Q&A: The Euthyphro Dilemma and Jewish Law
The Euthyphro Dilemma and Jewish Law
Question
Hello,
Are you aware of anyone who has written about the Euthyphro dilemma in the context of Jewish law?
I would appreciate a relevant reference.
Thank you very much,
Answer
It is not clear to me why this is specifically connected to Jewish law.
See Avi Sagi’s book, Judaism: Between Religion and Morality, which is entirely devoted to this question. Also his article (with Danny Statman?) in the collection they edited, Between Religion and Morality (they discuss the approach of Rabbi Michael Avraham — morality as the command of God — and argue that it is almost impossible to find such an absolute approach in Jewish thought). In my personal opinion, part of their analysis of the sources is quite flawed (in addition, there are no halakhic sources there, only philosophical sources about Jewish law). I also think there are problems in the conceptual analysis, but this is not the place.
Discussion on Answer
Hello Rabbi Y.,
I am doubtful about this inquiry on the conceptual level. In my view, the Euthyphronic question can be asked only with respect to morality, not with respect to Jewish law. With respect to morality, there is a moral obligation, and there is room to ask whether it precedes its appearance in the Torah (I am careful not to say “command”; see below) or not. But a command certainly exists only by virtue of a command, not prior to it. That is the difference between morality and Jewish law: morality is God’s expectation, whereas Jewish law is command.
These matters are connected to Rabbi Elhanan Wasserman’s article on repentance, where he distinguishes between two aspects in every commandment or transgression: the command and the essence.
Therefore, with regard to Jewish law there is room to ask a different question (and not the Euthyphro question): is there some rationale underlying the command (the purpose of the commandment or prohibition, the essence), or is the prohibition constituted by the command and nothing more. This is essentially the question of the reasons for the commandments, which has already been discussed exhaustively. I do not see what there is to discuss in the Euthyphro question in the halakhic context beyond the question of the reasons for the commandments.
In any case, good luck and goodbye.
Could I please have a link to Rabbi Elhanan Wasserman’s article on repentance? Where was it published?
https://drive.google.com/open?id=0BwJAdMjYRm7IdE0xajcyOWZ2Rm8
The connection to Jewish law (even apart from morality): is pork forbidden / beef permitted because God commanded it, or did God forbid eating pork / permit eating beef because pork is forbidden / beef is permitted? Is a corpse a source of ritual impurity because God commanded it, or did God command corpse-impurity because a corpse imparts ritual impurity?
Off the top of my head, it seems to me there are many primary sources in both directions. And not only philosophical sources, but halakhic sources as well, as I hinted in the examples.
I tend to see the Euthyphro dilemma as a paradigmatic dilemma of grounding relations, based on the assumption (which perhaps could be dealt with) that grounding relations are anti-symmetrical. This dilemma can be applied to many other things, and not דווקא to the relationship between religion and morality.
I am looking for someone who writes not about “religion and morality,” which is very closely tied to Euthyphro, but about Jewish law and the command of God in the spirit of Euthyphro.