I don’t understand where the Rabbi is getting tangled up.
Ethiopian Jews didn’t return in the Second Temple period.
Meaning, their Judaism is the one that existed during the Babylonian exile.
Ethiopian Jews didn’t know about the Oral Torah, they aren’t familiar with the concept of partial admission of a claim, or the thirteen hermeneutical principles.
Which conclusively proves that during the Babylonian exile there was no Oral Torah, no?

Either I’m getting tangled up, or I’m simply right. [That’s also an option, no? 🙂 ]
1. Your assumption that their Judaism is the one that existed during the Babylonian exile is self-refuting. After all, if you don’t accept the reliability of tradition, then why do you accept theirs? Their tradition has no distortions, only ours does? If during the mourning period for Moses thousands of laws and midrashim were forgotten, then over there, over the course of thousands of years, nothing could have been forgotten? On the contrary, their tradition was passed down in a very small group, only a few of whom were even involved in studying it. Our tradition, by contrast, was passed down on a very broad front and many were involved in it and studied it, so in my opinion it is more reliable (for the period in question, not regarding authenticity back to Mount Sinai. See point 2). By the way, do you observe their tradition? Another question: do you think the Sigd holiday that they celebrate was given at Sinai?
2. There are of course many details of Jewish law in the Oral Torah that developed over the course of history. Does one even need proof of that? Go ask schoolchildren. But for some reason you assume that authenticity (that is, the fact that something was given to Moses at Sinai) is a condition for obligation. Where do you get that from? I, like the entire halakhic tradition, disagree with you on that. At Sinai we were given certain foundations, and they developed over the years. Does the fact that they are later mean they are not binding? Are enactments, interpretations, or midrashim created in periods after Sinai not binding?
Specifically regarding the thirteen principles, I showed this in great detail in the second book in the Talmudic Logic series (on the principles of general and particular). Note that even the principles that everyone agrees are a law given to Moses at Sinai were not given at Sinai in their current form. There is such a thing as a dynamic law given to Moses at Sinai (or a dynamic tradition).
See the example in Babylonian Talmud, Shabbat 64b:
“As it was taught: ‘And she shall remain in her menstrual impurity’ — the early elders said that she may not put on eye paint, nor rouge, nor adorn herself with colored garments, until Rabbi Akiva came and taught: if so, you make her repulsive to her husband, and the result will be that her husband divorces her. So what does the verse teach by saying, ‘And she shall remain in her menstrual impurity’? In her state of impurity she shall remain until she comes into the water.”
So there you have a Torah-level law that was practiced by tradition and then abolished in Rabbi Akiva’s time on the basis of reasoning. Is Rabbi Akiva’s interpretation halakhically binding? Or should we go back and forbid women from adorning themselves and braiding their hair during menstruation?

Which conclusively proves that there is no conclusive proof in what you said. 🙂

A. Obviously the Sigd holiday was not given at Mount Sinai, because Ethiopian Jews themselves do not claim that it is from the Torah.
B. Who says that what was added over the years is binding? Who says the sages have authority to institute enactments and decrees? There are no answers to any of these questions.

Who said the Torah was given? Who said there is a God? Who said Julius Caesar or Nero Caesar existed? Who said you exist? Who said we are talking? Nobody said any of this.
If we don’t agree, then no. If you’ve already decided in advance that there are no answers, then I faithfully promise you that you won’t find any, even though there definitely are good answers (which explains the decisiveness). I just don’t understand why you open a discussion that you have absolutely no intention of participating in and listening in. Isn’t that a waste of both our time?!

Sorry for the bluntness.
I’d be glad to hear what the Rabbi has to say.

About what?

About the source for the authority of the sages to institute enactments, and the people’s obligation to follow their interpretations.

