not there — but there is no active thing defined as the opposite of being in a state of fasting. All you can say is that you are not fasting; you can’t say in a positive way what you are.

[Speaker F] That you should not be sated…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Ah? Yes, exactly. That’s it. But “you should not be mentally satisfied” is basically just another way of saying “don’t be not fasting.” It’s really the same thing. Okay? So the point is that behind the linguistic twisting in the Talmud here, there is some conception of the notion of fasting. I’ll give you implications. First implication: people are not sufficiently aware of this, but the Talmud in Yevamot says there is a prohibition against directly feeding a minor something forbidden. Let’s say I give a child a piece of pork to eat. I have violated a Torah prohibition, even though he is a child and not obligated in commandments. “לא תאכלום לא תאכילום” — “you shall not eat them” is read as “you shall not feed them,” to warn adults regarding minors. I am forbidden to place a prohibition directly into a child’s hands, meaning to cause him directly to violate a prohibition. So “לא תאכלום לא תאכילום”. And that is a Torah prohibition according to almost all views. Terumat HaDeshen wants to say something else, but according to almost all views it is a Torah prohibition. The Magen Avraham asks: then why is it permitted to feed minors on Yom Kippur? You are feeding them, you are directly giving them a prohibition. So he says: because the prohibition on directly feeding a child a prohibition applies only to ordinary prohibitions, not to positive commandments. Only to prohibitions. If you hand him pork, fine. If you don’t give him the four species or forcefully prevent him from taking them, that is not called directly feeding him a prohibition. Okay? It applies only to prohibitions, not to positive commandments. So people ask against the Magen Avraham: but there is also a prohibition on Yom Kippur, right? We just saw that there is both a positive commandment and a prohibition regarding fasting. So it should be forbidden to feed a minor directly with your hands, and this is a prohibition. So some later authorities — the Divrei Yechezkel, for example — explain it this way. There is a Nachmanides in Kiddushin 34. The Talmud brings there a list of positive commandments that are not time-bound. Among them, it brings the commandment of a parapet. So Tosafot and Nachmanides and other medieval authorities there ask: what difference does it make whether it is time-bound or not? There is also a prohibition: “לא תשים דמים בביתך” (“do not place bloodguilt in your house”) alongside “ועשית מעקה לגגך” (“you shall make a parapet for your roof”). The commandment of a parapet is a positive commandment, but it also has a prohibition attached to it. Same thing. So even if it were time-bound, women would still be obligated because of the prohibition in it, not because of the positive commandment. So there would be no practical difference whether it is time-bound or not. Why should I care if this thing is time-bound or not time-bound? And now it’s very strange — there are, I think, four examples listed there, and three of them are like this, examples that have both a positive commandment and a prohibition attached to them. In all of them the question is: so what difference does it make whether it is time-bound or not? Women would be obligated anyway. Various answers… Nachmanides says there that the prohibition comes to support the positive commandment. Basically… okay? So what follows? If, say, it were time-bound, women would be exempt from the positive commandment. If they are exempt from the positive commandment, then there is no point imposing the prohibition on them, because the whole role of the prohibition is to ensure that whoever is obligated in the positive commandment fulfills it. Whoever is not obligated in the positive commandment will also not be obligated in the prohibition. If you have a prohibition and a positive commandment that are independent, and it is time-bound, then women would be obligated. But if the whole point of the prohibition is only to reinforce the obligation to fulfill the positive commandment, to prod you into fulfilling the positive commandment, then whoever is not obligated in the positive commandment won’t have the prohibition apply either. That’s what Nachmanides claims. Later authorities apply this principle in many other places, including here. What do they say? That the prohibition on Yom Kippur is basically there only to support the positive commandment. Therefore when you give a child food to eat, then from the perspective of a positive commandment, according to the Magen Avraham, it is obviously permitted, because there is no prohibition of directly feeding with one’s hands when it comes to a positive commandment. So the prohibition also will not apply, because its whole role is only to support the fulfillment of the positive commandment. But if you are not obligated in fulfilling the positive commandment, then the prohibition also does not apply to you. Consequently it is permitted to feed a minor directly by hand. Now why is that so? Why does he really understand that the whole prohibition here is only to support the positive commandment? Interpretively, why did he really understand the prohibition of Yom Kippur that way? The answer is what I said earlier: because in essence this really is a positive commandment. There is no prohibition. You can’t even formulate that prohibition. It’s not… When we found a prohibition here through all these tricks, its whole role was only to make sure you fulfill the positive commandment. In principle, you have to be in a state of fasting. There is no prohibition against eating. You have a duty to be in a state of fasting, fine? The prohibition imposed on someone who eats a large date or more only comes to make sure that you are in a state of fasting, that you fulfill the positive commandment. It is not an independent prohibition. What? Right. He claims there too that it is meant only to make sure you build the parapet.

