Q&A: Tautological Laws of Physics and the Physico-Theological Argument
Tautological Laws of Physics and the Physico-Theological Argument
Question
Hello Rabbi Michi,
I have a question about a topic that, as far as I understand, is not addressed in the notebooks (or in Does God Play Dice). My apologies in advance if it is.
The physico-theological argument says that we see a complex system of laws and assume that it makes sense that it has a creator. We do not apply that same logic to the creator, on the understanding that the regress has to stop somewhere (at what is defined as being its own cause and reason), and since the creator is not part of our experience, we stop that line of reasoning with Him.
In a conversation with a friend, the following question came up:
Why shouldn’t we apply the same logic to the “theory of everything,” that one law of physics that is supposed to describe all the laws of physics together? That law is not part of our experience, so perhaps it too is structured in such a way that it is its own reason. And if that law really is its own reason, then it eliminates the need for a designer of its sub-laws (because they are properties of the general law).
Of course, there is no proof at all for this theory, but the question is why the thesis that the theory of everything is its own reason is preferable to the thesis of a designer. It answers the philosophical difficulty no less well.
I tried to attack this discussion from several directions (the original thesis was different; it was refined in order to answer the objections below):
– A law only describes an “existent,” and that existent would be the creator. I was answered — rightly — that this law would be a unification of all the laws of physics, and the existent it would describe would be the universe itself in all its parts. To identify that entity as the creator would amount to pantheism. After all, we have identified the creator with the laws of physics or nature (alone), and not with something beyond that. (Here we are not talking about a new law that is the reason for the other laws, in which case it really could be identified with a creator, but rather about including all the laws together.)
– I tried to attack the argument (in our earlier version) by saying that the theory multiplies entities and is not economical, but that objection is irrelevant in this formulation of the challenge. We are talking about one entity.
– I tried to attack the challenge from the direction that, based on what we know, the existing laws either are not their own reason at all, and so it is more reasonable to assume that there is something else that is its own reason. I was answered that a law of this kind (one that includes all the laws) is not part of our experience.
– I tried to attack the challenge from the fact that we see that all the sub-laws of this theory are not self-grounding, and therefore their union would not be either (some of them even contradict each other, after all…). I was answered that until you combine them all into one unit, you cannot know whether something is tautological or not (to my understanding there is some logic to that claim).
– I said that all the proposals made so far for a theory of everything are not tautologies, and he answered that all those proposals really do have difficulties in being that theory.
– We agreed that both of us understand that there has to be something that is its own reason, and we cannot know what it is. I was answered that as long as a law of physics could be that thing (and this seems at least like an equally weighted option), this proof has no significance at all.
Beyond that, seemingly the thesis of a creator is more wasteful: I need a creator in addition to the laws of physics, whereas he only needs a unified description of the laws of physics known to us (something that is needed anyway in order to resolve the contradiction between quantum mechanics and relativity).
What does the Rabbi say about all this? Does the Rabbi perhaps have an idea whether the idea of a creator is a preferable thesis to the one above?
Many thanks.
Answer
Hello.
First, I definitely do address pantheism in the second notebook.
Briefly, I would say that, as you wrote, a law solves nothing. Only if the law describes some existent can it be a solution, but then it turns out that this existent is God, and that is the cosmological and physico-theological proof (for the proof does not enter into the question of who or what He is by nature; it only proves the existence of such an existent).
Contrary to your suggestion, the universe as a whole cannot be that existent, for two reasons (which are related): 1. Because the universe is indeed an existent within our experience. It is made of perishable matter, and so there is no logic in thinking that it is its own cause. The universe as a whole is nothing more than the totality of the entities familiar to us. There is nothing here beyond them. 2. In fact, the pantheistic claim smuggles in the assumption that the universe is eternal, but the Big Bang rules out the eternity of the world.
Discussion on Answer
Hello Ishay.
You are right that the pantheistic claim is not identical to the claim that the world is eternal, but when pantheism is offered as an alternative solution to the cosmological argument — it definitely means that we are talking about an eternal world.
As for a God created without a creator, that is problematic, because one of the premises of the argument is that everything created requires a creator. You can of course make an exception, but then, as you wrote, you can make anything an exception. You can also say that at the basis of the world there was an existent that is indeed one of the kinds of entities familiar to us, except that specifically it was not created by someone/something else. The assumption at the foundation of the argument stems from scientific thinking, which assumes that familiar entities behave, and have always behaved, as we know them.
In any case, as I wrote in the notebooks, I do not think any argument leads to certainty, but at most to plausibility (as you also wrote here).
Regarding God, in any case I’m already making an exception: every existent I know was created except for Him, so if I’m making an exception already, I can just as well say that He was created without a creator. And I can say the same about the pantheistic God-world.
The problem with the pantheistic argument is that it isn’t clear on what basis they distinguish between the parts of the world and the world as a whole.
It goes beyond that. Its totality is nothing but the collection of its components. The assumption that the totality is in itself something else (even if it has the same characteristics as the components) is what seems problematic to me. That is aside from the question whether something can be said about the whole that cannot be said about the components. I dealt with this in the second notebook, and explained that if one sees the whole as something additional (as in an organism), then one essentially returns to the conclusion that there is indeed God in my sense.
He really does discuss it there, but that’s less the direction that answers this for me.
For our purposes, in your opinion could the “existent” be the law described by the unified law of physics — could that be the creator?
1. After all, it’s a law that describes the behavior of everything in the universe (matter at different scales, energy, dimensions, etc.). It seems strange to me to identify such a thing with the creator… because that law describes many “existents” (say, dimensions), not one single existent, no?
2. Suppose we say that this law describes one single existent. That would basically mean that the creator’s properties are simply the laws of physics, and nothing beyond that. Isn’t that just giving the laws of physics (in a comprehensive sense) the name “creator”? Isn’t that itself the definition of pantheists?
The argument shows that there exists a basic existent from which the entire universe was created. It is what underlies the fundamental laws of physics. That does not mean that those laws are a description of it, and certainly not a full description of it. As I said, this is not the universe itself, but another existent that is the source of the laws governing the universe. The laws of physics are not (necessarily) a description of it. The claim is that they derive from it (it legislated them).
I don’t think the universe has to be eternal for pantheism, and the same goes for God. The idea that it was created without needing a creator is strange, but the idea that it is eternal is also strange — the whole point of God is to solve the problem of something that wasn’t created. I also prefer an eternal God to a God created without a creator, but both solve the problem of the creation of the world familiar to us by hanging it on something unfamiliar that, in a strange way, does not need to be created.
So in my opinion your first argument really does refute pantheism, but your second argument only says that it is less plausible than God.