Q&A: In response to Prof. Harari’s article: What if Judaism had not had a major influence on the human race?
In response to Prof. Harari’s article: What if Judaism had not had a major influence on the human race?
Question
To Rabbi Dr. Michael Abraham, greetings.
On 20.07.2016 an article by Yuval Noah Harari was published on the Haaretz website under the title:
What if Judaism had not had a major influence on the human race?
I would be happy to hear your response to the article. Thanks in advance.
Answer
Yuval Noah Harari does not disappoint. So much nonsense, demagoguery, begging the question, and baseless assumptions in one article. It’s drivel that is even more concentrated than in his books. He is apparently looking for sensations, and for that purpose he uses meaningless word games that people who aren’t skilled sometimes fall captive to. Postmodern arguments that empty every concept of content by taking things to extremes, while not noticing that in doing so they also empty themselves of content.
First, I’ll refer you to several critique articles on Harari’s books, links to which appear here on the site (two by Persico quoted in my comments there, and another by Nadav Shenarav in a comment below).
This article suffers throughout from a common fallacy in the study of the history of ideas. In fact, it is nothing but one continuous fallacy. It is very hard to define, and therefore also to point out, connections between ideas and relations of influence among them. For every case of influence I can point to something like the relation between Newton’s mother and his mechanics, or between Judaism and Einstein’s physics. According to his method, nothing influences anything, because the concept of influence is empty of content and undefined. After all, by his method Christianity and Islam, which spread the Hebrew Bible, also did not influence anything any more than the person who printed and bound it or invented printing. They merely brought the Hebrew Bible to various places, but those people decided to adopt it. So why is there influence here? It’s like Newton’s mother, no? And the same goes for the printer or the inventor of ink. If those who wrote and conceived the Hebrew Bible (= all Jews, to the best of my knowledge) are not considered to have influenced those who implemented it and the culture that adopted it as a foundational text—then I do not know what influence is.
You can see the other side of this fallacy in the following example. After I published my first book, Two Carts, I received quite a few responses along the lines of: fine, but it’s all already found in Rabbi Kook, Rabbi Tzadok, Rabbi Nachman, the Maharal, the Ramchal, etc. Every such claim contains something, and yet it is the other side of the same fallacy. There are, of course, various influences on what I say (as on everyone), but an idea belongs to the person who conceptualized and formulated it. Even if you later find it implicit in another book or article, the birth of the idea in the history of ideas is with the one who conceptualized and formulated it and placed it in the general human toolbox. This fallacy is the other side of Harari’s fallacy, because here too the basis of the fallacy is the inability to identify relations of influence between ideas.
If you empty the concepts of influence of all content through a postmodern argument of Harari’s sort (taking things to the extreme), then no meaning remains in them at all. According to his method, one cannot speak of influences not only with respect to Judaism but in general. This fallacy is very characteristic of postmodern emptiness, and it expresses the characteristic lack of awareness of its speakers that they are sawing off the branch they themselves are sitting on.
Beyond that, he repeats here a fundamental misunderstanding of concepts of morality. As a materialist he identifies morality with considerate and altruistic behavior, and points out that it also exists among animals. As I explained in my fourth booklet, this is a very basic philosophical misunderstanding (very characteristic of Harari). Morality is behavior derived from commitment to a categorical imperative. No monkey is committed to such an imperative. A lamb that behaves very nicely toward its companions is not moral, just as a computer that does not harm other computers is not moral, and a stone that does not crush the chair on which it is placed is not moral. And it seems to me that this moral idea is quite a distinctly Jewish product (even if not entirely exclusive. Kant was the one who finally conceptualized it, although it is indeed found fairly clearly even before him. See my first note). Too bad Harari himself did not learn this Jewish lesson.
Likewise, a computer has no intelligence, just as water flowing according to very complicated equations or a bird navigating in a very complex way has no intelligence. The reason is that intelligence requires reflection. Only an entity that thinks, deliberates, and makes decisions in a non-deterministic way is endowed with intelligence. Harari himself, who believes that human beings are not such creatures (he is a materialist and a determinist), so perhaps one cannot demand from him logic and philosophical understanding. He writes what he is conditioned to write. But why should I relate to such things?
Needless to say, one cannot speak of meaningful ideas, good or bad (such as rejecting racism), within Harari’s materialist worldview. According to his method, ideas are not true or false. They are embedded in us, and as such they are not subject to judgment. Some people are built in a racist way, so they are racist, and others are built differently.
A self-contradictory sentence like this one already borders on the ridiculous: There is no doubt that the Jewish people are a special people with a fascinating history (although it must be admitted that this statement is true of most peoples);
Meaning, we are a “special people” in the same way that every other people is special. In that sense, the term “special” is of course emptied of any essential content. Every person or stone is special, because the collection of characteristics of each one will never be found in any other individual. So what?
Logic is taught mainly at Givat Ram (in mathematics), but I think he could improve in it at Mount Scopus as well (in the philosophy department). The man lacks basic concepts, and his thinking suffers deeply from fallacies.
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Questioner:
Nicely put. You didn’t disappoint either. Thank you. You opened my eyes.
But I’d like you to give your opinion on a few more points.
Let’s start, in fact, with this issue of “genocide” in Judaism. How do you see things? What about infants, women, and children, and innocent people in general? I have my own view on the matter, but I’d be happy to know what you think about this issue.
