Q&A: On the Attitude Toward Canonical Texts
On the Attitude Toward Canonical Texts
Question
Hello Rabbi,
I don’t know whether you have spare time or not, so I’ll ask both briefly and a bit more expansively.
I’d be glad for some knowledge on the following topic.
The Tummim, in the abridged edition of Takfo Kohen, section 124 or 144—I don’t remember exactly—says that even though “there is no doubt” that the Shulchan Arukh and the Rema did not intend everything later commentators explained into their words, nevertheless “it was all enlightened upon them by God,” etc. etc., and there is room for these explanations even if they are not the author’s intention.
Are there additional sources for something like this regarding the Mishnah, the Talmud, or Maimonides or others—that people also made forced readings and reconciliations on them and gave answers which, to put it mildly, do not seem to have been what they intended?
Do we find that someone knew that Maimonides, in his letters, retracted or explained his words in a certain way, and nevertheless still interpreted his words not in accordance with how he himself explained them—out of an attitude of, “I interpret the book and I am not interested in what he himself wrote in a letter,” or something like that? (I heard from someone that there is such a case in Pri Megadim, where he retracted in a letter and nevertheless people relate to what is written in the book, because they accept the book and not the man.)
And a bit more broadly: in halakhic discussion, anywhere there is a notion of “they accepted it upon themselves” (in the language of the Kesef Mishneh, Laws of Rebels), there will be an immediate need for “expansive” interpretation. Since once you are committed to the text and you have questions—whether from logic, or internal contradictions, or contradictions from earlier sources—since you cannot erase the text and you are not speaking with the author himself, you are forced to reconcile it through new methods, not to say strained inventions…
And that is the meaning of the words of the Tummim, who first said that one cannot say “the accepted ruling follows” against the Shulchan Arukh and the Rema, and immediately continued and wrote that “it was all enlightened upon them by God,” because once he determined that we accept the Shulchan Arukh and Rema and do not reject them even because of difficulties and contradictions, but choose to accept them and are thereby obligated to offer reconciliations wherever they arise, the question then arises: what is the meaning of the discussion about them? Did they really think of everything later said to reconcile them? And since the Tummim says boldly that certainly not, he is forced to drag the Holy One, blessed be He, into the halakhic discussion… I saw in the notes there as well that the Hatam Sofer says something like this about the Shulchan Arukh. I wanted sources like these regarding earlier books, such as the Mishnah, the Talmud, and Maimonides.
According to what emerges from what I wrote, such a phenomenon exists only in books that are canonical and codificatory—I hope I wrote that correctly—such as Maimonides and the Shulchan Arukh, and less so in interpretive books, where if someone’s interpretation of the passage does not seem right, it will be rejected in favor of another opinion that seems more correct, and there will be no need to reconcile the opinion that seems incorrect.
In any case, please speak your mind on the matter.
Answer
Hello.
I’m not familiar with sources that say this explicitly. But I also don’t understand why it is important. If the Tummim or anyone else said something, does that mean it is true? Does anyone have communication with the Holy One, blessed be He, who revealed this secret to him? I think this is indeed the underlying assumption in traditional learning (and that is what I wrote in my article on hermeneutics, though in the meantime I have moderated the extremity of what I wrote there), and of course this is mainly with respect to canonical texts.
As a side note, I will just say that the fact that we accepted something upon ourselves does not mean that it is impossible to deviate from it. Like all rules of Jewish law, this too is a rule that has exceptions when necessary (“one does not derive from general rules, even where an exception is stated”). When there is something that is clearly incorrect, there is no reason to accept it, even if we have accepted the authority of the text upon ourselves. We accepted its authority so long as we were not forced not to accept it.
Beyond the fact that rules in Jewish law are not viewed as mandatory in the sense of something frozen that automatically obligates, one should note another point as well. Rav A. U. once wrote that the Sages say that whoever recites Havdalah over a cup of wine will have male children. Yet we can see with our own eyes that there are those who did not merit this (the Chazon Ish). Does that mean he did not recite Havdalah over a cup? (Even assuming the Sages meant it seriously, and even assuming they could know such a thing at all.) He explains that this is one consideration among several. Thus, for example, because of the sin of vows, a person’s children die. What will happen with a person who recites Havdalah over a cup but is not careful with vows? Will he have sons or not? In my article on forced readings, I explained that this is so regarding every generalization, including laws of nature. Such a law is completely true, but alongside it other laws are also operating, and they too are completely true. In reality, all the laws operate together, and the result is whatever emerges from among them all. And if we return to our issue, there is the authority of the Talmud, but there is also the authority of truth. And both of these rules are fully binding. And sometimes, when they clash, difficult decisions must be made and one of them must be given up. Sometimes we will give up truth, and sometimes authority, depending on the consequences and the severity of the error, etc.
Discussion on Answer
I don’t have sources. It’s like looking for sources about the principle of changing natural conditions—whether there were people who saw it as a polite way to disagree with the medieval authorities. Of course there were, but “the heart does not reveal to the mouth,” and usually they won’t write that.
But regarding forced readings, that is actually a very poor example. Forced readings are an astonishingly reasonable interpretive move, as I explained in my article in Akdamot. See here:
I’m not arguing with you, and I agree in advance with the content of everything you said, except that you are dealing with content and I am dealing with history.
I’m only trying to see how much awareness halakhic decisors had of this issue. I agree that even the Tummim surely disagreed once or twice with the Shulchan Arukh and the Rema, and indeed we find later authorities disagreeing with them, and later authorities disagreeing with medieval authorities, and all the way back to the Talmud itself. (And of course this could be greatly expanded, but this is not the place.)
I’m only trying to understand the awareness halakhic decisors had of the tension between acceptance—you’ll agree with me that it has significance, even if not without exceptions—and the difficulties and problems you have with the book, which require expansive interpretation. I think there are three possible ways to understand it: either like the Tummim (I agree with you that this is somewhat presumptuous), or we can say that this was the intention of the wise author, that every word and letter was carefully aimed to hint at these things, etc. (same issue), or that we simply do not care at all about the author’s intention (who, in our opinion, was mistaken), but since the things can somehow be fit into what he wrote—through far-fetched forced readings, for example—then by that we uphold the acceptance and resolve the difficulty, and that is enough for us. For example, in the Mishnah: “If one placed down a jug and another came and stumbled over it and broke it, he is exempt,” and the Talmud asks a sensible question: “He should have looked and walked.” And on the strength of this it gives three answers: either it was taught in a case where one filled the public domain with barrels, or it was taught in a corner, or it was taught in the dark. And it turns out that instead of ‘exempt’ you get ‘liable’—pretty amazing. Which of these three possibilities did our Sages actually think? And do you have sources on this?