Q&A: Homosexuals Living Together
Homosexuals Living Together
Question
Dear Rabbi Dr. Michael Abraham, greetings,
I should begin by saying that I am not homosexual. I do not know whether that is to my regret or my joy, but if God determined it that way then I am glad. In any case, out of concern for homosexuals among the Jewish people, for the moral and social strength of society, and as a light unto the nations, I am occupied with the issue of homosexuality (and I also discuss it with Rabbi Yuval Cherlow, in whose hesder yeshiva I studied).
I am trying to argue for a halakhic permission for homosexuals to live together for the sake of parenthood, but with maximal sexual distancing. I would be happy to hear your opinion on the matter.
From a halakhic perspective—
The argument is based mainly on the passage about “when there is no other way,” from which it seems that a person is permitted to walk on a road where women are washing clothes, but he must force himself not to look.
“And shuts his eyes from looking upon evil” — Rabbi Hiyya bar Abba said: this refers to one who does not look at women when they are standing over the wash. What are the circumstances? If there is another road, he is wicked; if there is no other road, he is under compulsion. Actually, it is a case where there is no other road, and nevertheless he is required to force himself. (Bava Batra 57b)
In other words: if there is a shared purpose, one may take the risk of erotic stimulus. And if there is a shared purpose of parenthood, that indeed is a shared purpose.
I stress that I am talking about living together without trying to achieve erotic intimacy (and also trying as much as possible to overcome the desire as much as one can), but only for the sake of parenthood, which presumably does involve romantic love. In my opinion romantic love is not forbidden, as seems implied by Ezer Mikodesh— “As for what is written in the name of the Ari of blessed memory regarding one who entertained thoughts and distracted his mind from his tefillin, saying ‘lest I touch in vain,’ it appears that this referred to immersion in thought and the arousal of desire in his soul, by imagining in his mind the act of that desire in actual deed — which is the kind of thing that leaves an imprint on the traits of the soul to become aroused toward that which may, God forbid, lead to actual forbidden sexual relations, and also because of nocturnal impurity” (Even HaEzer 23:3)
As for the prohibition of seclusion—
1. I ask you: it is said that Jews were not suspected of male homosexual intercourse. Even if we know that two men are homosexual, does that mean they are suspected of male homosexual intercourse? Could they not spend their whole lives having relations only from the front? I am not sure there is reason to say that the statement that they are not suspected does not apply to two homosexuals if they can have relations only from the front. And regarding the prohibition of wasting seed, no prohibition of seclusion was stated. For example, most rabbis maintain that there is no law of seclusion with the internet…
2. Regarding seclusion, in the earlier halakhic literature we do not find a prohibition on two men or two women being together. This is an extension that perhaps some people think should be made in recent times, when the subject of homosexuality has become more openly discussed. According to the earlier halakhic tradition of our time, there is no prohibition of seclusion with the same sex, only between a man and a woman. In any event, let us examine two cases—
A. Seclusion of two women with one man is forbidden. Seclusion of two men with one woman is permitted. From here it follows that a woman does not serve as a safeguard for a man and a woman, while a man does serve as a safeguard for a man and a woman. Therefore there is no basis to forbid two men from living together because of the prohibition of seclusion, and the reason is that a man guards against transgression.
B. Suppose we say that a man serves as a safeguard only for a pair of whom he himself is not part, but that two men as an exclusive pair are forbidden because there is no one to safeguard them. But in the case of one man with two women, one woman is alone, and nevertheless it is forbidden and she does not safeguard. From here it follows that the reason is not that there is an individual outside the pair who serves as a safeguard.
The common denominator between them is that where there are two men, they serve as a safeguard. A woman does not safeguard, because “women are light-minded” (“…because women are light-minded and cover for one another and are not embarrassed before one another” — Ritva; and see the article http://www.oranim.ac.il/sites/heb/sitecollectionimages/documents/hamidrasha/nashim/parshanut-feminist/israeli-isurei-yichud.pdf and the opinions of Rabbi Steinsaltz and Rabbi Amit Kula there). Therefore the prohibition should not apply to two men in any case. As for “women rubbing together,” one could open a separate discussion, but I have not dealt with it much, and in any case it is not at all certain that it falls under the category of forbidden sexual relations, but rather under “licentiousness,” and the question is what exactly counts as licentiousness; I have not yet investigated that much.
And a question for thought— are homosexuals forbidden to live together in the same apartment despite everything I wrote, whereas a man and his menstruating wife are permitted, and they only have to separate the beds somewhat? (After I heard the comparison between homosexuals living together and living with the neighbor’s wife…)
And here is an argument not only to permit homosexuals living together, but even to encourage it from a halakhic standpoint, if they can avoid male homosexual intercourse and would only waste seed together—
From an ethical standpoint, and also from an additional halakhic argument (according to Sefer Hasidim), regarding the ethical claim — it seems to me that failing through wasting seed with a homosexual partner is a “preferable” failure to failing through wasting seed in front of media.
In my opinion the religious public has lost its bearings on this issue. The prohibition of wasting seed has a clear rationale, unlike the way it is presented — as though God almost maliciously imposed it on us for no reason. Presenting it as forbidden simply because of “holiness,” full stop, with no reason we can understand, distorts the entire service of God. Someone who consumes pornographic media is encouraging prostitution (just as someone who consumes food from animals encourages cruelty to animals). A homosexual couple who waste seed within their relationship are committing a halakhic failure, but ethically it is incomparably more positive than wasting seed through consuming pornographic media, which causes exploitation and enslavement of human beings within the circle of prostitution, sinking into drugs, and terrible things. Wasting seed in front of media has something of prostitution in it, according to Maimonides, Laws of the Foundations of the Torah ch. 5, halakhah 12: “[9] One who set his eyes on a woman and became lovesick and was close to death, and the doctors said there is no cure for him unless she submits to him — even if she were unmarried, and even merely to speak with him from behind a fence — we do not instruct this; rather let him die and we do not instruct that he may speak with her from behind a fence, lest the daughters of Israel be rendered ownerless and these matters lead to breaches in forbidden sexual relations.” And what difference does it make whether it is behind a fence or behind a camera, if it encourages prostitution on a public scale among homosexuals who consume pornographic media when they could instead fail “only” in wasting seed with a partner?