(I mean the commandments of “you shall not let a soul remain alive,” wiping out Amalek and the seven nations, and the like.)
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Rabbi:
I don’t have all that much to say about it.
First, the Torah is strict about the prohibition of murder, both for Jews (“You shall not murder”) and for gentiles (“Whoever sheds the blood of man”). Therefore, when it instructs the destruction of those nations, I assume that this is not arbitrary but that it has a good reason. Usually people bring a parable of a Jew living during the Holocaust. Would it sound unreasonable if he wished for all Germans to be destroyed, from infant to elder? So we who stand outside can relate to it more academically, but that does not mean there is no justification for it. For example, if those nations are lost cases, because they educate all their members toward murder and severe prohibitions, then this is a gang of murderers, in the present or in the future. Therefore, in such a situation there may be logic in a command to destroy them all. Like the wayward son who is judged on account of his end (when there is no hope for him).
Beyond that, the Sages knew throughout the generations how to sublimate these commandments, and I assume that if this ever became relevant and they saw that it was truly a terrible crime, they would find a way to change the law and nullify it. As Maimonides did with wiping out Amalek (that there is an obligation to call to them in peace, and to kill only fighters, etc.), and like “an eye for an eye,” and so on. In such a situation the Torah’s instruction receives a general value meaning (that it would have been fitting to kill, just as it would have been fitting to put out an eye), but not a practical one.
I didn’t write about all the problems in his little article, because the paper would run out and they still would not. I’ll just add here that his claims about the difference between Jews and gentiles are also incorrect, or at least imprecise. First, we are talking about gentiles who themselves do not behave properly, for toward moral and humane gentiles there are obligations just as there are toward a Jew (as Meiri holds). So why should they murder us freely while we should be careful about murdering them as we are about murdering a Jew? Especially according to Harari’s own method, in which there is no difference between animals and humans, so what right does he have to complain about us rather than complain about the whole world, which prefers human beings over animals.
And furthermore, the fact that there is extra severity regarding the murder of a Jew is not discrimination at all, since there is a Torah-level prohibition, though a different one, against murdering a gentile as well. So what is the problem? There is a severe prohibition against murdering any person, Jew or gentile, but if it is a Jew the prohibition is even more severe. This is not leniency regarding murdering a gentile, but stringency regarding murdering a Jew. Is it not common in various countries to grant extra rights to their own citizens? As long as basic rights are not harmed (human rights, as distinct from citizens’ rights), there is no obligation of total equality, and nobody does that. Everyone prefers his family and his people over others, and rightly so. The question now is whether reducing the severity of the murder prohibition constitutes a violation of a human right. In my opinion, definitely not, because the prohibition of murder exists with respect to every person, and that is every person’s basic right. Beyond that, imposing the death penalty for murder is not a person’s basic right (we do not have a right that if someone murders us, he should be killed. We have a right not to be murdered, and that right is indeed granted equally to every person).
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Questioner:
While we’re on the subject, I’ll ask: why, in your opinion, does the Torah reduce the punishment for rape so drastically, to the point of a ridiculous monetary fine?
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Rabbi:
Again, we are dealing with a punishment for the halakhic prohibition. But the act of rape is very immoral, and on the moral plane there can be completely different treatment (a religious court administers lashes and punishments not according to the formal law).
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Questioner:
Thank you. But this time I don’t understand.
The halakhic prohibition (if I accept this distinction) is “there shall be no harlot among you,” or “menstruant,” and the like, for which there are already punishments (which he would certainly get in this case too, if not because of “one punishment covers the greater one”). When we talk about rape, we are talking about a special punishment that the Torah imposes for the act of coercion itself—that is, relations without consent—that is, decency—interpersonal conduct—and not a violation of laws of holiness. And here such a light punishment seems extremely forgiving.
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Rabbi:
What are you talking about?! For the prohibition of a menstruant one receives a separate punishment. And if she is not a menstruant, then there is no law of rape? And likewise regarding “there shall be no harlot,” that exists even without rape. So it is clear that this is not about those prohibitions. This is a fine for the act. By the way, this fine also exists in the case of seduction, and therefore it is clear that even the fine is not for the rape. For the rape itself there is no punishment at all.
Moreover, Maimonides explains that the fine of fifty silver pieces is paid for the benefit of intercourse (see Laws of the Virgin Maiden, beginning of chapter 2. This is of course innovative, since it is a fine that ought to be punitive and not payment for something). Meaning, this fine is not even a punishment, and the reason it is defined as a fine is apparently that there is no personal appraisal for the value of the benefit of intercourse.
Beyond that there are payments for pain, shame, and depreciation (and in the case of seduction there is no pain). Only here is there a difference between rape and seduction.
In any case, all of these are compensation and payments for benefit, not punishment. There is no punishment at all for such an act, because the transgression here is a moral transgression, as I wrote.
One can compare this to monetary damage. There too the commentators wonder where its warning prohibition is derived from, since in the Torah only the payment obligations appear, the compensation. But there too it is clear that there is a moral prohibition, and the payment is not a punishment for it.
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Questioner:
What you’re writing is very interesting; proofs can also be brought for it.
But the real question is: why? Why indeed is there no punishment?
Would you also say, regarding murder, that the death sentence is not a punishment for the moral crime?
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Rabbi:
Indeed, in my opinion even in the case of murder the punishment is for the halakhic transgression. Punishment for the moral aspect is confinement in the kippah cell. Therefore, for murdering a gentile there is no punishment, because there there is no full halakhic transgression of “You shall not murder” (only “Whoever sheds the blood of man,” for which there is no death penalty), but only a moral transgression.