The source is threefold: from the Torah, from tradition, and from reason.
1. From the Torah there is the commandment of “do not deviate,” which speaks about a situation in which a matter is too difficult for us and we need to heed the sages on it.
2. Tradition says that the sages have authority and that the Torah is accompanied by an Oral Torah.
3. And by reason, it is obvious that there has to be a central authority, as in any legal system. It is not reasonable to leave a law book without an authorized interpreter. Beyond that, just as we accepted upon ourselves the Torah given at Sinai, we accepted upon ourselves the authority of the sages even if it has no source.
By the way, in every legal system the highest institution defines its own powers. Thus the Supreme Court in Israel defines for itself what powers it has, what it intervenes in and what it does not. That is always how it is, and reason suggests that this is how it should be (though of course there can be debate about the scope of the authority).

Hello Rabbi.
Let’s set aside for a moment the issue of the authority to institute enactments.
Let’s deal only with the authority to give binding interpretations to the Jewish people.
Does the Rabbi agree that strong evidence is needed in order to reach the conclusion that one must follow the authority of the sages in interpreting the Torah? Especially in light of the many times when a reader is perplexed by the sages and sees that they seemingly took the verse away from its plain meaning (piggul is a good example).
(By the way, I recommend that the Rabbi devote part of his trilogy to grounding our obligation to accept the Oral Torah — the enactments and the interpretations. Some think that the dispute over the Oral Torah has passed from the world, but in truth it is only intensifying from different directions. Finding a reasonable basis for accepting the Oral Torah is difficult to almost nonexistent in books and on the internet. The proofs range from “Torot” — from which they infer that there are two Torahs — to “what would we write in the tefillin without the Oral Torah,” even though tefillin in the plain sense seems metaphorical. Our plain-sense commentators say this too. If the Rabbi writes a book on the matter, I recommend not neglecting this issue and clarifying this topic thoroughly. I always thought Karaite arguments were totally stupid, but when I argued with them I saw that one needs a strong basis for the idea that the sages have such strong authority to interpret the Torah, at times not according to its plain sense, and to institute enactments. It would be worthwhile for the Rabbi to argue a bit with Karaites in order to hear the arguments from them.)
I’ll move to the three points:
1) Regarding “when a matter is too difficult.” In the plain sense, the verse speaks about a doubt that arises in Jewish law; obviously one goes and asks the Sanhedrin. How do we know that if, on a clear day, the Sanhedrin decided to institute the thirty-nine categories of labor, we must follow them, even though in Moses’ time no one had heard of those definitions?
2) If the intention is that it was passed down to us by tradition that the sages have authority, that sounds like a very good explanation. But what do we do with the history showing that throughout the generations there were always challenges to this tradition?
Who guarantees to us that it wasn’t the Pharisees who invented it, and that the Sadducees were once the central and original stream? (Some trace them back to Zadok the priest.)
That is: in the Second Temple period there were several sects. The Pharisees claimed tradition, the Sadducees disagreed. Where does the Rabbi’s confidence come from to follow one sect, even leniently?
3) As for reason, indeed in laws between man and his fellow it makes sense to have a uniform legal system, since the matter is not religious.
But why does reason say that if the sages decided that meat and milk is also forbidden for benefit, then it is forbidden for the entire Jewish people? After all, the purpose of the commandments is to do God’s will, not to organize a social system. So reason would seemingly be less relevant here.
Many thanks for the Rabbi’s enormous effort.

Hello. I thought we were done.

I do not agree. There is a simple rationale that when there is a normative system, there must be an authority that interprets it. That is how courts work in every proper country. And if a court takes a law away from its plain meaning, that is still the binding interpretation. Very simple, and not at all problematic in my eyes.

I’ll consider your suggestion.

1) A doubt arose for me as to what labor the Torah forbade on the Sabbath. And when that doubt arose for our ancestors, they went up to the place that God chose and asked the elders, and they told them that it refers to the thirty-nine primary categories of labor and their derivatives. And it really makes no difference to me whether in Moses’ time they had heard of this (my personal guess is that they had not).
2) Challenges to this tradition don’t really change anything. There are also challenges to the very existence of the commandments. This is what was accepted, and there has to be an authorized institution (as above). I don’t see any alternative institution that is a candidate for the crown. If there is one — I’ll consider it. If you want to follow Sadducean or Pharisaic Jewish law, health and happiness to you. I don’t see such an option today. And inventing something new is not an option in my eyes either.
3) The reasoning applies in any normative system, completely regardless of whether we are talking about laws or other things. A society cannot be run according to a normative system in which everyone does whatever they want, with no rules and no framework for discussion. After a week, there would be nothing left of it. So obviously God’s will is also of that sort.

