And in connection with the physicotheological proof? Because the cosmological one I understood very well, honored Rabbi.

But the problem is that even in the physicotheological context you answer the same way as in the cosmological one.

In the physicotheological context I say that laws require a lawgiver (the principle of causality or sufficient reason). That’s all.

Here, for example, the Rabbi says that God does not need a creator (with respect to the physicotheological proof) because God’s complexity was not created at any point in time (unlike the universe, which is not primordial). But if the laws are primordial (or some material state from which the laws emerged is primordial), then it is not clear how they are different from God.
A quote from one of the commenters whom the Rabbi endorsed: “Since the first existent was never created, our logic which says that every complex thing requires a composer does not apply to it, because that logic speaks only about the entities familiar to us (all of which were created at some point in time) and not about the first existent (since it was not created); something that was not created does not need a creator.”
But if there were a primordial material state, then the answer is unclear.

https://mikyab.net/%D7%A9%D7%95%D7%AA/%D7%93%D7%91%D7%A8-%D7%A9%D7%91%D7%A0%D7%99%D7%A1%D7%99%D7%95%D7%A0%D7%99%D7%A0%D7%95-%D7%91%D7%9E%D7%97%D7%91%D7%A8%D7%AA-%D7%94%D7%A9%D7%9C%D7%99%D7%A9%D7%99%D7%AA/

But in Does God Play Dice (p. 220 and on) (in response to Dawkins’s counter-argument from the Boeing), different reasons are given:
1) God is not material, and therefore it cannot be said that He is composite.
2) Only the universe requires a creator because its complexity was created at some point in time, but if the laws are primordial, then the complexity was embedded in them from the outset and does not require a creator.

Besides, if the laws are primordial, it is not clear why not say that they do not require a creator either (since they are primordial), and where does the insight come from that God is “His own reason”? Why can’t that be said about the universe’s initial material state?

And why not God too, then?

And one more thing: does the Rabbi want to distinguish between laws, which require a lawgiver, and some entity, which does not necessarily require a creator?
Is the claim that in laws, the order, complexity, and coordination exist, whereas regarding some entity you cannot ask that? And why?

As stated, I am conducting discussions like this in parallel in several threads, in addition to the whole host of questions. I can’t keep repeating again and again things I’ve already explained, because I don’t have the time. Therefore I won’t address contradictions in my view here, if there are any, and I’ll answer briefly on the questions themselves (all of which I have already answered and explained).
Laws are not entities. And if they are entities, then one can certainly say that they are God.
Even primordial things require a reason (= the principle of sufficient reason), but not a creator. Only something novel requires a creator.
The matter of the universe is an existent within our experience, and such things are not self-caused but are created by someone or something.
As stated, all this is explained well and fully in the notebooks and here in various threads. I will not answer further.

Hello Rabbi,
The Rabbi argues here, as in the book Does God Play Dice, that one can claim that the laws of nature are entities and they are God.

1. I wanted to know what it means to call them an entity, as opposed to a “law” (what is a law of nature anyway).
2. You wrote that Dawkins refrains from making this claim because he understands the philosophical meaning of such a claim.
I’d be happy if you could expand a bit on what exactly that meaning is. After all, the laws of nature couldn’t be otherwise… it’s like a primordial computer stuck on the same law. Where is God here?

1. What needs explaining here? A law describes something, whereas an entity is an existing object. The law of gravity describes the attraction of bodies with mass to one another. The force of gravity is the entity that produces that attraction. Laws cannot produce anything, because they only describe things. Only entities can do or produce something.
2. I don’t know what you are referring to here. I don’t remember the entire book by heart.

1. Thank you very much, Rabbi.
2. The Rabbi wrote in the book in a footnote that one could raise an objection to the cosmological argument: that the laws are entities, always existed, and therefore would be called God.
(That is, this God is within our experience, by the way.)
And you said that you regard yourself as exempt from reflections on this approach because not even Dawkins raised it, since he too understood the implications.
I’d be happy if the Rabbi would explain what those huge implications are in understanding that the laws are an entity in the context of the nature of God.

Page in the book? Footnote number?

I don’t have the book next to me right now, Rabbi, to check the page,
but footnote 107.

Page 162, footnote 107.

There are no “huge” implications in what I wrote. I don’t understand what is unclear there. Just read what is written. If the laws are entities and they brought about the world, then they are God. Either way, the conclusion is that there exists some entity that brought about the world.
God, even in this sense, is not within our experience, because no one has ever seen these entities, and no one knows their nature.