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Oren:
Following up on this question, in your last answer you wrote regarding murdering a gentile that there is a halakhic prohibition of “Whoever sheds the blood of man, by man shall his blood be shed” (beyond the moral prohibition). The question is why there is also no punishment alongside this halakhic transgression, especially since the punishment is stated explicitly in the verse itself (“by man shall his blood be shed”)?
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Rabbi:
I don’t know. Maybe because this is a moral transgression and the Torah does not deal with punishment for such transgressions. That is left to the religious court, which punishes outside the formal law.
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Oren:
But there is also a halakhic transgression here (correct me if I’m wrong), derived from the verse: “Whoever sheds the blood of man, by man shall his blood be shed.” In other words, there is a halakhic prohibition imposed on all human beings to refrain from bloodshed (one of the seven Noahide commandments), and in addition the Torah seemingly permitted shedding the blood of the shedder.
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Rabbi:
What I suggested is that this transgression is moral and not fully halakhic (even though Jewish law incorporated it into itself in the prohibition against killing a gentile, somewhat like coercing against the measure of Sodom), like the rest of the Noahide commandments.
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A:
In my humble opinion, communication does not take place only through human speech. We communicate through body language, dogs communicate through wagging their tails, and certain animals communicate by secreting substances with odors. Therefore a monkey too can respond to all sorts of categorical imperatives, even if he cannot explain them to you. He and his companions understand each other, and that is enough for them. The human being is more developed, as I wrote elsewhere (http://www.bhol.co.il/forums/topic.asp?topic_id=3120416&whichpage=2#R_15), and therefore he also develops morality to a higher level. But morality does not belong to Jews just as it does not belong to man. Of course I see a great problem in belittling man, since when they want to they know very well how to claim they are very enlightened, and only when it comes to people whose views they disagree with—then suddenly man becomes a primitive and pitiable creature, at best like a monkey. But morality itself is the property of God and not the property of man. Only its use is man’s property, though in the end even man’s property belongs to God.
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Rabbi:
I didn’t understand the claim. The problem is not understanding but free will. I discussed this at length in the fourth of the five booklets on the site. See there in the third part. Even if the monkey understands everything (it is a philosophical question what understanding is and whether monkeys have it), apparently it has no free will, meaning it does not decide. One who does not decide cannot be moral even if he understands everything. A moral act is only an act that I decided to do. A stone that falls and hits an enemy pursuing me does not perform a moral act. Not because it does not understand (even a stone with consciousness would not be moral in such a situation), but because it did not “decide” to do the act. Therefore the difference between a human and a monkey is not quantitative but essential and categorical. Responding to a categorical imperative is a decision, not automatic obedience to a command. Therefore when a dog responds to its master’s command, that is not really responding, since it is not the result of its own decision. It is its nature. Of course there is an assumption here that animals have no free will, and if you disagree with that then the picture changes. But that is my assumption. At the margins, I also tend to think that a monkey has no intelligence, because intelligence is the result of exercising judgment out of decision. Automatic calculation like that of a computer points not to the intelligence of the actor but of the one who programmed it. The movement of water takes place according to very complicated equations (Navier-Stokes), which nobody knows how to solve except in the simplest cases. And the water solves them at every moment (because the solution is a description of the water’s motion). Does the water have intelligence? By the same token, the water also cannot be moral. Here too the assumption is that water has no free will, and of course you may disagree with that as well. I do not understand the talk about “morality as someone’s property.”
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A:
I really do think animals have free will. True, a tiger has no choice whether to prey on a doe or not. But it does have a choice how to behave toward its fellow tigers. By the same token, a human being has no choice whether to chat with an ox (even if technically he is capable, psychologically he is not capable). But he certainly has a choice whether to chat with his friend in the middle of study or work. To some extent, perhaps even water has some kind of thought. But that is another story in any case, and requires philosophical reflection on the nature of matter. Likewise regarding intelligence—a monkey has intelligence with respect to the decisions it carries out. And it certainly has such decisions, at its own level and in its own context. What I wrote about “morality as property” perhaps referred more to the paragraph quoted there, where it was explained that man is not more moral than the monkey. To that I replied that this is true in terms of “who possesses moral insight,” but not in terms of “who possesses higher moral insight.”
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Rabbi:
If so, our disagreement is about facts and not about essence.
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Oren:
If animals are in some sense similar to water, as you said above, what is the meaning of a moral attitude toward them (beyond the halakhic sense of the prohibition against causing suffering to animals)? Seemingly, according to your words, refraining from harming a monkey is similar to being careful not to step on stones so as not to harm them.
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Rabbi:
I don’t think so. The animal suffers, and therefore there is a moral obligation to prevent it from suffering. Water does not suffer. The obligation to prevent suffering is not because of the animal’s value, but because of the very fact that it suffers.
In other words, contrary to your assumption in the question, there is a difference between the subjects who are obligated in moral behavior and can be judged as moral or not—in that respect, only beings with free will are included—and the subjects (or entities) toward whom there is a moral obligation. Here animals can be included as well.
A similar distinction exists also in Jewish law regarding minors. They are not obligated in commandments, but interpersonal commandments still apply toward them.
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Oren:
When you say of animals that they suffer, is there also an implicit assumption here that they have some sort of consciousness that experiences this suffering? Otherwise, what does the suffering of animals even mean?
