Q&A: Popper
Popper
Question
I saw that the Rabbi wrote that no one really takes Popper’s claims seriously anymore regarding the idea that science can only refute theories and nothing more. I wanted to ask whether that criterion too, for distinguishing between science and pseudoscience, is no longer valid. In the Rabbi’s opinion, what is the way to distinguish between a scientific theory and one that is not?
Answer
I don’t know if literally no one does, but it seems to me that many regard his criterion as too strong. When there is one refutation, we do not therefore throw out a well-established theory (as Kuhn wrote, a paradigm is replaced only when there is a large enough accumulation of problems). Beyond that, refutation always involves background assumptions, and therefore it is almost always possible to propose ad hoc solutions and say that the theory was not really refuted in this case.
As a rule, it is hard to give a sharp definition for complex concepts like science. It is a combination of various criteria in non-sharp proportions. The concepts have to be clear, the content of the claims has to be precise—that is, what exactly they rule out—and from that it follows that they must yield predictions that can be tested. It needs to be sufficiently complex (the theory that if you hit someone it hurts is scientific, but it is not really complex, and I would not call it scientific), and it must explain a sufficient number of empirical phenomena. That is more or less it.
Thank you very much.