Have a good week.
I reply when I have time, which is why there are gaps between my responses.
Indeed, these Karaite heretical thoughts don’t leave me alone, and after wandering around the web this is my last hope of finding a reasonable answer. The purpose of every legal system in the world is to regulate social matters, protect society from criminals, and regulate monetary matters; it doesn’t really matter whether it is English law, American law, or French law. Therefore we are not alarmed if a judge takes a law away from its plain meaning.
The Torah, by contrast, is meant to “bring divine abundance into the world,” in the wording of Rabbenu Nissim, if I remember correctly. If so, it is no simple innovation to say that authority is given so strongly to the sages, and that we are obligated to their words (even if mistaken, God forbid, for the sake of the discussion) for all generations (or until a Sanhedrin arises to change it).
The Torah is not state law, where in the name of authority one can give up the truth intended by the Torah.
A) How do we know that this law originated in the Sanhedrin and is not a separate invention like parts of the Talmud?
B) There definitely is an alternative: to act according to the plain sense of the Torah in all places where there is no doubt that the sages took a verse out of context.
C) As stated, the commandment of tefillin or Sabbath or the laws of non-kosher flesh is not like monetary law.

We’re repeating ourselves. In my opinion, it is the same thing. It is a normative system, even though it deals with additional areas. From the standpoint of Jewish law, refraining from eating pork is as important as the prohibition of theft. Therefore the same logic that says there must be an authority to determine the binding interpretation exists here as well.
A. I didn’t understand the question.
B. Because of the doubtful cases, we reached the conclusion that there must be an authority to determine what the binding interpretation is. That means there is an authorized Sanhedrin that determines the interpretation. If so, even when it determines an interpretation against what seems to you to be the plain meaning, it is binding. That is what authority means.
C. As stated, they are.

A) If the sages have unlimited authority, why is there a sacrifice for an error taught by the Sanhedrin? After all, we have not violated any prohibition if we followed them, since that is the binding word. And in general, why do they need to retract their ruling? (By analogy to state law, where there is no ideal of retracting.)
B) The Rabbi always mentions the Jerusalem Talmud, “unless they tell you about right that it is right”… If so, why is it so surprising to the Rabbi that we would accept the Sanhedrin in places where we do not know that it erred (that it took a verse out of context, or instituted the thirty-nine categories of labor that God did not intend)? Suddenly it is so obvious that one follows them through fire and water?
I am not speaking on the halakhic plane (where there may be a distinction) but on the logical plane.
Even if there is a small distinction, the Karaite position seems far more reasonable. They are only extending the teaching of the Jerusalem Talmud. It seems that the Rabbi treats the arguments with complete dismissal and as stupidity. It is not clear where that comes from.
C) The Rabbi mentioned above that in every system, the highest institution defines its own powers. And what about the ruling of all the leading sages of the generation concerning the severe prohibition on owning an iPhone? Here the Rabbi has no problem being a Karaite and saying they have no authority?
After all, they define their own powers, and if they forbid it then it is forbidden.

The Rabbi adopts independent thinking in quite a few areas of Jewish law, and it is not clear to me where the dismissive attitude toward Karaism comes from — as though the questioner is an idiot for even asking such a question, when after all it is obviously clear that we are 100% obligated to every mistaken instruction of the Sanhedrin.

Hello. Now we’re already in the realm of reading comprehension.