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Rabbi:
Indeed. That is what suffering means. Suffering that is not felt is not suffering. In cases of pain and the like, it seems on the face of it that they really do suffer, and therefore that is my impression (that animals do suffer), though of course one can always interpret these as merely incidental contortions.
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Just Someone:
The answer about rape is missing a bit
The payment of the fine is only an addition to pain, damage, shame, loss of livelihood, and medical costs
So the payment for rape—the fine is the small part of it
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Rabbi:
Even if that were true, what difference would it make? But in my humble opinion it is not true. After all, all those payments are not punishments (fines) but tort compensation (except for Maimonides’ view, which is unclear on this point). Therefore only the fine is a punishment for the rape.
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Just Someone:
Michi, hello
It makes a difference; there is an explicit Mishnah that one is liable for five things-
How much do you think one has to pay for pain and shame?
It seems to me you’d reach an amount that would force the person to sell everything he has in order to pay it
and in effect he would have to sell himself into slavery.
That’s prison in the old world.
It’s not clear to me which is preferable, today’s punishments or those of the past
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Rabbi:
I do not know what was unclear in my words. All these are not punishments, and therefore it is not relevant whether or not there is such a Mishnah. They are compensation payments. Only the fine is a punishment. If it is very hard for someone to compensate another person for damage, is he exempt from punishment? “The greater liability absorbs the lesser” does not apply here.
Discussion on Answer
I don’t know the source of the authoritative and decisive information you present here. In my opinion this is speculation that seems implausible to me. My intuition says that they do suffer (I’m not completely dogmatic, but that is what seems likely to me. Enough to be concerned about it).
If you want, call it consciousness in some basic sense (that is already a matter of terminology). When they are in pain, they suffer, and you can see reactions to that. If you attribute it to instinctive electrical reactions without suffering, you could say the same thing about human beings suffering next to you (this is the problem of the other minds).
The point is not whether they suffer or not, but what the *meaning* of the suffering is. Studies have shown that even when plants suffer they secrete various chemical substances during stress and the like.
The point is that both halakhically and in simple intuition, it is permitted to cause a certain amount of suffering to an animal. Anyone who has ridden a donkey knows you have to “prod” it a bit, or if you want to train a dog, for example, you use the carrot-and-stick method, which involves punishing the dog to some degree. And so too with the act of slaughter itself (although there is, if I remember correctly, a Tosafot in Hullin that claims there is no suffering in slaughter).
If the point is the animal’s suffering, why is it permitted? It would be unthinkable to cause a small amount of suffering to another person for my own needs, even if the need is great. If in my opinion my cleaning lady is not working fast enough, I can’t give her a light slap to make her hurry, whereas with a donkey I can (the exception being if the suffering is constructive, as in military training, where it is also by choice).
Likewise, during courtship animals secrete all sorts of hormones and the like, yet that is not “love”; so too the suffering of an animal has no meaning beyond instinctive reactions that indeed hurt it (like plants).
Therefore it is not relevant except according to the effect it has on the human being. Obviously, someone who is more sensitive and is pained by the disgraceful treatment in industry—then it is relevant for him. But it is not a moral issue at all. The benefit of food security for all humanity, especially the weaker strata, in my opinion outweighs the cost of the suffering, if it is necessary and not just pointless abuse (because then the effect on the soul of the abuser is more severe, and that is already a danger to society).
Your remarks mix different levels of discussion and make logical leaps that are not clear.
I do not know the difference between suffering and the meaning of suffering. If animals suffer, that is a problem. Even a baby who is abused suffers, despite having no awareness, and it seems to me that he is not in a different state from animals, and perhaps even less than they are.
You can of course argue that causing suffering to animals is not like causing suffering to a person, because the moral status of an animal is different from that of a human being (if it has any at all). To that I definitely agree, and still it is forbidden to cause it suffering without justified reason.
Hormones and the rest of the vegetables are unrelated to the discussion here. Secretion of hormones is not suffering. Suffering is a sensation and not a physical phenomenon; my claim is that to the best of my judgment there is such a sensation in animals too.
The question of dosage—whether it is permitted to cause a little or a lot of suffering to animals—is again unrelated to our issue. We also cause suffering to human beings in the army in order to bring benefit to society. That is a question of reasonable dosage and not of animals versus human beings. Assigning work to your cleaning lady is itself causing suffering. Not cleaning up the dirt you leave is causing suffering. All this is not relevant to our discussion.
In summary, this is the picture as I understand it:
1. There are physical phenomena that accompany suffering. These certainly are not suffering. Did anyone say otherwise? That is agreed.
2. There is a sensation of suffering in human beings (why also in others?). The dispute between us, if I understood correctly, is whether there is such a sensation in animals too.
3. Different entities have moral meaning and status. Human beings have a higher status than animals. I am even willing to agree that animals have no moral rights, but still we have an obligation not to cause them suffering (for their sake too, not only for our education, as you wrote). I assume that here too we agree.
4. The amount of suffering that it is permitted to cause anyone is a function of the moral status of the suffering object, of our level of need in the matter, and of the situation. This is true of human beings and animals alike. Except that the difference in status (point 3) causes a difference in the amount of suffering it is justified to cause under given circumstances. Here I do not know whether we agree, but it seems trivial to me.
