Answer

The decisor himself might want there to be a consensus before he rules that way, and that depends on his own judgment and evaluation. So he is also supposed to decide who, from his standpoint, counts in that consensus. But as far as the layman is concerned, this has no significance at all. From the moment there is a decisor who ruled that way, if that decisor is your rabbi, you may act in accordance with his approach. If not—then this is a case of taking the leniencies of this one and the leniencies of that one (“wicked”).
And regarding the possibilities open to the decisor himself, in my new article: On Reasoning, Its Meaning, and Its Halakhic Status, I showed that reasoning obligates by virtue of being reasoning, and there is no need for an authorized institution to enact or establish it. At the end I also brought that this is true even for a layman (though he takes a risk that his reasoning is foolish, and then he will be held accountable for it in the heavenly court, because it is reckless to act on your own reasoning when you are not qualified).
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Questioner:
Regarding “the leniencies of this one and the leniencies of that one,” as best I recall Rashi explains that this applies only to leniencies that contradict one another (for example, bringing in the Sabbath according to Rabbenu Tam’s times and ending it according to the regular time).
Do you think someone who is not qualified should follow only one rabbi?
And is someone who is not qualified allowed to act on his own reasoning?
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Rabbi:
1. I do not recall such a Rashi. In the Talmud, Eruvin 6b, it certainly does not sound that way, and on 7a there it is explained that doing according to the stringencies of both applies only when they contradict one another. It does not speak there about the leniencies of both. And from simple reasoning it is quite clear that this is not connected specifically to contradictory leniencies. With contradictory leniencies the problem is that one is acting in a contradictory way. That is a logical problem, not a problem of wickedness. But when one takes leniencies from every sage even without contradiction, then this is a search for leniencies instead of a search for truth.
2. Someone who is not qualified should preferably follow one rabbi. But even if he follows several rabbis depending on their accessibility, it still seems that if he does so because he is looking for the leniencies of all of them (and not because of accessibility considerations), that is what the Talmud there is talking about.
3. In general, the question is not well defined. Someone who acts on the basis of his own reasoning is not judged for that itself, but for the transgression he committed (if he committed one). If he acted correctly, would it even occur to you that he would be held accountable because he acted on the basis of his own reasoning? Only if he acted incorrectly can the question arise whether he has a defense claim that this was his reasoning and therefore he is under duress.
About that I would say that it is permitted and desirable for everyone to act according to his own reasoning. Except that part of his reasoning ought to be that if he does not understand the area of Jewish law, he should not follow whatever merely seems right to him, but should attach himself to someone who does understand. This is not a halakhic instruction but common sense and responsibility. That itself should be his own true reasoning. And if he did not do that, then he acted on crooked reasoning. Still, if he believed this sincerely and wholeheartedly, and was not simply negligent or lazy, then it seems he is still under duress. But a reasonable person should understand (from his own reasoning) that this is not the right way.
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Questioner (another):
This Rashi appears in tractate Rosh Hashanah 14b:
“The leniencies of Beit Shammai, etc.” – in Eruvin it explains this regarding one dispute, where in one respect the words of Beit Shammai tend toward leniency, and in another respect the words of Beit Hillel tend toward leniency. For example: how much of the spinal column must be missing for it not to impart impurity in a tent—Beit Shammai say: two vertebrae, and Beit Hillel say: one vertebra. And similarly regarding making an animal non-kosher by injury: according to Beit Shammai it is lenient regarding trefa and says only if two vertebrae are missing; while Beit Hillel are stringent there and lenient regarding impurity, saying that once one vertebra is missing it does not impart impurity. So one who grabs this leniency of Beit Shammai and that leniency of Beit Hillel is wicked, since his words contradict one another in order to be lenient. And one who takes the stringencies of both is “a fool who walks in darkness,” because he does not know whom to rely on. But in two separate disputes, where these were lenient in one and those were lenient in another—there is neither wickedness nor foolishness here, because he holds like Beit Shammai in this and like Beit Hillel in that.”
Sagi
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Rabbi:
Notice Rashi’s reasoning: because he holds like Beit Hillel in this and like Beit Shammai in that. When a person actually holds this way here and that way there, obviously he is not wicked. The question is what happens when a person chooses opinions only because they are lenient. Here I said that it seems to me from reasoning that this is the wickedness being spoken about. When there is a logical contradiction, that is not wickedness but error or lack of coherence and a violation of the Jewish law itself. A person who does that violated the law under discussion (such as the vertebrae case in impurity), and not the instruction not to take the leniencies of this one and that one.