[Speaker C] It’s not similar to not eating,

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] On the contrary — here it’s even better. What Nachmanides says there can still be debated. What is written here is clear. Fine? Let’s talk about this case here. Here I’m saying this follows exactly from the point I made earlier, that the obligation to fast is not a prohibition of eating. It is not the same thing. You are obligated to fast, and therefore in essence it is only a positive commandment. There is no prohibition. And that’s what Maimonides says: we did not find a warning for this prohibition. Fine? We did not find a warning for this prohibition, but we know there is a warning — he proved that from the Sages — there is some “if it is not needed here” derivation, some homiletic derivation, and so on. Why? Because really there cannot be a warning for this prohibition. There is no way to write it. But it’s not only that there is no way to write it — conceptually it is simply incorrect. In essence it is a positive commandment. Even when you attach a prohibition to it, that prohibition is only there to make sure you fulfill the positive commandment, that you are in a state of fasting. It is not a prohibition that defines a negative state; it is a prohibition that warns you more strongly to be careful not to fail to be in the positive state — not to fail to be in the positive state, okay? Another implication: there is a dispute — or let’s call it an inquiry, not a dispute — about how to understand the obligation of fasting. Is the obligation to fast an obligation that applies at every single moment, or is it a general obligation covering the whole day? What practical difference does that make? Ah? Yes — what practical difference? If a minor grows two pubic hairs in the middle of Yom Kippur. If the obligation applies every single moment, then the moment he becomes an adult he becomes obligated in commandments, fine, so he has to fast. But if it is an obligation for the entire day as a whole, he has already lost half the day. So that Yom Kippur is already impossible for him to fulfill. Because if he fasts from now on, fine — but he did not fast an entire day. The commandment is to fast an entire day. That commandment does not apply to him if he grew two hairs in the middle. Similarly, they say this about the counting of the omer, where there is a dispute between the author of Halakhot Gedolot and Tosafot whether each day is a separate commandment or whether it is one inclusive commandment — “complete weeks,” and so on. There too they bring this practical difference: a minor who grows two hairs in the middle of the counting of the omer — from that point on, is he Torah-level obligated to count, or not? If it is one commandment, then he has lost it; he didn’t count the first part, so he can’t continue counting from now on. So basically it depends on whether the commandment applies at every single moment, or whether it is an inclusive obligation for the whole day. Now I ask: what does that depend on? You define the commandment one way or the other. Exactly the comment that came from you earlier, between the meals. If it were a prohibition of eating, it would clearly be a prohibition at every moment. Every time you eat, you violate the prohibition, right? That’s obvious. But if we’re talking about an obligation to fast — fasting is not simply not eating. Here, right now I’m fasting, I’m not eating right now, correct? Would anyone say that I am now fasting? I’m not fasting — I’m just not eating at the moment. I ate before, I’ll eat later. Right now I’m not fasting. It’s not true that every moment I don’t eat, I am fasting. We talked about this before. Not eating is not the opposite of fasting. Fasting has to exist over an interval of time. Fasting is some span of time during which you don’t eat, and then you reach a state in which you are afflicted, you feel hungry. That’s the point, not the non-eating in itself, right? That is the side that says the obligation to fast is not an obligation at every moment. Rather, the interval is Yom Kippur — on that day one has to fast. That is why this possibility arises here, that the obligation might be a collective obligation. No — you have to refrain from eating the whole day, and that creates a state of fasting on Yom Kippur. No. There are later authorities — I think the Sha’agat Aryeh asks this too — who explain the additional period before the fast this way. Why do you need to add extra time before the fast begins? So that from the very first moment you will already be afflicted, because you need to fulfill the commandment of fasting, not only the commandment of refraining from eating. Well, that is not the accepted opinion.