And obviously, if one fears that he is likely to commit a severe sexual transgression, one should prefer the lighter one; and on this Sefer Hasidim §176 says— There was an incident of one who asked: if his inclination overpowers him and he fears lest he sin by lying with a married woman, or with his menstruating wife, or with other forbidden sexual partners, may he emit his seed so as not to sin? He was answered: at that moment he should emit it, for if it is impossible otherwise, it is better that he emit semen than that he sin with a woman. But he requires atonement: let him sit in ice during the winter days or fast forty days in the summer days. And the Chelkat Mechokek, Beit Shmuel, and Chokhmat Shlomo ruled likewise (with Chokhmat Shlomo emphasizing that this is about weighing the relative severity of transgressions).
And if there is still the question that seed is being emitted in any case, he can put on a condom and the seed will be nullified before it actually exits, and in that way he would violate only the prohibition of erotic thoughts according to Tzofnat Pa’aneach.
And if that is not enough, I know a method by which one can reach orgasm even without erection of the organ, and the seed and blood are prevented from entering the organ; rather the seed returns to the urinary tract and only comes out later after being nullified in the urine, and in that case there is certainly only the prohibition of erotic thoughts. I would be happy to send you an explanation of it in another email soon.
From an ideological perspective—
Regarding the verse “and cling to his wife”—
it says, “Therefore a man shall leave his father and his mother,” just as “Therefore those who speak in proverbs say: Come to Heshbon.” In the plain sense of the verse, this is describing a common reality, not imposing a normative obligation. (The midrash about “those who rule over their inclination” is not the plain meaning.) Or “Therefore it is said: Like Nimrod, a mighty hunter before the Lord,” or “And a man from there answered and said: And who is their father? Therefore it became a proverb: Is Saul also among the prophets?” — and there are more such examples; I have not gone through the entire Hebrew Bible (Tanakh).
The verse is directed toward marriage for the sake of having children. It speaks of cleaving in order that the man and his wife become “one flesh.” In Pesikta Zutarta on Genesis 2:24 there is almost a proof to the contrary, that a romantic relationship between men is not excluded: “And they shall become one flesh — this excludes beast, animal, bird, and male homosexual intercourse, for they do not become one flesh and there is no fruitfulness and multiplication from them.” Was there ever any reason to think we would weave a romantic relationship with an animal? And it does not say simply “male,” but rather the midrash specifically narrows the problem to “male homosexual intercourse.” In other words: there is no contradiction here to romantic feeling toward a male, only an obligation regarding becoming one flesh, which is the child.
That is, one must marry in order to have children, and within that framework there must be cleaving. The cleaving is not an obligation in and of itself. As for the obligation to marry, I will discuss it later in the email, but already here I wanted to emphasize that there is no obligation “to cleave.”
Also regarding what the midrash said about “You shall not do as the practice of the land of Egypt,” namely that a man married a man and a woman married a woman — marriage can be understood in two ways, and my “proposal” of homosexuals living together while trying with all their strength not to come to erotic intimacy is not included in them.
A. Humanly
B. Religiously
A. According to the first possibility, we are speaking of a couple-bond in Egypt which, both according to the context of the verse in Leviticus — in the matter of forbidden sexual relations — and according to its placement in Maimonides — in the matter of women rubbing together — is connected to a sexual relationship. Therefore the attempt to say that a shared foster/adoptive relationship of raising a child by two men counts as the “marriage” of Egypt seems strange to me. It is also hard to argue that “society is forbidden to recognize a pair as a couple.” That is a very strange prohibition. A “prohibition on recognizing” something is almost unknown to me in Jewish law. Society simply organizes itself for certain purposes (such as raising a child together), and whether someone “recognizes” something is not important at all. Would it specifically be permitted for us to establish an orphanage staffed only by two men because society recognizes them as an “orphanage” and not as a “parental couple”? There is barely even an obligation to acknowledge the existence of the World to Come or the coming of the Messiah, and not even really the “existence” of God. Even if there were, it seems the prohibition would be on society, not on the couple — for example, it would be forbidden to say to someone, “Your partner told me that…,” and instead one would have to say things like, “The one who is raising the child with you told me that…” — and obviously we have reached absurdity.
B. Religiously speaking, beyond the human content included in it, which I already discussed, marriage is what permits sexual relations (and the responsum Torah Temimah even said that Maimonides meant “when they do so regularly and constantly,” from which it is clear that he really linked the issue of marriage to sexuality). Since I am not arguing to permit one homosexual man to have intercourse with another homosexual man (neither from the front nor from the back), I am not arguing for marriage together.
After it seems to me that I have ruled out the arguments against a parental-romantic bond between men, I will now argue in favor of it.
Love between men, between women, between men and women, between everyone — is a positive thing. It says, “Love your fellow as yourself.” The verse is also interpreted as applying to love of “your wife,” and that one should not betroth her until he has seen her. David says to Jonathan, “Your love to me was more wonderful than the love of women.” More than that, the attempt to say that it is forbidden for a homosexual to love a man is almost to say that he is like a donkey and even less than one, and cannot love God, as Rabbi Elijah de Vidas says: “One who has not desired a woman is like a donkey and even less than one… for from what is sensed one must discern the divine service”. It is certainly speaking of romantic love.
An adoptive bond is a bond of kindness toward the adopted child. It is parallel to teaching him Torah, and this is “These are the offspring of Moses: Eleazar and Ithamar, sons of Aaron.”
And now regarding procreation—
Can solutions nevertheless be found? Maybe not the most ideal ones for children. But it seems to me that one who issues halakhic rulings for the public should allow the public a degree of freedom to decide about its own life, if these are in fact things that are permitted, and not decide for it. I could suggest the possibility of marriage/concubinage for the sake of childbirth. Or surrogacy (I do not know the subject in halakhah and ethics), or a combination of the two, such as taking sperm from a gay man and an egg from an egg donor into the womb of a lesbian woman (and the reverse, taking sperm donation for a lesbian, seems much easier to me… and many verses were written about “emission of seed for a need,” and Chokhmat Shlomo understood “for a need” as for the sake of a commandment or “good deeds,” which are the offspring of the righteous, and clearly this is a commandment of kindness).
Maybe that is not the most ideal for children, but I ask myself: suppose I know a woman and there is compatibility between us. But then I discover that she has a mental illness with the same diagnosis as mine. And there is a high risk that children will become ill. Is it necessarily proper that I break off the relationship with her? Is that a halakhic obligation? An ethical one? Is the same obligation present in every case such that there should be a general law about it in the state “for the sake of the children”?
It is said, “Do not judge your fellow until you have reached his place.” Every homosexual has personal considerations, including an ethical system, and he can decide for himself whether he is willing to raise a child in such-and-such a way, and it seems to me there is a limit to how much a halakhic decisor can impose one particular family structure.
Unless, of course, there is a clear Torah-based position on the matter.
I would be happy to hear your opinion.
With many thanks and wishes for a good week, and with great appreciation for your work,
Answer
A., hello.