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Questioner:
Regarding 1, I found an opinion among the commentators on the Talmud in the Responsa Project: Torat Chaim on tractate Eruvin 7a: “One who acts stringently in those two places walks in darkness, because he does not see the reason of the matter; and one who acts leniently in the two places is wicked, for his words contradict one another in order to be lenient. But where they do not contradict one another, he is neither wicked nor foolish. Even so, although he is neither wicked nor foolish, it is still not proper to act this way; rather, in matters of Torah law he should follow the stringent view, and in matters of rabbinic law he should follow the lenient view.” Even aside from this opinion, when one adopts the lenient ruling of two different sages, that is not always because of wickedness or a desire to be lenient. Sometimes, in two different topics, the words of the more lenient sage simply make more sense. Regarding 2: practically speaking, it is very hard to turn to a rabbi on every halakhic issue, and it is more convenient to use rules like “in rabbinic doubt we are lenient” (meaning a doubt among authorities), “in Torah-level doubt we are stringent,” “the law follows the majority of decisors,” “go out and see what the people do,” “follow the custom,” “the power of leniency is preferable,” etc. (while trying to maintain fairness and intellectual honesty, without tilting toward leniency or stringency). Are these rules intended only for people who are qualified, or also for laymen? Regarding 3: I agree that, from reasoning, following whatever seems right to me is irresponsible, but if there is a halakhic opinion of an accepted and famous decisor, which also seems logical to me (“its reasoning is with it”), where is the irresponsibility in adopting that ruling (even if he is not my rabbi)?
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Rabbi:
1. You have answered yourself here. When he holds like this one here and like that one there, there is obviously no wickedness in that (see my reply just written below here). On the other hand, when there is no contradiction between the leniencies, it is still not proper, as I wrote.
2. When clarification is possible, the accepted halakhic practice is not to follow the laws of doubt. But one can discuss whether asking a sage has the status of clarification (after all, the holders of the two opinions were also Torah scholars). Therefore I agree that here one may follow the laws of doubt, but not as “the leniencies of this one and that one.” These rules are not intended for decisors, but on the contrary only for one who is not a decisor. Decisors are supposed to decide on their own (unfortunately, a large portion of them are not aware of this).
3. That is a reasonable move, although when your opinion is not well grounded (you are not “qualified”), any consideration given to it seems problematic to me. Still, when you have no rabbi, you can rely on it, because you need somehow to make a decision. So your reasoning is a reasonable tool for doing so. But when your rabbi has an opinion, you should accept his opinion. In such a case your reasoning (as one who is not “qualified”) carries no weight. I am not sure this is a halakhic determination, but that is what seems proper to me.
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Questioner:
Regarding 2 you wrote that “here one may follow the laws of doubt,” whereas regarding 3 you wrote that one may choose an accepted halakhic opinion in accordance with one’s own reasoning, but there seems to be a bit of a contradiction here. That is, is one allowed to decide between the halakhic opinions of several decisors according to one’s own reasoning, or must one follow the laws of doubt (for one who is not qualified, of course)?
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Rabbi:
I will summarize my view.
We are speaking about a halakhic question before which there are several halakhic opinions of accepted decisors.
1. If you are qualified, the best thing is to decide between them and act according to your own understanding.
2. If you are not qualified, follow your rabbi.
3. If you do not have a rabbi, make one for yourself.
4. If nevertheless you do not have one, or he is inaccessible, follow your own reasoning as long as it parallels one of the opinions of an accepted decisor.
5. If you have no opinion/reasoning of your own—follow the laws of doubt (if you know what the laws of doubt say in such a situation).
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Shavua:
I never understood, and I still do not understand, why it is forbidden to take the leniencies of this one and the leniencies of that one where there is no contradiction (and where we are not worried about some hidden contradiction lurking under the surface). Whether one may rely on a rabbi because he is closer to the truth, or because that is what the Torah permits us to do, what essential reason could there be to prevent someone from gobbling up leniencies to his heart’s content? The claim that this does not indicate a search for truth seems, on its face, just to assume the conclusion that this is forbidden. Does someone who chooses a rabbi have to identify with “his truth” in the depths of his throbbing soul?
If the laws are independent, then one also cannot appeal to the assumption that an expert rabbi hits the truth in, say, a respectable 65% of cases, and that zigzagging between rabbis may lead to a lower percentage of hits. (If I take myself as a weak example, during the relevant period I followed the lenient view in the interpretation of “the leniencies of this one and that one,” which was a tiny measure preserving a great treasury of leniencies.)