A-B) The sages do not have unlimited authority. Where did I write that they do? The Talmud at the beginning of Horayot speaks about someone who erred regarding the commandment to heed the sages (he thought one must obey them at any price). What I wrote is that they have authority to interpret the Torah and even to take it away from its plain meaning. There are situations in which one need not accept their words, but that is for one qualified to issue rulings (and there is a dispute about this among the halakhic decisors). So there you have it: the sages themselves limit their own authority, and therefore when they establish authority for themselves it is apparently because that really is the correct interpretation in their view (not a lust for power). “To say about right that it is left” is not at all identical to “an interpretation that deviates from the plain meaning.”
When someone acted on the instruction of a religious court, it is not clear that he is obligated in a sacrifice, nor when he is (this is the topic of “an individual who acted on the instruction of the court”). In such a situation there is a sacrifice obligation on the court (the bull offering for an error).
I do not treat the Karaite view as stupidity. Where did you see that in my words? In my opinion it is mistaken.
C) I have not heard that all the leading sages of the generation forbid iPhones. And I have still not heard that whatever all the leading sages of the generation say is binding on anyone. Authority belongs only to the Sanhedrin.

Indeed, I try to be independent in many areas of Jewish law and thought, but that does not necessarily mean that everyone with independent thinking is right or not foolish. And in general, I don’t understand why Karaites seem to you to have independent thinking and Rabbinic Jews do not. To my mind, Rabbinic thought is far more independent and original. But as I said, that discussion is not important.

A-B) It doesn’t matter whether the sages established that one need not follow their mistakes. The fact is that the sky doesn’t fall in a reality where one does not follow the Sanhedrin’s mistakes. (If I recall correctly, the author of Torah Temimah writes that even an individual not qualified to issue rulings is forbidden not to listen to the Sanhedrin’s mistake — if it is certain, then certainly so.)
C) The Rabbi hasn’t heard of the authority of the leading sages of the generation? Very surprising. That is after all a simple rationale for two reasons:
A) It is impossible to maintain a normative system without the authority of people whom we follow, even if they are mistaken (and forbid using the holy iPhone).
There simply is no such reality.
And if you say such a system can exist in our times, and there is no need for them, then the Rabbi’s argument falls apart and it is proven that even in the Temple period there was no need for a Sanhedrin.
There is no reasonable distinction between the periods.
B) The leading sages of the generation define their own authority. They interpret the Torah and say an iPhone is forbidden.

I’m done.

Just one final clarification please: why is it so obvious and necessary and simple that there be a binding institution in the time of the Temple, if nowadays there isn’t one and we manage fine without it?

This isn’t a frivolous question (even if asked with a bit of sarcasm).
After all, the Rabbi’s main argument is that obviously there must be a supreme institution. But for two thousand years there has been no such institution. So what is meant here?

Hey,
I don’t want to interfere in the discussion, but since as the Rabbi said the discussion has already run its course, I’ll do so (regarding both discussions).

If I understand correctly, there are 4 questions that need to be answered.

1. Do the sages or the Sanhedrin have authority (enactments + interpretations)?
2. According to the Torah, is there any need at all for authority, and is there evidence in the Torah for the existence of an Oral Torah?
3. Is the Oral Torah in our hands the correct one (that is, do the sages have a tradition at all, or one preferable to that of the Karaites)?
4. Is the Karaite position more correct than the Pharisaic one?

As I understand it, it is enough to answer one of the first 3:

– If the Sanhedrin has authority — simple. Let them determine whatever they want; even if the tradition in their hands is corrupted, we are obligated.
– If there really is a need for an Oral Torah or evidence for the existence of one, and there is doubt as to which one is correct — clearly it is preferable to take the one accepted by the Jewish people and by most sages.
– If the sages’ tradition is truly ancient — clearly we should adopt it, since it is the closest we have to revelation. Otherwise, why should we accept the words of the prophets in the Hebrew Bible? They too were not given at Sinai… The presumption is that if a tradition is ancient, it is the most correct one to rely on.

Let’s discuss the claims one by one. In my opinion, there are good answers to all 3.

