Question

It is well known what our master Karl Popper established: that a scientific theory is a theory that can be falsified.
He further added that a scientific theory can never be proven, only subjected to a test of falsification, and at most the falsification can be ruled out. (And there is no difference between a theory that explains existing phenomena and a theory that predicts them in advance; the theory is not more confirmed when it explains additional things.)
Now, everyone’s intuition says that a test confirms a theory and does not merely prevent its falsification.
And while reading the first book in the trilogy, with Heaven’s help I was moved to explain the depth of the matter. The Rabbi brought there that if the number six comes up on a die many times, that is a sign that the die is not fair. So too, if any sequence appears that is meaningful in the eyes of the observer—even though any particular sequence is statistically unlikely, it is still one of many possible sequences—yet in a case where there is a number that is meaningful in the eyes of the observer, this is considered objectively unlikely.
Accordingly, one could say that when I formulate a scientific theory and put it to a test, unlike a theory that explains existing phenomena, the experiment tests a prediction, such that if a result is realized that is meaningful in my eyes, that is a sign that the “die” is not fair and that there is a law causing it to operate דווקא in this way. And unlike a theory that explains existing phenomena, where there may be other ways to explain them, once I have formulated a theory and expected a certain result, the expectation enters as an additional datum and raises the probability that the theory is correct.
Are these things correct?