Besides that, the general status of literary declarations of the type “wicked,” “like a dog,” “better for him not to have come into the world,” and the like, is not really clear to me.
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Rabbi:
Hello Shavua.
Simply put, to choose leniencies when that is not your own position is a search for an easy life and not a search for halakhic truth. By contrast, the stringencies of this one and that one are a way of being stringent in order to satisfy all the views. Therefore that is better. And best of all, of course, is to act as you yourself understand (provided you are qualified). And if not—then choose a rabbi for yourself and follow him.
This is not begging the question, because searching for truth and behaving legitimately are not the same thing. Even if this were legitimate conduct because at the end of the day you are acting in accordance with rabbinic guidance, it is still clear that there is no striving here for halakhic truth.
If you are playing target practice, that itself is not a search for truth. An accidental hit on the truth is also not a search for truth (we are speaking about the search, not the finding).
The general status of such statements is the status of general declarations. What is unclear about that? This is not a halakhic statement but a meta-halakhic one.
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Shavua:
(I hope a follow-up question to the answer will appear under the answer.)
I’m afraid I still haven’t understood what the problem is. Finding the truth is equal whether by choosing one rabbi or by gathering leniencies (when there is no dependence), and a process of searching for truth does not exist in choosing one rabbi either. Even if the qualified person who searches is preferable*, in what way is the one who chooses a single rabbi better than the one who chooses seventy, aside from the implicit revelation that he is seeking an easy life where there is no clash with the command of the Creator (or with other values)—which is presumably what everyone does, and I do not see any problem with that. Why is it possible to choose a rabbi and not necessary to combine stringencies in order to satisfy all views, and is there any problem with choosing a lenient rabbi?
Seemingly, searching for truth is one thing and obeying all the rules of Jewish law is another.
* [I’ll ask separately about the familiar-but-strange idea of acting autonomously according to what the person himself understands, provided he is qualified, and about its connection to the concept of halakhic truth and the mechanism of reward and punishment. It has bothered me ever since I read the articles on “these and those are both the words of the living God” and on the difference between Jewish law and Hebrew law.]
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Rabbi:
The Helper of the poor has helped, and indeed the answer appears below the thread. “Let them thank the Lord for His kindness and His wonders to the children of men.”
Because seeking an easy life is not seeking the truth. It is an extraneous consideration. To choose one rabbi means to hand over the decision to someone who knows. It is like creating a reverse Responsa Project: give me the answer I want and I’ll find you the decisor who says it.
When you are qualified, you seek the truth to the best of your understanding. That is best, because autonomy is a value (and not only truth). When you are not qualified, you choose a rabbi to decide for you or to guide you in the decision. But when you choose the answer you want, you are just doing what is convenient.
You assume that choosing a rabbi is an algorithm for minimizing mistakes, and therefore you argue that one could also choose a rabbi by lottery. To that I say two things:
A. Choosing a rabbi by lottery is possible, but choosing a rabbi according to leniencies is not the same thing even statistically (that is, contrary to your assumption, you will hit the truth less often that way). It seems to me you will err more, because the choice is biased by a side consideration (the desire to be lenient).
B. Choosing a rabbi is not necessarily an algorithm for minimizing damage. It is a method of handing the decision over, in your place, to someone else (he is a kind of agent who fulfills the autonomous obligation on your behalf). Not because of the assumption that this is the best way to minimize damage.
And after all that I will add what I wrote to you in the previous message. It says that one who takes the leniencies of this one and that one is wicked, and it does not say that he is a halakhic offender, meaning that he errs more in relation to halakhic truth. The drive to be lenient rather than the drive to do what is required of you is a state of mind that does not indicate commitment to God’s will, and therefore contains wickedness. But that does not mean you violated a halakhic prohibition in the laws of Sabbath or niddah by acting that way. This is a דין regarding the person, not regarding the object—this is about the individual, not the legal status of the act itself.
As for the expression regarding combining stringencies, there is an error in it. I did not write that one must combine stringencies. What I wrote is that one may combine stringencies (as opposed to combining leniencies, which is wicked). Combining stringencies is a legitimate option for one who does not know the truth. One may at times choose leniency and at times stringency without combining stringencies, and that too is a legitimate option. But to choose the lenient option every time—that is not legitimate, as above.