Is there logic to authority:
1. From the Torah — the well-known verse “according to all that they instruct you.” Even if we say one can argue about its interpretation (though as I understand it, that’s just nitpicking), both of us have the question “Is the authority of the sages binding?” We go up to the court — and it (the sages) ruled that it is…
2. From logic — there must be interpretive authority. Like with every law and like with everyone in the ancient world (there is evidence for this).
3. From tradition — this is the tradition of most of the Jewish people.
4. Because that is how it happened throughout history — the Hebrew Bible is full of records of practices beyond the Torah itself. See, for example, refraining from labor on the New Moon, “if you turn back your foot because of the Sabbath,” the prohibition of foreign women, the rule of food that renders food impure in Nehemiah, carrying, and more. Likewise interpretations brought for existing verses. Albeck shows in his book many examples of this. For example, he shows that “she shall not go out as the slaves go out” refers to Canaanite slaves and not Israelites already in the Septuagint, 300 years before the Mishnah. And he shows that Nehemiah rebukes the people for carrying in Jerusalem, while on the other hand it says “let no man go out of his place on the Sabbath day.” From here, beyond the fact that there is a carrying enactment, “his place” also contains a specific definition; otherwise there would have been no point in decreeing about it.
5. The Holy One, blessed be He, knew that Israel would eventually go into exile — it is not logical that He would leave them without leadership that could adapt the Torah to reality. How did the Holy One, blessed be He, expect that in the 21st century someone would know what the word “leavened food” means?
6. Moses ordained Joshua; we are obligated to the words of Moses, and accordingly to the words of Joshua; Joshua ordained the elders, and so on and so on.

Is there a need for an Oral Torah:
1. The Torah is a document meant for all of history; interpretive rules must be transmitted. How will you read the Torah without punctuation? How will you know 2,000 years from now the meaning of the word “tzitzit,” or “the fat that covers the entrails,” or how the month is counted? You can of course say that this is not an Oral Torah but simply the context or interpretation of the sentence — excellent. I have no problem with that statement, but all those contexts were transmitted in the tradition of most of the Jewish people, and that is the tradition of the sages. You can claim that perhaps there is a more accurate tradition, but that belongs under question 2.
2. How will you interpret “according to the law of daughters,” “a writ of severance,” “frontlets” (do you have proof that this is only a metaphor?), marriage rituals that are not spelled out in the Torah, tzitzit (all groups have something of that sort), vocalization, ritual slaughter, punctuation. Even if on each small point you can give some local explanation and say that “the law of daughters” means what was practiced in ancient times… okay… but then how will you know what “the law of daughters” was after 200 years without it being passed down by tradition? Clearly some kind of tradition must be transmitted. And beyond that, even if you manage to patch up one place or another, the Torah is full of such expressions (I listed 12 for you here), and if you find yourself looking for excuses for everything, that means perhaps the method is flawed from the outset and an interpretive tradition really is required.
3. The Torah contains contradictory laws. See Exodus 22:6-14: “If a man delivers to his neighbor money or vessels to keep, and it is stolen out of the man’s house — if the thief is found, he shall pay double. If the thief is not found, then the master of the house shall come near to God, to see whether he has not put his hand unto his neighbor’s goods. For every matter of trespass, whether it be for ox, for donkey, for sheep, for garment, or for any manner of lost thing, whereof one says: ‘This is it,’ the cause of both parties shall come before God; he whom God shall condemn shall pay double unto his neighbor. If a man delivers unto his neighbor a donkey, or an ox, or a sheep, or any beast, to keep, and it die, or be hurt, or be driven away, no man seeing it; the oath of the Lord shall be between them both, whether he has not put his hand unto his neighbor’s goods; and the owner thereof shall accept it, and he shall not make restitution. But if it be stolen from him, he shall make restitution unto the owner thereof. If it be torn in pieces, let him bring it for witness; he shall not make good that which was torn.” What does this law even mean? How would you rule regarding something that is neither vessels nor an animal? You need an interpretive tradition. If this were one isolated case, you might manage, but the Torah brings similar things in many laws. If you have no interpretive tradition as to what is meant — in this case, whether the distinction is about the type of object or about an unpaid versus paid guardian — it is impossible to understand the Torah at all. You can of course say that everyone will interpret as they see fit, but you do not expect every court to interpret the verse however it feels like, and you do not expect the Holy One, blessed be He, to want the law to work that way… that every court should do whatever it wants.
4. Biblical scholarship shows that almost all ancient peoples preserved legal traditions orally (see in Inbal’s book below, where he brings evidence for this).

