Q&A: The Authority of the Sages of Israel to Interpret Verses After the Destruction
The Authority of the Sages of Israel to Interpret Verses After the Destruction
Question
Hello Rabbi,
I wanted to understand a bit more about the issue of the authority of the Talmud and of the sages in general. (Of course I already looked into Maimonides in Laws of Rebels and the commentators there beforehand.) We are obligated by the words of the Great Court because of “do not deviate,” and apparently only they have the authority to interpret verses and enact ordinances (especially against the plain meaning).
After the destruction, the court of the Talmud wrote its explanations of the Mishnah, and we accepted upon ourselves to conduct ourselves according to these explanations as if they were the words of the Great Court (requiring a court greater in wisdom and number in the relevant places, etc.), and that is simple and clear.
Now, under the assumption that “do not deviate” refers only to the Sanhedrin, the question arises: why did the sages of the Mishnah or the Talmud (the later ones) themselves have the authority to interpret verses and the like against the plain meaning in the first place? That is permitted only to the Sanhedrin, isn’t it? Likewise, why were they themselves permitted to enact ordinances? (As a matter of reasoning this is clear. But from the verse “do not deviate” it seems that this applies only to the Sanhedrin.)
Obviously, if this is within their authority, then I have the right to apply to them the procedures of the Great Court stringently, since I have the right to accept any stringency upon myself (as long as it does not contradict the plain meaning), but it seems to me that with later ordinances that uprooted commandments (the shofar on the Sabbath) or changed verses from their plain meaning (“an eye for an eye”), it is not clear why this is legitimate…. (Maimonides too, when discussing interpretation of verses, refers only to the Great Court and attributes “do not deviate” only to it.)
(All this of course refers only to new ordinances and new interpretations, and not to earlier Sanhedrin traditions that they put into writing.)
Thank you
Answer
It is accepted among halakhic decisors that the Talmud has the status of the Great Court, because the Jewish people as a whole accepted their authority. According to Maimonides’ view, that ordination can be renewed “from below,” this is straightforward. But perhaps according to everyone, the agreement of the entire public is effective (and not specifically the sages of the Land of Israel, as Maimonides wrote and thereby sparked dispute). See also Beit Yishai, Homilies, section 15, on the authority of public acceptance, somewhat like the force of the acceptance of the Torah, which derives from the public’s acceptance. Beyond that, there is the reasoning of Sefer HaChinukh that there must be authority for the sages to explain and interpret the Torah, and that should not change when there is no Sanhedrin. According to this, if a consensus were formed today, it too would be binding.
Discussion on Answer
First, poultry with milk is a rabbinic prohibition.
Second, any person can use the hermeneutical principles for himself and for others. The difference between him and the Sanhedrin is that an interpretation made in the Sanhedrin is binding on everyone. This is exactly like any halakhic ruling: a person can decide for himself, but a ruling of the Sanhedrin binds everyone.
When the authority of the Talmud was accepted, its interpretations too were accepted as binding.
The Rabbi’s answer helps retroactively, but in their own time, where did they draw their authority from? After all, we even find that in Rabbi Yosei the Galilean’s place they ate poultry with milk based on his interpretations. And in general, the tannaim interpreted and ruled, each man for his own students, directly from the Torah itself and using all the hermeneutical principles.
So can any person simply interpret the Torah? If so, what help is the Sanhedrin specifically? What special force does it have?