As for what you wrote at the end, was that a question or a promise of a question to come?
[I’ll ask separately about the familiar-but-strange idea of acting autonomously according to what the person himself understands, provided he is qualified, and about its connection to the concept of halakhic truth and the mechanism of reward and punishment. It has bothered me ever since I read the articles on “these and those are both the words of the living God” and on the difference between Jewish law and Hebrew law.]
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Shavua:
Thank you. This salvation did not come to Israel except in the merit of the eighteen rotel that I poured on the grave of Rashbi with awe and trembling.
If you can explain the difference on the statistical level. After all, the side consideration applies only among the laws that can be chosen, and under the assumption there is no dependence between them. (And indeed I assumed that the reasons for choosing a rabbi from within the range need not be stronger than a lottery, and that entrusting the ruling to a rabbi is an algorithm for minimizing mistakes.)
The sharpened formulation “a kind of agent for fulfilling the autonomous obligation” brings out the problematic element built into it, but once it has surfaced it refuses to sink back down. What “personal obligation” is greater than the autonomous obligation, and what remains here of autonomy? (In democratic elections, by contrast, the choice has more dimensions of autonomy, because there it really is, ideally, a reverse Responsa Project.) Can the permission to choose leniency sometimes (by choosing a rabbi who also has leniencies) be explained without the idea of agency? In such a way that choosing a rabbi is merely a convenient conceptual shorthand for choosing the set of his rulings (and if more members are added to the set one can always move to another rabbi; that is, the choice is always about the present).
Regarding “qualified,” that was (or should have been) a wish for myself, that I merit to ask later, after I check again what already exists.
Cutting leniencies is of course permitted; presumably the intention was combining.
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Rabbi:
The moment the sample is biased, there is a difference in the statistical result. You are not choosing randomly but with a certain agenda.
You appoint him as an agent to act on your behalf. Your choice is the choice of the rabbi. And in any case his choices are considered your choices. Where there is a personal commandment that cannot be fulfilled in person, agency is effective even regarding it (not to mention that the distinction concerning personal commandments is itself not agreed upon).
In any case, the conclusion is that the dispute is over whether the sole goal is minimizing mistakes.
I remind you of the additional explanation I offered (wicked and not offender), which concerns the person and not the object.
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Shavua:
Indeed that is the conclusion, but it seems to me I remain with the assumption that the sole goal is minimizing mistakes (because at the moment I assign a nicely rounded single-digit weight to the value of autonomy in itself).
Only one detail remains that I did not understand regarding the statistical difference under the assumption that we are minimizing mistakes (and for me, if it indeed exists, then the fate of the possibility of choosing by a majority of leniencies is sealed), and I would appreciate clarification. Perhaps the assumptions of our model do not fit, and clarification will help me avoid guessing. The assumptions I am making (at least those visible to me) are that the laws are independent, and that the truth/falsehood axis is orthogonal to the leniency/stringency axis. From these assumptions I also infer that the reason there is no rabbi who rules according to the largest possible collection of leniencies is only that Rabbi Akiva’s students died and there are not enough rabbis who reached the level of issuing rulings. In any case I cannot manage to see the effect of the bias. Instead of randomly choosing the door behind which the car is, I always choose the right-hand one; it seems entirely equivalent to me.
At the moment I am discussing the truth of the halakhic position, not the performance of the act. So in that respect stringency has no advantage. In terms of performance it is clear that the stringent side has the advantage (since he fulfills all the views, as you wrote in the first answer), and if that is the only subject relevant to the discussion then I understand. But I assume that one decides the position and from that the practical ruling follows, meaning that it is permitted to choose between equivalent positions without regard to their practical outcomes (a bit like the presumption of witness validity that allows them to testify in capital cases).
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Rabbi:
Hello Shavua.
First, I will note that once you remain with that conclusion and it leads you to a difficulty, you should draw conclusions, no? You can of course disagree with the Talmud, but its determination that one who takes the leniencies of this one and that one is wicked led us to the conclusion that the goal is not minimizing mistakes, and there is no difficulty. To my mind this is similar to someone saying: my conclusion is that Sabbath observance has a nicely rounded value, and now it still requires investigation why the Torah commands us to observe the Sabbath.
You assume there is no dependence between the parameters (leniency/stringency and correct/mistaken). One can argue about that itself, but let me go along with you for the sake of sharpening the point.
One should remember that the halakhic conclusion can change from person to person and from situation to situation, and if you always choose the lenient side you may tilt the balance. You yourself are biased to choose what is convenient instead of what seems correct to you. What I mean is that your choice of halakhic option, even if you are not a Torah scholar, is not a completely random lottery.
Take the following case as an example. In your given situation two halakhic options arise, X and Y. If you were deciding in a way independent of your convenience, you would choose X (or the rabbi who says to do X), because that is what seems to your modest self to be correct, but Y is more convenient for you and therefore you choose it.
Now notice that the original choice is not mere lottery but your own small attempt to aim at halakhic truth. Since you are not a Torah scholar (under our assumption here), your choice will hit the truth 60% of the time (and not 90% like a clear Torah scholar). And still, that gets you somewhat closer to the truth than random lottery, which brings you to the truth 50% of the time. By contrast, choices based on convenience will bring you to the truth only 50% of the time (under the present assumption that there is no dependence between the parameters).
Notice that in the picture I described, the value of autonomy entered the scene, since when you choose an option not according to convenience you are exercising judgment (and not simply drawing lots, as per your own assumption). By contrast, taking the leniencies of this one and that one is a decision without your own judgment, a kind of lottery. Of course, one who holds that autonomous judgment has only a nicely rounded value will not accept this—and here I can only send you back to the beginning of what I said.
I did not understand your remark at the end where you distinguish between theoretical discussion and practical decision. I decide X and that is what I do. If X fulfills all the views then clearly I have covered the halakhic truth. Why should I care whether this is at the decision stage or the implementation stage?

