Answer

1. There is a common failure here: people mix up the view of Jewish law with the views of one halakhic decisor or another. Halakhic decisors are shaped by the landscape of their birthplace, and therefore one should not judge Jewish law by the words of this or that decisor. Just as I would not judge secularism based on things written a hundred years ago (about the status of women, homosexuality, etc.). There are dimensions in Jewish law that reflect the culture of particular people and are not Jewish law itself. By the way, this is also why one should be careful not to judge Islam by the behavior of particular people (blood revenge, for example, is Arab culture and not Islam).
Beyond that, I’m surprised to hear such criticism from a secular woman who belongs to a society that almost entirely champions the right to abort (= murder) fetuses freely even when there is no grounds at all. So why should she complain about Jewish law, which places very strong restrictions on that permission (= permission to murder), far more than is accepted in her own environment? Think of a society that obligates its members to help anyone in distress with all their money, but says not to do so for children of forbidden unions (for them one may help only up to one-fifth), but yes for people with Down syndrome. Would there really be room to complain against them? After all, the whole standard under discussion is a much higher standard than what is accepted among us. So what exactly are we complaining about?
2. In the background, one should know that according to at least some opinions (Rabbi Shimon ben Menasya in tractate Yoma), Jewish law does not permit desecrating the Sabbath even for a Jew, but only because he will keep many future Sabbaths. If so, from the standpoint of Jewish law the value of life is not higher than the value of the Sabbath, even regarding a Jew. Now, anyone who wants to criticize Jewish law should criticize it over that principle itself (though that criticism is irrelevant, because from her point of view there is no value at all to Sabbath observance). But once you accept that — the distinction between a non-Jew and a Jew follows automatically, because a Jew will keep many Sabbaths and a non-Jew will not.
In addition, the non-Jews that the Sages were speaking about had an extremely low human level (murderers, adulterers, idol worshipers, people who sacrificed their children to Molech and worshiped Peor). It was only because of this that the halakhic discrimination toward them arose (see Bava Kamma 37). Looking at non-Jews through what we see nowadays is anachronistic. And indeed Meiri writes on that basis that today one should desecrate the Sabbath even by Torah-level prohibited labors in order to save a non-Jew, and I too pointed this out in my article in Akdamot on “Enlightened” Idolatry, and Rabbi Kook also wrote that the Jewish law follows his view.
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Questioner:
Rabbi Michi, hello,
Thank you for the response. I enjoyed what you wrote. Regarding no. 2, I would only note that Meiri does not write explicitly that one should desecrate the Sabbath to save a non-Jew by Torah-level prohibited labors… rather, people infer from his words that there are non-Jews worthy of being saved (sometimes there is a difference between explicit wording and an inference from the text in terms of how authoritative the statement is). I read your article in the past 🙂
In any case, even nowadays there are rabbis who view the entire permission to save non-Jews on the Sabbath as based only on enmity.
See for example here:
http://www.ynet.co.il/articles/0,7340,L-4229407,00.html
Of course one cannot learn from newspaper articles, but if you look for example at Hazon Ovadia, Sabbath, vol. 3, p. 307, Rabbi Ovadia rules that one saves a non-Jew only because of enmity. And in the notes he wrote a very long responsum which, to the best of my memory, contains no discussion whatsoever of any essential change in the perception of the non-Jew in our time. The whole discussion is technical: enmity, labor not needed for its own sake, two people who performed it together, Torah-level and rabbinic prohibitions. Rabbi Ovadia is a contemporary halakhic decisor (regarding, by the way, judging views from 100 years ago)… and it is very hard to say that his opinions and outlook were far from the mainstream in halakhic literature over the last hundred years. In my opinion, most Haredim in general would also have no dilemma about saving the non-Jew in the absence of enmity. They simply would not care about not saving him.
On another matter, do you have copies of Truth and Stability for sale? What is the price?
Best regards,
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Rabbi:
He does write it explicitly in his commentary to chapter 8 of Yoma, that the rule that one does not save applies only to the non-Jews of old, who were not constrained by the norms of civilized nations.
It is clear to me that almost no decisor today relies on Meiri, and I myself, had I not independently agreed with him, perhaps would not have leaned on him as a source. But it seems right to me on logical grounds, and I merely found support for myself in Meiri’s words. Even so, in my opinion, if a real question were to arise, and there were no technical way out through enmity and the ways of peace — I believe there would be quite a few decisors who would say so in actual Jewish law as well. Today it is convenient to lean on technical solutions lest they be considered Reform, God forbid.
Truth and Stability, like all my Yediot books, is sold only in stores. I’m not allowed to sell it.
All the best,
Michi
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Eliyahu Abramzon:
Rabbi, hello,