You wrote at great length, and I do not have time to address the details. I will write briefly.
Living together is not a prohibition in the formal sense, but because of the concern that it will lead to an act of transgression. Here the concern is almost certain (it seems to me that usually this is even the plan from the outset). When the transgression is certain, a person may not put himself into a situation of prohibition. Therefore I find it difficult to see this as something permitted.
Regarding the prohibition of seclusion, again, if one sees it as a formal prohibition there is room to discuss it. But if this is a prohibition out of concern for transgression (which is the plain meaning), then here there is certainly such a concern. And they are definitely fully suspected regarding this (like another man’s wife). The words of the Sages are not relevant to the situation we are discussing.
If you are looking for a permission for living together solely for the sake of parenthood, one could think of a gay man and a lesbian woman who would live together to raise children. Raising children without an intimate relationship seems to me a far-fetched excuse. In my estimation, no one really intends to do that, and if someone does, then better as I suggested above (that really is only for raising children). Here there is no problem at all. And what they do at other times is, of course, their own business.
The question of permitting emission of seed in place of forbidden intercourse relates to the words of Rabbi Ilai concerning one whose inclination overpowers him. In practice, we do not rule like Rabbi Ilai, and we do not instruct halakhically how to violate a lighter prohibition in order to avoid a more severe one (see Rif and Rosh in Moed Katan 16). If they decide to do so — that is their business (and I understand them). But there is certainly no room to issue them a halakhic permission to do so.
With all the sorrow, I do not see room to permit this halakhically. But at the same time, I definitely think that socially one should accept someone who does this. He is certainly no worse than one who desecrates the Sabbath.
Discussion on Answer
The argument of “there is no other way” seems problematic to me. That discussion is about a standard case of something unintended, and then there are categories of possible/impossible together with intended/unintended. But here it is very close to being intended. To put oneself into a state of constant stimulation over the course of years is not reasonably classified as unintended. And the prohibition of seclusion itself proves that we do not permit seclusion on the basis of “there is no other way.”
Moreover, I have not heard that one is permitted to have relations with an unmarried woman in order to fulfill procreation, even though here too, if he did not find a match, then there is “no other way.” And even if he could find a match — it is enough that marriage is difficult for him for it to count as “there is no other way.”
Regarding the prohibition of seclusion being forbidden even though he does not intend anything — in my opinion that is a strong argument the Rabbi brings, and I need to look into it.
Does the Rabbi know of the distinction of “intended / unintended” somewhere in halakhah where it belongs to this issue? I would be glad to look into it.
As for an unmarried woman — there he is not merely “risking erotic thoughts,” but actually reaching orgasm, which is itself erotic thought, and therefore it is not similar. “There shall not be adultery among you, whether by hand or by foot” — meaning that orgasm with emission of seed is considered erotic thought even without visual stimulus, simply by the “heating up” itself.
Hello.
See the discussion in Pesachim 25b–26a. The classic case of “impossible” (= there is no other way) and “not intended” is a person who has two routes before him to reach his destination, and on one of them there is a shop with the smell of idolatrous incense. If the route with the shop is shorter, this is considered “impossible” (= there is no other way). But in such a case it is clear that he is not going in order to smell it, but in order to reach his destination. The forbidden smell is an external constraint, independent of his original purpose, imposed on him. Moreover, even when he smells it, that is not an act he chooses; by merely being in that place he smells it (even though he could stop up his nose, he is not obligated to do so, as the halakhic authorities wrote). By contrast, in our case we are not talking about some unrelated prohibition. This itself is the problem: it is forbidden to live together lest they come to forbidden intercourse. Beyond that, in our case, if he fails, that failure is by his choice (his struggle with inclination), not something imposed on him merely by being there as in the case of the smell (and in this there is, of course, a similarity to seclusion).
For example, in Ran’s novellae on Pesachim there he wrote:
“Benefit that comes to a person against his will, such as the smell of idolatry, and ‘against his will’ means to say that he did not come here for it, but the benefit of the smell comes automatically — and in such a case, even though he intends it, it is still called against his will, for in our sugya we consider and exempt in a case where it is possible and he intends it.”
I was just reminded of what Rashba wrote on Shevuot 18 (actually this is explicit in the Talmud there), that if a man had relations with his wife close to her expected menstrual period and she saw blood, he is not considered under compulsion but rather unwitting (and is liable for a sin-offering). Even though the prohibition of intercourse close to the expected period is rabbinic. The reason is that the whole point of the rabbinic prohibition is lest she see blood and they come to the severe prohibition of menstruation. If that is exactly what happened, then that is exactly what he was supposed to be concerned about, not something incidental.
Similarly, in the law of “it began negligently and ended under compulsion.” A person hid entrusted money that was in his possession in a forest. This is considered good guarding against thieves and negligence against fire. If in the end a fire came, he is negligent and liable (because the concern from the outset was fire, and in that very matter he was negligent). But if in the end thieves came, that is a case of beginning with negligence and ending under compulsion, because what happened in the end was not what he was initially supposed to worry about. Again we see that there is a difference between eventually reaching an incidental prohibition (where perhaps it is treated as compulsion) and reaching the very prohibition that one was supposed to worry about from the outset (which is not considered compulsion).
(Of course it is forbidden to intend and enter such a relationship, as I propose, with intention. The question is whether one needs “purity of intention” such that in general he accepts upon himself to force himself, but knows that he most likely will not withstand his inclination.)
(And regarding having relations with an unmarried woman for the sake of procreation, the erotic thought is part of the path and not alongside the path like the women washing clothes beside the road.)
According to your own approach, where we are talking about creating an attached bond for raising the child, here too the erotic thought is part of the path.
I accept many of your arguments, and I think I cannot deny your conclusion because of the simple argument from the prohibition of seclusion as an example that even when we are dealing with work-related matters, seclusion is still forbidden.
At the same time, I am not sure that romantic feeling necessarily requires erotic thought as “part of the path.” Today there are many people who are erotically asexual and nevertheless report romantic feelings. Maybe they do still experience a small amount of eroticism, but that is not really clear to me.
As for the question whether acting out of inclination is in every case considered intended, as opposed to smell which is imposed on the person, it says: “What shall the son do and not sin?”