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Shavua:

Thanks again.
If I am forced to draw conclusions (about what Jewish law holds), of course I will draw them against my will and inclination. But I will replace a paradigm that seems to me considerably more plausible (a priori, and also a posteriori from memory of conclusions I reached in the past in my humble opinion, without memory of the reasons) only when the evidence smacks forcefully across my astonished face. As for the Talmud, I think one can manage with it (even if with difficulty) like the one who explained it—and was brought above in the main body of the discussion—that it is speaking about contradictory leniencies, in which case the wickedness is trivial. For me the discussion at the moment is about the plausibility of the claim in itself that one can gather leniencies, or: about the plausibility of the interpretation that it also speaks about leniencies that do not contradict one another.

As for going with the flow of the Hiddekel whose waters are swift and light.
On the latter before the former—if my own humble view really had a 60% weight, then relying on it would not stem from the value of autonomy at all but from minimizing mistakes. Here, in the autonomy discussion, what are we dealing with? My friend stands opposite me and he too is armed (generally) with 60%, and I prefer my own 60% over his 60% while autonomy is exalted in my throat. In any case I would prefer (hoping the preference is possible and acceptable, without this man seeming like some bizarre spring) to avoid assuming the value of autonomy when examining the statistical likelihood of minimizing damage that was presented as an alternative in your second answer beginning with “Because seeking.”
And on the former before the latter—the options are (as presented in that same second answer) to choose one rabbi by lottery across the board or to choose leniencies. I still see that this across-the-board lottery is no worse than piecemeal lottery (because the laws are independent), and piecemeal lottery is no worse than choosing what is convenient. I return to what I wrote above, that from the assumptions it follows that the fact there is no rabbi who rules exactly according to the collection of leniencies is entirely accidental (not enough rabbis were born), and therefore I will set up a hologram of such a rabbi and choose him as if he had come up by lot and sanctified his hands and feet. The possibility of relying on my own understanding to get closer to the truth is not on the table at all when one chooses a rabbi by lottery (which, as stated, is possible). I fear I missed something here despite the detailed writing, and I will not keep grinding further if you wave your hand one more time.

