Q&A: The Presumption That "It Is Better to Dwell"
The Presumption That "It Is Better to Dwell"
Question
Hello Rabbi, I saw the Rabbi’s dispute with Rabbi Joseph Dov Soloveitchik regarding the presumption of “it is better to dwell [as two than to dwell alone].” I would be glad to know which cases the Rabbi is familiar with in which, even nowadays, this presumption was used in a way that supposedly does not fit the presumed intent of the parties.
In simple terms, it seems to me that there is a basic difference between what men are particular about and what women are particular about, and even today women are willing “to put up with more” to a certain extent. Clearly, today women insist on their own judgment more than in the past.
For example, if today a woman were to marry a man without knowing that he had leprosy, it does not seem to me that there is any halakhic decisor who would say that she is not particular about that, and that these are not mistaken betrothal.
Thank you in advance.
Answer
It’s hard for me right now to go looking for sources of specific rulings (there are many). But contrary to your implicit assumption, “with this in mind” is said even about cases that arise after the betrothal, and not only about the discovery of faulty prior information (like a mistaken transaction). The passage in Bava Kamma 111a apparently deals with such cases as well (except according to some forced interpretations). By the way, the religious courts assume the opposite with respect to the two kinds of cases.
Discussion on Answer
After all, it seems to me that to this day there has been no case in which betrothal was annulled and they exempted her from the need for a bill of divorce (except perhaps for the sake of permitting levirate cases and the like). What example do you need me to bring you on this point? There is no contrary example at all.
Indeed, even regarding a mistaken transaction they usually are not willing to release her without a bill of divorce.
I already told you that I’m not going to do research here into court rulings. Check and you’ll find.
Thank you, Rabbi.
But I didn’t understand the end of your reply. Indeed, the main point of the passage is not to teach about a mistaken transaction, but about things that arose afterward. But I’m trying to extract a case description where the halakhic decisors would actually rule that a bill of divorce is required, while the Rabbi would say the opposite?
And what do you mean that the religious court assumes the opposite? Even regarding a mistaken transaction, would they say that if it was discovered that he had leprosy, then a bill of divorce is required?