Q&A: Universal Morality
Universal Morality
Question
You consistently argue in many of your articles that there is a binding “universal morality.”
For example, in article 15 about “one who has relations with a woman while she is still a gentile if his impulse overpowers him,” you claimed that this contradicts morality even though it does not contradict the Torah.
And here the questioner asked:
A. Morality is a society’s mode of conduct.
B. There are no standards for determining what is moral and how a society ought to behave. Society underwent a certain evolution and arrived at a certain kind of behavior—a culture that became morality. For example, in Africa women are like objects. And also to a considerable extent, in many places in Asia—in Arab countries. By contrast, in Europe and America the status of women has changed.
How can you know what is proper?! The evolution of behavior caused the culture in Europe, America, and Australia, but that does not say a thing about a binding “universal morality”! After all, in Africa and large parts of Asia there is no such culture and morality.
The same applies to the value of human life. In Africa and in Arab countries, human life is not regarded the way it is regarded in the constitution of Western culture.
You claim that you have proofs for the binding validity of “universal morality” for everyone. I would be glad to hear a proof of that.
Answer
Hello.
The “factual” claim about the relativity of morality is problematic. The fact that there are societies that behave in different ways is indeed a fact (what exists, or is found). But that has absolutely nothing to do with a norm (what is right, or proper). As for the question of how we know what is right, my answer is: we use our common sense, while also taking into account that others disagree with us. At the end of the day, that is what we have. Aren’t there disputes in Jewish law? Does that mean there is no point in forming a position? And what about law? And science?
By the way, it is worth noticing that despite the differences between societies, there is development in a fairly clear direction. Usually, after an encounter between an African society and a European one, the direction of influence is from Africa to Europe. Today, even someone who murders or discriminates against women finds himself on the defensive and produces excuses. Once, they did not bother doing that. That indicates an objective direction of development, and that the situation is not entirely relative and arbitrary.
Discussion on Answer
Hello Rabbi, and have a good week.
Thank you for the answer. With your permission, I’d like to respond to what seems unclear to me.
Regarding the question of how we know what is proper—you argued: “We use our common sense, while also taking into account that others disagree with us. At the end of the day, that is what we have. Aren’t there disputes in Jewish law? Does that mean there is no point in forming a position? And what about law? And science?”
And here the questioner asks:
Who says that the concept of “common sense” belongs in morality?
In that assumption you have a clear analogy between disputes in Jewish law and disputes in moral positions, between disputes in science and moral positions, and between disputes in science and moral positions.
I claim that science, Jewish law, and law—in a certain sense—are not like “universal morality.” Universal morality is a code for a certain kind of cultural behavior. Not something that can be proved, or something personally binding.
And why?
In Jewish law there is a halakhic basis and objective halakhic axioms, and the dispute there takes place on that same basis.
That is not the case with moral positions, which did not begin from any sort of objectivity, but from cultural evolution.
In science there is a basis, and its name is reality, and we merely raise hypotheses and discuss them.
In universal morality there is no reality that is being discussed; there is a culture that developed on top of the culture before it. Out of the silence of cultures, other cultures grow. Not out of a discussion on the basis of reality, but out of sheer randomness.
In law, in a certain sense, there is discussion within the framework of the law. What does it say? Or alternatively, discussion of the validity of the law according to the foundational values of that political regime.
In universal morality there are no foundational constitutional values. Because there is no universal constitution for all the people of the world. Therefore value is subjective. There is cultural behavior, not value.
You claimed that “today there is development in a fairly clear direction.”
That is clear only if you look from the perspective of the flight attendant in the terminal, not from the perspective of the African / Saudi / Syrian / Iranian, and the list goes on.
And even that is a kind of acceptance of the culture because he entered into that culture.
Universal morality can be valid as objective morality only if I claim that morality gets its validity from imitating nature and observing it. {Abrahamic morality}
Hello Neria. I’m unable to understand your question: are you wondering who said there is common sense in morality? What kind of answer are you expecting? A verse? A logical proof? Common sense says that there is common sense. Who said there is common sense in science or in law or in Jewish law? If there is—then there is.