I withdraw the distinction between theoretical discussion and practical decision. It seems nothing will hinge on it, so I will not burden things by trying to defend it.

By the way, I now remembered a responsum in Yabia Omer (and it is written there, part 7, Hoshen Mishpat section, siman 1) which discusses whether it is permissible for an appointing authority to appoint a judge because he is his relative even when another is greater than him. He brings there the Bach (Hoshen Mishpat siman 8), who wrote: “And it seems to me from the language of Maimonides that anyone who is a Torah scholar expert in law, even though there is one greater than him in the city, and he appointed this one because he is his relative, he does not transgress a prohibition. And so the custom is in all places, even though it is not the conduct of the pious.” [And perhaps indeed this is wickedness in the person, as you explained.] And he also brings there Torat Chaim on Sanhedrin (which seems somewhat to follow its own approach in Eruvin that was brought above in the main body of the discussion, though this can easily be pushed aside), who wrote: “‘A god brought in for silver or gold’—it seems that this is specifically when he is not learned, and they appoint him only because of his wealth. But if he is learned, except that there is someone more learned than he, and they appoint this one because of his wealth as well, even though it is not proper to act that way, as we hold that one should go after a good court, nevertheless he does not violate ‘You shall not make with Me gods of silver’—this means a judge appointed only because of his wealth. It follows that where he is learned, he does not transgress.”

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Rabbi:

One could still analyze much more, even on the statistical plane (when you choose a virtual rabbi who collects all the leniencies, you did not choose a rabbi by an objective criterion but ad hoc, and again there is a chance you will not hit the 60%, even if on average every rabbi hits 60%. Beyond that, you assume that the opinion collecting all the leniencies would indeed appear among all Rabbi Akiva’s students, and I wonder who revealed this secret to you—which assumes the conclusion. Maybe that is not an option at all!). But it seems to me we have exhausted the matter, and each person will draw his own conclusions.
As for the argument about appointments, I completely agree (even without the note about the person). But that is only if the appointer himself is not the one determining that the appointee is worthy, but rather that is known objectively.

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Oren:

Following your discussion, I wanted to ask about the matter of choosing a rabbi. I remember that in one of your lectures you said there are cases where a person is considered “qualified,” and in certain situations that qualified person will sometimes decide a halakhic issue contrary to the leading rabbis of the generation. I remember you saying that such a qualified person is aware that the leading rabbis of the generation are probably closer to halakhic truth than he is, and still he must go with his own truth (because of the value of autonomy). Now the question arises regarding ruling for others: if that qualified person understands that the leading rabbis of the generation are closer to halakhic truth than he is, should he not instruct others in accordance with the ruling of the leading rabbis of the generation rather than according to his own ruling? For when he is instructing others, considerations of the value of autonomy are no longer present, and the only value present is the value of halakhic truth.

A similar question can be asked from another direction. When a person who is not qualified is deliberating about a halakhic issue, is he permitted to follow his rabbi even in cases where his rabbi rules contrary to the opinion of most of the leading rabbis of the generation? For clearly halakhic truth is closer to the opinion of most of the leading rabbis of the generation than to the opinion of his rabbi, and his rabbi also understands this, but his rabbi follows his own opinion because of considerations of autonomy, which do not exist for that person who is deliberating.

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Rabbi:
When a person is asked, he should always express his own position. On the other hand, he should also present the position of the other decisors. In my view, a decisor does not really decide at all, but only presents the different possibilities and their “prices.” The questioner is the one who must decide between them and carry out what he has decided. I explain this in my book on Jewish law (as part of the theological trilogy).