Now you can see that your conclusion—that the suffering of animals has no moral significance—is implausible, unjustified, and also does not follow from the premises:
* If they do not suffer, then indeed there is no problem even without all the reasons you gave, but in my opinion it is factually implausible that they do not suffer.
* And if they do suffer, then all your arguments are irrelevant and do not lead to your conclusion.
You asked about rape, but you did not know what you were asking. You were really talking about the seduction of a virgin maiden. One must first distinguish in the language of the Torah, in its precise prohibition and the intent of its words, regarding the acts it is speaking about.
I will elaborate a bit so I can be understood.
A quick Google search will find the sources, so I will not bring them.
The Torah nowhere speaks about the rape of a virgin maiden, only of a betrothed or married woman. See: “If he found her in the field, and she cried out but there was no one to save her…”
As for the seduction of a virgin, see: “If a man seduces a virgin maiden who is not betrothed,” etc. It is clear that the Torah does not approve of this sexual impropriety, and furthermore the man is punished and she is not. For it is upon him that the command rests to maintain and “he shall rule over you” and refrain from seducing her.
I will also answer the question of rape. I will preface by saying that the Torah’s view is open to analysis; perhaps the punishment for raping a virgin is not death as it is for raping a betrothed woman. This is not the place for me to express my opinion on the matter. But one can learn from the episode of the concubine at Gibeah that for such acts of depravity the people of Israel and its sages were aware of their severity, and they nearly wiped out an entire tribe of Israel when it refused to hand over its criminals for judgment.
Therefore, go and learn, rise and succeed, and may God enlighten you with His wisdom.
The Rabbi wrote here:
“Such a self-contradictory sentence already borders on the ridiculous: There is no doubt that the Jewish people are a special people with a fascinating history (although it must be admitted that this statement is true of most peoples); meaning, we are ‘a special people’ in the same way every other people is special. In that sense the term ‘special’ is of course emptied of essential content. Every person or stone is special because the collection of characteristics of each one will never be found in any other individual. So what?”
My question here is about the last line: “Every person or stone is special because the collection of characteristics of each one will never be found in any other individual. So what?”
I do not understand why this is not correct. Indeed every stone and person is special. For with respect to his own characteristics, all the other characteristics of the whole are not present in them. He is indeed right, isn’t he?
My question here matches the parallel question in the context of the physico-theological proof about the definition of complexity—complexity is only one parameter that exists in systems of laws. And every system of laws will create a special world (because there exists only one system of laws for it).
https://mikyab.net/%D7%A9%D7%95%D7%AA/%D7%9E%D7%97%D7%91%D7%A8%D7%AA-%D7%94%D7%A8%D7%90%D7%99%D7%94-%D7%94%D7%A4%D7%99%D7%96%D7%A7%D7%95-%D7%AA%D7%90%D7%95%D7%9C%D7%92%D7%99%D7%AA/#comment-7596
Yedidya
Go back to the question of “what is exceptional.” Suppose you have there a circle, a square, a pentagon, and a line. You could say that the square is exceptional because only it is a circle and all the others are not circles. I hope you understand that this does not make it exceptional. The idea of uniqueness is that all the other things have a positive common property that the unique thing does not have—all of them are two-dimensional and the line is one-dimensional, and therefore it is unique. All nations are wiped out in exile and the Jewish people are not (assuming that is the case). Every set of laws produces a universe with only inanimate matter, except one specific set of laws that produces a universe with life as well.
You can philosophize about the question of what a positive property is, and I’m not sure analytically there is a satisfying answer to that, but usually it’s clear, and therefore this is a discussion similar to the heap paradox.
I accept your words with respect to objects that cannot be compared, one to another. After all, there is no general comparison parameter that applies to all of them. So it doesn’t even make sense what connection there is between them….
But there are many cases, and also in the matter of the universe, where the entity has many characteristics, so that from each individual object one can create a parameter that will fit its characteristic and the others as well. Yet even so it will distinguish it from the rest.
For example—for the parameter “the people with the most people,” the Chinese nation is the most special.
With respect to the parameter “the people that survived the longest under hardship,” Judaism is the most special.
With respect to the parameter “the richest people,” the Dubai people / Swiss are the richest. Etc. etc.
So it seems you can do this for every single people….
If so, is Judaism really so special? True, it is special in the parameter “the people that survived the longest,” but it is not at all clear that it is more special than any other people. Why is the above parameter—“the people that survived the longest”—better than any other parameter?! (wealth, etc.)
Likewise, my claim in the context of the laws of nature is with respect to the parameters/characteristics themselves!
One can create for every system of laws a parameter/characteristic that distinguishes it from the rest. For example, a parameter whose content is “the biggest star”—clearly the number of systems of laws that would allow that is very small.
If so, why is the characteristic/parameter of complexity better than the others?!? (You didn’t answer that.)
A few things:
1. If each one differs in a different parameter, then indeed one cannot say there is something special here. However, it is reasonable to give priority to certain parameters according to how exceptional they are and according to intuition that determines importance.
2. “The most X” is not uniqueness at all. There is always something that is the most, and there is nothing special about that. Regarding Judaism, the claim is not that it survived the longest, but that it survived exile, disconnection from territory, something that brings destruction upon other peoples (assuming that is true; I do not intend to defend this claim).
3. It is not at all clear to me where the confidence comes from that for every system of laws you can find a “most” characteristic. In any event, as I wrote in point 2, a “most” characteristic is not really interesting. It may also be that with small changes in the constants we would get a world even more complex than the present one. The “most” is really not what underlies the proof. The point is complexity itself, and the claim is that under almost any other system of laws there would not be complexity at all (or almost at all, but the point is qualitative and not quantitative).