[Speaker D] But the additional time also isn’t enough. What? The additional time isn’t enough.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] What do you mean it isn’t enough?

[Speaker D] Like if I eat…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] all day and…

[Speaker D] No, okay — when do you… You have to define it.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So define it however you want, I don’t know. That’s what they defined as the obligation; from there onward you decide when you become satiated and when not. But again, that is not the halakhic conclusion. The point is that you are supposed not to eat, but the goal is to reach a state of fasting, not merely not to eat. And therefore by definition this is over a time interval, not every single moment. That is a clear implication of what I said earlier. If it were a prohibition of eating, then why not say it applies at every moment? Every moment that you eat, you violated a prohibition because you ate. Right? But when you speak of fasting, then this possibility really does arise. There is no such thing as an obligation of fasting at every moment. The moment I’m not eating, I’m not yet afflicted, I’m not fasting. Fasting always exists over an interval. Okay? Therefore this possibility arises — that fasting applies to the whole day. What? On the face of it, for every large-date measure he violates a prohibition, because that further settles his mind.

[Speaker F] But if he’s already full?

[Speaker D] Huh?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If he is full and this is gross overeating, then he wouldn’t violate the prohibition. With gross overeating one does not violate the prohibition. But eating that is not gross overeating — even if you are already full — is still an additional settling of the mind. Right, it is additional settled satisfaction beyond what you had before.

[Speaker D] If he eats something in the… in the… like in the evening, like an hour before the fast begins, then he didn’t commit a transgression. Why not? He eats all day, and now he’s full, so… gross overeating.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Why didn’t he commit a transgression? Right now he’s full. Full, yes?

[Speaker D] So that’s it — gross overeating.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] I don’t understand. It isn’t gross overeating — he just ate during the fast. I’m not understanding the argument.

[Speaker D] Yes, but what’s the point — the problem of eating during the fast is that… if you’re not full, then I’ll be full when I don’t eat. Right. But if I’m already full…

