Q&A: Question about a yevamah who fell before a man afflicted with boils
Question about a yevamah who fell before a man afflicted with boils
Question
Hello Rabbi,
I wanted to ask about the initial assumption in the Talmud, tractate Bava Kamma 110b: “A yevamah who fell before a man afflicted with boils should go out without halitzah, for she did not betroth herself with this in mind.” The commentators raise difficulties there and answer them at length. But it is still hard for me to understand: why is there an assumption that when things go wrong, that constitutes sufficient grounds to say that she did not betroth herself with this in mind? After all, in many areas of life, we do things while knowing and accepting that things can go wrong, and nevertheless we do them—for example, we drive cars, invest in stocks, marry spouses, have children, and so on. In all these cases, we are aware of the risks, and despite that we consciously choose to take the risk (because overall the risk-reward ratio is worthwhile for us). If so, how can one say that when the risk materializes, you can turn the clock back and nullify the decision?
One could add that in decisions or transactions involving concealment of information or some kind of deceit, perhaps there one can apply the rule of a mistaken transaction. But in cases where there was no intent to deceive or conceal anything (as with a yevamah who fell before a man afflicted with boils), how is that relevant?
Answer
That is an excellent question. The issues are lengthy, subtle, and very difficult.
1. The question is of course connected to Column 20 and the question of the utility function; see what I wrote there, where I hinted to situations in which one can nevertheless speak of irrationality in the decision.
2. I would further note that this is not only an initial assumption (as you wrote) but also the practical halakhic conclusion. In the view of most medieval authorities (Rishonim), there are grounds on account of which one can annul betrothal with the claim, “she did not betroth herself with this in mind,” and we do not say “better to dwell as two.” In the case of a yavam afflicted with boils, no (according to the conclusion of the passage there), but in the case of a husband afflicted with boils, or a yavam who is an apostate, there are opinions that say yes. And in general, the very passage there proves this, for were it not for the presumption of “better to dwell as two,” it is obvious that one could annul it. And in commercial transactions, where there is no such presumption of “better to dwell as two,” this is certainly done.
3. See in my rabbinical court ruling where I dealt with all this, and with your question as well, at length:
4. I would further note that these matters are also connected to the topic of asmakhta in Sanhedrin 24b, since an opinion is brought there (Rami bar Hama) that gambling with dice is asmakhta. The Talmud itself brings a different opinion (Rav Sheshet) that it is not asmakhta, because he knows that he may lose or win. And again the question arises: why, according to Rami bar Hama, is this asmakhta? After all, that is his utility function. He takes into account that perhaps he will profit and perhaps not.