Ishay, basically you’re saying that specialness is subjective. After all, there is no objective difference between complexity and non-complexity.
It’s like rolling the sequence 665829 on a die; that is exactly as special as 666666, no? The odds of both are equal.
So too regarding systems of laws. If we number them from 1 to 1000, we’ll find for example that only system 563 brings about complex life, but by the same token only system 579 causes star x to be at distance a from star y. Only system 295 causes star x to be at distance b from star z, and only system 683 causes star x to be at distance c from star y. So likewise system 563 (which produces life) causes such a distance between the stars that brings life. What is the difference?
Ishay, I couldn’t understand what way you are actually proposing for choosing characteristics/parameters.
Only a negation of my words, what is not a parameter.
I’d be happy for you / the Rabbi / someone to explain how one chooses a parameter for characterizing uniqueness.
Why is the characteristic of “complexity” a reasonable parameter, while a characteristic like “the biggest star” is a failed parameter.
Thanks,
Yedidya.
Moshe
The result 66666 is objectively unique because all the rolls yielded the same number.
That is also why the distance between X and Y is not interesting. Because it always gives some number. But the formation of life is special.
Yedidya
I explained very clearly why “the most X” is not a parameter for anything, and that is for the simple reason that in every set, a priori, there is an element that will satisfy it.
Ishay, thank you very much.
1. I understand what you are saying, but in many things reality is not a property that does not exist in the other members of the set. For example, in your example with two-dimensional objects and a one-dimensional line, then indeed one-dimensional / two-dimensional is a unique property.
But what happens in cases where the reality is gray, not an actual property?
For example, if we take Judaism as the example—the only people that survived exile. Exile is not a new characteristic; it is only a property of an extremely difficult event. But it is not a new property.
If we take the example of systems of laws that produce living creatures. Living creatures are not a new characteristic but a form of expression of something very complex.
If so, my claim of “the most X” returns.
2. How do we know which side of the set is the unique one? For example, between the line and the two-dimensional members. Maybe specifically the triangle is the unique one? By the number of members in each of the groups?
3. Where does the assumption come from that characteristic X is a more unique characteristic than characteristic Y? For example, that survival in exile is preferable to extraordinary wealth (just as survival in exile is no more than a very difficult event, so extraordinary wealth is far beyond ordinary wealth). Why are the people of Dubai not more special than the Israelis?
And likewise, why is complexity preferable to a parameter of a world with equal distance between stars, for example.
Thanks in advance.!
1. I didn’t understand why living creatures are not a characteristic. For me, complexity itself is also fine. If I have a graph that is all very close to 0, and in some area it suddenly rises high, I will see that area as special.
2. Of course the unique one is the minority, for there is no reason to think it is accidental.
3. Regarding the people, I really do think that is a much weaker claim. Indeed, the people of Dubai can also claim they are the chosen people, with their wealth as proof. Here there is no escaping the use of intuition, but indeed there are cases where even if something seems more special to me, I would not be sure of myself. If you find a system of laws in which the distance between all stars is exactly equal, that really would be unique I assume (by the way, if there are more than 4 stars, you’d also need different geometry for the distance between every pair to be equal…). Whoever sees that will presumably assume there is a guiding hand behind it. However, here it is clear to me that life is far more special. If I left billiard balls on a table and all sorts of things happened there, and then I came back and discovered they were at equal distance (here it’s only 3 by the way), I would guess someone arranged them that way on purpose, but who knows—that three balls would arrange themselves into an isosceles triangle is not so far-fetched. If the billiard balls started jumping on their own and multiplying, that would already be much more special (I know this is a flawed example, but I’m only trying to illustrate).
Thank you very much.
1. Living creatures are our characteristic for defining especially high complexity and entropy. They are not something “other”…
Therefore here you show that indeed one can define “the most X” as a parameter. Then my questions above return.
1.* Note — one can define the soul as something that is a truly unique parameter (like the analogy between one-dimensional and two-dimensional). A situation that leads to dualism is different from any situation of materialism. But for the sake of the discussion let us ignore that option.
2. Thank you
3. If so, how does one distinguish between parameter X, which is stronger and more unique for us, and parameter Y?
For example, one could say we would be more surprised by a people that survived an ongoing disaster than by a people that is rich.
You claim that the difference between the cases is intuition. Is there nothing more formal and correct than that?
3.1. In the example you gave about billiard balls arranging themselves into an isosceles triangle: if we throw balls randomly, we will get the shape of some triangle or other. The probability that the “random triangle that came out” appears is equal to the probability that an “isosceles triangle” appears. So one cannot learn anything from the fact that now we see an isosceles triangle. It is completely like any other triangle as long as we did not predict it in advance.
Here is a wonderful example of what intuition can cause. Only mistakes.
Ishay, 123456 is also special because all the numbers progress in equal jumps. 13579 is also special because there is a jump of two, and you can do that for every number.
Yedidya
1. Of course life is something else. The level of complexity already becomes a different quality.
3. Maybe sometimes there is something formal, I don’t know. Intuition is fine by me.
Moshe
123456 is indeed special. It’s true that you can also find an explanation for the series 3415365, and then I will have to decide whether it is accidental or not, and probably my intuition will decide that it isn’t.