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So I’m saying: it depends how full. If you are completely full — what’s called gross overeating — it isn’t just that you are full. Gross overeating means this has already become… something where you are stuffed. Then this is not even considered eating. But if you are full and now become more full, that too is settling the mind, and that too is forbidden. Okay? So, by the way, this practical difference of a minor who comes of age in the middle of Yom Kippur is not actually correct. And likewise a minor who comes of age in the middle of the counting of the omer. Just as an aside, it’s not right. Why is it not right? Here it’s a whole separate topic, so I’ll say it briefly. Suppose the child is fasting on Yom Kippur anyway, because from the law of education, from age 12, he has to fast a full day. So by the law of education he fasts until he grows two hairs. Let’s say at 11:00 in the morning he grows two hairs, and now a Torah-level obligation applies to him. So people say: yes, but if this is one complete obligation, then he can no longer fast the whole day. What he did until now was not a Torah-level fast; it was only by virtue of education. And fasting half a day is not the commandment, because the commandment is for the entire day. Therefore he has lost this Yom Kippur. Okay? That’s the claim. According to the view that the obligation is for the entire day, there is no point in his continuing to fast from the moment he grows two hairs. I say: not true. Even according to that view, he still has to continue fasting. He has to continue fasting for two reasons. One possibility: he should continue fasting by virtue of education. So what if he reached age 13? At least he should still be educated like the minors are, even if he cannot yet fulfill it as a complete commandment. Why shouldn’t he continue by virtue of education? So that’s still rabbinic, because the law of education is a rabbinic commandment. But I claim more than that. After all, until now he was fasting too. True, he was fasting by virtue of education and not because of the Torah-level commandment to fast. Okay? It was only by virtue of education that he was fasting. But in practice he was fasting. And my claim is that the obligation to fast a whole day — the definition of a whole day is not a halakhic definition; it is a conceptual definition. Otherwise it simply wouldn’t be called fasting. I said before: if you merely don’t eat, that is not called fasting. Fasting is when you didn’t eat all day. But it doesn’t matter whether you refrained from eating in the first half of the day because of education or for some other reason; in practice you are fasting now. So from this point onward, if you don’t eat, then you are afflicted, right? And from now on you are indeed obligated in commandments, so keep fasting. Right? The practical difference would be if he did eat, meaning he didn’t fulfill the educational obligation — then indeed he would not be obligated from then on. But if he was fasting, only that he was fasting by virtue of education, so what? The requirement that it be a whole day is not a halakhic requirement, it is a conceptual requirement. The concept of fasting is not defined unless you fast all day. That is conceptual; it has nothing to do with the legal obligation. Now if in fact I fasted, what difference does it make whether it was by virtue of education or not? In practice I fasted. So even if I now continue the fast afterward, then I fasted a whole day, so it certainly counts as my having fasted. It makes no difference at all whether I did it rabbinically, voluntarily, or at the Torah level. It makes no difference. The same applies to counting the omer, by the way. In counting the omer, according to the author of Halakhot Gedolot, who says “complete weeks,” he basically says it’s one big commandment. Yes, but if you counted by virtue of education up until, say, day twenty of the omer, and then you grew two hairs, then if up to day twenty you counted by virtue of education, continue counting from then on. Why? Because the requirement of completeness stems from the concept of counting. The concept of counting has to extend through all fifty days. It is not a question of the legal definition of the commandment; it is a definition of the concept of counting. The concept of counting cannot begin from day twenty-one onward. But I am not starting from day twenty-one. I counted from day one — only up to day twenty I did it by virtue of education. But in practice I counted. So no problem. Then days 21, 22, 23 are also counting, because they continue the counting from day one onward. So the claim is that in both of these cases, the requirement of completeness in counting the omer or of fasting the whole day is not a legal requirement but a conceptual one. Meaning, Jewish law says: fast. Now I ask myself: what is this concept, “to fast”? To fast does not mean merely not to eat. To fast means an entire interval in which I am fasting. So here it depends only on the reality — whether I actually fasted. It doesn’t matter whether I fasted by Torah law or by rabbinic law. If I fasted, then I am afflicted. So at every stage after I grew two hairs and onward, I am fully afflicted. It is not merely that I didn’t eat; I was also in a state of affliction, and that is perfectly fine. Okay?

[Speaker C] If I ate unintentionally?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] If you ate unintentionally, then what does that mean?

[Speaker C] So now I should continue eating all day?