Did the sages preserve traditions:
1. This is a historical question. Scholarship is divided on the issue of who preceded whom, the Sadducees or the Pharisees. There are scholars who think the Pharisees came first in the Second Temple period. (As for the First Temple period, scholars do not accept the Torah regardless…) Read research literature on this. There are Jewish customs, such as candle-lighting, that even reached the exiles from the First Temple period (Ethiopia).
2. There is much evidence that many rabbinic decrees appear in the Hebrew Bible, apocryphal books (such as the prohibition of ordinary gentile wine in Judith), Philo, Josephus, and other earlier sources. In fact, many rabbinic decrees have attestation in pre-destruction Second Temple literature. More than that — some of them are also found in literature written in Greek, with which the sages were probably not familiar. Meaning: the sages preserved an ancient tradition among the people.
3. Many of the sages’ interpretations also have external evidence. The altar on Mount Ebal is built like the altar in tractate Middot. Greek historians who recount the stories of the Jewish people bring them in their rabbinic version. Many aggadic teachings of the sages have parallels in Josephus. And more.
4. Even if we say the Sadducees had a different tradition — this is the tradition accepted by most of the people, and it seems ancient. Why not accept it?
5. The sages’ interpretations are not pulled out of thin air. They are built in a systematic and fixed manner. As mentioned, many of them have proof in the text or in other ancient writings.
6. It is not clear why your interpretation is preferable to the interpretation of someone who lived very close to the period.

Is Karaism correct:
1. There is no dispute in scholarship that Karaism began as a movement in the 8th century through Anan. There are many studies showing that this was due to ego wars with the Geonim of Babylonia.
2. They too have an Oral Torah! They have their own substitute for mezuzah and tzitzit! If a Karaite changes the form of the tzitzit, they will rebuke him. They have their own slaughter, their own circumcision, their own Sabbath laws. If you think they have no Jewish law and no interpretation, you are mistaken. Why is their late tradition preferable to the ancient tradition of 99% of the Jewish people?
3. If Karaism — why not the Samaritans? Who said the Prophets and Writings are holy? Have you ever argued with a Samaritan? Maybe he is right? He is certainly earlier than the Karaite! If you work that way, there is no end to it…
So why am I not a Samaritan? — Here too… there are 2 ancient traditions. The rabbinic tradition was accepted by most of the people, it appears well-founded, and there is good evidence that it is ancient. Therefore, specifically the one who wants to show it is invalid bears the burden of proof! (Just to head off the next theological crisis — regarding the Samaritans there is additional evidence, as with the Karaites, that their method is later, such as changes they made in the Torah scroll, which most scholars date later, though the Samaritans disagree with the scholars about this.)

What about the cases where the sages’ interpretation takes verses away from their plain sense?
1. Who told you that? On every point one must examine whether this is really true (an unreasonable interpretation), and whether there is no early evidence for that interpretation. Regarding Sabbath, I think I saw that there is another source for it. I won’t swear that I remember correctly. Malbim brings proofs for all rabbinic expositions, showing that they have a great deal of logic.
2. As for the cases where it really is so (there is no logic and no outside evidence) — that is apparently relatively rare.
3. It is done by the authority stated in question 1. (logic, tradition, a verse, this is how others seem to have done it in the Hebrew Bible, Moses ordained Joshua, it was done systematically and not pulled out of thin air)
4. It happened in a very systematic way. (See Malbim’s commentary and his introduction. The main thrust of his commentary is to show that the rabbinic expositions are the more logical interpretation.) Add to that the fact that the sages have a tradition that this is a very ancient interpretive method, passed down by tradition. Since there is much evidence that the sages’ expositions and traditions are indeed ancient, at least in part, it is not impossible that this method too is ancient. (And one who wants to claim that the sages have many ancient things preserved by tradition, as scholarship shows, but that only the interpretive method is a total invention and not tradition as they themselves claim — the burden is on him to prove it.)
5. Regarding the puzzling places where there is no logic or additional evidence for the sages’ tradition in a specific interpretation of a verse — let’s think for a second. The sages were in an all-out war against the Sadducees. Why would the sages take verses away from their plain meaning if they had no tradition for it? If the sages insist so strongly, that is a sign that it really was an ancient tradition in their hands (like many things, as noted above).

