Question

Hello Rabbi,
How many times I’ve heard, both from the Rabbi and from many other places, about the supposed debate between Popper and Kuhn over the nature of a scientific theory. But in practice I don’t understand why there is a debate at all. It sounds as though they are talking on different planes altogether (philosophical versus psychological).
Popper defines what a scientific theory is even before looking at the laboratory: a theory must be falsifiable in order to count as scientific. He sets out a metaphysical-philosophical guideline: what defines the boundaries of science, what distinguishes “real” science from a story or metaphysics that has no potential for testing. In practice, I understand that we do not always act this way, but ideally this is how one ought to proceed.
Kuhn, by contrast, gives more of a psychological-sociological description. He describes how scientists actually think and behave: within an existing paradigm they “solve puzzles” rather than immediately looking for possibilities of falsification. He explains where the need to break into a new paradigm comes from (“crisis,” “anomaly”)—it is a matter of communal and psychological dynamics, not of an abstract criterion. From his perspective, the decision to abandon a theory is a gradual process, dependent on methodologies accepted within the paradigm.
What does the Rabbi think?