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Q&A: The Nature of Providence

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Originally published:
This is an English translation (via GPT-5.4). Read the original Hebrew version.

The Nature of Providence

Question

Hello Rabbi, I heard your lecture about essential explanations and examples. In the lecture, the Rabbi discussed Maimonides’ view that there is no providence over animals and inanimate objects except in a general sense, and you brought Maimonides regarding a ship that sinks, where Maimonides writes that the providence would be that people would not board it. And the Rabbi found it difficult, as part of the questions, why the providence should not instead be that there would be no storm. I thought, based on things I heard from the Rabbi, that nature is for the most part deterministic, since cause and effect are necessary. By contrast, human choice is a certain kind of novelty in which nothing compels the choice. If so, it is more plausible that the Creator would intervene in a person’s desire to board the ship, a situation that does not require intervention in the laws of nature, than that He would prevent a storm, which is intervention in nature—something that our eyes see generally does not happen.

Answer

Hello Rafi. I no longer remember the lecture in question, so I’ll address what you wrote here. There are two mechanisms that operate in our universe: natural causality (a physical cause and effect) and the free choice of people. Neither of these depends on God’s moment-by-moment decisions, but only on the fact that He created those mechanisms themselves. Intervention in either of them is a violation of the laws of creation—either the laws of nature or the law of free will. I do not see any fundamental difference between the two. On the contrary, it is easier to intervene in the laws of nature, which have no great value in themselves, than to intervene in human free will, which gives meaning to all of a person’s actions.
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Questioner:
What seems to follow from the Rabbi’s words is that the problem in understanding divine intervention is a theological problem—that it is simply unlikely that there would be intervention. As I understand it, the problem with intervention in nature is that our eyes see that everything proceeds causally, and we find no place where there is no causality, which leaves the possibility of intervention only where we are not checking. That is not true regarding choice, where we cannot know whether there is intervention or not, and the Rabbi’s assumption that there is no intervention seems to me to stem from the fact that it is unlikely there would be intervention in choice.
Even assuming there is no intervention in choice itself, one could still argue that there is intervention in the desire that causes the choice, and not in the choice itself, so that choice is not removed, but rather the person’s inclinations are changed. In that way we also avoid the problematic aspect of intervention in the power of choice itself. But I was unsure about this—whether the inclination of desire depends on natural causality, or whether it too lies outside the laws of physical nature.
Thank you for the quick response.
All the best,
Rafi Diamant
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Rabbi:
I do not agree. When we observe natural processes proceeding according to the laws of nature, you cannot know whether there is no intervention. It is a physical assumption that if there are laws of nature, then nature proceeds regularly according to them. By the same token, when I see that I have free choice, that means no one is intervening in my choice, nor in the desires that determine it. In Pharaoh’s case there was a special instance in which God intervened in his desires and thereby influenced his choice. The Torah does not note this for nothing; it is mentioned precisely because usually that does not happen.
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Questioner (another one):
How does the Rabbi define God’s providence in the world?
(Rabbi Joseph Dov Soloveitchik, for example, argues that casting lots is essentially relying on God’s decision, that He decides what will come up in the lot.)
Does every such providence necessarily contradict the laws of physics?
And really, how much divine involvement is there in our daily lives?
Avishai
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Rabbi:
That is not specifically Rabbi Joseph Dov Soloveitchik’s view; it is a common conception among many commentators before him as well (the Havot Ya’ir and others).
Clearly this involves a deviation from the laws of nature. After all, if he assumes that the die lands on the face that God decides upon for His own reasons, then it will not necessarily land according to what the laws of nature determine.
I tend to think that God is not involved in our lives, and that a lot does not express God’s will but is mere chance. A lot is a way of deciding when there are no relevant considerations that can decide the matter. Just as any ordinary person understands the idea of lots that are occasionally used (for when the Sabbath ends, or guard duty in the army).
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Questioner:
It still isn’t clear to me whether it is philosophically possible to understand that there is causality and yet there is intervention. Or does every intervention require that there be no causality, and what we think is causality is a mistaken thought, and there are really only coincidental events happening close together in time?
Rafi

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Rabbi:
I did not understand the question. When God intervenes, it means that something happens other than what the laws of nature would have dictated had there been no intervention. That is the definition of intervention, isn’t it?
And if everything that happens is in God’s hands, then you have said nothing, because He Himself operates according to the laws of nature. So what difference does it make whether He does it Himself according to fixed laws, or whether He created laws of nature that operate in exactly that fixed way? It is the same thing.

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Questioner:
If all the laws of nature are themselves a process of intervention, then indeed one can understand it, because then nature is the intervention. But if we understand that there are laws of nature, and the laws of nature are a chain of cause and effect, except that sometimes there is intervention that neutralizes the laws of nature, then in order for there to be intervention one would have to break the chain of cause and effect. If so, we would have to say that what I think is a cause is not really a cause, because if it is a cause, then there is no intervention here, since even without intervention it would have happened because of that cause, and therefore there is no intervention.
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Rabbi:
If you are talking about occasional intervention, then at those points where God intervenes there is no natural cause for what happens. For some reason you assume that even at those points it still seems to us that there is a natural cause. What is that assumption based on?
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Questioner:
Because I do not see things in the world that lack causality. So where can I posit intervention, if causality is apparent to me?
That is why I raised the possibility that the intervention is in human desire, since there in any case there is no causality, and therefore intervention could occur without us noticing it.
Thank you.

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Rabbi:
In a large portion of things, you do not see causality. You assume it exists.
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Questioner:
If so, then what is the reason to assume that “God has forsaken the earth” and that there has been a change in divine governance? After all, it seems that even in ancient times the main state of the world was that the experience was that the world followed its normal course, and yet the Torah and the Prophets reveal intervention. So what indication points to a change?
Thank you.
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Rabbi:
All the scientific indications that teach us that things that happen have natural causes. But it is still not true that in every case that happens before us we can discern that it has a natural cause.
 
 

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