Q&A: "Do not place a stumbling block" toward traditional Jews / apostates with regard to one commandment for appetite, and toward the wicked. Punishment for the general sin and for the particulars
"Do not place a stumbling block" toward traditional Jews / apostates with regard to one commandment for appetite, and toward the wicked. Punishment for the general sin and for the particulars
Question
Hello Rabbi Michi
This question follows your columns on a solipsistic and absolutist view in Jewish law.
It seems to me that you emphasized in other places and columns as well that the prohibition of "do not place a stumbling block" may, in principle, not apply toward secular Jews, and toward people like a captive child, since they are not knowingly committing a sin but doing so unintentionally. And therefore I am not causing them to sin if I indirectly participate in their sins. (I don’t remember the examples, but examples I can think of from everyday life are, for instance, giving charity to organizations that do not teach against religion, but also are not based on religion; and even giving charity to a secular person who is known not to use it for commandments and maybe will even eat non-kosher food; attending a wedding that is not conducted according to the rules of Jewish law; and in broader areas, spending time with secular people in a culture that is not a Torah culture; giving advice to secular people about how to conduct themselves in daily life in certain matters, while knowing they do not run their lives according to the way of the Torah; and so on.)
I wanted to ask a few things:
1. Could this leniency also apply toward traditional Jews, since they see themselves as obligated in the commandments, but sometimes out of negligence do not fulfill all of them? Because then, according to their own view, I really am causing them to sin, and the responsibility comes back to me as well.
2. In the case of the wicked who sin out of spite (granted, today there is no one like in the days of prophecy of whom one can say that he knows his Master and intends to rebel against Him consciously—but there are those who left religion simply because they can’t stand it for emotional reasons, and not out of confusion in matters of faith and belief)—is causing them to sin, in your opinion, more severe or less severe?
3. Does this depend on whether the sinner is punished for the general fact of the sin itself, or for each and every detail? That is, if the captive child / one coerced in matters of belief / an apostate who sins for appetite is punished (or, more accurately, has his reward diminished) for each and every detail that he transgresses, then maybe there is room to say that even for a small amount of help on my part I am sinning both against my fellow man and against God, because I am adding to his sin and worsening his situation. But if the disgrace is mainly for the very lack of principled commitment to keeping the commandments / not holding the correct beliefs, then this or that particular act of his does not really make much difference (and therefore perhaps the only stumbling block is exposing him to ideas that may be severe).
Answer
First, a more precise description of my position. When I cause someone to sin unintentionally, that is full-fledged causing-to-sin. On the contrary, in the case of an unintentional sin it is even clearer that there is a prohibition than when causing someone to sin deliberately. My claim is that if a person does not believe in God or in obligation to the Torah, then he is not an unintentional sinner but someone with no connection at all (like a captive child, only even further removed). Such a person does not belong to the realm of commandments and transgressions. He is obligated like every Jew, but he cannot fulfill or transgress. Even if he performs a commandment, it will not be a commandment, and if he commits a transgression, it will not be a transgression. If I directly feed him forbidden food with my own hands, then I do transgress, because then it is my transgression.
1-2. This is not a leniency but a halakhic determination. The labels “traditional” or “secular” do not mean very much. Each case must be judged on its own. What needs to be examined is whether this is a person who does not believe in the Holy One, blessed be He, or in the Torah from Heaven, or in our obligation toward it. It is about such a person that my claim speaks.
3. I’m not sure I understood your question. In my article “Causing a Secular Jew to Sin” I explained that in the case of a captive child there is a general liability of a sin-offering for the lack of knowledge concerning each transgression, and not every single time one violates it. As for a present-day atheist, in my opinion even that does not exist. See what I wrote in my article there.
Discussion on Answer
A traditional Jew whom I asked why he doesn’t keep the Sabbath said that traveling on the Sabbath is not work, and in the past lighting a fire was work. Jewish law does not recognize such reasoning, and even if the prohibition were because of “work,” in Torah-level laws the rationale does not matter even if it is written explicitly in Scripture.
When I explained to him about the thirty-nine primary categories of labor and about Jewish law, he said he knows that but that it is an “invention of the rabbis.” He also did not accept the authority of the Sanhedrin. His view is more similar to that of the Karaites, just with more modern interpretation.
Another traditional Jew said that he believes in a higher power / creator, but not in the Bible, though he observes some things as folklore.
Another said that “the main thing is faith.” Even when I explained to him that in Judaism that is not the case, he did not accept the arguments and said that most of the commandments are no longer relevant today.
I’m not sure most traditional Jews believe—at least not in Pharisaic/rabbinic Judaism. Some of them in certain respects resemble Reform Jews, just with less American/Western influence. Others are secular with a strong national feeling.
All three claims you brought in the name of traditionalism seem logical and reasonable.
Just 2 comments
A large part of traditional Jews
aren’t merely too lazy to keep some things while believing in principle;
rather, in principle they do not believe, and choose to keep some things because it is the tradition, heritage, culture, identity, etc.
A lot of water has passed through the Yarkon since the 1960s, and it seems that some of us are still thinking in 1960s frameworks.
A large part of secular Jews and traditional Jews do not believe, and it isn’t this or that emotional sensitivity that causes them not to observe,
rather they simply do not believe in the set of beliefs, or in the part of it, that obligates observance of Jewish law.