And in Tzidkat HaTzaddik §43: “Sometimes a person stands in such a great trial that it is impossible for him not to sin, as they said (Berakhot 32a), ‘What shall the son do…’ and in this he is considered completely under compulsion, and the Merciful One exempts him. And even in the incitement of the inclination with great force such that it is impossible to overcome it, the category of compulsion applies [and if God turned his heart, then this sin is not really a sin at all, but rather the will of God was thus]. And see what I wrote in Ketubot 51b regarding one whose beginning was under compulsion: even if she cries out at the end, if were he to leave her she would hire him, she is still permitted to her husband — why? Because ‘the inclination clothed her,’ so we see that this is considered complete compulsion even though it is with her consent; nevertheless such a great inclination cannot be subdued by a person and it is complete compulsion, and there is no punishment in this even though he did a prohibited act, since he was under compulsion. But a person himself cannot testify about himself in this matter, because perhaps he still had the power to subdue the inclination [as I heard in this regard concerning Zimri, who erred in this].”
I am still thinking about the matter and would be glad to hear your opinion.
The question whether this is the will of God or not is not important for our purposes. The question is whether there is an exemption of compulsion here. There is no novelty in saying that if his inclination compelled him, that is compulsion (an impulse that cannot be overcome). But our discussion is about putting oneself into a situation that arouses such an inclination, and there it is not compulsion.
Okay. It seems to me that I agree with you.
Out of interest arising from questions within my religious-philosophical worldview, I will ask—
Do you think that a future Sanhedrin could change things and permit partnership for gay men living together, or even male homosexual intercourse for gay men for whom this is their natural inclination?
Or—to what extent, in your opinion, could a Sanhedrin be lenient toward gay men here?
That is not a well-defined question. A Sanhedrin can do almost anything, so long as that is what it thinks (see Maimonides at the beginning of ch. 2 of Laws of Rebels). So there is almost no limitation on what it can do, except for ruling against things that are explicit in the Torah (which even the Sadducees admit). Any interpretation of what is written, however innovative, falls within the authority of the Sanhedrin.
The question one can ask, and probably the one you meant, is: is there such a permission based on reasoning? If so, it may be that today we lack authority to change the interpretation, and only a future Sanhedrin that becomes convinced this is correct could do so. Therefore the main question is not one of the authority of the Sanhedrin, but whether there is room for such reasoning in itself.
On this question, it seems to me that I already wrote here once that there is room for the reasoning that the prohibition from the outset was imposed only on those who desire male homosexual intercourse because of evil inclination, not on those who have such an orientation. Admittedly this is an innovative argument, and I do not know how far one can go with it. If a future Sanhedrin became convinced that it is correct, then of course it would have authority to interpret the Torah according to its understanding, as above.
It is interesting to note that specifically according to Rabbi Moshe Feinstein, who has a very stringent attitude toward the issue, there is room to be lenient. He argues that it is impossible that any person has such an orientation, because then the Torah would not have forbidden it. Therefore it is clear to him that for everyone this is inclination, not orientation. But in light of his words, an opposite conclusion emerges if one does not accept his factual assumption. That is, if one becomes convinced on the factual level that this is indeed an orientation (against what he says), and at the same time accepts his meta-halakhic conception that the Torah cannot forbid an orientation, the conclusion is that the matter was not forbidden for those who have such an orientation (as I suggested above).
For myself, it is fairly clear to me on the factual level that at least in some cases this is orientation and not mere inclination, unlike his view. On the other hand, I also do not accept his meta-halakhic conception that the Torah does not prohibit things against one’s inclinations. Kleptomania is also an inclination, and yet it still seems that the Torah forbids theft even for a kleptomaniac. Therefore relying on Rabbi Moshe Feinstein’s words is, for me, only dialectical play.
As for the matter itself, even without his words there is room for such an interpretation, but it is very innovative and I do not know how to validate it.
And another question — can you justify morally-philosophically (without connection to tradition) a blanket rejection of a romantic relationship that is not for procreation, because romantic love is not the primary goal of man in the world, but rather the primary goal is to engage in intellectual truths and “know and understand Me”; and on the contrary, romantic love can interfere, since it draws a person out of equanimity and can even cause great suffering. (I am really reflecting on this and would be glad to hear your opinion.)
I did not fully understand the question. A romantic relationship is a human need, and it is not intended only for bringing children into the world. The fact that there is no commandment in it does not make it forbidden. Food and sleep, or vacation and rest, can also interfere with engagement in intellectual truths. We have not heard that a person must avoid his basic needs in order to engage in intellectual truths. If his heart moves him — perhaps there is room for that. But there is no obligation or prohibition here.
Thank you for the enlightening answers.
I am trying to seek moral reasons for the commandments.
My view is that even though vacation and rest and sleep are permitted, they are for the sake of the Torah ideal, and there is also the “degenerate within the bounds of the Torah.” The Torah cannot cover all cases, so it gives specific commandments; one can always find holes in the law.
And it is clear to me that there are many very positive things in sexuality and romance, and also many very negative things.
I see that a couple who can have children are permitted to have a sexual and romantic relationship.
Whereas two people who cannot have children are forbidden to have a sexual relationship, and probably can hardly even have a romantic relationship.
Maybe the reason is that a sexual-romantic relationship is intended only for establishing a home for the sake of procreation. And this is so that there will be more people who engage in intellectual truths.
But a sexual-romantic relationship without childbirth only distracts from intellectual truths, and therefore it is forbidden.
My assumption here is that engagement in intellectual truths is the greatest pleasure, even more than a couple relationship, at least for one who is accustomed to it and knows how to quiet his soul.
First, even if engagement in intellectual truths is the greatest pleasure, is there an obligation to take pleasure? A person wants to suffer within the framework of a romantic relationship at the expense of the pleasure of engaging in intellectual truths. Is that forbidden? You can say that engaging in intellectual truths is the greatest value, but the fact that it is the greatest pleasure does not sound relevant to me.
Beyond that, even if it is the greatest value, there is still room to address needs or smaller values. That is completely legitimate. In allocating a state budget, for example, one does not put everything into security and health even though those are most important (because that is life itself). One also invests in culture and sports and other things. Human and social life are complex, and it is a mistake to invest only in the greatest value. There are many value-fronts, and it is permitted and perhaps proper to invest in all of them. In addition, there are fronts of needs, and one may also engage in them.
It is permitted to be in a romantic relationship even not for the sake of having children. But usually, when there is a couple relationship for the purpose of children, it also answers the romantic need, and of course it is forbidden to interfere with it by an additional or different romantic relationship. But someone who has no possibility of having children and has no other couple relationship is under no prohibition to create a romantic relationship not for the sake of children.