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] So that’s a question. That’s one of the practical differences they bring. Someone who ate unintentionally — is there any point in his continuing to fast? Because if the commandment is for the whole day, then he already did not fast the whole day. Right. So I claim that is not correct. I claim that even someone who ate in the middle unintentionally has to continue fasting, even if this is one commandment, even if this is one commandment. Why? Because at the end of the day he is still afflicted. Fasting applies over the whole interval. But you have to fast at every moment — merely not eating at a certain moment is not called fasting at that moment. But the obligation of fasting can be an obligation at every moment, provided that you are not merely refraining from eating but also actually fasting. Okay? So if you do this over the whole day, then there can be fasting even if you ate unintentionally at some moment. Fine? Just one last comment I want to make in this context: Maimonides — I told you that when something comes out of a derivation, then it does not constitute a warning; it counts as rabbinic. Now here, in the case of Yom Kippur, Maimonides brings a derivation. This is really the continuation of the Talmud here in Yoma. He brings the derivation: “if it is not needed.” Since there is already a warning concerning labor, and from here we learn a warning concerning affliction — because the warning concerning labor is not needed, since we can learn it through an a fortiori argument — therefore if it is not needed for the warning concerning labor, give it instead as a warning concerning eating… concerning affliction. Okay? But that a fortiori argument and that derivation cannot generate a warning. So how does Maimonides understand from here that there is a prohibition? Again, he has proof from the Sages that they understood there is a prohibition here. He only brings the source — where did the Sages know it from? From here, from this “if it is not needed” derivation. But that is not enough. It is a derivation, and according to him a derivation is not enough to create a warning. So here I’ll just say briefly: Maimonides, in the introduction to Sefer HaMitzvot, after the fourteenth root, enters into an introduction to the book. There he says that if the punishment is written in the Torah, then the warning can also come by derivation. Meaning, an ordinary warning by derivation, where you have no punishment and nothing else — you have a derivation and learned that something is forbidden by an a fortiori argument or analogy or whatever — that does not turn it into a Torah-level prohibition. You do not administer lashes for it; “we do not derive punishments through logic.” Okay? But if the punishment is written and you have no warning, and you learn the warning by derivation, then once you learned it by derivation, that is good enough if the punishment is written. What is the idea? Because once the punishment is written, then we know that there is no punishment without a warning — that’s the Sefer HaChinukh we saw. Okay? We already know that the thing is clearly forbidden. Ah — if that’s the case, and we found a derivation, then the derivation tells you that yes, it really is forbidden. And if we didn’t already know that it was forbidden, then the derivation would not be enough to turn it into a command, into a prohibition, into something the Torah forbids me to do. Therefore Maimonides there basically… Maimonides here is really hinting at what he said there in the introduction. Yes — he says: “And the language of the Sifra: ‘כל נפש אשר לא תעונה ונכרתה’ — this is the punishment for affliction. But the warning for affliction on the day itself we have not heard. When it says the punishment for labor, which need not be stated because it follows from an a fortiori argument,” and so on — “if so, why is the punishment for labor stated? To learn from it a warning for affliction.” Fine? What is he saying? There is already the punishment of karet. If there is the punishment of karet, then even if the warning comes from a derivation, that is good enough, because the punishment of karet is written. If there were no punishment, a warning from a derivation would not be enough. But if there is punishment, then a warning from a derivation is enough, and that is the warning from derivation that exists here. But really look at the twisting and turning. He says: “the warning for affliction on the day itself we have not heard,” because there is no such thing as a warning for affliction — you can’t say such a thing, right? The Torah cannot say such a thing. And therefore look at Maimonides’ language at the beginning: “He warned us against eating on Yom Kippur.” See? Here. “He warned us against eating on Yom Kippur.” He cannot succeed in saying it in the language of fasting: “He warned us against not fasting on Yom Kippur.” People would say that’s terribly awkward. So instead he says: “He warned us against eating on Yom Kippur,” right? But actually the intention is: He warned us against not being in a state of fasting. That is the warning. Here too, the same thing. We read it in the introduction — see? Here he says: four commandments… “to fast on it” — you see? That’s the positive commandment, to fast on it. And the prohibition is “not to eat and drink on it.” The prohibition is not formulated in the language of fasting because there is no way to do that in Hebrew. But in fact the intention is fasting, and then this is basically a prohibition whose whole function is to support the positive commandment. It is not really an ordinary prohibition. In essence this is a positive commandment to fast. The prohibition only comes to make sure you fulfill the positive commandment of affliction, that’s all.

[Speaker C] It’s forbidden to take pleasure. Only pleasure. That’s the prohibition.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] Fine, that’s the same thing. Eating is a form of pleasure.

[Speaker C] No — with an ayin, pleasure. No, he’s saying that the warning is not to take pleasure. Right.

[Rabbi Michael Abraham] That’s what he says — a warning not to eat. Not to eat means not to take pleasure. Eating and drinking are simply examples of pleasure. Everywhere the Torah speaks of a prohibition of benefit, it uses the expression “do not eat,” and that is called a prohibition of benefit, because eating is one example of benefit. Maimonides writes that in several places. When they say not to eat, that is exactly like saying not to take pleasure. Fine? Okay, let’s stop here.