What you perhaps meant to say is that in morality there are no truths, and therefore there is no meaning to your claims or mine about it, unlike law or Jewish law (though there too some would disagree with you). I disagree with you. In my view there are moral truths, and there is moral right and wrong. Common sense is a measure of those truths. I explained this in detail in my book Truth and Unstable. You can look at the fourth booklet here on the site, in the third part.
The Torah was especially strict regarding the moral character of the army of Israel going out to war, and therefore it established in our portion:
“When you go out as a camp against your enemies, you shall guard yourself from every evil thing” (Deuteronomy 23:10).
The sharp difference between the character of the camp of Israel and the character of the camps of the gentiles was well explained by Nachmanides in his commentary on the Torah:
“For it is well known in the practices of armies going out to war that they eat every abomination, rob and commit violence, and are not ashamed even of adultery and every disgrace… therefore the Torah warned about this: ‘You shall guard yourself from every evil thing!’”
There is no doubt that the warning “You shall guard yourself from every evil thing” is directed first and foremost toward preserving the purity of body and soul from matters involving sexual licentiousness, as the verse says at the end of the section: “…and let Him not see among you any indecent thing and turn away from you,” and the Sages also expanded this warning and established that it includes obscene speech as well, as they said in the Jerusalem Talmud (Terumot 1:3): “‘Any indecent thing’—indecency of speech—this is obscene language.”
It should be noted that Rabbi Moshe Chaim Luzzatto in Mesillat Yesharim, in “The Details of the Trait of Cleanliness,” emphasizes in a special way the prohibition of obscene language, that one should not treat it lightly. These are his sharp words on the matter:
“And if someone whispers to you, saying that what they said about obscene language was only meant to threaten and distance a person from sin, and that these words apply only to one whose blood runs hot, since by speaking he comes to desire—but one who says it merely in jest, it is of no significance and there is no need to be concerned about it!—you too should say to him: up to this point are the words of the evil inclination! … But the truth is as our Sages of blessed memory said, that obscene language is literally the nakedness of speech, and it is prohibited because of harlotry…”
“Because the Lord your God walks in the midst of your camp, to save you and to deliver your enemies before you; therefore your camp shall be holy, so that He see no indecent thing among you and turn away from you” (23:15). “Another interpretation: a transgression extinguishes a commandment, but a transgression does not extinguish Torah. Rav Yosef said: Rabbi Menachem bar Yose taught this verse as if from Sinai, and had Doeg and Ahithophel interpreted it this way, they would not have pursued David, as it is written, ‘saying: God has forsaken him’ etc. What did they interpret?—‘and let Him not see among you any indecent thing’ etc.; and they did not know that a transgression extinguishes a commandment, but a transgression does not extinguish Torah” (Sotah 21a). The principle that a transgression extinguishes a commandment but not Torah should be understood in light of what was said earlier there: “And was it not taught: Rabbi Menachem bar Yose expounded, ‘For a commandment is a lamp and Torah is light’—Scripture compared the commandment to a lamp and Torah to light. It compared the commandment to a lamp to tell you: just as a lamp protects only temporarily, so too a commandment protects only temporarily; and it compared Torah to light to tell you: just as light protects forever, so too Torah protects forever.” Torah is stronger than a commandment, and therefore a transgression cannot extinguish it as it extinguishes a commandment, because a commandment and a transgression are each a particular point, whereas Torah is the totality of the commandments, so it contains many commandments, and therefore the transgression is not strong enough to extinguish it. But it seems to be more than that: the emphasis is that a commandment protects temporarily and Torah forever, so this appears to be a fundamental distinction. Therefore it seems there is here a difference in content: Ahithophel and Doeg thought that because David had sinned in matters of sexual immorality, God had abandoned him, and they thought this had annulled even the merit of his Torah. But what is the point here? The verse says, “and let Him not see among you any indecent thing and turn away from you,” and in Sifrei they expounded: “‘and let Him not see among you any indecent thing and turn away from you’—this teaches that sexual immorality causes the Divine Presence to depart” (124). And similarly they expounded in the Talmud (Sotah 3b): “And Rav Hisda said: At first, before Israel sinned, the Divine Presence rested with each and every one, as it is said, ‘Because the Lord your God walks in the midst of your camp.’ Once they sinned, the Divine Presence departed from them, as it is said, ‘and let Him not see among you any indecent thing and turn away from you.’” And so too in Avot de-Rabbi Natan (38:4). And they learned from this verse that a naked person may not separate terumah (Bava Metzia 114b). It seems that terumah elevates the world to God, and therefore in nakedness one may not separate terumah, because it does not sanctify for God due to the connection to nakedness, which recalls the sin, for the Tree of Knowledge is connected to nakedness (which is why they saw that they were naked). In general, when a person connects to nakedness he sinks deeper into impurity, because this impulse is connected to offspring in the world, and through sin he corrupts the connection to the repair of the world that is carried out through the generations (and God hates lewdness). Therefore this causes the Divine Presence to depart, and this applies in commandments through which one repairs the world. But Torah is something else. Rashi comments on the verse “and let Him not see among you”—the Holy One, blessed be He, should not see an indecent thing—as though God stands on the side and looks at your actions, and when He sees nakedness God turns away from you. But in Torah this is the will of God, for God placed Himself in the connection of Torah to us: “The Holy One, blessed be He, said to Israel: The Torah is Mine and you have taken it; take Me with it, as it says, ‘And they shall take for Me a donation’” (Tanhuma, Terumah 3); and also, “Rabbi Yohanan himself said: ‘I am the Lord your God’ is an acronym for ‘I Myself wrote and gave My soul’” (Shabbat 105a). So in connection to Torah this is a connection with God Himself, and therefore Doeg and Ahithophel thought that just as terumah is forbidden in nakedness, so too Torah is nullified, since it says “And they shall take for Me a donation.” But they were mistaken, because Torah connects us with God Himself, and therefore it is not that God is looking from the side, but rather is actually connected to us, and so nothing can damage this. That is why Torah is light and a commandment is a lamp: the lamp brings light, so a commandment brings connection to God, but Torah connects us with God, the light itself. Therefore, with a transgression—which is damage to our deeds of holiness in the world—it can harm a commandment, so that God will not relate to it and it will be extinguished; but against Torah it can do nothing, because this is a complete connection with God Himself.
For the elevation of the soul of my father and teacher, Abraham son of Yehoshua Tzvi, may I be an atonement for his resting place.
In Mesillat Yesharim, in the explanation of the trait of piety, these are his words:
“For the commandments whose instruction is explicit and publicized should serve him (the pious person) only as an indication, to know that the will and desire of the Blessed One inclines toward that matter. Then he will not say, ‘It is enough for me what is explicitly stated’… Rather he will say: since I have already seen that His blessed will inclines toward this, it will guide me to increase in this matter and broaden it in every direction that I can judge His blessed will desires. And this is what is called: bringing pleasure to his Maker.”
In summary, if we set before our eyes the question: is this His blessed will? we will discover that it is not. The Holy One, blessed be He, wants everything to be kosher according to Jewish law, and that we overcome our inclination in every place and in every situation, especially in war. And if we set our eyes on a gentile woman, then at least let us sanctify her after the war. And just as Joseph saw before him the image of his father when Potiphar’s wife tried to seduce him—and he fled from her—so too we must understand how bad it is to touch a gentile woman. And all the more so when it is written, “and turn away from you”… “Because the Lord your God walks in the midst of your camp,” “you shall guard yourself from every evil thing”—then certainly, when God walks in the midst of your camp, be ashamed to have relations with a gentile woman or even to think about it. And who is mighty? One who conquers his inclination—even if it is not forbidden by the Torah but by morality, as the Rabbi explained at the beginning of his words to the questioner.
And the first article I quoted shows that this is a moral matter. And it’s not I who said it, but Nachmanides!
I hope that with this we have closed the discussion in this responsum. In agreement with things I googled from the internet. Rabbi Yohanan said: A man has a small organ; if he starves it, it is satisfied; if he satisfies it, it is hungry—and enough said.
As for proofs, I don’t recall saying that. In any case, there are arguments, but not proofs. See the third part of the fourth booklet on the site.