Regarding the comparison between male homosexual intercourse and kleptomania, you wrote: “Kleptomania is also an inclination, and yet it still seems that the Torah forbids theft even for a kleptomaniac.” The big difference is that male homosexual intercourse is a crime with no victim. It reminds me of David’s question to the Sanhedrin regarding theft for the sake of saving lives — whether it would be permitted. In the transgression of theft there are two layers: an offense toward Heaven, and an offense toward the person robbed. The offense toward Heaven is overridden by saving life like all prohibitions, but the offense toward the robbed person is not overridden even where saving life is involved. In the same way, even though a kleptomaniac has an inclination to steal, that may help him only on the layer of the offense toward Heaven, but not on the layer of the offense toward the victim. But regarding male homosexual intercourse, it may still be possible to say that since we are dealing here only with an offense toward Heaven, an inborn orientation might be a sufficient condition to exclude the person from the original prohibition.
The comparison is not in every respect. The claim is that the fact that there is an inclination toward something does not mean there is no transgression here. Indeed, the Torah also treats acts that do not harm another person as transgressions, and still the comparison stands.
Dear Rabbi Dr. Michael Abraham, hello,
I wanted to know the Rabbi’s opinion: if a method were found by which homosexuals could satisfy themselves sexually together, completely, without any male homosexual intercourse at all, but only through the prohibition of erotic thought or wasting seed — would it still be forbidden because of seclusion?
I know a method through which, naturally, from my youth, I masturbated, and that is how I became aware of it. I do not know whether anyone else in the world has experienced it. In it the organ does not become erect, because the blood does not enter to stiffen the organ, and the seed does not enter the organ but rather goes backward into the urine, and comes out afterward once it has been nullified in the urine. I called the method “the displacement method,” because the seed is displaced from its place but does not come out as seed. See below sources from Tzitz Eliezer and Tzofnat Pa’aneach for the relevance of this.
When I asked regarding masturbation (a person with himself), Rabbi Cherlow forbade it because of the prohibition of erotic thoughts, and Rabbi Yaakov Ariel said, “I reject it outright because of the prohibition of erotic thoughts,” when I asked him in a situation without time to linger on the matter. There was one rabbi who did not want to permit it because he was afraid of reactions (he told me that explicitly), there was a rabbi who deals with homosexuals (and when I contacted him I did speak about the connection to homosexuals) who told me that if I feel whole with it, then to go with it. Rabbi Aharon Lichtenstein, when I sent him the material through the yeshiva office — and I do not know how he received it — told me by phone that “he does not have time to deal with it.”
The method is that when the organ is limp, one lies on a carpet on the lower abdomen, with the limp organ pointing toward the feet, and places some raised towel that will press on the place where the organ joins the body and penetrate a bit inward toward the pubic bone, and then one moves so as to massage the place. The seed is displaced but blocked at the point of massage, and therefore does not come out.
A psychologist (Prof. Shmuel Shulman from Bar-Ilan) said that the orgasm is the same orgasm as in masturbation.
Two urologists and a family doctor whom I asked confirmed that there is no medical problem in this at all.
The question is whether, instead of a carpet and a raised towel, the Tzomet Institute could produce some sort of raised device on the pubic bone, so that homosexual men could rub against it facing one another from the front, and each would be rubbing against the other’s pubic bone with the help of this raised piece that works in both directions — or perhaps a towel is enough for that, I do not know. I am not homosexual, and I have not slept with a woman either.
Here is a diagram (I edited material from Wikipedia) of the method alone, and a diagram of the thought of how to perform it among homosexuals.
See image:
https://drive.google.com/open?id=0BwJAdMjYRm7IUG0wTzkycEUtbjQ
My thinking is that if this involves only the prohibition of erotic thought or “adultery by hand and foot,” without emission of seed, or at least without male homosexual intercourse, then there is no reason at all to forbid seclusion. After all, there is no seclusion prohibition with the internet, which leads to wasting seed. That is, if they could train themselves in this method until there would be no significant concern of male homosexual intercourse. And again we would return to the initial assumption that Jews were not suspected of male homosexual intercourse. (And if we try to force the claim that even if there is a small concern they are forbidden, then a man lives with his menstruating wife because he is accustomed to her and can wait two weeks.)
I am attaching a Word file with the rulings of Tzofnat Pa’aneach part 1 §89 and part 3 §164, and of Tzitz Eliezer part 14 §95, which are relevant to the argument for permission in this matter (which in my opinion is forbidden because of erotic thoughts or “adultery by hand and foot,” but permitted in terms of the actual removal of the seed from the organ itself). In any event, to my mind what matters more is whether homosexuals can reach calm, reasonable, and pleasurable release by this method, so that we would not suspect them of male homosexual intercourse (for why would they choose male homosexual intercourse if they have an act that is only wasting seed and is equally pleasurable?) — and then perhaps we could permit seclusion.
With thanks and blessings,
Hello A.
It is a bit embarrassing for me to deal with things at this level of detail, but it is Torah and we must learn it (by the way, it seems to me that the question itself could have been presented even without the personal confession. There is something jarring here, especially when it is written under your name).
On the matter itself, such an act must be forbidden because of erotic thoughts. Admittedly, you avoid emission of seed, but I doubt whether that itself is the essence of the prohibition or merely an expression of the level of forbidden erotic thought. Those who prohibit “adultery by hand” as an accessory of murder obviously see it as an act prohibited in itself, but that is a puzzling view (according to that, having relations with one’s wife on a day when it is clear there is no ovulation would also be an accessory of murder).
As for seclusion, it seems to me that it should still be forbidden. Even if there is a way to reach satisfaction in such a fashion, and even if we were to assume that this way is actually permitted (see above that it is not), seclusion could still lead to a forbidden act. People generally do not suffice with such acts and prefer an actual act of sexual intercourse. If so, it seems likely to me that among homosexuals this is also the case (unless there is something about the reality there that is different and unfamiliar to me).
I do not know. Maybe it would satisfy homosexuals more than male homosexual intercourse.
A man and woman also have to darken the room and do not kiss everywhere, so should we forbid intercourse because there is an inclination to have relations in all kinds of ways?
Why does the Rabbi call male homosexual intercourse “actual sexual intercourse” more than this?
Sorry again for the confession… I have no other way. And as the Rabbi said, “It is Torah and we must learn it” — with all the effort not to sin, when I sinned in the “usual” way, when the organ becomes erect and by hand, the pleasure was less than with this method.
Don’t you think it would be best really to clarify and investigate the reality?
I did not understand the claim. What is there to investigate? Whether the pleasure in such a state is greater than the pleasure in a full act (with penetration, an act of intercourse with another person)? I have almost no doubt that it is not (beyond the physical pleasure there is also contact with another person, which is important in this context), but if you have information otherwise, I would be glad to hear it.