By the way, human intuition has had great success in predictions about reality. When it takes a collection of empirical facts and derives a scientific theory from them, usually the predictions are very successful. It seems to me that in God Plays Dice and in The Sciences of Freedom there is some appendix that tries to prove from this that science works (I don’t remember exactly).
Ishay, you said: “It’s true that you can find another explanation for the series 3415365, and then I’ll have to decide whether it’s accidental or not, and probably my intuition will decide that it isn’t.” The question is why intuition would say that. You can rely on intuition as long as it isn’t absurd, but here it is absurd.
If you determine that it is absurd, who am I to argue?
I assume that in your opinion, since one can also find some explanation for the sequence 123456 other than +1, it is absurd to say that the sequence is +1. And in your opinion it is also absurd to infer from several thousand observations that F=GMm/r^2, because one can pass infinitely many other curves through those thousands of points, so why choose specifically that function. That is what I said at the end—that intuition works.
Moshe,
I’ve been following this correspondence for several days and wondering whether to intervene, but it seems to me the time has come.
I understand very well what you are claiming, but in my opinion there is a misunderstanding of the term “special” or “complex” from which all the questions arise. The Rabbi tried to explain this, but it seems the coin didn’t drop, so I’ll try to do it myself.
I want to use the term entropy (and in a moment you’ll understand why in my context this issue is relevant), and this is how I understand the term—“a micro-level state that allows something on the macro level”; the fewer the number of possibilities that enable this state, the lower the entropy.
That is, the fewer the number of things that allow a certain state, the more “special” it is. Meaning—the chance of the number 2-2-3-2 on a die is identical to the chance of 6-6-6-6, but the latter is more special because it is a state that allows *something* for which the number of combinations that allow it is low.
Now let us ask about a world that allows the creation of symmetrical spheres. The questions that need to be asked are: what does the fact “symmetrical sphere” allow, and how many things allow that same thing as well. I claim that the phenomenon of a “symmetrical sphere,” whose effect is “wonder,” is also enabled by a million other states, and therefore it is not an interesting parameter.
A certain DNA structure in this context is a state that allows something—life. The number of things that allow that same state (life) is astonishingly low compared to the number of things that allow “something else” (symmetrical things, for example). That is on the principled level. Meaning, clearly in every state there will be something “special”; the question is how many other states would have allowed this special thing, and what is the chance that the special thing would be allowed.
As for the other points you raised—
1. Things like “the biggest star” are presumably uninteresting. Clearly a certain combination will allow the biggest one, so that is neither interesting nor special. In addition, there are infinitely many types of things that are “the most,” so the probability of that is high and self-evident. In contrast, a state like life is so special that only rare things will cause it, and therefore it is an interesting parameter.
2. Regarding the Jewish people. Every people has something in which it is “the most”: money, length of survival, and so on. That is not the question; obviously there will be one people that stands out in every parameter. The questions are—1. What is the probability of that characteristic (that is, how special is it)? 2. How interesting is it? 3. How many such parameters are there?
The Jewish people have several parameters—
1. Survival—it is obvious that someone will survive the longest, and I am not at all sure that we survived the longest. What is interesting is that the people who survived so much are a people whom all of history tried to destroy. Add to that the return to the land.
2. Preservation of its culture—again, it is not clear that this should happen, given that they persecuted us and offered us everything if only we would convert.
3. Influence—it is not easy to influence from a position of inferiority.
4. Talent—ask yourself whether talent in music is equal to talent in science. What advanced the world more? And what is more important?
That is, these parameters are not parameters where it is obvious that someone would hold them, but parameters that are non-trivial under the condition of the Jewish people. Add to that the fact that these are much more important parameters religiously than wealth, and their combination together. Add to that the fact that this ethos is written this way in the prophecy of the prophets: “You are the fewest of all peoples,” etc.
That’s all.
Thanks M, I just didn’t understand your example regarding the die.
“The chance of 2-2-3-2 on a die is identical to the chance of 6-6-6-6, but the latter is more special because it is a state that allows *something* for which the number of combinations that allow it is low.”
What is that something?
A. *Entropy
B. In case I was not clear, I am not claiming that the world is special because it allows the parameter “entropy”—I am claiming that entropy (conceptually, as I defined it) is in my opinion the measure by which to examine “specialness.” Every time you claim something is special, ask yourself—
1. What does this special thing allow—and how interesting is that, though that can be debated.
2. What is the probability of the existence of this state itself?
3. How many other states would have allowed this “special thing”?
The fewer the number of states, and the lower the probability of each state, that would have allowed this special thing, the more “special” it is. And therefore a world with life is special in an exceptional way.
1. Wonder
2. Dice with the same number
3. To complete a line in backgammon 🙂
Wonder is just psychology. I’m actually moved by 141192 because it’s my birthday (let’s say).
I think the discussion has gone backward, so I have no interest in going back there (I’ll only note that M didn’t understand that for every number sequence one can find a rule and then it becomes unique).
I only wanted to relate to the point that Moshe is moved by a different number. The odd thing is that he himself brought the number 666666 as an example from within an understanding that it does indeed evoke wonder. He apparently thought everyone would agree that it evokes wonder, and now suddenly it no longer does.
With God’s help, 23 Elul 5777
To claim that every number series has a unique meaning seems to me somewhat exaggerated, but the argument that every person is a whole world and has a purpose and uniqueness—that is certainly a Jewish idea, and we hope that humanity will not only proclaim it but also internalize it.