Regarding your statement that there are things that are certainly late (tefillin — Shinan):
First, one has to examine whether this or that specific statement is correct (say, tefillin — it is not clear what that is based on; the fact that no tefillin were found doesn’t prove much).
But let’s say it is. So what?
1. There is authority, as we saw.
2. It is a practical necessity, and the prophets did the same.
3. The interpretation is built in a systematic way.
4. According to them, they have a tradition for it.

To your question whether the Talmud is binding:
Indeed, there must always be a constitutional institution. After the destruction, the **Sanhedrin** moved to Yavneh and committed the Mishnah to writing. After that, the Talmud was written by the religious court accepted by most of Israel (so it too has authority). But although authority is needed, it must work according to rules (a court greater in wisdom and number can repeal enactments). If today a religious court accepted by all Israel were established and acted according to the rules, it would be binding. In practice, such an attempt was made in the 16th century. It is simply difficult nowadays because the people are divided. But the fact that there is no court nowadays does not contradict the claim that authority is needed…
As for the authority of the “leading sages of the generation” — why do you assume people think there is none? There is a dispute about this (there is an article by Rabbi Dichovsky in Tehumin); most hold that there is no authority because today there is no great court. If all the sages of Israel established a halakhic body that all Israel accepted and they instituted an enactment, that would be within their authority (perhaps Rabbi Michi would disagree, but some do rule that way). Beyond that, even if halakhically one is not obligated to listen to them, there is logic in listening to the leaders of the public (that is the reasoning…).

As for your basic claim that you only want to do what the Holy One, blessed be He, intended:
Up to here I answered analytically. But doubt can always remain, so I’ll tell you how I see it. There can always be doubts, but my feeling is that the Jewish people, under siege and distress, preserved the Torah in exiles, ghettos, death camps, hunger and thirst for 2,000 years according to the tradition they had and according to the rulings of their leadership, against the whole world. If after 120 years one comes before the Holy One, blessed be He (let’s leave aside for a moment whether Rabbi Michi accepts that), I don’t think they’ll have complaints against someone who preserved the tradition of his fathers, which seems to have solid foundations (as I showed), with self-sacrifice. But that is only my feeling.

Regarding your saying that you can’t find an answer on any website:
There is high-level literature on every issue: the Oral Torah (see below), archaeology, philosophy, religion-science contradictions, questions of faith, and so on. You just need to know where to look.

In conclusion:
My feeling is that even the answer to each of the questions (the first 3) separately is clear — all the more so when one looks at the whole picture. There is evidence that the Oral Torah is ancient, there is logic to its existence (from the Torah and from reason), there are similar things that can be learned from the Hebrew Bible, it brings proofs for all its claims (method, logic, or parallel), it is built systematically, and it was accepted by most of the Jewish people. In addition, its alternatives, which are mostly much later, also contain an Oral Torah but not in a systematic form.
I agree that maybe one can quibble here and there over a specific point, but in general the method is grounded in sources, research, history, and reason, and this, as stated, is the method accepted by the overwhelming majority of faithful Jews. Quite the contrary: one needs very strong proof for why the opinion of the minority should override the tradition of most sages and of the Jewish people.

To the questioner, who seems to be a serious person troubled by truth, I would only suggest going through 3 works written on the topic of the truth of the Oral Torah. The first is by Yehoshua Inbal, The Oral Torah: Its Authority and Its Ways; the second is The Second Kuzari (Mateh Dan) by Rabbi David Nieto; and the third is Introduction to the Commentary on the Mishnah by Professor Albeck.