Following this question, is it correct to say that the prohibition of male homosexual intercourse is somewhat like the prohibition of going to secular courts nowadays? That is, both are formally forbidden from a halakhic standpoint, but on the other hand from a Torah perspective (that is, an extra-halakhic value) it is clear to us that the matter ought to be permitted.
I do not see the similarity. Regarding homosexuals, not much has changed in terms of the constraints. What I wrote is that perhaps there is room for an interpretation that permits the act (and I am very doubtful) in light of Rabbi Moshe Feinstein’s words that the prohibition was stated only about one who has an inclination. But that would be an actual permission, not a necessity to permit what is forbidden. And if there is no such permission — I see neither necessity nor possibility to permit it. In the context of secular courts there is a Torah value of proper life with an effective legal system (this is the commandment of laws, which applies also to Noahides), and that value, which today cannot be realized through Torah law, compels permitting what is forbidden. But with male homosexual intercourse there is no such value, only difficulty — and that difficulty always existed.
Just as there is a value of proper life from a legal standpoint, why should we not say there is a value of proper couple life and proper sexual life? Or even proper family life.
By the way, I recently came across an article on the subject that mentioned a permission similar to the one you brought up:
On the attitude toward members of the LGBT community within religious society, Rabbi Riskin said that “we cannot permit what the Torah forbids.” At the same time, he surprised people when he said that “on the other hand, ‘the Merciful One exempts the compelled’ — the Torah exempted the one under compulsion from the liabilities arising from what he did.” According to him, the word abomination in the Torah was explained by the Talmud as “you err concerning it,” and it does not refer to the LGBT community as a whole. “The one who could have been heterosexual and chose to be homosexual — about him it is said: ‘you err concerning it.’ ‘The Merciful One exempts the compelled’ applies only to someone who cannot receive any satisfaction in another way.”
The value of proper life cannot justify violating a Torah prohibition, for it always existed, so why did the Torah forbid it? (This is an essential clash and not an accidental one, according to my definitions.) True, if the prohibition exists only when they do not have such an orientation — then fine, but then one does not need permissions. It is simply not forbidden.
An exemption of compulsion is, of course, only a side exemption and not an essential permission. But indeed, the permission he suggests is very similar to what I suggested. Even the interpretation of “abomination” from the Talmud in Nedarim is written here on the site against the commentators who say it refers to moral abomination. He innovates that from this derivation there also emerges support for the very logic of the permission: only one who errs violates the prohibition. That is interesting, and I had not thought of it.
I just thought that perhaps the prohibition of male homosexual intercourse is based on a factual mistake of the Sages, that males are always attracted to females (all in all, a common mistake in the ancient world). But it may very well be that if the Sages had known that there can be a case in which a male is attracted only to males (similarly to a female), they would not have forbidden it. And just as the prohibition of fish with meat, which is based on a factual error, can be treated leniently nowadays, perhaps this prohibition can as well. Maybe one can add this doubt as an additional branch for leniency.
I think that specifically in the ancient world they were well acquainted with the phenomenon of homosexuality, and it was very common. The taboo against it was created under the influence of the Hebrew Bible (Tanakh) in later periods. Even today, in non-biblical cultures it is much more common.
Dear Rabbi Michael, hello,
I pray to God, and it is still difficult for me that the Torah is opposed to the nature of such a large group in the population, whose inclination harms no one (unlike sociopaths, for example) (I am not homosexual at all).
And in prayer I think about the verse “And with a male you shall not lie the lyings of a woman,”
and I say: Moses our teacher certainly felt the souls; he did not give a Torah that is opposed to deep-rooted natural inclinations. Not against the inner nature of the Jewish people. Otherwise they would not have accepted the Torah wholeheartedly.
I can deny the Torah, but I am still thinking.
And I wonder — why does it say “lyings” and not “lying”? And why does it appear at the end of the laws of forbidden sexual relations?
“Lyings”? But there is only one kind of lying.
There is a minority view about the hermaphrodite, but the Sages established that the prohibition of intercourse from behind with a male is learned from the word “woman.” And still, that makes the plural “lyings” unnecessary.
And also, I think intercourse from behind with a woman is permitted: “I arranged the table for him and he turned it over.”
And also, the question arises why apparently there are not two excisions for one who lies with his father, but only the excision of male intercourse.
And it seems to insignificant me, perhaps with fear and trembling, and after only light and insignificant study, that maybe everything can be explained by saying that “the lyings of a woman” is what turns all the forbidden relations in the section of Kedoshim into not only a prohibition of uncovering the nakedness of female relatives, but also of uncovering the nakedness of a male relative (except that a woman does not effect marriage upon a man, and therefore a man marries several women and a woman does not marry more than one man). And therefore it comes at the end of the forbidden relations, and the words “the lyings of a woman” refer to all the lyings of a woman that are forbidden, and therefore there is a special excision for male intercourse within the family, distinguished from male intercourse outside the family, where it is not forbidden at all. And this becomes even clearer from the Sages’ move to learn male from woman — that is, from the forbidden relations of a woman.
And perhaps the Mishnah and Talmud can be interpreted that way? Only the one who interpreted “the lyings of a woman” as normal and unnatural intercourse goes according to Rabbi Simai.
And it seems to me that Maimonides ruled according to the Sages — Laws of Forbidden Intercourse 1:15:
“[One who has intercourse with a male, or] one who has intercourse with a hermaphrodite through his male organ is liable; [if he has intercourse with him through his female organ he is exempt.] And a tumtum is doubtful; therefore one who has intercourse with a tumtum or with a hermaphrodite [through his female organ] is given lashes for rebellious conduct, and a hermaphrodite is permitted to marry a woman.”
With thanks and blessings,
Hello,
It seems to me I already wrote to you that Torah prohibitions do not necessarily depend on human nature. If there is a prohibition of homosexuality even though it does not harm anyone, then it is a religious prohibition (even if not a moral one). And therefore it is no difficulty why it would be forbidden for one who has such an orientation, any more than the prohibition of theft for a kleptomaniac. The question is whether you accept the existence of non-moral prohibitions in Jewish law or not (see my column 15).
Such a difficulty may perhaps justify choosing among interpretive options and rejecting others, but it is not a difficulty in itself.
Your interpretation of “the lyings of a woman” is possible, but the Sages and all the halakhic authorities did not understand it that way.
Your proof from Maimonides is not clear to me. One who has intercourse with a hermaphrodite through the female organ is exempt because the hermaphrodite is also a woman (has a female side), and in such intercourse he is only having intercourse with the female side, so there is no prohibition. He is also a man, and therefore he is permitted to marry a woman on account of his male side, and when he has intercourse with her through her female side, that is intercourse of a man with a woman.
