Q&A: Scientific Theory, Correlation, and the Principle of Falsification
Scientific Theory, Correlation, and the Principle of Falsification
Question
Have a good week!
1. How can one formulate a scientific theory, given that: (a) even if there are statistical data, there will always only be correlation, so who determined in which direction to take the cause? Must one necessarily rely on logic/intuition even though they are not empirical? And after all, as Mark Twain said, the world owes us nothing. (b) We do not observe causality itself, etc., so who says that science works?
Seemingly, Popper’s principle of falsification (and Hempel’s?) answers this by determining that an acceptable theory is only one that stands open to falsification. But that raises a difficulty for me: if so, it would follow that it is never possible to formulate a true theory that indeed states and reflects the truth, because we have not checked that it is never falsified. For example, even Newton’s theory was discovered by Einstein not to be exact?
So my question is: insofar as it is indeed impossible to formulate a true simulation of reality, how does science nevertheless work?
2. I thought perhaps one could say that even if Newton was indeed refuted, that does not mean he was not right. Since he did describe the laws that govern non-atomic physics. He simply did not discover the theory of everything?
That is, is it correct to say that he discovered at least part of the truth, or insofar as he was refuted, was he not right at all? If so, then how was non-atomic mechanics nevertheless correct?
Put differently: is it correct to say that he was right in a non-absolute way, or does it turn out that he was entirely wrong (even though science worked)? And only by chance we were unable to refute his theory until Einstein?
3. If so, perhaps one can determine that there is no possibility at all of interpreting reality, which is chaotic, and all of science is merely an interpretation by human beings in a particular period/culture?
Thank you very much!
Answer
1. First of all, as a matter of fact, it works. So I do not understand what is meant by “who says science works.” You are raising the foundational questions of philosophy of science.
2. This is semantics.
3. I did not understand.
Discussion on Answer
P.S. I see that my comment is also relevant to question 1.
David, according to you, does a “useful explanation” not describe at least part of “the truth about the mechanism of the universe”? If not, how does it work and make use possible?
No. A useful explanation can be completely mistaken about the description of the truth. When I was little, I thought that when people get married, children arrive. The act of the wedding itself (say, the breaking of the glass) gives birth. Is that an accurate description of the causal connections? Is it at least part of the mechanism? Does breaking a glass bring children?
By the way, modern physics also presumably “gets it wrong”; it does not describe everything, and there is even a clash between the major theories that “describe” it.
At the end of the day, as Michi said, this is semantics. If you want, you can call it partial truth. You could argue that usefulness itself is called partial truth…
David, you ask whether breaking a glass has causality with respect to the birth of children? The answer is that, precisely speaking, no. But one cannot ignore that in a certain context there really is a connection between them (in certain cultures it is a necessary condition. And just as you might say, on the other hand, that one can fertilize not by means of sex either—if we take it to an extreme, cloning—therefore sex is not causality for a child).
And my claim about this was: does Newtonian physics describe at least certain connections truly, or not at all? Like a child who remembers that at weddings they serve schnitzel, and understands when older that there is hardly even an accidental correlation there (as opposed to the breaking of the glass, which although it does not constitute a cause, nevertheless sometimes accompanies childbirth).
Yes indeed. I said that at the end of the day you can play with definitions.
By the way, the example of in vitro fertilization does not mean that sex is not more than that. Sex is not a side effect of the conception process; fertilization by a different method is simply playing with the mechanism and its causes. Unlike cases where an explanation really misses the truth, like with the glass, which is not part of the mechanism in any way and is only a marginal side effect.
Cloning*, not in vitro.
Regarding 2,
it is childish to say “he was right” or “he was wrong”; nobody is that naive. Even with relativity and quantum theory, the right attitude is “a useful explanation,” not “absolute truth about the mechanism of the universe.”
If so, classical mechanics is usually useful, and on very small or very large scales there are other useful explanations.