The Maharal already explained in Derekh HaHayyim that since every person is stamped with the seal of Adam the first man, who was created alone, all human beings resemble one another in that each one has his own personal uniqueness.
And Maimonides explained in Guide for the Perplexed III, chapter 17, that since man is close to his God in that he has knowledge, he is special in that he is under the particular providence of his Creator: “Great in counsel and mighty in deed, whose eyes are open upon all the ways of the children of men, to give every man according to his ways and according to the fruit of his doings” (Jeremiah 32:19).
May it be His will that our deeds be in the category of “a turtledove offering” and rise favorably before our Creator, “He who fashions their hearts together, who understands all their deeds.”
With blessing, S. Z. Levinger
Ishay — it seems to me that if you examine 6-6 as against the number Moshe wrote, under the definition I gave, you will see why the example is valid, but in any case what I said, I said, and I have nothing further to add.
Whoever was convinced—great, and whoever wasn’t—not terrible.
M
I don’t really understand what there is here to argue about. You want a special state for which the number of combinations allowing it is low (that’s your wording, and it seems to me very imprecise), and this exists to the same degree in both 6666 and 2232. If you want, you can find a function that allows 2232 in exactly the same way (I didn’t try to construct one because it’s uninteresting). This is a simple mathematical matter, not something one needs to be convinced about.
Ishay, there’s no need to split hairs over my words. Indeed, psychologically 66666 is special, but my claim was that once you get into mathematics, the probability of all combinations is equal, and there is no rational explanation for thinking that specifically 66666 is special and requires intelligence. Because I proved that 134584 is special to the same degree, and my birthday also arouses psychological specialness in me.
Moshe, hello dear fellow.
Of course 6666666 is something unique, because in a roll we would expect a spread of numbers. (Even though the probability is identical.) But from 12345 one indeed cannot learn anything. That is my humble opinion. Therefore it seems that with 6666 the die is probably unfair.
And regarding the other important people,
before you build the uniqueness, you need to establish what you expect to find—an unfair die / a supreme magician, etc. etc.—and how what you expect helps explain the results that came out. If in the casino near my home here in Milan 6666 comes up on the die, probably someone wanted that. But if I do not know of anyone who would want to fake results, I have no reason to suspect the die is unfair—only after a long sequence of results (because there is not enough spread among the other numbers in a short sequence).
Too bad the Rabbi is not joining this basic discussion.
With the blessing of “those who walk in darkness.”
Of course 6666 is too short. We are speaking briefly here. The intent is something with a very low probability.
Just as you would expect a spread of the numbers, so too you would expect them not to be in sequence.
You are right that the question of mechanism is important here, and I raised it in another Q&A. Even a result like 1234 repeated many times would probably convince me that it is not accidental, but more consistency would be needed because I do not know of a mechanism that would bring that about, unlike a result of 6666 and the like where I do know of such a mechanism.
With God’s help, Thursday of the portion “Who will go up for us,” 5777 from creation
Besides the casino (mentioned in the comment of “the one who understands magic”), Milan was also blessed with the Ambrosiana Library, founded in 1609 by Archbishop Borromeo, from within the outlook that opening the treasures of knowledge to the many strengthens faith and the service of the Creator.
The founder of the “Ambrosiana” sent an emissary to Greece, Egypt, Syria, and the Land of Israel in order to acquire manuscripts in Latin and Greek, but also in Hebrew, Aramaic, and Arabic, and thus one of the important collections of Hebrew manuscripts was established in the Ambrosiana.
As a typical Renaissance man, Borromeo understood that the foundations of European culture are rooted not only in the classical culture of Greece and Rome, but also in the culture of the people of Israel, whose faith and values became enduring assets of all humanity.
Three hundred years later, the better among the nations of the world understood this as well, like King George V and Lord Balfour, and felt that in acting for the “national home for the Jewish people” they were repaying a historical debt of gratitude to the ancient nation that gave the whole world the “Book of Books,” from which the world drew faith and values.
By contrast beyond all comparison, even the corrupt among the gentiles, who aspired to impose upon the world the “master morality” of the wild “blond beast,” felt that the Jewish “slave morality” burdened their conscience and interfered with their running wild as they pleased, and they imagined that with the destruction of the Jews, “Jewish morality” would cease to trouble them.
To their dismay, the literacy that developed among the people of Israel, due to Isaiah’s vision “And all your children shall be taught of the Lord,” and due to the ordinance of Joshua ben Gamla that brought a “compulsory education law” to the people of Israel some 1800 years before the entire cultured world—
that same literacy led to the rise of many great Jewish scientists, who were as great in science as they were in the pursuit of peace, and the Holy One, blessed be He, brought about through them, against their will, the merit of developing the atomic and hydrogen bombs, which led to the downfall of the evil Nazi empire, and to a “balance of terror” that brought stable peace to the world for many decades.
With blessing, S. Z. Levinger, librarian of the Nissimiana Library in Jerusalem
What does it mean that the animal suffers? Even if we say it’s not just contortions but pain, they still have no consciousness, only an electrical reaction of the nervous system that stimulates parts of the brain. They don’t have the added dimension that turns pain into something beyond that, like in human beings.
Therefore the prohibition against causing suffering to animals is on account of the emotional effect on the person, not on account of the animal. So in my opinion there is no moral problem at all in eating meat, though the breeders themselves do have one (either causing suffering to animals or the emotional effect on the person).