In halakhah 14 there, Maimonides writes explicitly that there is a prohibition on anyone who has intercourse with a male (he does not even quote the continuation of the verse “the lyings of a woman”):
“One who has intercourse with a male, or brings a male upon himself — once there is penetration, if both are adults they are stoned, as it is said, ‘And with a male you shall not lie,’ whether he was the active partner or the passive one. And if he was a minor of nine years and one day or more, the one who had intercourse with him or brought him upon himself is stoned, and the minor is exempt. And if the male was nine years old or less, both are exempt, and it is fitting for the court to flog the adult with lashes for rebellious conduct because he lay with a male, even though he was less than nine years old.”
It seems to me I already wrote to you that if there is an interpretive option that could permit such an act, the way to say it is that the Torah prohibited it only for one who does so because of evil inclination and not because of his natural orientation (and one can base this, ironically, on the words of Rabbi Moshe Feinstein, who wrote that it cannot be natural because the Torah would not have forbidden it — like your own reasoning, which I do not accept).
By the way, intercourse not in the usual manner is permitted only with one’s wife. With forbidden relations and other prohibited sexual relations, it is forbidden intercourse like any other.
I have not studied contemporary halakhic authorities on this issue, and I assume indeed that they do not rule as I propose.
From what the Rabbi shows, apparently my proof from Maimonides is also mistaken, and I will try to look into it more deeply.
In any case, I am talking about this sugya, in which it does seem that the Sages do go according to the interpretation of the verse that I am proposing (which is apparently really the plain meaning, because what does “lyings” in the plural mean?).
Yevamot 83b—
“Rabbi Shmuel bar Yehudah said that Rabbi Abba, brother of Rabbi Yehudah bar Zavdi, said that Rav Yehudah said that Rav said: With regard to a hermaphrodite, one is liable to stoning on his account from two places. An objection was raised: Rabbi Eliezer said: With regard to a hermaphrodite, one is liable to stoning on his account like with a male. In what case is this said? With regard to his male organ; but with regard to his female organ, one is exempt. He said in accordance with this tanna. For it was taught: Rabbi Simai says: With regard to a hermaphrodite, one is liable to stoning on his account from two places. What is Rabbi Simai’s reason? Rava said: Bar HaMeduri explained it to me: ‘And with a male you shall not lie the lyings of a woman’ — what male is there who has two lyings? You must say: this is a hermaphrodite. And the Rabbis? Even though he has two lyings, it is written ‘male.’ And the Rabbis, from where do they derive an ordinary male? From woman. In the case of a woman, from where do they derive unnatural intercourse? From ‘and a woman.’”
That is, Rabbi Simai interprets the plain meaning of “the lyings of a woman” as from behind and from the front, to include the hermaphrodite.
And the Sages — asks the Talmud — from where do they learn about a male at all??? From woman. And the Torah Or leaves us in Leviticus 18, meaning that they learn the male from the section of forbidden sexual relations, not from just any possible ways one could theoretically lie with a woman.
And “woman,” the woman in the section of forbidden relations from whom male is learned — from where do we derive that she too is forbidden unnaturally? Maybe one who has intercourse with his sister unnaturally is not liable to excision? This is the question to which the Talmud gives the law, and it also directs us to learn male specifically from woman in the section of forbidden relations, not just woman in general.
Rather, it says “and with a woman” (or “woman,” see the page) to include intercourse from behind in forbidden relations.
In any event, the Sages went according to the plain meaning that I am proposing, that male is learned only from forbidden relations. That is the only way little me can interpret the sugya here.
There are places where it seems the Talmud discusses it differently. But is this not an interesting question worth investigating, and perhaps we may find an opening to rule here according to some halakhic authority or authorities who understood it that way, or even directly according to the Talmud?
—
As for the comparison to kleptomania, I do not know the field at all. Perhaps one can overcome a tendency to kleptomania the way one overcomes drugs, and if a person wants to be whole with himself and not steal, and sees himself that way as a more whole creature. That is not the case with homosexuality.
There are mental illnesses such as schizophrenia. Such a person truly is not obligated in commandments at the time when he is genuinely insane (insane person, deaf-mute, minor). Maybe a kleptomaniac is also under compulsion when he cannot overcome his inclination at the moment of theft. A homosexual is not under compulsion to live with a partner. (Maybe only in specific moments, such as when secluded with him.) Does a kleptomaniac feel the need to steal all his life, or only at a specific moment in which he is under compulsion? A homosexual lives with a deep need for partnership, and one cannot apply to him the law of compulsion.
The sexual urge is rooted in the deepest powers of a person’s soul, and he must act with it in the world in order to fulfill commandments, and he is not under compulsion. A gay man can refrain from marrying a man. That is worse than compulsion. And it is natural.
Dear Rabbi Michael, hello,
Could the Rabbi nevertheless explain to me the sugya here in Yevamot 83? And why, in the Rabbi’s opinion, do the Sages hold that male homosexual intercourse is forbidden between people who are not in a forbidden-family relationship? That is, why does the innovation I am trying to suggest — that male homosexual intercourse is forbidden only between father and son, two brothers, etc. — not emerge from the sugya?
I went over the sugya again tonight, and maybe I saw a way to distinguish between the version in the Vilna edition of the Talmud and the emendations of the Bach. Earlier I had worked with the Responsa Project and did not see the emendations clearly, nor had I thought deeply enough.
According to the Vilna edition, the Sages learn the whole verse “And with a male you shall not lie the lyings of a woman” about the hermaphrodite, where the word “male” hints that only what is forbidden with a male side is forbidden with the hermaphrodite. But as for an ordinary male, from where do we know? From woman — that is, from the forbidden relations. It should be noted that learning the laws of male from the laws of woman is exactly the plain meaning of the verse, that the lyings of a woman are forbidden, and that is what the Talmud says: “from woman.” But the Talmud is precise in order to see what is forbidden with a woman, in order to transfer to the male exactly what is forbidden with the woman, and asks: “In the case of a woman, from where do they derive unnatural intercourse?” And then it says: from “and a woman” (that is, from the vav), so that the prohibition of intercourse from behind is threaded from the forbidden relations of women into the prohibition of the hermaphrodite through the derivation about male intercourse. But this is the prohibition of ordinary male intercourse — the derivation from woman. And in any case, we remain with the most limited scope of deriving from woman. There is no independent derivation about male. There is no law that we learned about male other than from woman, if even to learn intercourse not in the usual manner we learn from woman. after all this is the most minimal derivation in the laws of the prohibition on which all the laws are built.
By contrast, the Bach’s version is that according to the Sages the derivation is different, and it seems more forced to me — either not like Rashi or I really did not understand.
