Q&A: Regarding the Children of Captured Infants
Regarding the Children of Captured Infants
Question
Hello Rabbi,
I wanted to share with the Rabbi a question that has been bothering me for quite some time. Of course, only if there is time and availability to answer.
For several months I’ve had thoughts about it on and off, but lately it has been bothering me more and more. Really, the issue has a halakhic side and a philosophical side, which are of course connected to each other, but I would be very glad to separate them.
So one day I was thinking about the concept of a “captured infant,” and about how Jewish law views the transgressions of such a person in a different light, and I wondered what that says about how Jewish law looks at our own observance of the commandments. In other words, a person’s life circumstances are significant enough to affect something in the degree of his responsibility / guilt / free choice. So what does that say about the opposite side—the value of commandment observance by someone who grew up that way?
My question is about the details of the concept of a captured infant, with which I’m not familiar at all. I would be happy to know what exactly the difference is in status between an apostate and a captured infant. Maybe that will help me understand why they are not actually the same thing. And also about the essential difference there apparently is between performing commandments and committing transgressions by someone who has simply become accustomed to that way of life. Apparently it’s not correct to compare them, but I don’t understand why.
Maybe I’ll spell out a bit for the Rabbi the thoughts I have in my head, and you can sharpen where my understanding is mistaken.
So I could have thought that a person born into a religious home is familiar with the reality of secularity, whereas a captured infant, in the original context of an infant who was literally captured, truly knows no other reality at all. But then Maimonides comes and expands the concept to the children of the second generation of heresy, and that is what mainly complicates things for me. That is, not only a Jewish infant captured by gentiles is defined that way, but rather responsibility for the heresy rests only on the father who made the active move of abandoning the faith, while his children, who are educated that way, are already considered captured infants. I see a certain logic in that, because how can one make demands of a child who heard about Jewish faith from the mouth of a heretical father? Surely he passed on to him a distorted outlook, and it is no wonder that the child does not repent. And since we are not talking about a child but about a grown person, and we still attribute importance to the beliefs and views instilled in him at home, that seems very puzzling to me! Where is a person’s ability to investigate and search? After such an expansion of the concept, I ask: if we give such great weight to a person’s upbringing even when he is an adult, and say that his judgment is not clean, then seemingly that of the commandment-observant person isn’t really clean either. And if we were speaking in terms of an unwitting sinner, then it would come out that we do perform commandments intentionally, but can’t say that the intention is completely free of outside influence. Fine. But if a captured infant is considered coerced, that sounds like we are really talking about things that are not under his control at all! On the other hand, he does bring one offering for many Sabbaths and many labors. So there is some kind of responsibility here. But, as I understand it, there is one offering because in essence there was really only one sin here. So maybe all my commandment observance is really just one commandment.
And actually I’m generally surprised by the distinction between the heretic and his children. After all, presumably even a person who once believed and then became a heretic did not arrive at that out of nowhere. Such a person could claim before a religious court that he came to this because of poor education and being misled by his teachers regarding faith. I think it is obvious that this is a claim that would not be accepted, since Judaism surely educates toward personal responsibility and does not let us blame things like education. But then it is not clear to me where the line is drawn. How did Maimonides decide that a child whose parents are heretics is already a factor that must be taken into account, but the heretical father will not be able to make similar claims. I feel as though, really, the father and the child made the same move: choosing a way of life on the basis of the reality they knew. True, the father’s move is much more extreme, but not really different in essence. So how is it decided where the line passes? At what point is it no longer the person’s responsibility?
I’m trying to think about the reasons for the “exemption” that a captured infant has from his sins. Is it a matter of complete lack of guilt? Then I feel that those who keep the commandments also have no credit at all. Is it because it is not fair to punish such a person? Then why should commandment-observant people receive reward? Perhaps transgression and commandment are not two opposite actions at all, but belong to entirely different families, so the mirror image simply does not work. That is, maybe a transgression is an attempt to rebel—and that is simply not what is happening when a captured infant sins—whereas with one who keeps the commandments we would say that from his side there really was an intention to crown God and obey. But then it comes out that obedience can occur and have value even without recognizing the possibility of rebellion. That doesn’t sit so well with me.
In short, I think I wrote too much. I assume you can see from the writing that I’m really confused. I’d be very glad to hear the Rabbi’s view on the matter and get a bit of order in the Jewish law, if possible.
Thank you very much in any case!
Answer
There are a great many questions here, and it’s hard to elaborate in an email. I’ll try to explain as much as I can within this framework. If you want to expand further, we can speak orally as well (arrange it with me by phone below).
First, I’ll refer you to an article I wrote on related topics that addresses quite a few of the points you raised:
See there also in the footnotes regarding the obligation of a sin-offering for a captured infant.
My basic assumption is that one who is coerced is exempt.
