Q&A: Incest, Human Flesh, and Suicide from a Moral Standpoint
Incest, Human Flesh, and Suicide from a Moral Standpoint
Question
Is there a moral problem (aside from the halakhic problem) with consensual incest between first-degree adult relatives, or with eating the flesh of a dead human being, or with suicide—and why?
Answer
In my opinion, no. Only if the children who would be born are defective is there harm being done to them here (beyond the practical stigma of mamzer status that would pursue them). In the acts themselves I do not see a moral problem. See my response to Gadi Taub’s series of articles in Haaretz about incest.
Discussion on Answer
If there is no halakhic prohibition, does that necessarily mean there is a moral problem? I don’t understand this strange argument.
What connection is there between incest and cannibalism?
I wrote that in my opinion there is no moral problem with cannibalism or incest because it harms no one. What is unclear here? There are indeed values not connected to harming others. For example, religious values, but not only those. Some would see value in self-realization, and humble me too sees value in autonomous thought and action, and also in education.
But cannibalism or incest is just something that disgusts us, and I assume this is merely a cultural matter and nothing more.
I know Persico’s article (I assume you meant the first one, because there is a whole series of links there), but I do not agree with Haidt’s analysis for several reasons. Mainly because he talks about emotions and I talk about values. The two are not the same. And so too regarding other points there.
I didn’t mean to argue that if there is no halakhic prohibition then therefore there is a moral problem, but rather that if there is no moral problem and also no halakhic problem, then it could be permitted in practice (I meant: so that you wouldn’t say that although there is no moral problem, there is still a halakhic one).
The question is whether the Rabbi is unwilling to accept values of holiness. If the Sages say that regarding incest, even had the Torah not been given, it would have been proper to prohibit it, that indicates they understood by reason that such a thing ought to be forbidden—not from a religious standpoint but from a value-based one.
Indeed, if there is no halakhic problem and no moral problem, then it is permitted. At most there would be an issue of “do not make yourselves disgusting” (a prohibition against doing revolting things).
There are values of holiness, but those are not moral values. The same may be true of incest—that it is about values of holiness and not morality. In any case, even if the Sages thought this was a moral value, I do not feel bound by their value judgments.
If the Rabbi recognizes values of holiness as binding values, why does the Rabbi say that if there is no halakhic problem and no moral problem then it is permitted? Maybe there is no halakhic problem and no moral problem, but there is still a value problem in terms of values of holiness.
I can understand that there are such values, but I do not invent them on my own. If the Torah introduced them, I will accept that.
The Rabbi sees no moral problem with cannibalism? After all, according to some of the medieval authorities (Rishonim), there is not even a Torah prohibition on it.
And regarding incest too, the Talmud in Yoma says that even had the Torah not been given, it would have been proper to prohibit it.
Or does the Rabbi mean that “moral” is only in the interpersonal sense, but there are other values, like values of holiness, which are binding by reason (human dignity), just as morality itself is binding by reason—but that does not mean incest is merely a halakhic offense like Sabbath desecration, but rather a value-based offense. (Tomer Persico explains the value of holiness very nicely here https://tomerpersico.com/?s=%D7%A9%D7%A9+%D7%9C%D7%95%D7%97%D7%95%D7%AA)