The Bach changes the text and says that they learn male from the word “and,” and not from “woman.” That already seems forced, because the word “and” is merely ancillary to “male.” If “male” is referring to the derivation that the hermaphrodite is forbidden specifically on account of the male side, then would “and” teach about “male” without “male” first teaching that “and” is even speaking about the prohibition of ordinary male intercourse in itself? That creates a loop: and->male->and->male->and->male->….->hermaphrodite.
Afterward, according to the Bach, it is as if the Talmud adds a sentence unrelated to the sugya: “In the case of a woman, from where do we derive unnatural intercourse? From woman.” But why would the Talmud add such a sentence? Rashi himself says — “From where do they derive unnatural intercourse? — since they took this intercourse out of ‘lyings’ for the hermaphrodite” — so this is not some unrelated statement.
And furthermore, why should the laws of forbidden relations of a woman be learned from the word “woman” in the verse of male homosexual intercourse??
In any case, according to the Bach’s version, the laws of male homosexual intercourse may already, even according to the Sages, be contained in the prohibition itself, and are not necessarily learned from the laws of forbidden relations of “the lyings of a woman,” that is, not necessarily exactly exactly what is forbidden regarding women. And perhaps the main halakhic authorities knew his version and not that of the main Vilna edition.
It should be stressed that what the Sages say in the Mishnah, “A hermaphrodite marries but is not married,” according to the understanding I propose, simply means that he is considered male for the purposes of marriage law, but that does not mean he counts as forbidden relations. After all, a woman and a woman also cannot marry, but that does not mean they are forbidden relations. And one should not object that Rabbi Eliezer continues the Mishnah and speaks of actual forbidden relations as though disagreeing with the Sages who also were speaking of forbidden relations. For the Mishnah gathers different laws together (saris, tumtum…), and the Mishnah is not necessarily presenting disputes; rather, only by implication from their opinions does a collision arise in the Talmud itself, and the Talmud also divides the Mishnah between the Sages and Rabbi Eliezer.
May you have a peaceful and blessed Sabbath!! 🙂
Unfortunately, in the coming days I will not have time for this.
Have a good week and thank you for the answer.
Would it be more convenient if I came to the Rabbi and he explained it to me orally?
I do not think so. If you want, send it to me again in about a week.
Dear Rabbi, hello.
I thought perhaps the Rabbi would be busy before Rosh Hashanah, so I am sending it again now. Please, if the Rabbi can answer whether it follows from the sugya according to the Vilna edition that the Sages in this sugya held that “the lyings of a woman” are all the lyings specified among categories of forbidden family relationships that apply to male relatives — for with a male there is only one kind of lying, and that is apparently the plain meaning — as I detailed in the email above.
With very, very many thanks in advance,
Hello.
1. First, the Bach’s version, that they derive it from “and,” does not necessarily contradict the version before us. He only explains why a male is compared to a woman: because the Torah itself writes, “And with a male you shall not lie the lyings of a woman,” meaning that it included the male, that one may not lie with him as with a woman. Even according to the Bach, it is still learned from woman; only the word “and” instructs us to do so.
2. The word “lyings” is learned in the Talmud according to all opinions (!) as referring to the hermaphrodite, who has two lyings, and not as you suggest. Even the Rabbis (= Rabbi Eliezer) learn it this way, except that in their view it says “male,” and therefore even in one who has two lyings, there is a prohibition to lie only with his male side. That is, even according to them, the word “lyings” is interpreted as Rabbi Simai interprets it, referring to a hermaphrodite who has two lyings. The dispute is only over what is forbidden with such a person (both places, or only the male side).
This is also proven explicitly in the Talmud, for it asks Rabbi Eliezer from where we learn unnatural intercourse with a woman. Why not learn it from “lyings”? Because even according to him “lyings” deals with the hermaphrodite who has two lyings, and not with woman and not with male. That is, even according to Rabbi Eliezer we do not interpret the word “lyings” as referring to the male, as you suggest, that he has several lyings depending on degrees of kinship.
3. On the substance of the matter, only the form of intercourse is learned from woman (that it applies in two manners), but not the persons involved (that it applies only to a male who is a sexual prohibition). Otherwise, you would also innovate a prohibition of adultery for a male who is married in a homosexual marriage to another, for according to your approach this too should be learned from the forbidden relation of a married woman! This is implausible, and in any event it is clear you will not find halakhic authorities who support it (so it is a waste to look). The straightforward reading, as understood by the Talmud and all the halakhic authorities, is that the prohibition applies to any male, and the comparison to woman is that intercourse with a male is like all the forbidden women, and therefore the form of intercourse is the same as with them. And this is the rule everywhere: “Derive from it and from itself, but keep it in its own place” (even when something is learned from context A to context B, it is still applied according to the circumstances relevant in context B, and not copied-and-pasted wholesale from A to B).
Be that as it may, beyond the interpretive question in the Torah and Talmud, on the practical level this discussion has no value. You will not find any halakhic authority who supported or would support this, and therefore this is not where salvation will come from.
Dear Rabbi, hello, and thank you very much for the response.
I just want to go back and ask again about what I presented as the main point of the whole argument, and what I placed at the beginning of the question, namely the concern lest they sin—
“The argument is based mainly on the passage about ‘when there is no other way,’ from which it seems that a person is permitted to walk on a road where women are washing clothes, but he must force himself not to look.
‘And shuts his eyes from looking upon evil’ — Rabbi Hiyya bar Abba said: this refers to one who does not look at women when they are standing over the wash. What are the circumstances? If there is another road, he is wicked; if there is no other road, he is under compulsion. Actually, it is a case where there is no other road, and nevertheless he is required to force himself. (Bava Batra 57b)
In other words: if there is a shared purpose, one may take the risk of erotic stimulus. And if there is a shared purpose of parenthood, that indeed is a shared purpose.”
That is, it is permitted to live together; they simply need to “force themselves” not to entertain erotic thoughts and not to sin.
I would add that if the goal is to maintain a romantic relationship, that too is a goal in itself, and it does not exist in the gay-man/lesbian-woman pair that the Rabbi suggested. Romantic feeling can also support their ability to function as a couple and remain a couple over the long term, and deepen the emotional bond.
Therefore, for the purpose of asking whether there is “another way,” it seems there is no other way to achieve these essential goals, and according to this source it is permitted to risk erotic stimulus. (Erotic stimulus which, even in the Talmudic source itself, can lead to any sin whatsoever. They simply need to force themselves as much as possible not to sin, and whatever they sin under compulsion is not our issue here.)
I would be happy for the Rabbi’s response,
with many thanks!