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Oren:

It seems that you are presenting here a new idea, that even a person who is not qualified can arrive at a halakhic decision given the “prices” (when the rabbi only exposes the prices). In this conception, after the “prices” are exposed, even the ordinary person becomes “qualified,” and then the value of autonomy comes back into play.

And still, the ordinary person does not always feel capable of making the right decision, and he prefers to rely on the decision of a great rabbi. First, the question arises whether in such a situation it is preferable for the ordinary person to take the risk and decide on his own (because of considerations of autonomy), or whether in certain cases it is preferable for him to rely on the decision of a great rabbi.
For the sake of continuing the discussion, let us assume that the answer to the last question is that there are cases where it is preferable to rely on a great rabbi. In those cases, would it be permissible for the ordinary person to rely on his own rabbi, even in cases where his rabbi disputes rabbis far greater than he? Or shall we say that because considerations of autonomy are not on the table here anyway, he should adopt the decision of the greatest rabbis in the issue.

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Rabbi:

The halakhic decision of what to do in practice is always given over to the person himself. The decisor only decides regarding the options and their prices. He does not become “qualified,” because his decision does not require that. All the halakhic knowledge and skill are contributed by the decisor. Now the person must decide which prices he is willing/wants to pay, how acute the matter is for him, etc.
For example, a person comes to ask whether he is permitted to postpone the commandment of procreation (family planning). The rabbi should not answer him yes or no, but should map out the full range of possibilities and the different opinions, as well as his own opinion. He should tell him what the matter is from the standpoint of Torah law (neglect of the positive commandment of procreation), and what it is from the standpoint of “He created it to be inhabited” (from the Prophets/Writings and from reasoning), and in what situations we find among the decisors room to defer these obligations. Now the questioner must weigh how difficult the matter is for him and for his wife, and decide how heavy the price is (only they can do that), and in light of that decide whether to do it or not. The rabbi is not supposed to “give him permission.” That is nonsense, because there is no such thing as giving permission. Even if the rabbi gives him permission, he has no permission if it is forbidden; and even if the rabbi does not give him permission, it is permitted if there is no prohibition. The rabbi is a halakhic expert who is supposed to map out the options and their prices, not to give permissions.
If the person feels he is not qualified, one should explain to him that he is qualified for this decision. On the contrary, the decisor is not qualified to make the decision for him (does the decisor know how hard this is for them, what their financial condition is, how oppressive their unmet needs are, what the implications for marital peace will be, and so on and so forth?). Under no circumstances is it right to surrender to the questioners’ flight from responsibility, since they always want the rabbi to pull the chestnuts out of the fire for them.
In simple questions one can shorten the process and the decisor will decide for them, but in significant questions I do not recommend doing so, and I even think it is forbidden and wrong.

You can ask whether that person may rely on his rabbi against those greater than him if he has decided to hand the decision over to his rabbi, and if his rabbi erred and accepted this upon himself. I think yes, and his rabbi needs to take that into account. The question whether, when his rabbi instructs him, he should express his own position? In my opinion yes. Essentially he stands in the place of the questioner as his agent, and now the duty of autonomy applies to him.

By the way, the questioner’s decision to rely on a rabbi is itself a decision that he makes on his own.

I address these matters in greater detail in my book on Jewish law (in the trilogy currently being written).

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Shavua:
And all that remains for us is to wait (impatiently) for the trilogy to come out, speedily in our days.

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Oren:
I remembered a point I wanted to note in connection with agency in matters of autonomy. You wrote about the ruling rabbi that “he is a kind of agent who fulfills the autonomous obligation on your behalf.” But in any case, even if you choose to adopt the ruling of another rabbi, then that other rabbi will be your agent for matters of the value of autonomy. It follows from this that agency has no significance for the value of autonomy with respect to a person who does not rule for himself, no?

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Rabbi:
There is value in it because the choice of rabbi is itself your autonomous choice. From that point onward, the rabbi is the one who analyzes the situation for you and lays out the options before you (but you are the one who decides what to do in practice, and then your autonomy comes in again). Therefore you need to choose responsibly whom באמת seems suitable to you and expresses your values and your way of thinking. Choosing a rabbi is not arbitrary (a lottery).