Q&A: The History of the Palestinian People and Electric Shavers
The History of the Palestinian People and Electric Shavers
Question
Hello Rabbi,
Recently a book called The History of the Palestinian People was published, containing 120 blank pages. The right in general, and the Religious Zionist public in particular, are absolutely delighted about it on Facebook, and I’m a bit uneasy about the whole thing.
I don’t understand whether this is really the core of the dispute. I assume partly yes, because if one accepts that there is such a people, and assumes that every people deserves a state, then the Palestinian people deserves a state. But on the other hand, that isn’t our responsibility, as opposed to the claim that “people do not deserve to be occupied,” which is a claim that is harder to deal with in principle, even if practically one can argue that the time is not yet ripe.
In addition, I don’t think that 120 blank pages is reasonable, because even if the history of the Palestinian people began in 1967, that is still a crucible of nation-formation not essentially different from the formation of the Jewish people in Egypt.
I wanted to hear the Rabbi’s opinion.
And on a related topic, what is your opinion regarding electric shavers? On the face of it, it seems that most authorities permit them, but on the other hand, in matters of Torah law one follows the stringent view. And that would be fine if there were one straightforward rationale to permit them. Do you think there is such a rationale?
Answer
Hello Elad.
I hadn’t heard about this amusing book. It is, of course, a joke, and there is no need to take it too seriously. But like any joke, there is something true and very correct in it. Even if we recognize this people as a people (I do not accept the view that every group that wants recognition is entitled to such recognition), if it was formed after the establishment of the State of Israel, then it must realize its rights not at our expense. Let them go to Uganda. We also do not claim rights over Egypt. At the next stage, the Haredim will declare themselves a people, and the people of Metula or Akhziv (of Eli Avivi) will declare a state, and so on. When there is an existing state, no people that arises within it can demand independent rights inside it. Let them separate to another place and establish a state for themselves there.
This is on the level of rights. There are, of course, practical considerations, but the question was not about them.
An electric shaver does not remove the hairs all the way to the root. What is wrong with that reasoning? And the rule that in matters of Torah law one follows the stringent view applies only where you are in doubt. If you have a position of your own, then those who disagree are irrelevant from your perspective.
Discussion on Answer
I didn’t write “from the root” but “all the way to the root.” A machine that cuts all the way to the root is indeed forbidden like a razor.
By the way, as I recall there are other rationales too (the rotating blade in the machine is like scissors and not in the manner of a razor. But I haven’t checked it now).
Thanks for the answer.
The Rabbi wrote that the permission for an electric shaver is because it does not cut all the way to the root.
I looked into the topic a bit, and I’d be happy for an explanation of the lenient ruling.
Regarding the use of an electric shaver, the passage in Makkot indicates that for it to be forbidden it must meet two criteria: shaving and destruction.
The definition of shaving: according to Rivan and Tosafot, the definition of forbidden shaving is whether it is normal to use this implement for shaving, whereas according to Maimonides and Meiri, shaving means an implement whose mode of action is cutting. According to both of these approaches, it is clear that from the standpoint of shaving there is no permission here (though one could still discuss it from the standpoint of destruction).
However, according to Nachmanides, the criterion for prohibition is an implement capable of producing the result of cutting a large amount at once, and according to him it really can be permitted.
The definition of destruction: according to Rivan, what is not considered destructive is where the hair is not cut next to its base as with a razor, and similarly in Tosafot and the Rosh, who wrote that with scissors one does not remove the hair from its base and root (as I understand it, all the way to the root), and in Nimukei Yosef the definition of destruction is where the hairs are no longer visible.
If so, from the standpoint of destruction, in practice after shaving the skin is smooth, similar to a razor, and as I understand the medieval authorities (Rishonim), this is included under destruction.
Is the small gap that may exist between a razor and a machine (I am not familiar with the reality of a razor) enough to define it as not cutting next to the root? The difference is not visible to the eye and seems very insignificant; and can one say this purely on logical grounds without support, against five Torah prohibitions?
Rabbi Rabinovitch, who permitted it, relied on Nachmanides regarding the definition of shaving (and it was obvious to him that there is destruction), whereas Rabbi Rappaport wrote to permit it based on his understanding of HaKetav VeHaKabbalah, that the definition of shaving depends on the mode of action and not the result (contrary to the medieval authorities, who made it depend on the result), and he wanted to permit it because it is not considered shaving unless it is done in one pass over the face. This is different from Nachmanides: Nachmanides discusses that this is not destruction, whereas HaKetav VeHaKabbalah says it is not shaving.
As for what the Tzomet Institute discusses, namely the mode of action being similar to scissors—even they themselves admit on the micro level that the blade can cut even without the second part, or at least they are doubtful about this. Still, on the macro level it looks like scissors, and from that perspective there is room to be lenient. But all this is based on the idea that the prohibition depends on the action and not the result, which does not appear to be the view of the medieval authorities and is an innovation of HaKetav VeHaKabbalah (which many rejected, and I have not elaborated here).
I would be glad for your response, thank you.
I am not well-versed in this topic.
A razor also doesn’t remove hairs from the root, especially if one shaves with the grain rather than against it, as people recommend.
I asked about the reasoning because if there is a rationale you are convinced by, then there is no need to be stringent, but the rationales here remind me of the arguments about orlah regarding eggplant.