Okay, it seems you understood not badly.
The cosmological argument and the physico-theological one, which appears as an additional layer, already appear in Duties of the Hearts and elsewhere.
The list of basic arguments is:
The Kalam: if everything has a cause and there cannot be an infinite chain of causes, then there must be a first cause for creation.
The physico-theological argument: if creation is complex and beautiful, then it requires a composer.
Leibniz: if creation is contingent, then it requires a sufficient reason (Leibniz, and as far as I recall some attribute this to Maimonides).

And to this Spinoza answered: “Indeed!” There really is a cause for creation, and it is creation itself; although it is complex, it is also perfect, and it is God.
And according to his approach one could add that, even though there is apparently no meaningful way to prove this, there are phenomena that can lend it support, and these are called the conservation laws.
1. What does the Rabbi think about the conservation laws? After all, when we try to grasp an entity that is a necessary being, we assume that it is an entity that cannot be destroyed. And the conservation laws do show this to some degree or another.

2. Also, I wanted to challenge the pantheistic view: to what extent does it really answer the arguments? After all, insofar as Spinoza accepts the arguments, since when does one answer by saying that the universe is a necessary being? The assumption is that the universe requires a cause. And if he does not accept these proofs, then why innovate and say that the universe is God?

3. Also, if we take the cosmological proof as an example: if every point in the universe requires a cause, can one really say that the universe as a whole does not require a cause? This resembles the claim of strong emergence, and people also bring something similar regarding the oath at Sinai: even though the generations changed, the oath remained upon the collective body of people as a whole.
And thus one could say that the atheists are being consistent with their materialist approach regarding consciousness, which was created through strong emergence?
But even if we accept the general concept of the possibility of strong emergence, it is not clear that it can save the day in our case. For even if it has the power to create a new phenomenon, can it also protect the whole world from needing an additional cause because of a phenomenon created by something that itself requires a cause? It does not sound reasonable that a phenomenon should arise stronger than its own cause.
What does the Rabbi think about these things?

I’m sorry, but I truly still don’t understand what you’re asking. I again suggest that you choose just one question and formulate it properly. Clarify what the claim is and what exactly you’re asking me.

Okay, let’s start with the first one.
I identify pantheism as answering the proofs for the existence of God by saying that the world is God, and therefore it does not require a prior cause; rather, the world is its own cause and its own reason. Usually, when we think about an entity that is its own reason, as mentioned in the Gate of Unity, it is an entity that cannot be destroyed. That’s not a bad characteristic for an entity to have if it is its own reason, or at least its own cause.
And I think the conservation laws show, to some extent, that the world does fit the characteristic of being its own cause.
What does the Rabbi think about that?
Also, the question always comes up: why is there something rather than nothing? And if I remember correctly, Hawking really did claim something somewhat similar, that the world is a kind of free lunch, because the quantity of particles and antiparticles in the universe cancels each other out, so the total charge is zero.

Identifying the world with God is nothing but semantics. Which means the “therefore” is not clear. What you are claiming is that the world as a whole does not require a cause, regardless of whether it is called God or not. That is an interesting question, and I am not inclined to accept it. Since the world is nothing but a collection of things, each of which requires a cause, it does not seem reasonable to me that the whole collection would not require a cause. And from the opposite angle: if the whole exists, why should one need a cause for the particulars that compose it?
As for the conservation laws, that is a more complicated question. First, it seems to me that the conservation laws establish a relation between objects, but not their eternity. If all objects were to become energy, for example, I would not call that an eternal universe. Beyond that—and here we are already moving into the physico-theological proof—the conservation laws themselves are part of the world, and the question is what caused them. And even if they are eternal, the question is what their reason is (the principle of sufficient reason applies even to eternal entities). I dealt with all this in my notebooks.
I also responded there to Hawking’s claim. The conservation laws that determine a cancellation between charges are the product of someone/something. And the coming-into-being itself also requires explanation, despite the conservation laws. This is the discussion I had regarding the cosmology of Anaximander.

Indeed, I agree; I wrote that later in my remarks above, that they simply give up the assumption of the proof and do not accept the conclusion.
What you say here can be understood in two ways:
A. You are claiming that because every thing in the universe requires a prior cause, there must be a first cause that is its own cause; let’s call it “God.” (For example: a person is born because of his parents, his parents because of the monkey, the monkey because of the fish, the fish because of the Big Bang, and the Big Bang because of God.)
B. Because every thing requires a cause, the universe too, as the totality of things, requires a cause on the analogical level—as if to say that if every part of a wall is made of concrete, then the whole wall is made of concrete.
At the beginning of your remarks it sounded as though you hold like A, but from the opposite angle that you wrote later it sounds as though you hold like B, and if so then of course the issue of the Fallacy of Composition arises.

Regarding the conservation laws, I didn’t understand the claim at all as to why “if all objects were to become energy, for example, I would not call that an eternal universe.”
Also, we usually understand laws of nature as descriptions of interaction between entities, but conservation laws—if they are part of the world, and according to you the world is nothing but the totality of its particulars—then how do they preserve the world if they are part of the objects in the world? Unless they are not actual entities, or at least part of the property of being itself—that “transparent box” that allows the existence of objects.
But if they are eternal and they are actual entities, then don’t they fit the category of entities that are their own reason?

I didn’t understand the difference between the two possibilities, nor what the Fallacy of Composition is.

You can call energy an eternal universe if you want—that’s just semantics—but the universe as it stands before us still requires an explanation. That is already physico-theology.
I didn’t understand your remark about the conservation laws. Of course they are not entities. They are characteristics of the world, its properties (a description of the way it operates). Precisely for that reason, the laws cannot be the cause of anything. The laws only describe the process, and whatever brings it about is the cause.

The Fallacy of Composition is the claim that if every part in a system has property X, then the system as a whole also has property X. Like if every person stands up in a soccer stadium to watch the game and sees well, that doesn’t mean that if all the people stand up they’ll all see well. Or if every grain of sand is light, that doesn’t mean that a sack of sand is light, and so on.
That same thing seemed to come out of the end of your remarks: that if every object in the universe has a cause, then the universe as a whole has a cause. And if so, the difficulty of the Fallacy of Composition arises. And the sufficient reason also won’t always help here; it depends on the causal explanation.
On the other hand, at the beginning of your remarks you meant that every thing in the universe has a cause, and therefore there must be a first cause that caused the rest of the causes to operate. Not a cause for the universe as a whole, but a cause for its particulars.

Regarding the conservation laws: if they are characteristics, how do they preserve Anaximander’s particles so that they emerge properly? After all, there was nothing to preserve before the particle existed.

What you call the Fallacy of Composition is not relevant here. If every particular in the world has a cause, then that collection of causes (which may all be one cause) is something outside the world. And therefore it is the cause of the world as a whole—not in the sense that the whole is something different, but the whole as the union of the particulars. By the way, there is also an opposite fallacy: the global property characterizes all the particulars, as in John Searle’s example of liquidity (a single water molecule is not liquid). This is where the idea of emergence grows from.
I didn’t understand the other side, but it doesn’t seem to matter in light of what I explained here.
They are characteristics of the universe (and not of the particles specifically), and they describe processes within it. And indeed, the laws are not causal agents; they describe the activity of those causal agents.