I would add that coercion in matters of belief is also coercion. This is what the Radbaz wrote in a responsum (part 4, no. 1,255 [187]) regarding a person who thought that Moses our teacher was God, and he was asked what that person’s status was. The Radbaz argued that he is coerced, because that is genuinely what he thinks. I now saw a discussion of this here (see the chapter on the Radbaz).
I also assume that a situation in which any reasonable person would have reached the same conclusions / actions is coercion (even if it is not coercion in the deterministic sense). You cannot demand of a person that he do something that a reasonable person in his situation would not do.
Now I look at the Sages, who saw heresy / idol worship as a transgression, and I wonder why. After all, if the person truly believed in it, then he is coerced and exempt. My answer is that in their time, heresy and idol worship were a temptation; that is, people did this even though they knew it was not true (just as people violate sexual prohibitions because of temptation even though they themselves understand that it is forbidden). What confuses us about this is that the Talmud says the Sages abolished the urge toward idol worship, and so today that urge is unfamiliar to us (unlike sexual temptation). But it seems that in the time of the Sages there was an urge toward idol worship just like the sexual urge familiar to us. Therefore a person who sinned through idol worship was not coerced, just as a person who sins in matters of sexual prohibitions because of his urge is not coerced.
But in our time, when people truly do not believe, and not because of temptation, they are fully coerced. In fact, this is even more severe than the case of a captured infant. The situation of a captured infant is one in which it is clear to every person that there is a God and that commandments must be observed, and the only question is who God is (the god of the gentiles or the God of the Jews). So it was also clear that if he encountered Judaism he would understand that this is what is correct and begin observing commandments. That was the situation in the past (there were no secular people). But today, of course, that is not the case.
It is important to understand that the situation of a captured infant or of a secular person does not depend on knowledge. A person can know the entire Talmud with medieval and later authorities and be an enormous scholar and still be a first-rate captured infant. What he lacks is awareness that this is binding. He can know all this the way a researcher knows Native American culture. So what good is his knowledge? He is a captured infant in every respect. Therefore, someone who became secular after having been religious can certainly be a captured infant even if he is familiar with and knows everything and received a religious education. As long as right now he truly does not believe in it.
You asked what the value is of inertial commandment observance (a captured infant among Jews). Indeed, it has no great value, unless that observance reflects commitment. Inertia does not always reflect lack of commitment. Thus the Talmud at the beginning of tractate Zevahim speaks about “an unspecified act is for its own sake,” meaning that there are situations in which a person does not consciously intend the commandment, but it is still considered an intentional act. A person puts on phylacteries and does not consciously intend. I ask myself: why did he put on phylacteries? Clearly he did so because it is a commandment. Therefore even if he did not consciously intend, the lack of conscious intention does not reflect lack of commitment. But a person who observes commandments without truly being committed to them (and not merely lacking conscious intention)—that really has not a shred of value. As I wrote in the article (and so too in Maimonides at the end of chapter 8 of Laws of Kings, which I cited there), commandment observance that is not done out of commitment to the command given to us at Sinai has no religious value whatsoever. As far as I am concerned, a person who recited a blessing over food when he was not obligated, and afterward repented, should recite the blessing again. He did not fulfill his obligation, because his blessing was not a commandment act. But note: that is only if he was not committed at all, not if he simply lacked intention (that depends on the law of whether commandments require intention, and the halakhic decisors disagreed about this).
——————————————————————————————
Shimon Yerushalmi:
With the Rabbi’s permission, I wanted to suggest, if possible, also elaborating on this important and timely issue in the new book the Rabbi is writing.
Thank you very much, and more power to you,
——————————————————————————————
Rabbi:
That is definitely in the plan. Thank you.
——————————————————————————————
Questioner:
Hello Honorable Rabbi,
First of all, thank you very, very much for your detailed response to my question. In interesting timing, I began reading your book a few days before I received your answer, precisely because of this question that had been bothering me.
The conclusion I draw from the Rabbi’s words is that a person’s beliefs are something with respect to which he is coerced, and they are basically what dictate our actions. Even the understanding that I observe commandments out of commitment is something that was instilled in me and fits my mode of thought.
The Rabbi’s words increased my puzzlement regarding the meaning of commandment observance or committing transgressions. Sometimes I feel that I am programmed by my thoughts and worldview, which I did not choose in any real and objective way.
If by any chance the Rabbi has time to answer me, I would be happy. Of course, if it is more convenient, then by phone.
With great thanks,
——————————————————————————————
Rabbi:
I do not know which book you are reading, but if it is "The Science of Freedom," I think you will find there an answer to your questions.
In general, a person is not coerced in his beliefs; rather, he believes them. He adopts them as a result of his own judgment. True, if he is mistaken, he should be regarded as coerced, because he did his best. But that is not because he does not adopt the beliefs himself (as if they were forced on him), but on the contrary, precisely because he does adopt them through his own judgment.