The first two were published by Mossad Harav Kook and can be purchased on their website; the third is in university libraries. Each book deals with different things, but together they provide an important picture of the discussion. Inbal shows that there is good evidence that the Pharisees’ interpretations (the sages) are early and have support in the texts, and he answers difficulties in their approach (for example, he discusses at length the gap in the Persian period and “strange” aggadot in the sages). The second shows evidence for the need for an Oral Torah and argues with the Karaites. The third shows, from a scholarly perspective, that the Mishnah is ancient, long before the period in which it was committed to writing. There are other books on the issue, but these give a good basic picture. The first two are definitely also available in Otzar HaChochma.

If you want evidence for specific points that I wrote, ask and I’ll bring it.

We manage today after there were Sanhedrins over many centuries that defined the Oral Torah. If we had to manage with the Torah itself, I assume we would not manage.

Understood. I just want to clarify regarding newly instituted enactments.
Is the source there too reason, tradition, and a verse? If so, what is the verse and what is the reasoning?

M, you wrote that if there is authority, then that leads us to obligation to the Pharisaic religion, because then there was basically a dispute whether the Sadducees were right or the Pharisees, and it was decided in favor of the Pharisees. But Rabbi Michi wrote that if the Sadducees are the truth, then the Sanhedrin has no authority (and consequently your argument falls).
A quote from Rabbi Michi in a parallel responsum:
“If Zadok’s tradition were correct, the Sanhedrin would have no authority. After all, that is one of the points of dispute with them.”

To say there is a substantive contradiction here to the Rabbi’s words, or that if there is such a contradiction the argument falls, is a bit exaggerated:
1. I gave several arguments for why one should follow our tradition; “the Sanhedrin decides” is only one of them. (1. It was accepted by the majority, so it is the best we have. 2. The Sadducean halakhah, which also had an Oral Torah, did not survive, so it cannot be practiced — except perhaps for 70-80 laws that we have. 3. Certain scholars see it as indeed the original one, and there is considerable evidence for this. 4. Historians of the Second Temple period described the dispute as being between those who sanctified primarily tradition and those who sanctified primarily their own understandings; that is, the public understanding was that these relied on tradition and those on reasoning. There is logic in following tradition rather than reasoning, since tradition is older by definition.)
2. Your words show me that you did not understand the point of my remarks (apparently because of lack of historical knowledge). In the Second Temple period, two sects fought over control of the Sanhedrin. When the Pharisees had the upper hand, the official state acted like them, and when the Sadducees gained control, things were conducted like them at the governmental level (that is, in the Temple). The dispute was which of the streams contained the more correct interpretation, and the state in practice followed the stronger side, while each fought the other to impose what seemed to it the truth.
3. The authority of the court is not a rabbinic interpretation at all, but a matter of explicit scripture and straightforward logic. You can of course say that if so, the fact that a court has authority to interpret does not mean it may interpret against the plain sense. But that claim is completely refuted by historical research — we know for certain that the two courts held oral traditions (though that of the Sadducees was much more limited; they relied mainly on their own interpretations), and that these contradicted the plain sense. See many examples in Professor Eyal Regev’s book The Sadducees and Their Laws. The same is true regarding the authority to institute enactments — the Sadducees and the prophets did that too.
4. Indeed, with the Karaites there really was a dispute whether each person may interpret for himself or whether only the court may interpret. But those Karaite statements contradict the explicit text, and beyond that they contradict their own doctrine itself (because they have written interpretations — Anan’s law book).

As for the “dispute” with the Rabbi:
It seems to me that you are exaggerating. In my opinion, what the Rabbi means is that the dispute with the Sadducees was not whether a court has authority to interpret — on that, it seems to me, everyone agrees, since that is the plain meaning of the text — but whether a court has authority in its interpretations to uproot the plain sense. I think that is what the Rabbi means. So as I said — indeed, that is sometimes how the Sadducee-Pharisee dispute is described, but today, when some of the Sadducean laws have come down to us, we know that this is not so, because they too did similar things.

Thanks.