Q&A: Hume’s Critique of the Cosmological Argument
Hume’s Critique of the Cosmological Argument
Question
Hello Rabbi,
In Hume’s Dialogues, he raises an interesting objection (which was later expanded) to the cosmological argument (which also affects the physico-theological proof).
A brief formulation of the claim looks like this:
1. We assume that everything has a cause, because that is what we learned from experience.
2. An infinite regress is a failure, as we concluded through reasoning.
3. Therefore >> there must be some primary thing that is “different.” It is its own cause (or its own explanation), and if only we knew it we would understand why it can be like that (or our logic does not apply to it).
Hume’s objection says as follows —
Just like infinite regress is a failure, something that is its own cause is also a failure; reason says there cannot be such a thing (because something that did not previously exist cannot create itself). Therefore, in order to deal with the failure of regress, we used a different failure; we replaced one irrational thing with another irrational thing. In fact, we have done nothing at all.
(The move is presented a bit differently and less relevantly in Simon Blackburn’s Think: A Compelling Introduction to Philosophy.)
What does the Rabbi say about this argument?
All the best.
Answer
This is a confusion. When people say “its own cause,” they do not mean that it created itself, but rather that there is no other cause that created it. That is, it always existed.
Discussion on Answer
This is not a problem of infinite regress but of a concrete infinity (see the second notebook). But only when we are dealing with a chain of causes is a concrete infinity unacceptable, because it is a causal chain that does not really begin anywhere (like the story of turtles all the way down). But when we are speaking about one object that exists for an infinite amount of time, one can use softer terminology and speak of a being with no beginning in time known to us, without entering into a positive description. In any case, we have to arrive at some such description, because otherwise everything necessarily has a prior cause, and then once again we are back to infinite regress.
I do not know of anything without a cause, but reason teaches that there must be such a thing (in order not to fall into infinite regress). And if there is such a thing, then that is what we call God.
What about “being is, and non-being is not” without a causal chain?
I didn’t understand.
I’m still having trouble with this.
Doesn’t the Rabbi think that something that *does not require* an explanation is something that is not logically possible? (Unfortunately I just can’t come up with such a concept; I’ve thought about it quite a bit.)
You can say that there must be such a thing, so there is… but that doesn’t seem precise to me. On the other hand, one could argue that there is some primary thing that does require an explanation (you can ask of it why it is not otherwise), but it simply does not have one, and that way I’m not stuck with the problem of regress.
Of course you can’t imagine it, since our experience deals only with beings of that sort. It is precisely because of this that we arrive at the conclusion that there must be another kind of being, one that is not like that.
I didn’t understand your suggestion at the end.
If there must be one like that, then you are right.
What I suggested at the end is that maybe there does not have to be such a thing. The primary thing is something that, according to reason, ought to have an explanation (that is, it has some characterization), but in practice it simply does not have one, and that is how I end the regress.
If I have to examine only 2 possibilities:
– The Rabbi’s option — at the beginning there exists something that has no need of an explanation (the problem with this option — it seemingly appears implausible from a logical standpoint)
– The option I raised — at the beginning there exists something that does require an explanation but simply does not have one (the problem with this option — the chance that it turned out this way rather than another is low)
Then indeed I would prefer option A (because I saw a natural phenomenon — a low probability, so it is reasonable to posit a “being” in order to explain it)
On the other hand, my concern is that option A is simply impossible; it contradicts the laws of logic or another necessary law, and then unfortunately solution A is simply unacceptable. So I have to choose option B (true, this is an option with low probability, but it is the only possible one, since A simply is not possible).
Does the Rabbi understand the difficulty?
(Maybe this sounds like hairsplitting… but my feeling is that “something that does not need an explanation” is simply an impossible / irrational thing, and not just something I reject because I have no experience with it.)
Correction:
“– The Rabbi’s option – at the beginning there exists something that does not require an explanation (the problem with this option – the thing seemingly appears implausible from a logical standpoint)”
No. I really do not understand. I also do not understand your suggestion, and I also do not understand what problem you found with my suggestion.
What does it mean, a thing that needs an explanation but does not have one? Then it does not need an explanation (otherwise how does it exist and have that nature without the explanation?). Begging your pardon, this really sounds like nonsense to me.
I also do not understand the problem you find with my suggestion. It is completely logical and called for. God is an exceptional being, unlike the other beings familiar to us, and He does not need an explanation outside Himself. What is the problem with that? That you do not know such a thing? I explained that of course you do not know such a thing, because it is a being different from the beings in our experience. After all, that is precisely why we need God, who is not like the things you know, because only in that way does the regress stop.
Let’s try one last time, otherwise we’ll end it here (the purpose of the question was to ask whether you had ever thought that maybe “something that does not need an explanation” is nonsense; I understand that you think that is not the case).
For example —
Suppose the first existent is the law A=VG^F*7.
(Yes, a law is not a being; let us just assume for the sake of the example that this is the first physical law.)
Now logic says that this law has an explanation — why is it like this and not otherwise?
I say that if I say that about it, I will fall into an infinite regress.
Therefore, at the beginning of creation there exists something that “according to logic requires an explanation, but nevertheless does not have one.” The primary being is that law above. And thus I solved the problem of regress; I am left only with the problem of the low probability that this is the case.
That too is a possibility, no? It just has negligible probability, so we prefer to reject it. But it is not impossible.
Why is this conceptual solution preferable to saying that at the “top” stands something that simply does not require an explanation? In other words, why might this be the more logical solution?
Because although it has low probability (since there could have been a different law), the alternative is simply logically impossible. The feeling is that there can never be a thing about which one cannot ask, “Why is it not otherwise?” My feeling is that this concept is nonsense.
And when choosing between something with low probability and something that is logically irrational, I would seemingly choose the second option.
We really are not making progress. Basically what you are claiming is what Dawkins claims regarding the formation of life, that it is a successful accident. And I am saying that the possibility I propose is more reasonable. You claim that this possibility is unacceptable, and I do not understand what is wrong with it. This is not an entity about which one cannot ask why it is thus and not otherwise. One can ask, but the answer is that its nature is explained from within itself (like a logical tautology).
Beyond that, you write that a law is not a being and then write that it is the primary being that created everything. I really cannot conduct this strange discussion.
Excellent, the sentence:
“This is not an entity about which one cannot ask why it is thus and not otherwise. One can ask, but the answer is that its nature is explained from within itself (like a logical tautology).”
That is the kind of answer I was looking for.
Thanks.
Indeed, I noticed that a second after I sent it.
Still:
1. But something that always existed also falls into the problem of infinite regress, no? So seemingly, if we don’t use the principle of “it always existed” (as you wrote in the notebooks), then something that requires no cause also contradicts reason.
2. On the theoretical level, do you have an idea of something that requires no explanation? (Even a thing with all powers seemingly requires an explanation, because one can ask why it has all powers rather than limited power.)
Thanks.