Your words remind me of the view of Rabbi Eliezer Berkovits, one of my favorite thinkers of the 20th century, since he sought to uncover the foundational values of Jewish law.
And yet the question is how one separates that “view of Jewish law” (the essence) from the views of the halakhic decisors, who are the instrument for revealing it (the form)?
We say that the motivations of the decisor are irrelevant so long as he justifies his view in the categories of halakhic language, but doesn’t halakhic language itself change because of such rulings? Regarding the non-Jew, it seems that only from you have I heard clear and direct statements, whereas from other decisors one usually gets almost technical considerations like enmity and the ways of peace.
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Rabbi:
Eliyahu, hello.
I did not mean to disparage the halakhic decisors, Heaven forbid. I only sharpened the point that one should not speak of “the Jewish law” but of one interpretation or another of it. The various interpretations, all of which deserve respect, are human products shaped by environmental influence.
The product of the decisor indeed does not depend on his motivations but on the justifications he gives, but at the same time it also does not bind me if I have a different interpretation and different justifications.
The preference of decisors for technical considerations stems, in my opinion, mainly from the fear of being perceived as Reform (a mistaken and distorted consideration in my view, but I think it accurately describes their mindset). I would like to believe — and in fact do believe — that in a real case (on a deserted island, where there is no concern of enmity, etc.), many of them would permit it on the same basis as Meiri. And if not — then I disagree with them. Therefore, for me, Jewish law says something else. Their opinion is theirs, and it deserves respect, but it is not “the Jewish law.”
I have not checked whether there are no other decisors who say these things directly, but it is clear to me that even if there are, they are very few. For the reasons above. In any case, if this is the truth in my opinion, it does not really matter to me how many decisors say it.
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Eliyahu Abramzon:
Rabbi, hello,
God forbid, I did not think you were disparaging the halakhic decisors, but rather I was asking how one decides that one decisor or another is right or mistaken. I understand from you that ultimately this is a matter of judgment and not formal “rules of decision.”
Between the lines I detect that your motivation (a blessed one, it should be said) is moral, or at least an attempt to ease the tension between Jewish law and morality where possible.
Thank you
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Rabbi:
What do you mean, how does one decide? With one’s intellect. Is there any shortage of disputes in Jewish law? How do you decide any halakhic dispute?
What I wrote is that if decisor A says X and decisor B says Y, I do not understand how one can go to decisor A and criticize Jewish law for saying Y. That is absurd. You can criticize the interpretation of decisor B, but not Jewish law.
As for deciding, as I said, one should use one’s intellect or choose a rabbi for oneself as one sees fit.
My motivation is moral, but I think that even in my case the matters should not be judged by motivations but by the reasons. In my opinion this is the necessary and correct interpretation regardless of my motivations. I mentioned the sugya in Bava Kamma 37 and Maimonides’ words in his commentary to the Mishnah about returning a lost object to a non-Jew, where it is made dependent on the behavior of the non-Jews. And from here it follows that if the behavior is different in reality, the attitude should change.
In summary, in my understanding, one who does not act this way is not only immoral, but halakhically mistaken and committing a religious transgression. And I distinguish between those two things (see column 15 on the site).
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Tuvia:
Maybe a more precise reference to Meiri is possible? At first glance I couldn’t find it

Here: http://ph.yhb.org.il/plus/01-27-03-04/ the lenient positions are brought (and Meiri is not mentioned)
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Rabbi:
I brought him in chapter 5 of my article on “Enlightened” Idolatry, which I linked to in my remarks. He also appears in Rabbi Gershuni’s article, which I referred to there in note 28.
This is the article.